THE GUNS WOULD NOT FIRE

SECRET

REPORT ON NO. 21 AND NO. 453 RAAF SQUADRONS

INTRODUCTION

1. For the purpose of clarity this report is divided into three periods, with a Pre-Japanese War

Period, the Malayan/Singapore Campaign, and the Post Singapore Period. While there is little

cheerful reading in this report it should be borne in mind that the period covered was one when

we suffered a set-back, and much of the matter therefore, concerns our inadequacy of the

time.

THE PRE JAPANESE WAR PERIOD

2. I arrived by air from the United Kingdom at RAAF Station Sembawang on the 4th October,

1941, and after an interview with the AOC [commander], Air Vice Marshal Pulford, I took

command of No. 453 RAAF Squadron which was equipped with Buffalo aircraft. Also on the

station were the RAAF Headquarters and No. 8 RAAF Squadron (Hudsons) and No. 21 RAAF

Squadron (Buffalos). I was amazed to notice amongst many of the Australian personnel on the

Station the prevalent dislike that some of them bore for the English--Englishmen were spoken of

as "Pommies" with an air of contempt. I did not pay a great deal of attention to this, but it was

this that grew into the strong dislike for RAF administration later in the war. It should be noted in

turn that RAF personnel elsewhere ostracised the Australians.

3. This matter was aggravated by the obvious and to my mind unwarranted dislike that the

Fighter Group controller, Group Captain Rice, had for the two Australian Fighter Squadrons, and

this was later a distinct fillip to inducing a lack of confidence in both Nos. 21 and 453 Fighter

Squadrons in the controlling of the air campaign. I believe the crux of this matter lay between

my Station Commander, Group Captain McCauley RAAF, and Group Captain Rice RAF, and

centred I believe on the question of whose Headquarters should have control of my two

Squadrons. Whatever the cause, however, this imposed a strain on me as CO of 453 Squadron

and later as Tactical Command[er] of the two Fighter Squadrons, and ... it resulted in Fighter

Group Headquarters taking practically no interest in us and our equipment and organisation. It

may explain the situation that arose from this, when I say that when we were later expected to

operate in defence of Singapore, the Fighter Group were unable to control us at first, because a

normal fighter dispersal ops. with telephones, an elementary requirement, had not been laid on.

This method of conducting warfare is bound to affect units adversely and is most unfair on the

Squadron Commanders, who have enough to do without having to convince regularly both

pilots and men that the Higher Command are doing their best.

4. The aircrew personnel of No. 453 Squadron with the exception of the two Flight Commanders,

Flight Lieutenant Grace and Flight Lieutenant Vanderfield, were pilots straight from PTS [pilot

training school], and some of them told me when I questioned them, that they had no desire to

be fighter pilots and had been given no choice in the matter. The officers consisted of two Flight

Commanders who had very little experience in operations and very little in Service matters, and

also three Pilot Officers who came from the same PTS, and were of the same seniority as the

Sergeant Pilots--besides these there were the Adjutant, Flight Lieutenant Wells, and the Engineer

Officer, Pilot Officer Pannial. The ground crews were entirely Australian with the exception of

nine WT [wireless telegraphy or radio] operators who were ex-RAF.

5. No. 21 Squadron was a regular Australian squadron and was commanded by Squadron

Leader Allshorn RAAF. Though I had no control of this squadron until after the war started with

Japan, I was responsible for teaching them their fighter tactics and air drill, as none of their pilots

had any operational experience.

6. The Pilots of both Squadrons were put through their OT [illegible] Squadron operational training

in a remarkably short time. Everyone was extremely keen and the units well knit. On the occasion

of the AOC's inspection, Air Vice Marshal Pulford said he was extremely pleased with the

advance of the units, and Group Captain McCauley RAAF Station Commander expressed the

progress made as an unprecedented personal achievement. I say this because I feel sure

Captain McCauley realized the gulf of feeling lying between the Australians and the English that

had to be bridged.

