human dignity in classical chinese philosophy: the daoist perspective

qianfan zhang

HUMAN DIGNITY IN CLASSICAL CHINESEPHILOSOPHY:

THE DAOIST PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

This article discusses the Daoist contribution to the idea of humandignity in the classical Chinese philosophy, particularly in aspectsthat had been ignored by the Confucians and the Moists. By criticiz-ing the traditional morality and reviving the faith in a primitive,self-sufficient life, Laozi and Zhuangzi add an important dimensionto the classical understanding of human dignity: individual freedom,particularly the freedom of living under minimum burden, direction,and oppression of the state. By comparing the Daoist conception ofhuman dignity with those of the Confucians and Moists, the articleconcludes that all three classical schools, if rationally construed,should support the view that the establishment of a liberal constitu-tional scheme is necessary to preserve and protect minimum/basicdignity in both physical and spiritual well-being of every humanperson who lives in a modern society.

I. Introduction

This article is the last in the trilogy following the previous discussionson the idea of human dignity in Confucianism and Moism,1 andfocuses on the original contributions made by the early Daoist phi-losophers in aspects that had been ignored by the Confucians and theMoists. The most unique contribution of Daoism is that it brings theindividual person—simple, uncultivated and, perhaps, selfish person,to the center of moral philosophy. Explicitly for the first time, activefulfillment of social duties ceases to be the unquestioned ground formoral encomium; a person is no longer viewed primarily in terms ofrelationships to others, but in his own right—more precisely, in hispersonal relation to the Way that is both his destiny and origin ofbirth. Rather than asking what a person ought to do for his family, the

QIANFAN ZHANG, Professor, School of Law, Peking University. Specialties: compara-tive public law and political theory. E-mail: [email protected]

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Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40:3–4 (September–December 2013) 493–510© 2014 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

community, and the state—in a word, for others—the Daoist is daringenough to question the very legitimacy of human obligations, and asksinstead what a person should do for his own sake. More than theutilitarian Moist, the Daoist brings into doubt not only a particularmoral code enacted for a people at any particular time, but alsomorality in general, which in one way or another restricts a person’sprimitive freedom to live as a natural animal. By criticizing the tradi-tional morality and reviving the faith in a primitive, self-sufficient life,Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子 add an important dimension to theclassical understanding of human dignity: individual freedom, particu-larly the freedom of living under the minimum burden, direction, andoppression of the state.

The article is divided into two main parts. It first explores theDaoist moral philosophy centered on the Way and human freedom.Distinguishing itself from other schools of Chinese philosophy, theDaoist takes the self as the ultimate end of human pursuit, therebyrecovering human dignity from excessive burdens of social or familialobligations that tend to crush individual personality. Second, it dis-cusses the Daoist political program as a way to realize its moral idealsand examines the extent to which the early Daoists have succeeded inbuilding a consistent theory to effectively pursue a free personal life.I argue that although the Daoists express the romantic longing forpersonal freedom, their unnecessarily radical hostility against reasonand institutional building has prevented them from formulating aneffective mechanism to gain, protect, and maintain such freedom. Thearticle ends with a brief comparison of the Daoist conception ofhuman dignity with those of the Confucians and Moists, and con-cludes that all three classical schools, if rationally construed, shouldsupport the view that the establishment of a liberal constitutionalscheme is necessary to preserve dignity for every human being wholives in a modern society.

In conclusion, I will point out the common merits and limitationsin all three schools of classical Chinese philosophy. To be sure, theMoist equality plus Daoist freedom is far from liberal democracy.However, although traditional Chinese thinkers, limited by thecontext of political and social practices at the time, had never dis-covered the modern notions of liberal democracy and human rights,the classical schools are not inherently repugnant to these notions.Indeed, I argue that the classical ideas about human dignity requirethe establishment of a constitution, which will limit the power of thegovernment, protect and help inculcate the innate virtues, maintainmoral independence as against the potential infringements by socialand political powers, and provide for a minimum welfare to everyhuman being.

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II. The Way and the Daoist Freedom

1. A Total Break with Traditional Morality

If Confucius, followed by Mencius 孟子 and particularly Xunzi荀子, seeks to preserve the traditional li禮 as a moral constitution forsociety, and Mozi 墨子 seeks to reform the particular provisions ofthis constitution under the overarching utilitarian principle, then theDaoist proposes to abolish artificial rules and customs altogether.Like Mozi and his disciples, the Daoist as represented in the classicLaozi and Zhuangzi,2 criticizes Confucianism for making social dis-tinctions contrary to the Daoist understanding of the Way (Dao道) asthe ultimate One.3 But the Daoist has gone much further in thatdirection.While the writings of Mozi represent a limited attack on theobstinate insistence of the later Confucians upon the anachronisticand wasteful system of li and yue 樂, and a comparatively limitedreform of such a tradition based on its utilitarian principle command-ing universal love, Laozi and Zhuangzi propose nothing less than atotal break with everything traditional and repudiation of all socialdistinctions in order for mankind to regain the true meaning of life.Thus, “from the view of the Way, things are neither noble or ignoble.. . . Ten thousand things are equal as one. How can we tell which isshorter and which is longer?”4

Put together, the Daoist works constitute a grand indictment ofhuman civilization. They seek to awaken the lethargic minds hithertocontent with the accepted doctrines of morality based on social dis-tinctions. In reality, what is branded as “moral” or “good” oftenamounts to no more than the adulation of the powerful, which rendersa large part of moral teachings to mere hypocrisy. In the somewhatcynical view of Zhuangzi, “he who steals a buckle gets the deathpenalty; he who steals the state gets the lordship, and benevolence andrighteousness are to be found at the lord’s gates.”5 For Laozi andZhuangzi, human problems, which they confronted over two thou-sand years ago no less than we do today, are to be solved neither bymoral indoctrination under the names of ren 仁, yi 義 and universallove, nor by astute political schemes or severe legal punishments; allthese artifices merely lead mankind further away from the naturalWay that gives birth to everything existing—heaven, the earth, andmankind. Repudiate knowledge, sagely teachings, and clever reason,which have merely served to pollute the simple morals of the primi-tive people; discard every nicety that the civilization had manufac-tured to distract a person from living according to his own nature;return to the primitive community where men and women, as simpleand sincere as they were in their infancy, live a natural life as destined

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by the great Way, and where they regain the paradise of primitivefreedom. The rulers, on the other hand, should do nothing (wuwei無為) but maintain such a primitive state of affairs.

