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Torchbearer National Security Report How "anaonal" is y naon?

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Torchbearer National Security Report

How "Thansfomtational"

is Army Transfonnation?

26 February 2003

Today the Army finds itself simultaneously at war (prosecuting campaigns) andtransforming (reshaping to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century). In adangerous and complex world, the value of America's Army has never been moreevident.

Yet some would argue that the U.S. Army's transformation to an "Objective Force" isnot in concert with U.S. national strategies and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance.In addition, they surmise, what is currently being articulated as an Army transformationstrategy is short on substance and long on rhetoric. Nothing could be further from thetruth.

In this installment of AUSA's Torchbearer series, we analyze DoD's operational goals,emerging joint operating concepts, and the Army's Objective Force concepts toprovide insights into their connectivity.

We think you will find this report to be a useful resource, and we hope you willcontinue to look to AUSA for credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

ContentsExecutive Summary ----------------------- 3

Introduction ---------------------------------- 4

DoD Perspective --------------------------- 4

Joint Perspective -------------------------- 5

Army Transformation --------------------- 6

Viewing Army Transformation in Termsof the New National Security Strategyand Joint Concepts ----------------------- 8Army Transformation:Is It Transformational? ------------------ 16

The Way Ahead -------------------------- 17

What Must Be Done ---------------------- 18

Torchbearer Message ----------------- 19

2

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, USA RetiredPresident

Army Vision(document) http://www.army.mil/vision/Documents/The%20Army%20Vision.PDF(homepage) http://www.army.mil/vision/index.html(Vision links) http://www.army.mil/vision/links.htmlGEN Shinseki speeches cited in text(AUSA 12 Oct 99 ) http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/speeches/991012.htm(Arrival ceremony 23 Jun 99) http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/speeches/990622.htmShallow-Draft High-Speed Sealift and Theater Support Vesselhttp://www.tacom.army.mil/TSV.htmhttp://www.tacom.army.mil/http://www.austal-ships.com/range/military.cfmFuture Tactical Truck System (FTTS)http://www.ssss.com/ssss/milestones.asphttp://www.asc2002.com/summaries/n/NP-19.pdfhttp://www.cascom.army.mil/transportation/FTTS.htmComanchehttp://www.sikorsky.com/details/1,,CLI1_DIV69_ETI260,00.html

Web Links for Additional Information

Torchbearer Message

In 1999, the Army Chief of Staff outlined an Army vision comprising three elements: People, Readinessand Transformation. Guided by that vision, the Army began a timely and profound transformation of structure,equipment, manning, training and resources. Ultimately, Transformation is about risk management, strikinga balance between readiness today and preparedness tomorrow.

Within this framework the Army developed a Transformation Campaign Plan designed across threesimultaneous paths: a Current Force (the nation’s “go to war” capability); an interim force of Stryker BrigadeCombat Teams (the bridge to the future as well as a capability between heavy and light forces); and theObjective Force (the future Army, a full-spectrum, network-centric capability designed as an integral part ofthe joint force).

The Objective Force is organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive,deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the full spectrum of military operations.The Objective Force will operate within the framework of a joint force in which it will lead jointforces, be led by a joint force and use joint capabilities at the lowest reasonable level. The ObjectiveForce comprises modular, scalable, flexible organizations whose leaders are adaptive for prompt and sustainedland operations in complex terrain. It is an adaptable force, able to transition quickly between changes intask, purpose and directions, maneuvering into and out of contact without sapping operational momentumbecause the Objective Force facilitates joint decentralized operations at the tactical level. Trained andequipped leaders and informed and networked soldiers at the lowest levels, adapting to the situation,make decisions to seize the initiative and accomplish operational objectives with tactical action.

Army Transformation is in harmony with Department of Defense and joint efforts to transform the armedforces. It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully support the National Security Strategyand the National Military Strategy as part of the joint force. Its progress will realize the transformationalcapabilities as outlined by DoD. The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan is on track and on target, designinga force to lead joint operations.

Congress must recognize this compatibility and resource the Army and DoD accordingly. An investmentin the Army today is an investment in America’s future.

So is Army Transformation transformational? Emphatically yes!

It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully supportthe National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy

as part of the joint force.

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Executive Summary

3

The transformation of the U.S. Army to a lean, agile, joint capabilities-based force is ongoing. The Army must accomplishin less than 10 years what traditionally has taken more than 20 years. To do this, the Army set in motion the necessaryelements to facilitate change and has accelerated Transformation to the Objective Force in 2008.

Army Transformation is in harmony with Department of Defense (DoD) and joint efforts to transform the armed forces.It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully support the national security and military strategies as part ofthe joint force. Its progress will realize the transformational capabilities outlined by DoD.

The strategy demands that mobile, deployable ground forces be joint and capable of conducting simultaneous anddistributed operations across the entire battlespace. This will accomplish the operational objectives of the joint force fromdeterrence to combat operations to stability operations, all while protecting the homeland. The Objective Force:• contributes to prompt operations (preemptive attacks, joint raids or other forcible/early entry operations) by increasing

the force flow through multiple, simultaneous deployments; and

• provides sustained forces not only for campaigns that require more time, but also for those periods of transition topostcombat and stability operations that are critical in meeting the national security objectives.The Objective Force will operate within the framework of a joint force in which it will lead joint forces, be led

by a joint force and use joint capabilities at the lowest reasonable level.The Objective Force is characterized by an integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture—one that is compatible with both current and future forces. Trainedand equipped leaders and informed and networked soldiers at the lowest levels, adapting to the situation, willmake decisions.

The Objective Force is strategically and operationally responsive, an Army that can deploy a unit of action (UA) in 96hours, a unit of employment (UE) in 120 hours, and five UEs in theater in 30 days using a mix of air, sea and land movementand prepositioned equipment. A joint, interdependent combined-arms team, it deploys directly to the fight at critical nodesand centers of gravity to accomplish operational objectives as part of the joint force across the breadth and depth of thebattlespace. Among its capabilities is situational awareness, i.e., the ability to determine at all times not only its own locationbut also those of both friendly and enemy forces. The UA is self-sustainable for three to seven days of operations andmaintains combat power with dramatically reduced theater logistics infrastructure.

The Army must continue to selectively recapitalize and modernize the Current Force, fully field the Interim Force (sixSBCTs) by 2008 and field brigade sets of equipment at the rate of three UAs and one UE per year until transformation iscomplete, in the projected 2030 time frame.

Congress must:• fully fund the Army’s Fiscal Year 2004 President’s Budget submission;

• fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army’s share ofthe DoD budget to at least 28 percent to maintain readiness while transforming to the Objective Force; and expeditiouslyfund future commitments of Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies so the Army is not forced to internallyreprogram Transformation and readiness dollars; and

• provide additional C-17 airlift capabilities and support and fund Army power-projection platform (AP3) initiatives.

So is Army Transformation transformational? Emphatically yes!Ultimately, Transformation is about risk management,striking a balance between readiness today and preparedness tomorrow.

What Must Be DoneToday the Army finds itself simultaneously at war

(prosecuting the global war on terrorism) andtransforming (reshaping to meet the emerging challengesof the 21st century). In a dangerous, complex world, thevalue of America’s Army has never been more evident.

The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan is on trackand on target, designing a force that leads joint operations.It is in harmony with DoD and joint efforts to transform.Funding relationships among the Current, Stryker andObjective forces are fully integrated in Program ObjectiveMemorandum (POM) 04-09, and the first significantelements appear in the Fiscal Year 2003 budget. The Armyhas inculcated the Army Vision across the senior leadershipand down to the lowest levels of the organization. Soldiersunderstand the azimuth for the future and why the Army ismoving along that azimuth.

The momentum to achieve the Objective Force isirreversible. Therefore, Congress and DoD must:• fully fund the Army’s FY 2004 President’s Budget

submission;

• fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent ofthe gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army’sshare of the DoD budget to at least 28 percent tomaintain readiness while transforming to the ObjectiveForce; and expeditiously fund future commitmentsof Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies sothe Army is not forced to internally reprogram Transfor-mation and readiness dollars;

• fully fund and support Stryker Brigade Combat Teamsand associated costs to ensure fielding of six brigadesby 2008;

• fully fund and support research, development, test andevaluation (RDT&E) efforts for the Future CombatSystems (to include the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon,or NLOS-C) and to achieve First Unit Equipped(FUE) by 2008 and Initial Operational Capability (IOC)by 2010;

• fund and support the prioritized recapitalization andupgrade program for the Current Force to ensurewarfighting readiness today;

• fund and field command and control criticalinformation systems, to include the Army KnowledgeEnterprise architecture, and support the developmentof Computer Network Attack and Computer NetworkDefense capabilities;

• accelerate funding for high-pay-off weapon systems(e.g., Comanche) that support the Army’s requirementsfor the Current, Stryker and Objective forces;

• support Basic Research investment in revolutionarywarfighting technologies such as autonomous vehicles,compact power sources, and nanoscience, biometrics,smart structures and materials-by-design;

• continue to fund the Land, Air, Mounted and ObjectiveForce Warrior programs to ensure the overmatchcapabilities of soldiers;

• support Advanced Technology Developmentfocusing on maturing critical Objective Forcetechnology (e.g., within the Army’s 13 science andtechnology mission areas;

• provide additional C-17 airlift capabilities by continuingthe acquisition of the programmed 134 aircraft andaccepting the 60 additional C-17s proposed by industryto the Air Force;

• support and fund Army power-projection platform(AP3) initiatives (such as Shallow-Draft High-SpeedSealift and the Theater Support Vessel, or TSV) andthe Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS);

• support Applied Research to provide block upgradesto Objective Force systems; and

• fund requirements (e.g., Distribution Management andReengineering Initiative) to enable the rapid and assuredsustainment of forces worldwide across the fullspectrum of military operations.

