henry ii and the papal conclave of 1549

Henry II and the Papal Conclave of 1549Author(s): Frederic J. BaumgartnerSource: The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 301-314Published by: The Sixteenth Century JournalStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2540219 .

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Sixteenth Century Journal XVI, No. 3 (1985)

Henry II and the Papal Conclave of 1549 Frederic J. Baumgartner*

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

THE CONCLAVE OF CARDINALS that convened on November 29, 1549, to elect a successor to Paul III was perhaps the most extraordinary of the sixteenth century. Among the attributes that made it noteworthy was its length-seventy-two days of formal conclave, second in length in the century to the 111 days for the conclave that elected Pius IV ten years later.I Another unusual aspect was the large number of cardinals present, reaching a total of fifty-one at one point, the largest number of electors until that time and larger than the vast majority of conclaves down to the present century.2 What makes that conclave, which even- tually elected Gianmaria Del Monte as Pope Julius III, particularly in- teresting for the historian is the bitter factionalism in the conclave. Other conclaves have been as bitterly divided, but few have had as much blatant interference from the political powers of Catholic Europe or have been as extensively reported as this one. The conclave of 1549-1550 stands as a clear and thoroughly documented example of open political intervention in a papal election.3

*I wish to thank my colleagues and friends J. Dean O'Donnell, Carl Hood, and A. Lynn Martin for their critiques of this paper.

'Of the seventeen conclaves of the sixteenth century, only four lasted for more than eighteen days. In contrast, the election of Julius II in 1503 took one day; those of Leo X in 1513 and Innocent X in 1591, two days, and that of Paul III in 1534, three days. See the pertinent volumes of L. Pastor, The History of the Popes, translated by R. F. Kerr, 30 vols. (Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1969). Pastor has a lengthy discussion of the conclave of 1549, XIII: 4-43, but he was largely concerned with the internal mechanics of the balloting and was less informed on the political machinations of the French mon- archy, in part because he did not use the reports of the imperial ambassador in France.

2The large number of cardinals present was dictated by the length, which allowed time for foreign cardinals to reach Rome, and by Paul III's enlargement of the college of cardinals to fifty-four, largest in history to that time. Three cardinals did not attend the conclave, and deaths and illness reduced the number of cardinals voting to forty- four for the final ballot. For a list of the cardinals present for every ballot, see the diary of Angelo Massarelli, a conclavist for Cardinal Marcello Cervini, in Sebastian Merkle, Concilii 7Tidentini Diarorum, 11 vols. (Freiburg: Herder, 1901-1911), 11: 1-185. Henceforth, Massarelli. In contrast Marcellus II was elected by a conclave of thirty cardinals in 1555.

'In the nineteenth century there was the right of exclusion by which the principal Catholic rulers could each exclude one cardinal from consideration. Pius X revoked it in 1903 after the Austrian emperor had invoked it to exclude a respected Italian cardinal. See G. Constant, "Une rivalit6 Franco-Allemande en conclave L'6lection de Jules III," Revue hebdomadaire, (February 18, 1922), p. 333. Constant's work is primarily concerned with explaining why Cardinal Reginald Pole failed to win the papacy.



302 The Sixteenth Century Journal

The length of the conclave created a vicious circle in that it en- abled the rulers to receive reports and give commands to their partisans inside the conclave, which in turn prolonged the deadlock. Thus, the conclave was also unusual for the blatant disregard of the rules of conclave, which explicitly prohibited such communications.' While rulers such as Cosimo I of Tuscany and the Signory of Venice exercised some influence at the conclave, the dominant roles were played by Emperor Charles V and King Henry II of France. Emperor and French monarch had contested control of papal elections previously, but what made the situation unusual in 1549 were the unremitting hostility that Henry had toward Charles and the importance of several key policy decisions that the new pope would have to make.5

As a result of the ill-treatment that Henry felt he had received when a child as a hostage in Spain for his father, Francis I, he had a burning hatred for Charles. A Venetian ambassador later wrote in 1554: "As for the emperor the king hates him and demonstrates always his hate; he wishes for him every evil that one can hope for his most mortal enemies.' '6 In such circumstances the ability to control the election of a pope and largely destroy the influence of one's enemy at Rome was a prize worth contesting.

