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1 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) FROM THE SEA CAPT MARTIN A. SEBASTIAN RMN (R) & MOHD IKMAL HISYAM ABU CENTRE FOR MARITIME SECURITY & DIPLOMACY CMSD VERSION: FINAL DATE: 30 JAN 2016

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) FROM THE SEA

CAPT MARTIN A. SEBASTIAN RMN (R) & MOHD IKMAL HISYAM ABU

CENTRE FOR MARITIME SECURITY & DIPLOMACY – CMSD

VERSION: FINAL

DATE: 30 JAN 2016

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Table of Contents 1.0 Problem Statement 4 2.0 Objectives of the Study 5 3.0 Outcome of the Study 5 4.0 Introduction 6 4.1 Natural Disaster 8 5.0 Recent Disaster 9 5.1 Typhoon Haiyan 11 5.2 Typhoon Hagupit 12 6.0 Global HADR 14 7.0 Extra Regional HADR 15 8.0 Regional HADR 17 9.0 National HADR 18 10.0 NADMA and NaDMA; A Comparison 18 11.0 Developments in Civil-Military Cooperation on HADR in Malaysia 19 12.0 Identify the Sea as a Theatre for Disaster Relief 22 13.0 Land as Relief Area to Effectively Coordinate HADR 24 14.0 Recommendation 25 14.1 Civil-Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for HADR 25

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Table of Figures Figure 1: Cost of Natural Disasters 6 Figure 2: Infogram on Typhoon Nargis in Myanmar 9 Figure 3: Infogram on Typhoon Hayyan in the Philippines 11 Figure 4: Ilustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National Actors in HADR and Their Roles, Function 14 Figure 5: OCHA Presence in the Global Disaster Relief 15 Figure 6: Pacific Disaster Centre Portal 16 Figure 7: AHA Centre 17 Figure 8: Industry Capability in HADR 23 Figure 9: Philippines Bureau of Fisheris and Aquatic Research(BFAR) for HADR 23 Figure 10: CONOPS for Disaster Relief from the Sea 25

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) FROM

THE SEA

Captain Martin A. SEBASTIAN RMN (R)

Mohd Ikmal Hisyam bin Abu

Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy

MIMA

“Sometimes, the enormity of the disaster is such that a nation, however powerful, finds it difficult to

manage the disaster on its own, thus warranting the need for external assistance and, more often than

not, involvement of military. Why then the military? By nature of its structure, organization, assets and

capability, militaries are seen as suited for immediate response to any disaster relief operations.

However, foreign or international military involvement in any disaster relief operations must be short and

objective orientated. Their main objective in HADR is to deploy quickly, set the ground, conduct SAR

operations, save lives, provide medical assistance and leave the area once the situation is stabilized by

handing over the responsibility to civilian-led government agencies, NGOs and the international

community.”

Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Minister of Defence, Malaysia

Shangri-La Dialogue 2010, Fourth Plenary Session, 6 June 2010

1.0 Problem Statement

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is about bringing

together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.

It is a time sensitive activity which means timely response is the essence to

bring relief to affected victims in time of disaster. To achieve this, coordination

and mobility become the key pillars. The National Security Council’s Arahan

MKN No. 20:DasardanMekanismePengurusanBencana Negara was

promulgated on 11 May 1997 following the highland towers incident.

However, it is a land centric incident which does not cater for mitigation on

HADR but responses. Additionally, it does not cater for responses from the

sea. The new National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) acts as a

coordinating agency, however policies on HADR from the sea policies nor the

effective use of the civil-military cooperation architectures are not apparent.

Therefore, there is a dual need to policies for HADR from the sea and the use

of civil-military architecture for HADR operations. The lessons learnt from

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previous HADR operations in the region suggests a need for the use of the

sea and to explore further the benefits of civil-military cooperation in HADR.

2.0 The Objectives of this Study is as follows:

• Illustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National actors in

HADR and their roles, functions.

