historical backtesting vs. real-world positions

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Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions SECOND EUBANK CONFERENCE: MODELING FINANCIAL MARKETS IN A WORLD OF FIAT MONEY John A. Dobelman Rice University October 18-19, 2010 George R. Brown School of Engineering STATISTICS

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George R. Brown School of Engineering STATISTICS. Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions. SECOND EUBANK CONFERENCE: MODELING FINANCIAL MARKETS IN A WORLD OF FIAT MONEY John A. Dobelman Rice University October 18-19, 2010. Outline. The Asset Allocation Problem - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

SECOND EUBANK CONFERENCE: MODELING FINANCIAL MARKETS IN

A WORLD OF FIAT MONEY

John A. Dobelman

Rice UniversityOctober 18-19, 2010

George R. Brown School of Engineering STATISTICS

Page 2: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

2

Page 3: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

33

Outline

• The Asset Allocation Problem

• The Equity Portfolio

• Managing the Portfolio

• Conclusion and Future Work

Page 4: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Asset Allocation

4WSJ, October 19, 2030

Page 5: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Simplified Allocation

• October 14, 2009 thru October 15, 2010:– WTC Insurance

• 32,536% 6-Yr Return

– Gold (Comex): • 28.2% 1-Year Return

– Cotton (ICE)• 63.5% 1-Year Return

– TGMP (American Power Group):• 850% 1-Yr Return

– LBSV (Liberty Silver): • 9,499,900% 1-Year Return

5

Page 6: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Best Allocation

– Powerball ($50M Jackpot):• 4,999,999,900% 1-Day return

6

LBSV Liberty Silver, OTC-BB

10/14/09 – 10/15/10

Page 7: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Market Modeling

• Primarily for Trading– Determine how much to produce/buy– Capacity allocation– Hedging application– Speculation!

• Not Necessary Necessary for LT Holding– LT holding returns → GBM model

– Given that, looking for w=(w1,…,wk)

7

Page 8: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

BAH ≠ BAH

• Active portfolio management required– "Indexes are not available for direct investment; therefore, their

performance does not reflect the expenses associated with the management of an actual portfolio.“ -DFA

• Even the E-V portfolios require rebalancing to maintain MV construction

• For– SBAH = BAH + DivMgt

– SBAH = BAH + DivMgt + Tender

– SBAH = BAH + DivMgt + Tender + Tax

– SBAH = BAH + DivMgt + Tender + Tax + Realloc8

S, :BAHS S BAH

Page 9: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Come a Long Way Since 1973

9

2

1 2

2

1

2

2 1

( , )

( ) ( )

1log( ) ( )

2

1log( ) ( )

2

rt

SX

SX

S GBM

CP C S

S

C S d Xe d

r td

t

r td d t

t

Page 10: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

ACC2010

• 2010 American Control Conference– Operations to Finance: Opportunities for

Control Theory and Application• Control Systems Methods in Finance: Modeling

and Optimal Trading, Primbs, Stanford University, and Barmish, Univ. Wisconsin

• Interfaces between control theory and finance• Dynamic hedging as a stochastic control problem• LQ and receding horizon control methodolgies

10

Page 11: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

That’s not All!

• A model of the human as a suboptimal smoother– WB Rouse - 1974 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 1974

• Trading Costs Around M&A Announcements– L Mai, BF Van Ness, RA Van Ness, 1983

• Economic prediction using neural networks: The case of IBM daily stock returns– H White - Proceedings of the IEEE International

Conference on …, 1988

• Applications of statistical physics to economic and financial topics– M Ausloos, N Vandewalle, P Boveroux, A - Physica A:

Statistical …, 199911

Page 12: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

1990’s - 2010

• “Chaos” in futures markets? A nonlinear dynamical analysis (1991)– Steven C. Blank, Journal of Futures Markets

• Components of multifractality in high-frequency stock returns (2005)– J Kwapien; Physica A: Stat Mech & Apps

• A fuzzy control model (FCM) for dynamic portfolio management– R Östermark – Fuzzy sets and Systems 1996

