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DOI: 10.1177/0952695111427360

2012 25: 52 originally published online 13 January 2012History of the Human SciencesGavin Walker

Sociological theory and Jungian psychology

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Sociological theory andJungian psychology

Gavin Walker

James Watt College, UK

Abstract

In this article I seek to relate the psychology of Carl Jung to sociological theory,specifically Weber. I first present an outline of Jungian psychology. I then seek torelate this as psychology to Webers interpretivism. I point to basic methodologicalcompatibilities within a Kantian frame, from which emerge central concerns with thefactors limiting rationality. These generate the conceptual frameworks for parallelenquiries into the development and fate of rationality in cultural history. Religion is amajor theme here: contrasts of eastern and western religion; the rise of propheticreligion and the disenchantment of modernity. Webers categories ascetic andmystic seem applicable to his own and Jungs approaches and indeed temperaments,while a shared ironic view of rationality leads to similar visions of the disenchantedmodern world. I conclude that Jung is sociologically coherent, but in an entirelydifferent sense from Freud: rather than a constellation of family, socialization,ideology, social continuity, there is an analysis of cultural history against a backgroundof adult normal psychology. I conclude that sociology should acknowledge Jung, butnot in terms of over-arching theory. Rather Jungian insights might be used to orient newenquiries, and for reflexive analysis of sociologys methodological debates.

Keywords

disenchantment, Carl Jung, psychoanalysis, sociology, Max Weber

Corresponding author:

Dr Gavin Walker, School of Communication and Social Science, James Watt College (Waterfront Campus),

Customhouse Way, Greenock, Scotland, PA15 1EN

Email: [email protected]

History of the Human Sciences25(1) 5274

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Introduction

My intention in this article is to consider the psychology of Carl Jung in relation to

sociological theory.

It is surprising that there is no tradition of doing this. It is generally known that Freudand Jung created closely equivalent systems of thought. And sociology has a long-

standing commitment to Freud. But Jung (and indeed Adler) seems to have been left

unexamined. At the same time, tradition has related Freud either to Durkheimian or to

Marxist traditions, but has been far less inclined to relate him to Weber (Bocock,

1976; cf. Gabriel, 1983). Several possibilities emerge from this (and there are other tra-

ditions in sociological theory). But to relate Jung to Weber seems the obvious project,

and it is this that this article attempts.1

Possibly sociological theory has been reluctant to engage with Jung simply because it

cannot see where he fits. The location of Freudian theory has long been established, inrelation to both Durkheimian and Marxist sociology. The way that Jung and Weber fit

together is completely different, however. I will discuss these differences at the end of

the article. But it should be made clear at the outset that I am sceptical of formal synth-

eses or over-arching theory, and am not making proposals of this kind. My purpose is

simply to place Jung on the sociological map: to show that his psychology is sociolo-

gically coherent, in the light of (one of) sociologys major theoretical traditions. We

ought to know about him.2

A word on the structure of this article. Jungs thought has two aspects: a timeless

theory of the psyche, and a cultural history of the psyche. Webers sociology likewisehas two aspects: social action theory, and comparative historical sociology. Assuming

that most sociologists will not be familiar with Jung, I present an outline of the former

aspect first. I next seek to relate it to Webers social action theory. I then attempt an inte-

grated consideration of Jungs and Webers cultural history.

Here, however, an important proviso must be made. Weber, in contrast to Marx and

Durkheim, offers a general rather than a universal sociology: he avoids systematic con-

sideration of the primitive. In view of the transformations of anthropology taking place

in his time, this was wise: much wiser than Jung or Freud (cf. Shamdasani, 2003: 2768).

So far as possible, I follow it here: this article is an interrogation of Jung from a Weberiansociological perspective. The questions of Jung and anthropology are for another article

(and another author).

Analytical psychology

Jung considers the psyche in terms of consciousness and the unconscious.3 Conscious-

ness is what we know. The unconscious is the unknown, inferred only from the entry

of its contents into consciousness, in which process they change. Jung is very aware

of the epistemological problems of psychology.4

The unconscious he divides into two elements: the personal unconscious and the col-

lective unconscious. The collective unconscious is the oldest and most primitive level of

the psyche. Its contents are inherited rather than acquired. These contents comprise

instinctive actions and their attendant emotions, and also the archetypes. Archetypes are

Walker 53



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propensities for the formation of a specific range of strongly emotionally coloured

concepts images, themes, places, situations, etc. relating to humankinds evolution-

ary biological and cultural experience. They are linked to instinctive impulses: their

spiritual or ideational, as opposed to somatic, pole. One should note the similarity ofconception in the ethology of Lorenz and Tinbergen (Evans, 1975: 579; Shamdasani,

2003: 2568; cf., for example, Jung, 1993: 90). An archetype can be actualized only

through contact with specific culture: this creates an archetypal image.

Consciousness forms out of the collective unconscious; it centres on the ego. It

develops and becomes increasingly differentiated over time: a process visible both in

cultural history and in childhood. Differentiation of a function means that it separates out

from other functions, and also that its elements separate out, in a process of continuous

unfolding. Especially its positive and negative aspects become separate. Hence as differ-

entiation proceeds, consciousness is increasingly caught between conflicting opposites,

e.g. true and false, knowledge and belief, good and evil. These cannot be reconciled

through reason, but only through archetypal symbols. Jung identifies two types of

thinking: a conscious, logical, coolly focused type, and an unconscious, symbolic,

emotionally coloured type (typified in dreams). The dialogue and balance between these

is Jungs most fundamental concern.

With consciousness there also emerges the personal unconscious. This is unique to

the individual: its contents are not inherited but acquired. They comprise things known

or sensed but not currently attended to, and things once known but now forgotten

including repressed material from the conscious mind. The personal unconscious arises

from consciousness, then, rather than from the collective unconscious its contentscould as well be conscious. Where the collective unconscious has archetypes, the per-

sonal unconscious has complexes (Jung, 1993: 359; Jung, 1964b: 79). But personal

unconscious contents often flesh out archetypal images, and complexes can have an

archetypal core. Indeed the personal unconscious itself can acquire an archetypal aspect.

Jungian psychology is not centred either on psychopathology or on childhood. It is

centred on adult normal psychology. Aetiology is located in cultural history, though

childhood tends to mirror it. Even so, Jung was much struck by the clinical phenomena

of dissociation, the extreme form of which is multiple personality. Jung sees our propen-

sity to form autonomous personalities beside our egos as normal. His notions of complexand of archetypal image reflect this.

Central to this psychology is the notion of two realities: an inner reality, the reality of

the psyche, and an outer reality, the social, cultural and material world. Both these

realities present their demands to the individual, who must adapt to them and balance

between them. The individual typically has a preferential orientation to the one or the

other. These orientations Jung terms introversion and extraversion.

Jungs conception of libido accords with this. Libido flows between opposite poles

but alternates in direction a tide rather than a current. Thus it progresses to satisfy the

needs of consciousness and adapt to the outer world, regresses to satisfy the needs of theunconscious and adapt to the inner world. Sleep and dreams exemplify the latter: regres-

sion is a normal not a pathological function. Libido for Jung means psychic energy. It has

two main instinctual channels, sex and aggression (biologically, these relate to the sur-

vival of the species and the survival of the individual respectively). Jung associates

54 History of the Human Sciences 25(1)



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sexuality with extraversion and aggression with introversion. Freud and Adler had each

sought to build the theory of the psyche in terms of his own personality: the extravert

Freud in terms of sexuality, the introvert Adler in terms of aggression.

