how many naval squadrons did athens send to evagoras?

How Many Naval Squadrons Did Athens Send to Evagoras?Author(s): P. J. StylianouSource: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 37, H. 4 (4th Qtr., 1988), pp. 463-471Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436076 .

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Miszellen 463

XT3GLXOWTCEOV nCEQEUxEVaoUiva). This corresponds to Homer's use of the adjectives yXaq)puQ6g (II. 2.454; Od. 3.287) and xotkog (II. 1.26; Od. 1.211), indicating that the ships were open, i. e., had no decks. These ships did not operate in fleets but made surprise attacks in the manner of pirates. The second time Thucydides explicitly mentions shipbuilding he informs us that the Athenian triremes in the battle at Salamis in 480 BC were deployed against the Persians according to modern strategy, i. e., within a fleet, but that they, too, did not yet have complete decks (xat asiTal oi3Jro EIXov bta 3t JT6aY XaTaOTQ(o[aTOa). The emphasis on the construction of the deck is not surprising. Practically all ships of his time had decks which covered their full length and width. This change is attributed to Cimon, who, if Plut. Cimon 12.2 is to be trusted, around 467 BC changed the design of the 200 ships which Themistocles had constructed with a view to speed and maneuvrability by making them wider and by putting a bridge between their decks, so that, carrying many soldiers, they were the better armed for attacking the enemy (tQ6; [tv TxoXg dM'

DXsg xai nELtQaywyrv V3To eEFLLoToxEoU; `EQtTQa XtcTeoxEtJaotvaL, dxelvog & T6rE xai nxXamUtQCag ?EoiOev a.'itq xaCi 8,fiacOtv tOic xaTwtaTt RCtaoLV ENOXEVV, t &v 'U?o J[OXdV

6ITXLTWV [WXlR(bTEQCEL JTLOO(pEQOLVtO TOtq 3OXEJ1tOL).

Thucydides knew these ships well and was aware that the construction of an enlarged deck was inspired by the wish to execute boarding tactics as well as ramming tactics. The larger decks offered room for soldiers, which could change the dimensions of naval warfare.

Thuc. 1.13.2 must, in my opinion, be seen in this context. Around 700 BC the Corinthians did something with ships which seemed "almost modern" (eyywta`U TOV Vi3V TQ6JOV). In view of the statements in 1.10.4 and 1.14.3 this innovations must concern deck construction. It was a change which had far-reaching consequences for the functioning of warships. The construction of a (partial) deck brought about a change in the tactics of naval warfare. The deck strengthened the ship, as a result of which ramming tactics could be more successful. Moreover, soldiers could be stationed on the deck in order to launch missiles. The pirate-style confrontations of ship against ship were replaced by confrontations between groups of ships. It is, thus, not without reason that Thucydides writes that the first real naval battle in Greek history took place 40 years after Ameinocles had built the first ships for the Samians.

That in 480 BC ships with small decks were still in use, is not surprising. Deck construction was only a small part of shipbuilding as a whole, which was subject to constant change from the ninth to the sixth century. All monoremes and biremes, which preceded the trireme, had a raised deck over the centerline only.7 Thus, it was not uncommon for triremes in 480 BC, 50 years after they had been launched, still to have a small deck over the centerline. Thucydides was struck by the resemblance of the deck over the centerline. Both the ships around 700 BC and the triremes in 480 BC had not yet gone through the entire development from aphracts to full cataphracts, ships with a raised deck with a side screening, so that the rowers were "fenced-in".

Universiteit Amsterdam F. Meijer

7 Casson, Ships 87-8.

HOW MANY NAVAL SQUADRONS DID ATHENS SEND TO EVAGORAS?

Athenian support for Evagoras in his war against the Great King, at a time when Athens seems to have hoped for continuing Persian backing against Sparta, or at least for Persian neutrality, did not only baffle Xenophon (Hell. 4.8.24); it has perplexed, vexed even, many a modern historian too. Reactions vary from admiration, albeit tinged with criticism, for what is viewed as a brave and

Historia, Band XXXVII/4 (1988) K Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart



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honourable action which nevertheless Athens could ill afford at such a critical stage in her history, to condemnation for reckless opportunism which provoked Persia to retaliation, with unhappy consequences for Athens.2 Obviously, the line one adopts depends on one's analysis of the political and military realities obtaining in the eastern Mediterranean at the time. However, such is not my main concern in this paper and I do little more than touch on it in the concluding section. 3

