IA-RTE Philippines of the HR to Typhoons Ketsana and Parma

debriefing IASC New York 26/02/2010

Index1. RTE Purpose /

process

2. Context

3. Funding

4. Needs and prioritization

5. Response

6. Coordination

7. Support to national capacity

8. Next steps

1) RTE purpose• Provide a snap shot of the

current situation including real/time feedback and learning to the UNCT and to the IASC locally.

• support of the operational planning of the HCT…

• Improve ongoing and similar future responses.

Evaluation process

• Desk review• 42 ssi (Government, donors,

UN, RC, NGOs) • Workshop hosted by NDCC• Field visit to Laguna, NCR and

Rizal (higher D & L)• 30 focus groups and interviews

in 10 locations with 200 people affected by the disaster (whole cycle of displacement)

• Presentation of initial findings MNL, BKK & GVA comments and validation

2) Context• Archipelagic country • Middle income country on the low

end of MDG• 12th largest population (highest

natality rate in Asia), double within 30 Y

• HDI 90th down to 105th

• 43% of the pop lives below the poverty line

• Fragmented political environment • Ongoing conflicts

Disaster hot spot• Western Pacific

typhoon belt and NW fringes of the Pacific ring of fire

• Recurrent slow & fast onset disasters

• In areas with high poverty incidence vicious cycle of limited economic opportunity exacerbated by the impact of disasters.

The disasters

• Sequential Ketsana, Parma & Mirinae

• 963 people killed; 46,203 houses have been completely destroyed, 10 M people affected

• Looses represented 2.7% of the GDP

• Large geographical distribution but different impact (resilience and preparedness).

3) Funding• Initial funding flows activated the int’l response

but did not allow to build up an integrated one.• FA 1 / FA revised 37% funded (4th underfunded)• FA timely but overstretched• Even if initial consultation (Gov’t/UN), it did not

point out critical gaps (considering the ongoing response)

• Uneven distribution/ gaps• Low media coverage, end of FY, donor fatigue,

MIC, small pool of donors, simultaneous disasters, PDNA (section of FA integrated), GoRP capacity to respond, perceived as individual agencies shopping list

• CERF…9th largest recipient?

Sectoral distribution of funding to Philippines Flash Appeal - Revised (October 2009 - February 2010)

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Funding Unmet requirements

Evolution of Funding Philippines Flash Appeal - Revised

(October 2009 - February 2010)

$0$2.000.000$4.000.000$6.000.000$8.000.000

$10.000.000$12.000.000$14.000.000$16.000.000$18.000.000

Week1

Week2

Week3

Week4

Week5

Week6

Week7

Week8

Week9

Week10

Week11

Week12

Week13

Week14

Week15

Week16

Week17

Week18

Funding recommendations“More focused and targeted”

• HC with OCHA support, develop a UN humanitarian funding strategy (ERF?) before next DSG visit

• Global, regional and country level. Clarify division of labor FA/PDNA (recovery). Develop SOP with WB. ERC and OCHA regional / country offices

• In similar emergencies: (RC with HCT) the preliminary FA should focus essentially on the most critical needs (2-3 weeks period), revised appeal based on thorough assessment. Present FA in an integrated, prioritized and complementary way

4) Needs assessments, prioritization & planning• Good sharing of info but

insufficient analysis & prioritization (Flat figures, flows).

• Full picture of needs and gaps missing

• NA sectoral conducted in parallel and fragmented (few joint),, # varied. Little consolidation (even within clusters). UNDAC, RDRT…

• Assumptions were made about needs rather than consultations

• Missing linkages and analysis between needs identified, capacity to respond, presence, coverage and gaps

Conclusion and recommendationsNeed for more holistic and targeted approach.

• Before next D. OCHA should support gov’t to improve its’ information management. So that it can promptly identify outstanding needs to prioritize & bridge sectoral and geographic gaps

• In similar emergencies IASC should carry out more joint assessments and develop standard templates (inter & intra)

• To avoid duplications do OCHA with CL 4 Ws (who, what, where and when) in a RT fashion (i.e. Myanmar

• All HCT components should strive to inform people what they will receive (accountability…)

5) Response: • Faster for Parma than for Kestana (overwhelmed,

unprepared and UN not timely, RC mobilized through NS, NGOs) as already in Op’l mode. No EWS for the first

• It improved the collaboration between the Government and the UN.

• The UN managed to mobilize through it’s surge capacity.

• Local R swift - int’l often reactive “running behind the challenges”

(ii) response• S&R through ONS• FI (locally procured) & NFI (Hygiene, repair kits

distributed) to complement the primary emergency response mainly done by the LGU’s

• Logistic support was key to reach areas of difficult access

• Challenges in WASH (ECs) - slugging positively dealt with (Manila water).

