history of science: history or science

History of Science: History or Science*

Morton L. SchagrinAssoc. Prof. of Philosophy and History of Science, Denison University

Granville, Ohio 43023

I believe that historical studies and philosophical problems can beused to assist the student to begin to understand science, and to in-crease whatever understanding he already has. This paper howeveris less of a defense of that belief, and more of an argument concerningthe kind of history and philosophy that one ought to teach sciencestudents. I shall also consider how a program of this sort can beimplemented in a normal science course.

Students must learn many different kinds of things in a normalscience course: there are theories and theoretical concepts; there arelaws of the behavior of systems; there are explanations of phenomena;there are the facts about the occurrences of different phenomena. Inaddition, there are procedures: procedures for constructing hypoth-eses, testing hypotheses, and gathering new facts. There are alsoproblems in describing, controlling and predicting natural (or ex-perimental) events. All of these topics are included in the study of agiven science, whether it be biology, chemistry, or physics. Nowhistorical and philosophical studies are relevant only to a few ofthese activities. It is foolish, to say the least, to expect a studentsproblem-solving abilities to be raised by historical studies, or hislaboratory technique to be improved by philosophical studies.Our initial task is to determine where history and philosophy can

effectively relate to these tasks. Now if we take science and spread itout along a scale running from abstract to concrete, we find theoriesat one end, laboratory exercises somewhere in the middle, and problemsolving over at the concrete end. What I want to suggest to you is

THEORY LABORATORY PROBLEMS

Abstract FIG. 1 Concrete

that the same thing can be done for history of science. We can placedown at the concrete end case histories. These are genealogies of

ECHT-HISTORY HISTORY OF IDEAS CASE STUDIES

FIG. 2

specific scientific problems; the Harbard Case Histories, or the kind ofwork that Leo Klopfer did on the History of Science Cases are obvious

* A revision of a paper presented at the 1967 CASMT Convention.

393

394 School Science and Mathematics

examples. But these are quite difficult. If someone doesn’t under-stand science already, he is going to have serious difficulties with acase history. Consider, for instance, the difficulties a student wouldhave trying to understand Priestley’s ^goodness of air7’ test, if hedid not know the difference between NO and N20. Likewise, thestudy of Fraunhofer lines requires some fore-knowledge of refraction.So I would claim that it requires some degree of scientific knowledgejust to follow the case histories, let alone learn something from them.The middle category is the history of ideas. It is concerned with

both the development of a particular concept within a science andalso with the impact of a particular concept on science and otherfields of human activity. Lovejoy’s classic on the scald natura comesto mind immediately. Of relevance to physics are the works of MaxJammer on concepts of space, mass and force. These kinds of studiesrequire, however, a maturity and sophistication well beyond that ofthe average student; it is hardly the place to begin. Incidentally,most standard histories of the special sciences are structured in ahistory of ideas approach. A history of biology, a history of chemistry,and so forth will usually deal with the development of selected con-cepts within a specific branch of science, and will seldom considerextradisciplinary matters.The third category, the most general, I call echt-history. This

"genuine" history examines a topic within a science as it is relatednot only to the rest of that science at that time, but also as it isrelated to other sciences and other cultural or societal events andinstitutions. To some extent L. Pearce Williams’ recent biographyof Michael Faraday is a move towards echt-history, although R.Schofield’s The Lunar Society is probably a better example. I cannotavoid mentioning S. G. Brush’s recent article "Thermodynamics andHistory" (The Graduate Journal, VII, 2, Spring 1967) dealing withthe effects of the concept of entropy on late nineteenth centuryliterature. The National Gallery of Art has available sets of slidesand pre-recorded lectures on the interaction of scientific ideas andstyles of painting. This is an ideal classroom activity for broachingthe subject of echt-history.A similar scaling can be done for philosophy. Down at one end we

have logic, in the middle there is epistemology, and at the abstract,conceptual end we find metaphysics. By metaphysics I mean such

METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY LOGIC

FIG. 3

problems as atomism vs. process, causality and indeterminism, or

History of Science 395

just a topic like Whitehead^s philosophy.1 In epistemology we findsuch issues as the instrumentalist-realist controversy on the nature ofscientific theories�are theories descriptive or are they merelyeconomical calculating devices. Whether biology can be "reduced" tophysics and chemistry might be another issue in this area.2

Finally one comes down to logic, that is, little puzzles concerningsuch things as confirmation and explanation. Most people do notappreciate the funny kinds of games that logicians play. Here is anexample having to do with confirmation. I offer it to you as an il-lustration of what some philosophers do with this general problem.Your may be repelled by this symbolic approach, or you may dis-cover that philosophers are silly people.The question is what do we mean by confirmation. That is to say,

we want to know what the relationship is between evidence, laws andtheories such that one thing confirms another. Presumably the lawsare deducible from the theory; there is no problem there. And pre-sumably the laws imply the (observational) evidence. Now let usassume three characteristics of confirmation:

(1) If E implies S, then E confirms S.(2) If E confirms Z, and T implies Zr, then E confirms T.(3) If E confirms T, and T implies Z, then E confirms L.

where S is any statement

E is evidence statementL is a (statement of a) lawT is a (statement of a) theory

What these mean is fairly clear if you reflect on them. The secondexpresses the idea that theories are seldom directly confirmed, butare confirmed by confirming the laws implied by the theory. Thethird condition expresses the idea that laws deduced from a theorygain confirmation when the theory does. When most people discoverwhat these three statements mean, they usually agree that confirma-tion works this way.

Unfortunately it is simple to prove that given these character-izations of confirmation, any evidence confirms any theory!The argument:

a) E implies itself, so E confirms itself: E confirms E by (1).b) Take an arbitrary theory T. The conjunction (T and E)

implies E, hence by (a) and (2): E confirms {T and jB).

1 See, for instance, E. E. Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science.2 Interest in this question has recently been revived by K. F. Schaffner, "Andreductionism and Molecular

Biology," Science, 157 (11 Aug. 1967) 644-647, and the symposium: Does Life Transcend Physics and Chemis-try. AAAS Annual Meeting, Dec. 1967 (available on TV tape).


But

c) The conjunction (T and E) implies T, so by (b) and (3):E confirms 7\ where T was an arbitrary theory.

It is quite clear that our concept of confirtiaation cannot be character-ized by the initial three statements. Something is wrong; somethinghas to be done to restrict statements (1), (2), and (3) to reach theconcept of confirmation, or else we shall be led to the unacceptableresult that any evidence confirms any theory. I offer this as anexample of the sort of thing going on in the logic of science. I suggestthat it is doubtful there is much room for this in the science class-room�at least to the extent that problems like this are not going tobe that helpful to students in learning particular sciences.

Part of our difficulty, I think, arises from my initial character-ization of the three fields, science, history, and philosophy. I preferto draw a tetrahedron which gives the relationship in a much moreperspicacious view. In the tetrahedron science is along the center,running from problems through laboratory to theories. I have historyrunning along one side, and philosophy running along the other edge.According to this view, then, the case history of the development

of a scientific theory may not be very effective in teaching a studentthe contents of the theory. Case histories can teach students aboutscience. They can illustrate the process of science�at that time; theycan exemplify some strategies of science, and presumably, studentscan emulate or, even improve, these procedures. One can learn fromcase histories that scientists are fallible humans, subject to intel-lectual passions and prejudices: science is clearly no sacred cow.From this, students might resolve to be less prejudicial and moreopen-minded, or they might resign themselves to being human andsimply doing the best they can. These are not unimportant things tolearn about science, and about man, yet precious little of this islearning the content of science.When we move up the scale representing history, we find in the

history of ideas some more effective resources for the teaching ofscience. We can find concepts similar to, but not identical with, theone we are trying to teach; we can find examples of misunderstandingsof the theories we are trying to teach. I need not remind you thatknowing a concept requires knowing what the concept is not. History,when it is not a record of successes, can be a marvelous source ofnegative examples.We have now reached the pinnacle: echt-history. Here we consider