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IntroductionOn 17 September 2002, President George W. Bush

released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) thatacknowledges the need for the United States to wield itsstrength and influence in the world to shape it for the better.Transformation of the Department of Defense (DoD)emerged as one of the key imperatives. The NSSdirects the military, DoD and intelligence agencies tosustain the strategic advantage over any potentialadversaries while advancing transformation. It furtheremphasizes that the military “must be transformed tofocus on how an adversary might fight [emphasisadded] rather than on where and when a war might occur.”Innovation such as capabilities-based forces will beexploited by experimenting with “new approaches towarfare” within the armed forces. Since the Army hasalready been focusing on Army Transformation for severalyears, it is useful to evaluate that effort in light of theexpectations contained in the new National SecurityStrategy.

DoDPerspective

Speaking at theCitadel on 11 December2001, President Bush,directly addressed theimportance of DefenseTransformation: “Whilethe threats to Americahave changed, the needfor victory has not. Weare fighting shadowy,entrenched enemies—using the tools of terrorand guerrilla war—yetwe are f inding newtactics and new weaponsto attack and defeatthem. This revolutionin our military is only

beginning, and it promises to change the face ofbattle.” [emphasis added] The President furtheremphasized the complexity of the transformation as a resultof the U.S. war on terrorism: “What’s different today isour sense of urgency—the need to build this future forcewhile fighting a present war. It’s like overhauling an enginewhile you’re going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have noother choice.”

The Department of Defense, as a follow-on to theQuadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, announcedsix transformational goals to better focus defense strategyand force structure:• protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. bases overseas;

• project and sustain power in distant theaters;

• deny U.S. enemies sanctuary;

• protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attacks;

• use information technology to link U.S. forces; and

• protect U.S. information networks from attack.

4

The Way AheadWhile transforming, the Army will contain differing units

that combine to contribute capabilities. These capabilitieswill be represented by:• units of employment;

• units of action;

• Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;

• Digital Divisions and Corps; and

• a combination of Current Force and specialty forcebrigades (airborne, air assault, Special Forces), ArmyReserve units, and four multifunctional Army NationalGuard divisions.The Army must continue to selectively recapitalize and

modernize the Current Force, fully field the interim StrykerBrigade Combat Teams (six SBCTs) by 2008 and field

brigade sets of equipment at the rate of three units ofaction and one unit of employment per year untiltransformation is complete, in the projected 2030 timeframe. The Objective Force will provide the traditionalheavy-force campaign overmatch, rapid and flexibleSBCTs, and the full-spectrum, precision maneuver-capableUEs and UAs.

The Army requires sufficient airlift, sealift andprepositioned assets to support the Objective Force. Atthe strategic level, the Objective Force will deploy eitherfrom forward sanctuaries or from the continental UnitedStates. The force will have both expeditionary andcampaign qualities; and will be configured for rapiddeployment and ready at a moment’s notice for sustainedoperations. At the operational level, the Objective Forcewill arrive at multiple austere points of entry via air andsealift. Tactically, the Objective Force will deploy andredeploy in tactical aircraft capable of using short fieldsand unimproved runways.

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Four transformational pillars—the essence ofTransformation— build on these long-term DoD goals toensure that they can be met faster, less expensively andmore reliably in the future:• strengthening joint operations;

• experimenting with new approaches to warfare;

• exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages; and

• developing transformational capabilities.In a 31 January 2002 address at the National Defense

University, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said,“Our challenge in the 21st century is to defend our citiesand our infrastructure from new forms of attack whileprojecting force over long distances to fight new andperhaps distant adversaries. To do this, we need rapidlydeployable, fully integrated joint forces capable of reachingdistant theaters quickly and working with our air and seaforces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully, and withdevastating effect. We need improved intelligence, long-range precision strikes, sea-based platforms to help counterthe access denial capabilities of adversaries. . . . And weneed to make the leap into the information age, which isthe critical foundation of [DoD] transformation efforts.”

Joint PerspectiveThe senior military leadership has provided a series of

guidelines (Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020) tofocus preparations for an uncertain future. Joint Vision2010 aimed to keep the United States preeminent in theworld—no matter how complex the world became.Released in the late 1990s, JV2010 was the conceptualtemplate for producing forces for the 21st century that couldprotect and promote America’s interests worldwide. Theend state of JV2010 was dominance across the entirespectrum of conflict. Information Superiority (IS) andTechnological Innovation (TI) were critical “enablingconcepts” for the vision. IS and TI enabled achievement ofnew levels of capability in the concepts of maneuver, strike,logistics and personnel protection. Maneuver becameDominant Maneuver; Strike became Precision Engagement;

Logistics became Focused Logistics; and PersonnelProtection became Full Dimensional Protection. To achievefull-spectrum dominance, six critical considerations—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership andpeople, representing all elements of military power—hadto evolve together.

Joint Vision 2020 (released in June 2000) built uponand extended the conceptual template established byJV2010 to guide the concept development for America'sarmed forces. It reiterated several of the intellectualconcepts of JV2010:• creation of a force that was dominant across the full

spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace,decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict;

• strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection,overseas presence, and strategic agility; and

• recognition of the importance of technology andtechnical innovation to the U.S. military and itsoperations.JV2020 went one step further by emphasizing that

technological innovation must be accompanied byintellectual innovation leading to changes in organization anddoctrine. Only then can the full potential of the joint forcebe reached. JV2020 postulated information operations,joint command and control, and multinational andinteragency operations as focal points for change.

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Is Army Transformation transformational? Emphat-ically yes! Army Transformation is in harmony with DoDand joint efforts to transform the armed forces. It is thegoal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fullysupport the national security and military strategies as partof the joint force. Its progress will realize the trans-formational capabilities outlined by DoD.

The national strategy calls for a capabilities-based forceable to:• protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. bases overseas;

• project and sustain power in distant theaters;

• deny U.S. enemies sanctuary;

• protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attacks;

• use information technology to link U.S. forces; and

• protect U.S. information networks from attack.

Army Transformation:Is It Transformational?

enablers (aviation, fire support, engineer and sustainment).The UE will be the ideal joint headquarters, withmultinational and interagency capabilities for campaignplanning and execution. UEs will be created whenoperations approach the high end of combat or demandsustained operations, or when control of multipleorganizations or joint organizations is desired.

The UA will be the decisive element within the ObjectiveForce that closes with and destroys the enemy in anyoperation, against any level of threat, in any environment.It will not be a fixed organization and will have the capabilityto command and control up to three FCS combined-armsunits, one aviation detachment, one Non-Line of Sight-capable artillery unit and one forward support unit, as wellas to employ enablers from higher headquarters. It will beable to employ a range of supporting joint and organiccapabilities from a UE or a joint task force and to tailor aforce with additional capabilities for specific missions acrossthe full spectrum of military operations. The C4ISRarchitecture will enable the UA to increase its span ofcontrol.

The strategy demands that mobile, deployable groundforces be joint and capable of conducting simultaneous anddistributed operations across the entire battlespace. Thiswill accomplish the operational objectives of the joint forcefrom deterrence to combat operations to stabilityoperations, all while protecting the homeland. The Army’scontributions to the joint force will be the capabilities forprotection of U.S. national interests.

The Objective Force will:• contribute to prompt operations

(preemptive attacks, jointraids, or other forcible/early entry operations) byincreasing the force flowthrough multiple, simultaneousdeployments; and

• provide sustainedforces not onlyfor campaignsthat requiremore time,but alsofor periodsof transitionto postcombat andstability operationsthat are critical inmeeting nationalsecurity objectives.

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Army TransformationArmy Transformation was announced almost four

years ago, in 1999. Building on efforts that began withthe end of the Cold War, the Army set in motion acomprehensive transformation of all aspects of its cultureand capabilities from warfighting to institutional support.

General Eric K. Shinseki, soon after he became the34th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in June 1999, issued astatement of intent outlining these objectives:

• increasing strategic response;

• improving operational jointness and implementing thegoals of Joint Vision 2010;

• developing leaders for joint warfighting as well as forimplementing change;

• completing the full integration of the active and reservecomponents;

• manning warfighting units;

• providing for the well-being of soldiers, civilians andfamily members;

• providing soldiers with the most modern equipmentavailable to ensure technological superiority over alladversaries; and

• continuing the commitment to business improvementand efficiencies.

Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard B. Myers isdeveloping a Joint Vision that will refine and focus JV2020by incorporating the transformation goals and pillars fromthe 2001 QDR and providing an overarching frameworkto shape the future joint force. Earlier revision efforts callfor “joint core competencies” and reinforce the role of JointForces Command (JFCOM) in leading joint conceptdevelopment and experimentation. JV will enable the JointStaff and services to articulate what the future force musthave and how that force will operate across the range ofmilitary operations to achieve full-spectrumdominance—all based on a clearunderstanding of the strategicsetting, strategic guidance anda capabilities-based approachto joint warfare and crisisresolution.

In addition, the JointStaff is working toproduce an overarchingJoint Operating Con-cept to describehow the force willoperate. Thisdocumentwill set theoperationalcontextfor thetransformation of the armedforces of the United States;provide subordinate operating,functional and enablingconcepts for future jointoperations, as well as joint,service and Defense agencyconcept development andexperimentation; and assist inthe development and acquisitionof future capabilities acrossdoctrine, organization,training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel and facilities(DOTMLPF).

General Myers’ view of transformation (as quoted inthe 30 September 2002 issue of Transformation Trends):“For me, transformation is a lot more than putting wheelson armored vehicles, or making a stealthier aircraft or puttingnew missiles on submarines. Transformation is aboutcreating new relationships and a new operating culture. Inmy view, the most important element will take placebetween the ears of the warfighters.”

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The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat-capable—deployment will be synonymous withemployment. This necessary capability for groundforces to rapidly respond, articulated by the Army as96/120/5-30 deployment timelines, will be possible onlywhen the timelines are accepted and stated as jointrequirements.

Transforming deployment capabilities will counteradversaries’ strategies of antiaccess and area denial. Thetransformation of air- and sealift platforms, prepositioning,deployment organizations, training, processes andinfrastructure will enable the joint force equipped with theObjective Force to meet deployment objectives to protectU.S. national interests. The joint force’s ability to employground combat power immediately upon entry into atheater will enhance its operational capability and tacticalagility to recognize and seize opportunities. Technologysupporting inter- and intratheater lift platforms foroperations in forward and austere environments anden route mission planning and rehearsals fordeploying units will facilitate that capability.