• Identify the sea as a theatre for disaster relief

• Divide the sea and land into maneuver area and relief area to

effectively coordinate HADR

• Maneuver area managed by military and industry whilst relief area

managed by inter-agency

• Include industry as key players in HADR and bring to bear industry

level logistics and coordination mechanisms

3.0 The outcome from this Study is as follows:

• Concept of Operation for Militaries

• Identify industrial support for Disaster Relief

• Develop delivery, storage including protection, distribution and

monitoring mechanism

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Figure 1: Cost of Natural Disasters

4.0 Introduction

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations have

attracted the attention of the global community in recent years. Building

capabilities, interoperability and a conceptual framework for participation in

these operations has gained traction among national, regional and

international policymakers. Malaysia being a divided land mass, Peninsula

and Sabah/Sarawak with coasts at every state may need to factor the sea as

a conduit for HADR. In so far as the Arahan MKN No. 20:

DasardanMekanismePengurusanBencana Negara is concerned, it is a land

centric disaster relief Instruction It does not lay foundations for comprehensive

action in cases of disasters akin to those that has hit ASEAN. Though

disasters cost a fortune of response, it is vital that the response reach the

affected population early, feed and provide shelter, tender to the injured, clear

the dead and destroy carcasses that may give rise to outbreaks. In addition,

there is a need to clear the affected area from debris for relief agencies to

conduct logistics movement. This will entail providing fuel support services

and mobility support in addition to shelter for relief agencies working round the

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clock. They too need to be fed and protected from disease. Coordination

mechanisms between logistics providers, movers, storage and distribution are

vital to ensure the right elements reach the right people at the right time and

at the right location. Force protection of storage areas will be required

especially food and medicine. In understanding the whole gamut of HADR, it

is vital to first understand that the supported and supporting both will require

adequate logistics. To provide relief, relief agencies themselves must be

appropriately trained for the calibrated response. Whilst doing so, they must

be well aware of the restrictions, constraints and the hazards forthwith. This is

where prior knowledge will be essential, learning from the lessons of past

incidents.Humanitarian organisations should appreciate that the key factors to

responding quickly to meet disaster survivors' expectations are: local

permanent relief logistics facilities; transportation; preparedness of human

resource and co-ordination between different parties. Without it, essential

supplies and relief will take much longer to reach the people who need it most

at the time they need it most.

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4.1 Natural Disasters. More than seven trillion US dollars of

economic damage and eight million deaths via natural disasters have

been recorded since the start of the 20th century1. The number of

natural disasters around the world has increased by more than four

times in the last 20 years, according to a report released by the British

charity Oxfam.Oxfam analyzed data from the Red Cross,United

Nations and researchers at Louvain University in Belgium. It found that

the earth is currently experiencing approximately 500 natural disasters

per year, compared with 120 per year in the early 1980s. The number

of weather-related disasters in 2015 was 240, compared with 60 in

19802. The world’s failure to prepare for natural disasters will have

―inconceivably bad‖ consequences as climate change fuels a huge

increase in catastrophic droughts and floods and the humanitarian

crises that follow. Last year, earthquakes, floods, heatwaves and

landslides left 22,773 people dead, affected 98.6 million others and

caused $66.5bn (£47bn) of economic damage. Yet the international

community spends less than half of one per cent of the global aid

budget on mitigating the risks posed by such hazards. Robert Glasser,

the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Disaster Risk

Reduction, said that with the world already ―falling short‖ in its response

to humanitarian emergencies, things would only get worse as climate

change adds to the pressure.3

1https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/04/160418092043.html

2http://www.naturalnews.com/023362_natural_disasters_floods.html#ixzz47QFKxeQO

3http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/24/world-heading-for-catastrophe-over-

natural-disasters-risk-expert-warns

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5.0 Recent Disasters

Figure 2: Infogram on Typhoon Nargis in Myanmar

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008, making landfall in the

Ayeyarwady Division and passing into Yangon Division before hitting the

former capital, Yangon. The cyclone’s toll was catastrophic, overall, 84,500

people were reported dead, 55,500 missing, and 19,300 injured. Out of the

7.35 million people in the 37 affected townships across the Ayeyarwady and

Yangon Divisions, some 2.4 million were estimated to have been severely

affected. An estimated 800,000 people were displaced4 . The Ayeyarwady

Delta, known as the country’s rice bowl, saw tremendous damage to its paddy

4http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jul/16/cyclone-nargis-

burma-disaster-relief-aid

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fields - here, the effects of extreme wind had been compounded by a 3.7m