the concepts and theories of a given science in relation to othersciences, and in relation to other cultural or societal institutions.Under the first heading, concepts in biology, for instance, have been


borrowed (and transformed) from physics, and in the other direction,concepts from biology have been borrowed by physics: a kind ofmodel generalization from one field to another. There has also been ageneralization of method from one field to another, and this too ispart of the understanding of scientific concepts, since method shapescontent.The impact of a scientific achievement on other cultural institutions

such as art, literature, political theory, war, production and economicconditions are all part of its significance. And the impact of meta-physics, religion and artistic insights on the form of scientific the-orizing cannot be ignored either. "Cultural determinants5 ? is probablytoo strong a phrase for these factors; perhaps "cultural influences"is more modest.A similar discussion exists for philosophy in science courses.

Logical questions about explanations and prediction, proof andconfirmation, necessity and contingency, are all valuable for pro-viding a structure for the analysis of the process of science, but are oflittle value in the teaching of substantive scientific concepts. As wemove up the line to epistemological topics, we begin to illuminate theelements of scientific theories by considering what it means for atheory to be true, or merely useful; why some hypotheses are ad hoc,how pure and certain observations are; what is, and what is not,conventional and arbitrary in a theory.The most important use of philosophy, however, is in the area

known as metaphysics. Metaphysics, as it relates to the study ofscience, may be (superficially) distinguished into the two categories ofpresuppositions and consequences. All scientific theories presuppose�in the sense of uncritical acceptance�certain views concerning thenature of reality. I have in mind such principles as: All change isultimately a rearrangement of parts; mental phenomena are (iden-tically) physico-chemical events. Philosophers have elaborated andcriticized coherent systems containing these principles. The study ofthese systems and their criticisms helps to complete the network ofbeliefs that scientific theories sometimes require, sometimes exclude,and other times merely permit.The category of metaphysical consequences of scientific theories

investigates such questions as: If man is a machine, what does thisimply about educational goals and precedures? What effect does thispremise have on the bases of human morality? There is no need nowto multiply examples; some systematic investigation of the kinds ofmetaphysical presuppositions and consequences is required beforewe can fruitfully explore this area. Yet before we begin this explora-tion, we must accept the point I am trying to make about the rel-evance of philosophy. The metaphysical systems, in which answers


to metaphysical problems are elaborated and systematized, provide,with reference to other human concerns, a rationale over and besideempirical evidence for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories.If scientific theories are studied only in relation to the empiricalevidence for or against them, the student can only perceive a partialand distorted picture of science. Scientific ideas must be seen asintegrated within an entire intellectual, cultural, and social Weltbild.Now the question is how are we to implement this proposal. At the

outset I want to caution against crowding out the science. You mustnot convert your science course into a history of science course or aphilosophy of science course. It has to be a science course. This meansthat you are going to have to select a few (three, maybe four) topicsfor an entire year to supplement with historical or philosophicalmaterial. You cannot do it with every topic because you will sacrificetoo much science. The choice of topics is up to the teacher. It dependson the teachers background and on the students5 interests. Pleasedo not underestimate student interest. The question of what studentscan do is usually based on their performance on material they are notreally interested in. But you know many ^poor" students who, assoon as they found a problem or a topic that interested them, per-formed quite well. And this seems to me to be the basic issue: studentsgenerally are not interested in purely logical puzzles, but they areinterested in metaphysics; they are not generally interested in whodiscovered what and when, but they are interested in the impact ofscientific discoveries on art, literature, and society at large.What about teacher preparation? It would be absurd to claim that

anyone can do this without any preparation at all; if you are goingto do what I am recommending, you will need some preparation.I do not mean course work; I am not sure that taking courses in thehistory or philosophy of science is required of you. I think it will haveto be done in your spare time through your general reading. Youalways read books in science; you might as well choose every fifthbook or so to be a book in history or philosophy of science. Notice thatyou do not have to be an authority in these fields. All you want is alittle background, because you are not going to be the lecturer; youare not going to be the authority figure. You really do not have toknow the right answers, which is a good thing because often there areno right answers. Here is a brief reading list, with no comments, forthose of you who would like to begin building a background:A History of the Sciences, S. F. Mason (originally published as Mainstream of