Deployment of the Objective Force will beaccomplished with joint and organic Army assets. TheShallow-Draft High-Speed Sealift (SDHSS), Super-Short Take-Off and Landing Aircraft (SSTOL), HeavyLift Vertical Take-Off and Landing Aircraft (HLVTOL),Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Ultra-Large Airlifter(ULA), capable of austere port or airfield/landing zoneoperations, are in various stages of concept develop-ment to support joint deployment.

FCS will be sized for a C-130 profile, but the use ofother aircraft, such as C-17s and aircraft from the CivilReserve Air Fleet (CRAF), will not be precluded. ObjectiveForce deployment IT will provide real-time in-transitvisibility (ITV) of soldiers, units, cargo and equipment,moving in the Defense Transportation System (DTS), nestedin the Global Information Grid and linked to the sustainmententerprise architecture. This concept integrates sustainmentpackages with ready-to-employ units. Continuous resupplyof employed forces requires reachback operations, sense-and-respond logistics and recurring unit-configured loads,all contributing to a reduced logistics footprint. Execution

Adaptive Modular OrganizationsUEs will be the command and control elements of

UAs. They will link the tactical operations to the operationallevel of war. They will be joint capable and adaptive to thesituation. They will plug into and/or receive assets fromorganic, higher-level Army and joint organizations andtherefore adapt to a wide variety of potential operationsand maintain a honed readiness through continuous,habitual relationships. UEs, highly tailorable for specificmissions and contingencies, will draw from a pool of force

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of this paradigm shift across a distributed battlespace willrely on new vertical and horizontal distribution/sustainmentcapabilities (i.e., HLVTOL, SSTOL, TSV and PrecisionExtended-Glide Airdrop Systems, or PEGASYS). Supportof these capabilities is critical to achieving the joint goal ofoperational maneuver from strategic distances.

Power-Projection Platforms. Installations will support theObjective Force requirements to deploy echelons in 96hours, 120 hours and 30 days directly into the battlespace.Deployment facilities will provide the means to meetemployment timelines with unit-configured packages thatensure the future force is ready to conduct operationsimmediately upon arrival. Strategic networked power-projection capabilities at installations will be optimizedthrough forward basing, multiservice basing strategies anddeployment configurations. Installations will conductproactive, anticipatory master planning effortsresulting in transformed platforms capable ofprojecting the Objective Force.

Note: Fundamental change and experimentationare nothing new to the United States Army. Itstransformation from a small, underfunded force in1939 to more than 100 divisions (includingarmored, airborne and amphibious capabilitieslacking in the prewar force) by 1945 is just oneexample of the Army’s historical ability to adapt tonew circumstances and new technology.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s,the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrestled with planning forthe future, which they saw as immediate. GeneralGordon R. Sullivan was Army Chief of Staff in thewake of the Gulf War. At the time, he pushed“digitization,” a project to share data among allsoldiers and all combat vehicles in the field of battle.

Regarding experimentation, the U.S. Army has hada long tradition of experimentation—as far back

as its Louisiana Maneu-vers of 1941 thatdeveloped the doctrinefor combined-arms air/ground operations. Thecurrent (2003) deploy-ment of the 4th InfantryDivision, the world’s onlydigitized division, toSouthwest Asia istestament to revolution-ary change throughexperimentation. The4th Infantry Divisionbecame the Army’s firstfully digitized division in2000, following five fullyears of testing.

To accomplish these objectives, on 12 October 1999(at AUSA’s annual Eisenhower Luncheon) General Shinsekiannounced the release of Army Vision:

Soldiers on point for the nation [are]transforming this, the most respected Armyin the world, into a strategically responsiveforce that is dominant across the full spectrumof operations.Heavy forces must be more strategicallydeployable and more agile with a smallerlogistical footprint and light forces must bemore lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.Achieving this paradigm will requireinnovative thinking about structure,modernization efforts, and spending.This concept was already in place when then-Governor

Bush stated in a 23 September 1999 speech at the Citadel:“Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readilydeployable, and require a minimum of logistical support.We must be able to project our power over long distances,in days or weeks rather than months. . . . On land, our

heavy forces must be lighter. Our light forces mustbe more lethal. All must be easier to deploy. And theseforces must be organized in smaller, more agile formations.”

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Space-based systems and the resulting products willsignificantly increase situational understanding. Thefog, friction and uncertainty of warfare will still exist becausethe adversary is adaptive, but fully integrated space-basedsystems link units and capabilities across vast distances andprovide the commander unprecedented flexibility tocollaboratively plan and execute full-spectrum militaryoperations at the time and place of his choosing.

“Factory to Foxhole” SustainmentAn Objective Force Joint Logistics Corporate

Enterprise (JLCE)—comprising an architecture from thestrategic to the tactical level—characterizes sustainment. Itwill begin with the requirements determination process andcontinue through the total life cycle. The JLCE will enableenhanced strategic responsiveness, a reduced sustainmentfootprint and reduced cost of logistics, allowing thewarfighting commander to employ the full spectrum ofcapabilities to achieve battlefield dominance.

The JLCE will be formed by a common logistics-operating environment where knowledge is integratedvertically and horizontally from “factory to foxhole” andcompletely integrated with the common relevant operatingpicture (CROP). This environment will facilitate thejoint concept of a focused common relevant operatingpicture or “sense and respond” logistics, enablingsustainers to see, understand and act upon thewarfighters’ requirements more rapidly and preciselythan ever before.

Distribution-Based Logistics (DBL)—the fusion of thesupply, transportation and information functions to speeddelivery (e.g., new ground, sea and aerial

concepts for delivery) and reduce the deployed footprint—will fully integrates industry, Army and joint organizations,infrastructure, processes and automated systems thatenhance flexibility and agility to support the full spectrumof operations. Its fundamental principles are velocity overmass; centralized management; direct delivery; minimumessential stocks; two-way flow of resources and time-definite delivery. DBL will provide the means to supportjoint forces with greater agility and responsiveness.

Demand reduction will decrease the sustainmentfootprint and enhanced strategic responsiveness whilereducing costs and improving readiness. The decrease insustainment requirements will be driven bywarfighters’ confidence in the sustainment system andcapabilities made possible by technologicaladvancements. Innovative sustainment concepts andcapabilities (e.g., increased use of robots; two-levelmaintenance; improvements in reliability, maintainabilityand sustainability; and reachback operations) will reducedemand. The adequate resourcing of enablers, designedto reduce consumption, such as hybrid electric power, on-board water generation (i.e., water generation andreplenishment at every UA echelon), embedded diagnosticsand prognostics, modular systems, platformcommonality, and precision munitions, will result indramatic demand reductions of the big battlefieldsustainment drivers—water and fuel as well asmaintenance.

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Deployment = EmploymentResponsive Army deployment timelines for the joint

force have increased the military response options availableto the President and Secretary of Defense. The Army’s

goal is to deploy a brigade-sized UA anywhere inthe world in 96 hours after liftoff, a division-sized

UE on the ground in 120 hours, and fivedivision-sized UEs in theater in 30 days,using a mix of air and surface modes aswell as leveraging prepositionedequipment and a deployment

Information Technology (IT)architecture.

Viewing Army Transformationin Terms of the New National

Security Strategy and JointConcepts

Department of DefenseTransformation goals areclear. The Joint Staff and JointForces Command, in conjunc-tion with the services andcombatant commands, aredeveloping joint concepts toarticulate how the future jointforce will operate. Theframework for the Army’stransformation plan is inconcert with these goals andconcepts.

The key to under-standing this harmony is adetailed understanding ofthe joint force and the ArmyObjective Force’s role injoint operations.

With this as its intellectual underpinnings, in late 1999the Army developed the Transformation Campaign Plan(TCP), designed across three simultaneous paths toprovide:

• a trained and ready Legacy Force—the CurrentForce—(the nation’s “go to war” force) to fight andwin decisively now and in the near future;

• an Interim Force, now known as the Stryker BrigadeCombat Teams (SBCTs) (the bridge to the future) tomeet an operational shortfall that exists between thecapabilities of early-arriving light forces and later-arriving heavy forces; and

• a new Objective Force (the future Army) that isstrategically responsive and capable of dominating atevery point on the spectrum of operations.

In the summer of 1999, the Army had realized that allthree capabilities were integral to maintaining near-termreadiness while transforming as quickly as possible to thefuture.

In 2003, present-day forces are protecting thehomeland while defending America’s interests abroad. TheStryker Brigade force will attain initial operating capabilityfor one of its six brigades in May 2003, while the ObjectiveForce is nearing concept development completion. Thatconcept calls for the Objective Force to be designed asthe force that guarantees the nation’s freedom. As the forceof decision, this force will operate as part of the joint force,enabled by and enabling the joint force, leading andsupporting joint operations. The force will executedecentralized, adaptive tactical operations achievingoperational objectives. Objective Force tactical units willbe networked to joint capabilities and information. Theywill collaborate interactively with the joint force. TacticalObjective Force units will be joint capabilities-basedforces.

8

Space. As a space-empowered force, units across theArmy, now and even more so in the Objective Force, willroutinely exploit military and civilian space systems tosupport knowledge dominance and decisive victory.

Space is inherently joint, and the Army, as an inter-dependent member of the space community, relies on spaceproducts and services provided by DoD, intergovernmentalagencies and commercial space systems. Army forces areinteroperable with nonorganic space systems and able touse their capabilities. Additionally, space systems will fullyintegrate with joint and service air/ground architecturesto enhance C4 and ISR support to the tactical commander.

The Objective Force will routinely exploitcommunication, intelligence and surveillance, earlywarning, position/navigation, weather, terrain andenvironmental space systems integrated through directlinks and global broadcasts. The most transformationalaspects of space support will be assured and on-demandaccess, real to near-real time responsiveness, greatercapacity, and an enhanced ability to protect space interestsand routinely deny space products and services toadversaries.

multiband frequencies, high throughput, conformingantenna technology and capabilities to automatically convertfrom omni to directional operation. Software-defined radioswill provide joint interoperability and inherently supportnetworking capabilities. Both radios and some sensors(particularly airborne) will have the capability to act as relays.Aerial and space-based relay assets will provide coverageover wide areas and in communications-restrictive terrain.

