high-living hogs squander aid funds

1
T he explosion at Kabul’s luxurious Serena Hotel several weeks ago sent shock waves around the thriving international community in the dusty Afghan capital. In a cold, muddy and impoverished city in which not much functions, the five-star Serena was an oasis of joy – as long as you could afford to go in, of course. The Sere- na was built, not for Afghans, but for the wealthy expats with bulging expense accounts who queue up to get past the armed guards at the gates of the hotel com- pound. Inside, the parking lot is always filled with bulky 4x4s from one or other of the hundreds of international aid agen- cies, security companies and consultancies that have flocked to make money out of Afghanistan. I know, because last year, I was one of them. It is no consolation to the eight people who lost their lives in the capital’s suicide bombing but, in many ways, the conspicu- ous consumption on show at the Serena encapsulates the sheer folly, unchecked greed and commercial self-interest of the western rebuilding effort in Afghanistan. The Serena was built by the Aga Khan Foundation and does good work in training local people and its profits fuel local char- itable projects. It also gives jobs to women. But, on Fridays, the start of the week- end, its tables are packed out with western- ers. On offer is everything from sushi to gourmet Cantonese food – at a price. There is airport-style security before you enter a vast, bright central lobby – where last year I ran into Tim Spicer, the former British Army officer who now runs one of the world’s biggest private armies. Inside the hotel grounds, there are terraces and a garden, a pool and expensive spa with every treatment you could need. Rooms run to £150 (about R2 000) a night and a meal without alcohol – the Serena is “dry” – would cost about £20 (about R300), almost a month’s wages for a local in this, the fourth-poorest country in the world. And here is the rub. First-world govern- ments pour billions of dollars into Afghanistan each year, ostensibly to fix a country reduced to little more than rubble by three decades of warfare culminating in the 2001 United States-led invasion. But little actually reaches infrastruc- ture projects or the Afghan people who need it most. Instead, it is too often frit- tered away in an insane and immoral money-go-round, where multimillion- pound contracts are awarded to multibil- lion-pound western corporations, who recommend that yet more western con- sultants are needed. Last year, I was recruited by the inter- national public relations firm Hill and Knowlton to work in Kabul for three months. The company has an excellent worldwide reputation for its expertise in communications strategy for govern- ments, corporations and major brands. It had been awarded a contract by the US state department to advise three Afghan ministries – the ministry of the interior, the ministry of agriculture, and the ministry of rural rehabilitation and development. I was employed as a senior adviser. I was thrilled to go to Afghanistan, and keen to do my job, but I made no secret of the fact that the only skills I had to offer were those of a journalist. On my first day in Kabul, I was asked to outline my media strategy for the ministry of rural rehabil- itation and development (MRRD). It was a ludicrous demand I could not meet. The MRRD had a sophisticated minis- ter. The two young local men who worked in his press office were smart, energetic, ambitious and trying really hard. They had an excellent command of English and seemed dedicated to getting Afghanistan on the road to recovery. My advising them, I soon realised, was a bad and extremely expensive joke. One of their most important tasks was to help in the war on opium production which, by some estimates, now accounts for 90 percent of the economy of Afghanistan. Under guidance from the US state department, H&K’s big idea was to run poster campaigns and radio advertise- ments telling dirt-poor farmers who strug- gled to feed their families that opium pro- duction was un-Islamic – clearly a policy designed by foreign consultants addicted to spin, rather than anyone with a real grasp of the region. Millions have been spent on a useless and unco-ordinated counter-narcotics policy, while the farmers who grow the pop- pies have little alternative means of earn- ing a living. The crop is 10 times more prof- itable than wheat. While the western governments claim to be eradicating the source of illegal nar- cotics, the heroin trade in Afghanistan is increasing year on year. It has become so pervasive that it now infects every level of society. In the Sherpur district of Kabul, there is a new rash of grand and gaudy houses being built on the back of drug money. The style has been called, inevitably perhaps, “narcotecture”. And the effect of our anti-drug adverts? Precisely nothing. Millions of pounds of other people’s money were spent when there appeared to me to be no overall strat- egy. Why not, for example, simply buy the Afghan opium crop to solve the world shortage of pharmaceutical morphine? I still maintain that public relations has an important part to play in the recon- struction of Afghanistan – winning hearts and minds and providing information to the people of a shattered country is impor- tant. It is also true that – as I soon discov- ered in Kabul – we in the developed world take PR skills and our established mass communications networks for granted. But, while H&K has a good worldwide reputation, it is unlikely to be as highly thought of in Kabul – ultimately H&K lost the contract. My guess is that is because many of the people I worked with there – both Americans and British – seemed not to be interested in seeing results or bring- ing about useful change in a country