tidal wave. The FAO estimated that 63% of Myanmar’s paddy fields had been

impacted upon5. Nargis hit as paddy farmers had been at the last stage of the

dry season harvest, which accounts for 25% of annual production. The

cyclone also caused widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure,

including roads, jetties, water and sanitation systems, fuel supplies and

electricity networks. A large number of water sources were contaminated and

food stocks damaged or destroyed. Overall, it was estimated that Nargis

caused USD 4 billion in economic losses. A United Nations Population Fund

(UNFPA) report on lessons learnt 6 identified how would the humanitarian

response need to change if the same happened again? Among the lessons

learnt were as follows:

Essential reproductive health supplies. Speed was critical. If

emergency obstetric care was not made available, a pregnancy could

be fatal for a mother and child.

Life-saving supplies. Thesewereprocured, shipped and were handed

over to UNFPA's implementing partners for distribution via mobile

clinics that could reach thousands displaced in hard hit areas.

Gifts-in-kind. This well-meant logistics from other governments began

arriving without content descriptions. Most of it did not match the needs

of the beneficiaries, and instead just caused congestion in the

warehouse. The supplies were stuck in stores when they should have

been in the field where they were in desperate need of them.

Competencies. Some agencies relied on local staff who lacked

humanitarian experience of dealing with such a tragedy as it was the

first time that Burma had experienced a natural disaster of this

magnitude.

Delays in the international humanitarian supply chain.

Thesedelays sent aid workers scrambling for essential supplies at local

markets, carrying large sums of money, and buying essential supplies

outside the usual procurement procedures. As a result, prices were

5http://fao.com.my 6Pam Steele, Disaster preparedness: Lessons from Cyclone Nargis, The Guardian, 16 July 2013.

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inflated, making goods more expensive for the Burmese people too.

This situation persisted for two to three weeks until supplies started to

arrive from outside the country and the humanitarian response stepped

up a gear.

In addition to these lessons learnt, a report from CARE International on

Cyclone Nargis is attached in Annex A.

5.1 Typhoon Haiyan. On November 8, 2013. Typhoon Haiyan—

known as Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines—made landfall in the

central Philippines, bringing strong winds and heavy rains that have

resulted in flooding, landslides, and widespread damage.

Figure 3: Infogram on Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines

The lessons learnt from Typhoon Haiyan were as follows:

Communication of any sort was not available. This made coordination

difficult

No power supply. Essential services could not be delivered.

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Lack of mobility. Heavy equipment and other vehicles were temporarily

inoperational as there were no fuel.

Impassable roads. Debris were all over and therefore it is was

impossible to move from one area to another to help victims

Damaged relief goods. Goods stored in the provinces and regions were

damaged and washed away

There were many other lessons learnt which are captured in the Centre for

Excellence 7 . These lessons captured the Civil-Military Cooperation in

response to the HADR requirement. The Best Practices captured are in

Annex B.

5.2 Typhoon Hagupit, known in the Philippines as Typhoon Ruby,

was the second most intense tropical cyclone in 2014. Hagupit particularly

impacted the Philippines in early December while gradually weakening,

killing 18 people and causing $114 million (2014 USD) in the country.Prior

to making landfall, Typhoon Hagupit was considered the worst threat to

the Philippines in 2014.8 fortunately, the disaster was significantly smaller

than 2013's Typhoon Haiyan.In a nutshell, the lessons learnt from

Typhoon Haiyan greatly helped in the preparations for Typhoon Hagupit.9.

Relief Web also published an article by Nanyang University of Technology

Singapore on the use of Singapore Defence Force during the Typhoon10.A

six-man ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), which

included four Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) officers, were

deployed prior to the onslaught of Hagupit. The team was deployed under

the auspices of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian

7Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response, ―Advances in Civil-Military

Coordination in Catastrophes: How the Philippines Turned Lessons Learned from Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Into Best Practices for Disaster Preparedness and Response (2015), Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 456 Hornet Avenue, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI 96860-3503 8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhoon_Hagupit_(2014)

9Melanie Tef, Learning the Lessons of Typhoon Hagupit: Investing in emergency preparedness pays off,

The International Rescue Committee, February 9, 2015. 10Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano, Lessons of Two Disasters: Building Resilience

from Within, Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 9 Dec 2014

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Assistance (AHA), based in Jakarta. Its critical function is to provide rapid

assessment and determine the critical resources such as tents, medical

kits, and sanitation facilities required for the areas affected by the typhoon.

