944 David Howarth

Ideology, Hegemony and Political Subjectivity

David HowarthStaffordshire University

‘Theorising Hegemony’

Introduction

It has been recognised by numerous political scientists that the concept of hege-mony constitutes an invaluable tool of analysis for understanding and explaininga wide range of empirical phenomena. However, despite this centrality, rigoroustheorisation of the concept has not been forthcoming. In comparison to a range of‘family resemblance’ concepts such as power, domination, leadership, and force(not to mention other key concepts of political theory such as freedom, obligation,social class and the state), theoretical labour on hegemony has remained underde-veloped. One recent exception to this generalisation is the work of Ernesto Laclauand Chantal Mouffe. They have drawn on post-structuralist and post-modernistthemes to articulate a novel conception of hegemony (See Mouffe, 1979; Laclau& Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 1990). Though this theorisation has attracted a gooddeal of commentary – both positive and negative – the discussion has tended to beof a typically ‘either/or’ variety: either their work has resolved all the problemsassociated with the concept, and requires very little further investigation, or it hasno relevance at all in advancing theory in this field, and should be immediatelyabandoned. In the too rapid desire to praise or condemn, usually for short-termpolitical advantage, much of the richness of Laclau & Mouffe’s problematic hasbeen lost, while careful analysis of its sources, and the unanswered questions itraises, foreclosed. In this paper, I shall situate and contextualise their innovativetheorisation of the concept of hegemony, while at the same time pointing out a se-ries of difficulties and weaknesses which still need to be clarified if their approachis to be theoretically coherent and empirically applicable.

The Classical Precursors

The emergence of the concept of hegemony in the Marxist tradition can be tracedback to debates in Russian social democracy from the late 1890s to 1917 (Ander-son, 1976). Nevertheless, echoes of the problem which generated the concept, canbe found in Marx and Engels. The question of politics in Marx and Engels’ writ-ings generally concerns the role of the state and ideology in the maintenance ofclass domination, in which the state is understood principally as an agent of coer-cion, and ideology as the inculcation of ‘false consciousness’. There are, however,at least two important supplementary dimensions to their theorisation. In the firstplace, the working class must transcend its own particular interests to become auniversal class in any succesful social revolution; second, the organisation of classrule involves more than narrow state coercion and ideological deception but thecreation of an ideal, though illusory, community to justify its particular mode ofexistence, and a set of state institutions designed to supervise, regulate and en-mesh the private lives of individuals (See Marx, 1977, pp.169, 316).

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Despite these supplementary additions to the class domination theory of poli-tics and ideology, it was left to later Marxist thinkers to elaborate upon the com-plexities of class rule and the strategic prerequisites of succesful political classstruggle. Foremost amongst these was Gramsci. Most commentators have em-phasised the central role of hegemony in his political thought, though this concepthas a number of different and at times contradictory meanings (Anderson, 1976;Femia, 1981; Hoffman, 1984; Mouffe, 1979). In brief, there are at least four di-mensions of hegemony in Gramsci’s writings. Firstly, in contradistinction to aLeninist conception of ‘class alliances’, it designates a particular type of politi-cal practice in which a social class endeavours to ‘become hegemonic’ by win-ning the consent of forces external to it and in so doing exercising leadership overthem (Gramsci, 1971, pp.180-185). Secondly, it represents a type of political formin which supremacy is characterised by the predominance of consent and leader-ship over force and domination (Gramsci, 1971, p.55 n.5). Thirdly, it refers to theliberal democratic historical bloc which is structured by the ‘normal exercise ofhegemony’, that is, hegemony is equated with a historical bloc in which there is aproper balance between consent and coercion (Gramsci, 1971, p.80 n.49). Finally,and this is paramount to many Leninist readings of Gramsci, hegemony is madeequivalent to class supremacy as such, in which all political rule comprises a com-bination of the exercise of leadership over allies, and the domination of enemies(See Buci-Glucksman, 1980, pp.47-68).