The Daoist rejects a tendency commonly present and seek some-thing commonly absent in both Confucianism and Moism. WhileConfucianism can be interpreted to support moral autonomy andpersonal independence, and even Moism can be construed to requiretreating everyone as the end and not merely as means, in practice theyare all too easily disposed to immerse, and ultimately dissolve, anindividual person in the relationship to others. Under the crushingburden of a myriad of social responsibilities and the stringent demandof universal love (which does not require anyone to sacrifice himself,but does require him to love everyone as he loves himself and his kin),a person can no longer live his own life; properly speaking, he is livingprimarily not for himself, but for others.6 He is no longer taken, byothers or by himself, to be the person he is, but only a son of his father,a subject of his lord, or a universal servant whose worth lies solely inthe benefits he confers to the world. He sees himself as the summationof the duties he owes to his kin and superior, and of the various sortsof comfort he may derive in turn from the duties others owe to him.In him as in everyone else, the very essence of personhood is lost.Such a person is necessarily deficient in dignity, just as dignity islacking in a slave or an instrument used for purposes other than itself.The Daoist effort is precisely to rediscover and regain the essence ofself that has been lost, perhaps in small steps, each imperceptible tohuman consciousness, along the path toward civilization.

2. The Self as the Ultimate End

Opposed to both Confucius and Mozi, who lay heavy emphasisupon one’s social duty and pay homage to those sage-kings whosupposedly had saved society from dissolution, Laozi and Zhuangziextol the virtue of private life and seek to convince men and womento return to their natural, easy, and simple way of living, by which theycan live in touch with their true selves. This idea is pervasive in thework of Zhuangzi, who repeatedly preaches “the usefulness of beinguseless,” as against turning oneself into a useful tool, thereby aban-doning one’s own nature. “The Truth of the Way is in looking out foroneself; its fringes and leftovers consist in managing the state; its offaland weeds consist in governing the empire.”7

The Daoist principle is generally consistent with the teaching ofYangzi 楊朱, who challenges his contemporary archrival, Mozi, byquestioning not whether one ought to do useful and beneficial things,but what is truly useful and beneficial to life—one’s own and every-

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one else’s life.8 While “Confucius valued benevolence, Mozi valuedbeing for everyone . . . , Yangzi valued self”;9 “Keeping one’s natureintact, protecting one’s genuineness, and not letting the body be tiedby other things—these Yangzi advocated but Mencius condemned.”10

The idea of Yangzi, it seems, is to leave everyone to benefit his ownperson and allow the others to do the same. Here we have a flavor ofthe early Chinese individualism.11 The way Yangzi views the selfnaturally leads him to value one’s person as the ultimate end that isabove everything else, whether wealth, high office, or the honor itentails. Thus, “our life is our own possession, and its benefit to us isvery great. Regarding its dignity, even the honor of being Emperorcould not compare with it. Regarding its importance, even the wealthof possessing the world would not be exchanged for it.”12 As “regard-ing its safety, were we to lose it for one morning, we could never againbring it back,”13 and we ought to value ourselves and take thingslightly.

The divergence in the view of man and society among Confucian-ism, Moism, and Daoism begins with the metaphysical meaning ofthe Way. Unlike “the Way of heaven” in Confucianism, the Way inDaoism, as the ultimate source of all things, is more fundamental thanheaven and the earth. It is the eternal, spontaneous, nameless, andindescribable One, the differentiation of which gives rise to heaven,the earth, humans, and other things.14 While the Confucian and Moistheaven is the source of morality and universal love that governs thehuman world, such moral connotations are entirely absent in theDaoist Way. On the contrary, the Way, as a morally neutral principlethat governs the entire universe, transcends the human concerns ofgood and evil.15 Everything in that universe has its own nature, and tochange it is as futile as harmful. The duck’s legs are short, just as thecrane’s legs are long; it would equally violate their nature to stretchthe former and to shorten the latter in order to fit the aesthetic viewsheld by parts of the human species.16 No less than other animals in theuniverse, mankind, too, has its inalienable nature, and Zhuangziwonders whether the man-made doctrines of ren and yi, imposedupon ordinary men and women by the force of social sanctions andlegal punishments, are unlike the stretching and shortening of legs.17

Just like everything else, a human being has an innate virtue (de德) ornatural character insofar as he spontaneously participates in the Way,free from the interference of human artifice.18 Thus, “human beingsmodel themselves after the Earth; the Earth models itself afterHeaven; Heaven models itself after the Way; and the Way followswhat is natural (ziran 自然).”19 As long as a person holds fast to hisnatural virtue, he cannot be far from the Way and nature. As Laozireportedly says to Confucius:


Heaven and the Earth hold fast to their constant ways, the sun andmoon to their brightness, the stars and planets to their ranks, thebirds and beasts to their flocks, the trees and shrubs to their stands.You have only to go along with Virtue in your actions, to follow theWay in your journey, and already will you be there.20

Thus, like Confucianism, the idea of treating oneself as the end andnever as means is prominent in the Daoist thinking. But, unlike theConfucian who, seeing everyone as potentially a moral and rationalbeing, requires a person to fulfill his social duties, the Daoist seeshuman beings as naturalistic, amoral animals who ought to shun alldesires for honor, power, and socially imposed responsibilities inorder to live with their true nature. It is the nature of every animal toremain free—humans no less than brutes, and freedom means morethan any comfort of life.21 Frederick Mote is quite accurate when hepoints out that the Confucian value lies in humans, and the Daoist innature.22 It is too often forgotten that humans still belong to theanimal kingdom, and should not lose altogether the simple freedomcommon to the living species.

