4.1Martin Heidegger's Understanding of UltimateMeaning and Reality

Michael Gelven, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill., U.S.A.

1. INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth centuryand the greatest German philosopher since Hegel. His influence, though, goes farbeyond national boundaries, for his works are translated into all the majorlanguages including Japanese and Chinese. The academic and secondary litera-ture on Heidegger has swollen even during his lifetime, into the thousands. Yet.for all his enormous and pervading influence, he remains a thorny and difficultthinker whose followers rarely agree on a proper interpretation. These dis·agreements are due as much to the originality of his language as t? the pro~und~tyof his thought. Even his life has provided troublesome speculation, for his bnefbut definitive association with the National Socialists in Germany is the cause ofbitter debate among his supporters and enemies. In spite of controversies ov~rboth his life and his thought, however, he remains one of the central figures 10

European, Japanese and Spanish-American intellectual life, and since the. latesixties has even enjoyed considerable attention in the Anglo-American untver-

sities. . . .' asHis thoughts are seen as profoundly influencing such diverse lOter~st~

modern theology, the theatre of the absurd, French and German existentlailSIII

•

psychiatry, linguistics and aesthetics. In no field, however, is Heideg~er mo~significant than in the question of ultimate reality and meaning; for all his wor

tOseek to establish a profounder understanding of being and reality. In or~er r/.describe this search our essay shall be divided into considerations of his ~Ife,r/.his major works, and finally of the significance of his thoughts for the questIOnSinterest to the present journal.

2. LIFEill

. f SM" hurebHeidegger was born In 1889, the son of the sexton 0 t. artm s c ~Messkirch, Baden. He attended the G~mnasium in Constance on ..the Bod~n y ~where, at the age of eighteen he received from Dr. Conrad Grober a c P

114

Brentano's On the Manifold Sense of Being According to Aristotle. This book, appa:ently was the original influen~e for his life-long questioning of the meaningofbemg. For a short penod he studied for the priesthood at the Jesuit seminary infreiburg, but he soon found that his proper interest was philosophy. He did hisPh.D. work under Heinrich Rickert at the University in Freiburg, where in 1915hehimself o~ered his own first lectures, on Parmenides and Kant. Two yearslater,~long wI~h thousands of other Germans, he left to serve his country at thefront 10 the First World War. He returned to the university in 1919 and stayeduntiI1923.w~en he accepted a post at the University at Marburg, then a centre ofneo-KantmOism. It was at Marburg that he published his most famous work, Sein/lnd Zeit' Being and Time' which immediately became one of the most influentialworksin m~dern philosophy. In 1928 he accepted the chair of philosophy at hisbelovedFreiburg, where he returned, this time to stay.

What would normally be the quiet and undisturbed life of a German scholarsoonbecame enmeshed in one of the most frightening political movements themodern world has ever known. Heidegger, who used to argue that aphilosopher's life was supremely insignificant to his thought, became in 1933 therect?rof the .u~iversity, a post which at that time required membership in theNatIOnalSO~lahst Par~y. T.here is some evidence that Heidegger's acceptance oftherectorship an~ the lOe~ltable membership in the party was urged upon him bythosewho felt his prestige would assure greater academic freedom for theuniversity. But if his original acceptance was somewhat reluctant he seemed tomanifestduring the few short months of his reign a considerable enthusiasm forhisduties. In a famous speech, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitiit~eurged the German people, and parti~ularly the university community, toespond to .the new call for greatness which was represented by Hitler's party,

and to sacnfice some of the aloof autonomy traditionally held by the universityforthe s.ake of a greater national community. He couched these urgings ofsupp~rt m terms of his own philosophical inquiry into authentic existenceseeml th . his work i 'ng us to tie up IS work in ontology With what he saw as the spiritualaWak' fenmg 0 the German soul under the new movement. The Nazis of courseWerctI'h .."~ e e.lg ted t? find such a famous thinker supporting their party. But in 1933tis~~azls, now m power, changed their image. By January of 1934 they estab-R d t~e one-party rule and June saw the macabre brutality of the 'Second~VOlutlOn' and the grisly violence of the 'Night of Long Knives.' The truetilure of Hitler's rule was becoming obvious. Heidegger, in a public disassocia-on from th . I' . .anI" . ese worsenmg po teres, resigned from his rectorship in February,

Pr IClpatmg by several months the repudiations of Hitler's rule by the universityOlests' B h~a b 10 onn, were the faculty walked out on Goebbel's speech and atr Urg h P'" '~,. were von apen s anti-Hitler speech was applauded. Heidegger's act

..•thu . b' I'4d. ~ quite a It ear ier than those other academic protests which drew suchS.~lrahon. At once the Nazis' delight with Heidegger changed to suspicion. Thetna: Went so far as to place watchers in his classroom. Throughout the years of

Ilny and the war, Heidegger continued to write and teach at the university

115

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4.1Martin Heidegger's Understanding of UltimateMeaning and Reality

Michael Gelven, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill., U.S.A.

1. INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth centuryand the greatest German philosopher since Hegel. His influence, though, goes farbeyond national boundaries, for his works are translated into all the majorlanguages including Japanese and Chinese. The academic and secondary litera-ture on Heidegger has swollen even during his lifetime, into the thousands. Yet.for all his enormous and pervading influence, he remains a thorny and difficultthinker whose followers rarely agree on a proper interpretation. These dis·agreements are due as much to the originality of his language as t? the pro~und~tyof his thought. Even his life has provided troublesome speculation, for his bnefbut definitive association with the National Socialists in Germany is the cause ofbitter debate among his supporters and enemies. In spite of controversies ov~rboth his life and his thought, however, he remains one of the central figures 10

European, Japanese and Spanish-American intellectual life, and since the. latesixties has even enjoyed considerable attention in the Anglo-American untver-

sities. . . .' asHis thoughts are seen as profoundly influencing such diverse lOter~st~

modern theology, the theatre of the absurd, French and German existentlailSIII

•

psychiatry, linguistics and aesthetics. In no field, however, is Heideg~er mo~significant than in the question of ultimate reality and meaning; for all his wor

tOseek to establish a profounder understanding of being and reality. In or~er r/.describe this search our essay shall be divided into considerations of his ~Ife,r/.his major works, and finally of the significance of his thoughts for the questIOnSinterest to the present journal.

2. LIFEill

. f SM" hurebHeidegger was born In 1889, the son of the sexton 0 t. artm s c ~Messkirch, Baden. He attended the G~mnasium in Constance on ..the Bod~n y ~where, at the age of eighteen he received from Dr. Conrad Grober a c P

114

Brentano's On the Manifold Sense of Being According to Aristotle. This book, appa:ently was the original influen~e for his life-long questioning of the meaningofbemg. For a short penod he studied for the priesthood at the Jesuit seminary infreiburg, but he soon found that his proper interest was philosophy. He did hisPh.D. work under Heinrich Rickert at the University in Freiburg, where in 1915hehimself o~ered his own first lectures, on Parmenides and Kant. Two yearslater,~long wI~h thousands of other Germans, he left to serve his country at thefront 10 the First World War. He returned to the university in 1919 and stayeduntiI1923.w~en he accepted a post at the University at Marburg, then a centre ofneo-KantmOism. It was at Marburg that he published his most famous work, Sein/lnd Zeit' Being and Time' which immediately became one of the most influentialworksin m~dern philosophy. In 1928 he accepted the chair of philosophy at hisbelovedFreiburg, where he returned, this time to stay.

What would normally be the quiet and undisturbed life of a German scholarsoonbecame enmeshed in one of the most frightening political movements themodern world has ever known. Heidegger, who used to argue that aphilosopher's life was supremely insignificant to his thought, became in 1933 therect?rof the .u~iversity, a post which at that time required membership in theNatIOnalSO~lahst Par~y. T.here is some evidence that Heidegger's acceptance oftherectorship an~ the lOe~ltable membership in the party was urged upon him bythosewho felt his prestige would assure greater academic freedom for theuniversity. But if his original acceptance was somewhat reluctant he seemed tomanifestduring the few short months of his reign a considerable enthusiasm forhisduties. In a famous speech, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitiit~eurged the German people, and parti~ularly the university community, toespond to .the new call for greatness which was represented by Hitler's party,

and to sacnfice some of the aloof autonomy traditionally held by the universityforthe s.ake of a greater national community. He couched these urgings ofsupp~rt m terms of his own philosophical inquiry into authentic existenceseeml th . his work i 'ng us to tie up IS work in ontology With what he saw as the spiritualaWak' fenmg 0 the German soul under the new movement. The Nazis of courseWerctI'h .."~ e e.lg ted t? find such a famous thinker supporting their party. But in 1933tis~~azls, now m power, changed their image. By January of 1934 they estab-R d t~e one-party rule and June saw the macabre brutality of the 'Second~VOlutlOn' and the grisly violence of the 'Night of Long Knives.' The truetilure of Hitler's rule was becoming obvious. Heidegger, in a public disassocia-on from th . I' . .anI" . ese worsenmg po teres, resigned from his rectorship in February,

Pr IClpatmg by several months the repudiations of Hitler's rule by the universityOlests' B h~a b 10 onn, were the faculty walked out on Goebbel's speech and atr Urg h P'" '~,. were von apen s anti-Hitler speech was applauded. Heidegger's act

..•thu . b' I'4d. ~ quite a It ear ier than those other academic protests which drew suchS.~lrahon. At once the Nazis' delight with Heidegger changed to suspicion. Thetna: Went so far as to place watchers in his classroom. Throughout the years of

Ilny and the war, Heidegger continued to write and teach at the university

115

••.....------------------~~until, on the eighth of November, 1944, his lectures were interrupted by theinvasion of the allied army. Because of his membership in the party and his earlysupport of Hitler in 1933, the allies forbade him to teach for six years. He wasfinally cleared by the denazification procedures and hearings and in 1951 he onceagain offered lectures at the university. Many European scholars have neverforgiven him his association with the Nazis, but Heidegger's continued creativityand teaching were not deterred by this criticism.