Introversion and extraversion provide a first typology of personality. Jung followsthis by identifying four psychic functions: thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition.

Thinking and feeling are rational functions (feeling means valuing, e.g. moral judge-

ment); sensation and intuition are irrational. Jung often presents these as two cross-

cutting axes. Each function tends to shut out its opposite, so that an individual strongly

developed in, say, thinking, will be correspondingly weakly developed in feeling. One of

the other pair (the auxiliary function) will be quite strongly developed. Any of these

functions may be inwardly or outwardly turned. The typology this creates then is quite

complex. It has bearing both for cultural history and for gender.

Gender Jung sees basically as a psychological reflection of biological complementar-

ity. But Jung sees epistemological problems here: the male psychologist who sets out to

discuss female psychology often finds himself discussing the image of woman in the

male psyche instead. Woman always stands just where the mans shadow falls, so that

he is only too liable to confuse the two (Jung, 1964a: 113). There is no bias between the

sexes as to introversion and extraversion, but there is at the level of the four psychic

functions: in men, the thinking function tends to be strongly developed and the feeling

function weakly developed; while with women it is the other way round. But deeper than

this, each sex holds an unconscious archetypal image of the opposite sex: the anima in

men, the animus in women. These hold the undeveloped function; thus men are subject

to irrational moods, women to irrational opinions. Further, the anima/animus mediatesour dealings not only with the opposite sex, but also with our own unconscious. The rela-

tionship between conscious and unconscious is then played out in the relationship

between the sexes. Jung expresses much of male and female psychology through the con-

cepts Logos andEros. He says that these are partly intuitive concepts that he is reluctant

to define (Jung, 1959: 1416; cf. Jung, 1963: 17883). But they seem through the anima/

animus to draw together the thinking or feeling function on the one side, and conscious-

ness and the unconscious on the other. Logos then is focused, rational thought; Eros is

relatedness or connectedness. Logos is the key to male, Eros to female, psychology.

There are some possible misunderstandings to avoid here. Thinking and feeling areboth rational functions; and Logos in men and Eros in women are conscious not

unconscious. Womens psychology is different from mens; it is not inferior or defective.

More, all this is an analysis of traditional women. Jung thought it superficial and point-

less for modern women simply to develop their thinking function instead oftheir feeling

function. But he welcomed modern womens desire for material and personal indepen-

dence, and to develop their Logos. This would force men to develop their Eros, and

explore their unconscious. The mutual assimilation would be enormously beneficial.

Men might learn to avoid political violence, and women might find a cure for the

symbolic desert that besets the modern age (Jung, 1964a: 113 ff.).5

Although Jungian psychology is not primarily a psychopathology, it is nonetheless

informed by Jungs clinical experience. This lay more with psychosis than with neurosis

(which he might prefer to treat through a Freudian or an Adlerian approach); but he pro-

vides an integrated conception of the two. Central to Jungs thinking on these matters is

Walker 55



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dissociation. Jung very early noted how in word association tests, a number of words

could be found which were linked for the given person by a common feeling tone. To

this he gave the name complex (apparently the origin of the term in psychology). These

complexes could apparently carry on a life of their own within the psyche, almost asindependent personalities. In the extreme form of dissociative neurosis, actual realized

alternative personalities would appear, taking over the person in turn. Jung tended to see

all neurosis in terms of dissociation (it is the equivalent of the Freudian repression).

Psychosis could also be understood in these terms, as the personality fragmenting into

a number of such elements; but here the sense of identity is lost: the ego becomes only

one fragment among many.

Neurosis he associated with failure to adjust to the outer world; typically this would

call up material from the personal unconscious. Psychosis he associated with failure to

adjust to the inner world; typically this would call up material from the collective uncon-

scious. Neurosis he saw in terms of frustrated libido expressing itself by re-activating

significant repressed childhood memories (indeed, adult memories of childhood are

basically projections rather than recollections Jung was wary as to child psychology).

But the cause of the neurosis is the present frustration; the past only provides a vocabu-

lary of symptoms. More than this, the neurosis acts as the psychic equivalent of pain, to

warn us of an inadequacy in our adjustment, a frustration of libido that must be dealt

with. The psyche thus is self-regulating; a distinctive conception, and, in Storrs view

at least, one of Jungs most valuable contributions (Storr, 1973: 66 ff.).

Psychosis has a less clear aetiology. It starts with a decline in the level of conscious-

ness; a setback in life might be a precipitating factor in this. The dissociation processthen takes the form of a dramatization of the archetypal structure of the psyche itself. Yet

even here there could be an attempt at adaptation and recovery. Psychotic delusions can

have a mythological quality, representing a drama of self-rescue through which the

individual tries to reconstruct his or her world.

All this is normal as much as abnormal psychology it is such autonomous

sub-personalities that populate our dreams. It has implications for interpersonal as well

as intra-psychic relations: one forms similarly autonomous internal images of other

persons, and unconsciously projects them back onto them. It also has implications for

culture: one encounters these figures equally in art, literature, mythology and religion.At the heart of Jungs psychotherapeutic and theoretical concerns is the individuation

process. This is the process of becoming separate and distinct individual persons. It is

implicit in the development of consciousness, and the growth from child to adult. But

Jung means something more than this, focused in the contrast between the second and

third quarters of life. Initially one grows towards society and the outer world, to work

and material achievement and to forming sexual and parental relationships. But then

one grows away from the outer and towards the inner world, and adopts a critical

distance from society and its values. Individuation in this sense implies a degree of

self-awareness and of inner and outer adjustment: centrally it is consciousness encoun-tering and coming to terms with the unconscious. This is Jungs deepest concern.

Jung then describes a set of archetypes which symbolize the structural elements of the

psyche itself. These include: the shadow, the persona, the anima or animus, the old wise

man or earth mother, the self, and also such symbols as mandala. Encounters with these




7/24

in dreams or reverie form part of the individuation experience. What is in question is

the ultimate location of identity: the ego is the centre of consciousness, but the self is the

centre of the psyche, poised between consciousness and the unconscious, between the

inner and outer worlds. This is a distinctive Jungian sense of self. The individuationprocess then is a transfer of identity from ego to self. Symbolically the self may appear

as a child; mandalas symbolize the psyche itself. The process is importantly symbolized

in the Christian and other religious myths.

The shadow is the personal unconscious, in its archetypal aspect. It is the shadow of

the ego, everything about ourselves that we cannot accept. Often it appears as a devil

figure. The persona is a social mask for non-intimate dealings, an identity from which

most of us would expect to distance ourselves. The animus and anima are internal images

that each sex carries of the opposite sex, generalized images which mediate all our sig-

nificant dealings with the opposite sex, especially in terms of sex and love. But they also

mediate our dealings with our unconscious: this in opposition and balance to the persona,

which mediates our dealings with the outer world. Lastly, the old wise man or the earth

mother represents an unconscious force of inner wisdom and compassion, an inner guide

to the individuation process itself. Some of these archetypes appear in different form to

men and women. The shadow and the wise old man/earth mother appear as male figures

to men, as female figures to women. Conversely, the (female) anima appears and

teaches Eros to men, while the (male) animus appears and teaches Logos to women.