I propose rather to consider the extent to which Athens aided Evagoras. And here there is unanimity amongst scholars: two squadrons, each of ten triremes, were dispatched to Evagoras. The first, commanded by Philocrates, was sent out shortly after the outbreak of the Cypriot War and it met with disaster - it was captured by the Spartan commander Teleutias off Rhodes (Xen. Hell. 4.8.24). The second, commanded by Chabrias, set out 2-3 years later and succeeded in reaching the island (Xen. Hell. 5.1 .10; Nep. Chabrias 2.2). What has occasioned some doubt is the identification of the expedition, likewise of ten triremes, mentioned in Lysias 19, On the Property of Aristophanes, S? 21 and 43. Is this to be identified with the unlucky squadron of Philocrates or with that of Chabrias? With few exceptions scholars have preferred the first identification.4 To go contrary to the weight of scholarly consensus is no light matter. All the same, careful consideration of Lysias 19 inclines me to believe in three and not two Athenian naval expeditions in defence of Evagoras.

Aristophanes (a milder version of Alcibiades of the 390s to judge from what is said in the speech) and his father Nicophemus had been executed, probably in Cyprus,5 on charges which are not entirely clear,6 but which were serious enough to warrant confiscation of their property in Athens. Apparently the state was not satisfied with the amount confiscated and the relatives of Aristophanes by marriage were accused of withholding part of the property. Hence the occasion of the speech delivered by the brother-in-law of Aristophanes. His aim is to prove to the court that

I Cf. G. Grote, History of Greece X (London, 1852) 28; J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, A History

of Greece 4th ed. (1975) 344. 2 Cf. Robin Seager, JHS 87 (1967) 114; David M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977)

146f. I I have more to say on the career of Evagoras and his relations with Athens in a chapter in

vol. I of the forthcoming History of Cyprus (Arch. Macarios III Foundation, Nicosia, Cyprus). I For the older literature see W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien (Marburg, 1892) 120 n. 1.

Judeich himself (120 and n. 1) is strongly in favour of the first identification. The most eminent amongst those who favour the second is J. Beloch in Die attische Politik seit Perikles (Leipzig, 1884) 356. However, in the 2nd ed. of Griechische Geschichte III:1 (Berlin und Leipzig, 1922) 90

n. 1, Beloch leaves it undecided which of the two identifications is to be preferred. Ed. Meyer,

Geschichte des Altertums V (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1902) 259, is in no doubt that the first identification is the correct one, and this is the view which has prevailed. Cf., e. g., L. Gernet and

M. Bizos, Bude ed. of Lysias 19 (1926) 37; G. F. Hill, A History of Cyprus I (Cambridge, 1940)

133; C. Spyridakis, EV'iay6oa; A (Nicosia, 1945) 62; E. Gjerstad, The Swedish Cyprus

Expedition IV:2 (Stockholm, 1948) 494; S. Accame, Ricerche intorno alla Guerra Corinzia

(Naples, 1951) 119; J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B. C. (Oxford, 1971)

201f., 330; G. L. Cawkwell, CQ 26 (1976) 274. 5 S 7. The examples the speaker adduces in SS 34 and 51 point to father and son having been

arrested and executed abroad. 6 Harpocr. s.v. XOl-Qot: Auofa;g v Tej xat' AiciXvou nEQ!t rig 6vtEbUFsew; uTOV 'AelO-

Towdvov XQqtLdTL&V "i3Mbf TOV VS to0l; X16TQov; 6 A t[z6QvtoT atk6 x0obt6os;g". Chytroi was a city in Cyprus. The charge may have been treason against Evagoras, an ally of Athens.



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the property of Aristophanes was not as substantial as some people had imagined and that, considering all the expenses Aristophanes had incurred in the years before he sailed to Cyprus, it was not to be wondered at that relatively little of his fortune remained.

The speaker gives the court a resume of the financial circumstances of Aristophanes, listing the major expenses he underwent. At the time of the battle of Cnidus (August 394) Aristophanes had hardly any property to speak of in Athens, and though the victory over Sparta proved quite a windfall (his father had been a senior subordinate of Conon) Aristophanes' life-style was such that in the next 4-5 years most of his wealth was used up: he had bought an estate, performed the office of choregos twice, served as trierarch three times in a row, and he had even been sent to Dionysius the tyrant as ambassador (5? 19f., 28f., 42f.). His last major expense is given in some detail (5? 21-27, 55).

