how china is adopting market mechanisms to foster soil and water conservation
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How China is Adopting Market Mechanisms toFoster Soil and Water ConservationShaolin Yang a , Prof. Tor Hundloe b & Robert Cramb ca Water Resource Department , Jiangxi Provinceb Environmental Management Centre , University of Queenslandc School of Natural and Rural Systems Management, University of QueenslandPublished online: 20 Mar 2013.
To cite this article: Shaolin Yang , Prof. Tor Hundloe & Robert Cramb (2005) How China is Adopting MarketMechanisms to Foster Soil and Water Conservation, Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, 12:1, 37-46
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14486563.2005.10648632
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How China is Adopting Market Mechanisms to Foster Soil and Water Conservation
Shaolin Yang, Tor Hundloe and Robert Cramb*
Soil erosion is a major environmental concern in China; it not only causes significant environmental damage, but also undermines the national economy.
In the last half century, a series of soil conservation policies has been employed to combat soil erosion. During the period of the planned economy, government mobilization of a massive labour force to build soil conservation engineering works and plant trees in degraded land was a primary strategy to control soil erosion, while in the present era economic incentives like the Household Contracting Watershed (HCW) scheme have been introduced to encourage farmers to implement soil conservation. The market-oriented economic regime views this approach to be more effective. Nevertheless, an increase in government investment in soil conservation is playing a significant role in areas where soil erosion is most severe. Also in recent years, soil conservation laws and regulations have been introduced to deal with soil erosion generated by massive and rapid urbanization in China. Because of a history of state ownership of land, it is easier in China than in market economies to require farmers to control soil erosion, particularly as they are being given property rights at the same time.
Introduction Soil erosion is not simply a result of rainfall and runoff, but the consequence of natural, social and economic processes. This is particularly true in China. Inappropriate land use, such as over-cropping and inappropriate tree clearing, is often the cause of soil erosion. However, irrational land use is in fact the result of the demand for more food, population pressure and uncertainty of the land tenure system (Blaikie 1985; Douglas 1992; Hershkovitz 1993).
* Shaolin Yang works in the Water Resource Department, Jiangxi Province, and is a visiting scholar with Prof Tor Hundloe, the Professor and Director of the Environmental Management Centre, University of Queensland; Robert Cramb is Associate Professor, School of Natural and Rural Systems Management, University of Queensland.
March 2005
Given that soil conservation provides mostly long-term social benefits rather than immediate benefits, farmers are reluctant to carry out soil conservation in the absence of political pressures, such as through soil conservation laws, or economic incentives, such as subsidies.
Political and economic conditions are primary causes of soil erosion in most developing countries. Farmers in tropical developing countries, for instance, need to crop in marginal steep land, which is susceptible to soil erosion, in order to obtain enough food to feed their family (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). In semi-arid and arid environments, it is the poorest farmers who are left with the worst quality land and the least water. It follows that land degradation is both the cause and the result of poor economic situations. As Blaikie and Brookfield ( 1987) point out, "land degradation can undermine and frustrate economic development, while low levels of economic development can in tum have a strong causal impact on the incidence of land degradation" (p. 13).
In this article, we explain the evolution of soil conservation policy in China under various political and economic conditions. We firstly outline the characteristics of, and response to, soil erosion in China. We then examine the changes in soil conservation policies over the past half century, in accordance with the transition from a planned to a market economy. This is followed by a consideration of new soil conservation strategies put in place at the onset of the new century. We conclude by pointing out some major obstacles to soil conservation faced by the Chinese Government.
Soil erosion in China China has a severe soil erosion problem. A survey carried out in 1999-2000 shows that the total area affected by soil erosion is 3.56 million km2, accounting for 37 per cent of the total area of China (Table 1). This comprises 1.65 million km2 affected by water erosion and 1.91 million km2 affected by wind erosion. About 1.14 million km2 (or 32 per cent of the eroded area) has an annual soil erosion rate greater than 5,000 tlkm2 (MWR 2000).
The distribution of soil erosion areas is uneven. North China has the highest incidence of eroded land at 59 per cent, compared to less than 5 per cent in South China (Table 1). The Loess Plateau, the most susceptible water
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Table 1. Soil erosion by province in China (103 km2; MWR 2002).
