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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) FROM THE SEA
CAPT MARTIN A. SEBASTIAN RMN (R) & MOHD IKMAL HISYAM ABU
CENTRE FOR MARITIME SECURITY & DIPLOMACY – CMSD
VERSION: FINAL
DATE: 30 JAN 2016
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Table of Contents 1.0 Problem Statement 4 2.0 Objectives of the Study 5 3.0 Outcome of the Study 5 4.0 Introduction 6 4.1 Natural Disaster 8 5.0 Recent Disaster 9 5.1 Typhoon Haiyan 11 5.2 Typhoon Hagupit 12 6.0 Global HADR 14 7.0 Extra Regional HADR 15 8.0 Regional HADR 17 9.0 National HADR 18 10.0 NADMA and NaDMA; A Comparison 18 11.0 Developments in Civil-Military Cooperation on HADR in Malaysia 19 12.0 Identify the Sea as a Theatre for Disaster Relief 22 13.0 Land as Relief Area to Effectively Coordinate HADR 24 14.0 Recommendation 25 14.1 Civil-Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for HADR 25
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Table of Figures Figure 1: Cost of Natural Disasters 6 Figure 2: Infogram on Typhoon Nargis in Myanmar 9 Figure 3: Infogram on Typhoon Hayyan in the Philippines 11 Figure 4: Ilustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National Actors in HADR and Their Roles, Function 14 Figure 5: OCHA Presence in the Global Disaster Relief 15 Figure 6: Pacific Disaster Centre Portal 16 Figure 7: AHA Centre 17 Figure 8: Industry Capability in HADR 23 Figure 9: Philippines Bureau of Fisheris and Aquatic Research(BFAR) for HADR 23 Figure 10: CONOPS for Disaster Relief from the Sea 25
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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (HADR) FROM
THE SEA
Captain Martin A. SEBASTIAN RMN (R)
Mohd Ikmal Hisyam bin Abu
Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy
MIMA
“Sometimes, the enormity of the disaster is such that a nation, however powerful, finds it difficult to
manage the disaster on its own, thus warranting the need for external assistance and, more often than
not, involvement of military. Why then the military? By nature of its structure, organization, assets and
capability, militaries are seen as suited for immediate response to any disaster relief operations.
However, foreign or international military involvement in any disaster relief operations must be short and
objective orientated. Their main objective in HADR is to deploy quickly, set the ground, conduct SAR
operations, save lives, provide medical assistance and leave the area once the situation is stabilized by
handing over the responsibility to civilian-led government agencies, NGOs and the international
community.”
Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Minister of Defence, Malaysia
Shangri-La Dialogue 2010, Fourth Plenary Session, 6 June 2010
1.0 Problem Statement
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is about bringing
together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.
It is a time sensitive activity which means timely response is the essence to
bring relief to affected victims in time of disaster. To achieve this, coordination
and mobility become the key pillars. The National Security Council’s Arahan
MKN No. 20:DasardanMekanismePengurusanBencana Negara was
promulgated on 11 May 1997 following the highland towers incident.
However, it is a land centric incident which does not cater for mitigation on
HADR but responses. Additionally, it does not cater for responses from the
sea. The new National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) acts as a
coordinating agency, however policies on HADR from the sea policies nor the
effective use of the civil-military cooperation architectures are not apparent.
Therefore, there is a dual need to policies for HADR from the sea and the use
of civil-military architecture for HADR operations. The lessons learnt from
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previous HADR operations in the region suggests a need for the use of the
sea and to explore further the benefits of civil-military cooperation in HADR.
2.0 The Objectives of this Study is as follows:
• Illustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National actors in
HADR and their roles, functions.