In 1549 two substantial issues involving the papacy made the election all the more crucial. One of the issues was the question of the re- sumption of the Council of Trent. Charles V was determined to elect a pope who would convene a council quickly, have it meet again at Trent, and issue a genuine invitation to the German Lutherans to attend. Henry for his part opposed the council as a device by which the reli- gious problems in Germany might be settled, problems that for years had distracted the emperor and reduced his ability to raise troops and revenues in Germany. The other issue involved the Italian duchies of Parma and Piacenza, which Paul III had invested as papal fiefs on his grandsons Ottavio and Orazio Farnese, much to the annoyance of Charles, who regarded them as imperial fiefs. Henry II had arranged for the marriage of his legitimatized daughter, Diane de France, to Orazio Farnese and looked on the Farnese as allies. While Henry had a strong sense of loyalty to those he regarded as his friends or faithful allies, he had a more substantial stake in the issue. He intended to use Parma as a base from which he could attack imperial-held Milan. The

4For the rules see Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et An6, 1938), III-1: 707-727; and John Wrigley, "The Conclave and Electors of 1342," Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 20(1982): 51-81.

'The length of the conclave of 1559 was largely a result of internal divisions among the cardinals since the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis and the recent death of Henry II had considerably reduced political tensions for the moment. See Pastor, Popes, XV: 6-39.

6Giovanni Capello, in M. Tommaseo, Relations des ambassadeurs venitiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1838), 1: 385.



Henry II & Papal Conclave of 1549 303

French dream of ruling northern Italy was still very much alive in 1549. Charles V was equally determined to elect a pope who would recognize these duchies as his fiefs. Thus the papal election of 1549 was very much an extension of the bitter dynastic feud that was already five generations old.

It took ten days for the French court to confirm the death on No- vember 10 of Paul III. At that point Charles appeared to have a clear advantage since most cardinals of the imperial party were already in Rome, while only two of the fourteen French cardinals were in Italy.7 The absence of most of the French cardinals was largely a result of Henry's efforts to reduce the right of the papacy to fill French benefices under several clauses of the Concordat of Bologna. One clause permitted the pope to fill the benefices of a French prelate who died at Rome. The residence in the Eternal City of the French cardinals, all pluralists on the greatest scale, would have provided the pope with a considerable number of appointments. To prevent it, Henry kept most of the French cardinals in France and preferred to work through such French partisans as Cardinal Ippolyto d'Este in the Curia. On Novem- ber 24, with the death of Paul III confirmed, the king, highly fearful that the conclave would be over before the French cardinals arrived, ordered them to depart for Rome.

The possibility that Henry's own policy might prevent the French from controlling the conclave did not reduce his determination to elect his choice. The imperial ambassador Simon Renard, a shrewd observer, underscored that point in his report to the emperor of Novem- ber 21. "For he puts all his hope in the papal election, being confident that if he has a pope at his beck and call he will combine spirituality with temporality, and free himself of his dread of your Majesty, for which purpose he is determined to give all."8 Renard regarded the Con- stable Montmorency as dissembling when he, Henry's chief adviser, told him that the king wanted to see the best man elected who had the welfare of the whole of Christendom at heart and not burden his con- science with it. The ambassador felt that the king believed that "the election will go in his favor, as he disposes of more means of influenc- ing it. The French cardinals had quite made up their minds for what member of their party they would vote, before they left this country."'

7Lucien Romier, Les origines politiques des guerres de religion, 2 vols. (Paris: Per- rin, 1913), 1: 216.

8Calender of Letters, Dispatches and State Papers Relating to Negotiations between England and Spain (Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1969), IX: 474. Henceforth CSP, Spain.

9Ibid., p. 475. One of Renard's spies told him that Henry had remarked that if a pope favorable to him were not elected, he would take care that the pope would never see the color of French money, p. 487.




It was in fact urgent that the French settle on their strongest candidate and a strategy for electing him before going to Rome since the balance in the conclave between the French party and the imperial was nearly even. As the balloting began and the twelve French cardinals who attended reached Rome, it became clear that the cardinals were divided into three hard-and-fast factions: twenty-three who would vote for the French candidate, twenty-two for the imperial candidate, and four neutrals.10 Two of the three cardinals who did not attend the conclave were French, reducing the potential advantage of the French party. The number of neutral cardinals was too small to provide the balance of votes needed for the two-thirds majority for election. Thus, Cardinal Charles de Guise (known still as the Cardinal de Guise since his uncle Cardinal Jean de Lorraine was still alive), the leader of the French cardinals, could only hope to win the papacy for a French partisan by gaining votes from those regarded as imperial cardinals. That task promised to be most difficult.

