Humanitarian Responsibilityand Committed ActionRESPONSE TO “PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION”

]oelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry,

Mkdecins Saris Fronti2res/Doctors Without Borders

A typology, despite inevitable simplifications and generalizations, can be a use-

ful tool of analysis. Thomas Weiss has proposed to establish an analytical spec-

trum through which the principled positions of the disparate humanitarian aid

community can be assessed in the evolving political arena of the late 1990s.

Moving beyond a “charity versus rights” analysis of the approaches of aid

organizations, Weiss proposes a political continuum with classic apolitical

humanitarianism at one end and an overt “solidarist” political agenda at the

other. Between these, he claims, lie a “minimalist” position stressing the impor-

tance of avoiding unintended negative consequences of aid, and a “maximalist”

position that delves into broader political actions in pursuit of solutions to

humanitarian crises, such as contributions to conflict-resolution initiatives. He

questions the relevance of apolitical approaches to humanitarian action in an

era in which the political and the humanitarian are intrinsically linked, and he

advocates for a more concerted integration of political realities into the

thoughts and actions of aid agencies.

While Weiss’s paper contains many pertinent observations of the

humanitarian arena, it also contains assumptions and inaccuracies that

undermine the arguments he is espousing. Our discussion will challenge two

central tenets of his paper. First, his understanding of the rationale and posi-

tion of Miidecins Saris Fronti&-es/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) as the arche-

typal “solidarist” agency is flawed. Second, his criticism of strict adherence to

humanitarian principles and his call for a broadening of humanitarian action

into the political realm will, in our opinion, lead to a further erosion of

humanitarian space to the detriment of victims of crises. But before tackling

these criticisms, it is necessary to address the underlying assumption that per-

meates the paper and much of today’s discourse on “complex humanitarian

crises. ”

30 Joel/e Tanguy and Fiona Terry

On Contemporary Crises

Despite Weiss’sacknowledgment that a “golden age” of humanitarianism is fiction, he

implicitly suggeststhat contemporary crises bring unprecedenteddilemmas to human-

itarian actors. Weiss claims that reflecting on the unintendedconsequences and politi-

cization of humanitarian aid is now “becoming a priority for the staff of most aid agen-

cies.” In our experience, while it is clear that the context has changed, aid organiza-

tions were faced with just as intractable dilemmas in the past decades. Extensive reflec-tion and debates of a similar kind animated our organization throughout the

1980s. Deciding whether to feed the Khmer Rouge along the Thai-Cambodian borderwas one instance; watching aid used as a tool of the brutal forced migration policies

of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia was another. William Shawcross’s expos~ in

1984 of the dilemma of “how to feed the victims without also providing aid to their

tormentors” 1 and Jean-Christophe Rufin’s 1986 book on the “humanitarian trap”z

attest to the debates within MSF and other humanitarian organizations. Thesedebates shaped much of MSF’S approach to the crises of the late 1980s and 1990s.

The dominant discourseon contemporary crisesfrequentlyinvokes a “new com-plexity,” characterized, by Weiss and others, by “an increased disregardfor humanitar-

ian law,” “direct targetingof civilians,”and “the protracted nature” of conflict. We chal-

lenge the notion that this “new complexity” derivesfrom a tendency toward increased

barbarity. Two instances of genocide 50 years apart and two famines, one in

Mao’s China3and the other in today’sSudan, illustratethis well. Aspects of conflict have

changed with the end of the Cold Wac the fragmentation of armed movements, in par-

ticular increases the difficultiesof identifyingreliable interlocutors, and the distinctions

between state and nonstate, private and public, political and business inkiatives are

increasingly blurred.qBut rather than a causal emphasis, the “complexity” associated

with contemporary crises better reflectsthe responseof the multiplicityof actors presentin the heart of conflicts. The increasinglyblurred distinction among these actors has led

to a confusion of roles and increasedmanipulationand misuseof aid. Humanitarian aid,

once a tool of states to promote foreign-policyobjectives, has become a tool with which

to avoid foreign-policy engagement. And aid organizations, although lamenting

the “humanitarian alibi,” are lined up to receive more government funding.

................... . .......... ................................... ..... .. ..........................................................................................................................................1 William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).

2Jean-Christophe Rufin, Le Pi.?ge humarzitaire (Paris: Edition Jean-Claude LattEs, 1986).3Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine (New York: Free Press, 1997).

4 See Franqois Jean, “De I’interEtatique au translational: Ies acteurs non-~tatiques clans les conflits,”

Recherches & Documents, no. S (June 1998).