There is a paradoxical relationship between the individuation process and psychosis.

In psychosis there is a great up-welling from the unconscious, in which consciousness is

swamped. All the above archetypes may be met with; but the ego itself is lost or astray. Itwas through experiencing this himself during his breakdown that Jung discovered the

individuation process. You could say that psychosis is failure to survive the individua-

tion process failure due to lack of intelligence or education; wrong time in life; lack

of a supporting symbolism in culture or anyone who can interpret it, making the expe-

rience incomprehensible and terrifying. Religious visions and prophecies occupy a

ground halfway between, as also do certain kinds of art, literature, etc. The ego has

weathered the storm, but little rational interpretation has been attempted. Such interpre-

tation, however, is found in religious mystics and intellectuals, such as the Gnostics and

alchemists, or Buddhist or Taoist sages. Jung sees his own psychology as a more rationalsuccessor to these: a secular religion rather than a psychotherapeutic system (cf. Ulanov,

2008).

Jung then is much concerned with the relations between psyche and culture,

especially religion. This is a complex and evolving relationship. We project the contents

of the psyche onto the world around us: we create gods and demons, myths and religious

symbols and rituals. We use these to think about ourselves: our own psychology. This in

itself need not be a conscious process: it may simply play itself out like childrens play or

a dream. Indeed organized religion generally serves to keep it so. But gradually we

become aware of what we are doing, and we progressively subject these projectionsto rational scrutiny. In doing this we risk destroying them, removing their numinous

quality. Often they renew themselves, through some new prophecy or vision. But if this

fails, it may leave us with no way to think about ourselves: indeed we may forget

Walker 57



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altogether that we have an unconscious as well as conscious minds. This is the situation

that has arisen in the modern West.

Social action theory and analytical psychology

Webers social action theory is concerned with the subjective meanings persons attach

to their actions.6 It centres on free will and consciousness: Weber does not contextualize

it with any psychological theory as such.7 How then can it be related to Jungian psychol-

ogy now?

The Kantian philosophical element in Jungs thought clearly puts him into the same

methodological universe as Weber.8 For all that psyche is not mind, then, the notion of

the unconscious itself is not problematic for interpretivism. It simply feeds into the

complexities of motivation and limitations of self-awareness which interpretive metho-

dology already knows (see Weber, 1978a: 322, esp. 910, 19; cf. Albrow, 1990: 1246,

12931). Weber and Jung both see rationality as limited by a range of factors: physical

factors such as age or fatigue, emotions such as anger or love, unconscious motivational

forces; and not least, incomplete information in a world not wholly amenable to reason.

There is a difference in emphasis. Weber does no more than acknowledge the uncon-

scious, whereas this is Jungs main concern. But it would be quite wrong to elevate this

into a categoric difference. Again, though Jung conceives the individual in terms of a

psychic apparatus possessing a history and continuity, his conception is nonetheless

existential: the individual lives in the here-and-now and her or his past is subject to her

or his present. This again accords with interpretivism.As to specifically the collective unconscious and the archetypes, Weber certainly

would not have balked in principle at this as a transcendental presupposition (cf. Weber,

1949: 81). As a neo-Kantian, he holds that there are innate structures in the mind which

project themselves onto the world; these act as objective constraints on what we do and

think just as the material world does.9 Culture is no mere reflex of social structure; the

thought found in, say, theology or jurisprudence or art has to be engaged on its own

terms.10 Jungs elaboration of this in terms of the archetypes need not be a problem here,

at least so far as they are projected into culture. His concern with the archetypes within

the psyche itself might flag a personal difference in terms of extraversion and introver-sion: there will be more to say on this. On the face of it, however, it simply reflects the

difference between sociology and psychology.

Next is the question of relating Jungs typology of psychic functions to Webers

typology of social action. Here Jungs opposition of thinking and feeling is strikingly

similar to Webers opposition of ends-rationality and value-rationality. Again, there is

the division in both schemata between two forms of rationality and two of irrationality.

However, Webers irrational pair, affectuality and tradition, seem quite different from

Jungs intuition and sensation, at first sight at least. Moreover Weber does not set out

his typology as two cross-cutting axes though Jung does not always do this.It is worth exploring this more deeply. For Weber, it is clearly the primary inten-

tion of the typology to generate a vision of cultural history (cf. Hennis, 1988: esp. ch.

3). What emerges then from the traditional and affective orientations of social action

is the dialogue between tradition and charisma: the original condition of culture into




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which rationality increasingly intervenes. Comparing this with Jungs psychic

faculties sensation telling us what things are, intuition telling us what they could

be perhaps there is something of an affinity. And Jung is aware of the same dialo-

gue, as will appear.Jung, however, did not initially intend his typology for this purpose. His vision of

cultural history is rather in terms of the evolving dialogue between consciousness and

the unconscious, and of the division between Logos and Eros. I have discussed this

above: partly intuitive concepts that Jung resists defining. Through the involvement of

the anima/animus, they mediate between the thinking and feeling functions on the one

side, and consciousness and the unconscious on the other. The upshot, then, is a vision

of modernity as dominated by Logos: a loss of contact with feeling, the irrational

functions, the unconscious. This is highly similar to Webers vision of ends-rationality

driving out the other types of social action though it has gender resonances that do not

appear in Weber.11 I will return to these matters presently.

Jung identifies two main groups of instincts: sex and aggression. Weber agrees (e.g.

Weber, 1978a: 601), though their role for him is more limited: their basic affinity is to the

affectual mode of social action. The former instinct obviously feeds into the sociology of

gender. The latter surely feeds into the sociology of power: not merely domination, but

the state, war and military affairs, vengeance, the protection of personal security, etc.

Weber treats these as primary; he does not (like Marxist and other approaches)

attribute them to a nexus of state and stratification. Violent social action is primordial

(ibid.: 90410). In short, the relation of instinct to social action and relationships is of

a common-sense order.Against this, neither theorist proposes a repression (or shock) theory to account for

culture itself (Jung, 1954: 11011, 11415). The contrast here is with Durkheim as well

as Freud: both are, so to speak, creationists. For Durkheim, society is the God that creates

Man (sic); for Freud, the Oedipus complex; and Mankind cannot really be thought prior

to these things. Weber and Jung, however, are evolutionists: they accept the slow rise

from animal to human, a gradual process with no decisive threshold (e.g. Weber,

1978a: 3201).12 Redirection of psychic energy might be entailed in this, but it does not

cause it. For Jung, the sexual and aggressive instincts keep each other in check. But

while these two main groups of instincts are still recognizable, human behaviour ishighly complex; the instincts have been extensively modified and differentiated and their

original full range is not known. This has been the work of the human learning capacity

which inhibits other instincts: it might itself be based on the animal instinct of imitation

(Jung, 1954: 81 ff.; Jung, 1964a: 2878). As to Weber, though he occasionally speaks of

psychic energy and its redirection or sublimation, he does not offer any formal

considerations and sublimation is Nietzsches term not Freuds (Gabriel, 1983:

512; Kaufmann, 1968: 21623, 23546; Ellenberger, 1994: 274, 277, 505, 543).13

Fundamentally, then, for both Weber and Jung, the creation of culture is simply a

given of human existence. Their concern is with its trajectories and implications, notwith its origins or causes.