Among the French partisans were eleven Italian cardinals, many of whom, however, would vote only for a fellow Italian from the French party. Accordingly, the French wish for a French pope chosen from among Cardinals Louis de Bourbon, Jean de Lorraine, and Georges d'Amboise gave way to the need to support an Italian ally of France. Queen Catherine de Medici pushed for support of her cousin, Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, a solid French partisan. Perhaps to humor her the French court spread the word that Henry intended the French party to vote for Salviati.11 But Cosimo de Medici was completely hostile to him as were the emperor and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the grandson of Paul III and leader of the Farnese party at the conclave. A stronger candidate was Niccolo Ridolfi, like Salviati a grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent but more acceptable to the imperial party.12

10Guise to Henry II, in G . Ribier, Lettres etMemoires d'Estat... sous les regnes de Franpois I, Henri II, et Franpois II, 2 vols. (Paris, 1866), II: 261. Guise's list dated from well after the balloting had begun, and after one cardinal, an imperialist, had died and another, a French partisan, left the conclave because of illness. He did not place Cardin- al Carafa with the French partisans, unlike Massarelli, p. 97, and several other other- wise similar lists cited in Pastor, Popes, XIII: 6.

11CSP, Spain IX: 475. See Ribier, Lettres, II: 254, on Jean de Lorraine's hopes for the election.

12Ribier, Lettres, II: 253; Carlo DeLeva, Storia Documentata di Carlo V in correla- zione all' Italia, 5 vols., (Venice, 1869-1895), V: 65; Emile Picot, Les Italiens en France au XVIe siecle, (Bordeaux: Gounouilhan, 1918), p. 101. The Guises' agent in Rome wrote on November 19 that the respected Cardinal Cervini thought the French King supported Salviati or Ridolfi, but he could not vote for either. M6moires de Franpois de Lorraine, vol. 6 of Michaud and Poujoulet, Nouvelle Collection des memoires, (Paris, 1853), p. 14. DeLeva's article on the election of Julius III in Rivista Storica Italiana, I(1884): 632-653, is an extract of material on the conclave from Storia, pp. 63-93. It is largely concerned with Charles V's diplomacy.




It is clear, however, that Henry's first choice was Ippolyto d'Este, the cardinal of Ferrara. Este would boast in 1553 that he had a letter in Henry's hand pledging to make him pope "by love or by force.""3 Ip- polyto, the brother-in-law of Renee de France, Henry's cousin, had just been named protector of French affairs in the Curia and remained throughout his life a favorite of the king, receiving numerous French benefices. But Este was unable to get all the votes of the Italians in the French party and never was a serious candidate. Charles V, of course, had also communicated his favorites to his ambassador in Rome, Diego de Mendoza. His first choice was the Cardinal of Toledo, Juan de Alvarez, followed by the English cardinal Reginald Pole. He explicitly excluded all Frenchmen as well as Salviati and Ridolfi."4

Faced with a conclave that initially would have a substantial imperial majority, Ippolyto d'Este, out of consideration for French interests and his own prospects for election, used his influence at Rome to delay the opening of the conclave. The funeral ceremonies of the dead pope began nine days after his death, an unusually long delay, and by statute they took nine days.'5 Thus, the opening ceremonies of the conclave occurred on November 29. On the following morning the doors of the conclave rooms in the Vatican Palace were sealed, and the formal rules of conclave were invoked. The rules were very strict about the passing through of persons, information, and communications, but their actual observance was so loose at this conclave that an observer later remarked that it was more open than closed.'6

Among those who received detailed information of the happenings in the Vatican were the Roman bankers who made book on the cardinals likely to be elected, the papabili (a regular practice during papal interregnums). The Venetian Dandolo reported to his superiors early in the conclave: "It is more than clear that the merchants are very well informed about the state of the poll, and that the cardinals' attendants in Conclave [the conclavists] go partners with them in wagers, which thus causes many tens of thousands of crowns to change hands."117 At

13CSP Spain, IX: 474; XI: 462-463. At the time of the conclave that elected Marcel- lus II, Henry wrote to Este that he would do all in his power to make him pope. Ribier, Lettres, II: 604.

14Massarelli, pp. 30-31; DeLeva, Storia, V: 65. Charles also excluded Del Monte and Marcello Cervini because they had a role in the transfer of the council from Trent to Bologna against his wishes.

"5French ambassador to the Holy See Claude d'Urfe to Henry II, November 16, 1549, in Ribier, Lettres, II: 254. See also Lorraine, Memoires, p. 123. In contrast the conclave that followed Julius III's death opened eleven days later. Pastor, Popes, XIV: 3.