7. About six weeks after my arrival in Singapore I realized that war with Japan was highly

probable, and I approached the AOC in order to change some of the pilots in my Squadron--I

hoped to obtain in place [of them] some experienced officers who were more suited for fighters.

I was instructed by him to fly to Australia where I was to try to get some more pilots, unfortunately

I was unable to achieve any results and I was told that any available experienced pilots were

required to form a Higher OTU in Australia in June of the following year.

8. At this stage the Japanese war commenced and I immediately returned to Singapore.

THE MALAYAN/SINGAPORE CAMPAIGN

9. I returned to Singapore on about the 19th December to find that two thirds of the pilots of the

Squadron had been sent to Northern Malaya to assist No. 21 Squadron which had not fared too

well on its own. [21 Sq. was caught on the ground on 8 Dec, and when it retreated next day only

six aircraft could be made airworthy. Four of these were shot down on 10 Dec.] I was instructed

by Group Captain Rice (Fighter Group) to go up and pull the two units together, and I

understood from him that the morale of the two squadrons was very poor. (Group Captain

McCauley was away on a tour of the Middle East at that period.)

10. I flew up to Ipoh the next day with the remaining pilots and aircraft. I found on arrival that the

morale of both Squadrons had dropped. Both units had suffered some losses and the Officer,

Flight Lieutenant Vigors who had come from Kallang to command No. 453 in my absence had

been shot down in flames on his first sortie.

11. Several matters required immediate attention, but the most serious was the considerable

losses we were suffering [to] our irreplacable aircraft, that were being destroyed on the ground,

and I decided that if we were to be able to operate at all at the end of another seven days we

must stop this heavy drain on our numbers.

12. The landing ground position was disastrous for fighter operations. There was only one landing

ground and that was at Ipoh, the surrounding country was jungle, rubber [plantation], or

mountainous, and we had no facilities for airfield strip construction. Ipoh airfield consisted of a

usable strip with another at right angles to it at the North end, but which was too small for any

but the lightest types of aircraft. A narrow Macadam taxi track led off from the usable strip and

off this track lay the dispersal pens. However, there were no pens [revetments] and also no other

possible means of dispersing the aircraft on the strip itself owing to the Japanese ground straffing

tactics, and our only alternative was to have to the aircraft either in the air or along the taxi

track in their dispersal pens as we had no warning system.

13. The taxi track to the dispersal pens was exceedingly narrow and [illegible; I think he's saying

they needed an erk to guide each wingtip]; furthermore the aircraft which had become

bogged through running a wheel off the track it was necessary for all pilots to excercise extreme

care; as many of the pens were a remarkably long way distant at the end of this winding track it

was nearly impossible to get a flight or Squadron onto the strip for take-off in less than 20

minutes, by which time it would have been too late to intercept any enemy aircraft.

14. The airfield was located in the valley and if no air cover was in the air while the aircraft

prepared for take-off, Japanese fighters or bombers, signalled by spies located in the nearby

hills, would attack our aircraft when they were on the ground or taking off. Furthermore almost

invariably when our aircraft were landing, Japanese aircraft attacked if no top cover was

available, in any case they usually attacked the top cover when it attempted to land.

15. This problem was discussed with Wing Commander Forbes[?] the Officer Commanding NOR

Group and I proposed that the only solution to operating from Ipoh lay in some form of warning

system. This was agreed and I was instructed to prepare a fighter ops. system.

16. A crude observer system was available which theoretically gave us reasonable cover.

However, there were practically no signal specialists available to us, and very little equipment,

we had to rely on asking the assistance from the local AA [anti-aircraft artillery] Unit for our

telephone equipment. The telephones which literally must have been some of the first that were

ever made were totally unreliable. The observer system which I had to use had been organized

by fighter ops Kallang, and under it we were unable to get reports on approaching enemy

aircraft direct from the observer posts, but got them through the Railway Station Master at Kuala

Lumpur. Owing to the delays attendant on this system we usually got our warnings that the

Japanese were 40 miles away just as the raid was on. I had with me in the ops. room the Colonel

Commanding the local AA Unit and we occasionally got helpful information from him on

approaching enemy raiders. Considerable delays were experienced however, through the

telephone lines which ran through the jungle being cut either by 5th columnists [Japanese

collaborators] of whom there were plenty, or by bombing.