Heidegger's life manifests certain obvious influences on his thought. Althoughhe had received several impressive offers to teach at other universities, Heideg_ger continued to have great affection for the Black Forest, and he would not leavehis post at Freiburg. His thinking shows a profound mistrust of modern citY-lifewhich, through its noise, its frenzied pace, and its artificiality keeps one fromauthentic understanding. Heidegger often praised the quiet and earthly peace ofhis beautiful homeland and the authenticity of the simple but honest folk whodwell in the country. His early training in the Catholic schools of the south and inthe Jesuit seminary obviously had some effect on him, though Heidegger is innoway a specifically theistic thinker.

No aspect of his life has fascinated the critics more than his tragic associationwith Hitler's party. How could this articulate champion of authentic existenceand human freedom have associated himself with the dark forces of that terriblemovement? In trying to assess this paradox one must keep in mind two dimen-sions: 1) the reasons why Heidegger could support what he saw happening in1933, and 2) the reasons why he could not support what he saw in 1934.Fascination with the first question often forfeits consideration of the second.There are elements in his thought which can, in part, explicate his originalinterest in National Socialism. What he saw in the early stages of the party'sdevelopment was obviously a repudiation of socialism and modernistic technoc-racy; he saw in the fledgling movement a chance to counter the nihilism ofasociety interested only in pleasures and conveniences. That such an opportunityto re-establish the true values was welcomed by Heidegger is not surprising,since he always had been dubious of the worth of committees, and like Plato, sa~little worth in populist democracy. Heidegger put considerable value on indI-vidual greatness, and under the influence of Nietzsche saw worth in theachievement of a powerful will. To this extent his enthusiasm for the early for~of National Socialism in the first year of Hitler's reign is consistent with ~sphilosophical principles. His rapid disenchantment with Nazism is also conSISttent with his principles, for it rapidly manifested an even greater misuse 0

technology; the strong leader became a tyrant, the strong will became l.icense,and spiritual leadership became ruthless political terrorism. Although Heldegge~in later years admitted his association with the Nazis was an error, it was an e~Obof judgment and not of principle. His error is essentially a tragic story in whtC~the hubris of greatness is a dominating factor. From his involvement, however,of t

is outrageous to infer that his philosophy can be equated with the wickednessHitler.

3. HEIDEGGER'S WORK

3.1Being and TimeNomatter how fascinating and compelling the subject of Heidegger's rectorshipunderthe Nazis is, it cannot offset his true importance, which is not what he wasdoingbut how he was thinking. Heidegger's philosophy is characterized by asingletheme: how can we think the question of being? An essential element of histhoughtis the attempt to awaken a sense of the question. We must learn to ask thequestionof being and to resist the powerful influence of those persuasions whichdetract us from asking the question. In his first major and still greatest work,Being and Time, Heidegger argues that there are two major persuasions that keeponefrom confronting this primary question of the meaning of being. One isexistential, the other theoretical. The former consists ofthose attitudes and waysofexisting which deter the terrible confrontation with the question. Thus whenoneavoids truly recognizing himself, when one chatters instead of speaks, showsmildinterest rather than concern, avoids the truth of his finitude in death and

, guiltrather than embracing it, one succeeds in keeping the great question, whatdoesit mean to be? at bay. One can thus exist in such a way as to avoid thequestion; but one can also think theoretically in such a way as to avoid thequestion.When one examines one's self and the world primarily in terms of whatkindsof things exist rather than in terms of what it means to exist or for things intheworld to exist, one has erected a barrier to the truth of being. One then seesonlyentities, not being itself. This, according to Heidegger, is to overlook whatheinearlier works calls the ontological difference: that is, the difference betweenSeienden 'entities' and Sein 'being.'

For Heidegger, then, part of his task is to raise anew the question of beingratherthan the question about entities. The word 'anew' belongs, for he finds inmanyof the ancient thinkers a greater sense of the question than in modernthought. This raising anew of the question of the meaning of being must becarriedout always on these two levels: 1)to shake loose the persistent tendencyofwestern philosophy to formulate the world always in terms of 'kinds of things 'and2) to actually inquire into the meaning of existence purely in terms of what itmeansto be. Heidegger originally sought to include both of these accounts in hisgreatwork, Being and Time, but as it stands his major work is incomplete.bT?etask in Being and Time is to inquire into the meaning of being. The most

~h~IOUSpoint is that being is not itself an entity. There is no special kind of thingidIC~one can call 'being'. In English, of course, it is perfectly legitimate toIh~nh~ythe term with a particular kind of entity, asserting that such-and-such aP.a~ IS a being. Heidegger, ho.wever, does not utilize the term in this way.lOber, he uses the term 'being.' m the sense that is equatable with the infinitive,be')~'as when we equate 'being hungry' with 'to be hungry.' Here, 'being' (or 'tolOisl~not .anentity ?ut the supre~e condition for all.pos~ible modes of existence.(or b PecIaI sense IS supremely Important to bear m mmd: the search for being

etter: the search for what it means to be) is not a search for a mysterious,

117

••.....------------------~~until, on the eighth of November, 1944, his lectures were interrupted by theinvasion of the allied army. Because of his membership in the party and his earlysupport of Hitler in 1933, the allies forbade him to teach for six years. He wasfinally cleared by the denazification procedures and hearings and in 1951 he onceagain offered lectures at the university. Many European scholars have neverforgiven him his association with the Nazis, but Heidegger's continued creativityand teaching were not deterred by this criticism.

Heidegger's life manifests certain obvious influences on his thought. Althoughhe had received several impressive offers to teach at other universities, Heideg_ger continued to have great affection for the Black Forest, and he would not leavehis post at Freiburg. His thinking shows a profound mistrust of modern citY-lifewhich, through its noise, its frenzied pace, and its artificiality keeps one fromauthentic understanding. Heidegger often praised the quiet and earthly peace ofhis beautiful homeland and the authenticity of the simple but honest folk whodwell in the country. His early training in the Catholic schools of the south and inthe Jesuit seminary obviously had some effect on him, though Heidegger is innoway a specifically theistic thinker.

No aspect of his life has fascinated the critics more than his tragic associationwith Hitler's party. How could this articulate champion of authentic existenceand human freedom have associated himself with the dark forces of that terriblemovement? In trying to assess this paradox one must keep in mind two dimen-sions: 1) the reasons why Heidegger could support what he saw happening in1933, and 2) the reasons why he could not support what he saw in 1934.Fascination with the first question often forfeits consideration of the second.There are elements in his thought which can, in part, explicate his originalinterest in National Socialism. What he saw in the early stages of the party'sdevelopment was obviously a repudiation of socialism and modernistic technoc-racy; he saw in the fledgling movement a chance to counter the nihilism ofasociety interested only in pleasures and conveniences. That such an opportunityto re-establish the true values was welcomed by Heidegger is not surprising,since he always had been dubious of the worth of committees, and like Plato, sa~little worth in populist democracy. Heidegger put considerable value on indI-vidual greatness, and under the influence of Nietzsche saw worth in theachievement of a powerful will. To this extent his enthusiasm for the early for~of National Socialism in the first year of Hitler's reign is consistent with ~sphilosophical principles. His rapid disenchantment with Nazism is also conSISttent with his principles, for it rapidly manifested an even greater misuse 0

technology; the strong leader became a tyrant, the strong will became l.icense,and spiritual leadership became ruthless political terrorism. Although Heldegge~in later years admitted his association with the Nazis was an error, it was an e~Obof judgment and not of principle. His error is essentially a tragic story in whtC~the hubris of greatness is a dominating factor. From his involvement, however,of t

is outrageous to infer that his philosophy can be equated with the wickednessHitler.

3. HEIDEGGER'S WORK

3.1Being and TimeNomatter how fascinating and compelling the subject of Heidegger's rectorshipunderthe Nazis is, it cannot offset his true importance, which is not what he wasdoingbut how he was thinking. Heidegger's philosophy is characterized by asingletheme: how can we think the question of being? An essential element of histhoughtis the attempt to awaken a sense of the question. We must learn to ask thequestionof being and to resist the powerful influence of those persuasions whichdetract us from asking the question. In his first major and still greatest work,Being and Time, Heidegger argues that there are two major persuasions that keeponefrom confronting this primary question of the meaning of being. One isexistential, the other theoretical. The former consists ofthose attitudes and waysofexisting which deter the terrible confrontation with the question. Thus whenoneavoids truly recognizing himself, when one chatters instead of speaks, showsmildinterest rather than concern, avoids the truth of his finitude in death and

, guiltrather than embracing it, one succeeds in keeping the great question, whatdoesit mean to be? at bay. One can thus exist in such a way as to avoid thequestion; but one can also think theoretically in such a way as to avoid thequestion.When one examines one's self and the world primarily in terms of whatkindsof things exist rather than in terms of what it means to exist or for things intheworld to exist, one has erected a barrier to the truth of being. One then seesonlyentities, not being itself. This, according to Heidegger, is to overlook whatheinearlier works calls the ontological difference: that is, the difference betweenSeienden 'entities' and Sein 'being.'