16Pastor, XIII: 10. 17Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in

Venice, (Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprints, 1970), V: 281; Henceforth CSP, Venice. At the end of the conclave Dandolo noted that one banker had taken in upwards of 20,000 crowns in wagers, p. 310.




the death of Paul III, Cardinal Gianmaria Del Monte was the betting favorite at 1 to 5 followed by Salviati, Ridolfi, and Pole. Pole, however, quickly moved up to become the favorite at 1 to 4 only three days later.'8

Others besides the bankers who seem to have known of every word spoken in the conclave were the various ambassadors. Dandolo provided the Signory of Venice a day-to-day account of the ballots and negotiations. The imperial ambassador in France, Simon Renard, reported regularly to Charles V the extensive information that had come to the French court. And Ambassador Mendoza kept the emperor very well-informed. Numerous letters passed back and forth between Henry and his spokesmen in the conclave, Guise and Este. Numerous diaries were kept as well by various conclavists, so that an extraordinarily detailed account of the workings of the conclave can be constructed.

As the balloting began, Cardinal Pole emerged as the favorite. Much to the surprise of Este and the French party, Cardinal Alessan- dro Farnese stepped forward as the leader of the imperial party, although he supported Pole rather than Toledo, Charles' first choice. Farnese, on whom the French had been counting, had struck a deal with Charles V by which Charles pledged his support for the retention of the cardinal's younger brother in the duchy of Parma. Into the imperial party with him he brought his youngest brother, Cardinal Ranuccio Farnese, and three or four other cardinals created by Paul III and devoted to the Farnese interests."1

With the Farnese party voting for Pole, the English prelate seemed certain to be elected. On December 5 he received twenty-six of the twenty-eight votes that constituted the two-thirds majority of the cardinals then present. The cardinals were on the point of "adoring him" as pope-proclaiming him by acclamation-and papal vestments were tailored for him. Pole's own scruples prevented it as he insisted on being voted pope by ballot and with the two-thirds majority required. His odds in the Roman banks rose to 95 to 100. The French party, solidly opposed to Pole, became desperate. Este let the French ambassador, Claude d'Urfe, know of the dangerous situation, and he rushed to the door of the conclave hall, through which the only legitimate ex- change of goods and communications could be made, to demand that

'Ibid., pp. 274, 276. 19More accurately the deal was made between Ferrante Gonzaga, Charles' governor

in Milan, and Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma, on November 28. See Gonzaga's letter to Charles in CSP, Spain, IX: 479-480; an anonymous letter printed in Merkle, Diarorum, IX: 975; and a report of the Guisard agent in Rome, Lorraine, Memoires, p. 13. In the sixteenth century the cardinal nephews (or grandsons) of the late pope and the cardinals created by him often formed a distinct party in the next conclave. Constant, "Une rivalitO," p. 335.




the conclave wait for the French cardinals. He declared that they were then at Corsica, although he had no such information, and that the French king would never accept a pope elected in their absence, in ef- fect threatening a schism. There is no clear evidence that he actually persuaded anyone, but Urf6 was convinced that he had prevented the election of Pole.20

The French opposition to Pole was rooted in several factors. Cer- tainly important was that he came from a land traditionally the enemy of France, as Henry noted in a letter to Urf6. England and France were at the moment involved in a minor war over the Boulonnais near Calais. Likely more important was the sense that he was too much a reformer. Further, there was the perception that he would favor the emperor and that he would quickly reconvene the Council of Trent. In addition, several Italians could not bring themselves to vote for a foreigner or one who was so young (forty-five years old). Some Italian cardinals also regarded Pole as too reform-minded; but on the other hand Cardinal Carafa, that scourge of the slightest deviation from rigid orthodoxy, passionately accused Pole of holding heretical opin- ions on the doctrine of justification. Carafa's charges apparently swayed the opinion of at least one other cardinal and were repeated fre- quently by Charles de Guise after his arrival.21

In early December, however, it appeared so certain that Pole was going to be chosen pope that the imperial ambassador in France reported on December 17 the arrival of the news of his election at the French court. Renard described the consternation of the court at the report and its attempt to put the best interpretation on the question of what sort of pope Pole would make. He theorized that the French dis- comfort at the alleged election was based on "the cardinal's prudence, which is enough to make the king fear that he may follow the truth. ... I cannot believe that the result of this election can be agreeable to the king, dissemble as he may."22

20CSP, Venice, V: 281; CSP, Spain, IX: 484; Massarelli, pp. 41-47. Apparently Farnese had a pledge from three cardinals that if Pole reached twenty-seven votes, they would also vote for him. That twenty-seventh vote, however, did not materialize. From the list of scrutinies in Massarelli it is clear that the cardinals wrote more than one name on their ballots and as many as five.