3. Human Dignity in the Daoist Universe

Like Confucianism, Daoism accords to human beings a high posi-tion in the universe, and the optimism about human nature hasallowed the Daoist to develop a liberal view on government. Accord-ing to Laozi, mankind is elevated to a status parallel to that of theWay, heaven and the earth. “Thus, the Way is great; Heaven is great;the Earth is great; and humans are also great. There are four greatthings in the universe, and one of them is man.”23 Not surprisingly,however, the “great humans” here take a completely differentmeaning from the Confucian counterpart. He is not a moral andrational being in the conventional sense, as one may gather from theworks of Mencius and Xunzi; rather, he is free, natural, and sponta-neous in the primitive sense, acting as he is destined by the amoralnature. Thus, the perfect person is marked not by conventional moralvirtues, which would only distract him from the Way, making him nodifferent from those small men who live in a way contrary to their truenature,24 but by free spontaneity achieved only through the intuitive(and somewhat mysterious) experience of the Way, when he is freedfrom desire and passions for external objects.25 Likewise, a perfectsociety is not one in which everyone is busy with such lofty principlesas humanity, righteousness, or universal love, but a primitive commu-nity in which every member pursues her own life according to theinborn virtue. Such a society is not far from the state of naturedescribed by Mozi, Mencius, and Xunzi, except that it is characterized

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by a great deal more peace, joy, and spontaneity, and a great deal lessviolence, misery, and incapacity so many thinkers have uncriticallyattributed to mankind in its natural state.

Thus, the Daoist account of state of nature differs completely fromall other schools. To a Confucian or a Moist, the people in the state ofnature were either incapable of providing for their own basic needs(Mencius) or iniquitous to others’ welfare, drawing themselves into awar of all against all (Mozi and Xunzi), the state of nature to Zhuangziwas a Garden of Eden, in which the primitive people enjoyed liveswithout the worries and desires multiplied in a modern society.Through the infamous chapter of Robber Zhi <盜蹠>, the Zhuangziprovides a vivid picture of men and women living in a peaceful stateof nature:

In the age of Shen Nong 神農, the people laid down peaceful andeasy, woke up wide-eyed and blank.They knew their mothers but nottheir fathers, and lived side by side with the elk and the deer. Theyplowed for their food, wove for their clothing, and had no thought intheir hearts of harming one another. This was Perfect Virtue at itsheight.26

Presupposed in these passages is the ability of ordinary humanbeings to provide for their own living. The primitive people are nec-essarily poor and perhaps ignorant, but they know enough to producethe basic means to sustain a peaceful, self-sufficient and, perhaps,reasonably comfortable life.They take no interest in sages, heroes, andstatesmen because they are superfluities of a complex modern society.Nor are they interested in making themselves one of those types, forsocial honor to them is a burden, and luxury the very origin ofdebauchery and decay.27 In a society with minimal needs and wants,the people can manage their own daily lives, and the government isnecessarily relegated to a marginal role.

III. The Daoist Governance

1. Toward a Minimal Government

Having identified the true good and the causes for true evil, theDaoist does not hesitate to propose radical measures in order toimplement their primitive utopia.28 Daoists believe that the peoplecan be restored to their natural conditions simply by abolishing allthose nice artifices that come along with civilization. As Laozi puts it,“Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom; the people will benefit ahundred-fold. Abandon humanity and justice; the people will returnto filial piety and deep love. Abandon skill and discard profit; there


will be no thieves or robbers.”29 Following Laozi, Zhuangzi appeals tothe complete abandonment of reason, knowledge and conventionalmorals.30 A government does exist even in such a primitive society, butits function is neither to promote any positive good—because thepeople can supply enough of it with their own hands, nor to honor theworthy and virtuous, because the primitive people have no need forthem,31 nor to punish and prevent crimes—because evils so prevailingin a civilized society are unknown to a people with so simple morals.Rather, its function is purely negative, that is, to guarantee that thepeople will continue to live in such a primitive and ignorant state, freefrom external disturbances—luxuries, wisdom and, above all, thoseConfucian and Moist sages, the culprits who have stirred up thehuman ambitions that break the serenity of a primitive mind.32 Onceagain, the dialectic teachings of Laozi reflect his deep insight into theevils inherent in a big “benevolent” government:

The more taboos there are in the empire, the poorer the people. Themore sharpened tools the people have, the more benighted the state.The more skill the people possess, the further novelties multiply. Themore laws and orders are made prominent, the more thieves androbbers come into being. Therefore the sage says:

I take no action, and the people of themselves are transformed. Iprefer tranquility, and the people of themselves become correct. Iengage in no activity, and the people of themselves become prosper-ous. I have no desires, and the people of themselves become simple.33

Thus, in contrast to all other classical doctrines, Daoism is in fullsupport for a minimal state. Like the Confucians and Moists, theDaoist condemns those tyrants who exploit their people for satisfac-tion of their sensuous desires, or muster troops and kill the people ofthe neighboring states merely for enlarging their own territories.34