17. As soon as the operations system was completed I tried to instruct the four Flight

Commanders so that they could take a turn at controlling in order to relieve me, but they had

no knowledge of controlling units and they needed supervision if we were to intercept any

raiders. Unfortunately the day after the completion of the ops. system, the Army lost ground and

we [lost] our observer posts.

18. During the two days that were necessary to construct the fighter control system, including

the provision of a suitable ground station, as there was none up to that time, I arranged for a

constant cover of four aircraft from each of the two Squadrons throughout daylight. This was

expensive as we anticipated, on engine hours, but as we were not attacked once during that

period it gave us two days valuable respite in which to reorganise and repair the aircraft.

19. The need for reorganisation was considerable. The Aircraft of the two Squadrons were being

serviced by the ground crews of only No. 21 Squadron [since only the aircraft of 453 Sq. had

moved up to Ipoh]. This Unit's ground crew strength was totally inadequate for one Squadron, let

alone two, and the vast majority of guns in the aircraft would not fire, because of the rust which

the troops had not had time to clean off. I had signalled to Singapore for Armourers from my

own Squadron as soon as I had reached Ipoh, and these men had arrived before we retreated

from the airfield, and had improved the guns considerably before we left. Inspections were also

not being done and the aircraft were rapidly becoming unreliable. The ex civil Airline engines on

the Buffalos were quite unsuited to the treatment they were getting in combat and on the

ground, and many developed serious loss of [illegible, but probably intending "loss of oil" or "loss

of power"].

UNFIT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS

20. The reorganisation of the Station was also a serious and pressing problem. There was no

appointed Station Commander. Food was an urgent need--the men were going without food

and so were the pilots. There was no suitable accommodation and as the men and pilots were

sleeping without mosquito needs under any available covering I feared malaria.

21. I therefore requisitioned accommodation in a Hotel at Ipoh and sent out the cooks with

money to buy food, and I also tried to introduce certainty and reliability into the organisation so

that morale should be improved.

22. Transport was lacking at first and caused grave difficulties. Spare parts for aircraft were

usually obtained by the cannibal system, oxygen was not available. Neither 21 Squadron nor 453

Squadron were equipped with either men or equipment for the role they were given, and while

expected to be self supporting they had neither trained cooks. MT [motor transport], nor

sufficient specialist staff or equipment to do their duty as they would have liked to do it.

Furthermore nearly all native labour on which we had to rely, had disappeared when the war

became "dangerous." I believe from hearsay that these circumstances were foreseen by the

RAAF Headquarters at Sembawang sometime before the war started, and a proposal put up by

them to substitute RORs [?] for native labour was turned down.

23. My conclusions from the foregoing matters at Ipoh were that there was a lack of imagination

in the prewar preparations made for Air Warfare in this area, and this resulted in a lack of air

support for the Land Forces and in both No. 21 Squadron and 453 Squadron being forced into a

state where they were unfit for sustained operations against the enemy.

24. While I was at Ipoh there was only one minor air combat and no land support operations

were requested by Group Headquarters. ON the 20th December evening, the day on which our

observer system fell to the Japanese advance troops, we received instructions to retreat to

Kuala Lumpur at first light the following morning. Transport was "borrowed" but considerable

difficulty was experienced through the night in preparing for the move, as we even lacked

torches and the airfield was completed blacked out through lack of any form of lighting.

Fortunately a crash and Repair Unit (also retreating I believe) reached us that evening and they

were able to assist considerably with breaking up crashed aircraft and removing all value and

transportable parts including engines.