This “network-centric” view is possible as a result of acomplex set of technological advances and changes intactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The networkwill be a mix of several generations of technologies but willstill achieve unprecedented levels of robustness, reliabilityand survivability by using state-of-the-art technologies anddigital bridging techniques to ensure interoperability. TheObjective Force will possess advanced ISR capabilitiesand networked sensors to see the enemy in complex urbanterrain, through structures and below ground. Advancedtechnologies will lead to an unprecedented commonintegrated operational picture providing an ability to seethe enemy in part and as a whole, complex, adaptiveorganization. ISR enablers will include combat identificationsystems; organic robotic multispectral, disposable sensors;a proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) andunattended ground vehicles (UGVs); embedded C4ISR,special operations forces (SOF) and long-range surveillancedetachments; and air and ground reconnaissanceoperations.

Network Operations (NETOPS) will be a criticalfunction on the future battlefield. The enterprise NETOPS

provides for network management and computer networkdefense to be performed at the enterprise level, using efficientand streamlined processes and state-of-the-art technology.

Transparent to the warfighter, network managersmonitor, configure and control all aspects of the networkand observe changes in network status. Their capabilitiesinclude a robust detect, react, respond defense-in-depthagainst computer network attacks (CNAs). NETOPS—

accomplished as an enterprise across all Armynetworks—permits the requisite network operationand defense to achieve a high-speed, secure,interoperable Army knowledge enterprise.

The Army’s network operationscapabilities, a key element ofjoint NETOPS, will beintegrated with the joint

force. Army NETOPS is capableof assuming control of joint networks

when required.

13

The Objective Force will beorganized, manned, equippedand trained to be morestrategically responsive, deploy-able, agile, versatile, lethal,survivable and sustainableacross the full spectrum ofmilitary operations.

The Objective Force willoperate within the frameworkof a joint force in which it willlead joint forces, be led by ajoint force and use jointcapabilities at the lowestreasonable level.

The Objective Force willcomprise modular, scalable,flexible organizations whoseleaders are adaptive for promptand sustained land operations incomplex terrain. It will be an adaptable force, able totransition quickly between changes in task, purpose anddirections, maneuvering into and out of contact withoutsapping operational momentum because the ObjectiveForce facilitates joint decentralized operations at thetactical level.

Trained and equipped leaders and informedand networked soldiers at the lowest levels,adapting to the situation, will make decisions toseize the initiative and accomplish operationalobjectives with tactical action.

The Objective Force is characterized by anintegrated command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(C4ISR) architecture—one that is compatible with bothcurrent and future forces. The Army KnowledgeEnterprise (AKE) enables this knowledge-based forcethrough an architecture that connects “factory to foxhole”and “space to mud.” Soldiers have the requisitecommunications equipment and knowledge to send andreceive the right information, at the right time and in theright place.

The Objective Force will be strategically and opera-tionally responsive, an Army that can deploy a brigade-sized unit of action (UA) in 96 hours, a division-sized unitof employment (UE) in 120 hours, and five division-sizedUEs in theater in 30 days using a mix of air, sea and landmovement and prepositioned equipment.

A joint, interdependent combined-arms team, it willdeploy directly to the fight at critical nodes and centers ofgravity to accomplish operational objectives as part of thejoint force across the breadth and depth of the battlespace.Among its capabilities will be situational awareness,i.e., the ability to determine at all times not only itsown location but also those of both friendly and enemyforces.

Note: For the purpose of this paper, units of action(UAs) are being compared to brigades, and units ofemployment (UEs) to divisions, but the readershould not make the assumption that these unitsare analogous to the current “brigade” and“division” respectively. The details of both UAsand UEs are still under development.

9

Note: Rapid spiral transformation is the process foraccelerating change from today’s Current Forces totomorrow’s forces capable of conductinginformation-age warfare. The objective is to injectincremental improvements along parallel tracks thatenable the emergence of joint transformedcapabilities in years rather than decades. This entailsthe coevolution of concepts, organization,procedures, technology and training. It is part of theset of overall strategies for transforming defense.

N e t w o r k - C e n t r i cOperations. C4 systemswill establish a globalinfrastructure that enablesnetwork-centric opera-tions to be accessiblefrom anywhere in theObjective Force areas ofoperation. Integratedcommunications systemswill be embedded in everynew Objective Forceplatform. Sensors willprovide ISR information,while reporting devicesautomatically providefriendly-force locationand focused logisticsinformation within andacross echelons. Radiosystems will have

nested within the Global Information Grid (GIG) willconnect the Objective Force system of systems. EveryObjective Force soldier and platform will be capable ofsensing and engaging the enemy by using the synergisticpower of the information network enterprise whilemaintaining the necessary situational awareness of friendlyforces. The Land Warrior system, enabled by the ObjectiveForce Warrior Science and Technology efforts, will connectindividual soldiers to the network while providing themincreased protection and lethality. The FCS will providethe capability to destroy any adversary and control anysituation in all conditions and environments, with smallercalibers, greater precision more devastating target effects,and at longer ranges.

The Objective Force’s FCS is a transformationalapproach to meeting the nation’s needs. This family ofsystems will contain eight manned and ten unmanned airand ground system variants. The components of the FCSmust be developed and fielded as a complete family ofsystems in harmony, to achieve the desired warfightingcapabilities the nation requires against adaptive, asymmetric

conventional and unconventional adversaries. Newweapons, sensors, digital command and control systems,and corresponding training aids, simulators and simulations(TADSS) equipment will be integrated, fielded andupgraded as a unit set. Additionally, the acquisition andrequirements development processes are being updatedto accommodate the Army’s need to rapidly field anetworked system of systems through spiral developmentand an open architecture that allows maturing technologicalinsertions as they occur.

12

The UA will be self-sustainable for three to seven daysof operations and maintains combat power withdramatically reduced theater logistics footprint throughincreased sustainability reachback access to supplies;sustained distribution; real-time tracking of materiel,equipment and personnel (military, DoD civilian andcontractor); commonality of systems and components; andinterdependency (interoperability) with joint, interagencyand multinational forces.

Objective Force systems will support the joint forcewith the capabilities for decisive dominant maneuver—horizontal and vertical, day and night—in all weather andterrain as dismounted or mounted combined-arms teams.The Objective Force will provide the best combination oflow-observable ballistic protection, long-range acquisitionand targeting, and first-round hit-and-kill technologies.These technologies will enable the Objective Force toanticipate and adapt to an adversary’s intent and controlthe situation with networked joint force capabilities.

The Transformed Army is not just new systems;it is the complete, holistic transformation in doctrine,

organizations, training,materiel, leader develop-ment, people and facil-ities (DOTMLPF). TheObjective Force repre-sents not only a changein the operational Army,but also a change in theinstitutional Army. It willbe soldiers, not tech-nology, that realize thecampaign qualities ofAmerica’s Army, theObjective Force.

Capabilities-BasedJoint Force

The Objective Force—an integral component of thejoint force—will be orga-nized, manned, equipped

and trained as a joint force, possessing common overarchingdoctrine, integrated training, commonality andinterdependency/interoperability.

Networked joint forces will redefine the current under-standing of the term “joint.” The networked joint force ofthe future will be capabilities-based, not unit-based. In otherwords, the separate military services will not be task-organized into tactical joint units operating at lower echelons;instead, joint capabilities will be applied transparentlythroughout the networked joint force at all echelons. Forexample, at squad level, when a soldier identifies atarget, the call for fire will automatically be answeredwith the most appropriate joint capability for the task—ajoint capability is transparently applied at the squad level.Therefore, each unit will be able to operate and adapt moreeffectively to fluid situations, enabling more decisions atlower levels tied to the common understanding of theoperational plan and the situation. As a result, all units willbe more adaptive, more lethal, more rapid and morecapable of simultaneous, decentralized and distributedoperations. This is jointness redefined.

10

.

Full-Spectrum Operationsin a Network-Centric Environment

The future battlefield will be multidimensional, dis-persed, continuous and noncontiguous in nature.Operations will take place on land and sea, in air, spaceand cyberspace. Adversaries will be evolving, sophisticatedand adaptive, with asymmetric capabilities. The ObjectiveForce will be designed to provide innovative capabilities tocope with the new operational environment, relying onleaders and soldiers to think and dominate U.S. adversarieswith superior capability. It will be able to operate acrossthe entire spectrum of operations from homeland securityto major combat operations to stability and supportoperations.

The Objective Force andFuture Combat Systems(FCS). The Objective Forcewill be a networked “systemof systems” comprisingexisting platforms and newcapabilities developed to meetthe needs of the Army’s futurefighting formations. It willinclude soldiers equipped withLand Warrior technology; afamily of 18 integrated,synchronized, manned andunmanned systems; andcritical complementarycapabilities derived fromComanche and the FutureTactical Truck System(FTTS). A network-centricinformation architecture

Specifically, the Objective Force will:• integrate, transfer and partner capabilities throughout

the joint force with speed and audacity;

• strengthen the ability of the United States to deter,preclude and limit conflict escalation by providing amultidimensional campaign-quality threat to anypotential adversary;

• provide the joint force commander (JFC) precision inexecution. Interdependent fires and maneuver willcreate the synergistic effects of precision strikethroughout the joint operations area;

• enable joint fires by empowering the maneuvercommander to accurately focus all availabledestructive fires;

• contribute joint C4ISR architecture to the commonoperating picture, thereby transforming data intoknowledge by massing joint capabilities;

• provide operational-level information superiority tothe JFC, enabling him to gain and maintainoperational initiative;

• provide the essential capability to achieve a decisivevictory through the control of terrain, people andresources without resorting to indiscriminate destruc-tion; and

• provide an optimized sustainment footprint and reducedcost of logistics.