des- perate for both. They, like so many other contractors there, wanted to make money, capture new and even more lucrative business con- tracts and live high on the hog. While many westerners do live in harsh and aus- tere conditions, expat life was a whirlwind of alcohol-fuelled private parties, evenings at international restaurants or functions hosted by diplomats, NGOs or other inter- national bodies. Though that has come to a standstill since the bombing, and there are many who are not allowed off their premises and live in severely restricted conditions. There was much concern among expats last year when the city’s red wine stock suddenly dried up – not for long. The demand is far too high and the profits too large for a long-term alcohol drought. Afghans aren’t allowed in the dozens of restaurants that serve alcohol – mostly dis- creetly run by foreigners and operating by word-of-mouth recommendations – and the growing number of bars operating in pri- vate homes. Most can’t even dream of pay- ing the prices charged by places such as the Serena Hotel. But what do all these westerners achieve? When I lived at one of the two H&K houses – like many Afghan homes, they were low, airy buildings set in walled, private gardens behind heavy gates, staffed with unarmed guards – the company’s main boss in Afghanistan was hardly ever present. He roamed the world looking for new business, which never seemed to mate- rialise. In my view, you cannot successful- ly manage a multimillion-dollar pro- gramme, one thought to be vital to the country and central to the western govern- ments’ strategy to reduce heroin produc- tion, and simply not be there for most of the time. On his occasional visits to Kabul, he said in front of Afghans that you had to “treat them like children”. What a shame they understood English. But H&K isn’t the only one. The Rendon Group, USAID, and the Lincoln Group all charge vast amounts for their executive expertise. With these large multimillion- pound contracts, lots of the money goes to keeping the contractors in a cushy life. Many of the contractors have drivers, cooks, cleaners, generators, security guards. All these posts employ Afghans who need work, and who get paid better- than-average salaries. It is good accounting practice, of course. The more local people you had on your books, the more money you made for the company. But appalled expats and sources within the Afghan government estimated that 80 percent of the interna- tional aid money is frittered away on over- heads and multinationals’ profits. These profits come from money ear- marked to improve the infrastructure of a desperately poor country, teach Afghans necessary skills and leave a legacy when foreigners are no longer there. I’m sure Afghanistan does have more roads, more schools and better healthcare. But with all the money that has been spent, there should be so much more to show for it. I knew I had been sent to fill a three- month gap before H&K’s contract came to an end. After about a month, I was instruct- ed by H&K not to return to the ministry. I was given the impression that H&K felt the ministry wasn’t co-operating with what they wanted to do. I ended up staying in Kabul for four months – several weeks after my contract came to an end. But one previous incum- bent was asked to leave and others left because of internal politics and one before that had been unexpectedly asked to leave. It was a dysfunctional office with strange rules. The company employed a wonderful cook, Reza, who made really delicious food. But, at lunchtime, the expats would gather in the dining room while the local Afghans we employed were given money to go elsewhere for their food. I found it incredibly awkward. It was a real privilege to have had the chance to go to Afghanistan, a bewildering- ly wonderful place. I met many expats who, like myself and some of my colleagues, genuinely cared for the people and the country and worked six days a week for eight or 10 hours a day. But others were dis- dainful of the Afghans and seemed to be there to cash in, happily enjoying a good life at the expense of the taxpayer and jus- tifying themselves by making money for their employers. Many would have strug- gled to justify their wages had they been working in Britain or America. The majority of Afghans support the rebuilding programme and welcome the international presence in their country. But while expats charge more than £1 000 a day for their services in a country where the average annual income is not much more than £250, it’s not surprising that progress is slow, resentment is growing and very few Afghans, save those on the corporate payroll, are any better off. A spokesman for Hill and Knowlton confirmed the company had two full-time workers and up to five western contractors in Afghanistan for the duration of its 12- month contract with the US state depart- ment, which ended in May 2007. “We also employed up to 20 Afghans and part of our remit was to train them in the communica- tions skills needed – everything from answering the phone and running an effec- tive office to writing press releases,” the spokesman said. “Local Afghan contractors were also used to produce publicity material for the anti-narcotics campaign. Our work was well-received by the Afghan and American governments.” High-living hogs squander aid funds War-ravaged and poverty-stricken Afghanistan attracts opportunists with an eye to quick profits, writes H e i d i K i n g s t o n e On the outside looking in: people watch authorities leaving the inauguration ceremony of the Serena Hotel, the first five-star hotel in Kabul, in November 2005. The luxurious establishment, too expensive for most Afghans to dream of patronising, was recently rocked by an explosion PHOTOGRAPH: TOMAS MUNITA, AP