25. On the 21st morning I flew with the pilots of 453 Squadron to Kuala Lumpur; it has been

arranged for 21 Squadron pilots and ground crew to return to Sembawang to reorganise and for

me to have my own ground crews from Singapore.

26. Kuala Lumpur airfield was a single strip which was being partly reconstructed. There were no

dispersals and we had the aircraft spread out around the strip and covered with branches from

trees. The ground crews with tankers [petrol bowsers or gasoline trucks] did not arrive until later

that day, and no operations were carried out. An Operations room and warning system were

again in the course of being formed but were not ready in time to control us successfully by the

time we left for Singapore on the morning of the 24th. It did not seem at first that there was every

chance of our being able to get down to some regular operations from Kuala Lumpur. The

Japanese ground troops were about 100 miles away and I anticipated that we had 10 clear

days at least in which to operate. No. 453 Squadron was similar to No. 21 Squadron, in that it was

also not equipped satisfactorily for a Squadron expected to be self supporting in this theatre,

there no cooks, no MT other than petrol tankers, and no MO or Intelligence Officer. Our first task

was to get the aircraft fully servicable and to utilize our troops so that the Squadron was on a

working basis with facilities for food and accommodation. The Group ops organisation had been

placed in the hands of an experienced officer, Wing Commander Daley, and we were

fortunately comparatively free of duties in connection with its functioning.

27. Only two operations took place during the three days we were at Kuala Lumpur. On the first

occasion our aircraft were attacked as they were taking off, and in the second they were

attacked from above just as they had formed up after take-off. In these two combats we lost

three pilots killed, four wounded, and six aircraft written off from our remaining strength of 14

aircraft and pilots ... having lost five pilots killed and wounded and several aircraft at Butterworth

and Ipoh before my arrival. No true record was available of the numbers of enemy aircraft shot

down by the Squadron but we later heard indirectly from the Army that the wreckages of 25

Japanese aircraft were found around Kuala Lumpur.

28. On December 23rd, instructions were passed to us to return to Sembawang on the following

morning. This was done.

29. On my return to Singapore a reorganisation of both 21 Squadron and 453 Squadron took

place. Squadron Leader Allshorn, CO of 21 Squadron, was replaced by Flight Lieutenant Williams

RAAF, who became Squadron Leader Commanding that Unit. On my recommendation Flight

Lieutenant Kinninmont RAAF, ex 21 Squadron, took over 453 from me. This enabled me to leave

all the administration and to lead both Squadrons of whom I was given tactical control. Owing

to Flight Lieutenant Kinninmount's inexperience, Flight Lieutenant Wells the Adjutant of 453

Squadron was instructed to look after the administration of the men of that Unit.

30. The Buffalo aircraft with which both Squadrons were equipped were slow and less

manoeuvrable than the Japanese aircraft with whom they came in contact, and who

outnumbered them considerably. Before the Japanese war had started we were given no useful

intelligence information on the enemy aircraft, the only information made available to use were

some silhouettes of early Japanese biplanes, which resulted in both Units going into battle with a

very wrong impression of the opponent they were going to meet. This was a very serious matter

as it completely upset all the tactics that had been planned, thereby giving the enemy Air Force

the initiative. Our pilots could not dog fight nor use dive and zoom tactics, and expect to get the

better of the enemy fighters, who also had an appreciable advantage in the climb owing to

their better power to weight ratio. A further serious setback was that above 14,000 feet the pilots

had to pump his petrol to his engine continually by a hand pump if he wished to use more than

about half throttle setting; this state of affairs made air combat a very uneven match.

31. I had decided at Kuala Lumpur to reduce the disadvantages of the Buffalo as much as

possible, and on my return to Singapore I arranged for all aircraft to be stripped of as much

surplus weight as possible. By reducing the petrol load and ammunition and replacing two of the

four .5 guns with .303, we reduced the load by almost 900 lbs, thereby improving the

performance in combat appreciably. However, not all aircraft were modified as there was a

considerable amount of normal work to be done and we had no assistance beyond our ground

crews.