What emerges, then, for both thinkers, is an exploration of the problem of rationality

and irrationality in human affairs, conducted through an enquiry into cultural history. In

this, they both diagnose a distinctive modern western condition of culture and psyche,

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while avoiding any simple contrast with a unitary pre-modern condition. Rather they set

out a two-dimensional space in which a number of tensions and developments are

possible. This generates comparative as well as developmental analysis.

To ground the latter, a primordial condition of humankind is adduced. Here Jungrelies heavily on the philosophical anthropology of Levy-Bruhl: the contrast of logical

and pre-logical mentalities (Jung, 1964a: 50 ff.; cf. Cazeneuve, 1972).14 Weber rather

has a two-stage theory: pre-animistic naturalism, followed by an efflorescence of

symbolism (Weber, 1978a: 399407, 420, n. 1). But his sketch (it is no more) seems

to serve the purpose of grounding the dialogue between tradition and charisma, rather

than being presented as anthropology for its own sake.15 Either way, both theorists seem

to see primordial irrationality in much the same terms: symbolic thought unconsciously

projected onto the environment. For Jung, this is simply the collective unconscious at

play. For Weber, it is a mentality that makes exclusively for traditional or affectual social

action (ibid.: 17, 31923, 11334; cf. Jung, 1954: 167 ff., esp. 1737). Primordial irra-

tionality is not static: rather it takes the form of distrust of innovation punctuated by

innovative eruptions which may be acclaimed or suppressed. Into this picture ration-

ality enters, and comes to play an increasing role. Henceforth the two forces for

culture-change exist in tension, irrational creativity and rationalization.

Evaluation of this as anthropology is perhaps best left to anthropologists. But one

might note Evans-Pritchards comment on Levy-Bruhl, that his error lay not in diagnos-

ing the two modes of thought, but in identifying the one with the primitive and the other

with the civilized, rather than seeing them as arising together in all times and places an

error which Weber, among others, didnotmake (Evans-Pritchard, 1965: 912). For bothWeber and Jung, the subsequent historical analyses, in which the comparative as well as

the developmental dimensions are explored, do seem to work in these terms. Cultural

development is a matter of cultural elites: the mentality of the masses remains even now

much as it always was (Jung, 2001: 201; Weber, 1970c: 277; Weber, 1978a: 4001).

For Weber, a major factor in the development of culture is rationality grappling with

problems that do not admit of perfect solutions.16 This leads to further rationalizing

activity; it may also lead to a rebound into the irrational (Weber, 1970c: 2812). Jung

also perceives this; but he views it in terms of the increasing differentiation of

consciousness. He focuses then on the irrational rebound, and the rise from the uncon-scious of new symbolic systems which serve to transcend the contradictions. This again

may flag personal extraversion/introversion or simply the difference between disciplines.

For Jung, the history of culture mirrors the history of the psyche. Webers position on

this has to be inferred; but the key point is that the history of culture does notreflect the

history of society. That in itself is episodic and fragmentary: it can only support

comparative study. The history of culture is far more coherent: it is this that must provide

the historical spine of a comparative historical sociology. This appraisal, it seems to me,

does imply a history of the psyche, though no forcing factor is adduced.

This does not create conflict between sociological and psychological modes of attri-bution of objective meanings (as might arise, say, with Marx and Freud). Meaning is

subjective: it appears in the outer world because we put it there. In this, our various

concerns psychological, social, natural overlie and inform each other. The process,

initially unthought, enters consciousness and becomes subject to rationalization.




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Meanwhile, we select constructively from the cafeteria that culture presents to us, in

accordance with our subjective preferences or affinities. Our social structural and

material situations may certainly be a factor in this. But Webers sociology of religion

details the sociological consequences of psychological processes, not the sociologicaldeterminants of consciousness (Weber, 1970c: esp. 26970). Again, Jung explicitly

admits the social structural dimension, though he rarely pursues it (e.g. Jung, 1970:

130, n. 4, also 151; see also Jung, 1959: 22).

To sum up, then, Webers and Jungs oeuvres appear to be methodologically coherent

and indeed complementary. Weber thematizes social structure, culture and conscious-

ness; Jung thematizes culture, consciousness and the unconscious; both acknowledge the

full spectrum. Their approaches converge in an account of cultural history focused on

modernity.

Themes in cultural history

Both Webers and Jungs treatments of cultural history are largely organized around

religion. This in terms of two cross-cutting themes: comparison of the Great World Reli-

gions in East and West, and the evolution of religion from its primitive beginnings to the

Great World Religions. These come together in the consideration of western

modernity.17

It will be useful to take the comparative theme first. Weber identifies two syndromes:

emissary or ethical prophecy in the West, exemplary prophecy in the East. The emissary

prophet is Gods messenger, who demands our obedience; the exemplary prophet ratherteaches by the example of his life. With this, religious rejection of the world in the West

has typically taken the form of asceticism; in the East, that of mysticism. The ascetic sees

himself as a tool for carrying out Gods work; the mystic sees himself as a vessel to be

filled with Gods presence (Weber, 1978a: 54451).

These contrasting forms, ascetic and mystic, may be seen as the extravert and

introvert modes of religious rejection of the world. Jung indeed held that it was a

fundamental difference between western and eastern civilizations, shaped by their reli-

gious traditions, that the former are extraverted while the latter are introverted (Jung,

1970: 481).But the contrast surely holds at the personal level too: Weber is an ascetic whereas

Jung is a mystic (cf. Derman, 2008: 68).18 The deeper implications of this I will take

up at the end. Meantime, the question is how the difference is reflected in their

theoretical concerns. Webers main concern is with the sociological impact of religious

economic ethics: asceticism is an important component in the aetiology of the compre-

hensive rationalization of western modernity. Asceticism is also found in the East, and

mysticism in the West, but these are relatively minor traditions and have not had the

same kind of impact. Jung, however, is mainly concerned with the needs of the psyche,

as consciousness becomes increasingly differentiated, for a supporting symbolic frame-work in culture. Accordingly, he evaluates eastern and western religion alike above all

by their mystical traditions, where this need is most consciously met. For Weber, asceti-

cism and mysticism are equally validas religion. Jung sets little value on asceticism, and

indeed rather distrusts it.

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Weber accounts for the different trajectories of religious thought in West and East,

bringing in both social structural and environmental factors (Weber, 1978a: 44750,

5516). The total dependence of agriculture in western Asia on irrigation, and hence

on a powerful king ruling through a bureaucracy, made for the identification of an all-powerful creator God; emissary prophecy and asceticism follow from this. In the Far

East, agriculture is rain-fed; there are kings and bureaucracies, but with a more limited

role in flood control. This made for the identification of an impersonal cosmology of

forces; exemplary prophecy and mysticism follow. This syndrome is also more tolerant

of secular thought though the great historical setting for that has been the city-state,

unique to the West, which arises in the absence of kings and bureaucracies and is free

from priestly domination (Weber, 1981: 31622).

Within this broad comparative frame, other factors are identified: the religious

affinities of different classes and other social groups, as conditioned by their changing

fates; different types of bearers of religious action, such as priests, prophets and intellec-

tuals, and the typical conflicts between them, etc. A central theme in all this is historical

contingency: how far marginal figures such as prophets or lower-class intellectuals, or

marginal peoples such as the Jews, have made for historical outcomes quite different

from the priestly religions of the mainstream civilizations.