21Ribier, Lettres, II: 258; CSP, Spain, IX: 486-487, X: 22-23; Massarelli, pp. 43-47. For a fuller discussion of the opposition to Pole see Dermot Fenlon, Heresy and Obe- dience in Tridentine Italy: Cardinal Pole and the Counter Reformation, (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), pp. 227-231; and Constant, "Une rivalitM," pp. 335-340. The charge of heterodoxy derived largely from his opposition to Trent's definition of justification in 1546 but also from his friendship with a number of Italians under suspicion of heresy.

22CSP, Spain, IX: 487.




Much to the joy of Henry and his advisors, the news of Pole's election proved to be false. Dandolo speculated that the harangue of the French ambassador at the conclave opening, delivered on December 5 and repeated two days later, had carried weight with several cardinals who refused to elect a pope until the French arrived. On December 7 French ambassador Urfe truthfully reported the landing of the French party south of Genoa. Pole slipped back to twenty-four votes and then to twenty-three where he remained until nearly the end of the conclave.23

The first group of French cardinals-Guise, Vendome, Chatillon, and Du Bellay-arrived on December 11. Although they were admit- ted to the conclave with a loud demonstration of joy, the intrigues and division within now truly began in earnest. With their arrival the number of votes needed for election was increased to thirty-one, tight- ening the deadlock. Pole remained the choice of the betters at 2 to 5, but his chances were fatally injured by the presence of the French.

From the first Henry had made it clear to his cardinals that they were not to vote for Pole, orders that were repeated several times in the following months.24 In early January Guise, suspecting that several of his countrymen might be inclining toward Pole, summoned the French cardinals together and admonished them "in their king's name, not to elect England.... Thereupon they all pledged their faith to him, not to vote for Pole, to whom Guise shows himself very adverse. Thus will they continue awaiting letters from their king" on what candidate to support.25 New instructions were necessary since Jean de Lorraine, the sentimental favorite of the French, clearly was unelectable. In order to promote the French candidates, Guise had received from Henry a decharge on the Lyonnais banks to receive a sum of 150,000 ecus for use at the conclave, presumably for bribes.26 Although Charles V refused to allow his party to consider any of the French candidates but especially Giovanni Salviati,27 the French party continued to strengthen as more French cardinals straggled into

23CSP, Venice, V: 281-282; Massarelli, pp. 48-54. 24Henry II to UrfM, November 18; Henry II to Guise, November 24, Ribier, Lettres,

II: 257-258. A letter from the king to Guise was hand-carried into the conclave on December 18 by Guise's brother, Louis, himself later made a cardinal. Louis de Guise remained in the conclave to the end despite efforts to remove him and other superfluous persons on several occasions. Merkle, Diarorum, IX: 974; and Massarelli, pp. 100, 113.

26CSP, Venice, V: 296. 26Ribier, Lettres, II: 257. A copy of the decharge is in Archives Nationales, Fonds

JJ, 259. See also Romier, Origines Politiques, I: 218; and Pastor, Popes, XIII: 30n, on French efforts at bribery. The Guisard agent wrote on November 19 that Charles V had dispatched a large sum to Rome for the same purpose. Lorraine, Memoires, p. 13.

27CSP, Venice, V: 296; G. Muller, "Die Kandidatur Giovanni Salviatis in Konklave 1549/50. Zwei Briefe Pietro Bertanos vom Hof Karl V," Quellen und Forschungen aus Italianischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 42-43 (1963-1964): 435-452.




Rome: Georges d'Amboise and Philippe de La Chambre on December 28, Jean de Lorraine himself on December 31, and Louis de Bourbon on January 14.28 The presence of Bourbon was especially significant because he was an elderly and frail man who had not been expected to make the trip to Rome. The fact that Henry II decided to send him demonstrates the importance of the election to the king and suggests as well a growing sense of possible victory among the French at the beginning of 1550.