32. Several good sorties were carried out on bomber escort and ground straffing duties.

33. During January 1941, the aerodrome was bombed a few times by formations of Japanese

bombers who dropped many medium size bombs. This bombing was reasonably accurate and

though our aircraft were in their pens or dispersed around our portion of the aircraft we lost

many of them. This was infuriating as we felt we ought to be in the air before these raids came. A

radar warning system was being operated by fighters ops at Kallang but we were not called on

[line evidently missing] have handed them to the Japanese on a plate. The role of the two

Squadrons was changed several times from that of Army Support to pure fighter interception,

however we were somehow never on our fighter role when the Japanese were bombing the

Island which was done fairly regularly. The main task of the squadron on most days seemed to

be to send two aircraft out each morning as a recce. [reconnaissance] for the Army. I was

several times approached by the pilots who spoke in a manner showing they had little

confidence in the RAF's ability to run its affairs, and they were opening in favor of moving nearer

to Australia so they could come under Australian control and put up a better fight. While there

may have been considerable wisdom in what the Australians said, my orders were to get on with

the job. At Kuala Lumpur for example I had a considerable disagreement with Flight

Commanders who considered we ought to return and operate from Singapore under a

reasonable working fighter control system, rather than lose our aircraft in penny packets for little

apparent result at Kuala Lumpur. My orders, however, were to stay there and in supporting my

superiors I made myself extremely unpopular with my Squadron. This was a very unenviable

position for me to be in, and as these circumstances repeated themselves before the campaign

was over I do believe the troops felt I was in league against them.

34. It may show the extent to which the dislike of the Royal Air Force was prevalent when I saw

that it was necessary for the Station Commander, Group Captain McCauley, to assemble his

officers before him and instruct them to cease drawing comparisons between the two Services

[between the RAF and the RAAF, presumably].

35. After the war with Japan had commenced, work had been started to make dispersals for

aircraft and the ground organisations in the rubber [plantation] away from the airfield. This

made it difficult to keep an eye on the troops during raids, and Pilot Officer Pennial the

Engineering Officer of 453 Squadron reported that he was finding difficulty in locating men to

work on the aircraft. I found that some men were going off to their billets and into the woods

and were not being stopped. I therefore let Flight Lieutenant Kinninmount lead the flying and [I]

commenced to organise the men again in No. 453. Parades with roll-calls were organised

throughout the day and I instructed Flight Lieutenant Wells to arrange a system whereby certain

reliable NCOs were given approximately 15 men and they were responsible that their men kept

at work. This did not prove entirely satisfactory as some of the NCOs were as lackadaisical as

some of the men. Great difficulty had been experienced throughout in trying to develop a sense

of responsibility and importance of position in the Officers and NCOs. There were no Warrant

Officers and only two Flight Sergeants in the whole Squadron, one of whom Flight Sergeant

[evidently a phrase missing]. Discipline was extremely weak, and the remaining Sergeants and

Corporals had risen from amongst the men with rather mushroom-like speed, and too many of

them were not satisfactory from the disciplinary aspect.

36. I had occasion to speak severely to Flight Lieutenant Wells who would not support me in

making the men get to reasonably near shelter trenches in an air raid. He contended that they

should be allowed to go to trenches some distance away, if they liked. This gave a bad lead to

the NCOs and owing to the shortage of other officers I had to go around the dispersal points

myself to ensure my orders were being obeyed. It was not practicable to obtain an exchange

for Flight Lieutenant Wells at this stage, owing to the difficulty of obtaining an Adjutant who

could take over immediately.

37. Towards the end of January, the two Australian GR [reconnaissance?] Squadrons who were

now located at Sembawang, plus No. 21 Squadron, retreated from Singapore to Sumatra. The

Station was placed under RAF control with Group Captain Whistondale as Station Commander.