11

The UA will be self-sustainable for three to seven daysof operations and maintains combat power withdramatically reduced theater logistics footprint throughincreased sustainability reachback access to supplies;sustained distribution; real-time tracking of materiel,equipment and personnel (military, DoD civilian andcontractor); commonality of systems and components; andinterdependency (interoperability) with joint, interagencyand multinational forces.

Objective Force systems will support the joint forcewith the capabilities for decisive dominant maneuver—horizontal and vertical, day and night—in all weather andterrain as dismounted or mounted combined-arms teams.The Objective Force will provide the best combination oflow-observable ballistic protection, long-range acquisitionand targeting, and first-round hit-and-kill technologies.These technologies will enable the Objective Force toanticipate and adapt to an adversary’s intent and controlthe situation with networked joint force capabilities.

The Transformed Army is not just new systems;it is the complete, holistic transformation in doctrine,

organizations, training,materiel, leader develop-ment, people and facil-ities (DOTMLPF). TheObjective Force repre-sents not only a changein the operational Army,but also a change in theinstitutional Army. It willbe soldiers, not tech-nology, that realize thecampaign qualities ofAmerica’s Army, theObjective Force.

Capabilities-BasedJoint Force

The Objective Force—an integral component of thejoint force—will be orga-nized, manned, equipped

and trained as a joint force, possessing common overarchingdoctrine, integrated training, commonality andinterdependency/interoperability.

Networked joint forces will redefine the current under-standing of the term “joint.” The networked joint force ofthe future will be capabilities-based, not unit-based. In otherwords, the separate military services will not be task-organized into tactical joint units operating at lower echelons;instead, joint capabilities will be applied transparentlythroughout the networked joint force at all echelons. Forexample, at squad level, when a soldier identifies atarget, the call for fire will automatically be answeredwith the most appropriate joint capability for the task—ajoint capability is transparently applied at the squad level.Therefore, each unit will be able to operate and adapt moreeffectively to fluid situations, enabling more decisions atlower levels tied to the common understanding of theoperational plan and the situation. As a result, all units willbe more adaptive, more lethal, more rapid and morecapable of simultaneous, decentralized and distributedoperations. This is jointness redefined.

10

.

Full-Spectrum Operationsin a Network-Centric Environment

The future battlefield will be multidimensional, dis-persed, continuous and noncontiguous in nature.Operations will take place on land and sea, in air, spaceand cyberspace. Adversaries will be evolving, sophisticatedand adaptive, with asymmetric capabilities. The ObjectiveForce will be designed to provide innovative capabilities tocope with the new operational environment, relying onleaders and soldiers to think and dominate U.S. adversarieswith superior capability. It will be able to operate acrossthe entire spectrum of operations from homeland securityto major combat operations to stability and supportoperations.

The Objective Force andFuture Combat Systems(FCS). The Objective Forcewill be a networked “systemof systems” comprisingexisting platforms and newcapabilities developed to meetthe needs of the Army’s futurefighting formations. It willinclude soldiers equipped withLand Warrior technology; afamily of 18 integrated,synchronized, manned andunmanned systems; andcritical complementarycapabilities derived fromComanche and the FutureTactical Truck System(FTTS). A network-centricinformation architecture

Specifically, the Objective Force will:• integrate, transfer and partner capabilities throughout

the joint force with speed and audacity;

• strengthen the ability of the United States to deter,preclude and limit conflict escalation by providing amultidimensional campaign-quality threat to anypotential adversary;

• provide the joint force commander (JFC) precision inexecution. Interdependent fires and maneuver willcreate the synergistic effects of precision strikethroughout the joint operations area;

• enable joint fires by empowering the maneuvercommander to accurately focus all availabledestructive fires;

• contribute joint C4ISR architecture to the commonoperating picture, thereby transforming data intoknowledge by massing joint capabilities;

• provide operational-level information superiority tothe JFC, enabling him to gain and maintainoperational initiative;

• provide the essential capability to achieve a decisivevictory through the control of terrain, people andresources without resorting to indiscriminate destruc-tion; and

• provide an optimized sustainment footprint and reducedcost of logistics.

11

The Objective Force will beorganized, manned, equippedand trained to be morestrategically responsive, deploy-able, agile, versatile, lethal,survivable and sustainableacross the full spectrum ofmilitary operations.

The Objective Force willoperate within the frameworkof a joint force in which it willlead joint forces, be led by ajoint force and use jointcapabilities at the lowestreasonable level.

The Objective Force willcomprise modular, scalable,flexible organizations whoseleaders are adaptive for promptand sustained land operations incomplex terrain. It will be an adaptable force, able totransition quickly between changes in task, purpose anddirections, maneuvering into and out of contact withoutsapping operational momentum because the ObjectiveForce facilitates joint decentralized operations at thetactical level.

Trained and equipped leaders and informedand networked soldiers at the lowest levels,adapting to the situation, will make decisions toseize the initiative and accomplish operationalobjectives with tactical action.

The Objective Force is characterized by anintegrated command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(C4ISR) architecture—one that is compatible with bothcurrent and future forces. The Army KnowledgeEnterprise (AKE) enables this knowledge-based forcethrough an architecture that connects “factory to foxhole”and “space to mud.” Soldiers have the requisitecommunications equipment and knowledge to send andreceive the right information, at the right time and in theright place.

The Objective Force will be strategically and opera-tionally responsive, an Army that can deploy a brigade-sized unit of action (UA) in 96 hours, a division-sized unitof employment (UE) in 120 hours, and five division-sizedUEs in theater in 30 days using a mix of air, sea and landmovement and prepositioned equipment.

A joint, interdependent combined-arms team, it willdeploy directly to the fight at critical nodes and centers ofgravity to accomplish operational objectives as part of thejoint force across the breadth and depth of the battlespace.Among its capabilities will be situational awareness,i.e., the ability to determine at all times not only itsown location but also those of both friendly and enemyforces.

Note: For the purpose of this paper, units of action(UAs) are being compared to brigades, and units ofemployment (UEs) to divisions, but the readershould not make the assumption that these unitsare analogous to the current “brigade” and“division” respectively. The details of both UAsand UEs are still under development.

9

Note: Rapid spiral transformation is the process foraccelerating change from today’s Current Forces totomorrow’s forces capable of conductinginformation-age warfare. The objective is to injectincremental improvements along parallel tracks thatenable the emergence of joint transformedcapabilities in years rather than decades. This entailsthe coevolution of concepts, organization,procedures, technology and training. It is part of theset of overall strategies for transforming defense.

N e t w o r k - C e n t r i cOperations. C4 systemswill establish a globalinfrastructure that enablesnetwork-centric opera-tions to be accessiblefrom anywhere in theObjective Force areas ofoperation. Integratedcommunications systemswill be embedded in everynew Objective Forceplatform. Sensors willprovide ISR information,while reporting devicesautomatically providefriendly-force locationand focused logisticsinformation within andacross echelons. Radiosystems will have

nested within the Global Information Grid (GIG) willconnect the Objective Force system of systems. EveryObjective Force soldier and platform will be capable ofsensing and engaging the enemy by using the synergisticpower of the information network enterprise whilemaintaining the necessary situational awareness of friendlyforces. The Land Warrior system, enabled by the ObjectiveForce Warrior Science and Technology efforts, will connectindividual soldiers to the network while providing themincreased protection and lethality. The FCS will providethe capability to destroy any adversary and control anysituation in all conditions and environments, with smallercalibers, greater precision more devastating target effects,and at longer ranges.

The Objective Force’s FCS is a transformationalapproach to meeting the nation’s needs. This family ofsystems will contain eight manned and ten unmanned airand ground system variants. The components of the FCSmust be developed and fielded as a complete family ofsystems in harmony, to achieve the desired warfightingcapabilities the nation requires against adaptive, asymmetric

conventional and unconventional adversaries. Newweapons, sensors, digital command and control systems,and corresponding training aids, simulators and simulations(TADSS) equipment will be integrated, fielded andupgraded as a unit set. Additionally, the acquisition andrequirements development processes are being updatedto accommodate the Army’s need to rapidly field anetworked system of systems through spiral developmentand an open architecture that allows maturing technologicalinsertions as they occur.

12

Viewing Army Transformationin Terms of the New National

Security Strategy and JointConcepts

Department of DefenseTransformation goals areclear. The Joint Staff and JointForces Command, in conjunc-tion with the services andcombatant commands, aredeveloping joint concepts toarticulate how the future jointforce will operate. Theframework for the Army’stransformation plan is inconcert with these goals andconcepts.

The key to under-standing this harmony is adetailed understanding ofthe joint force and the ArmyObjective Force’s role injoint operations.

With this as its intellectual underpinnings, in late 1999the Army developed the Transformation Campaign Plan(TCP), designed across three simultaneous paths toprovide:

• a trained and ready Legacy Force—the CurrentForce—(the nation’s “go to war” force) to fight andwin decisively now and in the near future;

• an Interim Force, now known as the Stryker BrigadeCombat Teams (SBCTs) (the bridge to the future) tomeet an operational shortfall that exists between thecapabilities of early-arriving light forces and later-arriving heavy forces; and

• a new Objective Force (the future Army) that isstrategically responsive and capable of dominating atevery point on the spectrum of operations.

In the summer of 1999, the Army had realized that allthree capabilities were integral to maintaining near-termreadiness while transforming as quickly as possible to thefuture.

In 2003, present-day forces are protecting thehomeland while defending America’s interests abroad. TheStryker Brigade force will attain initial operating capabilityfor one of its six brigades in May 2003, while the ObjectiveForce is nearing concept development completion. Thatconcept calls for the Objective Force to be designed asthe force that guarantees the nation’s freedom. As the forceof decision, this force will operate as part of the joint force,enabled by and enabling the joint force, leading andsupporting joint operations. The force will executedecentralized, adaptive tactical operations achievingoperational objectives. Objective Force tactical units willbe networked to joint capabilities and information. Theywill collaborate interactively with the joint force. TacticalObjective Force units will be joint capabilities-basedforces.

8

Space. As a space-empowered force, units across theArmy, now and even more so in the Objective Force, willroutinely exploit military and civilian space systems tosupport knowledge dominance and decisive victory.