• Identify the sea as a theatre for disaster relief
• Divide the sea and land into maneuver area and relief area to
effectively coordinate HADR
• Maneuver area managed by military and industry whilst relief area
managed by inter-agency
• Include industry as key players in HADR and bring to bear industry
level logistics and coordination mechanisms
3.0 The outcome from this Study is as follows:
• Concept of Operation for Militaries
• Identify industrial support for Disaster Relief
• Develop delivery, storage including protection, distribution and
monitoring mechanism
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Figure 1: Cost of Natural Disasters
4.0 Introduction
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations have
attracted the attention of the global community in recent years. Building
capabilities, interoperability and a conceptual framework for participation in
these operations has gained traction among national, regional and
international policymakers. Malaysia being a divided land mass, Peninsula
and Sabah/Sarawak with coasts at every state may need to factor the sea as
a conduit for HADR. In so far as the Arahan MKN No. 20:
DasardanMekanismePengurusanBencana Negara is concerned, it is a land
centric disaster relief Instruction It does not lay foundations for comprehensive
action in cases of disasters akin to those that has hit ASEAN. Though
disasters cost a fortune of response, it is vital that the response reach the
affected population early, feed and provide shelter, tender to the injured, clear
the dead and destroy carcasses that may give rise to outbreaks. In addition,
there is a need to clear the affected area from debris for relief agencies to
conduct logistics movement. This will entail providing fuel support services
and mobility support in addition to shelter for relief agencies working round the
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clock. They too need to be fed and protected from disease. Coordination
mechanisms between logistics providers, movers, storage and distribution are
vital to ensure the right elements reach the right people at the right time and
at the right location. Force protection of storage areas will be required
especially food and medicine. In understanding the whole gamut of HADR, it
is vital to first understand that the supported and supporting both will require
adequate logistics. To provide relief, relief agencies themselves must be
appropriately trained for the calibrated response. Whilst doing so, they must
be well aware of the restrictions, constraints and the hazards forthwith. This is
where prior knowledge will be essential, learning from the lessons of past
incidents.Humanitarian organisations should appreciate that the key factors to
responding quickly to meet disaster survivors' expectations are: local
permanent relief logistics facilities; transportation; preparedness of human
resource and co-ordination between different parties. Without it, essential
supplies and relief will take much longer to reach the people who need it most
at the time they need it most.
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4.1 Natural Disasters. More than seven trillion US dollars of
economic damage and eight million deaths via natural disasters have
been recorded since the start of the 20th century1. The number of
natural disasters around the world has increased by more than four
times in the last 20 years, according to a report released by the British
charity Oxfam.Oxfam analyzed data from the Red Cross,United
Nations and researchers at Louvain University in Belgium. It found that
the earth is currently experiencing approximately 500 natural disasters
per year, compared with 120 per year in the early 1980s. The number
of weather-related disasters in 2015 was 240, compared with 60 in
19802. The world’s failure to prepare for natural disasters will have
―inconceivably bad‖ consequences as climate change fuels a huge
increase in catastrophic droughts and floods and the humanitarian
crises that follow. Last year, earthquakes, floods, heatwaves and
landslides left 22,773 people dead, affected 98.6 million others and
caused $66.5bn (£47bn) of economic damage. Yet the international
community spends less than half of one per cent of the global aid
budget on mitigating the risks posed by such hazards. Robert Glasser,
the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Disaster Risk
Reduction, said that with the world already ―falling short‖ in its response
to humanitarian emergencies, things would only get worse as climate
change adds to the pressure.3
1https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/04/160418092043.html
2http://www.naturalnews.com/023362_natural_disasters_floods.html#ixzz47QFKxeQO
3http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/24/world-heading-for-catastrophe-over-
natural-disasters-risk-expert-warns
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5.0 Recent Disasters
Figure 2: Infogram on Typhoon Nargis in Myanmar
Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008, making landfall in the
Ayeyarwady Division and passing into Yangon Division before hitting the
former capital, Yangon. The cyclone’s toll was catastrophic, overall, 84,500
people were reported dead, 55,500 missing, and 19,300 injured. Out of the
7.35 million people in the 37 affected townships across the Ayeyarwady and
Yangon Divisions, some 2.4 million were estimated to have been severely
affected. An estimated 800,000 people were displaced4 . The Ayeyarwady
Delta, known as the country’s rice bowl, saw tremendous damage to its paddy
4http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jul/16/cyclone-nargis-
burma-disaster-relief-aid
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fields - here, the effects of extreme wind had been compounded by a 3.7m
tidal wave. The FAO estimated that 63% of Myanmar’s paddy fields had been
impacted upon5. Nargis hit as paddy farmers had been at the last stage of the
dry season harvest, which accounts for 25% of annual production. The
cyclone also caused widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure,
including roads, jetties, water and sanitation systems, fuel supplies and
electricity networks. A large number of water sources were contaminated and
food stocks damaged or destroyed. Overall, it was estimated that Nargis
caused USD 4 billion in economic losses. A United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) report on lessons learnt 6 identified how would the humanitarian
response need to change if the same happened again? Among the lessons
learnt were as follows:
Essential reproductive health supplies. Speed was critical. If
emergency obstetric care was not made available, a pregnancy could
be fatal for a mother and child.