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The Sunday Independent 3/2/2008

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Page 1: High-Living Hogs Squander Aid Funds

The explosion at Kabul’s luxuriousSerena Hotel several weeks agosent shock waves around thethriving international community

in the dusty Afghan capital.In a cold, muddy and impoverished city

in which not much functions, the five-starSerena was an oasis of joy – as long as youcould afford to go in, of course. The Sere-na was built, not for Afghans, but for thewealthy expats with bulging expenseaccounts who queue up to get past thearmed guards at the gates of the hotel com-pound. Inside, the parking lot is alwaysfilled with bulky 4x4s from one or other ofthe hundreds of international aid agen-cies, security companies and consultanciesthat have flocked to make money out ofAfghanistan. I know, because last year, Iwas one of them.

It is no consolation to the eight peoplewho lost their lives in the capital’s suicidebombing but, in many ways, the conspicu-ous consumption on show at the Serenaencapsulates the sheer folly, uncheckedgreed and commercial self-interest of thewestern rebuilding effort in Afghanistan.

The Serena was built by the Aga KhanFoundation and does good work in traininglocal people and its profits fuel local char-itable projects. It also gives jobs to women.

But, on Fridays, the start of the week-end, its tables are packed out with western-ers. On offer is everything from sushi togourmet Cantonese food – at a price.

There is airport-style security beforeyou enter a vast, bright central lobby –where last year I ran into Tim Spicer, theformer British Army officer who now runsone of the world’s biggest private armies.Inside the hotel grounds, there are terracesand a garden, a pool and expensive spawith every treatment you could need.Rooms run to £150 (about R2 000) a nightand a meal without alcohol – the Serena is“dry” – would cost about £20 (about R300),almost a month’s wages for a local in this,the fourth-poorest country in the world.

And here is the rub. First-world govern-ments pour billions of dollars intoAfghanistan each year, ostensibly to fix acountry reduced to little more than rubbleby three decades of warfare culminating inthe 2001 United States-led invasion.

But little actually reaches infrastruc-ture projects or the Afghan people whoneed it most. Instead, it is too often frit-tered away in an insane and immoralmoney-go-round, where multimillion-pound contracts are awarded to multibil-lion-pound western corporations, whorecommend that yet more western con-sultants are needed.

Last year, I was recruited by the inter-national public relations firm Hill andKnowlton to work in Kabul for threemonths. The company has an excellentworldwide reputation for its expertise incommunications strategy for govern-ments, corporations and major brands. Ithad been awarded a contract by the USstate department to advise three Afghanministries – the ministry of the interior,the ministry of agriculture, and theministry of rural rehabilitation anddevelopment.

I was employed as a senior adviser. Iwas thrilled to go to Afghanistan, and keento do my job, but I made no secret of thefact that the only skills I had to offer werethose of a journalist. On my first day inKabul, I was asked to outline my mediastrategy for the ministry of rural rehabil-itation and development (MRRD). It was aludicrous demand I could not meet.

The MRRD had a sophisticated minis-ter. The two young local men who workedin his press office were smart, energetic,

ambitious and trying really hard. They hadan excellent command of English andseemed dedicated to getting Afghanistanon the road to recovery. My advising them,I soon realised, was a bad and extremelyexpensive joke.