For Heidegger, then, part of his task is to raise anew the question of beingratherthan the question about entities. The word 'anew' belongs, for he finds inmanyof the ancient thinkers a greater sense of the question than in modernthought. This raising anew of the question of the meaning of being must becarriedout always on these two levels: 1)to shake loose the persistent tendencyofwestern philosophy to formulate the world always in terms of 'kinds of things 'and2) to actually inquire into the meaning of existence purely in terms of what itmeansto be. Heidegger originally sought to include both of these accounts in hisgreatwork, Being and Time, but as it stands his major work is incomplete.bT?etask in Being and Time is to inquire into the meaning of being. The most

~h~IOUSpoint is that being is not itself an entity. There is no special kind of thingidIC~one can call 'being'. In English, of course, it is perfectly legitimate toIh~nh~ythe term with a particular kind of entity, asserting that such-and-such aP.a~ IS a being. Heidegger, ho.wever, does not utilize the term in this way.lOber, he uses the term 'being.' m the sense that is equatable with the infinitive,be')~'as when we equate 'being hungry' with 'to be hungry.' Here, 'being' (or 'tolOisl~not .anentity ?ut the supre~e condition for all.pos~ible modes of existence.(or b PecIaI sense IS supremely Important to bear m mmd: the search for being

etter: the search for what it means to be) is not a search for a mysterious,

117

mystical or God-like entity which is in any wayan ultimate cause or ground of I

other things, and is essentially and always something other than what Oneis roneself. Rather, since being is simply that meaning which underlies all othermeaning, it is far from mysterious or mystical, and certainly not something otherthan oneself. For when I ask: 'What does it mean to be?' the object of my inquirymy being, is uniquely present. What is not obvious is its meaning. 'What does itmean to be?' As obvious and as inescapable as my being is, the question isultimate. How, then, without any reference to kinds of things (such as gods andheavens and souls) can I inquire at all into this question? Heidegger's response isbasically that one not only can but often does inquire into his existence as such.There is, then, what Heidegger calls an existential analytic: an analysis ofexistence. This analysis is based upon the principle that there are various waystoexist, which either reveal or cover up our own meaning. I can thus live in suchaway as to avoid becoming aware of my existence, or I can live in such a way asto Idiscover my meaning. With the distinction between authentic and inauthenticexistence, Heidegger has established a logic of existential inquiry which does notdepend on any kind of entity at all. Thus, when the inquirer distinguishes I

between authentic and inauthentic speech, for example, the inquiry does not askwhether there exists any speaking, it asks directly about the meaning of speak-ing. Something must either exist or not exist; but meaning depends rather ODwhether existence as such is covered up or revealed.

Since the modes of existence can be made articulate in terms of authenticity,what it means to exist can thus be examined structurally. That is to say, it is nowpossible to recognize the order and interrelationship of the various ways to exist.These ways of existing are now given the name 'existentials,' and for the sakeofinquiry they are a priori. They are not, then, experienced; rather they approxi-mate Kant's categories in that they are presupposed in order to make intelligiblethe meaning of existence. The existentials, it must be remembered, do not revealany entity, but the meaning of existence itself. It is through the a priori existeD-tials alone that one can rationally and thematically inquire into the meaning ofone's existence.

A frequent mistake by commentators and critics is to s~e thes~ ex!stenti~s:theories about man's essence. They see, for example, Heidegger s dISCUSSIO~anxiety or dread as constituting a certain bleak or nihilistic view oflife. Nothl'could be further from the point. When Heidegger speaks of the importance °ddread, he is not opting for dread over happiness, he is merely showing that ~e\.discloses some crucial insights into the meaning of hun:an exi~tence .. ef~certainly not a nihilist, since he is directly arguing that existence IS mea~iOg eand indeed open to rational inquiry. But certain dimensions of human. eXlst~~can be analyzed clearly only through a comprehension of that peculiar hU• tophenomenon known as dread. This is not to say that the 'true picture' ofmanlS

edsee him only in the perspective of dread, nor does it suggest that weIl-balanC/Itand happy people are somehow dishones~ ~ith themsel.ves. I.t m~st be ~el1l:vel'bered that Heidegger's purpose in descnbmg these existentials IS to disC

1I8

,hat it means to exist. He is not, then, preaching a doctrine of nihilism orIIexistentialism: he is carrying out an inquiry.

A major part of Being and Time is an analysis of these existentials. In order tograsp the essence of Heidegger's thought it is necessary to sketch out themeaningofa few of the most important existentials.

3.I.I Being-in-the-WorldThemost basic thing that can be said about the meaning of human existence isthat it always takes place from a perspective of a world, so that the mostelementalof all existentials is that one can be said to be in a world. This 'being-in'isnot a spatial or even cosmological concept; it is rather a sense one has abouthowone exists so that the environment is somehow a priori significant. In thissense, 'world' is more like its use in such phrases as 'the world of jazz' or 'theworldof Shakespeare' rather than the objective entity called the universe. One ofthedimensions by which one is characterized in light of this a priori existential isfacticity.By facticity Heidegger means that we always see ourselves as bound upwiththe destiny of those entities we confront in our world; that human existencehasan element of ,give ness' within the world. Thus the world is not derived fromexperience, it is a priori presupposed as an existential of human meaning. Thisworldis seen in a variety of ways, but human existence finds itself dealing withtheworld in two basic ways: either by seeing it as ready-at-hand or present-at-hand. The former is the more primordial, and it refers to the state in which wesimplyuse the objects within the world for their basic purpose. Thus when Iwrenchthe doorknob to open the door I am seeing the knob as ready-at-hand; butifI were to withdraw from such immediate dealing and reflect upon the kind ofentitythat is the doorknob, I am apprehending it as present-at-hand. One can seeanimportant epistemological point being made in regard to the existential under-standing: it is a mistake to deal with one's existence in the world as primarilysubstantial, for one substantizes only after one reflects and relates to the world inasecondary or derived manner. What is important in such existential analysis isthatwe discover what it means to exist so that we find ourselves always already10 a world: the world is not built up after an awareness of the mind. This firstexistential, being-in-the-world, is the broadest and most inclusive of all theexistentials, and because of this it is the least specific. The other existentialsshould be seen in the light of this first dimension of self-reflective existentialanalysis: before I am aware of anything else about myself, I am already in aworld.

3·1.2 The 'Self' and the 'They'As a thinking and inquiring being I can recognize myself in the existential T or I~~nl~~e myself in the existential 'they.' It is important to remember that thee :y ISa dimension of human meaning and hence cannot be seen as made up ofs~~tiesor persons other than oneself. Rather, the 'they' is a characteristic of thee .By the 'they-self,' then, Heidegger means that mode of existing in which one

119

mystical or God-like entity which is in any wayan ultimate cause or ground of I

other things, and is essentially and always something other than what Oneis roneself. Rather, since being is simply that meaning which underlies all othermeaning, it is far from mysterious or mystical, and certainly not something otherthan oneself. For when I ask: 'What does it mean to be?' the object of my inquirymy being, is uniquely present. What is not obvious is its meaning. 'What does itmean to be?' As obvious and as inescapable as my being is, the question isultimate. How, then, without any reference to kinds of things (such as gods andheavens and souls) can I inquire at all into this question? Heidegger's response isbasically that one not only can but often does inquire into his existence as such.There is, then, what Heidegger calls an existential analytic: an analysis ofexistence. This analysis is based upon the principle that there are various waystoexist, which either reveal or cover up our own meaning. I can thus live in suchaway as to avoid becoming aware of my existence, or I can live in such a way asto Idiscover my meaning. With the distinction between authentic and inauthenticexistence, Heidegger has established a logic of existential inquiry which does notdepend on any kind of entity at all. Thus, when the inquirer distinguishes I

between authentic and inauthentic speech, for example, the inquiry does not askwhether there exists any speaking, it asks directly about the meaning of speak-ing. Something must either exist or not exist; but meaning depends rather ODwhether existence as such is covered up or revealed.

Since the modes of existence can be made articulate in terms of authenticity,what it means to exist can thus be examined structurally. That is to say, it is nowpossible to recognize the order and interrelationship of the various ways to exist.These ways of existing are now given the name 'existentials,' and for the sakeofinquiry they are a priori. They are not, then, experienced; rather they approxi-mate Kant's categories in that they are presupposed in order to make intelligiblethe meaning of existence. The existentials, it must be remembered, do not revealany entity, but the meaning of existence itself. It is through the a priori existeD-tials alone that one can rationally and thematically inquire into the meaning ofone's existence.