Life-saving supplies. Thesewereprocured, shipped and were handed
over to UNFPA's implementing partners for distribution via mobile
clinics that could reach thousands displaced in hard hit areas.
Gifts-in-kind. This well-meant logistics from other governments began
arriving without content descriptions. Most of it did not match the needs
of the beneficiaries, and instead just caused congestion in the
warehouse. The supplies were stuck in stores when they should have
been in the field where they were in desperate need of them.
Competencies. Some agencies relied on local staff who lacked
humanitarian experience of dealing with such a tragedy as it was the
first time that Burma had experienced a natural disaster of this
magnitude.
Delays in the international humanitarian supply chain.
Thesedelays sent aid workers scrambling for essential supplies at local
markets, carrying large sums of money, and buying essential supplies
outside the usual procurement procedures. As a result, prices were
5http://fao.com.my 6Pam Steele, Disaster preparedness: Lessons from Cyclone Nargis, The Guardian, 16 July 2013.
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inflated, making goods more expensive for the Burmese people too.
This situation persisted for two to three weeks until supplies started to
arrive from outside the country and the humanitarian response stepped
up a gear.
In addition to these lessons learnt, a report from CARE International on
Cyclone Nargis is attached in Annex A.
5.1 Typhoon Haiyan. On November 8, 2013. Typhoon Haiyan—
known as Typhoon Yolanda in the Philippines—made landfall in the
central Philippines, bringing strong winds and heavy rains that have
resulted in flooding, landslides, and widespread damage.
Figure 3: Infogram on Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines
The lessons learnt from Typhoon Haiyan were as follows:
Communication of any sort was not available. This made coordination
difficult
No power supply. Essential services could not be delivered.
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Lack of mobility. Heavy equipment and other vehicles were temporarily
inoperational as there were no fuel.
Impassable roads. Debris were all over and therefore it is was
impossible to move from one area to another to help victims
Damaged relief goods. Goods stored in the provinces and regions were
damaged and washed away
There were many other lessons learnt which are captured in the Centre for
Excellence 7 . These lessons captured the Civil-Military Cooperation in
response to the HADR requirement. The Best Practices captured are in
Annex B.
5.2 Typhoon Hagupit, known in the Philippines as Typhoon Ruby,
was the second most intense tropical cyclone in 2014. Hagupit particularly
impacted the Philippines in early December while gradually weakening,
killing 18 people and causing $114 million (2014 USD) in the country.Prior
to making landfall, Typhoon Hagupit was considered the worst threat to
the Philippines in 2014.8 fortunately, the disaster was significantly smaller
than 2013's Typhoon Haiyan.In a nutshell, the lessons learnt from
Typhoon Haiyan greatly helped in the preparations for Typhoon Hagupit.9.
Relief Web also published an article by Nanyang University of Technology
Singapore on the use of Singapore Defence Force during the Typhoon10.A
six-man ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), which
included four Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) officers, were
deployed prior to the onslaught of Hagupit. The team was deployed under
the auspices of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian
7Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response, ―Advances in Civil-Military
Coordination in Catastrophes: How the Philippines Turned Lessons Learned from Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Into Best Practices for Disaster Preparedness and Response (2015), Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 456 Hornet Avenue, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI 96860-3503 8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhoon_Hagupit_(2014)
9Melanie Tef, Learning the Lessons of Typhoon Hagupit: Investing in emergency preparedness pays off,
The International Rescue Committee, February 9, 2015. 10Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano, Lessons of Two Disasters: Building Resilience
from Within, Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 9 Dec 2014
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Assistance (AHA), based in Jakarta. Its critical function is to provide rapid
assessment and determine the critical resources such as tents, medical
kits, and sanitation facilities required for the areas affected by the typhoon.
