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Ice melt opens up increased Arctic maritime and military activity

[Content preview – Subscribe to Jane’s Intelligence Review for full article]

The prospect of global warming leading to ice-free navigation in the Arctic Ocean raises

commercial opportunities as well as the risks of military conflict. Dr Jeffrey Mazo and Dr

Lee Willett examine the long-term indicators of inter-state competition as Russia expands

its military footprint in the region

The Arctic has been gradually warming since the middle of the 19th century, and since 1950 this

trend has accelerated. It has heated up twice as rapidly as the rest of the planet, and average

temperatures are now higher than at any time in at least the last 2,000 years - and probably much

longer - according to a 2012 report by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP),

a working group of intergovernmental organisation the Arctic Council. The most visible and

immediate consequence of this warming is a decline in sea ice, especially in the summer, raising

hopes for increasingly easy access to resources and shipping routes in the region, but also raising

geopolitical concerns.

Oscar II-class nuclear submarine Orel with an icebreaker heading out of Severodvinsk on 6 April 2017 towards the White Sea, following several years of repairs at the Zvezdochka plant. (Oleg Kuleshov)

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The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the five nations with Arctic Ocean coastlines -

Canada, Denmark (through Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory), Norway, Russia, and the

United States - and the other Arctic states of Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. The council was

formed as a high-level intergovernmental forum to promote co-operation, co-ordination, and

interaction on Arctic issues. Its remit is strictly scientific, environmental, social, and economic;

military and security matters are explicitly excluded.

As well as the eight members of the Arctic Council, 13 non-Arctic states have been granted

observer status, including major powers such as China, India, and Japan. The council is the

principal international forum for non-security Arctic issues, but has no decision-making,

implementation, or enforcement powers. Lower-level forums for military co-operation exist but

have stalled since Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in 2014.

Maritime territorial claims are defined and governed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the US has not signed but treats as customary international law.

The only unresolved maritime sovereignty dispute in the Arctic involves the US-Canadian

boundary in the Beaufort Sea, and there is also considerable dispute over whether certain parts of

the Canadian archipelago constitute national waters or international straits under UNCLOS.

[Continued in full version…]

Arctic security. (Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN and the GIS User Community/IHS Markit/Mauricio Beltran)

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Vanishing ice

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported in 2013 that the area of the

Arctic Ocean with year-round ice cover fell by 11.5% per decade between 1979 and 2012.

According to the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration, this rate is accelerating, and






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is now 13.3%. The maximum ice extent in winter has decreased more slowly - between 3.5% and

4.1% per decade - but April 2017 was a seasonal record low. Moreover, the 2016 summer

minimum ice extent was the second-lowest on record. The melt season has also been

lengthening: the duration of ice-free conditions in the region between the East Siberian Sea and

the western Beaufort Sea, for example, increased by nearly three months between 1979 and

2012.

Decline in Arctic sea ice volume, 1979-2017. (IHS Markit)

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The total amount of sea ice is more important than the extent of ice cover for assessing rates of

decline and conditions for Arctic maritime operations. If sea-ice area remains constant or grows,

but the ice becomes thinner on average, the total volume of ice will decline. First-year ice, or ice

that has formed over the winter in ice-free water, is thinner than multi-year ice, making it more

likely to melt in subsequent summers and easier for icebreakers or ice-hardened ships to navigate.

Multi-year ice has been declining by 13.5% per decade, faster than total ice extent, according to

the IPCC. Total average ice volume has been decreasing by a substantial 19% per decade, or by

more than 70% between 1979 and 2016. Indeed, for every month to date in 2017, Arctic sea-ice

volume has dropped below the previous 2012 record minimum. Winter ice conditions are now

similar to those found at the height of summer less than four decades ago.

Various methods of projecting ice conditions analysed by the IPCC provide dates between 2020

and after 2100 for the first year of near-disappearance of Arctic sea ice for at least part of the

summer. For the more pessimistic and higher greenhouse-gas emissions scenarios, the upper

bound of the range is 2060.







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Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing Russian Northern Fleet assets berthed at Severomorsk Naval Base, including a guided missile cruiser (CGN), guided missile destroyers (DDGs), and an attack submarine (SSN), on 10 July 2017. (CNES 2017, Distribution Airbus DS/IHS Markit)

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High stakes

There are three potential shipping routes connecting the Bering Strait and the North Atlantic

through the Arctic: the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian archipelago; the

Northeast Passage (NEP) along the Russian coast, which includes the Northern Sea Route

(NSR), an administrative entity comprising seaways under Russian jurisdiction between Novaya

Zemlya archipelago and the Bering Strait, but excluding the Barents, Pechora, and White seas;

and a direct Transpolar Passage (TPP). None of these routes comprises discrete sea lanes, but

rather broad and, in places, overlapping corridors consisting of multiple alternative channels

whose navigability depends on varying ice conditions.