Joining their intellectual rivals, the Daoist insists that a government isto protect the people’s lives, and avoid endangering their physicalsurvival by all means.35 While they all denounce political tyranny fromwhich the people suffer materially, the Daoist sees further that the evilof a government lie precisely in its attempt or pretense of activelydoing good for its people.36 In fact, the capacity of a governmentincreases proportionally to loss of the people’s energy and purity. AsLaozi puts it, “when the government is dull, the people are simple.When the government is searching, the people become cunning.”37

Once the government busies itself doing everything for the people,ordinary men and women would lay down in idleness and degenerateto the point where Mencius finds them capable of nothing but waitingfor heroes and sage-kings to save them from chaos and calamities; aweak, domesticated civilization further necessitates a “benevolentgovernment,” keeping it permanently handicapped in serfdom.To the

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contrary, an ideal Daoist ruler always does the minimum, and leavesthe people alone to provide for their own needs.38

2. The Daoist Inconsistencies

Laozi and Zhuangzi condemn every human artifice that wascreated under the name of humanity and righteousness, but moreoften than not turned out to be an instrument with which the strongerand the wicked can exploit the world more efficiently and legitimately.They propose a radical move back to a primitive society maintainedby a minimal government acting in accordance with the Way.The Daoist rejection of reason, knowledge, and civilized society is,however, at best a simplistic solution;39 it is both unrealistic and self-defeating. First, although Laozi and Zhuangzi see the problems inher-ent in the existing morality, they have not shown the plausibility ofreturning to the primitive state without creating disastrous socialconsequences. In a way, the Daoist is even more conservative than theConfucian because, while the latter looks only to the immediate past(the Zhou Dynasty) to find the true principle of government, Laoziand Zhuangzi would require mankind to go all the way back to thebeginning of human history. The Daoist fails to realize that theiridealistic state of nature, if ever existed in human history, had irre-trievably passed as soon as mankind entered the civilized condition;there is no way back, and nothing constructive is established by simplydemolishing the current morality.

Second, Daoists contradict themselves by presupposing asupremely wise government that keeps everyone else in that societyprimitive and ignorant (in order to live according to the Daoistnature), while refraining from abusing its monopolized knowledgeand power. This is no more than a wishful dream, to be realized only(if ever) in extremely rare cases of the true “sage-kings.” To keep thepeople naive and ignorant, the Daoist opens the door to heavymanipulations of the ruling elites, the surest road toward tyranny. Inseeking to implement an impractical mechanism to preserve primitivefreedom, the Daoist is compelled—more than the Confucian andMoist—to pin his hopes solely on the elite-monopolized powers,which are necessarily inimical to liberty itself.40 Thus, the Daoist isconfronted by the same fundamental problem that confronts the Con-fucian and Moist—how to design a rational government? And theyhave failed to provide a feasible solution.

The failure of Daoism is rooted in its radical attitude toward reasonand in its implicit distrust of the rational capacity possessed by ordi-nary human beings.41 Although the people are capable of providingfor their own means of life, the Daoist writings have nothing to


suggest that they are also capable of governing themselves in a rela-tively complex society. To the contrary, it seems that the people arebound to either remain ignorant or misuse their knowledge andwisdom, which are the very means that make a civilized society pos-sible. As a result, the only solution feasible to a Daoist is the resur-rection of the primitive society, in which the government rules over amass of people kept as ignorant as infants. True self-government is as(if not more) illusory in Daoism as it is in Confucianism and Moism.Having abandoned reason and wisdom in favor of primitive freedom,the Daoist ultimately fails to gain any freedom in the practicalworld.42 Freedom is cherished, but without the aid of reason, itremains an unfulfilled dream. In the end, Daoism is reduced to apassive ethic, merely providing a private sanctuary for those who weredisheartened by the corrupt political and social realities.

IV. Conclusions: Human Dignity Revisited

1. Human Dignity: A Common Thread of Classical ChinesePhilosophy

The previous discussions have illustrated many differences amongConfucianism, Daoism, and Moism.While Confucianism takes gentle-man as the ideal personality and humanity and righteousness as thecentral principles of the Way of heaven, Moism is based on mutualbenefits and universal love under the will of heaven, and Daoismendorses the amoral Way and nature, which destine mankind to live afree and primitive life. Taken together, however, the three schools ofthought do converge on a common moral precept: to treat everyhuman being as the end in itself and not merely as means to otherthings. All three classical schools, I argue, imply in essence the notionof human dignity, even though they do differ as to what dignity con-sists of. For Confucianism, human dignity is fully illustrated in theideal personality of a gentleman, who has cultivated innate virtuethrough learning and the practice of li; he takes humanity and righ-teousness as the highest principles, and follows the principle of themean by which he gains moral independence. For Moism, everyoneought to love everyone else alike, and everyone equally deserves atleast a minimum concern for well-being.43 Daoism rejects conven-tional morality as hypocritical and worthless practice, and seekshuman dignity in a free, self-sufficient, and spontaneous life; likeConfucianism, it also values an independent moral character, butinsists that personal independence and freedom can be maintainedonly in a simple and primitive lifestyle. All three schools, particularlyDaoism and Confucianism (possibly except Xunzi), take an optimistic

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view of human nature, and recognize the intrinsic worth in everyhuman being. While the Confucian emphasizes the duty of self-cultivation and practice in developing the virtues, the Daoist objectsto external interferences that distract men and women from truenature; in comparison the Daoist pins more hopes on the people’sown initiatives, and the people themselves should not be active inpursuing profits (like Moists) or reputation (like Confucians). Yet allschools at least imply that the intrinsic worth of every human beingshould be respected and protected. Thus, human dignity, thoughunderstood in different (but mutually complementary) ways, seems tobe a common element that can be extracted from all three schools ofthought.