• Fluctuations and Market Friction in Financial Trading– Bernd Rosenow, 2001, Condensed Matter 12

Page 13: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

1990’s - 2010

• Stochastic Lotka-Volterra Systems of Competing Auto-Catalytic Agents Lead Generically to Truncated Pareto Power Wealth Distribution, Truncated Levy Distribution of Market Returns, Clustered Volatility, Booms and Crashes– Sorin Solomon (Hebrew University) Submitted on 30 Mar 1998)

Computational Finance 97

• THE JOINT PRICING OF VOLATILITY AND LIQUIDITY!– F. Bandi, C.E. Moise, and J. Russell,2008

• Liquidity skewness– R Roll, A Subrahmanyam - Journal of Banking & Finance, 2010

13

Page 14: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

1990’s - 2010

• Idiosyncratic Volatility, Stock Market Volatility, and Expected Stock Returns– Hui Guo, Robert Savickas. Journal of Business and Economic

Statistics. January 1, 2006

• A theory of power-law distributions in financial market fluctuations– X Gabaix, P Gopikrishnan, et.al. Nature 423 (2003)

• On fitting the Pareto–Levy distribution to stock market index data: Selecting a suitable cutoff value – H.F. Coronel-Brizioa, and A.R. Hernández-Montoya, Physica A:

Statistical Mechanics and its Applications Volume 354, 15 August 2005

14

Page 15: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

1990’s - 2010

• Predicting Stock Prices Using a Hybrid Kohonen Self Organizing Map (SOM)– Afolab & Olude; System Sciences, 2007. HICSS 2007– Examples of these methods are fuzzy logic, neural

network and hybridized methods such as hybrid Kohonen self organizing map (SOM), adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) etc.

– This paper presents a number of methods used to predict the stock price of the day. These methods are backpropagation, Kohonen SOM, and a hybrid Kohonen SOM...the hybrid Kohonen SOM is a better predictor compared to Kohonen SOM and backpropagation

15

Page 16: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Orthodoxy• Departures from the EMH Market Portfolio

– Market Ω=Ω– Departure 1 Ω=ΩE

– Departure 2 Ω=ΩE\Priv

– Departure 3 Ω=ΩS

– Departure 4 Ω=ΩIndex

– Departure 5 Ω→Your E-V portfolio, and – Departure 6 Ω→Your E-V portfolio, – Departure 7 Ω→ Some other portfolio P

16

ˆ, ˆ

Page 17: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Portfolio Construction

• Remark: Ω=Ωindex

– Wilshire 5000, SP500, RUT3000, Value-Line, DOW30, etc., are ALL actively determined portfolios.

– Only “recently” could you buy into a mutual fund/ETF which attempts to replicate these indexes

• Unless you inherit a portfolio, you must create one, or build one over time.

17

Page 18: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Portfolio Construction

• Fundamental analysis– Slow and time-consuming

• Technical Analysis– Value Line– O’Neil /Investors Business Daily– Efficacy in question

• Quantitative Portfolio Management– Formulation– Management– Allows statistics-based portfolio strategies

18

Page 19: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Portfolio Formulation

You Must Pick 10 Stocks

19

Page 20: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

How Much Would You Pay?

20

Page 21: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

For This?

21

Page 22: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Fundamental Analysis

22

Valuation Measures ABC DEF ABC DEF

Market Cap (intraday)5: 238.79M 2.10B Income Statement 68.60M 2.12BEnterprise Value (Oct 4, 2010)3: 185.34M 3.86B Revenue (ttm): 2.65 8.36Trailing P/E (ttm, intraday): 130.57 15.83 Revenue Per Share (ttm): 3.00% 8.00%Forward P/E (fye Dec 31, 2011)1: 29.48 13.71 Qtrly Revenue Growth (yoy): 50.14M 421.18MPEG Ratio (5 yr expected)1: 2.81 1.49 Gross Profit (ttm): 4.77M 508.55MPrice/Sales (ttm): 3.59 1.01 EBITDA (ttm): 1.83M 136.66MPrice/Book (mrq): 4.25 1.46 Net Income Avl to Common (ttm): 0.07 0.54Enterprise Value/Revenue (ttm)3: 2.7 1.82 Diluted EPS (ttm): N/A 74.40%Enterprise Value/EBITDA (ttm)3: 38.84 7.58 Qtrly Earnings Growth (yoy):