Jung does not attempt explanation at this level, but comes directly to the question how

early choices in religious thought set the future course of cultural development. Thus as

soon as spirit and nature were differentiated, the East turned to the one and the West to

the other: the civilizations of India and China are spiritually competent but materially

inept, while with the West it is the other way round. This is the introversion and extra-version referred to earlier. The East has always had a grasp of religion as psychology.

The West, however, insisted that it concerned a reality out there God and Jesus are

outside ourselves (Jung, 2001: 1956; Jung, 1970: 47593; Jung, 1993: 5425). This led

to a view of evil as cosmological principle and its consequent rejection, and the devel-

opment of an incomplete and unbalanced symbolism a Trinity rather than a Quaternity

(Jung, 1970: 5763). This forms the essential background to the distinctive modern

western condition. But this argument is best taken later.

At the finer level, Jungs account does chime with Webers. He distinguishes religion

from mere creed: the organized religion of priests which has lost or suppressed aware-ness of its true meaning and only serves its own interests. (Yet its symbols, dogmas and

rituals may still have psychologically supportive value so long as people believe in

them.) True religion, however, is carried forward by prophets and intellectuals who stand

outside and in opposition to priesthoods (Jung, 1993: 57780; Jung, 1964a: 2568; Jung,

1970: 89, 435).

Now to take up the other theme, the evolution of religion. Webers considerations

here focus on the development, and subsequent fate, of prophetic salvation religion out

of the matrix of pagan polytheism, mystery cults, philosophical schools, etc., in the

ancient world,19

with a sketch of preceding anthropological stages (Weber, 1978a:399 ff.; cf. Weber, 1970b, 1970c). He describes the development from spirits to gods

to pantheons of functional gods to monotheism; a process in which religion is

rationalized, but paradoxically is also irrationalized, in the creation and elaboration of

a symbolic world to which ones fate has been displaced. Ethical gods rise to




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prominence; with this, the relationship to the god takes on an ethical, rather than a

magical or ritual, character. The nature and relationship to the gods become matter for

intellectual speculation, which increasingly encounters paradoxes as the gods are con-

ceived as greater than humanity, superordinate rather than subordinate to nature. Thusthere arises a conflict between faith and reason; in particular there arises the problem

of how a world dominated by powerful ethical gods can be pervaded by evil.

Jungs account parallels much of this, although his focus is different: the evolution of

the psyche and its mirroring in culture. He often argues this through a contrast of

primitive and modern mentalities, drawing, as already indicated, on Levy-Bruhl (Jung,

1964a: 5073; cf. Cazeneuve, 1972).20 But this frames a historical thesis.

Initially, mental life is wholly unconscious, and the contents of the collective uncon-

scious are projected onto the outer world. Humankind thinks, but is not yet aware that it

thinks. Natural, social and psychic processes are superimposed on each other. As con-

sciousness emerges, however, these projections are increasingly withdrawn. The spirits

become fewer and less remote, and their scope is diminished as the world becomes

subject to materialistic, scientific thought. Increasing differentiation of consciousness

thus is mirrored in symbolic systems which are more tightly focused, more complex and

integrated. The spirits become a pantheon of gods, in time to become one God, who

finally becomes man. At the same time, the symbols themselves become subject to

rational consideration. The character of the gods changes: from simply being powerful

and capricious, they acquire a rational and ethical character differentiation of con-

sciousness includes the development of rational and moral judgement. The individual

then increasingly finds himself or herself crucified between incompatible opposites such as faith and reason, or good and evil. These conflicts cannot be rationally resolved,

but only reconciled through symbols which transcend their contradiction: the images,

rituals and dogmas of unconscious origin which are elaborated in religion (Jung,

1970: 825; Jung, 1983: 1357; Jung, 1959: 445; Jung, 1993: 1969, 3603).

Thus the evolution of consciousness entails an increasing dependence upon symbolic

systems, but also an increasing exposure of these symbolic systems to rational scrutiny.

In this, the needs of the unconscious may well be sacrificed to the demands of reason.

Symbolic systems thus are subject to periodic crisis and need of renewal.

Jung gives an extended account of the crucial development of Judaeo-Christianthought in this frame (Jung, 1970: 355470). This relates how Yahweh developed con-

sciousness and a rational, ethical character, and flows into an analysis of the Christian

myth as an account of Gods experience of the individuation process: Jesus incarnation

as Gods emerging ego; his death as the transfer of identity from the ego to the self. Here

Jung argues, Kantian-fashion, that metaphysical truths are unknowable: it is the God-

archetype that he is concerned with (Jung, 1993: 5501). Again, Jesus himself fulfilled

the myth because he let himself be possessed by the Christ archetype. In unsettled times

when paganism is losing its credibility, the symbolic support provided by this dogma

should prevent the Christians experience of individuation from becoming a psychoticepisode (ibid.: 57980).21

This brings us to another issue: the individual in history. Weber approaches this

mainly through the notion of charisma (intellectuals have mostly had impact through

charismatic figures taking up their ideas). Charismatic individuals are found in many

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fields: war, politics, the arts, as well as religion. Charisma is typically episodic: it

breaks through tradition, but then becomes routinized to form a new tradition. Charisma

has been the main force for radical change outwith the modern rationalized era. There are

two sides to charisma: on the one hand, the individual who makes a claim to specialness;on the other, an audience that affirms this claim. Weber says little as to the psychology

that is involved, on either side. In particular, as regards the Old Testament prophets, he

simply indicates psychopathology and leaves it there (Weber, 1952: 28696, see esp.

288).22

Jungian psychology however bears directly on this. At times of cultural crisis such as

the end of paganism or now, when culture fails to keep pace with the evolution of the

psyche, the traditional repertoire of symbols becomes obsolete. New symbols then will

form themselves in the psyches of certain susceptible individuals, who become pos-

sessed by the archetypes they embody and act them out in their lives (Jung, 1970:

41929; Jung, 1993: 1658, 57980, see also 34451). Typically the priesthood will seek

to turn these into a new tradition a creed in Jungs sense. Religious intellectuals who

subject the experience and the resultant symbolism to conscious interpretation may then

find themselves in conflict with the priests. As to the audience affirming the charismatic

individual, it is again a matter of letting themselves be vicariously possessed by the

archetype. Jung sometimes refers to this as a psychic epidemic, especially in the

context of modernity (Jung, 1954: 17780; Jung, 1964a: 17993 see esp. 185).

Finally, modernity. Webers diagnosis of this refers to rationalization and disenchant-

ment (cf. Tenbruck, 1989; Hennis, 1988: esp. chs 1, 4 and 5; Sica, 2000; Scaff, 2000).

Rationalization (basically, reordering in a more thought-out way), is a general long-term tendency across many fields of society and culture. It tends, however, to be

excluded from the economy: agriculture and the organic life-cycle are rather the realm

of magic, while crafts and trades are the realm of traditional stereotyping and secrecy.

Where rationalization has had a clear field is in speculative thought, especially theology.

It is distinctive for the West that Protestant theology redirected rationalization into the

economy; hence its modern pervasion of all areas of society and culture.