A frequent mistake by commentators and critics is to s~e thes~ ex!stenti~s:theories about man's essence. They see, for example, Heidegger s dISCUSSIO~anxiety or dread as constituting a certain bleak or nihilistic view oflife. Nothl'could be further from the point. When Heidegger speaks of the importance °ddread, he is not opting for dread over happiness, he is merely showing that ~e\.discloses some crucial insights into the meaning of hun:an exi~tence .. ef~certainly not a nihilist, since he is directly arguing that existence IS mea~iOg eand indeed open to rational inquiry. But certain dimensions of human. eXlst~~can be analyzed clearly only through a comprehension of that peculiar hU• tophenomenon known as dread. This is not to say that the 'true picture' ofmanlS

edsee him only in the perspective of dread, nor does it suggest that weIl-balanC/Itand happy people are somehow dishones~ ~ith themsel.ves. I.t m~st be ~el1l:vel'bered that Heidegger's purpose in descnbmg these existentials IS to disC

1I8

,hat it means to exist. He is not, then, preaching a doctrine of nihilism orIIexistentialism: he is carrying out an inquiry.

A major part of Being and Time is an analysis of these existentials. In order tograsp the essence of Heidegger's thought it is necessary to sketch out themeaningofa few of the most important existentials.

3.I.I Being-in-the-WorldThemost basic thing that can be said about the meaning of human existence isthat it always takes place from a perspective of a world, so that the mostelementalof all existentials is that one can be said to be in a world. This 'being-in'isnot a spatial or even cosmological concept; it is rather a sense one has abouthowone exists so that the environment is somehow a priori significant. In thissense, 'world' is more like its use in such phrases as 'the world of jazz' or 'theworldof Shakespeare' rather than the objective entity called the universe. One ofthedimensions by which one is characterized in light of this a priori existential isfacticity.By facticity Heidegger means that we always see ourselves as bound upwiththe destiny of those entities we confront in our world; that human existencehasan element of ,give ness' within the world. Thus the world is not derived fromexperience, it is a priori presupposed as an existential of human meaning. Thisworldis seen in a variety of ways, but human existence finds itself dealing withtheworld in two basic ways: either by seeing it as ready-at-hand or present-at-hand. The former is the more primordial, and it refers to the state in which wesimplyuse the objects within the world for their basic purpose. Thus when Iwrenchthe doorknob to open the door I am seeing the knob as ready-at-hand; butifI were to withdraw from such immediate dealing and reflect upon the kind ofentitythat is the doorknob, I am apprehending it as present-at-hand. One can seeanimportant epistemological point being made in regard to the existential under-standing: it is a mistake to deal with one's existence in the world as primarilysubstantial, for one substantizes only after one reflects and relates to the world inasecondary or derived manner. What is important in such existential analysis isthatwe discover what it means to exist so that we find ourselves always already10 a world: the world is not built up after an awareness of the mind. This firstexistential, being-in-the-world, is the broadest and most inclusive of all theexistentials, and because of this it is the least specific. The other existentialsshould be seen in the light of this first dimension of self-reflective existentialanalysis: before I am aware of anything else about myself, I am already in aworld.

3·1.2 The 'Self' and the 'They'As a thinking and inquiring being I can recognize myself in the existential T or I~~nl~~e myself in the existential 'they.' It is important to remember that thee :y ISa dimension of human meaning and hence cannot be seen as made up ofs~~tiesor persons other than oneself. Rather, the 'they' is a characteristic of thee .By the 'they-self,' then, Heidegger means that mode of existing in which one

119

.,is aware of oneself solely in terms ofw~a~ the impersonal chatter and distractin I ).1.3.3 Discourse. There. is a third ~ode by ~hich we disclose ourselves:~usyness ?f everydayn~ss presents. It IS Indeed a mode of existence so unreftec~ discourse. In talk we ~rtJculate me~nIng,. gl:e It ~orm,. express ours~lves astive and distracted that It keeps true self-awareness from occurring. This mode' J1leaningful. The capacity to speak IS equiprirnordial WIth understanding andcontrasted with the self that is aware of itself in which we relate to the vario~S tate-of-mind; that is, it is an essential way in which we are aware ofthe meaningelements of our world in the various modes of our being. Thus, according t

S~four own existence.

Heidegger, I can exist in such a way as to be authentically myself; but I can alsO What Heidegger says in each of his discussions of the three elements ofexist in such a wa~ that my tr~e self is taken over by the chatter, ambiguity, an~ disclosure must always be seen in t~e I!g?t of the ov~r~1I perspective of ~isclo-vague~ess ~f the I~personal the~.' Throughout all the ways I exist (i.e., in all sure.Thus one ought not to see the .Inclplent determinism ?f thrownness In o~rthe existentials) this threa~ of losing myself In the they-~elf is very real. Now I state-of-mind as having any gre.ater Influence ~ha~ the exaItI~g.f~~edom found Inmany people have recognized that one can lose oneself In triviality: we don't theanalysis of the understanding as the projection of possibilities. It must beneed the net of Heidegger's language to tell us that. But Heidegger has taken this remembered that these elements are parts of the total disclosure of our exis-obvious.point and made it structurally intel~igible on the level of pure ontology. tence. Ho~ is it t~at our .existence manifests its:lf as meanin?ful? By ourHe has, In other words, taken the popular WIsdom and shown its true philosopj], mood-domInated existence In response to our actuality, by the projection of ourcal roots. The lostness of one's self in the 'they' now becomes intelligible as a freepossibilities in response to our existentiality, and by the articulation of suchmode of existence, and a part of the overall structure of the existential analytic. meaning through talk. Heidegger thus describes human existence so that it can

bemeaningful; and he has included in it those powerful but incomplete dimen-sionsof our awareness that make us actual, possible, and articulate. The mean-ingof our existence, after all, in order to be meaningful, must disclose itself to us.Suchdisclosure itself is a mode of existing.

3.1.3 DisclosureThe meaning of our existence is something which needs to be explained in termsof how we come to be aware of it. How is the meaning of our existence mademanifest to us? Heidegger explicates a three-fold way in which our existence'discloses' itself to us. These three elements of disclosure are a priori existentialsand must be seen as ways of existing. They are: state-of-mind, understanding,and discourse.

3.1.3.1 In our state-of-mind we are disclosed in terms of our actuality, but suchdisclosure is not through factual investigation. Rather, one's actuality is mademeaningful through moods. One finds oneself in a world, which, to a certainextent, is not of one's own doing; we are, to a certain extent, thrown into theworld. Heidegger interprets this 'thrownness' as an existential of human exis-tence, so that it cannot be understood merely as a psychological phenomenon.What he means by this special term is that dimension of our existence which, asaway of existing is already determined for us. The reader should not concludefrom this that Heidegger is denying free will, nor is he asserting fatalism eitherinits classical metaphysical or in its modern existential sense. He is merely shoW-ing that there is a side to us which manifests our existence as being partly thatover which we have no control. But this is only a part.

3.1.3.2 Understanding. Equiprimordial with state-of-mind is understanding·Whereas state-of-mind reveals our actuality, understanding reveals our po~-sibilities. One understands by projecting possibilities which are always one S

own. This projection of possibilities through the understanding balances theinfluence of actuality achieved by the moods of our state-of-mind. Heideggef

r

claims that state-of-mind discloses our facticity (that we are as we are) wher~understanding discloses our existentiality (that our existence is in fact ours all

made up of possibilities).

120

3.1.4 Fallenness and Its Three MomentsThese modes of existence which constitute the disclosure of the meaning of ourexistence, are, of course, capable of hiding that meaning as well. There is noguarantee that our projections will succeed in always revealing us as we are; ourmoods can lead us astray, and our language can serve to cover up rather thanreveal. These modes of the they-self, taken together, which represent disclosureof a self which hides its meaning, are called fallenness. That is, rather thangenuinely talking, we can chatter in idle talk; rather than a true awareness of ourpossibilities we can engage in curiosity; rather than an acute awareness of ourOwnfacticity we can be pleasantly clouded over in ambiguity. Each of theseterms, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, are described by Heidegger in greatdetail, showing their a priori character as existentials. The awareness of thiseXistential falleness is of supreme importance, for it shows us that the meaning ofexistence is not conceptual or utopian: the meaning of our existence is notSomething beyond us in any ideological sense. On the other hand, neither is itPessimistic or founded solely on the description of mankind as it is, for the~odality ofthe existentials permits the difference between success and failure. ItIS,in fact, precisely because of the modality of existence that it can be madernanifest, and hence understood. The existential disclosure, in its three momentso~state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, as well as in the three moments~ falleness, thus presents an intelligible view of existence which can now be

OUghtabout.

3.1.5 Care or Concernl'he various existentials provide a structure by which one can see that existence

121

.,is aware of oneself solely in terms ofw~a~ the impersonal chatter and distractin I ).1.3.3 Discourse. There. is a third ~ode by ~hich we disclose ourselves:~usyness ?f everydayn~ss presents. It IS Indeed a mode of existence so unreftec~ discourse. In talk we ~rtJculate me~nIng,. gl:e It ~orm,. express ours~lves astive and distracted that It keeps true self-awareness from occurring. This mode' J1leaningful. The capacity to speak IS equiprirnordial WIth understanding andcontrasted with the self that is aware of itself in which we relate to the vario~S tate-of-mind; that is, it is an essential way in which we are aware ofthe meaningelements of our world in the various modes of our being. Thus, according t

S~four own existence.