This explication of the concept must be seen against the backdrop of Gram-sci’s rethinking of Marxist political theory more generally. This consists in Gram-sci’s twofold expansion of the category of political society (or the state) to includethose aspects which Hegel had bracketed under the name of civil society, on theone hand, and his transformation of the functions of class domination (especiallyevident in the institutions of civil society) to encompass the manufacture of con-sent, and the exercise of ‘leadership’ through ‘ethico-political’ and ‘intellectualand moral’ means. Both of these developments were predicated on a sharp sepa-ration between ‘the East’, where ‘the State was everything, [and] civil society wasprimordial and gelatanious’, and the West, where ‘there was a proper balance be-tween State and civil society’, a division which meant that in the West there oughtto be a prioritisation of the ‘war of position’ over the ‘war of movement’ as themost appropriate political strategy for advancing socialism by the working classes(Gramsci, 1971, pp.229-238).

Laclau & Mouffe’s Critique of the Marxist Tradition

While Laclau & Mouffe presuppose and build upon Gramsci’s theory of hege-mony (See Laclau, 1977; Mouffe, 1979), they are critical of the Marxist ontologyand epistemology underpinning it. In short, there are two fundamental assump-tions which they criticise. These are Gramsci’s commitment to a fundamental so-cial class – in capitalist societies the working class – bringing about important so-cial change, as well as the centrality of a ‘decisive economic nucleus’ as the objectof political struggle and the ultimate determinant of the character of the politicaland ideological superstructures. Both of these assumptions require the Marxistnotions of a unified and expressive social totality with a set of predetermined lawsof motion and development. In this sense, Gramsci’s innovative theorisation of

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hegemony, and his introduction of concepts such as a historical bloc mediatingbetween, and condensing, the different moments of a social formation, remainsconstrained by a linear theory of history (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.65-71).

This critique of Gramsci is symptomatic of Laclau & Mouffe’s overall decon-struction of the Marxist tradition. In this respect, they posit an ineradicable tensionbetween what they call the ‘logic of necessity’ and the ‘logic of contingency’ (La-clau & Mouffe, 1985). These two logics are traced back to the writings of Marxand Engels, and are manifested, according to Laclau & Mouffe, in two compet-ing theories of historical change: one, epitomised in the 1959 ‘Preface’ toTheContribution to Political Economy, , in which social change is determined by thecontradiction between the forces and relations of production, and the other, mani-fest inThe Communist Manifesto, in which there is the primacy of class strugglesin the production of historical transformation (Laclau, 1990). While, accordingto Laclau & Mouffe, both logics are present in Marxist theory they do not have anequal status. Instead of a mutual co-existence and contamination of the two logics,Marxist theoreticians have posited a sharp separation between them, and have pri-oritised the logic of necessity. (Though structurally undecidable, to use Derrideanterminology, Marxist discourse subordinates contingency to necesssity, making ita supplement of the latter.) Hence, the logic of contingency – which, according toLaclau & Mouffe, is synonymous with questions of political subjectivity, strategy,the role of the state and ideological efffects (in short, the politicalpar excellence)– has a restricted field of application, which is both theoretically indeterminate, inthat it is beyond rigorous and scientific analysis, and ultimately reducible to thenecessary laws of economic development (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.47-48).

Laclau & Mouffe’s Post-Marxist Alternative

Laclau & Mouffe’s post-Marxist alternative and their retheorisation of the conceptof hegemony is predicated on an ontology of the social in which there is an inter-weaving of the logics of necessity and contingency, rather than a prioritising of theformer over the latter. To do so, they introduce a theory of discourse where thereis no ontological separation between an extra- discursive and objective reality, onthe one hand, and the particular discourses which constitute the social meaningof reality on the other. They also refuse a sharp distinction between a realm ofideological practices, on the one hand, which can be counterposed to other prac-tices, such as those pertaining to the economy on the other, while also rejectingany attempt to concede ana priori primacy to any particular set of practices.

In addition, and importantly, Laclau & Mouffe stress the contingency of iden-tity, insofar as any particular discursive formation is always limited by the exis-tence of other discourses. In this sense, discourses are never completely able todomesticate a particular field of meaning (sometimes referred to as the ‘field ofdiscursivity’), such that any particular discursive identity is ‘surrounded’ by whatthey call a ‘surplus of meaning’, which prevents its full closure. The structural in-ability of a discourse to dominate meaning means that social identities are neverdetermined by an underlying logic of historical development, but are always pre-carious historical and political constructions, vulnerable to the destabilising ef-fects of discourses external to them (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.110-114).

