Henry Kissinger Henry Kissinger DiplomacyDiplomacy

Chapter 26 Chapter 26

Vietnam: On the Road to Vietnam: On the Road to DespairDespair

Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions

1. 1. (644) Assess Kissinger’s (644) Assess Kissinger’s notion that guerrilla notion that guerrilla warfare was a “relatively warfare was a “relatively new phenomenon” in the new phenomenon” in the 1960s? 1960s?

2.* (644) How important was the 2.* (644) How important was the fundamental misconception that Moscow fundamental misconception that Moscow “called all the shots” in a global “called all the shots” in a global conspiracy with Beijing and Hanoi?conspiracy with Beijing and Hanoi?

3.* (645) Why was Vietnam 3.* (645) Why was Vietnam thethe battle to confront communism battle to confront communism in the third world?in the third world?

4. (646) Why would North 4. (646) Why would North Vietnamese political leaders Vietnamese political leaders have made great public relations have made great public relations executives for aggressive executives for aggressive countries?countries?

5. *(646) How did the failed Bay of Pigs 5. *(646) How did the failed Bay of Pigs invasion affect the Kennedy invasion affect the Kennedy Administration’s conduct of foreign Administration’s conduct of foreign policy?policy?

6. *(647) How did Kennedy “give” the 6. *(647) How did Kennedy “give” the trail to North Vietnam?trail to North Vietnam?

7. * (647) Would a Kennedy reversal of 7. * (647) Would a Kennedy reversal of U.S. policy of Laotian neutrality to U.S. policy of Laotian neutrality to one of an expanded war in Laos one of an expanded war in Laos have been acceptable to the have been acceptable to the American public?American public?

8.  *(647) What was the Cambodian “catch-8.  *(647) What was the Cambodian “catch-

22” that Kissinger describes?22” that Kissinger describes?

9. *(647) Big Picture: Bay of Pigs, 2nd 9. *(647) Big Picture: Bay of Pigs, 2nd Berlin Crisis, Laotian neutrality – Was Berlin Crisis, Laotian neutrality – Was withdrawal from Vietnam a viable withdrawal from Vietnam a viable option for the Kennedy option for the Kennedy

Administration?Administration?

10. (648) How do the Special Forces 10. (648) How do the Special Forces served the goal articulated by served the goal articulated by Kennedy’s quote on page 648?Kennedy’s quote on page 648?

11.  (648) Do you think that in 1954 11.  (648) Do you think that in 1954 Senator Kennedy was hinting at a Senator Kennedy was hinting at a “Vietnamese Marshall Plan”? Would “Vietnamese Marshall Plan”? Would that have been acceptable to the that have been acceptable to the

American public and leadership?American public and leadership?

12. *(649) The concept of nation building was 12. *(649) The concept of nation building was (to some extent) formalized as U.S. policy (to some extent) formalized as U.S. policy under the Kennedy Administration. Why under the Kennedy Administration. Why would this idea gain support from both would this idea gain support from both liberals and conservatives since is requires liberals and conservatives since is requires increased U.S. commitment and increased U.S. commitment and involvement to interests outside our involvement to interests outside our borders? Despite rhetoric against this idea borders? Despite rhetoric against this idea (W during his first presidential campaign), (W during his first presidential campaign), do you feel that the U.S. is still committed to do you feel that the U.S. is still committed to this idea?this idea?

13. (649) Is a Vice-Presidential envoy 13. (649) Is a Vice-Presidential envoy assessment a valid political assessment a valid political measure? measure?

14. (650) What was Vice-President 14. (650) What was Vice-President Johnson’s “assessment” of the Johnson’s “assessment” of the situation in South Vietnam in May situation in South Vietnam in May

1961?1961?

15.* (651) Why do you think that there 15.* (651) Why do you think that there was uniform underestimation of the was uniform underestimation of the

future size of the conflict?future size of the conflict?

16.* (652) Why was gradual escalation 16.* (652) Why was gradual escalation the “fashion of the day”? Why did it the “fashion of the day”? Why did it prove to be the “most dangerous” prove to be the “most dangerous” option? option?

17. (652) Is Kissinger guilty of 17. (652) Is Kissinger guilty of hyperbole on page 652 at the end of hyperbole on page 652 at the end of

the 3rd paragraph?the 3rd paragraph?

18. (652) Was history on “America’s 18. (652) Was history on “America’s

side” in this emerging guerrilla war?side” in this emerging guerrilla war?

19.  (653) Does Kissinger give any 19.  (653) Does Kissinger give any evidence to the theory that JFK would evidence to the theory that JFK would have withdrew from Vietnam? (658) have withdrew from Vietnam? (658) What does Kissinger imply later on page What does Kissinger imply later on page 658? 658?

20. *(655) Describe how Diem was 20. *(655) Describe how Diem was removed from office to include: (a) removed from office to include: (a) domestic tensions leading to the coup domestic tensions leading to the coup

and (b) U.S. involvementand (b) U.S. involvement

21. *(655) Assess the following 21. *(655) Assess the following statement in context of the American statement in context of the American Revolution, “And history teaches this Revolution, “And history teaches this iron law of revolutions: the more iron law of revolutions: the more extensive the eradication of existing extensive the eradication of existing authority, the more its successors have authority, the more its successors have to rely on naked power to establish to rely on naked power to establish themselves.”themselves.”