Region Province Total Area ofsoil erosion
million hectares of land (equal to 900,000 hectares annually) has been removed from cropping over the last four decades due to soil erosion (Guo 1997; MWR 2000). Silt sedimentation is another major problem induced by soil erosion. The riverbed of the Yellow River increases 8-10 em annually owing to severe soil erosion upstream. This significantly increases the possibility of a flood disaster. Silt from soil erosion has also reduced around 20 billion m3
of dam capacity and this costs China at least I 0 billion yuan per year1 (Wang 1995).
(Municipality, land Water as o/o of Wind as % of Total area as %land Autonomous
Region)
area erosion land area erosion land area of erosion area (1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(3)/(1) (6)=(2)+(3) (7)=(6)/(1)
North
Northeast
East
Central
South
Southwest
Northwest
China
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia
Subtotal Liaoning
Jilin
Heilongjiang
Subtotal Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shan dong
Taiwan
Subtotal
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Subtotal Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Subtotal Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
Tibet
Chongqing
Subtotal Shaanxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
Subtotal
16.8
11.3
187.7
ISS. I
11S7.1
1528
146.9
187.S
454.8
789.2
S.8
102.1
102.8
140
121.5
167
154.S
3S.98
829.68
165.9
18S.8
211.4
563.1
176.7
236.3
34.3
447.3
S66.6
176.1
383.2
1228.4
82
2436.3
20S.6
397.2
731.9
51.8
1633.6
3020.1
9613.68
4.38
0.46
S4.66
92.86
IS0.22
302.58
48.22
19.3
86.S4
154.06
0 4.11
18.32
18.78
14.82
3S.11
32.43
7.84
131.41
30.07
60.84
40.39
131.31
11.01
10.37
0.21
21.58
1SOA
73.18
142.56
62.74
S2.04
480.93
118.1
119.37
S3.14
20.91
IIS.43
426.94
1648.81
26.1
4.1
29.1
S9.9
13.0
19.8
32.8
10.3
19.0
19.5
0.0
4.0
17.8
13.4
12.2
21.0
21.0
21.8
15.8
18.1
32.7
19.1
23.3
6.2
4.4
0.6
4.8
26.5
41.6
37.2
S.l
63.5
19.7
S7.4
30.1
7.3
40.4
7.1
14.1
17.2
0 0
8.3
0
594.61
602.9
2.33
14.28
8.91
25.52
0
0
0
0
0.09
0
3.S6
0
3.64
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.34
0.35
6.12
0
0
49.89
0
56.01
10.71
141.97
128.97
1S.94
920.73
1218.3
1906.7
erosion region, has the highest soil erosion rate at more than 20,000 tlkm2 annually. Around 95 per cent of the wind eroded areas lie in five provinces (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang), and these are in the poorest region of China (Figure I) (Wang I995; MWR 2000).
Soil erosion causes significant environmental and economic losses in the country. Approximately 2.6
I. I yuan is approximately $USD 0.12.
38
0
0 4.4
0
Sl.4
39.5
1.6
7.6
2.0
3.2
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
2.3
0
0.4
0
0
0
0 0
0
1.0
0.1
1.1 0
0
4.1
0
2.3
S.2
3S.7
17.6
30.8
S6.4
40.3
19.8
4.38
0.46
62.96
92.86
744.83
905.49
SO.S5
33.S7
9S.4S
179.57
0
4.11
18.32
18.78
14.91
35.11
35.99
7.84
135.05
30.07
60.84
40.39
131.31
11.01
10.37
o.ss 21.93
IS6.S2
73.18
142.56
112.64
52.04
536.94
128.8
261.34
182.11
36.8S
1036.15
1645.25
3555.5
26.1
4.1
33.5
S9.9
64.4
59.3
34.4
17.9
21
22.8
0
4
17.8
13.4
12.3
21
23.3
21.8
16.28
18.1
32.7
19.1
23.3
6.2
4.4
1.6
4.9
27.6
41.6
37.2
9.2
63.5
22
62.6
6S.8
24.9
71.1 63.4
54.5
36.98
Given the severity of soil erosion and its significant impacts on land degradation, agricultural productivity and food security, major efforts have been made to combat it by the Chinese Government. A number of soil conservation policies have been developed in the last few decades.
Evolution of soil conservation policy Political and economic settings have changed dramatically in China over the past half century. These include rural polices which have directly influenced soil conservation. The economic regime which dominated China's development from the
middle 1950s to late 1970s was that of a planned economy, drawing on Mao Zedong's version of Marxism-Leninism.