This officer was eccentric and often spent time discussing his hobby of stamp collecting with the

airmen, when the Station organisation was in urgent need of assistance [The sentence was lined

out]. At the same time as this change, all the remaining Buffalo aircraft in Singapore from the

other Squadrons were given to me along with an assortment of pilots. A Fighter ops dispersal

organisation had been set up, and we were now fully under the control of Kallang fighter ops.

The aircraft we had been sent, however, had already been well used by other units and they

required considerable checking and servicing in every case except one before we could

operate them. Furthermore with the departure of all the RAF personnel except for one or two

officers of the Headquarters Staff, and those of course of No. 453 Squadron, no RAF troops had

been brought in, and out of a Squadron of 150 men we were forced to provide 50 for manning

the Station. Some of the men worked extremely well and creditably although we were so short

handed, but others were not so good, and we often had difficulty in finding them. I had, in fact,

on one occasion to ask the AOC to assist me by talking to the troops.

38. As the aircraft were made reasonably servicable, they were tested, and it was found that a

large proportion of the Cyclone engines were suffering from a serious lack of power. Spare

engines were no available and the number of aircraft therefore available for operational work

never exceed six, though there were several more flyable. The enemy had a constant fighter

patrol five miles North of the aerodrome, and the controllers at Fighter Group refused to send

pilots up [to intercept]. This was a form of stalemate, no policy was given for some while to the

Squadron, and they stayed at readiness with no hope of flying. In fact, before one raid they

were told by Fighter Control to clear off the aerodrome, as there was a raid coming. I was at this

stage unable to tell the Flights what was required of them except to carry on and make the

aircraft servicable. These matters were not well received, and the Flight Commanders had,

understandably, no enthusiasm in the running of their Flights.

39. On the 4th of February occurred the occasion when half a dozen men of No. 453 Squadron

were found some distance from the aerodrome without permission, by Air Vice Marshal Maltby,

and it was also the occasion when Australian officers had spoke disrespectfully to the Provost

Marshal in front of the troops. At approximately ten o'clock on that day I had gone to the Mess

to bath[e] and change, when the enemy commenced to shell the aerodrome and buildings

from across the Johore Straits. As the shelling continued, and shells were bursting about thirty

yards away, I circumnavigated the Mess and made my way to the Guard Room. I learned here

from the Engineer Officer that instructions had come through to fly all aircraft off the aerodrome

to Tengah a few miles away, in order to avoid the shelling. A driver was sent round in a van to

pick up the pilots from their dispersal; meanwhile, along with the few pilots present, I flew an

unserviceable Hurricane belonging to 232 Squadron to Tengah, as it would have been left on

the airfield owing to a shortage of Hurricane pilots. Altogether ten aircraft were flown off the

aerodrome by my pilots under shell fire. Two aircraft were hit in taxying, and one pilot was hit

and blown out of his aircraft by a salvo of three shells. Shortly after the first pilots landed at

Tengah , that aerodrome, which was an equal distance from the enemy artillery at

Sembawang, also came under fire, and the pilots had then to be asked to start their aircraft and

fly them out to Kallang. It was difficult to keep the pilots and crews confident in the command

when pilots are asked to fly out of one aerodrome being shelled into another an equal distance

from the source of shelling.

40. I was detained for the remainder of the day by Group Captain Rice of the Fighter Group,

who had order a Court of Inquiry to be held because our Squadron pilots were late at readiness

that morning. [Handwritten note: He canceled that decree later that evening.] I was therefore

away the whole day and had no opportunity to control the Squadron and ground troops which

were, in my absence, under the control of Flight Lieutenant Wells the Adjutant. I had no idea

that any of the men had gone down the roads towards Singapore town, and the first intimation I

had that Australian officers had spoken disrespectfully to the Provost Marshal in front of the men

was from Air Vice Marshal Maltby himself in Java.