At present, the TPP is only navigable during the year by heavy icebreakers or submarines, and the

other routes are only open inconsistently during the summer. Scott Stephenson and Professor

Laurence Smith of the University of California, Los Angeles, reported in March 2013 that the

probability of a technically feasible transit of the NSR by non-ice-strengthened vessels in any given

year rose from 40% in 1979-2005 to 61% in 2006-15, and will reach 98% by 2040-59 under high-

emissions scenarios.

The probability of such a transit of the NWP will increase from less than 15% currently to 50% by

2050. Choosing whether to ship through the passage in summer, according to Smith, "will become






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a coin toss", but "this will never be a year-round operation". Along the TPP, the ice will be

sufficiently thin in summer for "moderately capable icebreakers [Polar Class 6] to go where they

please", said Smith.

These routes potentially all offer significant savings in time, distance, and cost for shipping

operating between Asian and European or North American ports. Various economic studies - none

of which is judged by Jane's to be entirely comprehensive or authoritative - collectively suggest

that fuel prices, insurance, icebreaker fees, and construction costs for ice-capable ships are critical

variables in determining whether such savings can be achieved.

Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and attack submarines(SSNs) at Gadzhiyevo, north of Severomorsk, on 10 July 2017. (CNES 2017, Distribution Airbus DS/IHS Markit)

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Arctic warming and the decline of sea ice have been accompanied by an increase in shipping

along the NSR, but there is not a strict cause and effect between them. The NSR has been

strategically and economically important for Russia since the Second World War, and annual

traffic increased throughout the Cold War, peaking in 1987. By 1998, the tonnage using the route

had dropped to its lowest level since the mid-1960s. However, since 2010, activity on the route

has increased once more, with annual transits increasing from 5 in 2010 to 71 in 2013, before

dropping to 18 and 19 in 2015 and 2016 respectively.






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Political and economic considerations are still more important than ice conditions in driving

maritime activity on the NSR. This may change as ice cover dwindles and land-based

infrastructure is improved. Currently, vessels capable of transiting the shallow straits constraining

the most reliable NSR channel are limited to approximately half the capacity of those using the

Panama or Suez canals.

The opening of the TPP or of reliable deep-water NSR paths north of the New Siberian Islands

would significantly change economic calculations and political risks. Despite many unknowns, a

broad picture of future maritime activity in the warming Arctic can be formed, which by 2050 is

likely to be an order of magnitude greater than currently. Shipping between Arctic ports and bulk

shipping, especially of hydrocarbons, from the Russian Arctic to non-Arctic destinations are likely

to see the earliest and greatest increases; trans-Arctic shipping, especially involving container

vessels, is likely to grow much more slowly.

The opening up of Arctic sea routes would give Russia easier access to markets for its Siberian oil

and gas, but global warming would also provide access to new resources. In 2008, the United

States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the region north of the Arctic Circle contained

approximately 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas, with 84% of

resources likely to be found offshore under less than 500 metres of water and with 90-95% of this

expected to be within territorial waters or demarcated and undisputed EEZs. More than 80% of

current production and estimated undiscovered Arctic energy resources are Russian.


Military footprint: Russia

Given the strategic opportunities that the rate and range of Arctic ice melt may create,

considerable attention will fall on any perceived military build-up in the region, with Russia, which

considers the Arctic to be a primary national interest, at the centre of the debate. Moscow regards

the region as its 'back yard' and has a 'use or lose' concern over its territorial and resource

interests: it fears that it risks losing access to these territories and resources if it does not use

them.






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Typhoon-class nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoy leaving Severodvinsk on 19 May 2017. (Oleg Kuleshov)

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Consequently, Russia considers Arctic territories, resources, and sea lines of communication

(SLOCs) as fundamental to its national security, and a desire to secure them may explain Russia's

modernisation of military forces deployed in what it is likely to see as sovereign territory. During an

interview with Jane's at Haakonsvern naval base in Bergen, Norway, in March 2017, Royal

Norwegian Navy (RNoN) chief Rear Admiral Lars Saunes said, "Russia is not doing anything else

than taking care of its own national interests, and [is using its] military force in the Arctic to do that

- but [it is] the only Arctic nation that is militarising the Arctic so far."