Heidegger, I can exist in such a way as to be authentically myself; but I can alsO What Heidegger says in each of his discussions of the three elements ofexist in such a wa~ that my tr~e self is taken over by the chatter, ambiguity, an~ disclosure must always be seen in t~e I!g?t of the ov~r~1I perspective of ~isclo-vague~ess ~f the I~personal the~.' Throughout all the ways I exist (i.e., in all sure.Thus one ought not to see the .Inclplent determinism ?f thrownness In o~rthe existentials) this threa~ of losing myself In the they-~elf is very real. Now I state-of-mind as having any gre.ater Influence ~ha~ the exaItI~g.f~~edom found Inmany people have recognized that one can lose oneself In triviality: we don't theanalysis of the understanding as the projection of possibilities. It must beneed the net of Heidegger's language to tell us that. But Heidegger has taken this remembered that these elements are parts of the total disclosure of our exis-obvious.point and made it structurally intel~igible on the level of pure ontology. tence. Ho~ is it t~at our .existence manifests its:lf as meanin?ful? By ourHe has, In other words, taken the popular WIsdom and shown its true philosopj], mood-domInated existence In response to our actuality, by the projection of ourcal roots. The lostness of one's self in the 'they' now becomes intelligible as a freepossibilities in response to our existentiality, and by the articulation of suchmode of existence, and a part of the overall structure of the existential analytic. meaning through talk. Heidegger thus describes human existence so that it can

bemeaningful; and he has included in it those powerful but incomplete dimen-sionsof our awareness that make us actual, possible, and articulate. The mean-ingof our existence, after all, in order to be meaningful, must disclose itself to us.Suchdisclosure itself is a mode of existing.

3.1.3 DisclosureThe meaning of our existence is something which needs to be explained in termsof how we come to be aware of it. How is the meaning of our existence mademanifest to us? Heidegger explicates a three-fold way in which our existence'discloses' itself to us. These three elements of disclosure are a priori existentialsand must be seen as ways of existing. They are: state-of-mind, understanding,and discourse.

3.1.3.1 In our state-of-mind we are disclosed in terms of our actuality, but suchdisclosure is not through factual investigation. Rather, one's actuality is mademeaningful through moods. One finds oneself in a world, which, to a certainextent, is not of one's own doing; we are, to a certain extent, thrown into theworld. Heidegger interprets this 'thrownness' as an existential of human exis-tence, so that it cannot be understood merely as a psychological phenomenon.What he means by this special term is that dimension of our existence which, asaway of existing is already determined for us. The reader should not concludefrom this that Heidegger is denying free will, nor is he asserting fatalism eitherinits classical metaphysical or in its modern existential sense. He is merely shoW-ing that there is a side to us which manifests our existence as being partly thatover which we have no control. But this is only a part.

3.1.3.2 Understanding. Equiprimordial with state-of-mind is understanding·Whereas state-of-mind reveals our actuality, understanding reveals our po~-sibilities. One understands by projecting possibilities which are always one S

own. This projection of possibilities through the understanding balances theinfluence of actuality achieved by the moods of our state-of-mind. Heideggef

r

claims that state-of-mind discloses our facticity (that we are as we are) wher~understanding discloses our existentiality (that our existence is in fact ours all

made up of possibilities).

120

3.1.4 Fallenness and Its Three MomentsThese modes of existence which constitute the disclosure of the meaning of ourexistence, are, of course, capable of hiding that meaning as well. There is noguarantee that our projections will succeed in always revealing us as we are; ourmoods can lead us astray, and our language can serve to cover up rather thanreveal. These modes of the they-self, taken together, which represent disclosureof a self which hides its meaning, are called fallenness. That is, rather thangenuinely talking, we can chatter in idle talk; rather than a true awareness of ourpossibilities we can engage in curiosity; rather than an acute awareness of ourOwnfacticity we can be pleasantly clouded over in ambiguity. Each of theseterms, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, are described by Heidegger in greatdetail, showing their a priori character as existentials. The awareness of thiseXistential falleness is of supreme importance, for it shows us that the meaning ofexistence is not conceptual or utopian: the meaning of our existence is notSomething beyond us in any ideological sense. On the other hand, neither is itPessimistic or founded solely on the description of mankind as it is, for the~odality ofthe existentials permits the difference between success and failure. ItIS,in fact, precisely because of the modality of existence that it can be madernanifest, and hence understood. The existential disclosure, in its three momentso~state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, as well as in the three moments~ falleness, thus presents an intelligible view of existence which can now be

OUghtabout.

3.1.5 Care or Concernl'he various existentials provide a structure by which one can see that existence

121

T

is meaningful. This structure requires that all the existentials have a unity aboutthem so that there must be a perspective by which the totality of such existentialmeaning can be thought about. This ultimate existential Heidegger argues is careor concern. Its importance as the supreme existential lies in its capacity toground and embrace both the authentic and inauthentic moments: it not onlyreveals the meaning of disclosure by which human existence becomes intelligi_ble, but also how that existence becomes hidden, in which, through falleness, itturns away from itself. What this means is that whenever and in whatever wayIexist, such ways can be seen as ways of caring, even if that caring is for the wrongthing. Again, this caring should not be seen in terms of psychological states: tocare is to exist. It is thus a dimension of ontology, an existential, an a priori formby which existence as such can be thought about. An important dimension of thisargument is that the perspective of scientific observation of a value-neutral worldis hereby made merely one among many and several ways of being, such that itcan never be seen as the ultimate way to see reality.

According to Heidegger, then, the ultimate existential meaning of our exis-tence is to care. By this argument, the source of ultimate meaning does not comefrom any entity outside ourselves, but by a dimension of our own self-understanding. Any argument, then, which asserts that our meaning must rely onan ultimate being outside of and other than ourselves is here thrown into seriousdoubt. Oddly though, this is not an atheistic argument, though it is a denial of I

certain theistic arguments of meaning. Even less is this an argument for existen-tial relativism, for the structure of care is universally significant and not peculiarto each individual. Heidegger finds the structure of ultimate reality in the veryways in which we exist. This is not a claim about the existence or the absence ofanything, for the whole argument is that one reasons not through the assertionsthat there exists any kind of being, but that the meaning of being itself is directlyopen to inquiry. The ultimate in such inquiry is seen to be care: it is thefundamental existential by which such inquiry can be carried out.

3.1.6 Death .One of the most important of Heidegger's doctrines concerns his interpre~auo~of human death: the bold and forthright way in which he grasps the realitv 0

one's finitude in death. In death we escape completely from the influence of~hethey-self, since the they-self does not die. Although it is possible for me to hvesomeone else's life (in the sense that I never realize the meaning of my o;~existence) it is not possible for me to die another's death. As we have seen,

. c Id . I·· f ur existen-disclosure of our existence has a three-to articu anon In terms 0 .0 _~ldtiality, facti city , and fallenness. The meaning of death follows this thre~ Desstructure. The projection of possibilities through our understanding .consutu~atone's existentiality, and the existentiali.ty of death consists in thre~ ~hIngs:~~~011my death is absolutely my own; b) that It cannot be shared; and c) It IScerta d-the other hand, one's facticity is known through states-of-mind, and the rooDoflike state-of-mind which discloses death is dread. In dread we are aware

122

nothingness, and such experiences show us our radical finitude: we are beingswhichcan cease to be.

The experience of dread, then, is an important characteristic of our under-standing of ourselves, since it makes us aware of our finitude in a radical way.Dreadis not an experience of any thing; it is not fear, nor terror, nor fright, all ofwhich have objects. Dread is that sense or awareness we sometimes feel ofnothingness itself. It is through this mood of dread, then, that one's facticity ofdeathis revealed: we understand the facticity of what it means to be going to diebyreflecting on the meaning of our experience of nothingness in dread.

The third dimension of disclosure, fallenness, also plays its role in the under-standing of death. The they-self seeks to keep us aware of our death, not bydenying that we die, but by treating it always as something which occurs toothers, and by diverting our attention away from its proper meaning. Althoughthe they-self abandons us in death, it also keeps us from thinking about deathproperly. One's authentic relation to one's own death is that of anticipatoryresoluteness: an eager and forward-looking acceptance of our finitude.

3.1.7 GuiltBefore any enterprise can be thematic and capable of rational inquiry, it isnecessary that there be a principle of determination based on opposites. Thus, inorderfor empirical claims to be meaningful, they must first admit of being eithertrueor false; in order for morals to be intelligible one must admit of the bad andthegood; with aesthetics one must admit the beautiful and the ugly. Thus anessential ingredient of Heidegger 's analysis of existence is that there must besomeway in which existence has a negative. This negative cannot consist of not?eing,for we do not deny existence when we realize its negativity. The negativ-uy of existence must be understood in terms of a response to the question: howcanI exist negatively? Without this, the enterprise of existential analysis wouldbe.impossible. Heidegger finds this negativity of existence in guilt. To explainthisone must first sketch out that phenomenon which awakens us to the reality ofourguilt: conscience.