Financial Highlights Balance Sheet 60.77M 152.24MTotal Cash (mrq): 2.33 0.62

Fiscal Year Total Cash Per Share (mrq): 0 1.86BFiscal Year Ends: 31-Dec 31-Dec Total Debt (mrq): N/A 125.54Most Recent Quarter (mrq): 30-Jun-10 30-Jun-10 Total Debt/Equity (mrq): 2.51 1.03

Current Ratio (mrq): 2.21 5.97Profitability Book Value Per Share (mrq):Profit Margin (ttm): 2.67% 6.46%Operating Margin (ttm): 5.01% 16.10% Cash Flow Statement 9.40M 346.98M

Operating Cash Flow (ttm): 3.97M 263.52MManagement Effectiveness Levered Free Cash Flow (ttm):Return on Assets (ttm): 2.47% 2.50%Return on Equity (ttm): 3.40% 9.61%

Page 23: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Fundamental Analysis

23

Variable ABC DEF Variable ABC DEF

Shares Outstanding 25.8 280.2 F1 Sales 61.55 2280.60 Market Cap 506.2 3,936.2 F2 Sales 78.43 2294.00 Avg $M Volume 3.13 9.72 LTG #N/A 11.50 Closing Price 19.6 14.1 EPS NTM 0.45 0.57 Act. Price 19.6 14.1 FY1 EPS 0.41 0.51 Exchange NYSE NYSE FY2 EPS 0.47 0.60 Ind Name Software & ProgrammingPersonal Services FY3 EPS 0.59 #N/A F0 Sales Hist 2.2 7.7 F1 CFOPS 10.58 #N/A F0 Sales IBES Act 62.1 2,285.3 F1 FCF 9.03 291.71Working Capital Ann 27.6 -169.6 F0/F1 Sales Growth -0.87 -0.33Working Capital Qtr 28.1 -73.2 F1/F2 Sales Growth 27.75 1.73 LTD $M 0.0 1,779.8 Price to Book 17.75 2.50 BV PS 1.1 5.6 Price to Sales 0.32 0.01 EV $M 506.2 5,716.1 Price to Free Cash Flow 40.73 20.16 DA LTM 0.05 0.44 TTM PE 43.30 16.45 DA Annual 0.05 0.35 NTM PE 43.60 24.65 DA PS 0.05 0.44 F1 PE 47.85 27.55 CAPX LTM 0.08 0.54 F2 PE 41.74 23.42 CAPX Annual 0.04 0.36 F0 Yield 2.31 6.08 CAPX PS 0.08 0.54 F1 Yield 2.09 3.63 EBIT $M Ann 6.83 260.30 F2 Yield 2.40 4.27 EBIT $M Qtr 9.61 325.35 EPS NTM/TTM 6.57 123.57 EBITDA $M 8.10 356.99 F0/F1 -9.52 -40.27 EPS LTM 0.42 0.25 F1/F2 14.63 17.65 F0 EPS 0.45 0.85 F2/F3 25.53 #N/A FCF $M Ann. 12.43 195.26 EBIT/Tang Capital 24.77 -153.47 FCF $M LTM -29.48 204.01 EBIT/Tang Capital TTM 34.13 -444.77 ROE 95.45 4.63 EBIT/EV 1.35 4.55 Dividend Yield 40.77 1.14 EBIT/EV TTM 1.90 5.69

Page 24: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Fundamental Approach

24

Page 25: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

25

Outliers/Outliars

Page 26: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

BAH with the Greats

• Benjamin Graham

• Criteria for Defensive Investor 12/31/70– Size: 100M sales (326M today)– Financial Strength: CR 2:1, LTD<WC – Positive EPS in last 10 years– 20 years of uninterrupted dividends – Min 33% EPS growth in 10 years– PE < 15 for last 3 years average EPS– P/BV < 15-22