ERAT was formed within the AHA Centre to help ASEAN and the
international community identify what needs to be delivered to affected
communities during civil emergencies.
Working with the AHA, Singapore deployed its Swift Emergency Evaluation
Deployment (SEED) team, a nationally-organised needs assessment team to
assist the Philippines in getting a comprehensive analysis of the situation in
the affected areas and enhance information-sharing. This helped facilitate
decision-making by armed forces, for instance, by directing them to affected
areas most in need of disaster assistance.
Figure 4: Illustrate Global, Extra Regional, Regional and National actors
in HADR and their roles, functions
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6.0 Global HADR
In the global context, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of the United Nations Secretariat, is
responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure coherent
response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within
which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. OCHA's
mission is as follows:
• Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in
partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human
suffering in disasters and emergencies.
• Advocate the rights of people in need.
• Promote preparedness and prevention.
• Facilitate sustainable solutions.
Figure 5: OCHA Presence in the Global Disaster Relief
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7.0 Extra Regional HADR
The Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) delivers comprehensive information,
assessments, tools, and services with the goal of reducing disaster risk. PDC
is dedicated to improving disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery through innovative, global multi-hazard disaster monitoring, early
warning, and decision support systems, as well as risk and vulnerability
assessment, modeling and visualization, exercise support, and capacity
enhancement services. The PDC supports disaster management community
by making high-quality information from trusted sources securely available
and accessible. Additionally, they provide the up-to-date information, science,
and technology necessary to support evidence-based decision making. PDC
partnerships span civilian-military, academic-operational, public-private, and
U.S.-foreign stakeholders, institutions, and
communities with common interests.PDC is located in the state of Hawaii
(USA), with its headquarters on the island of Maui and additional personnel
supporting key clients and stakeholders elsewhere in Hawaii, on the U.S.
mainland, and in Southeast Asia.
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Figure 7: AHA Centre
ASEAN HADR preparedness comprises Chapter VI of the ASEAN Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) for Regional Standby Arrangements on HADR;
the ARF Strategic Guidance for HADR; and the Guidelines on the Facilitation
of Foreign Military Assistance by the Asia Pacific Conference on Military
Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations or APC-MADRO. The ASEAN
Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management
(AHA Centre) is an inter-governmental organisation which aims to facilitate
cooperation and coordination among ASEAN Member States and with the
United Nations and international organisations for disaster management and
emergency response in ASEAN Region. The Centre was established by 10
ASEAN Member States; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam on 17
November 2011, through the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment
of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster
management in Bali, Indonesia. AHA Centre is governed by the members of
the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), which consists of
the Heads of the National Disaster Management Offices of ASEAN Member
States. Hosted by the Government of Indonesia, the AHA Centre serves the
Member States from its Office in Jakarta.
9.0 National HADR
The government formed the National Disaster Management Agency or
NADMA to coordinate the work of various agencies during a disaster. NADMA
is set up not to take over the functions of agencies like the armed forces,
police, Civil Defence Department, Fire and Rescue, Rela and Social Welfare
Department but to manage and coordinate efforts. However, NADMA is not to
be mistaken with NaDMA, an agency in the Government of Grenada.
10.0 NADMA and NaDMA. A Comparison
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NaDMA is tasked to reduce the loss of life and property within Grenada,
Carriacou and Petite Martinique by ensuring that adequate preparedness,
response and mitigation measures are in place to deal with the impact of
hazards. The vision of the Agency is to develop a culture of prevention and
safety among all sectors of society. Formerly known as NERO, it was
established in 1985 under a Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness
Project. NaDMA is the body charged with the responsibility of coordinating all
disaster-related activities on Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique.
NaDMA is a department of the Office of the Prime Minister and is headed by
the Prime Minister himself. The day to day functions of the NaDMA are
executed by a Secretariat which is the National Disaster Office located at Fort
Frederick, Richmond Hill, St. George’s. The Office functions with
approximately eleven (11) other officers.