The major objectives of agricultural policies in that period were to provide cheap food for urban consumption as well as agricultural commodities for export to earn foreign exchange. From 1979 to the late 1980s, political and economic reform took place with rural reform as a
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Figure 1. Regions and Provinces in China.
pioneering strategy. The most notable change was the dismantling of the commune system. This was replaced by a market-oriented rural economy which included reduction of government procurement quotas, reliance on market prices as the incentive to meet consumer demand, and promotion of the development of rural enterprises. Since the early 1990s, rural policies have emphasized food security, increased farm income and promotion of economic efficiency, while taking into account the environment.
There have been three distinct stages of soil conservation policy in China in the last half-century. The first stage was characterized by massive 'people's campaigns' between 1950 and the late 1970s. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were the frameworks set by government to modernize China. The second stage, during the 1980s, focused on the strategy of integrated management of small watersheds, emphasizing the combination of ecological and economic effects. By then the experiments of Mao's era were over and a general recognition of market economics was occurring. In the 1990s, soil conservation policy came to recognize the Precautionary Principle of Sustainable Development with new regulations being written and the linking of economics and ecology to provide economic incentives. More government investment occurred in sustainable rural development and conservation, including soil conservation (Liu and Li 1999; MWR 1999; Guo 1997).
March 2005
Political movements and mass mobilization during 1950 -1979 Contemporary soil conservation in China originated in the Yellow River basin. The State Council held the first and second National Soil Conservation Conferences, respectively in 1955 and 1957, to emphasize the importance of soil conservation in the Yellow River basin. Meanwhile four experimental stations for soil conservation were formed during 1950-1953 in this basin in order to explore better soil erosion control measures (YRCC 1999).
Before 1954, the individual farm household was primarily responsible for soil conservation measures, while after 1955, collective groups or teams came to play an important role. In the collective system, especially in the commune system after 1957, farmers had almost no private business because
any private enterprise was perceived to be bourgeois and hence counter-revolutionary. Social resources, including natural resources, belonged to the state and were controlled by government agencies at various levels. For rural areas, this control was primarily concentrated in the production teams. The only private resources which farmers could contribute were their labour and some simple tools. Although there were few economic incentives for farmers' contribution, political honours such as certificates, medals, plaques and red banners played an important role to induce farmers and cadres to do better. It was not difficult for commune leaders to mobilize the masses to join labour-intensive projects or a 'people's war' to achieve soil conservation measures (Leeming 1985; Liu and Li 1999).
The characteristics of soil conservation policies during this stage can be summarized as follows:
• The implementation of soil conservation measures depended on political decisions and political incentives, for example, the status of winning awards. There were few economic incentives (Liu and Li 1999).
• Soil conservation institutions were set up, but these institutions had limited motivation under the centrally planned economy because farmers had less freedom to choose what they wanted to do based on the local situation. These institutions faced many difficulties,
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such as financial problems, given political upheavals at that time.
• There were no national soil conservation laws or regulations, and rather uncertain policies at lower levels of government.
Integrated small watershed management (ISWM) and the technical approach during the 1980s In the 1980s, China's economy was in the transition from traditional planning to a market-oriented one. The most notable feature for the rural economy was the introduction of the Household Production Responsibility System (HPRS) which significantly altered the land tenure system in China. HPRS gave farmers usufructuary rights (temporary possession, use or enjoyment) to land, and freedom to choose which crops to grow. Meanwhile, more and more land was cultivated in order to produce more household food or cash crops. Some 5.57 million hectares of additional farmland was cultivated from 1981 to 1990 after land clearing (Ash and Edmonds 2000). Under this situation, the main strategy for soil conservation in China was to guide farmers to use land appropriately, based on the principle of 'Integrated Small Watershed Management' (ISWM). The principle of HPRS was also employed in soil conservation programs to develop the Household Contracted Watershed (HCW) system, which encouraged more farmers to join in soil conservation.
The principles of Integrated Small Watershed Management (ISWM) Small watersheds were considered to be watersheds of around 5-30 km2 • There were reasons why the small watershed was chosen as the unit of soil conservation. The first was the limitation on financial resources. To use the limited funds efficiently, it was considered a good idea to concentrate the investment in a small area. This would reduce administrative and transaction costs, and facilitate integrated planning in areas where there were similar natural conditions and cropping patterns. The second reason was that it facilitated soil erosion control from the crest of the hill down to the gullies.