For Heidegger, conscience is of special value to the understanding of our-selvesbecause it is the call to guilt. As calling, it has four elements: that which calls,:hatWhichis called, that which is called about, and that which one is called to do.nconscience, each of these four dimensions of calling is a different way to be theself.The self calls the self about the self to be the self. With the aid ofHeidegger'sanalys· he.the. IS, t e~e rour eleme.nts are ma.d~ more s~eclfic: the uncanny self calls toCoIn~uthentIc self about ItSauthenticity to be Itself, i.e., to be authentic. Thus(e.nsclenced~es not be.gor depend upon the existence of an entity outside itselfPsg., God): In conscience we call ourselves to be guilty. Guilt is not af/chol~gical phenomenon, but an a priori form of existence, and indeed that

~ ~~Ich provides one with the negativity to one's existence.ca UI!tIS not the result of having done a censurable act, it is rather the a priori

pacIty to do so. It is that by which we can see ourselves as negative. In

123

T

is meaningful. This structure requires that all the existentials have a unity aboutthem so that there must be a perspective by which the totality of such existentialmeaning can be thought about. This ultimate existential Heidegger argues is careor concern. Its importance as the supreme existential lies in its capacity toground and embrace both the authentic and inauthentic moments: it not onlyreveals the meaning of disclosure by which human existence becomes intelligi_ble, but also how that existence becomes hidden, in which, through falleness, itturns away from itself. What this means is that whenever and in whatever wayIexist, such ways can be seen as ways of caring, even if that caring is for the wrongthing. Again, this caring should not be seen in terms of psychological states: tocare is to exist. It is thus a dimension of ontology, an existential, an a priori formby which existence as such can be thought about. An important dimension of thisargument is that the perspective of scientific observation of a value-neutral worldis hereby made merely one among many and several ways of being, such that itcan never be seen as the ultimate way to see reality.

According to Heidegger, then, the ultimate existential meaning of our exis-tence is to care. By this argument, the source of ultimate meaning does not comefrom any entity outside ourselves, but by a dimension of our own self-understanding. Any argument, then, which asserts that our meaning must rely onan ultimate being outside of and other than ourselves is here thrown into seriousdoubt. Oddly though, this is not an atheistic argument, though it is a denial of I

certain theistic arguments of meaning. Even less is this an argument for existen-tial relativism, for the structure of care is universally significant and not peculiarto each individual. Heidegger finds the structure of ultimate reality in the veryways in which we exist. This is not a claim about the existence or the absence ofanything, for the whole argument is that one reasons not through the assertionsthat there exists any kind of being, but that the meaning of being itself is directlyopen to inquiry. The ultimate in such inquiry is seen to be care: it is thefundamental existential by which such inquiry can be carried out.

3.1.6 Death .One of the most important of Heidegger's doctrines concerns his interpre~auo~of human death: the bold and forthright way in which he grasps the realitv 0

one's finitude in death. In death we escape completely from the influence of~hethey-self, since the they-self does not die. Although it is possible for me to hvesomeone else's life (in the sense that I never realize the meaning of my o;~existence) it is not possible for me to die another's death. As we have seen,

. c Id . I·· f ur existen-disclosure of our existence has a three-to articu anon In terms 0 .0 _~ldtiality, facti city , and fallenness. The meaning of death follows this thre~ Desstructure. The projection of possibilities through our understanding .consutu~atone's existentiality, and the existentiali.ty of death consists in thre~ ~hIngs:~~~011my death is absolutely my own; b) that It cannot be shared; and c) It IScerta d-the other hand, one's facticity is known through states-of-mind, and the rooDoflike state-of-mind which discloses death is dread. In dread we are aware

122

nothingness, and such experiences show us our radical finitude: we are beingswhichcan cease to be.

The experience of dread, then, is an important characteristic of our under-standing of ourselves, since it makes us aware of our finitude in a radical way.Dreadis not an experience of any thing; it is not fear, nor terror, nor fright, all ofwhich have objects. Dread is that sense or awareness we sometimes feel ofnothingness itself. It is through this mood of dread, then, that one's facticity ofdeathis revealed: we understand the facticity of what it means to be going to diebyreflecting on the meaning of our experience of nothingness in dread.

The third dimension of disclosure, fallenness, also plays its role in the under-standing of death. The they-self seeks to keep us aware of our death, not bydenying that we die, but by treating it always as something which occurs toothers, and by diverting our attention away from its proper meaning. Althoughthe they-self abandons us in death, it also keeps us from thinking about deathproperly. One's authentic relation to one's own death is that of anticipatoryresoluteness: an eager and forward-looking acceptance of our finitude.

3.1.7 GuiltBefore any enterprise can be thematic and capable of rational inquiry, it isnecessary that there be a principle of determination based on opposites. Thus, inorderfor empirical claims to be meaningful, they must first admit of being eithertrueor false; in order for morals to be intelligible one must admit of the bad andthegood; with aesthetics one must admit the beautiful and the ugly. Thus anessential ingredient of Heidegger 's analysis of existence is that there must besomeway in which existence has a negative. This negative cannot consist of not?eing,for we do not deny existence when we realize its negativity. The negativ-uy of existence must be understood in terms of a response to the question: howcanI exist negatively? Without this, the enterprise of existential analysis wouldbe.impossible. Heidegger finds this negativity of existence in guilt. To explainthisone must first sketch out that phenomenon which awakens us to the reality ofourguilt: conscience.

For Heidegger, conscience is of special value to the understanding of our-selvesbecause it is the call to guilt. As calling, it has four elements: that which calls,:hatWhichis called, that which is called about, and that which one is called to do.nconscience, each of these four dimensions of calling is a different way to be theself.The self calls the self about the self to be the self. With the aid ofHeidegger'sanalys· he.the. IS, t e~e rour eleme.nts are ma.d~ more s~eclfic: the uncanny self calls toCoIn~uthentIc self about ItSauthenticity to be Itself, i.e., to be authentic. Thus(e.nsclenced~es not be.gor depend upon the existence of an entity outside itselfPsg., God): In conscience we call ourselves to be guilty. Guilt is not af/chol~gical phenomenon, but an a priori form of existence, and indeed that

~ ~~Ich provides one with the negativity to one's existence.ca UI!tIS not the result of having done a censurable act, it is rather the a priori

pacIty to do so. It is that by which we can see ourselves as negative. In

123

Heidegger's analysis it thus becomes that existential reality by which onegrounds his own responsibility. It is also the very ground of our own meaningful.ness, for without this negativity to our existence there would be no meaning atall. Thus, when one accepts oneself as meaningful one necessarily wants to havea conscience, for without it one could not 'fail' at existing. In addition, uPonreflection it is clear that guilt, in this special sense of being an a priori existentialcomes prior to ethics. The traditional view argues that only after one believe~that certain acts are wrong, can one, upon the performance of such action, feelguilty. But Heidegger's point is that, prior to the development of any system ofright and wrong, there is already (hence: a priori) a need to succeed rather thanfail at existing. The system of morals is merely that by which we seek tounderstand how to succeed and avoid failure. Thus, the awareness of one's beingguilty is prior to any ethical or moral system, and indeed makes it possible. Thisis another example of the argument that an understanding of our existentiality ispresupposed in any and all other disciplines, making the analysis of existence thefundamental or primary discipline of philosophy. Heidegger thus has four pointsabout guilt: 1) it is the basis of negativity in existing, which is necessary for the irationality of our understanding; 2) being guilty makes one want to have aconscience, 3) only through guilt can one be authentic; and 4) guilt is prior toethics. Thus it is in guilt rather than in death or nothingness that Heidegger finds Ihis existential negative. Again, this analysis, as in the case of death, opts for the,full embrace of our finitude, a constant theme in all of Heidegger's works.

3.1.8 TimeSharing the title of his most famous work, time is the central key to Heidegger'sontology. From the analysis of the various existentials Heidegger discovers theirunity in the phenomenon of caring. But caring has an ontological structure whichgrounds its existential significance. This ontological structure is the three-foldcharacter of temporality. For Heidegger, temporality has three ecstases: pre~'ent, past, and future. These three ecstases are intelligible in terms of what Itmeans to be, not in terms of metaphysical entities. Thus, to be such that one has afuture is to anticipate, to project forwards and towards, and hence: to.bepossible. To be such that one has a present is to be able to declare and establtsh

situations, to be able to act. To be such that one has a past is to recollect, to reac:back into one's established meaning and to function within the establish:rstructure of significance. As in the other modes of existence, the elements.temporality have both authentic and inauthentic dimensions. The termi~ology I;as follows. Authentic future is called anticipation; inauthentic future IS ca!leexpecting. The distinction emphasizes the eagerness of the authentic gOlng~forward, whereas the inauthentic is merely that which awaits the future to cOl11

urIto it. The authentic past is called repetition, which means that past becomes.~ ,own, and we accept it as part of ourselves; the inauthentic past is fo~gett~b;which means that the past has faded in terms of our awareness and our belOg· It'authentic present is called the Moment, in which action is accepted as one'S oW '

the inauthenti~ present is called making-present, which suggests a letting ofevents determine us rather than the other way around. What is important in thisassignment of terms is that Heidegger describes the three ecstases of time interms o~ what it means to ~e so that time has these three dimensions and that theyall admit of the authentic-inauthentic distinction. For the fundamental on-tologist, the normal view of time, which is made up of moments of absolutepresent (or instantaneous Nows) which come into existence and go out ofexistence, is merely ~ derived notion and philosophically unsound. In seeking tounderstand the rnearung of one's existence, it is necessary to see time as ways ofexisting, as ~rticulating our essential finitude in respect to the three-fold way inwhich we exist temporally. To be is thus to be in time. Since one's existentialityis, as we have seen, due to the projection of possibilities, the future is the mostimportant of the three ecstases, and indeed the projection of possibilities is aningredi.ent in each of the t?ree elements. Since one's meaning must be presup-posed in most of our dealings, the past is the second most important; and theactual doing of things , which constitutes the present, is the least important of thethree ecstas~s. This ranking emphasizes Heidegger's interest in possibilities,and shows his abandonment of the tradition which has ever seen the actual andthe present as the foundation of metaphysics. For Heidegger, such thinking ismisguided.