Yet the classical moral ideas (re)interpreted above remained unful-filled in the traditional practice in China. Among the three schools ofthought in classical China, the Confucian system of li had no doubtdominated the social practice. As we have seen, although Daoismmade strong appeal to personal freedom, it lacked a realistic schemeto implement freedom on the social and political scale. Moism suf-fered from a great decline during the violent unification of Qin (229–1bce) and became extinct in the seventh century, and was not reviveduntil it was rediscovered nearly a millennium later.44 The Confucian lihad served as a moral constitution, as it were, of the traditionalChinese society, maintaining a degree of order and harmony.45 Butwhen the particular rules of li were mistaken for permanently fixedprinciples mandated by the laws of nature, and the subordinate rela-tions in families and in the state were legitimated to be natural, theybecame the fetter of social and moral progress; by treating humanbeings merely as the subjects of social control in the interests of order,they deviated from the high principle of humanity (ren), and could nolonger serve as the “process of humanization.”46 From different per-spectives, both the Moist and Daoist critiques can be constructive incorrecting the defects in Confucian li. While the Moist advocates theuniversal utilitarian principle that governs everyone equally, thus alle-viating the subordination of children, women, and subjects of therulers, the Daoist brings forward the concern for personal freedom,without which a person is but a selfless slave.

Even when different schools join together, however, the classicalChinese philosophy on human dignity has still been made defectiveby the traditional practice.After all, it is practice that both gives life toand defines the content of a moral concept. The visions and imagina-tions of the traditional Chinese philosophers were severely limited bythe political realities of their times. Unlike ancient Greece, wherepolities of different nature interacted and competed for prominence,China had been settled in one monolithic authoritarian government


since the earliest historical record; the seven warring states wereoffspring of the same parent, the Zhou regime, which in turn derivedits form from the earlier regimes with dubious historical records. Ifthere was a stage when the primitive people wandered freely in woodsand managed their own lives with a minimal government, such ahistory would remain an unverifiable Daoist fiction, and was in anyway irrelevant to the civilized communities. The Daoists themselves,who longed to return to primitive lives, could only wish a wise andbenevolent king to reign someday, and the way of governance, sim-plistic and impractical as it was, still appeared identical to a typicalChinese monarchy. Here Daoism was no less inconsistent than Con-fucianism: while the Confucians believed that the vast majority ofordinary people are morally inferior “small men,” they neverthelesshoped that the government would be run by the virtuous gentlemen;the Daoist hoped that everyone must live in ignorance in order to behappy, but the king must be supremely wise to maintain an ignorantstate. To make moral theories relevant to practical life, the classicaltheories need be reconstructed. If freedom is anything more thanromantic imagination and matters in practical life, it must come toterms with the needs and necessities of real social life. In a civilizedsociety, it means that freedom is to be maintained by a reasonablycapable government, and to coexist with its competence and possibleabuses. This requires a science that the traditional Chinese thinkerswere never given the opportunity to explore—the science of makinga liberal constitution, by which the power of the government is con-fined to certain limits.

2. Toward a Constitutional Principle

If it is correct to argue Daoism, Moism, and Confucianism all havea vision for human dignity, then it seems to be only consistent torequire that such moral visions be adequately carried into practice,primarily through social and political institutions. Respect for humandignity commands that a legitimate public power must treat everyonealways as the end and never merely as means—neither to others (e.g.,for the sake of social order or political control) nor to one’s owndesires and impulses.To express in the Confucian terms (which do notnecessarily conflict with the Moist or Daoist teachings), everyone isborn with the innate moral and intellectual virtues, capable of beingdeveloped fully in a mature person. To respect human dignity, then,the state and society must take such a moral belief seriously andrefrain from any positive acts that would impede personal develop-ment of virtues; human dignity is violated whenever a person isdeprived of the opportunity to develop himself and become a gentle-

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man, and any deprivation under the name of public authority must beseen as illegitimate exercise of power. Further, the state and societymay be required to create the positive conditions to provide everyonewith the opportunity of moral and intellectual development. Ratherthan preoccupied with provision of material benefits, the public powerought to be primarily concerned with the provisions of developmentaland educational opportunities, and perhaps establish and maintain asystem of li (social rules and norms) which helps to “make,” as it were,gentlemen who respect others as much as they respect themselves.Heaven has endowed human beings with innate virtues; it is their taskto develop them through their own efforts—through the establish-ments of society, state, and a constitution that lays down the funda-mental principles under which the state and society shall operate.

Such a constitution is indeed very much consistent with the spirit ofConfucianism, which is deeply concerned with the actualization ofpotential virtues through moral education and practice. The tradi-tional Confucians used to support rule of virtue by the few because itwas only feasible for the few to succeed in acquiring the virtues; butnothing prevents a modern society from helping all to develop theinnate human virtues, by which a value-based democratic society ismade possible.47 Such a development should be welcomed by theMoist, because human experiences have taught that the best way topromote universal love and social welfare is not by producing equalresult for everyone through political coercion, but by guaranteeingequal opportunity with which everyone can pursue one’s own aspira-tions and interest freely. It should be equally welcomed by the Daoistbecause the government can now become truly restrained (if notminimal) and the people retain their freedom—not because theyremain ignorant, but precisely because they are wise, mature, andcompetent in governing themselves in a complex modern society.