This theory of discourse draws upon Derrida’s deconstruction of structuralist

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linguistics (and Western metaphysics more generally). That is to say, though La-clau & Mouffe accept Saussure’s relational conception of linguistic value, theyweaken his view that there is a rigid fixity between signifier and signified, whichis itself the product of the total linguistic system. Instead, following Derrida, theyargue that the production of identity always involves the deferring of certain dif-ferences. This dual process of differing/deferring both stabilises identity, whileexposing it to the effects of exclusion. According to Derrida, this is consequentupon the nature of the linguistic sign which must, in principle, always be repeati-ble in different linguistic contexts (or systems of signification), if it is to performthe function of a linguistic sign (Derrida, 1971).

According to Laclau & Mouffe, the contingency of social identity is shown inthe experience of antagonism. Antagonisms represent the political momentparexcellence, namely, the moments of struggle, decision and subjectivity. In thiscapacity, they are both constitutive of social relations, while revelatory of the im-possibility of any total closure of identity upon itself. What are social antagonismsin Laclau & Mouffe’s perspective? In opposition to traditional conceptions of so-cial conflict, which represent antagonism as the clash of social agents with fullyconstituted identities (such that the task of the political analyist is to describe thecauses, conditions and resolution of conflict), Laclau & Mouffe insist that socialantagonisms occur because of the failure or inability of a social agent to attain itsidentity, in which case the task of the analyst is to explore the different forms ofthis impossibility, and the mechanisms by which the blockage of identity is con-structed as antagonistic by social agents. As they put it:

‘[I]n the case of antagonism, we are confronted with a differentsituation: the presence of the “Other” prevents me from being totallymyself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the im-possibility of their constitution ... Insofar as there is antagonism, Icannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that an-tagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of mynon-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of mean-ings which prevent it being fixed as full positivity (Laclau & Mouffe,1985, p.125).

In this sense, antagonisms are witness to the finitude of identity in that theyshow the limits of any social objectivity. Furthermore, antagonisms are also es-sential for stemming the relational flow of differences which make up the socialfield. They thus actively form identity by requiring the institution of political fron-tiers which divide social agents into opposed camps and discursive formations. Inthe latter sense, they perform an ontological role, that is, they are vital for the veryconstitution of identity, while paradoxically showing the limits and precariousnessof identity (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.125).

This brief contextualisation of Laclau & Mouffe’s social ontology enables usto make sense of their conceptualisation of hegemony. There are two differentmodels of hegemony at work in their writings. Let us examine each in turn.

Model 1

In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau & Mouffe present the concept of hege-mony as a particular type of articulatory practice – a ‘political type of relation’

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or ‘form of politics’ as they put it. It is made possible in a very specific set ofconditions: firstly, the existence of ‘antagonistic forces’ and, secondly, a socialfield in which there is the ‘presence of a vast area of floating elements’, that isto say, the availability of a proliferation of meanings not stabilised into a systemof differences, which can be articulated into opposed hegemonic projects (Laclau& Mouffe, 1985, pp.135-136). Given this situation, hegemonic articulations con-sist in the practice of partially condensing and stabilising social meaning aroundprivileged signifiers, which Laclau & Mouffe call nodal points. Alongside the on-tological openness of social identities, which makes the hegemonic practice pos-sible, is the abandonment of any privileged social agent peforming the function ofthe hegemonic subject. Contra the Marxist positing of the working class as theuniversal agent of progressive historical change, Laclau & Mouffe argue that anysocial agent can assume this role depending on specific historical circumstances.Similarly, they argue that hegemonic practices always involve a dislocation be-tween hegemonic tasks and the social actors supposed to carry them out. In otherwords, hegemonic operations require there to be no necessary link between a so-cial class and its ‘natural’ tasks; this implies that hegemony has a metonymicalform involving the displacement of actions from a certain shere to another.