In Arctic security, submarines are a key factor. In 2009, Moscow stated its intent to regenerate its

permanent nuclear-powered attack (SSN) and ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) presence in the

region. According to Jane's forecasting data, Russia may introduce more than 25 new submarines

by 2027, subject to budgets and shipyard capacity, spread across various fleets but including

procurement of eight Borey (Project 955/955M) SSBNs and the possible arrival of a first-in-class

next-generation SSBN.

Submarines are a visible element of Russian testing of new equipment in the Arctic that makes a

strategic point to international observers. In April 2016, the lead Project 885/885M Severodvinsk

(Yasen)-class SSN test-fired a Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) from the Barents Sea to

a target ashore in the Arkhangelsk region. Additionally in April, sea trials of the second-in-class

Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Essen took place in the Barents Sea.

Russia set out its Arctic strategy in 2013 with an implementation target date of 2020, highlighting

the need for its forces to maintain combat readiness to meet current and future threats, and in

particular to have the ability to conduct strategic deterrence and higher-end operations. An

October 2016 report from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets

forskningsinstitut: FOI) assessed that the tight timeframe was "best understood as a sign of

determination rather than a realistic assessment of the time needed to reach the goals", but that

the military component of Russia's Arctic strategy "seems to be developing reasonably well", with






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energy, security, and transport strategies backed up by the deployment of military forces and the

establishment of infrastructure.

Improving the capabilities of the Northern Fleet - Russia's main Arctic military asset - is central to

Moscow's strategy in the region. Several initiatives bear witness to the implementation of the

strategy, including, in 2013, Russia announcing the resumption of patrols in the central Arctic

Ocean, with 10 Northern Fleet vessels deploying to the Novosibirsk Islands, according to the FOI.

Northern Fleet assets have featured prominently in developing Russia's Arctic presence. When

Russia opened the Temp airbase on Kotelny Island in the Arctic Ocean in 2013, 10 warships and

support vessels - including the Project 1144.1/2 Kirov (Orlan)-class nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr

Velikiy and four icebreakers - participated in offloading heavy engineering and construction

materials.

Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate Admiral Gorshkov leaving Severodvinsk on 19 October 2015. (Oleg Kuleshov)

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In 2014, the Northern Fleet boosted its presence by establishing moorings at Novaya Zemlya and

a permanent base on the Novosibirsk Islands; in 2015, the first of two Project 03182 3,500-tonne,

ice-capable support ships designed to replenish warships operating in the Arctic was laid down; in

September 2016, a Northern Fleet flotilla including the Project 1155 Udaloy (Fregat)-class

destroyer Vitse Admiral Kulakov , an ice-capable support ship, minesweepers, tender vessels, and

nuclear-powered icebreakers transited the NSR to Kotelny Island, and on to Wrangel Island off

Chukotka Peninsula; and in April 2017, the first of two Project 23550 ice-class patrol ships was laid

down, an 8,500-tonne vessel with tug and ice-breaking capacity, and with a modular armament

suite, due for handover by the end of 2020.






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Russia uses such deployments to resupply different bases. Kulakov has featured in numerous

Russian deployments, including to Europe and the Indian Ocean, highlighting the relatively limited

number of Northern Fleet ships available to meet a large number of tasks.


Across its fleets, Russia is planning to introduce 77 surface platforms by 2026 (10 amphibious

ships, 17 frigates, 33 corvettes, and 17 mine warfare vessels), according to Jane's . The number

of platforms assigned to the Northern Fleet that will be ice-strengthened is not known; the FOI

report noted that many of the fleet's current platforms have not been designed to ice-class

standards.

Ashore, Russia's plans include basing light motor rifle brigades at Pechenga in the northwestern

Murmansk Oblast and at Yamalo-Nenets autonomous area in western Siberia, with hovercraft,

snow-mobiles, and all-terrain vehicles for mobility. Mobility is a key factor in concepts of operations

for ground forces, with their primary task being to secure coastal areas, including to facilitate NSR

shipping flow. Russia also plans to deploy airborne and naval components, including the 61st

Independent Naval Infantry Regiment, at Pechenga. However, the FOI believes that ground forces

are not central to Russia's Arctic plans due to the vast geographical distances; indeed, distance

may be as much a driver as climate in shaping Russia's Arctic military operations.

Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing Russia's Nagurskoye air base on Alexandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago on 6 April 2017. (CNES 2017, Distribution Airbus DS/IHS Markit)

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Russian aircraft are deployed at bases around Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Alakurtti in Murmansk

Oblast. According to various reports, several Russian air bases are being built or reconstituted

across the Arctic, including at Rogachevo on Novaya Zemlya, Temp on Novosibirsk Island, Anadyr

in Chukotka, and Arctic Trefoil on Franz Josef Land (to support 150 ground troops for 18 months),

as well as at Naryan-Mar, Norilsk, and Tiksi. Assets include Su-27 'Flanker' and MiG-31

'Foxhound' fighter aircraft, as well as Su-42 MR 'Fencer-E' and MiG-25 RB reconnaissance

aircraft, and transport and attack helicopters.

In addition, Russia is pursuing improved command-and-control (C2), surface-to-air missile (SAM),

radar, and air traffic control capabilities, and has optimised systems such as air-defence

equipment for Arctic deployment, for example by fitting them to all-terrain vehicles. Reports in early

2017 pointed to Russian plans to establish more air-defence divisions across the Eastern and

Western Arctic.

Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing Severomorsk-1 air base near Murmansk on 8 June 2017. The air base has been undergoing infrastructure improvements since 2012. (CNES 2017, Distribution Airbus DS/IHS Markit)

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Above and below the Arctic ice. (IHS Markit/H I Sutton)

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Military footprint: NATO

Russia's increasing Arctic activity appears to be prompting a short-term response from other

countries, particularly in generating a regional presence. Nevertheless, the US Navy's (USN's)

2014 Arctic roadmap assessed that the requirement for additional naval presence was low, with

current force levels meeting near-term needs, and that there was a need to boost key enablers

such as C2; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance; maritime domain awareness; remote






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surveillance; and climate forecasting. The strategy also stressed that the US would act if required,

including independently.

Coastguards remain the lead agency for many NATO countries operating in the Arctic. The US

Coast Guard mirrors the USN's emphasis on regional co-operation, and is focused on developing

capabilities in surveillance and communications to improve MDA, and a presence through

platforms capable of long-endurance deployments.

Within NATO, there is an increased focus on northern European waters, and a number of

platforms have potential Arctic relevance (see table). Such developments are also bound by

common interests: Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US all have North Atlantic interests, and

are introducing P-8A Poseidon multi-mission maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), new submarines, and

other maritime capabilities that can provide a subset of military output within NATO.

Given its location, Norway was arguably the first Western nation to face Russia's strategic and

military resurgence from 2008 onwards. Norway's 2016 maritime strategy and defence White

Paper stressed the geostrategic importance of the High North region, with Rear Adm Saunes

telling Jane's that both documents prescribed a greater focus on operations, high-intensity

warfare, and generating a presence in northern Norway.

According to Saunes, this presence had created "a 'new normal' situation up north, where we can

meet a lot of challenges both as a nation but also as part of the NATO alliance". He stressed that

Russia was not a threat, but added that such a presence would help to "avoid any

misunderstandings in the future … If it is quite normal that we are operating there, it is not an

escalation if we send a frigate or a submarine."

NATO is also increasing its air and ground presence. In 2016, US marines returned to Norway for

the first time since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, participating in Exercise 'Cold

Response'; in January 2017, 300 US marines deployed to Norway for a six-month period; and in

May-June 2017, 12 NATO air forces and NATO staff representatives participated in Exercise

'Arctic Challenge 2017' in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The exercise was designed to improve

interoperability in large-scale combat operations, and would, according to a US Air Force

statement, help NATO allies to create "a credible force prepared to effectively respond to any

crisis together".







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NATO procurement: snapshot of military forces slated for Arctic operations. (IHS Markit)

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Competition risks

Five issues - resource competition, underwater conflict, the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap,

SLOCs, and a spillover crisis - may drive increased strategic competition in the Arctic. The

likelihood of such competition escalating into crisis and conflict remains low, but the consequences

of any such escalation would be very high, given the nature of the stakeholders in the region and

the significance of the issues at stake.

Globally, countries are using the sea to a greater extent to boost economic strength, both through

traditional resources such as oil, gas, and fisheries, and increasingly through other resources such

as minerals. Access to resources below the surface, on the sea-bed, and below the seabed will

become increasingly critical. In the Arctic, many resources lie within established territorial waters,

but competition for them may become increasingly acute for several reasons: more resources will

become available as climate change continues; Russia will wish to secure access to Arctic

resources; and there may be increasing interest from non-littoral Arctic members, such as China

and the European Union.