Scientific Thought)The Scientific Revolution, A. R. HallThe Edge of Objectivity, C. C. GillispieThe Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, H. ProschThe Conceptual Foundations of Scientific Thought, M. Wartofsky


The Sociology of Science, B. Barber and W. HirschIssues in Science and Religion, I. Barbour

I think if you read these seven books in the next two years you willgain sufficient background to be the organizer of some historical orphilosophical studies in science.

I think one ought to see to it that your school library stocks ma-terials in the history and philosophy of science as well as materials inscience itself. You might even establish a classroom library.What would it look like if we did implement this enterprise? Let us

consider the cell theory in biology as an example, and contrast itbriefly with alternative approaches. The straight approach to celltheory would probably be: "This is a cell. Here is a picture of one;here are its parts." You undoubtedly have an overhead transparency.You might even have an 8 mm. film loop showing one-celled animalsmoving around. You would name the parts, etc. Certainly you wouldwant to get the students up there looking in microscopes at prettystained slides, carefully chosen so that the cell and its parts are clearlyapparent. There is nothing wrong with this�except that it is boring.Perhaps that is the problem: that it is boring just to learn the namesof things.The case history approach to cell theory can be a pedagogic

disaster, too. Here is an example from a biology textbook that is quitegood when it deals with strictly biological topics.3... It is pertinent to use the growth of the modern cell doctrine, or cell principle,to illustrate the steps by which an accumulation of facts may lead to formulationof a hypothesis, and the hypothesis become established as an accepted principle.

1. The Accumulation of Observations. This step began soon after the inventionof the microscope, and was doubtless long retarded by the slow development ofsatisfactory microscopes. Robert Hooke (1635-1703) first observed cellular struc-ture in cork and other plant tissues; . . .[a brief reference to Malpighi (1628-1694)]. Other students of plant and animal structures from time to time saw andmentioned that various parts of their specimens were composed microscopicunits, which they called by various names and interpreted in various fashions.

I cannot resist breaking into this account to remark that the lastsentence above is so vague it cannot be very meaningful to students.Actually the observations collected from Hooke to Schwann are veryinteresting. Some of them were due to spherical aberration. In somecases experimenters were not observing cells; they were observingcircles of confusion. Incidentally, I, for one, doubt that the slow de-velopment of the microscope was such an important ^retarding^factor. Compound microscopes had their problems, but simple mi-croscopes were quite powerful.

2. The Statement of a Hypothesis. In 1839 two men, the botanist Schleiden andthe zoologist Schwann, announced the hypothesis that ’all organized bodies are

« Rogers, Hubbell, and Byers, Man and the Biological World, 2nd ed. (McGraw-HilI, 19521.


composed of essentially similar parts, namely, of cells . . . / They came to thisconclusion partly from the work of others and partly from their own investiga-tions. They had examined a very large number of plant and animal parts in aspecial search for cellular structure.

Is it necessary to point out that the authors of this text had saidearlier that the accumulation of facts led to the formulation of thehypothesis, and now they (correctly) say that Schwann had thehypothesis before he sought out facts?Yet wherever Schleiden and Schwann had made a careful microscopic examina-tion they had found cells, . . .

This statement is just false. Not all tissues are composed of cells;they all come from cells, but are not made of them. There is alsoconsiderable amount of inter-cellular material. All of this was care-fully reported by Schwann himself.

3. Corrections, Modifications, and Extensions of the Original Hypothesis. Thepublished hypothesis of Schleiden and Schwann stressed the importance of cellsand at once attracted the attention of many other microscopists. New observa-tions were made, many more materials were examined, and the structure of thecell itself was scrutinized. . . .