Model 2

In New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Laclau presents a purported‘radicalisation’ of the concept of hegemony (Laclau, 1990, pp.28-31). This corre-sponds to three levels of the necessity/contingency relationship. In the first levelof radicalisation, and this is the model presented inHegemony and Socialist Strat-egy, Laclau & Mouffe stress the contingency of the elements which make up thesocial, arguing that in times of organic crisis, these signifiers take on a floatingcharacter, and become the objects of contestation amongst competing hegemonicprojects. The difficulty with this model, according to Laclau, is the transparencyof those projects which attempt to hegemonise the available floating signifiers. Asecond level of theorisation recognises the incomplete and contingent character ofthe projects which endeavours to hegemonise a field of signifiers. Though, accord-ing to Laclau, this movement deepens the degree of contingency in political anal-ysis (and simultaneously begins to weaken the duality of structure and agency), itremains trapped within a perspective dominated by the notion of equivocity – thatis, following Aristotle, the idea that terms can be used differently in separate situ-ations – rather than authentic ambiguity, such that ‘the ideal of a pure contextualtransparency is not placed in question’ (Laclau, 1990, p.29). Laclau’s solution isto move to a third level of radicalization in which ambiguity operates within struc-tures themselves. Drawing again on Derrida, Laclau argues that structures are nec-essarily undecidable in their formal constitution, with the result that hegemonicoperations always involve ‘acts of radical construction’, actualising possibilitiesinherent in formal structures. In this case, hegemonic practices always involvethe emergence of political subjects whose task is to reconstitute structures in newforms (Laclau, 1990, pp.30-32).

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Theorising Hegemony

Before I turn to a critical evaluation of Laclau & Mouffe’s concept of hegemony,it is important to clarify what is in need of theorisation. It is possible, I think, toisolate three important senses of the concept. First, hegemony is a kind of politicalpractice involving the drive to break down and reconstruct historically constitutedsocial and political forms. Second, hegemony refers to a substantive political andsocial formation; that is, it refers to a particular political project which at any par-ticular time has succesfully ‘become hegemonic’. Third, hegemony designates apractice and form of political rule which involves more than the simple exercise offorce or domination. This is to say that hegemony always has a normative dimen-sion in that it implies a politics which goes beyond the imposition of one forceover another, and requires the construction of consent, and the exercise of lead-ership and authority by one group over another. (As Gramsci suggests, hegemonythus operates on the terrain of civil society, as opposed to political society, and cru-cially involves the cultural dimension of social life.) Each of these dimensions ofthe concept raises a precise set of theoretical questions in need of further investiga-tion. Let us consider to what extent Laclau & Mouffe’s theorisation of hegemonyresolves each of them.

(a) Hegemony as a form of political practice

With respect to the first dimension, Laclau & Mouffe present hegemony as a prac-tice of disarticulation and rearticulation, a practice which is only possible giventhe availability of a proliferation of floating signifiers, and a social field criss-crossed by the existence of social antagonisms. This is the strongest and mostconvincing aspect of their theorisation, though it is not without some difficulties.It is predicated on their controversial theory of discourse in which all social iden-tity is structurally incomplete and unfixed, that is, penetrated by contingency.

My main question in this regard centres around Laclau & Mouffe’s theorisationof structural incompleteness: What do they mean by the concept of structure here?And when do structures become incomplete? On a general historical level, Laclau& Mouffe’s answer to the latter question is to assert that the unsutured nature ofidentity, and with it the centrality of hegemonic politics, only becomes dominant‘at the beginning of modern times, when the reproduction of the different social ar-eas takes place in permanently changing conditions which constantly require theconstruction of new systems of differences ... Thus the conditions and the possi-bility of a pure fixing of differences recede; every identity becomes the meetingpoint for a multiplicity of articulatory practices, many of them antagonistic’ (La-clau & Mouffe, 1985, p.138). However, apart from their devastating attacks onthe Marxist notion of structure, they provide no positive account of structure otherthan it being synonymous with their theorisation of discourse. The suspicion isthat Laclau & Mouffe’s conception of a generalised structural incompleteness (orunsuturedness) remains too abstract and formal to be used unproblematically inconcrete social and political analysis.

This criticism can be amplified if we consider Laclau’s radicalisation of theconcept of hegemony in Model 2. InNew Reflections, Laclau introduces the con-cept of structural undecidability by presenting an example of rule following ‘in-spired by Wittgenstein’:

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‘If I begin the counting the numerical series, 1, 2, 3, 4 and asksomeone to continue, the spontaneous answer would be 5, 6, 7, etc.But I can adduce that this is wrong, since the series I have in mind is1, 2, 3, 4; 9, 10, 11, 12; 17, 18, 19, 20; etc. But if my interlocuterbelieves that s/he has now understood the rule and tries to follow itby continuing the series in the stated way, I can still adduce that s/heis wrong, since the series I have in mind was merely a fragment of adifferent series – for example, one comprising the numbers 1 to 20,40 to 60, and 80 to 100 etc. And obviously,I can always change theseries in a different way[my emphasis]. As can be seen, the prob-lem here is not that the coherence of a rule can never be fully real-ized in empirical reality, but that the rule itself is undecidable and canbe transformed by each new addition. Everything depends, as LewisCarroll would say, on who is in command. It is a question of hege-mony in the strictest sense of the term. But in this case,if the series isundecidable in terms of its very formal structure[my emphasis], thehegemonic act will not be the realization of a rationality precedeingit, but an act of construction (Laclau, 1990, p.29).