26

Page 27: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Graham Portfolio

• As of 12/31/1970, this was the portoflio– AC, American Can– T, AT&T– A, Anaconda – SWX, Swift– Z, F.W. Woolworth

• Bring up to the present– 1/4/1971 - End

27

Page 28: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Graham Portfolio

28

Company Name and Archeology Dates Changes

AMERICAN CAN CO 1960-1988Commercial Credit/ PRIMERICA CORP

NEW/Travelers/Citigroup Inc.Commercial Credit/ PRIMERICA CORP

NEW/Travelers/Citigroup Inc. 1988-2009 Citigroup owns all of travelersAMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEG CO 1960-2005 SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP

SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP/ATT 2009 Renamed the entirety ATTANACONDA CO 1960-1970 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 1970-2000 BRITISH PETROLEUM LTD/BP PLCBRITISH PETROLEUM LTD/BP PLC 2000-2009 Anaconda holds the EPA liability

SWIFT & CO/Esmark 1960-1984 Sold to Beatrice Beatrice Foods 1984-1986 Private with KKR 3/31/1986

WOOLWORTH F W CO/Venator Group/Foot Locker 1960-2009 Woolworths purchases KinneyWoolworths forms VenatorKinney becomes the base for Foot LockerVenator falls completely under Foot locker

Price (10/10/10) Last SplitC 4.17 8/28/2000T 28.28 5/20/1998BP 41.42 10/4/1999FL 15.64 6/1/1990

Page 29: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Graham BAH Results

29

CAGR from 1971Thru 12/31/2009: 4.13%Thru 10/10/2010: 4.09%

Original DOW 30 from 1971Components unchanged 1956-19765 gone, only 14 continuously traded

Original DOW 30 from 1/3/2000Thru 10/10/2010: 4.59%

Indexes from 1/3/2000 thru 10/10/10DJIAK -0.29% DOXIK 2.04% SP50 -2.03% SP50.R -0.24%

Page 30: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

10-Yr S&P 500 Returns

30

10-Year, SPX Ex-Div

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.00

0.04

0.08

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.0

0.4

0.8

Cumulative Probability

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

10-Year, SPX Div

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.00

0.04

0.08

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.0

0.4

0.8

Cumulative Probability

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

Page 31: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

30-Yr S&P 500 Returns

31

30-Year, SPX Ex-Div

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.0

0.4

0.8

Cumulative Probability

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

30-Year, SPX Div

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

0.0

0.4

0.8

Cumulative Probability

IRR%

Pro

port

ion

Page 32: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Horizon Dependence

32

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of SP500 Ex-Div

Horizon in Years

IRR

%

°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of SP500

Horizon in Years

IRR

%

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of GE Ex-Div

Horizon in Years

IRR

%

°°°°

°°°

°°°

°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of GE

Horizon in Years

IRR

%

°°°°

°°°

°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of SP500 Eq-Wt, ExDiv

Horizon in Years

IRR

% °°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

0 20 40 60 80

05

1015

20

IRR of SP500 Eq-Wt

Horizon in Years

IRR

%

°°°°°°

°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

Page 33: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Benchmark Summaries

33

Ja Mr Ma Jl Se Nv

-40

040

80

1-Year, SPX Ex-DivIR

R%

Ja Mr Ma Jl Se Nv

-40

040

80

5-Year, SPX Ex-Div

IRR

%

Ja Mr Ma Jl Se Nv

-15

-55

15

10-Year, SPX Ex-Div

IRR

%

Ja Mr Ma Jl Se Nv

-15

-55

15

30-Year, SPX Ex-DivIR

R%

Page 34: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Benchmarks

• 50-Year Real Returns of 7% (Siegel, 2002)

– 1802 – 1870 (Schwert)

– 1871 – 1925 (Cowles)

– 1926 – 2001 (CRSP, all NYSE/AMEX/NASD)