At sometime after Aristophanes' mission to Sicily, the speaker says, the envoys from Cyprus arrived to request Athens' assistance. The demos voted that ten triremes should be dispatched to Evagoras but, a characteristic this of 4th century Athenian armaments, there was not enough money available to equip the warships. What is more, the envoys wanted to hire mercenaries and buy weapons, though they had not brought enough money with them. Aristophanes helped them out. When all his own money was spent he borrowed from his friends solemnly promising to refund them. His father, in his letters from Cyprus, was urging him not to spare himself, but to do all he could in equipping the expedition as the grateful king Evagoras was sure to reward him suitably when they reached Cyprus. Clearly, the expedition represented a major investment for Aristophanes and he was hoping for a handsome return.

Now, bearing in mind what the speaker's contention was, let us for a moment follow the communis opinio and identify this expedition with that which fell into the hands of Teleutias. Is there anything which would have served the speaker's purpose better than to point to the catastrophe which befell the squadron? Gone were the five talents Aristophanes had spent on it (? 43), and gone the money he had borrowed from his friends too - the venture was a complete loss. Yet not only do we not hear anything about that, but witnesses are produced to prove that the people who had lent Aristophanes money had been fully reimbursed; the money had been conveyed to them 'in the trireme' (? 24). It seems evident to me that the expedition, triremes, peltasts, and arms, got through, and that Aristophanes himself, in Cyprus now, paid back his friends.

Quite apart from this consideration, near decisive to my mind, the identification of the squadron in Lysias 19 with the unlucky one captured by Teleutias gives rise to a puzzle which few scholars have tried to solve: if the ten triremes were captured by the enemy how is it that Aristophanes is in Cyprus shortly afterwards? One solution proposed7 is that Aristophanes somehow managed to evade capture by fleeing to land (by swimming one presumes as all ten ships were captured); a second' that as he was elected ambassador to Evagoras (5 23) he may have sailed separately from the squadron. The first suggestion does not merit further consideration, while the second is less likely than might appear at first glance, for several reasons:

(i) Aristophanes was very much a part of the expedition in which he invested a great deal of money, thereby hoping to earn the gratitude of Evagoras. Would he, therefore, have consented to sail apart from it if he had a choice? Admittedly, the speech is not explicit on this point, but certainly the impression one derives from it (cf. 55 22, 24ff.) is that he sailed with the squadron.

(ii) The speaker stresses the dangers Aristophanes faced from the enemy and the sea when he went as an envoy to Dionysius (? 20). Considerations of safety would consequently have recommended that he now sailed under the protection of the naval squadron.

7 Judeich, op. cit. (n. 4) 120 n. 1. I Judeich, ibid.; Meyer, GdA V 259; Hill, op. cit. (n. 4) 133.



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(iii) It is to be strongly doubted that Athens at this time could have afforded the luxury of sending an additional trireme to distant Cyprus merely to convey her envoys when a whole squadron was about to sail there. It should be stressed in this connection that the ten warships voted for Evagoras were not a gift of old and useless triremes.9 We are told that Demus, the son of Pyrilampes, was serving as a trierarch (? 25). Presumably the squadron was sent to Cyprus for a definite period. From what we know about Athenian embassies the state might or might not provide them with transport, and we do in fact hear of envoys availing themselves of the chance to travel in triremes already serving in a campaign (Dem. 50.12; 53.5). There would be nothing surprising, therefore, in Aristophanes and his colleagues sailing in one of the ten triremes.

(iv) In ?S 42f. the speaker lists Aristophanes' major expenses in the years 394-390. We note that one talent and 40 minae he spent on the mission to Dionysius are itemized. The fact that nothing is said about his embassy to Evagoras is perhaps an indication that he sailed with the squadron, thus sustaining no additional expense. It is true that Athenians drew pay from the state when serving as ambassadors, but it appears that this was not so high that they did not need to spend from their own money. Io

I conclude that Aristophanes sailed with the squadron, and that both he and the squadron arrived safely in Cyprus." That being the case, we are faced with the task of setting the three expeditions in their correct chronological order and, if possible, of dating them. Unfortunately, the chronology of the Corinthian War is a notorious crux because of the vague and patchy nature of our main narrative source, Xenophon's Hellenica, which moreover fails to provide sufficient points of contact between events on land and events on sea. It would have helped if Xenophon had taken care over the succession of Spartan nauarchs, but he is as inexplicit and inconsistent here as elsewhere. The safest procedure for dating events of the second half of the war is to begin at the end, with the King's Peace. This is firmly dated in 387/6. But 387 or 386?