The Central Government issued guidelines in order to regulate small watershed management. The principles of those guidelines were as follows (Guo et al. 1989; YRCC 1999):
• integrated use of all natural resources, particularly water and land resources
40
• rural industrial structure to be adjusted to facilitate sustainable development
• a combination of erosion treatment on slopes and control of gullies
• a combination of mechanical and vegetative measures, the latter to combine trees, shrubs and grasses
• government to fund one-third of the investment including the costs of planning, subsidies for fertilizers, seeds, training and technical supervision
• the result should be a combination of conservation and economic benefits. To encourage farmer participation, farmers should get direct economic benefits from conservation measures.
Given the great diversity of topography, economy and traditions in China, it was inevitable that the ISWM approach would face difficulties. The area of a watershed in South China, for example, may be less than 10 km2,
whereas that of a watershed in the North China Plain may be larger than 100 km2• Disparity of economic conditions and education level among the farmers frequently generates conflicts which considerably hamper the implementation of soil conservation programs. In fact, promotion of conservation practices on individual farming plots rather than in whole catchments can be just as successful in reducing runoff. Small farm-based water storage projects (ponds) not only reduce runoff, but facilitate irrigation in dry seasons (Douglas 1992).
Household Contracted Watershed (HCW) scheme Given the extensive area of eroded land in China and the financial constraints in the 1980s, it was unlikely that the government could or would significantly increase investment in soil conservation, despite soil conservation being a severe environmental concern. It was recognized that knowledgeable subsistence farmers do not intentionally degrade the land they work, hence, the attempt by government to give more responsibility to farmers. Inspired by the Household Production Responsibility System (HPRS), the Household Contracted Watershed (HCW) scheme was first introduced in 1981 in Shanxi Province, one of the most serious soil erosion regions in China.
The major principle of the HCW scheme is that participating farmers can obtain extra land, which is always the dream of Chinese farmers. Although the land in the participating watershed is of relatively poor quality, any extr~ land is important for poor farmers. More land means more food or even more family income.
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Table 2. Erosion control funded in small watersheds by Central Govermnent (1987; Guo et aL 1989, p.1029).
Government subsidies for small watershed
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 management Number of small
41 62 149 748 924 977 1,006 watersheds
Total area (km2) 1,070 1,313 5,504 33,530 38,083 39,355 40,768
Treated area (km2) 67 171 260 2,770 3,673 3,429 3,339
Table 3. Erosion control funded in small watershed by three provincial governments (Shanxi, Liaoning and Fujian Provinces; Guo et al. 1989, p. 1030).
The investments from the Central Government usually accounted for one-third of the total costs of small watershed management. The remainder was provided by the local government and farmers' labour. The number of small watersheds funded by the Central Government increased from 41 with a total area of 1,070 km2 in 1980 to 1,006 with a total area of 40,768 km2 in 1986 (Table 2). Policies in different provinces varied, but there was never 100 per cent investment from governments. The number of small watersheds
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Number of small 80 240 353 731 993
watersheds
Total area (km2) 496 2,165 4,988 10,509 15,244
Treated area (km2) 28 196 787 1,357
Liu and Li (1999) summarize the major features of the HCW scheme:
• long term land use rights. More than 30 years tenure is usually employed in the HCW scheme, much longer than HPRS at that time
• land ownership certificate. This certificate gave the participating farmer rights of land use in case of any rural policy changes
• clearly defined division of profits. Contracts between the government and the farmer defined the share of benefits between the two (usually the village administration and farmers)
• tax concessions. Tax reduction and waiving of grain quota were part of the contract, based on the expectation that it would take several years for the farmers to obtain benefits.
The most important contract condition was the requirement for soil conservation measures (terracing, dam building, and grass and tree planting). Subsidies were available for seedlings, seeds, small tools, and there was free technical support.
The HCW scheme was another milestone; it totally changed the previous soil conservation strategy. It helped to attract farmer investment in soil conservation because it was farmer-oriented and farmers were given opportunities to employ their knowledge in soil conservation. Their enthusiasm for soil conserVation was thus greatly enhanced.
March 2005
1,697
1985 1986
ll15 1462
17,417 19,065
1,892 1,838
invested in by provincial governments also increased dramatically in the same period (Table 3).