– Post WWII 1946 – 2001 • Most inflation has been during this period

34

SP500: Horizon Returns Equity Index Benchmarks: 1999-2009Jan 1926 - Dec 2009 132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years (1/4/99 Thru 10/15/10)

Index Min Q1 Med Q3 Max5 Years: -19.5 5.0 10.79 16.1 36.010 Years: -6.2 6.8 11.03 15.6 21.520 Years: 1.3 8.3 11.71 14.1 18.430 Years: 7.4 10.3 11.01 12.5 14.750 Years: 7.2 10.5 11.19 12.1 14.0

Page 35: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Benchmarks

35

Page 36: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Benchmarks

36

Equity Index Benchmarks: 1999-2009132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years (1/4/99 Thru 10/15/10)

Index Avg% Avg L3Y Worst TotNegS&P 500 0.37 -2.9 -46.34 -932.3Russell 2000 5.48 -0.8 -46.37 -757.8Russell 3000 1.22 -2.3 -46.64 -921.4Universe Return 7.72 3.5 -50.41 -802.1DOW 30 2.54 -1.2 -43.43 -660.0DOW 30 Ex-Div 0.19 -3.9 -45.13 -743.4S&P 500 Ex-Div -1.43 -5.0 -47.70 -1004.9

Page 37: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Return by Period

37

Benchmarks by Fiscal Period [DRD 10-16-10]1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009

Index Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec AvgS&P 500 1.05 0.45 0.83 0.53 0.20 0.48 -1.40 0.13 -0.20 0.93 0.65 0.86 0.37

19990104 15.40 12.10 12.99 17.27 5.77 13.33 6.60 9.64 15.60 13.27 6.18 -4.82 10.28

20000103 -6.32 -1.40 -8.97 -25.68 -12.74 -11.96 -14.99 -14.42 -24.54 -25.87 -22.74 -12.24 -15.16

20010102 -8.81 -17.20 -7.56 0.57 -13.03 -14.18 -22.21 -26.17 -19.95 -17.11 -15.60 -17.21 -14.87

20020102 -19.98 -22.47 -24.39 -23.79 -14.12 -4.94 3.28 12.83 19.07 22.29 18.76 16.23 -1.44

20030102 24.16 34.43 40.36 34.20 22.94 18.40 16.92 14.34 11.37 13.06 9.83 13.30 21.11

20040102 11.22 6.92 6.55 5.44 5.76 9.20 7.71 14.45 12.45 10.56 8.30 8.10 8.89

20050103 7.50 9.83 8.70 12.45 15.10 8.95 8.34 4.81 9.37 10.84 15.91 12.54 10.36

20060103 13.81 14.93 10.74 12.92 16.02 21.75 21.37 17.51 14.50 18.35 12.37 8.02 15.19

20070103 4.10 -1.67 -3.35 -2.10 -3.28 -7.05 -15.26 -12.23 -15.17 -23.34 -34.38 -39.46 -12.76

20080102 -34.06 -39.37 -46.34 -39.23 -36.07 -29.95 -26.18 -19.51 -19.98 -8.90 11.06 39.34 -20.77

20090102 22.57 36.86 63.14 48.40 38.09 15.92 13.55 14.04 10.45 13.57 15.03 7.91 24.96

Russell 2000 5.15 4.70 5.83 6.67 5.58 5.39 3.19 4.96 4.88 6.08 6.54 6.84 5.4819990104 15.11 19.85 51.20 36.91 15.82 14.01 15.15 14.25 27.15 24.49 15.98 1.92 20.99

20000103 -1.43 2.28 -18.53 -16.17 -4.23 3.25 -3.94 -0.24 -12.29 -20.32 -10.89 2.33 -6.68

20010102 6.86 -4.34 2.49 15.40 5.59 -1.54 -11.93 -19.37 -15.40 -6.16 -10.61 -11.09 -4.17

20020102 -18.30 -21.38 -23.56 -25.85 -20.76 -5.03 1.82 22.05 36.67 37.83 39.64 37.32 5.04

20030102 44.72 58.41 66.60 63.37 41.95 31.03 31.08 19.04 11.51 18.22 11.90 17.36 34.60