4. Establishment of the Corrected Hypothesis. By about 1860, as the result of theobservations and experiments of many talented workers, the cell theory had beenrestated somewhat as follows: . . . [Here is a general statement of the basicprinciples of modern (1952) cell theory] . . .

First of all, it is not meaningful to students to begin with Hookelooking at cells. It does not mean anything to them. So what! "Idon’t want to know what a man back in the 17th century did. I wantto know what the truth is today. Don7! give me a lot of that oldstuff." So I would suggest that, if you introduce historical material,you begin by emphasizing the importance of the cell theory for today.What are the consequences of adopting the cell theory; what did itlead to? You might refer to such things as the germ theory of disease,explanation of heredity, assistance in understanding how organsfunction, etc.The second step would be to look at the discovery itself. That is,

why him�why Schwann? Who was he? Why did he make it? Why didhe make it then? Why wasn’t done earlier? Most people are going tosay that the microscopes weren’t good enough. That is not entirelytrue, as I suggested earlier. Why there? Why in Germany? Why in hisparticular laboratory’ Was there something unusual about Germanbiological science in the 1830’s? Now none of this is a chronologicaldevelopment, but you are going to have to refer back to what occurredearlier to get some answers to these questions.The next step is to look more closely at the matrix within which

this discovery took place. First is the matrix of biological thought.What did they believe before the cell theory? What about Bichat’s


theory of tissues�the 21 different tissues in the animal body? Thiswas the current biological theory. It was this theory that was beingoverthrown. There is a lot more in the background of biologicalthought. I just cite this as a single example.What was the situation in chemistry in the 1830^? What had just

happened? Wohler had just synthesized urea from inorganic sub-stances. Organic substances could be synthesized from inorganicchemicals! This had tremendous implications for the problem of life.Chemical atomism (Dalton^s theory) was becoming more and moresuccessful. The theme of atomism that pervaded 17th century physicshad come into chemistry and was just about to invade biology.What about physics? What fantastic discoveries were there just

prior to the 1830’s in physics? Voltaic electricity had been establishedat the beginning of the 19th century. Not only could one get elec-tricity from chemicals, but the Seebeck effect had just been discovered�in Germany. You could take two different metals, put them to-gether, heat one end and cool the other end, and get electricity. Heatcould produce electricity! No chemical interaction; just a heat dif-ferential. You can get new forces arising from combinations of thingsthat do not themselves singly exhibit these forces. Volta himself,when he exhibited his battery of cells to Napoleon analogized thecolumn of plates that produced electricity to an organism. I will notfollow this anecdote any further because it gets rather scatological.Schwann himself uses a similar Voltaic-organic analogy in his Mi-croscopical Researches. He said that when the chemicals in the cellcome together there could be a power set free by the combination ofthe appropriate chemical molecules and he compares this with puttingcopper and zinc together to get electricity.

Geology: Uniformitarianism is coming up on the scene; catas-trophism is going out. The present condition of the earth can beexplained by natural causes, mechanical explanations. This was anextremely important methodological point for Schwann too. Hewanted to get away from teleological explanation and to use physicalexplanation. He wanted to explain what the cell does in terms ofmechanical forces: forces that operate, in his characterization, blindlyout of necessity. Schwann granted that the forces known to physicsand chemistry may not be sufficient; he admitted there may bespecial vital forces. But he insisted that these vital forces act blindly,not purposefully.

Issues in "extra-scientific" areas are closely related to the discoveryof the cell theory. In philosophy, the movement known as Natur-philosophie is of crucial importance. In literature, the Romanticmovement with its emphasis on the individual and on naturalism isclearly relevant here. In politics, the rising tide of liberalism in


Germany utilized for its ideology many biological metaphors, andundoubtedly such political thought had its effect on biological think-ing. We may recall the words of Virchow, the next prominent celltheorist after Schwann:I insist on my rights and therefore I respect the rights of others, this is my stand-point in life, in politics, in science. We owe it to ourselves to defend our rights be-cause this is the only guarantee of our individual development and of our influ-ence on the community.