There are, it seems to me, a number of problems with this formulation. Firstof all, it is not clear whether or not the example constitutes an instance of unde-cidability (at least in the Derridean sense); the issue raised by the example is notthe ambiguity of the rule as such, but the inability of the interlocuter to grasp whatthe rule really is, as the rule is being constantly altered by the person in power.In this sense, for the interlocuter, the game becomes one of attempting to deter-mine which rule is being employed, that is, instead of a structural ambiguity, thereis an increasing complexification of the rules which are being formulated. As itstands, the example seems to confer to Laclau the power to determine at will whatthe rule shall be, whereas presumably in a hegemonic struggle both parties will beattempting to fix the precise form and meaning of the rule. (Besides, if every rulewas as structurally undecidable as Laclau suggests, it would seem to underminethe very idea of a rule, in that it would be impossible to determine in any particu-lar case whether or not a particular act was in accord with a rule, and without thisminimal normativity, it would be impossible to rule out instances of incorrect rulefollowing.)

Further, it is not clear what it means to say that a social structure is undecid-able. There are two aspects to this problem, which relate to the extension of theconcept of undecidability to social and political systems, and the question of po-litical subjectivity respectively. Let us examine each in turn.

Aspect 1

Here, the concept of undecidability has two related meanings: on the one hand, itis a function of an antagonistic relation, that is, it is the revelatory moment whenthe ‘outside’ which both forms and threatens introduces contingency or undecid-ability into social objectvity; on the other hand, as we have seen in the rule follow-ing example given above, it is a property of social structures themselves. In whatsense are these two aspects undecidable? To answer this question, we need firstto remember that for Derrida (to whom Laclau explicitly refers) undecidability

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refers to those infrastructural concepts such as differance or the supplement whichresist, baffle and weaken the preordained decisions and oppositions of metaphysi-cal thought. Hence they open philosophy to its own constitutive exclusions with-out closure or decision, and in this sense embody an ethical refusal to decide. AsDerrida remarks in Positions, to call conceptual ‘infrastructures’ undecidable is tostress that they are

‘unities of simulacrum, [of] “false” verbal properties (nominal orsemantic) that can no longer be included within philosophical oppo-sition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a thirdterm, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of specula-tive dialectics (Derrida, 1971, p.43).

In what sense is this commensurate with Laclau’s usages of undecidability forpolitical theory? With respect to Laclau & Mouffe’s theorisation of antagonism,we have seen how in this relation identity is shown to be dependent on an otherfor its consitution. This opens the purity of identity to that which is external, butit is not clear why this relation is necessarily undecidable. Undecidability in thiscontext requires, it seems to me, something additional: the positing of an ethicalrelation between self and other, that is, an opening of self to other. It is is not clearwhy this is so in the case of an antagonistic relationship.

What then of the case in which social structures themselves are deemed to beundecidable? While Laclau & Mouffe’s argument against social structures havingan essence is plausible, and results in a relational and contextualised conception ofsocial relations, it is not clear why and how undecidability is an inherent possibil-ity (or necesssary possibility) of the structure? It cannot mean, simply, that socialstructures are vulnerable to social historical change, or that they are internally con-tradictory, for this is the Marxist conception of structure which Laclau & Mouffehave severely criticised. Instead, structures are made analogous to instances ofintrinsically ambiguous rule following. This idea of rule following captures, a laWinch, the idea of structures as institutionalised social habits and customs, butas we have seen it is not clear why they are inherently ambiguous, nor why thismodel of undecidability is generally applicable to social relations and structuresas such. As it stands, the idea is too formal to capture the intricate network ofconstraints and facilitations (to borrow from Giddens) which operate in particu-lar kinds of historically specific social structures. In short, as against Laclau &Mouffe’s too thin and abstract conception of structure which is universally appli-cable to all societies, we need (following Ryle and Geertz) a ‘thicker’ conceptionof the structure, which allows for a fuller contextualization and historicization.