20040102 17.49 10.10 8.59 3.92 4.58 10.26 11.74 26.24 22.44 15.51 10.85 8.50 12.52

20050103 8.08 18.48 17.63 26.57 32.53 19.41 13.97 2.20 9.20 8.38 18.34 14.51 15.77

20060103 16.46 11.13 7.83 8.21 8.54 17.28 17.47 14.12 11.20 17.14 6.99 -0.55 11.32

20070103 -4.23 -8.46 -12.19 -10.20 -9.45 -11.19 -19.39 -6.71 -9.04 -17.46 -31.44 -39.40 -14.93

20080102 -31.83 -38.33 -46.37 -38.58 -32.11 -27.68 -23.87 -20.91 -23.42 -11.58 7.75 43.57 -20.28

20090102 25.56 38.67 78.86 61.59 49.12 24.55 18.40 17.39 13.45 17.88 26.59 20.69 32.73

Page 38: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

QPM

• Anomalies Research

• Ripe with Outperformance Goal– Market Outperformance: 433,000– "Seeking Alpha“: 922,000

• Poor performance of mutual funds

• Quantitative Portfolio Management– Matching market index– Outperforming market index – “Beat the Index”

38

Page 39: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

QPM

• Characterized by lots of data

• Long look-back periods

• Backtesting

• Pitfalls– Bad data– Biases – Datamining– Transaction costs

39

Page 40: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Statistical QPM

• Lots and lots of quantitative funds– Good job prospects, BTW: E.g.,

• Quantitative Portfolio Analyst - Asset Manager for a Leading Hedge Fund

– Diversification and expansion has seen them create a traditional asset management fund.

– New York; Up to $200k + standard benefits and excellent bonus potential

• Options Strategy

• Public Domain

• Simugram40

Page 41: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

41

Time Value Option Sales

Cash, 10% Draw, 1-Strike

Time

$M

1990 1995 2000 2005

-20

24

6

Cash, 35% Draw, 1-Strike

Time

$M

1990 1995 2000 2005

-20

24

6

Cash, 45% Draw, 1-Strike

Time

$M

1990 1995 2000 2005

-3-2

-10

1

Cash, 65% Draw, 1-Strike

Time

$M

1990 1995 2000 2005

-3-2

-10

1

Page 42: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

MaxMedian Rule

42

Performance

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 10 20 30 40 50

Years Since Purchase

Valu

e o

f In

itia

l D

ollar

at

Tim

e

T-Bill

S&P 500

MaxMedian

#REF!

Page 43: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Simugram

43

Page 44: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Simugram

44

SPX OEX Simugram2001 -10.5% -12.4% -15.0%2002 -23.8% -24.5% -23.3%2003 22.3% 19.9% 24.3%2004 9.3% 4.6% 13.7%2005 3.8% 22.2%2006 11.8% 15.7%

Page 45: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Fundamentals QPM

• Graham-Dodd on Steroids

• Exploit available data

• Try and sell for OPM

• Examples:– O'Shaughnessy– Greenblatt– Homegrown

• What happens in real life

45

Page 46: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

James P. O'Shaughnessy

• c1920: Ignatius Aloysius O'Shaughnessy– $110 million, I A O'Shaughnessy Foundation– Avoided 20’s stocks, fed his own companies– 66 years > $10M > $5.4B (at 10%)

• 1960: Jim O'Shaughnessy's Investment Horizon began

• 1986: BA Econ, University of Minnesota– Began work at the family's VC firm

• 1988: O'Shaughnessy Capital Mgmt, Inc.– Consulting to Institutional Investors

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Page 47: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

O'Shaughnessy (CONT’D)

47

• 1995: Compustat (Standard & Poor's)

• 1996: Cornerstone Growth and Value Funds

• 1997: "What Works on Wall Street“, RBC

• 2000: Sold Cornerstone to Hennessey – $200M Assets as of 6/30/00

• 2001: Sold O'Shaughnessy Capital to BSC– About $500M

• 2005: Updated WWOWS

Page 48: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

O'Shaughnessy (CONT’D)