One of their most important tasks wasto help in the war on opium productionwhich, by some estimates, now accountsfor 90 percent of the economy ofAfghanistan. Under guidance from the USstate department, H&K’s big idea was torun poster campaigns and radio advertise-ments telling dirt-poor farmers who strug-gled to feed their families that opium pro-duction was un-Islamic – clearly a policydesigned by foreign consultants addicted tospin, rather than anyone with a real graspof the region.

Millions have been spent on a uselessand unco-ordinated counter-narcoticspolicy, while the farmers who grow the pop-pies have little alternative means of earn-ing a living. The crop is 10 times more prof-itable than wheat.

While the western governments claimto be eradicating the source of illegal nar-

cotics, the heroin trade in Afghanistan isincreasing year on year. It has become sopervasive that it now infects every level ofsociety. In the Sherpur district of Kabul,there is a new rash of grand and gaudyhouses being built on the back of drugmoney. The style has been called,inevitably perhaps, “narcotecture”.

And the effect of our anti-drug adverts?Precisely nothing. Millions of pounds ofother people’s money were spent whenthere appeared to me to be no overall strat-egy. Why not, for example, simply buy theAfghan opium crop to solve the worldshortage of pharmaceutical morphine?

I still maintain that public relations hasan important part to play in the recon-struction of Afghanistan – winning heartsand minds and providing information tothe people of a shattered country is impor-tant. It is also true that – as I soon discov-ered in Kabul – we in the developed worldtake PR skills and our established masscommunications networks for granted.

But, while H&K has a good worldwidereputation, it is unlikely to be as highlythought of in Kabul – ultimately H&K lost

the contract. My guess is that is becausemany of the people I worked with there –both Americans and British – seemed notto be interested in seeing results or bring-ing about useful change in a country des-perate for both.

They, like so many other contractorsthere, wanted to make money, capture newand even more lucrative business con-tracts and live high on the hog. Whilemany westerners do live in harsh and aus-tere conditions, expat life was a whirlwindof alcohol-fuelled private parties, eveningsat international restaurants or functionshosted by diplomats, NGOs or other inter-national bodies.

Though that has come to a standstillsince the bombing, and there are manywho are not allowed off their premises andlive in severely restricted conditions.There was much concern among expatslast year when the city’s red wine stocksuddenly dried up – not for long. Thedemand is far too high and the profits toolarge for a long-term alcohol drought.

Afghans aren’t allowed in the dozens ofrestaurants that serve alcohol – mostly dis-

creetly run by foreigners and operating byword-of-mouth recommendations – and thegrowing number of bars operating in pri-vate homes. Most can’t even dream of pay-ing the prices charged by places such as theSerena Hotel.

But what do all these westernersachieve? When I lived at one of the twoH&K houses – like many Afghan homes,they were low, airy buildings set in walled,private gardens behind heavy gates, staffedwith unarmed guards – the company’smain boss in Afghanistan was hardly everpresent. He roamed the world looking fornew business, which never seemed to mate-rialise. In my view, you cannot successful-ly manage a multimillion-dollar pro-gramme, one thought to be vital to thecountry and central to the western govern-ments’ strategy to reduce heroin produc-tion, and simply not be there for most ofthe time. On his occasional visits to Kabul,he said in front of Afghans that you had to“treat them like children”. What a shamethey understood English.

But H&K isn’t the only one. The RendonGroup, USAID, and the Lincoln Group all

charge vast amounts for their executiveexpertise. With these large multimillion-pound contracts, lots of the money goes tokeeping the contractors in a cushy life.Many of the contractors have drivers,cooks, cleaners, generators, securityguards. All these posts employ Afghanswho need work, and who get paid better-than-average salaries.

It is good accounting practice, ofcourse. The more local people you had onyour books, the more money you made forthe company. But appalled expats andsources within the Afghan governmentestimated that 80 percent of the interna-tional aid money is frittered away on over-heads and multinationals’ profits.

These profits come from money ear-marked to improve the infrastructure of adesperately poor country, teach Afghansnecessary skills and leave a legacy whenforeigners are no longer there. I’m sureAfghanistan does have more roads, moreschools and better healthcare. But with allthe money that has been spent, thereshould be so much more to show for it.

I knew I had been sent to fill a three-month gap before H&K’s contract came toan end. After about a month, I was instruct-ed by H&K not to return to the ministry. Iwas given the impression that H&K felt theministry wasn’t co-operating with whatthey wanted to do.