ERAT was formed within the AHA Centre to help ASEAN and the

international community identify what needs to be delivered to affected

communities during civil emergencies.

Working with the AHA, Singapore deployed its Swift Emergency Evaluation

Deployment (SEED) team, a nationally-organised needs assessment team to

assist the Philippines in getting a comprehensive analysis of the situation in

the affected areas and enhance information-sharing. This helped facilitate

decision-making by armed forces, for instance, by directing them to affected

areas most in need of disaster assistance.

Figure 4: Illustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National actors

in HADR and their roles, functions

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6.0 Global HADR

In the global context, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of the United Nations Secretariat, is

responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure coherent

response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within

which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA's

mission is as follows:

• Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in

partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human

suffering in disasters and emergencies.

• Advocate the rights of people in need.

• Promote preparedness and prevention.

• Facilitate sustainable solutions.

Figure 5: OCHA Presence in the Global Disaster Relief

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7.0 Extra Regional HADR

The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) delivers comprehensive information,

assessments, tools, and services with the goal of reducing disaster risk. PDC

is dedicated to improving disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and

recovery through innovative, global multi-hazard disaster monitoring, early

warning, and decision support systems, as well as risk and vulnerability

assessment, modeling and visualization, exercise support, and capacity

enhancement services. The PDC supports disaster management community

by making high-quality information from trusted sources securely available

and accessible. Additionally, they provide the up-to-date information, science,

and technology necessary to support evidence-based decision making. PDC

partnerships span civilian-military, academic-operational, public-private, and

U.S.-foreign stakeholders, institutions, and

communities with common interests.PDC is located in the state of Hawaii

(USA), with its headquarters on the island of Maui and additional personnel

supporting key clients and stakeholders elsewhere in Hawaii, on the U.S.

mainland, and in Southeast Asia.

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Figure 6: Pacific Disaster Centre Portal

8.0 Regional HADR

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Figure 7: AHA Centre

ASEAN HADR preparedness comprises Chapter VI of the ASEAN Standard

Operating Procedures (SOP) for Regional Standby Arrangements on HADR;

the ARF Strategic Guidance for HADR; and the Guidelines on the Facilitation

of Foreign Military Assistance by the Asia Pacific Conference on Military

Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations or APC-MADRO. The ASEAN

Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management

(AHA Centre) is an inter-governmental organisation which aims to facilitate

cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member States and with the

United Nations and international organisations for disaster management and

emergency response in ASEAN Region. The Centre was established by 10

ASEAN Member States; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,

Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam on 17

November 2011, through the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment

of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster

management in Bali, Indonesia. AHA Centre is governed by the members of

the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), which consists of

the Heads of the National Disaster Management Offices of ASEAN Member

States. Hosted by the Government of Indonesia, the AHA Centre serves the

Member States from its Office in Jakarta.

9.0 National HADR

The government formed the National Disaster Management Agency or

NADMA to coordinate the work of various agencies during a disaster. NADMA

is set up not to take over the functions of agencies like the armed forces,

police, Civil Defence Department, Fire and Rescue, Rela and Social Welfare

Department but to manage and coordinate efforts. However, NADMA is not to

be mistaken with NaDMA, an agency in the Government of Grenada.

10.0 NADMA and NaDMA. A Comparison

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NaDMA is tasked to reduce the loss of life and property within Grenada,

Carriacou and Petite Martinique by ensuring that adequate preparedness,

response and mitigation measures are in place to deal with the impact of

hazards. The vision of the Agency is to develop a culture of prevention and

safety among all sectors of society. Formerly known as NERO, it was

established in 1985 under a Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness

Project. NaDMA is the body charged with the responsibility of coordinating all

disaster-related activities on Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique.