The chronology generally followed is essentially that of Beloch. 12 He has Antalcidas travel to Susa in autumn 388 whence he returned in late spring/early summer 387. The events in the Hellespont followed, resulting in the blockade which forced Athens to accede to the terms of the peace the Great King had sent down (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-32). The peace itself was not sworn to until well into the year 387/6, perhaps at late as spring 386.'3 All this is quite acceptable. Antalcidas, having augmented his navy to more than 80 triremes, had begun to intercept the Athenian cornships. This points to the late summer or early autumn of 387 (cf. Dem. 50.4-6).

9 As Cawkwell, art. cit. (n. 4) 275 n. 20, seems to imply. See further n. 33. 10 D. J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Wiesbaden, 1973) 74ff. 11 Aristophanes had borrowed, almost certainly without interest, from friends and relatives

and not from professional lenders. This appears to have been the usual practice (cf. Paul Millett in Peter Garnsey et al., edd., Trade in the Ancient Economy (London, 1983) 47ff.). It may not, therefore, be directly relevant, but it is worth bearing in mind the clause which generally accompanied Greek contracts of sea loans, and which provided that if either ship or

cargo were lost because of bad weather or capture by enemies or pirates, the lender lost all the money he had advanced (H. Michell, The Economics of Ancient Greece 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1957) 346). Aristophanes, by contrast, had promptly repaid his creditors. It should not be necessary to point out that Xenophon's silence on a third expedition to Cyprus is no argument against its reality. He mentions the other two in passing, and only because they bear directly on his narrative.

12 Attische Politik 348ff.; GG 111:2 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1923) 223ff. It is approved by Meyer, GdA V 258.

1' GG 111:2 225f.



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Also, the well-known Athenian inscription in honour of Clazomenae14 excludes a date for the peace earlier than the second half of the summer of 387. The document is dated in the archonship of Theodotus (387/6). The language of the decree is very much that of the renascent imperialism launched by Thrasybulus, with talk of a garrison, a garrison commander and the 5% tax. A clause even grants Clazomenians the right to sail freely into those ports of the east Aegean from which they imported their grain. It is inconceivable that such a decree was passed after Antalcidas had captured the eight triremes of Thrasybulus of Collytus, increased his own force to more than 80 warships, and blockaded the Hellespont (Xen. Hell. 5.1.26-28).'5

Beloch's chronology nevertheless is flawed by a conviction that we have in Xenophon a complete list of Spartan nauarchs from 393/2 to 387/6. What is more, he is of the opinion that the law whereby the nauarchy could be held once only (Xen. Hell. 2.1.7), whether still in force at this time or not, does not affect the chronology. Beloch is also inclined to consider that every nauarch, unless killed or wounded, was allowed to complete his term of office which, like the Spartan year, ran from autumn to autumn. 16 The result is an unduly schematic arrangement. After Podanemus, nauarch for 393/2, there were six other nauarchs for the duration of the war, with Teleutias serving as nauarch for not less than three years, 392/1,390/89 and 387/6.

Clearly, certain guiding principles are required before the Spartan nauarchies can be made to contribute to the discussion on chronology. The following seem reasonable and in accordance with the evidence: (i) The nauarchy was a very important appointment indeed, certainly from the Ionian War down to the battle of Leuctra, keenly sought by all ambitious Spartans below the rank of king. As Aristotle puts it: ou6tEwg yaQ ytveTatL ciTtog (6 ;TE(i TOV5 vaV6oXoVo v64og), 6dL yeQ ToIg

PCtoGtXEfotv ova01, 0TQCETTlyOtS L6L8OLg i1 vauaCtcta oXe-66v #TtQaC Pkt(RXeCt xaC(oTnjxev (Politics 1271 a 40-42). The word stasis brings Lysander and, to a lesser extent, Antalcidas to mind, but Aristotle's criticism is a general one aimed at the potential for faction of a powerful office which encouraged influential groups at Sparta, usually centred on the two kings, to use any means, fair or foul, to secure the appointment for one of their own members. The importance and seniority of the nauarchy, as well as the strife the pursuit of it might occasion amongst the Spartans, emerge clearly from the sources. 17 It follows that we should not automatically suppose that Spartan naval commanders we meet in the sources were nauarchs simply because no nauarchs are indicated for