Space is inherently joint, and the Army, as an inter-dependent member of the space community, relies on spaceproducts and services provided by DoD, intergovernmentalagencies and commercial space systems. Army forces areinteroperable with nonorganic space systems and able touse their capabilities. Additionally, space systems will fullyintegrate with joint and service air/ground architecturesto enhance C4 and ISR support to the tactical commander.

The Objective Force will routinely exploitcommunication, intelligence and surveillance, earlywarning, position/navigation, weather, terrain andenvironmental space systems integrated through directlinks and global broadcasts. The most transformationalaspects of space support will be assured and on-demandaccess, real to near-real time responsiveness, greatercapacity, and an enhanced ability to protect space interestsand routinely deny space products and services toadversaries.

multiband frequencies, high throughput, conformingantenna technology and capabilities to automatically convertfrom omni to directional operation. Software-defined radioswill provide joint interoperability and inherently supportnetworking capabilities. Both radios and some sensors(particularly airborne) will have the capability to act as relays.Aerial and space-based relay assets will provide coverageover wide areas and in communications-restrictive terrain.

This “network-centric” view is possible as a result of acomplex set of technological advances and changes intactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The networkwill be a mix of several generations of technologies but willstill achieve unprecedented levels of robustness, reliabilityand survivability by using state-of-the-art technologies anddigital bridging techniques to ensure interoperability. TheObjective Force will possess advanced ISR capabilitiesand networked sensors to see the enemy in complex urbanterrain, through structures and below ground. Advancedtechnologies will lead to an unprecedented commonintegrated operational picture providing an ability to seethe enemy in part and as a whole, complex, adaptiveorganization. ISR enablers will include combat identificationsystems; organic robotic multispectral, disposable sensors;a proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) andunattended ground vehicles (UGVs); embedded C4ISR,special operations forces (SOF) and long-range surveillancedetachments; and air and ground reconnaissanceoperations.

Network Operations (NETOPS) will be a criticalfunction on the future battlefield. The enterprise NETOPS

provides for network management and computer networkdefense to be performed at the enterprise level, using efficientand streamlined processes and state-of-the-art technology.

Transparent to the warfighter, network managersmonitor, configure and control all aspects of the networkand observe changes in network status. Their capabilitiesinclude a robust detect, react, respond defense-in-depthagainst computer network attacks (CNAs). NETOPS—

accomplished as an enterprise across all Armynetworks—permits the requisite network operationand defense to achieve a high-speed, secure,interoperable Army knowledge enterprise.

The Army’s network operationscapabilities, a key element ofjoint NETOPS, will beintegrated with the joint

force. Army NETOPS is capableof assuming control of joint networks

when required.

13

Note: Fundamental change and experimentationare nothing new to the United States Army. Itstransformation from a small, underfunded force in1939 to more than 100 divisions (includingarmored, airborne and amphibious capabilitieslacking in the prewar force) by 1945 is just oneexample of the Army’s historical ability to adapt tonew circumstances and new technology.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s,the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrestled with planning forthe future, which they saw as immediate. GeneralGordon R. Sullivan was Army Chief of Staff in thewake of the Gulf War. At the time, he pushed“digitization,” a project to share data among allsoldiers and all combat vehicles in the field of battle.

Regarding experimentation, the U.S. Army has hada long tradition of experimentation—as far back

as its Louisiana Maneu-vers of 1941 thatdeveloped the doctrinefor combined-arms air/ground operations. Thecurrent (2003) deploy-ment of the 4th InfantryDivision, the world’s onlydigitized division, toSouthwest Asia istestament to revolution-ary change throughexperimentation. The4th Infantry Divisionbecame the Army’s firstfully digitized division in2000, following five fullyears of testing.

To accomplish these objectives, on 12 October 1999(at AUSA’s annual Eisenhower Luncheon) General Shinsekiannounced the release of Army Vision:

Soldiers on point for the nation [are]transforming this, the most respected Armyin the world, into a strategically responsiveforce that is dominant across the full spectrumof operations.Heavy forces must be more strategicallydeployable and more agile with a smallerlogistical footprint and light forces must bemore lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.Achieving this paradigm will requireinnovative thinking about structure,modernization efforts, and spending.This concept was already in place when then-Governor

Bush stated in a 23 September 1999 speech at the Citadel:“Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readilydeployable, and require a minimum of logistical support.We must be able to project our power over long distances,in days or weeks rather than months. . . . On land, our

heavy forces must be lighter. Our light forces mustbe more lethal. All must be easier to deploy. And theseforces must be organized in smaller, more agile formations.”

7

Space-based systems and the resulting products willsignificantly increase situational understanding. Thefog, friction and uncertainty of warfare will still exist becausethe adversary is adaptive, but fully integrated space-basedsystems link units and capabilities across vast distances andprovide the commander unprecedented flexibility tocollaboratively plan and execute full-spectrum militaryoperations at the time and place of his choosing.

“Factory to Foxhole” SustainmentAn Objective Force Joint Logistics Corporate

Enterprise (JLCE)—comprising an architecture from thestrategic to the tactical level—characterizes sustainment. Itwill begin with the requirements determination process andcontinue through the total life cycle. The JLCE will enableenhanced strategic responsiveness, a reduced sustainmentfootprint and reduced cost of logistics, allowing thewarfighting commander to employ the full spectrum ofcapabilities to achieve battlefield dominance.

The JLCE will be formed by a common logistics-operating environment where knowledge is integratedvertically and horizontally from “factory to foxhole” andcompletely integrated with the common relevant operatingpicture (CROP). This environment will facilitate thejoint concept of a focused common relevant operatingpicture or “sense and respond” logistics, enablingsustainers to see, understand and act upon thewarfighters’ requirements more rapidly and preciselythan ever before.

Distribution-Based Logistics (DBL)—the fusion of thesupply, transportation and information functions to speeddelivery (e.g., new ground, sea and aerial

concepts for delivery) and reduce the deployed footprint—will fully integrates industry, Army and joint organizations,infrastructure, processes and automated systems thatenhance flexibility and agility to support the full spectrumof operations. Its fundamental principles are velocity overmass; centralized management; direct delivery; minimumessential stocks; two-way flow of resources and time-definite delivery. DBL will provide the means to supportjoint forces with greater agility and responsiveness.

Demand reduction will decrease the sustainmentfootprint and enhanced strategic responsiveness whilereducing costs and improving readiness. The decrease insustainment requirements will be driven bywarfighters’ confidence in the sustainment system andcapabilities made possible by technologicaladvancements. Innovative sustainment concepts andcapabilities (e.g., increased use of robots; two-levelmaintenance; improvements in reliability, maintainabilityand sustainability; and reachback operations) will reducedemand. The adequate resourcing of enablers, designedto reduce consumption, such as hybrid electric power, on-board water generation (i.e., water generation andreplenishment at every UA echelon), embedded diagnosticsand prognostics, modular systems, platformcommonality, and precision munitions, will result indramatic demand reductions of the big battlefieldsustainment drivers—water and fuel as well asmaintenance.

14

Deployment = EmploymentResponsive Army deployment timelines for the joint

force have increased the military response options availableto the President and Secretary of Defense. The Army’s

goal is to deploy a brigade-sized UA anywhere inthe world in 96 hours after liftoff, a division-sized

UE on the ground in 120 hours, and fivedivision-sized UEs in theater in 30 days,using a mix of air and surface modes aswell as leveraging prepositionedequipment and a deployment

Information Technology (IT)architecture.

Army TransformationArmy Transformation was announced almost four

years ago, in 1999. Building on efforts that began withthe end of the Cold War, the Army set in motion acomprehensive transformation of all aspects of its cultureand capabilities from warfighting to institutional support.

General Eric K. Shinseki, soon after he became the34th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in June 1999, issued astatement of intent outlining these objectives:

• increasing strategic response;

• improving operational jointness and implementing thegoals of Joint Vision 2010;

• developing leaders for joint warfighting as well as forimplementing change;

• completing the full integration of the active and reservecomponents;

• manning warfighting units;

• providing for the well-being of soldiers, civilians andfamily members;

• providing soldiers with the most modern equipmentavailable to ensure technological superiority over alladversaries; and

• continuing the commitment to business improvementand efficiencies.

Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard B. Myers isdeveloping a Joint Vision that will refine and focus JV2020by incorporating the transformation goals and pillars fromthe 2001 QDR and providing an overarching frameworkto shape the future joint force. Earlier revision efforts callfor “joint core competencies” and reinforce the role of JointForces Command (JFCOM) in leading joint conceptdevelopment and experimentation. JV will enable the JointStaff and services to articulate what the future force musthave and how that force will operate across the range ofmilitary operations to achieve full-spectrumdominance—all based on a clearunderstanding of the strategicsetting, strategic guidance anda capabilities-based approachto joint warfare and crisisresolution.

In addition, the JointStaff is working toproduce an overarchingJoint Operating Con-cept to describehow the force willoperate. Thisdocumentwill set theoperationalcontextfor thetransformation of the armedforces of the United States;provide subordinate operating,functional and enablingconcepts for future jointoperations, as well as joint,service and Defense agencyconcept development andexperimentation; and assist inthe development and acquisitionof future capabilities acrossdoctrine, organization,training, materiel,

leadership and education, personnel and facilities(DOTMLPF).

General Myers’ view of transformation (as quoted inthe 30 September 2002 issue of Transformation Trends):“For me, transformation is a lot more than putting wheelson armored vehicles, or making a stealthier aircraft or puttingnew missiles on submarines. Transformation is aboutcreating new relationships and a new operating culture. Inmy view, the most important element will take placebetween the ears of the warfighters.”

6

The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat-capable—deployment will be synonymous withemployment. This necessary capability for groundforces to rapidly respond, articulated by the Army as96/120/5-30 deployment timelines, will be possible onlywhen the timelines are accepted and stated as jointrequirements.

Transforming deployment capabilities will counteradversaries’ strategies of antiaccess and area denial. Thetransformation of air- and sealift platforms, prepositioning,deployment organizations, training, processes andinfrastructure will enable the joint force equipped with theObjective Force to meet deployment objectives to protectU.S. national interests. The joint force’s ability to employground combat power immediately upon entry into atheater will enhance its operational capability and tacticalagility to recognize and seize opportunities. Technologysupporting inter- and intratheater lift platforms foroperations in forward and austere environments anden route mission planning and rehearsals fordeploying units will facilitate that capability.