And if political thinking has an effect on scientific thinking, we mightexpect to find differing national styles in science. Is not this a questionworth pursuing?But what sorts of student activities, what sorts of classroom ac-

tivities can implement a program of this kind? This is really where Ishould be asking you for advice and suggestions. Before I sketch out afew ideas for your consideration, I think one has to decide right awaywhat you want the students to know. What kind of behaviors wouldbe criterion behaviors here? If you want students to know facts, if youwant them to know when Robert Hooke was born and died, I think itis fairly easy to teach that: just give them a list and tell them tomemorize it. That is all there is to it. Yet it seems to me the kinds ofbehavior you want your students to exhibit after having studied thehistory or the philosophy of science is somewhat different, and it is atremendously difficult and delicate task to specify them. We can be-gin, nevertheless, with a rough rule of the thumb: students should beable to respond intelligently to questions in these areas. Now I willhave to start breaking that down a little bit more, but, as you know,when you raise an issue about which students know nothing, theycannot respond; they just look blankly at you. Well, that is not thekind of behavior we want; we want at least some kind of spark ofrecognition. How well they respond is another problem.One could begin by making reading assignments in nearly any kind

of relevant historical or philosophical material. I would like to cautionyou against the Great Book fallacy. Do not assign materials in theoriginal researches, because they are not understandable unless thereader .already knows and understands the matrix in which the workis written. I warn against trying to get students to make textualanalyses of the great works. I think that is a very tricky kind of abusiness. You will notice that the case histories that often have agreat deal of direct quotation put this quoted material in context withextensive editorial commentary. This is the only way to use this orig-inal material.You could have students research specific questions, for instance,

the development of the microscope. What is the history of the micro-scope? What kinds of things could they see, what kinds of problems


did they have? Now in a biology class you may have some people whoare really interested in physics. Send them off, appeal to their owninterests! What about the rise of nationalism and its effect on thescientists? What about the influence of Naturphilosophie on poetry�in Tennyson, for instance, or Coleridge?You could arrange a class debate between vitalists and mechanists,

or epigeneticists and preformationists. The debate would have to referto facts that bolster each particular view. You could go a little far out,and have a little playwriting. Writing a little play may sound silly,but it is fun and students do learn science. Some people have 8mmmovie cameras; you could make a short four minute dramatization ofa particular event on 8mm film, or on TV.You could have a little role playing. You could establish a dramatic

situation with no script allowed, give some students a little time (aweek or so) to prepare for it, and then proceed to act out roles in thissituation. In the summer of 1967, I worked with an experimentalclassroom, provided by Harvard Project Physics. They were to actout the problem of Galileo seeking a permit from the town council ofPisa to perform some experiments at the Leaning Tower. In thecourse of this twenty-five minute scenario, the students exhibitedtheir strengths and weaknesses in physics, history, and scientificmethodology. Not only that, but these paid volunteers became caughtup in the spirit of the play and became quite involved in the material.This was true not only for the actors, but also for the audience, whosubsequently provided an insightful critique of the show.4With no attempt at completeness, I should like to mention briefly

some other, perhaps very obvious, kinds of classroom activities. Smallgroup discussions of philosophical issues are very difficult to organize,but if it is done well, it can be a valuable learning experience. Con-structing visual displays can be an engaging student activity: photo-graphs, models of early apparatus, reproductions of famous books orarticles. There are a few (too few) good sound films in the history ofscience. One could replicate, as a demonstration or student exercise,important historical research. I think it is advisable to have a facsim-ile of the original report when doing this, in order to compare yourobservations with the reported ones. Finally, as a complete last re-sort, if you are unable to do any of the above activities, call in an out-side lecturer. A lecture is the worst possible way to present material inhistory or philosophy, so it is a last resort as far as I am concerned.Furthermore, I would like to remove any fear of yours that you mayhave to stand in front of the class and talk about something you

4 At this point in the talk, I played a few minutes of a tape recording made during the role playing session. Iwish to thank the Multimedia Systems Group of Harvard Project Physics for permission to use this material.