" M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions II (Oxford, 1948) no. 114. is It is possible, therefore,to date the inscription more closely than 'in the first half of

Theodotus' year'(Tod), to the first or second prytany of 387/6. Ih R. Sealey, Klio 58 (1976) 335ff., argues against Beloch's thesis (GG 1I:2 (Berlin and Leipzig,

1931) 269ff.) that Spartan nauarchs were appointed at the beginning of the Spartan year in the autumn, proposing instead that from c. 409 their annual tenure began in the spring. It is true that in a number of instances Sealey's view seems to fit the evidence better, but in at least one case the change of command certainly took place in the autumn (Xen. Anab. 7.2.5). Perhaps the answer is that though appointed at the start of the Spartan year along with the ephors, nauarchs, depending on the circumstances, sometimes took up their command immediately, and sometimes waited until the following spring. In any case, for most practical purposes the difference between Beloch and Sealey is of no moment. The sailing season lasted from spring to autumn and to say, with Beloch, that X was nauarch for, e. g., 389/8, is in fact to say that his active service at sea was in spring and summer 388 - which is precisely what Sealey's proposal amounts to also.

'' Cf. Thuc. 8.6.5; 8.20.1; 8.39.2; Xen. Hell. 1.6.1-6; 2.1.7; 2.4.28f.; 3.4.27ff.; Anab. 7.2.4-8; A. Andrewes, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides V (Oxford, 1981) 43f. (on 8.20.1).



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the years concerned. 1 Not every commander of an army was a king and not every naval commander a nauarch. 19

(ii) We cannot assume that a nauarch was appointed every year.20 (iii) We can hardly deny that Xenophon was fully aware of the nature of the office of nauarch at

Sparta. He mentions in passing the provision that the nauarchy could be held once only (Hell. 2.1.7). This provision must have formed part of the law known to Aristotle which regulated the office. The problem is deciding the degree to which Xenophon's use of the term nauarch can be trusted, given that he not infrequently expresses himself loosely and imprecisely. For instance, at Hell. 5.1.5 he dubs the Athenian general Eunomus a nauarch. This particular case, however, need not worry us too much. Xenophon, who knew perfectly well that technically Eunomus was a strategos and not a nauarchos, was led to use the latter term in a passage in which Spartan nauarchs figure significantly. Nevertheless, the mere use of the term for a Spartan officer is not sufficient to ensure his status as nauarch. Clearly, each case should be treated on its merits. When Xenophon emphatically states that X was nauarch at a certain time, or that the Spartans sent out Y as nauarch, we can have no reason for doubting the correctness of his statement. When, on the other hand, at 5.1 .13, he refers to Teleutias as nauarch the term is qualified and that, as well as the circumstances of his appointment, make it highly unlikely that Teleutias held the nauarchy. Also, it would be imprudent to assume that he has given us, in one form or another, all the nauarchs, or that, alternatively, when he does not designate a naval commander a nauarch he was not one,21 or that the succession of nauarchies was as straightforward and uncomplicated as his narrative sometimes leads us to surmise. Xenophon was not the kind of historian who would scrupulously note departures from the norm.

Within these guide-lines Beloch's chronology may be modified thus: Antalcidas was nauarch for 388/7 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.6: 'AvTaQXX(hv vavaeaov aXov@xrmolvCJ), Hierax for 389/8 (Xen. Hell.

5.1.3: 'IUQa vu(Co0; &ptP,xveTCuL), and Ecdicus for 390/89 (Xen. Hell. 4.8.20: vasekXov b&

'Ex6LXov E:taTnactv). Teleutias, however, does not appear to have replaced Antalcidas as nauarch. The sentence {X &t Toi3Tuo 0o AUXE&toL6vtoL TEXEvUTLiCV (M' e'76 UtWljT EXnEtP.T0IU(JtLV niJi