The National Emergency Advisory Council (NEAC) is the body responsible for
giving general direction and control and the development of policies. These
responsibilities reside with the Prime Minister. The NEAC consists of
members of the government, NGOs, industry and various other institutions
which assist the government in developing actionable policies in HADR.
The National Disaster Office (NDO) overseas the work of the District Disaster
Committees which function in seventeen (17) districts established along
electoral boundary lines inclusive of Carriacou and Petite Martinique. These
District Disaster Committees are patterned according to the National Structure
and is headed by a District Disaster Coordinator who is assisted by a deputy
and consists of eight (8) management committees with responsibility for the
areas of Shelter Management, Safety and Security, Health and Welfare,
Public Education and Information, Emergency Works and Transportation,
Supplies Management, Damage and Needs Assessment and
Telecommunications. Evolving out of these District Disaster Committees are
Village Sub-committees which consists of the same management committees.
In as far as NADMA is concerned, it remains a coordinating agency with
regards to HADR efforts. Risk Mitigation, preparedness and the
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comprehensiveness that NaDMA advocates is not visible. NADMA website
illustrates several activities which may not guarantee effective and efficient
risk mitigation, preparedness, response and consequence management. This
is duly because there are no policies, processes, procedures nor inter agency
capacity building programmes as such, that will detail the evolution of HADR.
11.0 Developments in Civil-Military Cooperation on HADR. Malaysia11
MAF is guided by National Security Council Directive No. 20 which dictates
that the role of MAF is to assist and support the civil agencies in HADR.
Regionally, MAF abides to the following SOPs and guidelines:
a. Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets
in Disaster Relief.
b. Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint
Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).
c. ASEAN Regional Forum Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief Standard Operating Procedure (ARF HADR SOP).
MAF by nature of its structure, organization, training, readiness and inventory
capabilities is seen as an appropriate organization to respond to HADR
operations. Apart from being self-sufficient, MAF could provide logistics and
administrative support to other governmental or non governmental bodies
involved in HADR operations. Over the years, based on MAF exposure and
experience in HADR operations, it has developed the following capabilities:
a. Malaysian Army (MA). MA is capable to provide
immediate search and rescue efforts which is very critical during the
initial stage of HADR operation. Following that, MA has the capacity to
11ARF Seminar on Laws and Regulation: Participation of the Malaysian Armed Forces in HADR; Paper
Presented by Mindef.
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assist in constructions of temporary shelters, provide treated water to
the stricken areas, clearance of debris, disposal of explosive
ordinance, providing sanitation facilities and reopening of transportation
communication systems. In addition to that, MA is also capable to
provide logistics support to sustain HADR in terms supplying food, fuel,
cooking facilities, land transport system, repair and maintenance of
mechanical equipment.
b. Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN). RMN assets are suitable as
command, control and communication base and for transportation of
equipment. They could be utilized as afloat forward operating base;
logistics support base and as floating hospitals. Naval personnel can
also be tasked for beach and port management and to assist in any
engineering works. The RMN is also capable to assist in providing
limited helicopter facilities with night flying capabilities operating from
their capital ships. These helicopters are generally used in evacuation
of casualties and transportation of humanitarian aids to remote areas.
c. Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). RMAF main contributions
are in air transportations. The success of any HADR is dependent on
quick response which is dependent on the availability and readiness of
the RMAF air assets. The RMAF has the capability to fly 2 of its
transport aircraft to any destination within the region within 2-hours
notice and to provide at least one Sikorsky helicopter at any one time
for HADR operation. Apart from that, RMAF is also capable to provide
airfield security, air transportable health support, aero-medical
evacuation, evacuees processing, airspace management, air traffic
control and terminal services.
d. MAF Medical Services. MAF Medical Services is capable to
provide at least a level-one medical support with surgical capability in
the form of Field Hospital. Once deployed, the Field Hospital can be
constructed within 24 hours and will then be able to provide medical
services within 48 hours. This Field Hospital constructed in the form of
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modular cabin and tents with 20 beds in-house patient capability.