48

• 3Q2007: O'Shaughnessy Asset Mgmt, LLC– Unwound in BSCM sale to JPM– Taking $8B out BSAM's $44B

• Strategy– Benchmark: RUT2000– No regard for sector– Growth: EPS Growth, 52W Price Increase, P/S– Value: Div Yield, LTM P/S , LTM P/CF

Page 49: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

O'Shaughnessy (CONT’D)

• Dreyfus Premier Alpha Growth Fund– 1,600 companies– 300 largest-market-cap– 130 after P/E, 52W Price Incr, then by P/S– Quarterly validation– Dumping rules

• loss of 50% of market value• takeover that doesn't meet the screens' criteria• allegations of fraud• bankruptcy

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Page 50: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

O'Shaughnessy-esgue

• Recall 11-year benchmarks:

50

Equity Index Benchmarks: 1999-2009132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years (1/4/99 Thru 10/15/10)

Index Avg% Avg L3Y Worst TotNegS&P 500 0.37 -2.9 -46.34 -932.3Russell 2000 5.48 -0.8 -46.37 -757.8Russell 3000 1.22 -2.3 -46.64 -921.4Universe Return 7.72 3.5 -50.41 -802.1DOW 30 2.54 -1.2 -43.43 -660.0DOW 30 Ex-Div 0.19 -3.9 -45.13 -743.4S&P 500 Ex-Div -1.43 -5.0 -47.70 -1004.9

Page 51: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

P/S Backtest

51

0 20 40 60 80 100

20

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Number of Securities

12

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IRR

Best Factor Collation IRR, 132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years: 1999-2009

Filter: P/S Top 25%

0 20 40 60 80 100

-60

-55

-50

-45

Number of Securities

Ma

x D

raw

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Worst Drawdown by Portfolio Size

Page 52: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Starting and Stopping Times

• Backtested 1950 thru 1996 (47 years)

• Selected best factors (e.g., P/S)

• Started his funds

• Got lucky? In 4 years up about 166% vs. 75% for the market

• Got lucky? Sold to Hennessey at peak

• Got bad rap, 2000-2002 worse than market

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Page 53: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

HFCGX

• Hennessy Cornerstone Growth HFCGX– 10 Year return: 3.29%– Expenses: 1.36%

• “Net”: 1.93%• DOW: 1.7%• SP500: 0.74%• Dow Div: 4%• SP500 Div: 2.5%

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Page 54: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

HFCGX

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Page 55: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Rules of the Game

• How much can your investors stomach

• Restrictions on redemptions

• Success begets loyalty

• Success depends on starting time

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Page 56: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Another Example

• 10 year horizon

• Backtested 99-06, 12 fiscal periods (without drawdown constraint)

• Selected best factors (Screen#1)

• Out-of-sample returns were still good; (encouraging)

• Drawdowns horrible

• Developed Screen#2 with drawdown constraint

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Page 57: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Real Example, CONT’D

• In 99-06 backtest, best return factor had drawdowns of:– Screen#1 31%– Screen#2 20%

• In 99-09 OOS sample testing, best return factors remained the same (and equal IRR’s of 33-34%), but with drawdowns of:– Screen#1 79.9%– Screen#2 39%

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Page 58: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Out of Sample

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0 20 40 60 80 100

2030

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RR

Best Factor Collation IRR, 132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years: 1999-2009

Filter: Factor1<xx, Factor4>yy, Factor5<>zz

0 20 40 60 80 100

-80

-60

-40

Number of Securities

Max

Dra

wdo

wn

Worst Drawdown by Portfolio Size

0 20 40 60 80 100

2030

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Best Factor Collation IRR, 132 Fiscal Periods (Ja-Dc), 11 Years: 1999-2009

Filter: Factor1 Top 30%, Factor2 Top 35%, Factor3>0

0 20 40 60 80 100

-60

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Max

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Page 59: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

Keeping in the Game

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Filter: Factor1<xx, Factor4>yy, Factor5<>zz