TaUTaCLg Tla vafJ; vav)XLov (Xen. Hell. 5.1.13: Marchant's ed.), its partly corrupt state notwithstanding, strongly suggests a special local command and not the nauarchy. The circumstances surrounding the appointment point in the same direction. Antalcidas, the nauarch, had departed for Susa leaving his epistoleus, automatically acting nauarch, in charge of operations in the east Aegean. On his return from Persia Antalcidas resumed command (Xen. Hell. 5.1.6; 5.1.25ff.). Meanwhile the military situation in the Saronic, where Sparta maintained a squadron, had become critical; hence Teleutias' special appointment (Xen. Hell. 5.1.13). That was either in autumn 388 or spring 387. Likewise, on the two previous occasions Teleutias had been appointed to commands at sea, he had served as a mere naval commander and not as a nauarch (Xen. Hell. 4.4.19; 4.8.11; 4.8.23ff.; 5.1.2ff.). On the second of these occasions, in summer 389, he had replaced the timid Ecdicus as naval commander, though not as nauarch, in the south-east Aegean (Xen. Hell. 4.8.23).

Teleutias was sailing to Rhodes having relieved Ecdicus of his command when he fell in with

Ix Sealy, art. cit. (n. 16) 353, rightly questions that Herrippidas and Teleutias were nauarchs in

the Corinthian Gulf. 19 Cf. A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I1 (Oxford, 1956) 288f.

20 Pace Beloch, GG III: 2 233, who, e. g., suspects we might not really know the nauarch for

390/89, and Cawkwell, art. cit. (n. 4) 272 n. 14, who suggests for that year the otherwise

unknown Chilon. 21 Podanemus had an epistoleus (Hell. 4.8.11) and he may, therefore, have held the nauarchy

(Sealey, art. cit. (n. 16) 352). But can we be sure that naval commanders of a rank inferior to that of

nauarch were not accompanied by such officers?



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and captured the squadron of Philocrates (Xen. Hell. 4.8.24). That event therefore should be dated in summer 389. Chabrias sailed to Cyprus after the departure of Antalcidas for Susa and Gorgopas' raid on the Piraeus, but before the appointment of Teleutias to the Saronic (Xen. Hell. 5.1 .6-13), thus either in autumn 388 or, more likely, in spring 387.22 Where does the squadron of Lysias 19.21 belong? There are a number of indications in the speech itself.

(i) The Cypriot envoys arrived in Athens at some time (not defined) after Aristophanes' embassy to Dionysius (? 21). The times were critical, the speaker claims, and haste had to be made (? 24). It is a reasonable hypothesis that we are right at the outbreak of the Cypriot War when the news broke that the satraps Autophradates and Hecatomnus had been ordered to attack Evagoras, and Evagoras had consequently approached Athens, therefore in 391/0, most probably in the spring of 390.23

(ii) In SS 28f. we are told that Aristophanes had acquired his wealth after the battle of Cnidus (August 394), but that he had spent most of it over the next 4-5 years (? 29: &v oiTv T'TTaQOLV 11 3TfVTE fTEO). Judeich thinks that these 4-5 years are the period from the battle of Cnidus until the deaths of Nicophemus and Aristophanes,24 while Meyer prefers to see them as marking the time from Cnidus to the departure of Aristophanes from Athens.25 In all probability the speaker had both events in mind, the cxecutions having taken place not too long after Aristophanes' arrival in Cyprus, certainly not more than 12 months later. We hear of a speech by Lysias contesting the confiscation of Aristophanes' property (Harpocr. s.v. XUtToL), surely written immediately after the confiscation, and the time which intervened between that trial and the subsequent one at which Lysias 19 was delivered must have been short. If, therefore, Aristophanes sailed to Cyprus in spring 390, his execution and the two trials in Athens should be dated in 390/89.

(iii) A date for Lysias 19 prior to summer 389, that is, prior to the dispatch of Philocrates, seems indicated by ? 43,6ue oi KiOntQLot 'X*ov xati ELbOE aWTOlg Tag bxac vavSq - these are the only ten triremes sent to Evagoras of which the speaker and his audience know.

(iv) ?S 50f. refer to Diotimus as having recently served as a general. We know from other sources that Diotimus was a general in 390/89 and 388/7,26 though he may of course have served at other times too, the silence of the sources notwithstanding.

(v) ? 62 is evidence that the Corinthian War is still being fought (xai viiv . . . ToillQaQxGi kv

ey6))` - all armies and navies were disbanded as a result of the King's Peace (Xen. Hell. 5.1.35). (vi) As Seager suggests28 the fact that Eunomus is called as a witness (? 23) is indicative of a

date for the speech earlier than his appointment to the naval command in the Saronic in 388 which ended disastrously for him (Xen. Hell. 5.1.5-9).