Weber says much less about disenchantment a term he apparently took from

Schiller (Weber, 1978a: 506; Weber, 1970d: 138 ff.; Weber, 1970b: 3507; cf. Weber,

1968: 226 ff.; see also Tenbruck, 1989: esp. 48 ff.; Hennis, 1988: chs 2 and 4). In its pri-mary sense, it means the displacement of magic by science, a cause-and-effect realm not

amenable to prayer or ritual. Though Weber also speaks of the remoteness of the cultured

individual from the organic life-cycle (Weber, 1970b: 3556). Disenchantment like

rationalization goes far back in history: the rejection of magic by intellectuals helped

shape Jewish prophecy.

Disenchantment then for Weber seems to be shorthand for the whole syndrome of

post-Protestant modernity: secularization, the move from agriculture to industry,

increasing urbanization. It represents a comprehensive expulsion of magical beliefs and

religious values from our perceptions of both the natural world and the social order.These no longer possess validity in public life; society is now wholly an affair of

impersonality and expediency. All religion is now seen as irrational, and survives only

in personal relationships and individual mysticism. This leaves its mark on, for example,

art and literature, which must either be on the same intimate scale or else be fraudulent




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and impermanent. The impact for the individual is a sense of meaninglessness and

purposelessness: we do not know how to live our lives.

There are philosophical assumptions underpinning this. The world has no meaning in

itself; moreover it is somewhat resistant to our rational understanding. Again, our deal-ings both with the natural world and with each other do not of themselves make ethical

sense. Religion has basically arisen out of these dilemmas; with rational prophecy of

salvation, attention is directed to another world which saves the face of this world.

At the same time, our lives confront us with different value-spheres e.g. art, religion,

politics, sexuality, economics, intellectual life which are incompatible with each

other. The natural religious reflection of this is polytheism: the different value-

spheres and orientations are ruled over by gods who are in conflict with each other.

Prophetic (ascetic) religion only imposed a hierarchy on this, privileging one value-

sphere and subordinating or suppressing the others. With this broken down, we are now

returned to a situation of polytheism without gods, which we can only deal with by

making choices and taking responsibility for them as to what gods (so to speak) we will

follow.

Jungs account fits closely with this, both in philosophical assumptions and in cultural

diagnosis (he too is influenced by Schiller). He speaks of the historical process of world

despiritualization (Jung, 1970: 85), traceable from earliest civilization and reaching its

culmination in western modernity (ibid.: 835, 2456).23 The crisis he refers to variously

as the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Enlightenment: basically he has in view the

rise of Protestantism, materialism and science. These lead to the characteristic develop-

ment of modern society: industrialization, urbanization, large-scale societies whereindividuality is lost (Jung, 1964a: 247305; cf. Jung, 2001: 222).

This has a long aetiology. The Protestant Reformation itself may be attributable to the

imposition on the Germanic tribes of a more developed religion stemming from ancient

civilization. There was too much of the pax Romana in the Church for the barbarian tem-

perament to endure, and its dogmas and symbolism were too remote from immediate

religious experience. Doing away with the Churchs mediations released energies but

made for a split between consciousness and the unconscious: henceforth each went its

way. That this disruption of the natural rhythm of cultural/psychic evolution is diagnostic

for the modern West, is revealed by comparison with India, where no such disruptionoccurred (Jung, 1970: 467; Jung, 1964a: 5278).

Though again, the Reformation or Renaissance might also be seen as a compensatory

adjustment: an age of lateral expansion (explorations, materialism) to compensate for the

vertical, over-spiritual age that preceded it (Jung, 1959: 43; Jung, 2001: 1778). And

Christian civilization was always vulnerable. This comes from Christianitys develop-

ment of an unbalanced symbolism: a Trinity rather than a Quaternity. One quadrant is

suppressed: that representing evil, nature, the earth, the unconscious, the feminine (Jung,

1970: 5763; Jung, 1993: 557 ff.). This is a factor of Judaeo-Christian extraversion: God

out there and evil a cosmological principle. (Buddhism then is a more complete, as wellas more consciously insightful, religion.) Compounding this, Christianity quickly

became a creed, a thing of dogma and ritual, rather than a living mystical religion.

Conscious appreciation of its symbolism only survived underground, in Gnosticism or

alchemy (Jung, 1993: 52034, 53781).

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Jungs basic concern here is with the attrition of the symbolic systems upon which

the psyche depends for its integration and balance. Ritual and dogma did provide a

symbolic scaffolding for psychic processes, effective at an unconscious level so long

as people believed in them. When the Enlightenment swept these away in favour ofmaterialism and science, the unconscious was effectively lost: the mind came to be seen

simply as consciousness, rationality. Our unconscious now finds no reflection in our

culture and is incomprehensible indeed largely uninterrogated and wayward (Jung,

1993: 10922, 3706, 3835). The consequences are dual. On the one hand, we project

our unconscious contents onto others, especially our shadow side: we believe of others

the evil that we cannot see in ourselves. And we ourselves may become possessed: an

unconscious content may take us over. These are collective phenomena, psychic

epidemics, with above all political consequences such as Nazism or the cold war.

Materialism and extraversion combined make for submission to society and the state

rather than to inner realities, to the destruction of the individuality that alone could resist

such things. This is also seen in the eccentricity, instability and lack of restraint in our

religious, economic and cultural affairs. On the other hand, we are individually subject

to widespread neuroses and psychoses, and a sense of meaninglessness and purposeless-

ness in our lives as the psychological malaise of our times (Jung, 1964a: 247305; Jung,

1964b: 79103).

Modern mans great problem is loss of instinct (Jung, 1964a: 28492, cf. 4667): loss

of contact with the natural world, with our own natures, and with our unconscious,

leaving us living in an abstract realm of rational thought and of words. Ironically, this

was inherent in Christianity from the outset, in the doctrine that in the beginning wasthe Word Logos (Jung, 1970: 28991; Jung, 1964a: 28492, see esp. 286). In a sense,

the wheel has come full circle.

Jung sees positive aspects here too culture like the psyche is self-regulating. The

revaluation of nature in science, of the body in sport or in dancing, of sex: all are

compensatory (Jung, 1964a: 934, 103). So is the development of a science of the uncon-

scious: psychology itself (Jung, 1993: 364, 3845). Again, as outlined earlier, the eman-

cipation of women holds a promise of the rebalancing of Logos and Eros, and the

recovery of a symbolism for the unconscious (Jung, 1964a: 1303).24

What is striking, then, is not merely the similarity between Webers and Jungsvisions of modernity, but also that, for both, this is grounded not so much in a theory

of modernity as in a theory of humankinds existential situation and its implications for

the structure of consciousness. They both see meaning as a projection of the mind not a

given of the universe; they both see contradictions that reason cannot resolve but simply

has to live with; they both see incommensurate spheres of human activity that find their

natural expression in polytheism (see, for example, Jung, 1970: 868). Though for Jung,

this should be expressed in terms of the psyche, as involving both conscious and uncon-

scious processes.

Where they differ most is that, while Weber never doubts that the ego must be thecentre of the psyche, Jung holds that the individuation process entails the transfer of the

sense of identity from the ego to the self, the psyches true centre. Weber holds that hier-

archy and discipline must be self-imposed on ones personality; Jung considers that an

organic harmony and unity of purpose can be developed.