With his analysis of the structure of temporality , Heidegger has shifted from a~ere description of the ways we exist, to the fundamental understanding of whatIt.mean~ to be at all. Not only do the elements of temporality establish firmly the

I dll~enslOns of our finitude, they also provide an ultimate basis of meaning bywhich the v~rious ways we.exist can be grounded. To say that the proper answertothe ~uestlOn of our meaning is our temporality is no idle remark; Heidegger hasestablIshed in a thematic way the dependence of the various existentials on a~rO'perfoundation, and this foundation can only be our understanding of ourhm~tedness in time. Although many readers and critics find much enthusiasm forHeldegger's analyses of dread, death, and care, it is his analyses of temporalitythat P·d . h . .rovr es one Wit the key element to his thought. To dISCUSShim withoutreference to his theory of time is always to misread him in a rather serious way.

3.1.9 History

tThheimportance of temporality , of course, leads one to the inevitable concern fore natu f h hi . I· ..

h· re 0 t e rstonca m man. If one IS essentially characterized in terms ofIStem I·· hen tihi pora ity, IS one t en time-bound? Are the epochs and developments of

v ~tory absolute, so that each age determines its own ultimate meaning ande~Ue? .To argue in this way is to assert historicism, the doctrine of the non-upernahty of human truths. Although Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis

on the iznifi f . . .at sigm cance 0 time and history, he IS not an historicist. He does notgUeth t t h I·· d .ist a rut s are mute to epochal notions, he is not an historical relativist. It

he~e, however, that Heidegger finds much of one's meaning relevant to one'sI1tage, fate, and destiny. These three elements of one's historicality are not

125

Heidegger's analysis it thus becomes that existential reality by which onegrounds his own responsibility. It is also the very ground of our own meaningful.ness, for without this negativity to our existence there would be no meaning atall. Thus, when one accepts oneself as meaningful one necessarily wants to havea conscience, for without it one could not 'fail' at existing. In addition, uPonreflection it is clear that guilt, in this special sense of being an a priori existentialcomes prior to ethics. The traditional view argues that only after one believe~that certain acts are wrong, can one, upon the performance of such action, feelguilty. But Heidegger's point is that, prior to the development of any system ofright and wrong, there is already (hence: a priori) a need to succeed rather thanfail at existing. The system of morals is merely that by which we seek tounderstand how to succeed and avoid failure. Thus, the awareness of one's beingguilty is prior to any ethical or moral system, and indeed makes it possible. Thisis another example of the argument that an understanding of our existentiality ispresupposed in any and all other disciplines, making the analysis of existence thefundamental or primary discipline of philosophy. Heidegger thus has four pointsabout guilt: 1) it is the basis of negativity in existing, which is necessary for the irationality of our understanding; 2) being guilty makes one want to have aconscience, 3) only through guilt can one be authentic; and 4) guilt is prior toethics. Thus it is in guilt rather than in death or nothingness that Heidegger finds Ihis existential negative. Again, this analysis, as in the case of death, opts for the,full embrace of our finitude, a constant theme in all of Heidegger's works.

3.1.8 TimeSharing the title of his most famous work, time is the central key to Heidegger'sontology. From the analysis of the various existentials Heidegger discovers theirunity in the phenomenon of caring. But caring has an ontological structure whichgrounds its existential significance. This ontological structure is the three-foldcharacter of temporality. For Heidegger, temporality has three ecstases: pre~'ent, past, and future. These three ecstases are intelligible in terms of what Itmeans to be, not in terms of metaphysical entities. Thus, to be such that one has afuture is to anticipate, to project forwards and towards, and hence: to.bepossible. To be such that one has a present is to be able to declare and establtsh

situations, to be able to act. To be such that one has a past is to recollect, to reac:back into one's established meaning and to function within the establish:rstructure of significance. As in the other modes of existence, the elements.temporality have both authentic and inauthentic dimensions. The termi~ology I;as follows. Authentic future is called anticipation; inauthentic future IS ca!leexpecting. The distinction emphasizes the eagerness of the authentic gOlng~forward, whereas the inauthentic is merely that which awaits the future to cOl11

urIto it. The authentic past is called repetition, which means that past becomes.~ ,own, and we accept it as part of ourselves; the inauthentic past is fo~gett~b;which means that the past has faded in terms of our awareness and our belOg· It'authentic present is called the Moment, in which action is accepted as one'S oW '

the inauthenti~ present is called making-present, which suggests a letting ofevents determine us rather than the other way around. What is important in thisassignment of terms is that Heidegger describes the three ecstases of time interms o~ what it means to ~e so that time has these three dimensions and that theyall admit of the authentic-inauthentic distinction. For the fundamental on-tologist, the normal view of time, which is made up of moments of absolutepresent (or instantaneous Nows) which come into existence and go out ofexistence, is merely ~ derived notion and philosophically unsound. In seeking tounderstand the rnearung of one's existence, it is necessary to see time as ways ofexisting, as ~rticulating our essential finitude in respect to the three-fold way inwhich we exist temporally. To be is thus to be in time. Since one's existentialityis, as we have seen, due to the projection of possibilities, the future is the mostimportant of the three ecstases, and indeed the projection of possibilities is aningredi.ent in each of the t?ree elements. Since one's meaning must be presup-posed in most of our dealings, the past is the second most important; and theactual doing of things , which constitutes the present, is the least important of thethree ecstas~s. This ranking emphasizes Heidegger's interest in possibilities,and shows his abandonment of the tradition which has ever seen the actual andthe present as the foundation of metaphysics. For Heidegger, such thinking ismisguided.

With his analysis of the structure of temporality , Heidegger has shifted from a~ere description of the ways we exist, to the fundamental understanding of whatIt.mean~ to be at all. Not only do the elements of temporality establish firmly the

I dll~enslOns of our finitude, they also provide an ultimate basis of meaning bywhich the v~rious ways we.exist can be grounded. To say that the proper answertothe ~uestlOn of our meaning is our temporality is no idle remark; Heidegger hasestablIshed in a thematic way the dependence of the various existentials on a~rO'perfoundation, and this foundation can only be our understanding of ourhm~tedness in time. Although many readers and critics find much enthusiasm forHeldegger's analyses of dread, death, and care, it is his analyses of temporalitythat P·d . h . .rovr es one Wit the key element to his thought. To dISCUSShim withoutreference to his theory of time is always to misread him in a rather serious way.

3.1.9 History

tThheimportance of temporality , of course, leads one to the inevitable concern fore natu f h hi . I· ..

h· re 0 t e rstonca m man. If one IS essentially characterized in terms ofIStem I·· hen tihi pora ity, IS one t en time-bound? Are the epochs and developments of

v ~tory absolute, so that each age determines its own ultimate meaning ande~Ue? .To argue in this way is to assert historicism, the doctrine of the non-upernahty of human truths. Although Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis

on the iznifi f . . .at sigm cance 0 time and history, he IS not an historicist. He does notgUeth t t h I·· d .ist a rut s are mute to epochal notions, he is not an historical relativist. It

he~e, however, that Heidegger finds much of one's meaning relevant to one'sI1tage, fate, and destiny. These three elements of one's historicality are not

125

metaphysical, but ontological dimensions. His analysis of history is consistent I

with his other existential analyses: the question is not, what kind of thing ishistorical knowledge; nor is it, what kind of metaphysical forces are responsiblefor what has happened in the past; rather, the question is: what does it mean to behistorical? It is only because I am already that kind of being which has a fate, aheritage, and a destiny, that I can be as a being with a past. The past is thussignificant because of the a priori structure of my historicality, not the other wayaround. I am then radically an historical being; I am as historical.

3.2 Other Works

othe~form~ of inq~iry must presuppose the nature of ground as its ultimatestart~ngPOIn~,~u.t In fundamental ontology, freedom itself is thrown open toinqUIry,and It IS In the understanding of freedom that one understands what itmeansto ~round some~hing. There is a strong intuitional support for Heidegger'sargument In the reflection of the sense one has of being a cause in the case offreeacts.so that this ?eing is more basic than any knowledge of another thing's powerto [nfluence .actlOn. However, Heidegger's analysis is not epistemic (whichwou~dleavey open to Hu~e's classic criticism of 'internal cause') but ontologi-cal:i.e., he ISconcerned with what it means to be free rather than how one can'prove' the existence of freedom. Once more, if Heidegger is right about theargument that .freedom is the essence of ground, then fundamental ontology, thestU?yof what It me~ns to be at all, is the ultimate and primordial discipline fromwhich~II others spn~g. To ground something, or to give reasons for things, is soessentialan element In all rational disciplines that the discovery of the essence ofgroundswould constitute this ultimate discipline. Heidegger has shown that theonlyapproach to the question of ground is through an inquiry into what it meanstobe as a ground; i.e., what it means to be free.