I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HARPER'S ATTITUDE

41. I found out in Java that two of the men who were concerned in the departure from the

airfield to Singapore, were individuals who were mentally unbalanced and had been under

observation by the Station Medical Officer for some time, and they most probably influenced

the other four who were with them. With regard to the occasion concerning the Provost Marshal,

I question my [illegible line]

42. Early in February [1942] we were instructed that the squadron ground crews were to stay at

Singapore and fight with Ground Arms--all aircraft which could fly were to go to Palembang in

Sumatra. I instructed Flight Lieutenant Kinnimont to take the aircraft and their pilots to Sumatra

and I remained with my ground troops. There was some feeling among the men at this order

[because they considered?] this was a case of misemployment of trained personnel, and again

in supporting my superiors I made myself unpopular. I quote an extract from a Court of Inquiry

which was held in Australia on the subject of No. 453 Squadron in 1942, which will, perhaps,

explain the situation:

Evidence by Flight Lieutenant Kinninmont RAAF in answer to questions by the court:

"I could not understand Squadron Leader Harper's attitude at all. He had a queer attitude

towards the whole thing, and did not seem worried whether the Squadron left Singapore or not. I

could not understand Squadron Leader Harper's attitude at all in the end, but he had the

Squadron in sections ready to defend the aerodrome and more or less fight with the Army.... I

think his attitude was more or less the attitude of the British Command there to fight to the end

and die for Singapore, or just stay there and be killed. However, he looked after the troops very

well, he was always trying to organise things and get decent food, and also arrange sleeping

quarters, and with the pilots he was always trying to get them a day off and that sort of thing. He

always briefed us properly before the job right to the end, he treated the Squadron very well

including men and pilots. Towards the end when it was hopeless and only a matter of a day or

two, he did not seem concerned whether the Squadron got away on a ship, and she chaps

were prepared to stay although they could not have done any good had they stayed, because

they had few arms, about four or five Tommy guns and few rifles, and that was what annoyed

the chaps as they could see no good reason why they were staying there to be killed or taken

prisoner."

The last part of Flight Lieutenant Kinnimont's statement is partly incorrect. We had more arms

than Flight Lieutenant Kinnimont has said, and the men were rather resigned to staying on the

Island than prepared. However, when the troops were reconciled to it, considerable effort was

put into preparing the ground defences; machine guns were taken from crashed aircraft and

mounted on tripods made out of parts of crashed Blenheim air frames, and the men were

armed and prepared in squads. Arrangements were also made of the men to be led by trained

Army Officers in the event of any hand to hand fighting.

43. On the afternoon of the 5th February, contrary to expectation, we were given orders to

embark at Singapore and to go to Java. I believe this information was available before but had

not been given until the last possible minute as a corrective measure for the troops. Actually it

resulted in us not being able to leave our sections as tidily as we hoped and I apologised to

Group Captain Whistondale for this.

POST SINGAPORE PERIOD

44. We reached Java aboard the Cruiser Danae on the 9th February, and the Squadron was

billeted at Buitenzorg Transit Camp. I reported to the RAF Headquarters in Batavia and was

given a billet with a Squadron Leader McKenzie in a local private house. I was anxious however

to get the Squadron on its feet and operational. All the Buffalos we had sent to Palembang had

been destroyed with the exception of two, which were now located at an airfield near Batavia.

45. I approached the Dutch Divisional Staff Headquarters and persuaded them to leave me

have some transport so that I could get to Buitenzorg and Bandoeng.

46. Considering the circumstances the Squadron was reasonably housed at Buitenzorg and they

were given a good rest. I meanwhile proceeded to Bandoeng ABDAIR [probably meaning the

Air section of the American-British-Dutch-Australian command] to try and find out what was

happenings and to see if I could get some aircraft. I paid three visits to ABDAIR and spoke to Air

Commodore Williams and Group Captain Roberts, but I could get no definite orders for my

Squadron nor any promise of aircraft.

47. On about the 17th February, Air Vice Marshal Maltby instructed me to return to the Unit as he

now had matters in hand and had taken over control.