NaDMA is a department of the Office of the Prime Minister and is headed by

the Prime Minister himself. The day to day functions of the NaDMA are

executed by a Secretariat which is the National Disaster Office located at Fort

Frederick, Richmond Hill, St. George’s. The Office functions with

approximately eleven (11) other officers.

The National Emergency Advisory Council (NEAC) is the body responsible for

giving general direction and control and the development of policies. These

responsibilities reside with the Prime Minister. The NEAC consists of

members of the government, NGOs, industry and various other institutions

which assist the government in developing actionable policies in HADR.

The National Disaster Office (NDO) overseas the work of the District Disaster

Committees which function in seventeen (17) districts established along

electoral boundary lines inclusive of Carriacou and Petite Martinique. These

District Disaster Committees are patterned according to the National Structure

and is headed by a District Disaster Coordinator who is assisted by a deputy

and consists of eight (8) management committees with responsibility for the

areas of Shelter Management, Safety and Security, Health and Welfare,

Public Education and Information, Emergency Works and Transportation,

Supplies Management, Damage and Needs Assessment and

Telecommunications. Evolving out of these District Disaster Committees are

Village Sub-committees which consists of the same management committees.

In as far as NADMA is concerned, it remains a coordinating agency with

regards to HADR efforts. Risk Mitigation, preparedness and the

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comprehensiveness that NaDMA advocates is not visible. NADMA website

illustrates several activities which may not guarantee effective and efficient

risk mitigation, preparedness, response and consequence management. This

is duly because there are no policies, processes, procedures nor inter agency

capacity building programmes as such, that will detail the evolution of HADR.

11.0 Developments in Civil-Military Cooperation on HADR. Malaysia11

MAF is guided by National Security Council Directive No. 20 which dictates

that the role of MAF is to assist and support the civil agencies in HADR.

Regionally, MAF abides to the following SOPs and guidelines:

a. Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets

in Disaster Relief.

b. Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint

Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).

c. ASEAN Regional Forum Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster

Relief Standard Operating Procedure (ARF HADR SOP).

MAF by nature of its structure, organization, training, readiness and inventory

capabilities is seen as an appropriate organization to respond to HADR

operations. Apart from being self-sufficient, MAF could provide logistics and

administrative support to other governmental or non governmental bodies

involved in HADR operations. Over the years, based on MAF exposure and

experience in HADR operations, it has developed the following capabilities:

a. Malaysian Army (MA). MA is capable to provide

immediate search and rescue efforts which is very critical during the

initial stage of HADR operation. Following that, MA has the capacity to

11ARF Seminar on Laws and Regulation: Participation of the Malaysian Armed Forces in HADR; Paper

Presented by Mindef.

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assist in constructions of temporary shelters, provide treated water to

the stricken areas, clearance of debris, disposal of explosive

ordinance, providing sanitation facilities and reopening of transportation

communication systems. In addition to that, MA is also capable to

provide logistics support to sustain HADR in terms supplying food, fuel,

cooking facilities, land transport system, repair and maintenance of

mechanical equipment.

b. Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN). RMN assets are suitable as

command, control and communication base and for transportation of

equipment. They could be utilized as afloat forward operating base;

logistics support base and as floating hospitals. Naval personnel can

also be tasked for beach and port management and to assist in any

engineering works. The RMN is also capable to assist in providing

limited helicopter facilities with night flying capabilities operating from

their capital ships. These helicopters are generally used in evacuation

of casualties and transportation of humanitarian aids to remote areas.

c. Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). RMAF main contributions

are in air transportations. The success of any HADR is dependent on

quick response which is dependent on the availability and readiness of

the RMAF air assets. The RMAF has the capability to fly 2 of its

transport aircraft to any destination within the region within 2-hours

notice and to provide at least one Sikorsky helicopter at any one time

for HADR operation. Apart from that, RMAF is also capable to provide

airfield security, air transportable health support, aero-medical

evacuation, evacuees processing, airspace management, air traffic

control and terminal services.

d. MAF Medical Services. MAF Medical Services is capable to

provide at least a level-one medical support with surgical capability in

the form of Field Hospital. Once deployed, the Field Hospital can be

constructed within 24 hours and will then be able to provide medical

services within 48 hours. This Field Hospital constructed in the form of

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modular cabin and tents with 20 beds in-house patient capability.