The excitement of the first ballots of the conclave and the arrival of the French gave way in January to the tedium of endless indecisive votes. Pole continued to muster his twenty-three votes although he slipped to twenty-one by the end of the month. The French party, however, seems to have become badly split in January. Some French partisans were voting for Carafa because of his bitter hatred of Charles V and as a way of dividing the reform party, most of which was voting for Pole: Carafa received twenty-one votes for much of January. Others of the French party voted for the Cardinal de Bourbon, who reached nineteen votes on one ballot, and still others for Lorraine and Salviati.29 Lucien Romier has interpreted these divisions as a result of the feud between the Guises and Montmorency; the latter was pre- pared to accept a "Spaniard" rather than a "Guisard."30 It seems to me that a more plausible interpretation would maintain that the French were reluctant to put forward the candidate they most wanted to win, Ippolyto d'Este, until the cardinals had become so weary as to become persuadable to accept a French partisan. Meanwhile, they ad- vanced the candidacies, one at a time, of various French partisans, testing which ones had broad support.3'

Thus, Bourbon, Lorraine, Ridolfi, and Salviati were all put forward to test their strength and failed to win. Meanwhile, the French party was seeking to gain the emperor's approval for Este; the French leaders were also working on Farnese, who held the balance of power, promising money, lands, and French benefices for him and his brothers.32 Believing that Este's only hope lay in a prolonged deadlock or, more likely, that such was going to occur, the French cardinals pro-

28CSP, Venice, V: 280; Massarelli, passim; and Romier, Origines Politiques, I: 219n. Contrary to Romier, Lorraine arrived on December 31, not December 1.

29CSP, Venice, V: 284, 198; DeLeva, Storia, V: 81. 30Origines Politiques, I: 218. No hint appears in the French correspondence of such

a division among the French. I am convinced that Romier has overstated the impact of the Montmorency-Guise rivalry on French policy under Henry.

31Massarelli, p. 63. S2Ribier, Lettres, II: 268, The promises included the pledge of the archbishopric of

Narbonne for Alessandro Farnese.




claimed their intention to die in conclave before agreeing to a pope unacceptable to the French king.33

The usual efforts were made to pressure the cardinals into a decision. The number of attendants in the conclave and the amount of food passed in were decreased, and the upper story windows closed to reduce the fresh air and natural light. Several cardinals and conclavists fell ill, which was attributed to the stench and foul air. Ill- temper increased. For example, when an imperialist accused the French of refusing to accept Pole because he was too virtuous for them, "their lordships used foul language to each other."34 Paranoia increased to the point that, when Ridolfi died on January 31, accusa- tions of poisoning immediately surfaced; and an autopsy was performed. The death of Ridolfi was a blow to the French since they lost not only a vote but also their candidate most acceptable to Farnese and, therefore, the one most electable.35

As the conclave dragged on into late January, the Roman book makers gave up taking wagers on the various cardinals and took them on the month in which the pope would appear. On January 22, the odds were 9 to 10 against January, 1 to 2 against February, 1 to 5 against March, and 1 to 10 that the conclave would never elect a pope. A week later several conclavists left the Vatican and declared that they thought the prospect hopeless.36 The free coming-and-going of the conclavists and attendants was one of the scandals of the conclave, as were the easy access of ambassadors and the transmission of letters and communications. A canvass of the persons in the conclave in late January found secretaries of both the imperial and French ambassadors present and of several other governments. Urf6 boasted to Henry II how easily he was able to communicate with Guise. A letter of Farnese to Henry II was reported to have declared that "the place that should be secret is public and all that is done here is published." Renard added that all the rules referring to the creation of a pope were being broken, and order perverted. "The conclave is conducted in public, and no good can come of the assembly."37

In late January French strategy apparently had reached a dead- end. With Ridolfi dying, Salviati unacceptable to Charles and Farnese,

33CSP, Venice, V: 300. The cardinals of the imperial party also proclaimed the same intention, p. 299.

34Ibid., p. 300. The effort to hasten the election by increasing the restrictions on the cardinals subsided rather quickly; in fact, early February saw the conclave at probably its loosest.

36Ibid., pp. 304, 307. According to Dandolo, the anatomist who performed the autopsy on Ridolfi found such clear evidence of poison that he could not have been more sure of the cause of death than if he had himself given it to the dead man.

36Ibid., pp. 301-303. 37Ibid., p. 306; Ribier, Lettres, II: 259; CSP, Spain, X: 14-15, 21.




and the expected rise of Este not evident, the French waited for in- struction from the court on how to proceed. On January 25 and 29 Dandolo reported that the French were still waiting for letters and advice and would accept no other guide than the commands of the king. Guise meanwhile flatly rejected a proposal that cardinals from both parties be excluded from consideration.38

