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How to Win Polls without Really TryingSource: Fortnight, No. 58 (Mar. 16, 1973), pp. 6-8Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25544497 .

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6 FRIDAY, 16th MARCH, 1973

HOW TO WIN POLLS WITHOUT REALLY TRYING

After the Border Poll Fortnight takes a closer look at the

whole business of polling. Do opinion polls and plebiscites really tell us more than the organisers wanted us to tell them?

The evidence suggests that democracy is less absolute than some people would have us believe?

The most important thing to be remembered about democracy is that it all

depends how you put it into practice. The result of any election is determined as

much by the system of voting as by the views of the electors. Similarly the results in a referendum or opinion poll depend as

much on the questions asked as on the 'real opinions' of the people asked.

People sometimes think that this i

problem is restricted to unofficial opinion polls, and that proper elections where

everyone has a chance to vote are

different: Since the 'unexpected' defeat of the Labour Party and Harold Wilson in the British General Election of 1970

despite the prediction in most of the polls of a clear victory for Labour, the idea that

opinion polls can safely be disregarded has

caught on. But in fact the evidence is that

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCES

Hie Times (Marplan) (February 1969)

Prod. RC All Protestant Unionist 7% _ 5% Anti-O'Neill Unionist 15% \% \\% Pro-O'Neill Unionist 69% 45% 61% N.I. Labour 4% 20% 9% Nationalist _ 20% 6% Republican Labour _ 7% 2% Other 5% 7% 6%

Belfast Telegraph (December 1967)

Prod. RC All Unionist 81% 4% 53% Liberal 3% 12% 6% Labour 12% 33% 19% Nationalist ? 30% 11%

Republican Labour ? 6% 2% Other 6% 15% 9%

Fortnight (July 1972)

Prod. RC All Vanguard 26% 1% 17% D.U.P. 9% ? 6% Official Unionist 48% 1% 34% Alliance 8% 24% 15% N.I. Labour 4% 18% 10%

SDLP 1& 41% 17% Republican

? 3% 1% Other 4% 12% ?

by and large opinion polls are remarkably accurate, to within two or three

percentage points either way depending on the size of the sample. The polls in 1970 did show the sudden last minute

swing to the Tories. The difficulty was that all but one was simply taken too early to give an accurate prediction of the result

of the election itself. Asking everyone is not in practice a great deal more effective or accurate, though it seems more

democratic, than asking a reasonably selected sample.

The Border Issue What matters much more is what you

ask them. This applies most obviously to

plebiscites and referenda. General de

Gaulle, for instance, was a past master at

asking the right questions of the French electors and so effectively bypassing the

ordinary parliamentary channels on most

major issues. It also applies to the most basic political issues like the maintenance of Northern Ireland as part of the United

Kingdom. The figures in the tables

opposite for the five polls (four sample, opinion polls and last week's official

plebiscite) show just how flexible opinion is on such matters. The more starkly you

pose the issue, as in the Fortnight Poll and the Official Plebiscite, the more the Protestant community is likely to come

together to produce a massive vote; but if

you pose several alternatives, as in the two

Belfast Telegraph' polls, this unity

disappears. Among the Catholic

community on the other hand it seems clear that there is a great diversity of

opinion on any formulation, with the

highest recorded result being a mere 50% for ka united Ireland linked to Britain' in the Belfast Telegraph poll of 1967, and the assumed mass abstention in last

week's plebiscite. On this evidence the SDLP and other minority parties were

very wise to keep their supporters well

away from the ballot papers. It may be argued, of course, that these

differences reflect real changes in people's attitudes in response to events. But it is

equally plausible to argue that it is just as much a matter of the form in which the

question is put. If Mr. Whitelaw had wanted to begin to break down the

straight. communal voting pattern he would have been well advised to increase

the number of alternatives and so allow

the Catholics to begin voting.

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FORTNIGHT 7

Rigging the .elections? Elections are just as open to

manipulation. A good deal of mud has been thrown at and stuck to the Unionist

Party for its use of gerrymandering in local and Stormont constituencies under

the simple majority vote system. The big problem was that the process was so

simple to observe and therefore to attack. But virtually every other major political party in the 'democratic' West has at one

time or another indulged in some form of election rigging. Fianna Fail in the

Republic has almost as bad a reputation in this respect as the Unionists. Even under the PR system you can organise things so I as to ensure an unfair weighting of your own party's votes by manipulating the

number of seats in each constituency: where you expect a large majority it pays

to have an even number of members, so

that you can get three out of a possible four; where you are only just ahead it pays to have three seats, of which you will win two. Neil Blaney was the Fianna Fail

expert in these matters, having arranged the constituencies admirably for his party before the last election.

But this time round he was not there to make the necessary adjustments in

constituency boundaries and Fianna Fail lost for the first time in i6 years. Bill

Craig is the Unionist expert, which may be

significant.

Manipulation is not restricted to Ireland. De Gaulle's total recasting of the

French electoral system in 1958 so as to ensure a strong, and therefore a Gaullist,

government has already been mentioned.

The two election system, on following Sundays, with the space in between left

explicitly for those not elected by an absolute majority in the first round to sort out electoral pacts, operated yet again last

week to leep the Communists out of

government, even in collaboration with

the other socialists. Even in Britain the Labour Party came under heavy fire a few

years ago for delaying the promised boundary changes with a view to

improving its own electoral chances. And

the Germans have adopted yet another form of PR, the list system, again with a view to maintaining the internal political balance.