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMITTED ACTION 31

On “Solidarists” and Medecins Saris Frontidres

Crucial to Weiss’s typology and argument is his characterization of MSF personnel as

“the most visible contemporary representatives” of the “solidarist” group of political

humanitarians “who choose sides and abandon neutrality and impartiality as well as

reject consent as a prerequisite” of humanitarian action. He claims that advocates of

a classical approach to humanitarian aid “have always disagreedadamantly” with the

solidarists since the latter argue that “agencies should employ humanitarian action

within a political strategy on behalf of victims,” while the former advocate a strict sep-aration of humanitarian action from political objectives and conditionalities.

Far from rejecting the principle of impartiality, however, the provision of

aid in proportion to need and without discrimination is a fundamental principle

of MSF. Since true impartiality requires operational independence from econom-

ic and political pressures, MSF has also inscribed independence—and financial

independence—as a key principle and operational reality, with the majority of itsfunds raised from individual private donors throughout the world.

Furthermore, MSF has not abandoned or rejected the principle of neutral-

ity, which Weiss has defined as “not taking sides with warring parties. ” While theorganization chose to step away from the classical ICRC approach and sought to

put the interest of victims ahead of sovereignty considerations, it was more with

a spirit to provide prompt and unhindered aid than with a view toward espous-ing political causes.

While it worked on the U.S,-backed side of the Afghanistan conflict and in

refugee camps inhabited by asylum seekers fleeing totalitarian systems, MSF was

actually one of only a handful of aid organizations in Honduras that worked in

refugee camps controlled by both the Salvadorans (left-wing guerrillas) and the

Nicaraguan (Contras), recognizing that there are victims on both sides of a con-flict regardless of the “goodness” of the political ideology espoused by either side.

And in the mid-1980s, MSF was simultaneously expelled from Ethiopia bySoviet-backed Mengistu and from Guatemala by a U.S.-backed government eager

to send away potential witnesses to the violence. Rather than “siding” with one

or other party to the conflict, MSF has, at times, judged that the victims are morein need on one side than another, and designed its missions based on the “pro-

portionality” principle embedded in impartiality.

MSF has also occasionally withdrawn its aid from a region or population,

which gives rise to the notion that MSF has abandoned neutrality. Faced with massivehuman rights violations, misuse of humanitarian assistance, or a totalitarian regime,

MSF may exclude working with one party to the conflict, as was the case with the

32 ]oelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry

Khmer Rouge in the Thai border camps. But this position is less an expression of

political preference than a determination to claim and operate within humanitarianspace. “Humanitarian space” entails the ability to independently assess the needs of

the populatioty retain unhindered access to the population; conduct, monitor, and

evaluate the distribution of aid commodities; and obtain security guarantees for local

and expatriate aid personnel. The ideology and control mechanisms of the Phnom

Penh regime until 1988, of the Khmer Rouge along the Thai bordeq and of the

extremists in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania from 1994 to 1996

obviated the possibility of obtaining humanitarian space. Instead, the aid itself becamea tool in the further oppression of the civilian populations. As Rony Brauman argued

about the Cambodian crisis, “The choice, then, was not between a political position

and a neutral position but between two political positions: one active, and the other

by default.”$ In the search for humanitarian space, MSF’S operational principles and

its insistence on impartiality bring the organization closer to the “classical” or “min-

imalist” categorization of Weiss’s spectrum, rather than the “solidarist.”

Another characteristic of MSF that may have fueled the image of MSF as

a solidarist organization is its determination to speak in public when faced withmass violations of human rights, including forced displacement or forced repa-

triation, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. This aversion tosilence stemmed from the post-Holocaust debate in Europe, influencing the

intellectual generation that presided over the birth of the “Saris Fronti&es”movement. Often the sole witnesses to these violations, MSF volunteers con-

sider themselves accountable to international civil society and humanitarian

principles, rather than to governmental or multilateral financial backers of aid.

As a consequence, MSF’S testimony (t6moignage) is raised in public rather than

in closed diplomatic circles.

Thus if neutrality is defined as remaining silent, even when confronted

with grave breaches of fundamental humanitarian principles, MSF is not neutral.However, as long as neutrality is defined, as Weiss does, as “not taking sides

with warring parties, ” MSF upholds a spirit of neutrality throughout its opera-

tions. MSF tc$moignage seeks to combat indifference to the plight of populations

and to signal the need for local and international responsibility to uphold basic

humanitarian and human rights principles. As Alain Destexhe writes, “If human-

itarian assistance is to be worthy of its name, it must work in parallel with

efforts to meet the demands of justice and respect for human rights. “d............................................................................... .. ........................ .............................................................................................................

5Rony Brauman, “Refugee Camps, Population Transfers and NGOS,” in Jonathan Moore, cd., Hard

Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).~ Alain Destexhe, “Humanitarian Neutrality: Myth or Reality?” in K. Cahill, cd., Preventive

Diplomacy (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMITTED ACTION 33

On Political Humanitarianism

Weiss defines “political humanitarianism” as “conscious decisions to employ

humanitarian action . . . to mitigate life-threatening suffering and protect funda-

mental human rights in active wars. ” From this perspective, MSF maybe indeed

one of the archetypes of political humanitarian agencies.