On February 6 Henry wrote to Guise granting his permission to vote for a neutral candidate. While this letter is the only concrete evidence of such a decision, the French cardinals, apparently with the king's blessing, had already begun to move in that direction; for the letter arrived after the end of the conclave.39 The key development in the successful conclusion of the conclave involved Cardinal Salviati. Upon Ridolfi's death, which emphasized the unhealthy conditions in the conclave, the French party made an all-out effort to elect his cousin by attracting votes from the Farnese party, still voting en bloc for Pole. Promising French support and properties for Orazio Farnese, Henry II's son-in-law, Guise won over Ranuccio Farnese and three more Italian cardinals to Salviati. With Salviati within two or three votes of the papal throne, Alessandro Farnese decided to begin serious negotiations, having just received an angry letter from Charles recon- firming his total opposition to Salviati. Farnese was able to put off a vote on February 2 and began negotiations with Guise. The French leader was persuaded to negotiate in good faith when Ranuccio Farnese returned to his brother's party, ending the boomlet for Salviati.40

Cardinal Guido Sforza of the Farnese party played the role of the catalyst in the events that ended the conclave, telling Guise that if he persisted in pushing for the election of Salviati, he could lose every- thing for his party. Sforza had become convinced that Gianmaria Del Monte could serve as an acceptable neutral candidate and pressed Guise to support him. He also arranged for a meeting between Guise and Farnese, which took place on February 6. Guise first proposed Marcello Cervini, but Farnese pleaded that the emperor was far too hostile to him because he was one of the papal legates who terminated the Council of Trent. (He was elected pope in 1555 as the short-lived Marcellus II.) Guise then proposed Cardinal Del Monte, who in fact had been the betting favorite on the first days after Paul III's death. Also a papal legate at Trent, Del Monte had been rejected by Charles,

S8CSP, Venice, V: 302-303; Massarelli, p. 100. 39Ribier, Lettres, II: 263. See also Henry to Montmorency, February 4, Bibliotheque

Nationale, Fonds franqais, 3090, fol 18. Renard's report from the French court of Febru- ary 21 strongly suggests that the French party had received instructions to vote for a neutral candidate before February 6. CSP, Spain, X: 29.

40Massarelli, pp. 130-134; DeLeva, Storia, V: 86; CSP, Spain, X: 29.




although the most recent letter from the emperor to Farnese had not specifically excluded him as he had previously. The French also had objected to him, surprisingly, however, less for political reasons than for his rather low-born origins and character defects. Guise had described him as fickle and deceitful.4' Del Monte, while no one's first choice, was acceptable to Cosimo de Medici and Cardinal d'Este; the latter, after a long conversation with Del Monte, had become his strong advocate. Del Monte pledged to maintain Ottavio Farnese in Parma, winning Farnese's support.

With Guise and Farnese in agreement, they called the cardinals together in the evening of February 7 and announced their intention to acclaim Del Monte as pope. Forty-one cardinals agreed to do so, although four of the staunch imperialists refused. The next morning the formal vote (the sixty-first of the conclave) was unanimously favorable to Del Monte, and the news of the new pope, Julius III, was announced to the public.42

The news of the election was sped to France via a courier called "the cripple," who made the journey from Rome to Nemours in five days and seventeen hours.43 Imperial ambassador Renard was sur- prised to find that the members of the French court, after months of objecting to Del Monte, seemed pleased with themselves over the out- come of the conclave. The French objections to the Cardinal may well have been a subterfuge or, at least, were not so serious as not to be easily overcome. Renard reported after the election that the French cardinals had consulted Henry II on Del Monte and by his advice gave their votes to him. The French had done extensive research on the cardinal and found ample evidence of an anti-imperial attitude. The evidence included his disregard for Charles' wishes in determining the agenda at Trent, his role in moving the Council from Trent to Bologna, his bitterness at being denied the bishopric of Pavia at Charles' insis- tence, and a consistent hostility to imperial interests in the conclave, having been one of those who had never voted for Cardinal Pole. There- fore, the French decided to support him and in turn expected substantial dividends from that support. Renard concluded: "They expect that he will realize their hopes, being a creature of their own hand, and that he will set aside his fear of your Majesty; that, being an inconstant and weak man, they will be able to manage him as they please, and get him to yield to the promises and gifts, which they say were made to him.

41Muller, "Die Kandidatur," pp. 443-451; Ribier, Lettres, II: 268. 42CSP, Venice, V: 308-309; Pastor, Popes, XIII: 38-43. See Pastor for a more com-

plete discussion of the negotiations that culminated in the election of Del Monte. 43CSP, Spain, XIII: 29. Renard commented that he could not see how "this sharply

contested election resolved itself so suddenly in the choice of Del Monte."




They go about repeating the name and extraction of the said Monte, who was, as they say, a man of obscure origin," suggesting by that remark that they had made him what he had now become."