22. *(655/6) What problems did Diem’s 22. *(655/6) What problems did Diem’s coup solve? What problems were coup solve? What problems were

created?created?

23. (657) Why does Kissinger believe a 23. (657) Why does Kissinger believe a withdrawal from Vietnam would have withdrawal from Vietnam would have only been possible by the Kennedy only been possible by the Kennedy Administration and not the Johnson Administration and not the Johnson

Administration?Administration?

ContextContext Goal of War - _______Goal of War - _______

– Limited or Total WarLimited or Total War Measurement of successMeasurement of success

– Political: _______Political: _______– Battlefield: _______Battlefield: _______

Gradual EscalationGradual Escalation ““This is Language”This is Language” 1964/5 – Civil War to Invasion1964/5 – Civil War to Invasion OP-Plan 34AOP-Plan 34A De Soto PatrolsDe Soto Patrols Gulf of TonkinGulf of Tonkin

24. *(659) What does Kissinger mean 24. *(659) What does Kissinger mean when he said that methods used to when he said that methods used to achieve the Gulf of Tonkin achieve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution would not be possible Resolution would not be possible today? Was he right?today? Was he right?

25. (659) Evaluate Kissinger’s 25. (659) Evaluate Kissinger’s comparison of FDR to LBJ in entering comparison of FDR to LBJ in entering

the U.S. into war.the U.S. into war.

26. *(660) Does Kissinger offer any 26. *(660) Does Kissinger offer any newnew lessons from the Korean War? lessons from the Korean War? Why do these lessons seem so Why do these lessons seem so fundamental? Are they being fundamental? Are they being heeded today? heeded today?

27. *(660) Describe 2 strategies 27. *(660) Describe 2 strategies Kissinger believed would have Kissinger believed would have produced a “victory” in Vietnam. produced a “victory” in Vietnam.

28. *(660) What strategy did the US 28. *(660) What strategy did the US employ? employ?

29. *(660/1) How did the U.S. and 29. *(660/1) How did the U.S. and North Vietnam view the theaters of North Vietnam view the theaters of war differently? How did reflect their war differently? How did reflect their approaches to foreign policy? approaches to foreign policy?

30. *(661/2) Assess the policy outlined by 30. *(661/2) Assess the policy outlined by President Johnson’s quote on pages 661 President Johnson’s quote on pages 661

and 662.and 662.

31. (662) Is war a unifying force for a 31. (662) Is war a unifying force for a country? Assess Kissinger’s use of country? Assess Kissinger’s use of the unification of Germany as an the unification of Germany as an example? example?

32. *(662) Does Kissinger clearly 32. *(662) Does Kissinger clearly articulate the idea (previously articulate the idea (previously discussed in class) that U.S. discussed in class) that U.S. strategies aimed at bringing North strategies aimed at bringing North Vietnam to negotiation would never Vietnam to negotiation would never work? Does he add any new analysis work? Does he add any new analysis to that idea? to that idea?

33. (663/4) Describe Kissinger’s early 33. (663/4) Describe Kissinger’s early involvement in the Vietnam War? What involvement in the Vietnam War? What insights do you suppose his experiences insights do you suppose his experiences gave him in comparison with a special gave him in comparison with a special visit by a sitting Vice-President? visit by a sitting Vice-President?

34. (664) What was your impression of 34. (664) What was your impression of the description of “unofficial” the description of “unofficial”

diplomacy?diplomacy?

35. (664/5) What was the San Antonio 35. (664/5) What was the San Antonio Formula? Why was the proposal doomed Formula? Why was the proposal doomed for refusal? (669) Briefly explain why for refusal? (669) Briefly explain why North Vietnam would never commit to North Vietnam would never commit to

negotiations.negotiations.

36. *(665) Describe how the 36. *(665) Describe how the experiences of the Korean and experiences of the Korean and Vietnam Wars differed in respect to Vietnam Wars differed in respect to domestic support for the war. domestic support for the war.

37. *(666) Explain what is meant by 37. *(666) Explain what is meant by Lipmann’s assertion that U.S. world Lipmann’s assertion that U.S. world standing would improve if it were standing would improve if it were

“defeated” in Vietnam.“defeated” in Vietnam.

38. *(666) Explain how critics of 38. *(666) Explain how critics of Johnson’s Vietnam policy linked it to Johnson’s Vietnam policy linked it to an “arrogant” and “universal” U.S. an “arrogant” and “universal” U.S. policy that will prove to be policy that will prove to be ineffective. ineffective.

39. (667) How did the nature of the 39. (667) How did the nature of the post-Diem governments raise post-Diem governments raise concerns from Americans who were concerns from Americans who were growing critical of the war?growing critical of the war?

40. *(670/1) Does Kissinger offer any 40. *(670/1) Does Kissinger offer any new perspectives and/or new perspectives and/or information about the Tet information about the Tet Offensive?Offensive?

41. (671) Who (what group) does 41. (671) Who (what group) does Kissinger credit for ending the Kissinger credit for ending the escalation of the war and beginning escalation of the war and beginning

the process of liquidation?the process of liquidation?

42. *(672) Why does Kissinger criticize 42. *(672) Why does Kissinger criticize Johnson for his ending of bombing Johnson for his ending of bombing campaigns in 1968? What strategy campaigns in 1968? What strategy would have produced a more favorable would have produced a more favorable climate for negotiations to be conducted climate for negotiations to be conducted by his successor (ultimately Nixon)? by his successor (ultimately Nixon)?