The market mechanism, legislation and government investment in the 1 990s During the 1990s, more economic measures such as extending the period of land tenure were employed to facilitate rural development. This accelerated after 1993, when the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Congress of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to build a 'socialist market economy'. Strong economic growth enabled the government to increase soil conservation investment significantly. However, infrastructure development such as railway and highway construction generated additional soil erosion, which prompted the government to make new laws. The current institutional structure for soil and water conservation in China is shown in Figure 2.
Auction of Four Wasteland (AFW) system According to the Chinese Constitution, land and water resources belong to the state and collectives. That is, there are only two kinds of property rights, state and collective - no individual can own land (Zhang 1999). The most important innovation of the HPRS was to separate the property rights of land from the usufruct rights. Although the HPRS gives incentives to farmers to produce more, it embodies a notion of equality rather than efficiency as the area of land contracted by the household is based on the number of family members, not the capacity of individual households. Given a rural
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population of 800 million, it is important for social stability to let every rural household have enough land for subsistence farming. However, it was recognized that soil conservation needs to make use of economic incentives rather than being based on equality. This brought about the 'Auction Four Wasteland' system; the term 'four wasteland' referring to 'undeveloped mountains, slopeland, marshland and gullies or ravines, also to agricultural land resources other than non-arable land' (Zhang 1999, p. 77). The auction is to allow trade of the use rights rather than property rights.
Compared with the Household Contracted Watershed (HCW) scheme, the Auction Four Wasteland (AFW) system has some notable advantages (Zhang 1999; MWR 1999):
• leaseholders. The HCW scheme encourages farmers to contract small watersheds with their village committees, while anyone or any agency that meets the auction conditions may bid under the AFW system
• capital resources. In terms of financial and human resources, the HCW scheme was limited to farm households within several villages. By contrast, the
Center Government
Provincial Government
Prefecture Government
County Government
Township Government
Village Administration
AFW system may capture capital resources from the whole society in a county or even in a province
• efficiency. Bidding increases the efficiency of use of auctioned lands, while the price of a contracted small watershed depends on negotiation. More capital resources may bring about more efficient land use
• less uncertainties and risks in the land tenure system. According to the regulations promulgated by the State Council in 1996, the use rights of AFW system land can be transferred, inherited, leased and mortgaged. The lease term is usually 50 or even 100 years. The transferability and long-term tenure greatly reduce uncertainties and risks which leaseholders may experience.
By September 2001, some 7.84 million leaseholders (including farmers, laid-off workers and enterprisers) had joined the AFW system. A total of 4 billion yuan was invested with a total area of 12.67 million hectares leased (Jiao 2001). However, there were still problems. Firstly, most of the wasteland is marginal and not suitable for exploitation. Secondly, some of the participants were deficient in basic soil conservation knowledge; in some cases, rather than improving soil conservation, soil
Conservation
Division of Soil
Conservation
Section of Soil
Conservation
Section of Soil
Conservation
Station of Soil
Conservation
erosion was aggravated.
Soil conservation legislation The State Council promulgated the Regulation of Soil and Water Conservation Work in 1982, and it played an important role in the early 1980s. However, this regulation was not powerful enough to prevent soil erosion or to promote soil conservation. Following a significant increase in demand for land in the late 1980s, new soil conservation legislation became a major policy concern. In 1991, the Law of Soil and Water Conservation (The Law) was finally promulgated - the first real soil conservation law in China's history.
Figure 2. Government institutional structure for soil and water conservation in China.
The Law includes six chapters and 42 articles. The primary policies are to: place precaution first; implement comprehensive planning and control based on the local circumstances; enforce management; and to emphasize benefits. Three strategies, namely precaution, control, and supervision are explicitly defined in this law:
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• precaution. Special emphasis is placed on protection of forests and grassland, limitation of cropping on slopes, and prohibition of cropping on steep (>25°) slopes. Appropriate soil conservation measures should also be taken in construction and mining work
• control. Comprehensive and integrated strategies embracing agricultural, vegetative and engineering measures are to be used. The contracting system is to facilitate soil conservation by enhancing farmers' rights
• supervision. A national supervision network is to be established to monitor dynamic soil erosion.
One of the primary differences between the 1982 regulation and the 1991law is that the former emphasizes control of erosion while the latter puts precaution first, and gives it the force of law.
After promulgation of the Law of Soil and Water Conservation, a series of related bylaws and regulations was issued:
• The Implementation Regulation of Soil and Water Conservation Law (1993) details how the Law of Soil and Water Conservation should be implemented.
• The Management Measures of Soil and Water Conservation Schemes in Construction Projects explains how soil conservation measures should be taken and managed.