404School Science and Mathematics

know very little about; don5! do it. You can call upon someone fromoutside the school, or from a different department in the school, whocan talk about the topics you choose.In summary, then, this rather lengthy paper has been concerned

with four major questions, which may need further discussion. First isthe question of whether or not to use the history and philosophy ofscience in the science classroom. Secondly, if so, should the emphasisbe on echt-history and metaphysics rather than case histories andlogic? In the third place, how much time is this going to involve?There is the question of teacher preparation: will it be sufficient toread the few books I have mentioned or will much more be required ofthe teacher? Another time question relates to the problem of howmuch of the science course should be devoted to these problems, andhow, you will undoubtedly complain, can you cut any more scienceout of your present courses? Finally, of course, is the pedagogicalquestion of the kinds of student activities appropriate to this ma-terial, and in this matter I must defer to the judgment of those moreexperienced than I.

I said earlier that it was foolish to expert philosophical studies toimprove laboratory techniques. May I also say that it is foolish�evenstupid�to gauge a students achievement in each of the diverse ac-

TheoriesEcht-HistoryMetaphysics

emology

Logic

Problems

FIG. 4. The tetrahedron model of science. The concrete is at the base,while the general and abstract meet at the apex.


tivities in science solely by his performance on problem solving quizzesand written laboratory reports. I am willing to grant that one mea-sure of someone^s understanding of, say, a scientific law is his abilityto apply the law in solving a problem. I might even grant that theability to apply the law to a simple case is a necessary conditionfor a genuine understanding of the law. But I would defend theposition that being able to solve problems exhibits only a partial andincomplete understanding of scientific laws, theories, and concepts.An authentic understanding of a science requires a knowledge of the

historical and philosophical factors, in addition to what is usuallycalled, and tested as, ^scientific knowledge.?? What I am claiming isthat the distinction between ^straight science55 and history andphilosophy is invalid, that we have too narrowly defined what anunderstanding of science is. The historical and philosophical dimen-sions of science are inseparable and essential components of scienceitself. Whoever studies only science, will never understand science.

CHROMOSOME COUNT MAY PROVE INSANITYIN BLOODY CRIMES

Australian laborer Edward Hannell stabbed to death a 77-year-old widow.The jury this month acquitted him on grounds of insanity.

Daniel Hugon strangled a 62-year-old French prostitute in the Pigalle Hotel.The jury found him guilty last week but thought he should not be punishedseverely. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.Both murderers, genetically speaking, are supermales. By some little-under-

stood mistake of nature, each man was born with an extra male sex chromosome,which scientists recently have associated with a tendency toward crime.These two cases mark the first trials in which a man^s chromosomes directly con-

fronted the law, and are expected to have world-wide implications for lawyersand geneticists alike. "As far as I know this is the first time a man has beenacquitted on a murder charge because of his chromosome construction," saysDr. Digamber S. Borgaonkar, referring to the Australian case.The issue has yet to be raised in U. S. courts but may come up soon when

Richard F. Speck, convicted killer of eight Chicago nurses, appeals his deathsentence. Speck also has one male sex chromosome too many.Asked if he thinks this abnormal chromosome pattern is a justifiable defense

of crime, Dr. Borgaonkar, head of the chromosome laboratory at Johns HopkinsUniversity, replied, "I don^t know yet. I haven’t enough evidence to answerthat." But if it is used, he believes such criminals should be remanded for psy-chiatric care, "not just released to the streets."

So-called supermales have an XYY chromosome pattern, one female or Xchromosome inherited from their mothers and two male or Y chromosomes fromtheir fathers. Normally, a man has one X and one Y. (Women have an XXchromosome pattern. There seems to be in women no corresponding chromosomalaberration and genetically related tendency to crime.)

history of science: history or science

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