Name Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec AvgRHSFactor6 32.45 36.25 30.09 23.82 25.77 21.05 30.21 35.00 34.63 43.61 42.33 41.40 33.05

year_1999 8.54 125.07 117.67 30.38 5.12 3.15 17.01 23.12 6.87 9.29 14.12 20.95 31.77year_2000 69.46 32.97 32.27 8.09 44.11 48.27 51.57 42.48 54.47 39.66 60.71 25.65 42.47year_2001 10.14 13.10 -5.09 33.96 53.18 55.60 32.33 -0.23 15.12 49.87 39.21 58.17 29.61year_2002 10.85 -21.50 -29.21 -26.52 -15.67 5.68 46.32 99.41 118.69 238.18 143.15 63.81 52.77year_2003 87.31 110.91 212.25 127.27 74.51 78.52 90.81 124.89 62.32 105.99 79.04 97.06 104.24year_2004 51.23 46.83 13.51 -5.61 -1.33 4.66 -3.48 33.33 23.15 29.80 15.44 28.29 19.65year_2005 18.75 32.92 37.45 57.80 44.54 37.60 42.02 4.91 21.87 10.40 41.28 60.38 34.16year_2006 88.82 66.65 60.05 44.98 38.69 49.83 68.81 77.16 86.74 89.90 50.98 38.62 63.44year_2007 31.90 25.33 12.07 6.93 0.81 -28.50 -15.07 -5.08 -20.57 -38.38 -59.26 -70.23 -13.34year_2008 -56.92 -62.17 -79.87 -75.81 -55.24 -52.48 -36.41 -17.52 3.94 24.28 140.75 242.93 -2.04year_2009 171.56 247.59 430.59 495.48 308.04 144.14 112.84 64.76 52.32 38.34 50.90 62.92 181.62

Filter: Factor1 Top 30%, Factor2 Top 35%, Factor3>0

Name Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec AvgRHSFactor7 39.50 34.35 39.72 41.27 37.91 29.91 28.28 29.46 26.33 31.48 32.65 37.86 34.06

year_1999 14.57 9.38 29.58 69.51 7.95 -14.68 9.03 10.31 3.71 -4.25 -20.38 1.29 9.67year_2000 -3.63 16.39 41.96 28.25 54.91 94.34 71.22 56.24 32.93 8.92 46.77 40.81 40.76year_2001 125.97 25.58 27.28 55.97 63.36 55.64 32.34 31.20 32.27 44.02 19.32 12.40 43.78year_2002 13.47 -5.92 0.34 10.52 1.62 16.68 30.25 77.92 87.24 159.00 76.70 100.23 47.34year_2003 92.33 126.84 118.86 155.65 105.08 63.70 73.04 52.13 28.36 73.63 73.96 34.15 83.14year_2004 55.39 43.42 30.54 16.34 30.21 31.96 31.51 31.51 50.10 43.21 38.33 22.31 35.40year_2005 12.85 23.75 22.02 29.02 91.88 45.62 41.81 22.77 48.99 13.57 23.45 22.97 33.22year_2006 36.42 23.63 31.59 23.50 28.17 55.58 54.49 45.04 48.14 59.66 48.36 43.98 41.55year_2007 37.40 28.03 28.44 15.28 6.42 -0.92 -15.46 13.43 -8.21 -17.96 -32.95 -34.77 1.56year_2008 -25.54 -32.47 -39.91 -35.29 -24.43 -27.23 -17.39 -16.03 -15.52 9.83 144.49 329.60 20.84year_2009 192.09 297.56 376.27 237.65 134.08 67.31 38.23 25.39 16.19 27.49 21.61 22.87 121.39

Page 60: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

SYWTBAMM?

• Survival

• This is not an easy undertaking

• Survival depends on your starting time and redemption restrictions

• Young funds can have the least restrictive redemption requirements

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Page 61: Historical Backtesting vs. Real-World Positions

61

A Special Thanks To:

• Eubank Benefactors

• Profs. J.R. Thompson and E.E. Williams

• K.B. Ensor, Chair of CoFES

• TRU – Dept. of Statistics

• Collaborators