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In other words, as I have already suggested, where Weber is an ascetic, Jung is a

mystic. Even so, Jung comes closer to Weber than one might expect. He is sceptical

about westerners returning to Roman Catholicism or, even more, taking up eastern reli-

gions, and rather holds that the disenchantment of the modern West has to be endured albeit in terms of a psychologically interpreted individuation experience (e.g. Jung,

1970: 52937; Jung, 1993: 358407 esp. 3706). Indeed, like Weber, he invokes here

the Protestant notion of Calling! (Jung, 1954: 16786, see esp. 1756; Jung, 1993:

11122, 16772; Weber, 1970d; Weber, 1970e).

This difference goes beyond temperament into values: given the biographical relation

for each of intellectual oeuvre to psychological crisis, it could hardly be otherwise.25

Weber holds that it is the ascetic route that led to western civilization and that it cannot

be abandoned. Nor should it be: asceticism lends itself to action in and transformation of

the world, and political commitment in the modern world is in continuity with this. Jung

does not value asceticism. (He also lived to see more of the 20th century, which might

well disillusion him with politics.) Even so, Jung is no quietist or reactionary: his posi-

tion is rather that effective action requires self-knowledge. A solution is a synthesis of

opposites which transcends the conflict between them. Merely inverting the problem

taking sides solves nothing.

These differences of temperament and values should be kept in perspective. Webers

and Jungs difference of emphasis in the factors limiting rationality is underpinned by a

shared ironic view of rationality not merely the untoward consequences of rationality

in modernity, but, rather, philosophical reservations as to how far rationality ever was

appropriate to our lives and to this world. This is a more fundamental issue than Jungsthematization of the unconscious which Weber does acknowledge.

Conclusion

What then comes of this attempt to consider Jungian psychology in relation to

sociological theory?

Two things are immediately apparent. One is that Jung has a great deal to say to

sociology. The other is that the way he fits in is completely different from Freud.The classic location of Freud in sociological theory is in the area of ideology and

consciousness, or collective mentalities however this is expressed. Its ground is in the

family and childhood, seen as socialization, i.e. personality formation social values are

grounded in the superego. The family then is where social structure and values/ideolo-

gies meet. This gives an orientation to continuity rather than to change: to the reproduc-

tion of (capitalist) society. With this, it is also an orientation to how society makes us

rather than to how we make society: to structure rather than to agency, determinism

rather than free will and consciousness. Both psychoanalysis and the traditions in socio-

logical theory that use it have that bias regardless of their attempts at mutual critique(Bocock, 1976; Gabriel, 1983).

There is a lock-and-key relationship here: sociological theory presents a lock, to

which Freudian psychoanalysis seems to possess the key. Lock and key validate each

other: while the key turns the lock, and the lock is turned by the key, there is no reason

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to question either of them. This surely is the ultimate reason why alternative psychody-

namic theories have not received consideration.

With Weber and Jung, nothing of this obtains. Weber focuses on conflict and change;

he does not give the ideal realm a key function in securing continuity. He has little use forthe concept of socialization: the interpretive conception of social reality does not require

it. He dismisses the functionalist approach to the family in favour of a conflict approach

and he is more concerned with the household (Weber, 1978a: part 2, chs 3 and 4, cf.

68891; Weber, 1981: ch. 2). On childhood he says little, but implicitly its location may

be remote from the adult destiny Weber is very aware of migration, especially rural

urban migration (e.g. Weber, 1978a: 1237). Equally, children may actually be raised by

migrants (servants, slaves) from another culture. Children then have actual fates, while

social relationships and organizations may recruit quite variously.

Jung has little interest in childhood (Storr, 1973: 72; Jung, 1954: passim; Jung, 2001:

97116): the aetiology of the psyche lies in its cultural history. Family relationships may

be of concern for how they have conditioned the growth of the adult personality, but the

basic process is the unfolding of an innate pattern (Jung, 1993: 23940). He rejects the

concept of the superego; conscience implies a critical distancing from societys values,

not mere internalization (Jung, 1964a: 437 ff.). The individual consciousness is an arena

of conflict between ideas from the collective consciousness and universal ideas from

the collective unconscious (Jung, 1993: 11113; see also Jung, 1954: 167 ff., esp.

174): between collective consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an

almost unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended (Jung,

1993: 112).Paradoxically, the impact of all this is to free the field from aetiological and function-

alist commitments, and to open it for empirical enquiry presumably in terms of com-

parative historical sociology, rather than the traditional reliance on anthropology.26

For me, these considerations govern the use of Jung in sociology now. It should not

take the form of a new attempt at over-arching theory. For the project of over-arching

theory is one of synthesis: to achieve logical closure of theory, on the assumption that

classical sociology has already established a comprehensive body of primary enquiries.

This has costs: any issues that classical sociology failed to deal with cannot find a place

in post-classical synthesis. Gender is a case in point; the natural environment is surelyanother.27 The purpose of bringing Jung into sociology, then, is to augment our powers

of exploration, not explanation.

There is another aspect: Jungian psychology as epistemology. This is the question of

the personal equation: how we construct the world differently according to our differ-

ent individual psychologies. Shamdasani (2003: 2999) argues that this was a lasting

concern for Jung, starting from the identification of Freudian and Adlerian theory with

extraversion and introversion. (Simmel [1959a, 1959b] has comparable concerns, both as

regards the personal equation in philosophy, and as regards the interweaving of episte-

mological and ontological issues in sociology.) We might look at fundamental differ-ences and debates in sociological theory in the same light.

I will not put forward a detailed analysis here. The dimensions are obvious enough:

structure vs action, consensus vs conflict, political commitment vs value freedom, etc.

these are to be seen as constructions of the social world subject to such innate




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psychological differences as extraversion and introversion, Logos vs Eros, etc. I admit

the problem of showing this empirically within the sociological community. (As to

Weber and Jung themselves, their psychological crises comprised individuating experi-

ences, which tend to transcend original personality type.) Nonetheless, the suggestionremains intuitively attractive.

Of course this reflects on the question of sociology as epistemology the claim that

knowledge is socially rather than individually determined. This however is not a territor-

ial dispute between the disciplines of sociology and psychology. It is a division within

sociological theory itself, and as such can be brought under the personal equation as

above. Only certain structure approaches claim to take philosophy (and psychology)

under supervision Mertons (1973) paradigm for the sociology of knowledge. Other

approaches interpretive and humanistic sociologies and cultural anthropological tradi-

tions hold that sociology and/or anthropology are not competent to do this.28

I stress that it is reflexive analysis that is proposed here. Sociology has seen enough of

critiques from positions that set themselves above criticism. Indeed, sociology seems

increasingly to be stretched between poles of dogmatism and nihilism, each leading alike

to a refusal to acknowledge the content of any others communication. Jungs thought

could perhaps suggest a way for sociology to reintegrate its fragmented discourse.

Notes

1. Jung never cites Weber, at least not in the Collected Works, Collected Letters, or other volumes

consulted here. And Weber did not live to see Jungs thought emerge as a distinctive system.

There is a point of biographical contact, however. Jung treated Otto Gross, whose article for

Archiv fur Socialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik was the occasion for Webers comments on

psychoanalysis. See Weber (1978b); Marianne Weber (1975: 37084); Bair (2004: ch. 10); also

Noll (1997: 7089).

2. It is worth remarking that the relation of Jungs psychology to later humanistic psychologies

such as those of R. D. Laing (1960), to a fair extent mirrors the relation of Webers sociology

to later action micro-sociologies such as symbolic interactionism.