Other evidence, such as Henry II's comment about a "fine conclusion" to the conclave, strongly implied that the French looked upon the election as largely a victory for the French policy of intransigance in regard to Cardinal Pole.45 Blatant political interference had apparently paid off for Henry II; not that Charles V's was any less blatant, but it was less successful. Henry proceeded to act as if Julius III were a client of the French crown, expecting substantial dividends particularly in regard to the Italian situation. It was certainly the disappoint- ment of those high expectations that triggered the rage that followed Henry's discovery of Julius III's independence.

On March 1, 1550 an imperial agent at Trent wrote that "the Pope had declared himself openly as [Charles V's] friend, and given such good earmarks of his sincerity that the French are angry, and believe they have been fooled over the election."46 Again and again Henry re- vealed a sense of betrayal as Julius' policy went against his interests: in the case of Parma, where the pope prohibited Ottavio Farnese from making a formal alliance with Henry; in his intention to resume the Council at Trent; in his determination to exercise to the fullest the papal prerogatives under the Concordat of Bologna. In the year that followed the election, relations grew more bitter. Julius' bull in No- vember 1550, reconvening the Council of Trent, triggered a sharp out- burst from Henry, who regarded it as evidence of the pope's complete defection to the imperial camp. Henry reportedly wrote to Julius that his greatest regret was "to have caused the election of a pope so incom- petent, unworthy, and pernicious."47 By the following March Henry's anger had reached the point that he was contemplating the convocation of a national council for the French church, a possibility that the popes had always dreaded.48 The dispute between pope and king reached its culmination in August 1551, when the royal council discussed the erection of a French patriarchate for the Gallican church to free it from

44Ibid., p. 30. 46In a letter to Montmorency, February 20, BN, Fonds franqais 3134, fol. 24. 46CSP, Spain, X: 34. Also pp. 52, 53-54. 47A. Desjardins, NIgociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, 6 vols.,

(Paris, 1859-86), III: 250; CSP Spain, X: 345. 48Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Edward VI, (Liechten-

stein: Kraus Reprints, 1979), p. 93. See also M. Venard, "Une Reforme gallicane? Le projet de Concile national de 1551," Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise de France, 47(1981): 201-225.




the papacy.49 At the same time French troops allied with Ottavio Farnese face a combined papal-imperial army in the brief War of Parma.

Although the threatened schism was largely rhetoric on Henry's part to force concessions from Julius, he refused to send any French prelates to the resumed council. Thus, none attended the second convocation of Trent in 1551-1552. The experience of those sixteen French bishops who did attend the third convocation in 1562 indicates that most became reformers upon their return to France. Nor did Henry aid in any way in the work of reform, even in Julius' admittedly rather lim- ited efforts. For example, he refused to force the French cardinals to concede their multiple bishoprics as Julius had ordered them to do. In his anger over Julius' demands to exercise papal rights under the Con- cordat, the king refused to allow any French prelates to reside in Rome. Consequently, when Julius died in 1555, there were no French cardinals in Rome to advance the cause of Cardinal d'Este, again the principal French candidate, or to prevent the quick election of Marcel- lus II, whose program for reform badly frightened Henry and the French hierarchy.50

The conclave of 1549-1550 demonstrated, albeit in an exaggerated way, how political rulers could influence and manipulate the papal elections of the sixteenth century. By heavy political pressure Henry II had been able to gain the election of a pope he deemed would be be- holden to him. On the other hand the policy of Julius III, after he was elected with French support, also demonstrated the truism: "the office makes the man." Henry's failure to recognize that fact compounded his rage at what he perceived as Julius' ingratitude and betrayal, and it had several significant consequences-a war over Parma, the absence of the French prelates from Rome, French refusal to cooperate in the work of the Council of Trent. Most importantly, it set back the work of beginning the reform of the French Church for at least five years at a most crucial point of its history.

49CSP, Spain, X: 344-345; Romier, "La crise Gallicane de 1551," Revue historique, 108 (1911): 225-250; 109 (1912), 25-55; Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, 14 vols. (Rome: Ecole franqaise, 1967); VI: 25. For a further discussion of the Franco-papal dispute, see Baumgartner, "Henry II's Italian Bishops: A Study in the Use and Abuse of the Con- cordat of Bologna," The Sixteenth Century Journal XI,2 (1980): 49-58.

60Ribier, Lettres, II: 606; Pastor, Popes, XIV: 4-10. Marcellus' death in two months substantially reduced the consequences of the French failure to control that conclave. Many of the French cardinals, having arrived late, were still in Rome to help elect Paul IV. He was acceptable to Henry because he was anathema to Charles V.



henry ii and the papal conclave of 1549

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