Deployment of the Objective Force will beaccomplished with joint and organic Army assets. TheShallow-Draft High-Speed Sealift (SDHSS), Super-Short Take-Off and Landing Aircraft (SSTOL), HeavyLift Vertical Take-Off and Landing Aircraft (HLVTOL),Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Ultra-Large Airlifter(ULA), capable of austere port or airfield/landing zoneoperations, are in various stages of concept develop-ment to support joint deployment.

FCS will be sized for a C-130 profile, but the use ofother aircraft, such as C-17s and aircraft from the CivilReserve Air Fleet (CRAF), will not be precluded. ObjectiveForce deployment IT will provide real-time in-transitvisibility (ITV) of soldiers, units, cargo and equipment,moving in the Defense Transportation System (DTS), nestedin the Global Information Grid and linked to the sustainmententerprise architecture. This concept integrates sustainmentpackages with ready-to-employ units. Continuous resupplyof employed forces requires reachback operations, sense-and-respond logistics and recurring unit-configured loads,all contributing to a reduced logistics footprint. Execution

Adaptive Modular OrganizationsUEs will be the command and control elements of

UAs. They will link the tactical operations to the operationallevel of war. They will be joint capable and adaptive to thesituation. They will plug into and/or receive assets fromorganic, higher-level Army and joint organizations andtherefore adapt to a wide variety of potential operationsand maintain a honed readiness through continuous,habitual relationships. UEs, highly tailorable for specificmissions and contingencies, will draw from a pool of force

15

of this paradigm shift across a distributed battlespace willrely on new vertical and horizontal distribution/sustainmentcapabilities (i.e., HLVTOL, SSTOL, TSV and PrecisionExtended-Glide Airdrop Systems, or PEGASYS). Supportof these capabilities is critical to achieving the joint goal ofoperational maneuver from strategic distances.

Power-Projection Platforms. Installations will support theObjective Force requirements to deploy echelons in 96hours, 120 hours and 30 days directly into the battlespace.Deployment facilities will provide the means to meetemployment timelines with unit-configured packages thatensure the future force is ready to conduct operationsimmediately upon arrival. Strategic networked power-projection capabilities at installations will be optimizedthrough forward basing, multiservice basing strategies anddeployment configurations. Installations will conductproactive, anticipatory master planning effortsresulting in transformed platforms capable ofprojecting the Objective Force.

Four transformational pillars—the essence ofTransformation— build on these long-term DoD goals toensure that they can be met faster, less expensively andmore reliably in the future:• strengthening joint operations;

• experimenting with new approaches to warfare;

• exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages; and

• developing transformational capabilities.In a 31 January 2002 address at the National Defense

University, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said,“Our challenge in the 21st century is to defend our citiesand our infrastructure from new forms of attack whileprojecting force over long distances to fight new andperhaps distant adversaries. To do this, we need rapidlydeployable, fully integrated joint forces capable of reachingdistant theaters quickly and working with our air and seaforces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully, and withdevastating effect. We need improved intelligence, long-range precision strikes, sea-based platforms to help counterthe access denial capabilities of adversaries. . . . And weneed to make the leap into the information age, which isthe critical foundation of [DoD] transformation efforts.”

Joint PerspectiveThe senior military leadership has provided a series of

guidelines (Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020) tofocus preparations for an uncertain future. Joint Vision2010 aimed to keep the United States preeminent in theworld—no matter how complex the world became.Released in the late 1990s, JV2010 was the conceptualtemplate for producing forces for the 21st century that couldprotect and promote America’s interests worldwide. Theend state of JV2010 was dominance across the entirespectrum of conflict. Information Superiority (IS) andTechnological Innovation (TI) were critical “enablingconcepts” for the vision. IS and TI enabled achievement ofnew levels of capability in the concepts of maneuver, strike,logistics and personnel protection. Maneuver becameDominant Maneuver; Strike became Precision Engagement;

Logistics became Focused Logistics; and PersonnelProtection became Full Dimensional Protection. To achievefull-spectrum dominance, six critical considerations—doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership andpeople, representing all elements of military power—hadto evolve together.

Joint Vision 2020 (released in June 2000) built uponand extended the conceptual template established byJV2010 to guide the concept development for America'sarmed forces. It reiterated several of the intellectualconcepts of JV2010:• creation of a force that was dominant across the full

spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace,decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict;

• strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection,overseas presence, and strategic agility; and

• recognition of the importance of technology andtechnical innovation to the U.S. military and itsoperations.JV2020 went one step further by emphasizing that

technological innovation must be accompanied byintellectual innovation leading to changes in organization anddoctrine. Only then can the full potential of the joint forcebe reached. JV2020 postulated information operations,joint command and control, and multinational andinteragency operations as focal points for change.

5

Is Army Transformation transformational? Emphat-ically yes! Army Transformation is in harmony with DoDand joint efforts to transform the armed forces. It is thegoal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fullysupport the national security and military strategies as partof the joint force. Its progress will realize the trans-formational capabilities outlined by DoD.

The national strategy calls for a capabilities-based forceable to:• protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. bases overseas;

• project and sustain power in distant theaters;

• deny U.S. enemies sanctuary;

• protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attacks;

• use information technology to link U.S. forces; and

• protect U.S. information networks from attack.

Army Transformation:Is It Transformational?

enablers (aviation, fire support, engineer and sustainment).The UE will be the ideal joint headquarters, withmultinational and interagency capabilities for campaignplanning and execution. UEs will be created whenoperations approach the high end of combat or demandsustained operations, or when control of multipleorganizations or joint organizations is desired.

The UA will be the decisive element within the ObjectiveForce that closes with and destroys the enemy in anyoperation, against any level of threat, in any environment.It will not be a fixed organization and will have the capabilityto command and control up to three FCS combined-armsunits, one aviation detachment, one Non-Line of Sight-capable artillery unit and one forward support unit, as wellas to employ enablers from higher headquarters. It will beable to employ a range of supporting joint and organiccapabilities from a UE or a joint task force and to tailor aforce with additional capabilities for specific missions acrossthe full spectrum of military operations. The C4ISRarchitecture will enable the UA to increase its span ofcontrol.

The strategy demands that mobile, deployable groundforces be joint and capable of conducting simultaneous anddistributed operations across the entire battlespace. Thiswill accomplish the operational objectives of the joint forcefrom deterrence to combat operations to stabilityoperations, all while protecting the homeland. The Army’scontributions to the joint force will be the capabilities forprotection of U.S. national interests.

The Objective Force will:• contribute to prompt operations

(preemptive attacks, jointraids, or other forcible/early entry operations) byincreasing the force flowthrough multiple, simultaneousdeployments; and

• provide sustainedforces not onlyfor campaignsthat requiremore time,but alsofor periodsof transitionto postcombat andstability operationsthat are critical inmeeting nationalsecurity objectives.

16

IntroductionOn 17 September 2002, President George W. Bush

released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) thatacknowledges the need for the United States to wield itsstrength and influence in the world to shape it for the better.Transformation of the Department of Defense (DoD)emerged as one of the key imperatives. The NSSdirects the military, DoD and intelligence agencies tosustain the strategic advantage over any potentialadversaries while advancing transformation. It furtheremphasizes that the military “must be transformed tofocus on how an adversary might fight [emphasisadded] rather than on where and when a war might occur.”Innovation such as capabilities-based forces will beexploited by experimenting with “new approaches towarfare” within the armed forces. Since the Army hasalready been focusing on Army Transformation for severalyears, it is useful to evaluate that effort in light of theexpectations contained in the new National SecurityStrategy.

DoDPerspective

Speaking at theCitadel on 11 December2001, President Bush,directly addressed theimportance of DefenseTransformation: “Whilethe threats to Americahave changed, the needfor victory has not. Weare fighting shadowy,entrenched enemies—using the tools of terrorand guerrilla war—yetwe are f inding newtactics and new weaponsto attack and defeatthem. This revolutionin our military is only

beginning, and it promises to change the face ofbattle.” [emphasis added] The President furtheremphasized the complexity of the transformation as a resultof the U.S. war on terrorism: “What’s different today isour sense of urgency—the need to build this future forcewhile fighting a present war. It’s like overhauling an enginewhile you’re going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have noother choice.”

The Department of Defense, as a follow-on to theQuadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, announcedsix transformational goals to better focus defense strategyand force structure:• protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. bases overseas;

• project and sustain power in distant theaters;

• deny U.S. enemies sanctuary;

• protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attacks;

• use information technology to link U.S. forces; and

• protect U.S. information networks from attack.

4

The Way AheadWhile transforming, the Army will contain differing units

that combine to contribute capabilities. These capabilitieswill be represented by:• units of employment;

• units of action;

• Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;

• Digital Divisions and Corps; and

• a combination of Current Force and specialty forcebrigades (airborne, air assault, Special Forces), ArmyReserve units, and four multifunctional Army NationalGuard divisions.The Army must continue to selectively recapitalize and

modernize the Current Force, fully field the interim StrykerBrigade Combat Teams (six SBCTs) by 2008 and field

brigade sets of equipment at the rate of three units ofaction and one unit of employment per year untiltransformation is complete, in the projected 2030 timeframe. The Objective Force will provide the traditionalheavy-force campaign overmatch, rapid and flexibleSBCTs, and the full-spectrum, precision maneuver-capableUEs and UAs.

The Army requires sufficient airlift, sealift andprepositioned assets to support the Objective Force. Atthe strategic level, the Objective Force will deploy eitherfrom forward sanctuaries or from the continental UnitedStates. The force will have both expeditionary andcampaign qualities; and will be configured for rapiddeployment and ready at a moment’s notice for sustainedoperations. At the operational level, the Objective Forcewill arrive at multiple austere points of entry via air andsealift. Tactically, the Objective Force will deploy andredeploy in tactical aircraft capable of using short fieldsand unimproved runways.