• The Application and Approval Management Regulation of Soil and Water Conservation Schemes in Construction Projects stipulates soil conservation measures should be compulsorily employed in any construction projects.
Other laws strongly associated with soil conservation include:
• the Environmental Protection Law, which stipulates that natural resources should be protected and utilized in a sustainable way. In Article 20 of The Law, control of desertification and soil erosion is particularly emphasized
• the Law of Forests. This law provides comprehensive provisions to stipulate management practices, property rights, and forest protection
• the Law of Rangelands, which explains the principles and measures of rational rangeland utilization and protection (Rozelle et al. 1997).
Some 28 provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities) have promulgated the Implementation Measures of Soil
March2005
and Water Conservation Law and 27 provinces have promulgated the Expenditure and Charge Measures of Soil Erosion Control Fee and Compensation Fee for Destroying Engineering of Soil and Water Conservation (MWR 1999).
Large numbers of law enforcement agencies and officers have been employed. There are 1,166 counties that have established enforcement agencies. A total of 740,000 staff (180,000 full time and 560,000 part time) are currently employed. Some 6,003 cases have been handled (Zeng 2002).
The Soil Conservation Law is well implemented in terms of construction projects, particularly key national projects like railway and expressway construction. However, less attention is paid to soil erosion in rural areas, caused by cropping on steep land and brick-making based on quarried land. The reason may be that more soil conservation fees can be collected from key construction projects than from farmers. This creates strong incentives for soil conservation authorities to supervise the construction projects, whereas high administrative costs and a low tax collection hinder soil conservation agents to apply the same regulation in farming areas.
Government investment and key projects Regions with severe soil erosion are usually the areas with poor economic conditions. Hence, soil conservation is not only a measure to control land degradation but a means to improve productivity and help the underprivileged. At the beginning, due to financial constraints, the key projects only covered the poorest areas with the most severe soil erosion. During the Ninth Plan (1996-2000), increasing government funds were invested in key projects because of strong national economic growth. The important soil conservation projects are now scattered in all seven major river catchments and cover all soil erosion types. The earliest was the Project of Eight Key Soil Conservation Regions, started in 1983, and the largest was the Key Soil Conservation Project in Middle and Upstream Regions of the Yellow River, covering a total area of 430,000 km2
and including the most serious erosion region - the Loess Plateau. Features of those projects are listed in Table 4.
New strategies for soil conservation in China After the disastrous flood of 1998, the traditional philosophy of 'conquering the natural, transform nature' was challenged. A new notion of 'human beings should be harmonious with the natural' was put forward by the government. This was also in response to the lessons
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Table 4. Main features of four key soil conservation projects (MWR 2002). project in the next 10 years. It will be
Project PEKR• KPYb KPYT" CGSBct carried out in 1,108 counties in 24
Year started 1983 1986 1989 1998 provinces, and 5.3 million hectares of
Coverage Number of counties 56 n/a 195 617 farmland will be transformed into
Areas (I 03 km2) 110 n/a 351 n/a
forests and grassland. Some 36.7
Government Central n/a n/a 1.50 2.77 million hectares of land previously
investment Local n/a n/a n/a 2.21 suffering soil erosion will be under
(billion yuan) control after the project is completed
Treated 37 180 68.2 36.0 (Jiang 2001).
areas(km2) Today, there is still a tendency to
Main measures Terraces 584 142 548 444 emphasize legal control rather than completed (103 Afforestation 1,761 8,867 1,900 1,114 technical solutions. More areas will be ha) Grass planting 284 2667 293 184 protected as conservation areas. For
Orchard 353 766 534 Increase in n/a n/a 19.5 n/a
instance, 'natural ecological
vegetative coverage rehabilitation' (NER) has been put in
Benefits rate(%) place. The main idea of NER is to
Reduction in soil loss 67.2 n/a 74 n/a define a soil erosion area as a
rate(%) conservation region. Instead of soil
Increase in farm 35 times n/a n/a 30% conservation engineering, the region is
income protected from human disturbance to
a PEKR - The Project of Eight Key Soil Conservation Regions allow vegetation to recover naturally. b KPY- The Key Soil Conservation Project in the Middle and Upstream Regions of the This can be a cost-effective solution. In Yellow River 2000, the Ministry of Water Resources c KPYT - The Key Soil Conservation Program for the Middle and Upstream Regions issued an instrument to require local ofthe Yangtze River d CGSB - Central Government Special Budget for Soil Conservation
from past environmental degradation generated by irrational economic activities. The most important reason for the changes may be that people who have become better-off in the last two decades have strong incentives to improve the natural environment. The new ecological ideology is having a significant impact on shaping the new soil conservation policy in China.