48. Previous to Air Vice Marshal Maltby's instruction to me, I had been approached by the

Adjutant, Flight Lieutenant Wells who said the men were very keen to rejoin the RAAF. He said he

wanted to visit some RAAF people whom he knew at ABDAIR to enquire if this was possible. I said

I had no objection as long as I knew what transpired and all arrangements must be made

through me. On his return from ABDAIR I gathered that he had been negotiating to get the

Squadron back to Australia, though I had no proof of this. Shortly after Air Vice Marshal Maltby's

instructions to me I was again approached by Flight Lieutenant Wells to go to ABDAIR, but I

refused him permission this time. He then said that he was expected to go by the RAAF

authorities there, but I told him that he must telephone them and explain the situation. He

telephoned Wing Commander [blank] of the RAAF who instructed him to go and see Group

Captain McCauley, who had arrived from Sumatra. I refused to agree to this however, and

spoke to Wing Commander [blank] telling him clearly that the Unit was now under Air Vice

Marshal Maltby's control and I refused to take instructions which did not emanate from him. His

reply was, "We can soon stop this nonsense". I warned Flight Lieutenant Wells not to leave camp;

however, acting on the Wing Commander's orders he reported to Group Captain McCauley. I

immediately telephoned Air Vice Marshal Maltby who said he would visit us the next day, but

that afternoon I received instructions from the RAF, through the Camp Commandant, to embark

my Squadron at Batavia and to go with it. This was done and we reached Colombo on the 27th

February.

49. At my own requst I was kept at Colombo to organise the fighter defences for the Island as an

attack by the Japanese was expected.

50. Among the personnel of the Squadron, Pilot Officer Pennial, RAF Engineer Officer, and the

Armourer Sergeant Haines RAAF, did outstandingly good work in exceptionally trying and often

hazardous conditions, and are very worthy of reward.

[signed] W.J. Harper, S/L

Air Ministry

Branch [illegible]

14 Jan. 1946

Brewster F2A Buffalo

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Brewster F2A Buffalo was an American fighter aircraft which saw limited service early in

World War II. It was one of the first U.S. WWII Monoplanes with an arrestor hook and other

modifications for aircraft carriers. It usually had an open canopy. Though the Buffalo won a

competition against the Grumman F4F Wildcat in 1939 to become the US Navy's first monoplane

fighter aircraft, it turned out to be a big disappointment.

Several nations, including Finland, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands, ordered the Buffalo to

bolster their struggling air arms, but of all the users, only the Finns seemed to find their Buffalos

effective, flying them in combat with excellent results.[1] During the Continuation War of 1941–

1944, the B-239's (a de-navalized F2A-1) operated by the Finnish Air Force proved capable of

engaging and destroying most types of Soviet fighter aircraft operating against Finland at that

time, achieving, in the first phase of that conflict, a kill-ratio of 32:1, 32 Soviet aircraft shot down

for every B-239 lost[2] and producing 36 Buffalo "aces".[3]

When World War II began in the Pacific[4] in December 1941, Buffalos operated by both British

Commonwealth (B-339E) and Dutch (B-339D) air forces in South East Asia suffered severe losses

in combat against the Japanese Navy's Mitsubishi A6M Zero and the Japanese Army's Nakajima

Ki-43 "Oscar". The British attempted to lighten their Buffalos by removing ammunition and fuel

and installing lighter guns in order to increase performance, but it made little difference.[4]

The Buffalo was built in three variants for the U.S. Navy, the F2A-1, F2A-2 and F2A-3. (In foreign

service, with lower horsepower engines, these types were designated respectively, B-239, B-339,

and B-339-23.) The F2A-3 variant saw action with United States Marine Corps (USMC) squadrons

at the Battle of Midway. Shown by the experience of Midway to be no match for the Zero, the

F2A-3 was derided by USMC pilots as a "flying coffin."[5] The F2A-3, however, was significantly

inferior to the F2A-2 variant used by the Navy before the outbreak of the war.