• Emergency and transitional shelter were provided upon EC closure in some areas

• Good collaboration with DSW on registration - (displacement tracking system).

• TA to NDCC - staff and mapping

Response (iii)• FRI and NFRI much appreciated. Supply

driven: immediate needs largely met, but not based on consultation. Duplications and uncoordinated assistance reported – particularly at Barangay level

• Fragmented, varied by sector and geographically. Different levels of coverage and standards (i.e Marikina & Pasig). Concentrated in EC / affected areas. “Too much food”

• Most of the affected population got back to their daily life and places of origin rather fast (coping mechanisms – short emergency).

• Still challenge protracted displacement

Conclusions and recommendations• Today respective CL should

support the gov’t to bridge the gaps in shelter, protection and livelihood.

• In future em. HCT reduced scope and better targeted may increase the quality of outputs and outcomes. Stronger participation is also needed

• IASC members should adapt standards according to national context and identify suppliers (stand by agreements)

• CL and OCHA coordinate assistance by sharing information both at national, regional, provincial and local level.

6) Coordination• Place for the international

community to “plug in” to the national effort.

• Means of coordination improved over time

• Surge capacity allowed a quick shift from Dev’t to Emergency- turnover!

• Cluster’s role, mandate and mechanisms not sufficiently disseminated to international / national actors

• Some actors bypassed the DCC-structure challenging coordination (specially smaller NGOs).

Coordination (ii): Clusters• A total of 8 (12) clusters were

activated. Adequate #?• 2 configurations conflict / natural

disasters. // systems • Clusters integrated a variety of

org.• Some clusters well focused, other

too multi-dimensional, no clear mandate, outcome and output.

• Cluster coordination present at capital level but lost progressively grip in the field (disconnect)

• Limited OCHA presence

Cluster/Sector Government Cluster Lead IASC Cluster Lead

Agriculture Department of Agriculture FAO

Camp Coordination/Camp Management Department of Social Welfare and Development IOM

Child Protection (Protection sub-cluster) Department of Social Welfare and Development UNICEF

Coordination National Disaster Coordinating Council OCHA

Early Recovery Office of Civil Defense UNDP

Education Department of Education UNICEF

Food Department of Social Welfare and Development WFP

Health Department of Health WHO

Livelihoods Department of Social Welfare and Development ILO

Logistics & Emergency Telecommunications

Office of Civil Defense / National Disaster Coordinating Council Operations Centre

WFP

Nutrition Department of Health UNICEF

Shelter & NFIs Department of Social Welfare and Development IFRC (shelter) and IOM (NFIs)

WASH Department of Health UNICEF

Coordination (iii): Clusters• Geographic and sector gaps

irregularly addressed• Partnership between the UN/RC

and NGOs functioned sporadically

• Strategic field coordination and prioritization was mostly absent

• Did not act as provider of last resort, quality control absent, impartiality questioned (funding)

Coordination (3): Meetings• Too many, long & centralized.

Type of info and no clearly defined agenda and output.

• Initially number of participants was high - saw an opportunity for information gathering and funding opportunities. Progressively reduced to implementation partners.

• Level of staff and turnover represented a major concern

Conclusions and recommendations• In middle income countries clusters focus just

on ST emergency (smaller #)• All CL Gov and IASC should explain the role,

modalities of the clusters before the next disaster• One focal point between Government and the UN• Clusters should avoid becoming additional layers of

the response (activate int’l or use nat’l?) The challenge is to move coordination beyond the national level (reg/prov/loc)

• CL pre-plan agenda and output, less meetings, share information more strategically

7) Support to National Capacity• Government responsibility to coordinate and to respond but different

levels of capability observed• Level of preparedness in urban settings v. rural areas• Local response often robust through LGU & Barangay – but often

uncoordinated• Added value making the international community easier for GoRP to deal

with• Who does what not clear to all

Conclusion and recommendations• Opportunity for IASC to support

Government’s DM capacity (all levels) UN agencies focus on DRR in UNDAF (05/10 with a more holistic approach (RR integrated with S and E dev. plans), need to coordinate with WB and RC.

• IASC/HCT develop contingency plan now with Gov. before the next disaster strikes. Who would do what, where, when, with whom and how. Define ‘tipping point’, pre-plan division of labor, responsibilities and ‘nature’ of aid (int’l and national)

• What would happen without the clusters? Questioning the “business model”

More sustainable to reduce risk than respond to emergencies

8) Next steps

• Draft report due by 10/03• Comments IA by 17/03• Final report by 24/03

Maraming salamat po!