Aspect 2

An essential correlate of Laclau’s concept of undecidability is his rethinking ofpolitical subjectivity. Here he argues that the dislocatory logics of modern soci-eties continuously disrupt social structures, thereby revealing their essential unde-cidability. These dislocatory effects open up the possibility of political agency assubjects attempt to reconstitute dislocated social structures. As these subjectivi-ties cannot be derived from the previously dislocated forms, new political subjec-tivities are seen to emerge in the space between the dislocated structure and thedecisions of agents (Laclau, 1990; Laclau & Zac, 1994). In this sense, all social

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structures are political constructs in that they are ultimately the product of ‘found-ing’ acts or decisions which involve the exercise of power. This claim adds furtherweight to the idea that all structures are in the final analysis undecidable. That is tosay, if social forms are constituted by irreducible choices, and these decisions arenot algorithmic, then there must be a plurality of options from which to choose.

This reasoning proposes an interesting resolution to the so-called structure/agencydebate without apparently privileging either a determining social structure or anautonomous, self-determining subject, but it is not without some difficulties. Themajor question mark surrounds the decisionist and voluntarist connotations of La-clau’s theorisation of the subject. As it has been suggested, Laclau distinguishesbetween subjects positioned within a discursive structure, and political subjectswhich actively produce structures. Apart from the problem of assuming a uni-fied and homogenous subjectivity with clearly articulated intentions, the difficultywith the latter conception is the positing of an unconditional subjectivity whichis literally able to ‘create’ meaningful structures out of itself. This latter view isseemingly appropriate for what we may call extreme or ‘limit’ situations such asrevolutionary conjunctures (or the total breakdown of social and political orders)when a thorough restructuring of social relations is possible, but even this mustbe qualified if we accept that the most revolutionary movements and subjectivitiesare conditioned by previously existing ideological traditions and organisational in-frastructures. (This qualification is implicitly acknowledged by Laclau when heintroduces the concepts of ‘availability’ and ‘credibility’ to explain the discursiveraw materials which movements and subjectivites rely upon in order to attempt toconstruct new social orders (Laclau, 1990, pp.65-67).

A second difficulty concerns the question of taking a decision itself. In this re-gard, Laclau establishes an equivalence between taking a decision, the emergenceof a strong political subjectivity, and the creation of a new social order. This is,however, to collapse the distinction between different kinds of decisionmaking. Adistinction needs to be made between decisions takenwithin a structure and deci-sions takenabouta structure. With respect to the former, it is evident, I think, thatconsumers in free markets, or politicians in parliaments, are continuously takingdecisions without ever questioning or creating new structural contexts in whichthose choices are made. The latter sense of taking a decision covers the kinds ofcases in which structures fail and new structural forms emerge. With the kind ofqualifications noted above, these are the situations in which Laclau’s novel theori-sation of structure and agency becomes applicable. What this means is that ratherthan a general theory of a radical political subjectivity, we need to remain sensitiveto the specific historical contexts in which different kinds of subjectivity come intoplay. The criterion for this analysis is dependent on the kinds of decision whichget taken, and the circumstances in which these decision are taken.

(b) The formation of hegemony

Having examined hegemony as a type of political practice, we need now to con-sider the substantive dimensions of hegemony, that is, hegemony as an ‘achieve-ment’ of political projects. Two issues are raised here: the process of hegemonicconsolidation or institionalization, and the site in which hegemony is contestedand consolidated. While Laclau & Mouffe do not explicitly address the formerquestion, they provide important hints for its analysis. This emerges when they

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assert that hegemonic practices are basically metonymical in nature in that theyoccur when social forces in one sphere (for example trade unions in the economicrealm) begin to address issues in another sphere (for example community andhousing issues in the social sphere), thereby extending their domain of activity(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.141-142). To develop this important insight, we candraw on Derrida’s concept of iterability to show how every repetition of a linguis-tic sign results in some alteration of its meaning. Without exploring the idea insufficent detail here, it is possible using this concept to account more adequatelyfor the process by which projects attempt to hegemonise different forces, whileconsolidating their particular discourses in different institutions (See Howarth, 1995).