MAF’s earlier version of Field Hospital under tents has been deployed
previously in Chaman, Pakistan for Afghan Refugees Medical
Assistance in 2001/2002, Acheh Tsunami Assistance in 2005,
Battagram, Pakistan Earthquake Assistance in 2005/2006 and Bantul,
Yogyakatara, Indonesia Earthquake Assistance in May 2006.
The MAF continually involves itself in Exercises on HADR either bilaterally
(US, France, China) or multilateral (ASEAN, Five Power Defence
Arrangements, Cobra Gold). The MAF desires to acquire in the near future a
float support platform capability in the form of a Multi-Role Support Ship or
MRSS. This platform is expected to have the capability to carry food, medical,
clothing supplies and utility to the affected areas. It would have landing deck
for helicopter operations. Using the MRSS will afford some flexibility of
deployment, either to berth the ship at any port or to fly relief supplies to the
affected areas from a nearby anchorage position. Through this, we hope to
eliminate time wastage to transfer relevant supplies and assistance. This will
overcome the possibilities of unavailability of landing clearance at airports for
whatever reasons at that time12.
12.0 Identify The Sea as A Theatre for Disaster Relief
As explained earlier, Malaysia being a divided land mass, Peninsula and
Sabah/Sarawak, with coasts at every state may need to factor the sea as a
conduit for HADR. This is because large amounts of logistics may be
transported by air and sea to land. The effects from the sea may be staged
ashore for onward distribution inland. A comprehensive network of
coordination will be required at National, Extra Regional, Regional and Global
level prior to HADR. Vulnerable coast may need to be identified in the case of
disasters and potential coasts also need to be gazette for HADR delivery.
Beach reconnaissance may need to be carried out to ascertain the type of
12Dato’ Seri Dr Ahmad ZahidHamidi, Minister of Defence, Malaysia, Shangri-La Dialogue 2010, Fourth
Plenary Session, 6 June 2010.
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gradients that will be suitable for ship to shore activity. The ability of the MAF
to undertake the task cannot be underscored. The lessons learnt from recent
Typhoon incidents will prove to be worthwhile to ponder on a develop
institutional frameworks in the quest to save lives and property. In this case,
the sea need to be factored as a maneuver area where military and industry
can provide valuable logistics. With coordinating centres like AHA Centre in
Jakarta, it will be feasible to identify civil-military components that can be
moved in the maneuver area.
In discussing maneuver area, it will be worthwhile to look at the Marines
model. Marines are designed for ship to shore combat. Their key pillars being
mobility and coordination. However, instead of gaining ground or defending
ground, Marines can conduct mobility and coordination of logistics without the
use of weapons (unless to protect humanitarian relief supplies). Using the
same pillars, the deployments of civil-military components to any coasts in
Malaysia can be developed through amphibiosity. As Malaysia has vast
experiences with the MAF in HADR, it is timely to learn the lessons from the
recent catastrophes in the region and factor the industry in the movement of
logistics to the relief area. Industry logistics like 24 ftcontainers for office
space can be provided be the industry
Figure 8: Industry Capability in HADR
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Figure 9: Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Research (BFAR)
for HADR
13.0 Land as relief area to effectively coordinate HADR
Whilst the sea is the maneuver area for logistics supply, the land is to be
considered as the relief area to coordinate relief. This area is best only
supported by the military while the lead is to be a civil agency, coordinating
with relief agencies and the communities. The support by the military may be
in the form of military logistics akin to an amphibious operation. A Battalion
Landing Team (BLT) with three Companies are sufficient to cater for shelter,
medicine and food supplies. Company Operating Bases (COB) are capable of
deploying Platoons to receive and store this logistics while distribution to relief
areas can be provided by Relief Agencies. Coordination of logistics from the
sea and distribution of relief supplies need to be on a commercial network
which can manage the volume of information that will be required for the
activity. Platoons can also provide Force Protection for storage areas working
with civil security agencies and relief agencies. With the involvement of the
industry, a Service Level Agreement (SLA) can be developed by NADMA to
provide state-of-the-art equipment for rapid response. Additionally,
cooperation with OCHA and its subsidiary architectures can provide MAF with
the necessary framework to initiate, plan, deploy, conduct HADR and exit
successfully. Extra regional HADR like the Pacific Centre and
RegionalCentres like the AHA Centre can also provide additional capacity
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building and documentation for HADR. A NADMA-MAF-Industry-Community
framework will be required to effectively coordinate HADR for Malaysia.