MSF does not, however, advocate “humanitarian action within a polit-

ical strategy on behalf of victims, ” and rejects the “mission creep” of the

maximalists into areas of conflict transformation. Although the provision of

aid in conflict is implicitly political, the possibility of constructing humani-tarian space is jeopardized by tying aid to conflict resolution initiatives. The

use of aid as a carrot to bring about peace destroys all notions of giving aidaccording to needs and without discrimination. It also presupposes a level of

diplomatic expertise among aid workers, which MSF would be reluctant to

assume.Most “humanitarian crises” are fundamentally political crises with

humanitarian consequences. All the ambiguities of intervention lie in this

essential link. Humanitarian agencies are caught between governments seek-

ing an alibi for their political inaction and media tending to focus on humantragedy rather than its political roots. Refusing to act as a relief-service

provider contracted by state or multilateral financial backers, MSF seeksinstead to be both a humanitarian actor and an agent of change: to do so

often requires highlighting the political responsibilities of the local and inter-

national community.While Weiss suggests that there are “clear benefits from . . . collaborating

with diplomatic and military institutions, ” MSF considers it necessary to engagepolitical actors but essential to preserve the integrity of the humanitarian agenda

in relation to the political and the military.Humanitarian intervention can also fuel the crises it seeks to alleviate, and

all the more so since the number of NGOS and their funding multiplied in the

1990s. Aid can be taxed, hijacked, looted, racketeered. Interventions can be

manipulated to build internal or international legitimacy, to freeze military gains,

to sustain ethnic cleansing, to enforce population displacement, to support faminepolicies. When confronted with the dilemma of fueling a war economy7 or sus-

taining political or military strategies, MSF strives for a lucid and responsible

approach that might involve minimalist programming or even abstention, but

7 See Franqois Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, ~cotiomies des guers-es civiles (Paris: Hachette

Pluriel, 1996).

34 ]oelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry

remains essentially concerned with preserving humanitarian space. Every situa-

tion requires careful analysis. As Brauman writes:

From a moral standpoint,weighingthe pain inflictedagainst the pain avoidedisan impossibleendeavor.Despiteall contradictionsattachedto the act, strivingtosave lives and alleviatedistressremains fundamental.Humanitarianaction can-not be consideredas the “smallchange” of larger politicalconsiderations.But to

recognizethat humanitarianaid could haveperverseeffects and lengthenthe war,leads one to at least ask the right questionson the type of programto design,onthe control to exercise, on the levelof aid to channel.8

Hence once the emergency needs of the population have been met, MSF has

reduced or even withdrawn when humanitarian aid had a strong chance of pro-

longing the war. This was the case in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire andTanzania, from which MSF withdrew in late 1994.9

In conclusion, Weiss’s attempt to characterize contemporary humanitarianorganizations on a linear analytic spectrum is interesting insofar as it could help

clarify the blurred operational principles of increasingly numerous humanitarian

actors. Unfortunately, with regard to MSF, it is marred by his misunderstanding

of some of the organization’s principles and of the difference between advocating

for a political cause and advocating for humanitarian space. In asserting some of

the fundamental tenets of humanitarian action, such as impartiality, proportion-

ality, and nondiscrimination, and in extending the principle of neutrality to the

screening of potential political and economic manipulation of its aid, MSF is in

fact closer to the “classicist” or “minimalist” position than to the “maximalist”

one, thus throwing into question the linear nature of Weiss’s model.Far from aiming to resolve conflicts or even calling for an end to waq MSF’S

political humanitarianism is concerned with advocating against injustice and indiffer-

ence, and with asserting basic rights and providingquality of assistance for vulnerable

populations. Weiss’s support of political humanitarianism, while justified when invit-

ing the aid community to “weigh the political consequences of their action or inac-

tion,” becomes ambiguous in his call for a broadening of humanitarian action into the

political realm. In our opinion, the involvementof humanitarian actors and aid in con-flict resolution initiatives risks diluting the primary responsibility of humanitarian aid

to alleviate suffering. Moreoveq it will further shift the responsibilityfor the resolutionof conflicts and the respect of international legal conventions from accountable politi-

cal institutions to the private sphere. Is this where we want to lead humanitarianism?

6 Rony Brauman, I-Iwnanitaire:fe difemne (Paris: Les Editions Textuel, 1996).YFiona Terry, “The Humanitarian Impulse: Imperatives versus Consequences” (paper presented at

the annual convention of the International Studies Association,Washington, D. C., February 17, 1999).