The second issue concerns the key political spaces in which hegemony is ex-ercised. For the classical precursors in the Marxist and non-Marxist traditions,hegemony was seen to be exercised within the limits of the nation state (or waseven considered to be synonymous with the nation state). According to Gram-sci, for instance, the achievement of hegemony by the working classes was akinto their ‘becoming state’. InHegemony and Socialist Strategy, however, there isa double movement. On the one hand, the nation state is presented (albeit im-plicitly) as a key site for hegemonic politics while, on the other hand, Laclau &Mouffe make it clear that a discursive formation does not overlap with an em-pirical social formation (in the Marxist sense). On an abstract level, as they putit, a discursive formation is characterised as any formation which signifies itselfby drawing political frontiers separating it from others (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985,pp.143-144). While this is suggestive, it leaves many important theoretical ques-tions unresolved. Without exploring them in depth, it is worth pointing out thata fuller theorisation of hegemonic formations needs to take into consideration thedifferent types and forms of state, as well as the emergence of new political forms(at the global and local levels for instance) which go beyond the state form as weknow it. These issues (contra Laclau & Mouffe) cannot be resolved on a purelyformal and analytical plane, but must be examined in specific historical conjunc-tures, and if this is the case then appropriate concepts must be developed for thatanalysis. This brings us to the third and final dimension of hegemony.

(c) Hegemony as a type of political rule

Apart from its analytical and descriptive usages, the concept of hegemony in theMarxist tradition also implies a normative and critical perspective. Hegemonysuggests something more than the succesful imposition and consolidation of onepolitical project over others; it entails the winning of consent and the constructionof authority. The difficulty with Laclau & Mouffe’s position is the weakening ofthis normative aspect of the concept. This is not to say that there is a completedisappearance of normativity. Laclau & Mouffe distinguish between a democraticand authoritarian practice of hegemonic politics in their critique of Leninist dis-courses, arguing that the latter conception, which they clearly oppose, is integralto a theoretical perspective which retains an ontological and epistemological priv-ilege for certain classes and organisations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.58-59).This critique of different types of hegemonic practice, however, is not extendedto an analysis and evaluation of different forms of political rule.

The point is also taken up by Laclau inNew Reflections. Considering the rela-tion between consent and coercion, he argues that

954 David Howarth

‘the opposition between consent and coercion must not be con-ceived of as an exclusive polarity. Consent and coercion are, rather,ideal limitative situations. What would be, in effect, a type of consentwhich excluded any coercion? An identity so perfectly formed thatit would leave no space for anyidentificationin the Freudian sense ofthe term. But this is exactly the possibility which our entire critique ofthe objectivist conception of social relations excludes ... [T]he merechoosing of possible courses of action and the exclusion of others im-plies, in itself, a form of violence.’ (Laclau, 1990, p.171)

Again, at a formal level, this provides us with a convincing rethinking of the re-lationship between consent and coercion; a rethinking which is adequate for allpossible systems of power or political formations. At a more concrete level, how-ever, it is still important to retain a distinction between coercion and consent inorder to evaluate and criticise different types of political rule. That is to say, weneed to be in a position to explore the variable balances of coercion and consentin particular political systems. This would enable the analyst, for instance, to ex-amine the degree to which regimes and states rely on the exercise of coercion tosustain themselves. In this way, borrowing from Gramsci and Poulantzas, it mightbe possible (and useful both critically and descriptively) to construct a typologyof different forms of political rule depending on their degree of organicity or in-organicity. This would depend, following Gramsci’s theorisation of the state andcivil society in the East and West (or Poulantzas’ analysis of fascism and dictator-ship), on the organisation and circulation of consent in different states and formsof regime.

Conclusion

Laclau & Mouffe’s deployment of post-structuralist and post-modernistthemes has opened up new possibilities for theorizing the concept of hegemony.While this paper agrees with many of their assumptions and substantive argu-ments, in the limited space available it has endeavoured to point out certain de-ficiencies in Laclau & Mouffe’s approach, while also pointing to possible ways inwhich their approach might be extended and deepened. Three areas were singledout in this regard. First, the need to rethink the theorisation of social structureand its relationship to political subjectivity. Second, the need to concentrate onhegemony as a substantive political formation. Third, the need to explore the nor-mative dimension of hegemony, and its implications both for critically evaluatingand analysing concrete hegemonic forms of political rule.

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