3. For primary texts consulted and selected secondary works, see bibliography: de Laszlos Basic

Writings (Jung, 1993) is a useful introduction. For a biography of Jung see Bair (2004); cf. Noll(1997); also Jung (1977). See also Ellenberger (1994: chs 69) for comparative accounts of

Janet, Freud, Adler and Jung.

4. Shamdasani (2003: 2999 esp. 3740, 937) argues that the epistemological and ontological

problems of psychology as science are central concerns for Jung. Interestingly, he cites Dilthey,

Windelband and Rickert as influences: the philosophers who most immediately influenced

Weber. His sociological considerations, however, (he has much more on anthropology) are lim-

ited to Durkheim (Shamdasani, 2003: 28890). But indeed it is the Naturwissenschaft/Geistes-

wissenschaftdivision Freuds indifference to philosophical questions as much as the sexual

theory of the instincts, that separates Freud from Adler and Jung. For the development of thisdivision in German thought, see Schnadelbach (1984).

5. The main article used here (Jung, 1964a: 11333) was written in the 1920s, and is explicitly on

continental European as opposed to Anglo-American women. Other later reflections deal more

with patriarchal culture, notably Jung (1970: 38699, 461 ff.). There is modern feminist interest

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in Jung (e.g. Wehr, 1988; see also Samuels, 1985: ch. 7), though I find some of the criticisms

there rather forced. Jung encouraged women colleagues, making no attempt to restrict them to

the ghetto of female psychology; it is difficult to see what more he could have done. As

regards his later writings, Jung (1963: 1067, 178, see also 135) specifically states that thealchemical texts reflect male psychology only.

6. Following remarks by Gianfranco Poggi (1983: xixii) on dealing with classical authors,

I have preferentially worked with primary texts here and in the following section, keeping use

of the secondary literature to a minimum.

7. The question of Weber and Freud (Weber, 1978b; Schwenkter, 1987; Strong, 1987; cf. Mar-

ianne Weber, 1975: 37084) really needs to be viewed against the background of a general

work such as Ellenberger (1970). Weber did not privilege psychoanalysis over other

approaches in psychodynamic theory: that is an error of hindsight. If anything, he favoured

Karl Jaspers (Weber, 1978a: 3; Schluchter, 2000: 73; Derman, 2008).

8. See note 4 above.

9. The division material culture/ideal culture originally reflected this: culture that addresses the

material realm vs culture that addresses the ideal realm. This was first formulated by Alfred

Weber (Kroeber, 1952).

10. Durkheim is alone in proposing a sociological basis for the Kantian epistemology. Other

theorists of neo-Kantian orientation retain the categories on the status of an innate meta-

psychology: certainly Weber and Simmel, Boas and Kroeber, Malinowski; indeed this

aspect of Durkheims work did not come to the fore until the decline of functionalism

in the 1960s. All this apropos Shamdasani (2003: 271 ff., esp. 28895, 31114).

11. Actually, it is not clear that ends-rational action does drive out affectual action. It might rather

free it from traditional and value-rational restraints.

12. Above, I remarked on the similarity of Jungs conceptions to the ethology of Lorenz and Tin-

bergen. Note, too, since the pre-human ape already lives in groups, it is not society but culture

that emerges with humanity: Kroeber (1952: esp. 1605) would later spell this out more

clearly (see also Walker, 2001). Finally, I cannot forbear to mention Webers (1978a: 433

5) dismissal of universal theories of totemism!

13. Webers encounter with psychophysics apparently turned him away from any notion of an

actual energetics in psychic energy (Schluchter, 2000; cf. Shamdasani, 2003: 163 ff., esp.

2026). Though he generally kept an open mind as to possible developments in other sciences.His discussions of religion and sexuality (Weber, 1978a: 6027; 1970b: 34350) seem to envi-

sage sexual energy as specifically sexual a view held then by many (Ellenberger, 1970: 303;

Shamdasani, 2003: 210).

14. It is from Levy-Bruhl rather than Durkheim that Jung derives the terms collective conscious-

ness and representations collectives (Shamdasani, 2003: 28990).

15. On the former, Weber seems to be following Tyler and Fraser. On the latter, he makes what is

surely a guarded reference to Levy-Bruhl (Weber, 1978a: 4067). On all this see Evans-

Pritchard (1965).

16. An example, though not one that I think Weber uses, is the problem for calendar building, thatthe astronomical day, month and year do not form exact proportions. But such problems are

also found in the ideal realm, e.g. in jurisprudence or theology. It is here that Jung is most

aware of them.




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17. The main texts here are: Jung (1964a, 1970 [Collected Works, vols 10 and 11]); Weber (1978a:

399 ff.; 1970b, 1970c, 1970d).

18. There is more to Webers own position on religion than his famous religiously unmusical

comment (Albrow, 1990: ch. 1, esp. 16; cf. Poggi, 1983: 69). Jung also took a critical dis-tance from religion: religious writers are liable to accuse him of equivocation or worse. See

Palmer (1997: ch. 10).

19. Contra Schroeder (1987), salvation religion arises in ancient civilization not in primitive soci-

ety; it is if anything ancient conditions that its decay returns us to.

20. This is not merely speculative anthropology: Jung did spend time with primitives, in Amer-

ica (Pueblo Indians) and Africa. Indeed, some of Jungs remarks parallel those of Evans-

Pritchard (e.g. Jung, 1964a: 513; Evans-Pritchard, 1965: 8990). Jungs underlying concern

of course is with the persistence of primitive mentality as a substratum in the mentality of

moderns a valid substratum that we should take into account. See Shamdasani (2003:

31628).

21. Weber too notes the importance of the cure of demonic possession in early Christianity (e.g.

Weber, 1978a: 527, 6301).

22. Weber apparently felt an identification with certain Jewish prophets, especially Jeremiah. Pos-

sibly this is why he went no further in analysing their psychopathologies: it would have

revealed too much of himself to do so (Gerth and Mills, 1970: 27; cf. Marianne Weber,

1975: 5934). Incidentally Jung too could sometimes hit the Jeremiah note (e.g. Jung,

1964a: 31112 or 201!)

23. Despiritualization is Jungs own word. The Terry Lectures were delivered in English.

24. Jung placed tremendous importance on the doctrine of the Assumption of the Virgin,

announced by Pope Pius XII in 1950, as a rebalancing of the Christian Trinity. See, for exam-

ple, Jung (1993: 4469).

25. It is interesting to consider Webers mental breakdown in Jungian terms, asking less what

caused it than what did it mean to him? As with Jungs own breakdown, self-rescue seems

to have been entailed with his subsequent intellectual project.

26. I have attempted this myself, in an unpublished PhD thesis details on request from the

author. I am aware of Bologh (1990). Feminism may be politically radical, but its Marxist

or quasi-Marxist critique of functionalism hardly challenged the conventional

intellectual parameters. Gender is to be dealt with in structure not action perspective; socialconstructivism is assimilated to a Marxist notion of ideology (which begs the question of its

determinants); the basic relations between human nature and society/culture are to be estab-

lished through an anthropological enquiry, which sociology will merely apply to modern (or

capitalist) society, etc.

27. I have written on this, and will again, elsewhere (Walker, 2005). It is for the reasons indicated

here that I have avoided evaluation of Jung in this article.

28. See note 10 above. Incidentally, my arguments here might be compared with Douglas

(1992).

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