I ended up staying in Kabul for fourmonths – several weeks after my contractcame to an end. But one previous incum-bent was asked to leave and others leftbecause of internal politics and one beforethat had been unexpectedly asked to leave.It was a dysfunctional office with strangerules. The company employed a wonderfulcook, Reza, who made really deliciousfood. But, at lunchtime, the expats wouldgather in the dining room while the localAfghans we employed were given money togo elsewhere for their food. I found itincredibly awkward.

It was a real privilege to have had thechance to go to Afghanistan, a bewildering-ly wonderful place. I met many expats who,like myself and some of my colleagues,genuinely cared for the people and thecountry and worked six days a week foreight or 10 hours a day. But others were dis-dainful of the Afghans and seemed to bethere to cash in, happily enjoying a goodlife at the expense of the taxpayer and jus-tifying themselves by making money fortheir employers. Many would have strug-gled to justify their wages had they beenworking in Britain or America.

The majority of Afghans support therebuilding programme and welcome theinternational presence in their country.But while expats charge more than £1 000a day for their services in a country wherethe average annual income is not muchmore than £250, it’s not surprising thatprogress is slow, resentment is growingand very few Afghans, save those on thecorporate payroll, are any better off.

A spokesman for Hill and Knowltonconfirmed the company had two full-timeworkers and up to five western contractorsin Afghanistan for the duration of its 12-month contract with the US state depart-ment, which ended in May 2007. “We alsoemployed up to 20 Afghans and part of ourremit was to train them in the communica-tions skills needed – everything fromanswering the phone and running an effec-tive office to writing press releases,” thespokesman said.

“Local Afghan contractors were alsoused to produce publicity material for theanti-narcotics campaign. Our work waswell-received by the Afghan and Americangovernments.”

THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT MARCH 2 200816 DISPATCHES

An artist’s impression of the Ponte della Musica, a pedestrian bridge unique because it is an arch with no supports DRAWINGS: POWELL-WILLIAMS ARCHITECTS

Tiber bridge adds new note to Rome’s axis of music B Y H E I D I K I N G S T O N E

Veni Vidi Vici. They came, they saw andthey built a bridge over the Tiber, the firstsince Benito Mussolini held power andthe first pedestrian bridge since anyonecan remember.

Construction of the Ponte della Musica(Bridge of Music) will begin next month,after designers, Powell-Williams Archi-tects in collaboration with Buro Happold,

won an international competitionlaunched by the Council of Rome in 2000.It is scheduled for completion in 2009.

Buro Happold, a British engineeringfirm, was involved in drawing up the mas-terplan for the 2012 Olympics. It was alsopart of the team that built the MillenniumDome – now the 02 Centre – and the spec-tacular and celebrated Sackler Crossing atKew Gardens, designed by John Pawson,the acclaimed British architect .

The bridge is named Ponte della Musi-

ca because it is at the western end of theinformally named “axis of music” and isdesigned as a destination in itself.

On one side is the 1960s soccer stadiumused for the Rome Olympics and the 1990soccer World Cup. It is also home to Italianclubs Lazio and Roma.

On the other is the Maxxi Museum,dubbed a “gallery for the 21st century”,designed by Zaha Hadid, the acclaimedBritish-Iranian architect and currentlyunder construction.

“The bridge is 200m long with a clearspan of 150m and it is 20m wide,” saysDavood Liaghat, technical director at BuroHappold.

It will feature “a piazza, stalls andrestaurants, reinvigorating this part ofRome. The steel structure is uniquebecause it is an arch with no supports.

“The views on this long elegant struc-ture will also be exceptional because youcan see the Seven Hills [of Rome] fromwherever you stand.”

High-living hogs squander aid fundsWar-ravaged and poverty-stricken Afghanistan attracts opportunists with an eye to quick profits, writes Heidi Kingstone

On the outside looking in: people watch authorities leaving the inauguration ceremony of the Serena Hotel, the first five-star hotel in Kabul, in November 2005. The luxurious establishment, tooexpensive for most Afghans to dream of patronising, was recently rocked by an explosion PHOTOGRAPH: TOMAS MUNITA, AP

SI_DIS_E1_020308_p16 C M Y K