The implications The point of all this is to emphasise that

the choice of electoral systems is much more subtle than slogans about democracy imply. In relation to Northern Ireland it is

generally accepted that PR on a single transferable vote system, as used in the

South, will bring about a much wider

PPBPER POf ilfi

Belfast Telegraph (December 1967)

Q. Which of these arrangements do you think would be best for Ireland? Prod. RC All

Situation as it exists today 53% 20% 42% A united independent Ireland 2% 30% 12% A united Ireland linked to Ag%M ?^ aa<*

Britain 43% 50% U%

Loyalty Survey (Professor Richard Rose, 1968X

Q. Do you approve or disapprove of the Constitution of Northern Ireland?

Prod. RC All

Approve 68% 33% 54% Disapprove 10% 34% 20%

DK 22% 32% 26%

Fortnight Poll (July 1972)

Q. How would you vote if a referendum was held in the autumn for the

unification of Ireland?

Prod. RC All

Vote Yes 1% 24% 9% Vote No 97% 41% 79% Abstain 1% 35% 13%

! Belfast Telegraph (February 1973)

Q. Which of these do you think would be the better solution to the

! Northern Ireland problem? j Prod. RC AH

Stormont restored with stronger powers 41 % 1 % 28 % Total integration with Britain 20% 7% 16% Continuation of direct rule 12% 14% 13% United Ireland 1 % 39% 13 % A Stormont Assembly with the opposition

having representation in the Government 11% 12% 11% Joint control of Northern Ireland by the

British Government and the Government

in the Republic 3% 23% 9% A Stormont Assembly with the biggest single

party forming the Government g% \% g% An independent Northern Ireland not linked to

Britain or the Irish Republic 3% 3% 3%

Border Poll (March 1973) AH Do you want Northern Ireland to

remain part of the United Kingdom 58 %

Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Vi % Republic of Ireland outside the United Kingdom

Spoiled Vote 1/2%

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8 FRIDAY, 16th MARCH, 1973

spread in parliamentary representation and so make some form of coalition

government more likely. But the result would also depend on the number of

members per constituency, as in the

South. If Mr. Whitelaw is serious about

setting up a system which will help us to resume a less violent form of self

government he should be looking into all these matters a good deal more seriously.

For the moment the choice of system, and

thus of the likely result, is his. But sadly his options seem to be restricted somewhat by the purely internal self interest of the Tory and Labour Parties in

Britain for whom any form of PR could

prove highly embarrassing. Which simply goes to prove the point that all politicians are riggers at heart.

The answer to the basic question of unity with Britain in some form or other depends on the way the question is asked: (for details see table).

Percentage for maintaining the union

1967 1968 1972 1973 Border Poll

(BT) (Rose) (Fortnight) (BT)

80% ^^^

60% ^^^^^^ ~

40% 50%

Personalities

Protestant RC

1969 1973 1969 1973

(Times) (B.T.) (Times) (B.T.)

O'Neill 58% ? 91% ?

Faulkner " % 44% 1% 2%

Craig 5% 15% 1% ?

Paisley 3% 13% ? 2%

Bleakley - 9% - 9%

Cooper ? 3% - 9%

Fitt - " - 13%

Hume ? 1% ? 40%

On Reconstruction Robin BaUie

Robin Bailie gives his response to the

Fortnight suggestion for a left of centre

coalition and to the ten point plan for

reconstruction published in our last issue. He questions the practicality of any coalition form of government, and the

desirability of drawing a distinction between the centre and left parties.

I must start by questioning what

appears to be assumption in the remit

which 'Fortnight' has given namely that a

form of Coalition Government in the

traditional style of coalitions is likely to be an effective answer to the problems of

securing a basis for Government by consent in Northern Ireland. It became clear after a lengthy period of civil rights agitation that the basis of minority grievance was not a matter of improving the rules to ensure fair play. The real

motivating force behind it, and a force not

initially recognised or articulated by those

activating the movement, stemmed, I

believe from the frustration of exclusion from executive power. Any new system

which stopped short of providing for executive power.shared as a right would no matter what the checks or balances, fail to meet that aspiration. To effect the

necessary change in the polarised attitudes of both communities the system of

government must be reconstructed so that

it of itself ensures that power is shared and that society can therefore demand of both communities that responsibility which is the corollary of power. This is the

key without which the communities cannot be depolarised and without which

ultimately separatism in a formalised sense might become increasingly a serious

proposition. A form of coalition

government based on the chance

composition of the House, of horse trading between the parties would be unlikely to

provide a firm basis for new psychological attitudes. Equally a system of government based on collective Cabinet responsibility would seem to me to be workable on a

coalition of the kind of diverse interests one would belikely to have. It would

probably fall apart at the first Cabinet

meeting even if security were to be within the province of Westminster.

If the thesis is that a substantial measure of agreement would exist

amongst the centre or left groupings on

such issues as unemployment, local

government, education, regioflal

development and agriculture, then

speaking for myself and I imagine most moderate Unionists there would be no

doctrinaire or indeed practical barrier to a

substantial working arrangement

particularly bearing in mind that we are

concerned with the regional assembly where one would have to work within the

framework of national policies formulated

by the national Parties for the United

Kingdom as a whole.

1 myself believe it is a misconception of Northern Ireland attitudes that parties here are divided clearly on class and

ideological lines. There is little point in

importing from Britain a. system which is now under consideration where

deficiencies for providing for suitable

government ^are becoming increasingly

evident. The main thing is to produce a

radically and socially aware programme

and carry the support of as wide a

spectrum as possible for it without class labels. Consensus rather than conflict

either of the class or religious kind must be the key note.

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