Taken together, the above indications leave little doubt that the expedition of Lysias 19.21 was the first of the three, and that it set out in spring (or summer at the latest) 390.

Three squadrons, 30 triremes in all, sent out to Cyprus in relatively quick succession, represent no inconsiderable effort on the part of Athens at a time when she needed every single trireme if she were to hold her own in the Aegean. Certainly, they argue for a very serious commitment to Evagoras, but that is not the essence of the matter; Athens was not motivated by sentiment alone in aiding him. That she was resolved to recover her 5th century empire may be regarded as all too

22 Cf. Beloch, GG III:2 225. 23 The Cypriot War lasted for some 10 years, from c. 390 to c. 380: Beloch, GG III:2 226ff. 24 Op. cit. (n. 4) 120 n. 1. 25 GdA V 259. 26 Beloch, Attische Politik 295f., 314f. 27 Pace Beloch, GG III:1, 141 n. 3, who does not consider ? 62 decisive. 2R Art. cit. (n. 2) 113 n. 182.



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evident to require detailed argument.29 She saw her chance when Sparta fell out with Persia early in the 390s. What remained to be decided was the means to be employed and the timing. Clearly the single most important factor concerned the attitude Athens should adopt vis-a-vis Persia. Down to 392/lConon's 'softly-softly' approach of co-operation with Persia as far as possible was followed.30 That year saw the arrest of Conon by Tiribazus and the failure of the peace negotiations initiated by Sparta. Though released, Conon did not return to Athens, but retired to Cyprus where he died shortly afterwards.

The methods now adopted by Thrasybulus and his adherents mark a virtual return to those of the 460s and 450s. Egypt had been in full revolt since the closing years of the 5th century, and the successes against Persia in Palestine of the first Pharaoh of the 29th dynasty, Nepherites I (399-393), were continued by his successor, Acoris (393-380).3' In 391/0 the Great King, judging Evagoras to have become too powerful, declared war on him by ordering Autophradates and Hecatomnus, the respective satraps of Lydia and Caria, to invade Cyprus (FGH 115 F 103; Diod. 14.98.2-4). Evagoras promptly allied himself with Acoris. Together, Egypt and Cyprus were a formidable force, and for several years the whole Mediterranean seaboard of the Persian Empire seemed in danger of collapse (FGH 115 F 103; Isocr. Evag. 62; Diod. 15.2.3f.). The situation was particularly hazardous because nominally loyal Persian subjects like Hecatomnus were secretly in league with the rebels (Diod. 15.2.3). Not surprisingly, the projected invasion of Cyprus came to nothing. Equally unsuccessful was an invasion of Egypt which lasted for three years,32 and the preparations for which must have begun c. 390 (Isocr. Paneg. 140). No wonder the Great King was anxious to pacify Greece so that he could concentrate on Evagoras (Diod. 14.1 10.5; FGH 115 F 103).

When Evagoras approached Athens in 391/0 he was already her ally and shortly afterwards we find her allied with Acoris too (Aristoph. Plut. 178). Now was the time to make an 'open' bid for empire: as Thrasybulus sailed out in summer 389 with 40 new triremes hopes in the city were high.33 The venture was not an unqualified success and Thrasybulus himself perished at Aspendus

29 Athenian imperialism at this time is fully examined by Seager, art. cit. (n. 2) 95ff. 30 Cf. Cawkwell, art. cit. (n. 4) 275ff. 31 F. K. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte Aegyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der

Zeitwende (Berlin, 1953) 76ff.; E. Stern, Material Culture of the Land of the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 B. C. (Jerusalem, 1982) 254.

32 Correctly dated before the King's Peace by Judeich, op. cit. (n. 4) 153ff. Beloch's widely accepted dating after the King's Peace, GG 111:2 228f., is unsatisfactory, as I hope to argue elsewhere.