14.0 ASEAN and HADR.On the 16th of March 2015, the Defence Ministers
of ASEANpledged to elevate regional defence cooperation to new heights
consistent with the realisation of ASEAN Community 2015. This strong
commitment was made at the 9th ASEAN Defence Meeting held in Langkawi,
which was chaired by H.E. Dato’ Seri HishammuddinTun Hussein, Minister of
Defence of Malaysia and attended by all Defence Ministers and the Secretary-
General of ASEAN. The Meeting concluded with the Defence Ministers
signing a Joint Declaration on Maintaining Regional Security and Stability for
and by the People. The Ministers also endorsed the Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) for the Utilisation of Military Assets for HADR under the
Framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response (AADMER). This SOP will be a contribution to the
existing SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint
Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP).
The Ministers also endorsed the Concept Papers on ASEAN Militaries Ready
Group on HADR and the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre of Military
Medicine13.
14.1. Therefore, within the ASEAN HADR Framework, the hierarchy of
documents for Military use in HADR are as follows
14.1.2. Utilisation of Military Assets for HADR
14.1.3 ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR
14.1.4 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response (AADMER)
14.1.5 AHA Centre and ASEAN ERAT
13https://admm.asean.org/index.php/admm-news.html
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14.1.5 SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and
Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency
Response Operations (SASOP)
14.2. However, the Militaries do not have a Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) to phase HADR as it develops. Without a CONOPs, Phases of
Operations cannot be identified and Operations Orders (Opords) cannot be
developed. Moreover, the sea and land phase of the amphibiosity in HADR
from the sea is a complicated and complex environment which consist not
only of the military-industry nexus at sea, it also involves the civil agency-
military and relief agency coordination on land. Utilisation does not elaborate
on how assets will be used, and AHA Centre’s ERAT can only conduct an
assessment and not Planning. AADMER is just an agreement and SASOP is
only a process to identify asset arrangements for HADR. The ASEAN Military
Ready Group14 has the potential to develop a CONOPs for the utilization of
military assets in HADR.
14.3 There is a need therefore to develop a CONOPs which will enable
militaries to do what they do best in the conduct of operations giving them
flexibility to cooperate with the industry.
14.4. Malaysia has industries with cutting edge resources like containers,
communication equipment, sea and air mobility, rain water harvesting, fuel
bladders and the list goes on. Service Level Agreements (SLA) can be signed
between NADMA and identified cooperate players to provide the necessary
equipment, costs and duration.
14.5 MIMA can assist in the identification, utilization, simulation of HADR
support and process flow charts for effective coordinated of HADR in the
given space.
15.0 Recommendation
14This was the brainchild of CMSD, MIMA for Mindef.
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14.1 Civil-Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for HADR
Figure 2: CONOPS for Disaster Relief from the Sea
Phase 1 – Initiation
• Initiate by host country/regional secretariat
• Information gathering/ground recce
Phase 2 – Planning15
• Identify entry point and assembly point
• Type of assistance required by Host Country
• Selection of asset for deployment
Phase 3 – Deployment
• Deploy all asset to assembly point within the planned
15If this is going to be coordinated by AHA Centre, the ASEAN ERAT must consist of assessment team and planners, instead of just assessment team. Planners should be mainly from host country.
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time frame
• Assets can be deployed from multiple axis of approaches
towards assembly point
• All assets are required to report to AmphCdr at the
assembly point
Phase 4 – Relief Operations
• Land Cdr will establish land relief area
• AmphCdr coordinate the aids movement based on the
instruction from Land Cdr
Phase 5 – Handover
• Landed aids will be distributed accordingly
• Land Cdr assume OPCOM for relief operation (including
sea element)
Phase 6 – Exit
• AmphCdr will detach each unit which complete offloading
processes
• Critical asset (Capital Ship) will remain in vicinity of Land
Relief Area to render any assistance required