MAF’s earlier version of Field Hospital under tents has been deployed

previously in Chaman, Pakistan for Afghan Refugees Medical

Assistance in 2001/2002, Acheh Tsunami Assistance in 2005,

Battagram, Pakistan Earthquake Assistance in 2005/2006 and Bantul,

Yogyakatara, Indonesia Earthquake Assistance in May 2006.

The MAF continually involves itself in Exercises on HADR either bilaterally

(US, France, China) or multilateral (ASEAN, Five Power Defence

Arrangements, Cobra Gold). The MAF desires to acquire in the near future a

float support platform capability in the form of a Multi-Role Support Ship or

MRSS. This platform is expected to have the capability to carry food, medical,

clothing supplies and utility to the affected areas. It would have landing deck

for helicopter operations. Using the MRSS will afford some flexibility of

deployment, either to berth the ship at any port or to fly relief supplies to the

affected areas from a nearby anchorage position. Through this, we hope to

eliminate time wastage to transfer relevant supplies and assistance. This will

overcome the possibilities of unavailability of landing clearance at airports for

whatever reasons at that time12.

12.0 Identify The Sea as A Theatre for Disaster Relief

As explained earlier, Malaysia being a divided land mass, Peninsula and

Sabah/Sarawak, with coasts at every state may need to factor the sea as a

conduit for HADR. This is because large amounts of logistics may be

transported by air and sea to land. The effects from the sea may be staged

ashore for onward distribution inland. A comprehensive network of

coordination will be required at National, Extra Regional, Regional and Global

level prior to HADR. Vulnerable coast may need to be identified in the case of

disasters and potential coasts also need to be gazette for HADR delivery.

Beach reconnaissance may need to be carried out to ascertain the type of

12Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad ZahidHamidi, Minister of Defence, Malaysia, Shangri-La Dialogue 2010, Fourth

Plenary Session, 6 June 2010.

22

gradients that will be suitable for ship to shore activity. The ability of the MAF

to undertake the task cannot be underscored. The lessons learnt from recent

Typhoon incidents will prove to be worthwhile to ponder on a develop

institutional frameworks in the quest to save lives and property. In this case,

the sea need to be factored as a maneuver area where military and industry

can provide valuable logistics. With coordinating centres like AHA Centre in

Jakarta, it will be feasible to identify civil-military components that can be

moved in the maneuver area.

In discussing maneuver area, it will be worthwhile to look at the Marines

model. Marines are designed for ship to shore combat. Their key pillars being

mobility and coordination. However, instead of gaining ground or defending

ground, Marines can conduct mobility and coordination of logistics without the

use of weapons (unless to protect humanitarian relief supplies). Using the

same pillars, the deployments of civil-military components to any coasts in

Malaysia can be developed through amphibiosity. As Malaysia has vast

experiences with the MAF in HADR, it is timely to learn the lessons from the

recent catastrophes in the region and factor the industry in the movement of

logistics to the relief area. Industry logistics like 24 ftcontainers for office

space can be provided be the industry

Figure 8: Industry Capability in HADR

23

Figure 9: Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Research (BFAR)

for HADR

13.0 Land as relief area to effectively coordinate HADR

Whilst the sea is the maneuver area for logistics supply, the land is to be

considered as the relief area to coordinate relief. This area is best only

supported by the military while the lead is to be a civil agency, coordinating

with relief agencies and the communities. The support by the military may be

in the form of military logistics akin to an amphibious operation. A Battalion

Landing Team (BLT) with three Companies are sufficient to cater for shelter,

medicine and food supplies. Company Operating Bases (COB) are capable of

deploying Platoons to receive and store this logistics while distribution to relief

areas can be provided by Relief Agencies. Coordination of logistics from the

sea and distribution of relief supplies need to be on a commercial network

which can manage the volume of information that will be required for the

activity. Platoons can also provide Force Protection for storage areas working

with civil security agencies and relief agencies. With the involvement of the

industry, a Service Level Agreement (SLA) can be developed by NADMA to

provide state-of-the-art equipment for rapid response. Additionally,

cooperation with OCHA and its subsidiary architectures can provide MAF with

the necessary framework to initiate, plan, deploy, conduct HADR and exit

successfully. Extra regional HADR like the Pacific Centre and

RegionalCentres like the AHA Centre can also provide additional capacity

24

building and documentation for HADR. A NADMA-MAF-Industry-Community

framework will be required to effectively coordinate HADR for Malaysia.