Traditionally, Daoism is opposed to Confucianism in theory, butcomplements it in practice; while Confucianism governs one’s publiclife, Daoism takes over once one has retired to private life.The split inpersonal philosophy of the same person is due largely to the sharp gapbetween the public and private spheres in the Chinese society—between the ruling class of active elites and the vast majority of theruled who remained politically passive.As I have argued in the earlierarticle,48 however, a gentleman shall transcend such a division andacquire a mature, self-governing, and dignified personality in allspheres. Whether staying alone, in family, or before the sovereignstate, he will act to preserve and improve his dignity; he respects thedignity of others, and requires a reciprocal respect for his own dignity.To be consistent with such a moral aspiration, he should seek toimplement and maintain—with the consent shared by all members of


society—a constitution by which his dignity and that of others areequally protected.And the constitutional principle commonly accept-able to the classical schools of Chinese philosophy is the respect andprotection of human dignity, against which the legitimacy of everysocial action and political regime is to be measured.

PEKING UNIVERSITYBeijing, China

Endnotes

Acknowledgments of Rights and Credentials: The drafts of the article were presentedunder the title of “Human Dignity in Classical Chinese Philosophy: The Daoist Perspec-tive” at the Conference on Political Philosophy in China, held at the University of St.Andrews in June 2002 and the International Conference on Human Rights and HumanDignity held in Geneva in May 2008. The original version included a comparison withRousseau’s view on political freedom, which is omitted here due to the length consider-ation. I thank Professors Nick Bunin, David Archard, and Sarah Browdie, Editor-in-ChiefChung-ying Cheng, Managing Editor Linyu Gu, Assistant Editor Timothy Connolly, andtwo anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am responsible for all mistakes inthe article.

1. See Zhang Qianfan, “The Idea of Human Dignity: A Reconstruction of Confucian-ism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2000): 299–330; “Human Dignity inClassical Chinese Philosophy: Reinterpreting Mohism,” Journal of Chinese Philoso-phy 34, no. 2 (2007): 239–56. In an e-mail discussion on the previous draft of thisarticle, Managing Editor of this journal, Dr. Linyu Gu, introduced her BA thesiswritten in 1982, titled “孟子 ‘尚志說’ 管窺” (Meng Zi ‘Shangzhi Shuo’ Guankui)(English trans.: An Inquiry into Meng Zi’s Theory of Shangzhi), which should berelevant to the Confucian conception of human dignity. Herewith for the Englishtranslation, Gu holds that, opposed to the inaccurate convention, the surname Mengand the honorific name Zi should be written as two words in order to accord to theoriginal style in Chinese language.

2. The existence of Laozi and the authenticity of his work have been extensively debatedand remain inconclusive, but this issue is quite irrelevant here. See Benjamin I.Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1985), 187, and Hu Shi胡適, Zhongguo Zhexue Dagang《中国哲学大纲》,Vol.1 (Taipei: Shangwu, 1969), 32; Cf. A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: PhilosophicalArgument in Ancient China (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), 216–7, and Fung Yu-lan, AShort History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York: The Free Press,1948), 30–37. I refer “Laozi” (sometimes translated as “Lao Tzu”) to the author(s) ofthe work under that name. The same is meant for “Zhuangzi” (sometimes translatedas “Chuang Tzu”), whose work is commonly thought to be the product of many hands.I cite mostly its “Outer Chapters” (Waipian 《外篇》) because they are more perti-nent to the political views of Zhuangzi, a topic not so prominent in the “InnerChapters” (Neipian《內篇》) except the very last chapter. Although it is commonlybelieved that the outer chapters are written by Zhuangzi’s disciples rather thanhimself, they are equally influential, and are overall coherent with the Inner Chapters.Despite minor differences in their particular views, Laozi and Zhuangzi form aconsistent body of thoughts that can be fairly labeled as the “Daoist,” a term that isobviously not meant to obliterate the differences within this amorphous group ofthinkers.

3. Thus, “perfect humanity knows no kinship”; “Perfect humanity is unsurpassable;words like filial piety can never suffice to describe it” (Zhuangzi, Tianyun 〈天運〉[The Evolution of Heaven]), Chapter 14).

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4. Zhuangzi, Qiushui〈秋水〉 (Autumn Flood), Chapter 17.5. Zhuangzi, Quqie 〈胠篋〉 (Rifling Trunks), Chapter 10; see Burton Watson, trans.,

The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),110. In the same vein, “the petty thief is imprisoned, but the grand thief becomes afeudal lord, and righteous men are to be found at the gates of the feudal lords”(Zhuangzi, Daozhi 〈盜蹠〉 [Robber Zhi]), Chapter 29; see Watson, The CompleteWorks of Chuang Tzu, 332).

6. Thus, “everyone under Heaven is for sacrifice: those who sacrifice for humanity andjustice are by convention called gentlemen; those who sacrifice for goods and propertyare by convention called small men. But in one thing they share in common: that theyall sacrifice” (Zhuangzi, “Webbed Toes,” Chapter 8; see Watson, The Complete Worksof Chuang Tzu, 101–2).

7. Zhuangzi, Rangwang 〈讓王〉 (Yielding the Throne), Chapter 28; see Watson, TheComplete Works of Chuang Tzu, 312–13.

8. The rivalry of two thoughts is represented in Mengzi, 7A: 26 and other works. WhileMozi travels all over China seeking to help out every single human being who needshelp, the negative teaching of Yangzi is reduced to the extreme of selfish hedonismand total withdrawal from social life—a position that Laozi and Zhuangzi have neverexplicitly endorsed: “Men of antiquity did not prefer to sacrifice one single hair tobenefit the world. Nor did they choose to have the world support them. If everyonerefrains from sacrificing even a single hair and if everyone refrains from benefiting theworld, the world will be in order” (Liezi, Yangzi Pian〈楊子篇〉; Wing-tsit Chan, ASource Book in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963],311). For rebuttal by Mozi, who argues that pure selfishness is self-contradictory, seeMozi, 46:18; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 60–64.