33 Xen. Hell. 4.8.25; Lys. 28.4. In the narrative of Xenophon the voyage of Thrasybulus is firmly linked with the presence of Teleutias at Rhodes: he sailed out after Teleutias had captured the squadron of Philocrates and reached Rhodes (4.8.24f.), thus not earlier than summer 389. Cawkwell on the other hand, concerned at what he conceives as a serious hiatus between the disappearance of Conon from the Athenian political scene and the re-emergence of Thrasybulus, dates the voyage in 391 (art. cit. (n. 4) 271ff.). This, however, is a poor reason for forcing the evidence, and he himself agrees (274) that there are objections to his chronology, objections which, I hope, are sufficiently substantiated in this paper. 389 is the year for Thrasybulus to sail, not 391 or even 390. In any case, a fleet of 40 new triremes could not have been built overnight, and would not Athens watch the international scene for the right time to move? The hiatus, therefore, may be more apparent than real. Nor can I agree with Cawkwell's assumption that Athens did not build triremes prior to the failure of the peace negotiations of 392/1 (274f. and n. 20). The chances are that Athens (to the extent that her financial resources permitted) began building warships immediately on the outbreak of war in 395. We do in any case hear of war-taxes (eisphorai) levied and Athenians serving as trierarchs before 391 (Lys. 19.12, 29).



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in the following year.34 But the speed with which Sparta and Persia now reached an understanding is suggestive of the anxiety which the triple alliance of Athens, Evagoras and Egypt must have occasioned at Susa.35

Arch. Macarios III Foundation, Nicosia, Cyprus P. J. Stylianou

34 I agree with Seager, art. cit. (n. 2) 109 n. 127, that Aristoph. Plut. 449f. constitutes no evidence for dating Thrasybulus' death after February 388. However, the operations were clearly of some duration (Xen. Hell. 4.8.27-30; Lys. 28), and rhetorical exaggeration notwithstanding, we have to allow enough time for the fighting ability of the fleet to deteriorate and the triremes to age (Lys. 28.2, 4).

35 I am grateful to Professor A. Andrewes and Dr. R. B. E. Smith for helpful criticism of this paper.

ANTIGONUS, THE SATRAP OF PHRYGIA

In 333 Alexander departed Celaenae in central Phrygia, leaving Antigonus, the son of Philip, in charge of the satrapy of Greater Phrygia (Arr. Anab. 1.29.3; Curt. 3.1.8; Just. 13.4.14). Antigonus' role was critical; from his position astride the inland line of communications he was to guard Asia Minor against any counterattack and protect Alexander's lifeline to Europe.1 Alexander realized that his control of the coast was tenuous so long as the Persian fleet retained its dominance in the Aegean. After Issus2 it was Antigonus who prevented the remnants of the defeated Persian forces from reacquiring Asia Minor (Curt. 4.1.34-35). However, after Issus and the successful siege of Tyre, with the Great King in flight to Mesopotamia and the Aegean under Alexander's control, Antigonus' importance diminished and he remained in the west while events swept ever eastward. The ten years from Issus until Alexander's death in Babylon in 323 were, however, not wasted for Antigonus. They were used by him to create a personal empire in Asia Minor; one based on direct control of an extended satrapy, alliances with native rulers, and the recruitment of native forces. As a result, after Alexander's death Antigonus was a major force with which to be reckoned.

When Alexander departed Asia Minor, he had left behind, in addition to Antigonus, Balacrus as satrap of Cilicia (Arr. Anab. 2.12.2; cf. Diod. 18.22.1), Calas in Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. Anab. 1.17.1; 2.4.1; Curt. 4.5.13), Nearchus in Lycia-Pamphylia-Pisidia (Arr. Anab. 3.6.6), and Asander in Lydia (Arr. Anab. 1.17.7). Certain areas were either bypassed by Alexander, or entered and left to native rulers. Among the former Ariarathes held northern Cappadocia,4

I The importance of this lifeline was emphasized by W. W. Tarn (Alexander the Great (London, 1950) II, 110-111).

2 E. Badian in a note ("Agis III," Hermes 95 (1967) 178 n. 2) suggests that the Persian offensive in Asia Minor began before Issus, but see J. E. Atkinson (A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam, 1980) 286) for a concise refutation of this position.

3 For the extent of Nearchus' satrapy see P. Briant, Antigone le Borgne: les dibuts de sa carrinre et les problemes de l'assemblee macedonienne (Paris, 1973) 48; H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage (Munich, 1926) 1, 256.

4 Ariarathes may have been only nominally under the authority of the Persians (Berve, 11, n. 113). Strabo (12.1.4) states that Cappadocia had been divided into two provinces prior to the Macedonian invasion, Cappadocia Proper and Cappadocia near Taurus. The northern part was the satrapy of Ariarathes.

Historia, Band XXXVII/4 (1988) C Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart



how many naval squadrons did athens send to evagoras?

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