14.0 ASEAN and HADR.On the 16th of March 2015, the Defence Ministers

of ASEANpledged to elevate regional defence cooperation to new heights

consistent with the realisation of ASEAN Community 2015. This strong

commitment was made at the 9th ASEAN Defence Meeting held in Langkawi,

which was chaired by H.E. Dato’ Seri HishammuddinTun Hussein, Minister of

Defence of Malaysia and attended by all Defence Ministers and the Secretary-

General of ASEAN. The Meeting concluded with the Defence Ministers

signing a Joint Declaration on Maintaining Regional Security and Stability for

and by the People. The Ministers also endorsed the Standard Operating

Procedure (SOP) for the Utilisation of Military Assets for HADR under the

Framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and

Emergency Response (AADMER). This SOP will be a contribution to the

existing SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint

Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).

The Ministers also endorsed the Concept Papers on ASEAN Militaries Ready

Group on HADR and the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre of Military

Medicine13.

14.1. Therefore, within the ASEAN HADR Framework, the hierarchy of

documents for Military use in HADR are as follows

14.1.2. Utilisation of Military Assets for HADR

14.1.3 ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR

14.1.4 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and

Emergency Response (AADMER)

14.1.5 AHA Centre and ASEAN ERAT

13https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news.html

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14.1.5 SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and

Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency

Response Operations (SASOP)

14.2. However, the Militaries do not have a Concept of Operations

(CONOPS) to phase HADR as it develops. Without a CONOPs, Phases of

Operations cannot be identified and Operations Orders (Opords) cannot be

developed. Moreover, the sea and land phase of the amphibiosity in HADR

from the sea is a complicated and complex environment which consist not

only of the military-industry nexus at sea, it also involves the civil agency-

military and relief agency coordination on land. Utilisation does not elaborate

on how assets will be used, and AHA Centre’s ERAT can only conduct an

assessment and not Planning. AADMER is just an agreement and SASOP is

only a process to identify asset arrangements for HADR. The ASEAN Military

Ready Group14 has the potential to develop a CONOPs for the utilization of

military assets in HADR.

14.3 There is a need therefore to develop a CONOPs which will enable

militaries to do what they do best in the conduct of operations giving them

flexibility to cooperate with the industry.

14.4. Malaysia has industries with cutting edge resources like containers,

communication equipment, sea and air mobility, rain water harvesting, fuel

bladders and the list goes on. Service Level Agreements (SLA) can be signed

between NADMA and identified cooperate players to provide the necessary

equipment, costs and duration.

14.5 MIMA can assist in the identification, utilization, simulation of HADR

support and process flow charts for effective coordinated of HADR in the

given space.

15.0 Recommendation

14This was the brainchild of CMSD, MIMA for Mindef.

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14.1 Civil-Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for HADR

Figure 2: CONOPS for Disaster Relief from the Sea

Phase 1 – Initiation

• Initiate by host country/regional secretariat

• Information gathering/ground recce

Phase 2 – Planning15

• Identify entry point and assembly point

• Type of assistance required by Host Country

• Selection of asset for deployment

Phase 3 – Deployment

• Deploy all asset to assembly point within the planned

15If this is going to be coordinated by AHA Centre, the ASEAN ERAT must consist of assessment team and planners, instead of just assessment team. Planners should be mainly from host country.

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time frame

• Assets can be deployed from multiple axis of approaches

towards assembly point

• All assets are required to report to AmphCdr at the

assembly point

Phase 4 – Relief Operations

• Land Cdr will establish land relief area

• AmphCdr coordinate the aids movement based on the

instruction from Land Cdr

Phase 5 – Handover

• Landed aids will be distributed accordingly

• Land Cdr assume OPCOM for relief operation (including

sea element)

Phase 6 – Exit

• AmphCdr will detach each unit which complete offloading

processes

• Critical asset (Capital Ship) will remain in vicinity of Land

Relief Area to render any assistance required