9. Lüshi Chunqiu, 17: 7; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 54. As one of the anonymousreviewers pointed out, Lüshi Chunqiu may well be using the name of “Yangzi” toexpress a strand of the classical thought rather than attributing these words tothe true Yangzi in history. The same applies to the citations of his statementsbelow.

10. Huainanzi《淮南子》, 13: 10B; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 54.11. See Lü Zhenyu, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi 《中國政治思想史》 (Beijing:

Renmin Press, 1980), 138.12. Lüshi Chunqiu, Zhongji 〈重己〉 (Importance of Self), 1: 3; Fung Yu-lan, A Short

History of Chinese Philosophy, 63. Also, “one’s person is that doing is for sake of, theempire is a means to doing for the sake of it” (Lüshi Chunqiu《吕氏春秋》, Shenwei〈審為〉 [Examining the Means and Ends of an Action], 21: 4; Graham, Disputers ofthe Tao, 59).

13. Ibid.14. See Laozi, Chapter 1.15. Thus, “Heaven and Earth are not humane; they regard all things as straw dogs. The

sage is not humane; he regards all people as straw dogs” (Laozi, Chapter 5; see Chan,A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 141).

16. Zhuangzi, Pianmu〈駢拇〉 (Webbed Toes), Chapter 8.17. “Ever since that man of the Yu clan began preaching benevolence and righteousness

and stirring up the world, all men in the world have dashed headlong for benevolenceand righteousness. . . . From the Three Dynasties on down, everyone in the world hasaltered his inborn nature because of some external thing” (Zhuangzi, Pianmu,Chapter 8; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 101).

18. De is sometimes translated as “potency” (Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 186–9) or“latent power” deriving from the virtue inherent in a thing, but virtue, defined in theAristotelian sense to be the excellence of a thing in performing certain functions,seems at least equally adequate. See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy,136–8, 788–90.

19. Laozi, Chapter 25; see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 153.20. Zhuangzi, Tiandao 〈天道〉 (The Way of Heaven), Chapter 13; Watson, The Com-

plete Works of Chuang Tzu, 150. Also, “to be familiar with the Way and agreeable tothe Virtue; dismiss benevolence and righteousness, and rejects rites and music: the


mind of the perfect man will then find where to repose” (Zhuangzi, Tiandao, Chapter13; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 151).

21. The implication of the following passage is evident:“The swamp pheasant has to walkten paces for one peck and a hundred paces for one drink, but it doesn’t want to bekept in the cage. Even though you treat it like a king, its spirit won’t be content”(Zhuangzi, Yangsheng Zhu 〈養生主〉 [The Secret of Caring for Life], Chapter 3;Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 52).

22. See Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Knopf, 1971),71.

23. Laozi, Chapter 25; see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 152. One of theanonymous reviewers pointed out that all excavated versions of the text have “king”(wang王) rather than “humans” (ren人) as great.While this is true, that version of thetext is not accepted by the authoritative annotators. See, for example, Chen Guying陳鼓應, Laozi Jinzhu Jinyi《老子今注今譯》 (Beijing: Zhonghua書局, 2006), 169–72.Above all, it would be contextually odd to replace “humans” with “king” because thelatter does not match with the last sentence in that chapter that ranks the “fourgreats” (sida四大), beginning with “human beings model themselves after the earth,”without ever mentioning “king.” Such replacement is also structurally odd becauseLaozi seldom mentions, much less flatters, king and human authority, and has neverelevated them elsewhere to a status as eminent as the heaven, the earth, and the Way.For these reasons I choose to stay with the popular version of the text.

24. “A petty man will risk death for the sake of profit; a knight will risk it for the sake offame; a high official will risk for family; a sage will risk it for the world. All thesevarious men go about the business in a different way, and are tagged differently whenit comes to fame and reputation; but in blighting their inborn nature and risking theirlives for something they are the same” (Zhuangzi, Pianmu, Chapter 8; see Watson,The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 101).

25. “He who holds to True Rightness does not lose the original form of his inborn nature”(Zhuangzi, Pianmu, Chapter 8; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 99);“The True Men of ancient times used the natural principle of Heaven to deal withman; he did not use man to meddle with Heaven” (Zhuangzi, Xu Wugui〈徐無鬼〉,Chapter 24; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 277).

26. Zhuangzi, Daozhi, Chapter 29; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 326.27. Thus, when Shun舜 tried to cede the kingship to a hermit farmer (Shan Juan善卷),

the latter said, “I stand in the midst of the universe. Winter days I dress in skins andfurs, summers days, in vine-cloth and hemp. In spring I plow and plant; my body isgood enough for labor and exercise. In fall I harvest and store away; this gives myform enough leisure and sustenance. When the sun comes up, I work; when the sungoes down, I rest. I wander free and easy between heaven and earth, and my mind hasfound all that it could wish for. What use would I have for the empire?!” (Zhuangzi,Rangwang, Chapter 28; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 309–10).

28. The Daoist utopia is simple and unambiguous, as expressed by Laozi: “Reduce thesize and population of the state. Ensure that even though the people have tools ofwar for a troop or a battalion they will not use them; and also that they will bereluctant to move afar because they value their lives highly. Even when they haveships and carts, they will have no use for them; and even when they have armor andweapons, they will have no occasion to show them. Make the people return to the useof the knotted rope. Let them find relish in their food and beauty in their clothes; letthem be content with their abode, and happy in their custom” (Laozi, Chapter 80; seeD. C. Lau, trans., Tao Te Ching (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982),115–6; cf. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 175. The same passage is citedin Zhuangzi, Quqie, Chapter 10; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,112).