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A model of a Russian seismic survey submarine for Arctic operations photographed on 28 March 2017, showing the distinctive wing-like structures. (Oleg Kuleshov)

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In terms of military activity, submarine and anti-submarine operations, including MPA

deployments, are a primary focus for both NATO and Russia. To project power and protect

territories, submarines are a central element of the Arctic's strategic balance, and naval

competition is already under way beneath the ice; the ability to operate under ice will continue to

provide strategic advantage.

By way of example, in March 2016, two USN Los Angeles/688-class SSNs, USS Hampton and

USS Hartford , took part in the five-week 'ICEX [Ice Exercise] 16' at an Arctic Circle base camp

200 nm north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. ICEX was designed to develop the USN's presence and to

evaluate capabilities and readiness, with Arctic Submarine Laboratory director Larry Estrada

declaring afterwards, "Significant testing and research took place …. What we have learned and

the data collected … will only further our understanding of this region and improve our operating

capabilities in such an unpredictable environment."


The UK Royal Navy (RN) has extensive experience of under-ice and intelligence-gathering

operations with its Trafalgar-class SSNs. Two RN officers participated as observers on 'ICEX

2016', embarked in USS Hampton, and the RN stated after the exercise that it was seeking to

regenerate its under-ice capability as "an operational priority" with the Arctic's emergence as a key

theatre of increasing maritime activity. Participation in the exercise was aimed at preparing a

Triton-class submarine for under-ice operations, before the capability is rolled out across the UK's

SSN fleet, including the new Astute-class boats.






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The 'risk/response' element of the submarine/MPA balance is particularly evident with respect to

the GIUK gap, where geography, strategy, and capability combine to create a challenge for naval

operations. As a gateway between the North Atlantic and northern waters, the GIUK gap is a

critical maritime choke point that is returning to strategic prominence as Russian submarines have

become more active and as Russia has attempted to establish battlespace control through an anti-

access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.

Russian icebreaker Novorossiysk (Project 21900M) in Akhangelsk on 28 March 2017. (Oleg Kuleshov)

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In addition to securing strategic bastions for its SSBNs and North Atlantic access for its SSNs,

Russia's A2/AD strategy for the GIUK gap appears to be to deny access and presence east of the

gap to other navies, as Moscow seeks to increase its impact on European strategic affairs. In

capability terms, Russia's deployment and use of the Kalibr missile system on and from various

platforms is a game-changer: at a strategic level, the land-attack variant has given Russia a

capability previously the preserve of the USN and the RN, and at a tactical level the anti-ship

variant provides a robust component of Russia's A2/AD strategy in contexts such as the GIUK

gap.

The GIUK gap also hosts critical commercial and military SLOCs that are vital for Russia, NATO

member states, and other countries. For Russia, unfettered use of Arctic SLOCs is key to securing

Atlantic and Pacific access and to supporting bases across the Arctic region, and there is a need

for the country to maintain access to SLOCs to and from home waters in the event of a crisis

escalating elsewhere. This concerns Western countries in the Arctic region, which fear that a crisis

unrelated to the Arctic may prompt Russia to attempt to seize access to such SLOCs.

Even in the context of routine commercial access to key SLOCs, the requirement to transport

resources and to generate income from access through territorial waters makes the NSR a SLOC






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of key significance for Russia. Access to and effective use of the NSR, and the establishment of

supporting infrastructure including air, rail, and road links, sits at the centre of Russia's Arctic

strategy. Such access will be driven by Russia's ice-breaking fleet: several new military and

commercial icebreakers are due to enter service to replace ageing platforms.

In his 2016 mission statement, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority , USN chief of naval

operations Admiral John Richardson argued that increasing international maritime traffic was one

of several emerging "global forces". New Arctic trade routes were part of this increasing maritime

traffic, and according to Adm Richardson were "increasingly used, increasingly stressed,

increasingly important, and increasingly contested". The challenge, Adm Richardson wrote, was

whether Russia, aiming to secure SLOCs for economic or security purposes, would control access

to the detriment of other users.

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Related Articles

Russia modernises its Northern Fleet Russian military underpins foreign policy The rising influence of Russian special forces Author Dr Jeffrey Mazo is a consulting member on environmental security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr Lee Willett is editor of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems . Imagery analysis by Sean O'Connor, Jane's principal satellite imagery analyst. Original digital artwork by H I Sutton, author of the Covert Shores website.

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