17

Executive Summary

3

The transformation of the U.S. Army to a lean, agile, joint capabilities-based force is ongoing. The Army must accomplishin less than 10 years what traditionally has taken more than 20 years. To do this, the Army set in motion the necessaryelements to facilitate change and has accelerated Transformation to the Objective Force in 2008.

Army Transformation is in harmony with Department of Defense (DoD) and joint efforts to transform the armed forces.It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully support the national security and military strategies as part ofthe joint force. Its progress will realize the transformational capabilities outlined by DoD.

The strategy demands that mobile, deployable ground forces be joint and capable of conducting simultaneous anddistributed operations across the entire battlespace. This will accomplish the operational objectives of the joint force fromdeterrence to combat operations to stability operations, all while protecting the homeland. The Objective Force:• contributes to prompt operations (preemptive attacks, joint raids or other forcible/early entry operations) by increasing

the force flow through multiple, simultaneous deployments; and

• provides sustained forces not only for campaigns that require more time, but also for those periods of transition topostcombat and stability operations that are critical in meeting the national security objectives.The Objective Force will operate within the framework of a joint force in which it will lead joint forces, be led

by a joint force and use joint capabilities at the lowest reasonable level.The Objective Force is characterized by an integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture—one that is compatible with both current and future forces. Trainedand equipped leaders and informed and networked soldiers at the lowest levels, adapting to the situation, willmake decisions.

The Objective Force is strategically and operationally responsive, an Army that can deploy a unit of action (UA) in 96hours, a unit of employment (UE) in 120 hours, and five UEs in theater in 30 days using a mix of air, sea and land movementand prepositioned equipment. A joint, interdependent combined-arms team, it deploys directly to the fight at critical nodesand centers of gravity to accomplish operational objectives as part of the joint force across the breadth and depth of thebattlespace. Among its capabilities is situational awareness, i.e., the ability to determine at all times not only its own locationbut also those of both friendly and enemy forces. The UA is self-sustainable for three to seven days of operations andmaintains combat power with dramatically reduced theater logistics infrastructure.

The Army must continue to selectively recapitalize and modernize the Current Force, fully field the Interim Force (sixSBCTs) by 2008 and field brigade sets of equipment at the rate of three UAs and one UE per year until transformation iscomplete, in the projected 2030 time frame.

Congress must:• fully fund the Army’s Fiscal Year 2004 President’s Budget submission;

• fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army’s share ofthe DoD budget to at least 28 percent to maintain readiness while transforming to the Objective Force; and expeditiouslyfund future commitments of Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies so the Army is not forced to internallyreprogram Transformation and readiness dollars; and

• provide additional C-17 airlift capabilities and support and fund Army power-projection platform (AP3) initiatives.

So is Army Transformation transformational? Emphatically yes!Ultimately, Transformation is about risk management,striking a balance between readiness today and preparedness tomorrow.

What Must Be DoneToday the Army finds itself simultaneously at war

(prosecuting the global war on terrorism) andtransforming (reshaping to meet the emerging challengesof the 21st century). In a dangerous, complex world, thevalue of America’s Army has never been more evident.

The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan is on trackand on target, designing a force that leads joint operations.It is in harmony with DoD and joint efforts to transform.Funding relationships among the Current, Stryker andObjective forces are fully integrated in Program ObjectiveMemorandum (POM) 04-09, and the first significantelements appear in the Fiscal Year 2003 budget. The Armyhas inculcated the Army Vision across the senior leadershipand down to the lowest levels of the organization. Soldiersunderstand the azimuth for the future and why the Army ismoving along that azimuth.

The momentum to achieve the Objective Force isirreversible. Therefore, Congress and DoD must:• fully fund the Army’s FY 2004 President’s Budget

submission;

• fund DoD at an amount approximating 4 percent ofthe gross domestic product (GDP); increase the Army’sshare of the DoD budget to at least 28 percent tomaintain readiness while transforming to the ObjectiveForce; and expeditiously fund future commitmentsof Army forces for unprogrammed contingencies sothe Army is not forced to internally reprogram Transfor-mation and readiness dollars;

• fully fund and support Stryker Brigade Combat Teamsand associated costs to ensure fielding of six brigadesby 2008;

• fully fund and support research, development, test andevaluation (RDT&E) efforts for the Future CombatSystems (to include the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon,or NLOS-C) and to achieve First Unit Equipped(FUE) by 2008 and Initial Operational Capability (IOC)by 2010;

• fund and support the prioritized recapitalization andupgrade program for the Current Force to ensurewarfighting readiness today;

• fund and field command and control criticalinformation systems, to include the Army KnowledgeEnterprise architecture, and support the developmentof Computer Network Attack and Computer NetworkDefense capabilities;

• accelerate funding for high-pay-off weapon systems(e.g., Comanche) that support the Army’s requirementsfor the Current, Stryker and Objective forces;

• support Basic Research investment in revolutionarywarfighting technologies such as autonomous vehicles,compact power sources, and nanoscience, biometrics,smart structures and materials-by-design;

• continue to fund the Land, Air, Mounted and ObjectiveForce Warrior programs to ensure the overmatchcapabilities of soldiers;

• support Advanced Technology Developmentfocusing on maturing critical Objective Forcetechnology (e.g., within the Army’s 13 science andtechnology mission areas;

• provide additional C-17 airlift capabilities by continuingthe acquisition of the programmed 134 aircraft andaccepting the 60 additional C-17s proposed by industryto the Air Force;

• support and fund Army power-projection platform(AP3) initiatives (such as Shallow-Draft High-SpeedSealift and the Theater Support Vessel, or TSV) andthe Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS);

• support Applied Research to provide block upgradesto Objective Force systems; and

• fund requirements (e.g., Distribution Management andReengineering Initiative) to enable the rapid and assuredsustainment of forces worldwide across the fullspectrum of military operations.

18

26 February 2003

Today the Army finds itself simultaneously at war (prosecuting campaigns) andtransforming (reshaping to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century). In adangerous and complex world, the value of America's Army has never been moreevident.

Yet some would argue that the U.S. Army's transformation to an "Objective Force" isnot in concert with U.S. national strategies and Department of Defense (DoD) guidance.In addition, they surmise, what is currently being articulated as an Army transformationstrategy is short on substance and long on rhetoric. Nothing could be further from thetruth.

In this installment of AUSA's Torchbearer series, we analyze DoD's operational goals,emerging joint operating concepts, and the Army's Objective Force concepts toprovide insights into their connectivity.

We think you will find this report to be a useful resource, and we hope you willcontinue to look to AUSA for credible analysis of contemporary national security issues.

ContentsExecutive Summary ----------------------- 3

Introduction ---------------------------------- 4

DoD Perspective --------------------------- 4

Joint Perspective -------------------------- 5

Army Transformation --------------------- 6

Viewing Army Transformation in Termsof the New National Security Strategyand Joint Concepts ----------------------- 8Army Transformation:Is It Transformational? ------------------ 16

The Way Ahead -------------------------- 17

What Must Be Done ---------------------- 18

Torchbearer Message ----------------- 19

2

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, USA RetiredPresident

Army Vision(document) http://www.army.mil/vision/Documents/The%20Army%20Vision.PDF(homepage) http://www.army.mil/vision/index.html(Vision links) http://www.army.mil/vision/links.htmlGEN Shinseki speeches cited in text(AUSA 12 Oct 99 ) http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/speeches/991012.htm(Arrival ceremony 23 Jun 99) http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/speeches/990622.htmShallow-Draft High-Speed Sealift and Theater Support Vesselhttp://www.tacom.army.mil/TSV.htmhttp://www.tacom.army.mil/http://www.austal-ships.com/range/military.cfmFuture Tactical Truck System (FTTS)http://www.ssss.com/ssss/milestones.asphttp://www.asc2002.com/summaries/n/NP-19.pdfhttp://www.cascom.army.mil/transportation/FTTS.htmComanchehttp://www.sikorsky.com/details/1,,CLI1_DIV69_ETI260,00.html

Web Links for Additional Information

Torchbearer Message

In 1999, the Army Chief of Staff outlined an Army vision comprising three elements: People, Readinessand Transformation. Guided by that vision, the Army began a timely and profound transformation of structure,equipment, manning, training and resources. Ultimately, Transformation is about risk management, strikinga balance between readiness today and preparedness tomorrow.

Within this framework the Army developed a Transformation Campaign Plan designed across threesimultaneous paths: a Current Force (the nation’s “go to war” capability); an interim force of Stryker BrigadeCombat Teams (the bridge to the future as well as a capability between heavy and light forces); and theObjective Force (the future Army, a full-spectrum, network-centric capability designed as an integral part ofthe joint force).

The Objective Force is organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive,deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the full spectrum of military operations.The Objective Force will operate within the framework of a joint force in which it will lead jointforces, be led by a joint force and use joint capabilities at the lowest reasonable level. The ObjectiveForce comprises modular, scalable, flexible organizations whose leaders are adaptive for prompt and sustainedland operations in complex terrain. It is an adaptable force, able to transition quickly between changes intask, purpose and directions, maneuvering into and out of contact without sapping operational momentumbecause the Objective Force facilitates joint decentralized operations at the tactical level. Trained andequipped leaders and informed and networked soldiers at the lowest levels, adapting to the situation,make decisions to seize the initiative and accomplish operational objectives with tactical action.

Army Transformation is in harmony with Department of Defense and joint efforts to transform the armedforces. It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully support the National Security Strategyand the National Military Strategy as part of the joint force. Its progress will realize the transformationalcapabilities as outlined by DoD. The Army’s Transformation Campaign Plan is on track and on target, designinga force to lead joint operations.

Congress must recognize this compatibility and resource the Army and DoD accordingly. An investmentin the Army today is an investment in America’s future.

So is Army Transformation transformational? Emphatically yes!

It is the goal of the Army to build the Objective Force to fully supportthe National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy

as part of the joint force.

19

The Army's combat power does not wear tracks or wheels-it wears boots .

. . . Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations.

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Reproduction of this report, in whole or in port,

is authorized wilh appropriate acknowledgment of lhe source.

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