29. Laozi, Chapter 19; see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 149.30. Zhuangzi, Quqie, Chapter 10; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 111.31. “Promote men of worth, and the people begin trampling over each other; employ men

of knowledge, and the people begin filching from each other. . . . The source ofall great disorder will invariably be found to lie with Yao and Shun, and its evil

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consequences will linger a thousand generations later” (Zhuangzi, Gengsang Chu〈庚桑楚〉, Chapter 23; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 250).

32. Thus, “in an age of Perfect Virtue, the worthy are not honored, the talented are notemployed. Rulers are like the high branches of a tree, the people like the deer of thefields. They do what is right without knowing that this is righteousness. They love oneanother without knowing that this is benevolence. They are true-hearted withoutknowing that this is loyalty. They are trustworthy without knowing that this is goodfaith. They wriggle around like insects, performing services for one another, withoutknowing that they are being kind” (Zhuangzi, Tiandi〈天地〉 (Heaven and Earth),Chapter 12; see Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, 138).

33. Laozi, Chapter 57; see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 166–7; Lau, TaoTe Ching, 84–85.

34. See Zhuangzi, Xu Wugui, Chapter 24.35. Thus, Confucians and Daoists share the favorite story about the Great King Danfu亶父, the grandfather of King Wen of Zhou 周文王, who was willing to give up histhrone in order to divert a potential bloodshed due to the invasion of the neighboringherdsmen: “To live among the older brothers and send the younger brothers to theirdeath; to live among the fathers and send the sons to their death—this I cannot bear.My people, be diligent and remain where you are! What difference does it makewhether you are subjects of mine or of the men of Di (a northern minority race)? AndI have heard that one must not injure that which he is nourishing for the sake of thatby which he nourishes it” (Zhuangzi, Rangwang, Chapter 28; see Watson, The Com-plete Works of Chuang Tzu, 310). In other words, the lives of his people are (or oughtto be) far more precious to the ruler than the possession of his territory and property.

36. “The people starve because the ruler eats too much tax-grain. . . . They are difficult torule because their ruler does too many things. The people take death lightly becausetheir ruler strives for life too vigorously. It is only those who do not seek after life thatexcel in making life valuable” (Laozi, Chapter 75; Chan, A Source Book in ChinesePhilosophy, 174).

37. Laozi, Chapter 58; see Lau, Tao Te Ching, 85.38. “The best rulers are those whose existence is hardly known to the people. The next

best are those who are loved and praised. The next are those who are feared. And thenext are those who are despised” (Laozi, Chapter 17; see Chan, A Source Book inChinese Philosophy, 148).

39. For a critique of the Daoist anti-intellectualism, see Yu Ying-Shih 余英時, “FanzhiZhuyi he Zhongguo Zhengzhi Chuantong 反智主義和中國政治傳統,” in ZhongguoChuantong Sixiang de Xiandai Quanshi 《中國傳統思想的現代詮釋》 (Nanjing:Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1989), 72–81.

40. “Do not exalt the worthy, so that the people shall not compete. Do not value raretreasures, so that the people shall not steal. Do not display objects of desire, so that thepeople’s hearts shall not be disturbed. Therefore, in the government of the sage, hekeeps their hearts vacuous, fills their bellies, weakens their ambitions, and strengthenstheir bones, and always causes his people to be without knowledge or desire” (Laozi,Chapter 3; see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 140–1; cf. Zhuangzi,“Heaven and Earth,” Chapter 12). Also, “in ancient times those who practiced Taowell did not seek to enlighten the people, but to make them ignorant. People aredifficult to govern because they have too much knowledge” (Laozi, Chapter 65; seeChan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 170).

41. See Yu Ying-shih, Zhongguo Chuantong Sixiang de Xiandai Quanshi, 72–81.42. In this respect, Daoism can be meaningfully contrasted with Rousseau, who also

vehemently criticizes various aspects of modern civilization in the second Discourse,but adopts the opposite solution. Seeing clearly the impossibility of pulling back theclock, Rousseau would have the civilized society transcend its current condition togain civilized freedom under the general will. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourseon Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, Maurice Cranston, trans. (NewYork: Penguin Books, 1984), 24.

43. Although it is more difficult to derive the notion of human dignity directly fromMoism, it at least implies the idea of treating everyone as ends and not merely as tools.


As discussed above, it is perhaps easiest to derive from Moism, among the threeschools, the moral support for a democratic and constitutional regime.

44. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 7; Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, 90.45. To be sure, Confucianism was not a closed system; over time it did undergo self-

transformation by absorbing the essence of many other schools of thought (e.g.,Daoism and Legalism), and was divided into many sects. But the system of li hadpreserved the central elements of traditional Confucianism. For the historical devel-opment of Neo-Confucianism, see Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucianand Neo-Confucian Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991),47–57.

46. A term used in Tu Wei-ming, “Li as a Process of Humanization,” in Humanity andSelf-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press,1979).

47. Practical questions do arise with regard to the cases of failure, which are bound tooccur in reality: should only those who passed the literacy test be allowed to vote? Ishuman dignity violated if the unemployed, rather than passively waiting for socialwelfare, are required to take compulsory training programs? These issues are stilldebated in the contemporary period, and some of the debates can be expected tocontinue in future.

48. See Zhang Qianfan, “The Idea of Human Dignity: A Reconstruction of Confucian-ism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2001): 317–20.

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human dignity in classical chinese philosophy: the daoist perspective

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