A fundamental change may be the notion of 'Ecological Construction' (EC). EC requires policy makers to conceptualize soil conservation in a broadly ecological way, not just as the reduction of soil loss. Soil conservation is to be viewed as a path to sustainable development, which is associated with intergenerational equity in terms of land resource sustainability. Environmental benefits and sustainable development are emphasized more than narrow, short-term economic benefits.
More cultivated land, especially sloping land, will be rehabilitated into forestry land and grassland. The project of returning farmland to forests and grasslands, the 'grain to green project', started in 1999 with a pilot project. About 100 billion yuan have been allocated to fund this
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soil conservation agencies to do more work in natural rehabilitation.
In addition, more law enforcement agencies and staff are employed to implement and monitor soil conservation laws. Legal approaches are more cost-effective than technical conservation measures to remedy problems after they have occurred. The new laws can not only deter erosion, but also defend previously eroded areas which have been treated.
Finally, more intensive government investments are likely to be made in the future. According to the Guideline of China's Ecological Construction of Soil Conservation after 2010 (issued by the Ministry of Water Resources in 2001), some 500, 000 km2 will be treated in the next ten years, 900,000 km2 during 2011-30 and 555,400 km2 during 2031-50. A total investment of 11.4 billion yuan, including 7.6 billion yuan from the Central Government, will be needed for soil conservation in western China alone during the Tenth Plan (2001-2005) (MWR 2001). Three specific soil conservation strategic regions have been delineated, namely, key protected areas, key supervision areas and key control areas. Key protected areas refer to forestry lands and grasslands where conservation measures are emphasized. Key supervision areas refer to the areas with intensive resource extraction such as mining areas, and intensive
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construction sites such as highway building areas. Supervision and guidance to companies implementing soil conservation are underlined. Key control areas refer to historically severely eroded areas which need intensive investment to mitigate soil erosion.
Concluding remarks Political and economic reforms have substantial impact on soil conservation policy, not only through significant changes to the land tenure system and other institutional changes, but also through the incentives given to rural labour. The changing nature of soil conservation policies in China demonstrates that both soil erosion and conservation are the result of economic, political and social interaction.
Currently, soil conservation policies are still far from successful, and the area of soil erosion in some areas continues to expand (Jiao 2002). The causes of unsuccessful soil conservation policies are varied and complex, involving inappropriate policy design and its implementation. Most of the past policies have been part of a top-town strategy. There has been a shortage of local government involvement, particularly at prefecture and county level, and farmers were not involved. Soil conservation subsidization is the primary incentive to encourage framers to practise soil conservation. Therefore, there is a high possibility that if the subsidization is cut off, soil erosion will occur again. In addition, production-oriented economic policy induces local leaders to pursue short-term economic growth at environmental cost. Governments at highest levels usually set economic growth goals for lower level leaders, and these offer monetary and promotional bonuses when completed or penalties for non-completion. Meanwhile, there is no incentive for local leaders to implement conservation. In addition, soil conservation primarily contributes long-term benefits and it needs considerable and continuous financial support. If there is a conflict between production and conservation, it is obvious that the leaders' first choice will be to sacrifice conservation goals or even to over-exploit soil resources to meet their economic goals.
Institutional conflict has been another obstacle to the effective implementation of soil conservation. Although the water resource sector is the main sector responsible, the agricultural and forestry sectors have a considerable influence on soil conservation. Agricultural and forestry agencies have their own development policy and interests. If there is a conflict between conservation and sectoral interests, soil conservation may be neglected. For example, a decrease in cropping on slopes may
March 2005
substantially reduce agricultural production although it leads to a reduction of soil loss. Agricultural agencies may be deterred from limiting cropping on slopes, especially when production goals are set.
Given the enormous areas of soil erosion and significant natural, social, economic, and political diversity, soil erosion cannot be controlled widely in China unless bottom-up policies are also adopted which are suitable for, and broadly accepted by, farmers and regional land managers.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to express their sincere thanks to Robert Pagan, Daryl McPhee, Kellie Williams and Stephen Harrison for their critical recommendations.
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