3.2.1 The Works on Fundamental OntologyHeidegger's original intention was to include in Being and Time an investigationof certain major figures within the history of philosophy, to show how theontological difference has played such an important role in keeping the questionof being limited to questions of mere entities. One of the most important figures inthis regard is Immanuel Kant; and although Heidegger's analysis of Kant doesnot occur in Being and Time, the analysis does take place in a subsequentvolume, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The thesis of this latter work 3.2.2 Works on Language.was to interpret Kant's critique in an inquiry into fundamental ontology. Heideg- A.fterthe publication of the three great texts on fundamental ontology (Being andger interprets Kant as laying the groundwork for metaphysics, and by his , TII~e, Kant and the Pr?bler:z ?f Metaphysics and On the Essence of Ground)transcendental deduction, shifting the major inquiry from the objects to what it Heidegger seems to shift his Interest considerably, writing several works onmeans for us to know about them. Since Kant continually insists that his lang~ageand poetry. This shift is one of emphasis only, however; for the purposeinvestigations are not cosmological but transcendental, there is a similarity to of~ISstudy of language is to inquire into how being manifests itself. SinceHeidegger's endeavors. To be sure, Heidegger does not think that Kant saw the H~lde~gerargues that the purpose of language is not to refer to objects or evenfull meaning of this shift, but he does find provocative Kant's insistence on the pn.manlyto tell us about the world, but rather to articulate the meaning of ourdevelopment of an ultimate discipline from which all other philosophical in- eXlste?Ce,it is easy to see how he would focus upon the language, not of thequiries could be made. Kant's point, according to Heidegger, was something like sClen~lst,but of the poet. The poet speaks original language, the language ofthis: I cannot, a priori, tell you anything about the world; all I can do is tell you I meanmg.Language is 'the house of being. ' Heidegger's interest in the problemshow the mind goes about its business of organizing the data it receives through of~a?guageand poetry has considerable range, for he wrote the essay 'On theappearance. For Heidegger, this is the first step away from Cartesian substances; OngInof the Work of Art' in 1935, 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in 1937it emphasizes what it means to know rather than what is known. Parti~ularIy ~ndOn the W~y to Language in 1959, with many other works on poetry andwhen Kant then recognizes that the only reality which the mind can think directly anguageboth In between and since.is that of freedom, Heidegger feels his great German predecessor was on the For Heidegger, poets 'name the Holy,' and they give utterance to what itthreshold of perceiving the ontological difference. But Kant withdrew from thh

e ~eansto be in a world, to be removed from the gods or God and they do so notid . h d diti n oft e '"erelYa titi f f b "boldness of his insight, and, according to Hei egger, In t e secon e 110 d cl . s prac I toners 0 a era t, ut as thinkers. Heidegger has established as

Critique began once again to talk about things-in-themse~~es a.nd to fe~1the n~~e al~~ea link betwee? poet and th.inke~as a~y philosopher has ever dared; but suchto 'refute idealism.' For Heidegger then, the first edition IS supenor t.o ·tS Oflk makes sense In terms of his existential analytic. Poets are the true speakerssecond. Kant is seen as struggling to achieve a fundamental ontology, with I ~tt~ngu.age,and language ma~ifests our being. In 'On the Origin of the Work oftrue anchor being one's awareness offreedom.. .. wor~' I ~orbBeld~ggerargues that ar~lsts ~peak, not merely the beautiful, but the truth.

This theme offreedom continued to fascinate Heidegger, and In his next . 0 .' tho eautIful poetry and art gives hght, or better throws light on the meaning of. . thlnto' IngSTh· r h . 'On the Essence of Ground he argues that the very Idea of grounding any ne th·· IS rg t ISnecessary for thought, so that poets literally think as they dowhich is a basic principle to all forms of human inquiry, when pressed leads °Nl eoe1r~rt, and their thinking thereby reveals the truth. This is in part ac-to the original awareness of oneself as free. Freedom is the essence of ground. I11Phshedby the tension between 'earth' and 'world,' between one's being

126 127

metaphysical, but ontological dimensions. His analysis of history is consistent I

with his other existential analyses: the question is not, what kind of thing ishistorical knowledge; nor is it, what kind of metaphysical forces are responsiblefor what has happened in the past; rather, the question is: what does it mean to behistorical? It is only because I am already that kind of being which has a fate, aheritage, and a destiny, that I can be as a being with a past. The past is thussignificant because of the a priori structure of my historicality, not the other wayaround. I am then radically an historical being; I am as historical.

3.2 Other Works

othe~form~ of inq~iry must presuppose the nature of ground as its ultimatestart~ngPOIn~,~u.t In fundamental ontology, freedom itself is thrown open toinqUIry,and It IS In the understanding of freedom that one understands what itmeansto ~round some~hing. There is a strong intuitional support for Heidegger'sargument In the reflection of the sense one has of being a cause in the case offreeacts.so that this ?eing is more basic than any knowledge of another thing's powerto [nfluence .actlOn. However, Heidegger's analysis is not epistemic (whichwou~dleavey open to Hu~e's classic criticism of 'internal cause') but ontologi-cal:i.e., he ISconcerned with what it means to be free rather than how one can'prove' the existence of freedom. Once more, if Heidegger is right about theargument that .freedom is the essence of ground, then fundamental ontology, thestU?yof what It me~ns to be at all, is the ultimate and primordial discipline fromwhich~II others spn~g. To ground something, or to give reasons for things, is soessentialan element In all rational disciplines that the discovery of the essence ofgroundswould constitute this ultimate discipline. Heidegger has shown that theonlyapproach to the question of ground is through an inquiry into what it meanstobe as a ground; i.e., what it means to be free.

3.2.1 The Works on Fundamental OntologyHeidegger's original intention was to include in Being and Time an investigationof certain major figures within the history of philosophy, to show how theontological difference has played such an important role in keeping the questionof being limited to questions of mere entities. One of the most important figures inthis regard is Immanuel Kant; and although Heidegger's analysis of Kant doesnot occur in Being and Time, the analysis does take place in a subsequentvolume, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The thesis of this latter work 3.2.2 Works on Language.was to interpret Kant's critique in an inquiry into fundamental ontology. Heideg- A.fterthe publication of the three great texts on fundamental ontology (Being andger interprets Kant as laying the groundwork for metaphysics, and by his , TII~e, Kant and the Pr?bler:z ?f Metaphysics and On the Essence of Ground)transcendental deduction, shifting the major inquiry from the objects to what it Heidegger seems to shift his Interest considerably, writing several works onmeans for us to know about them. Since Kant continually insists that his lang~ageand poetry. This shift is one of emphasis only, however; for the purposeinvestigations are not cosmological but transcendental, there is a similarity to of~ISstudy of language is to inquire into how being manifests itself. SinceHeidegger's endeavors. To be sure, Heidegger does not think that Kant saw the H~lde~gerargues that the purpose of language is not to refer to objects or evenfull meaning of this shift, but he does find provocative Kant's insistence on the pn.manlyto tell us about the world, but rather to articulate the meaning of ourdevelopment of an ultimate discipline from which all other philosophical in- eXlste?Ce,it is easy to see how he would focus upon the language, not of thequiries could be made. Kant's point, according to Heidegger, was something like sClen~lst,but of the poet. The poet speaks original language, the language ofthis: I cannot, a priori, tell you anything about the world; all I can do is tell you I meanmg.Language is 'the house of being. ' Heidegger's interest in the problemshow the mind goes about its business of organizing the data it receives through of~a?guageand poetry has considerable range, for he wrote the essay 'On theappearance. For Heidegger, this is the first step away from Cartesian substances; OngInof the Work of Art' in 1935, 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in 1937it emphasizes what it means to know rather than what is known. Parti~ularIy ~ndOn the W~y to Language in 1959, with many other works on poetry andwhen Kant then recognizes that the only reality which the mind can think directly anguageboth In between and since.is that of freedom, Heidegger feels his great German predecessor was on the For Heidegger, poets 'name the Holy,' and they give utterance to what itthreshold of perceiving the ontological difference. But Kant withdrew from thh

e ~eansto be in a world, to be removed from the gods or God and they do so notid . h d diti n oft e '"erelYa titi f f b "boldness of his insight, and, according to Hei egger, In t e secon e 110 d cl . s prac I toners 0 a era t, ut as thinkers. Heidegger has established as

Critique began once again to talk about things-in-themse~~es a.nd to fe~1the n~~e al~~ea link betwee? poet and th.inke~as a~y philosopher has ever dared; but suchto 'refute idealism.' For Heidegger then, the first edition IS supenor t.o ·tS Oflk makes sense In terms of his existential analytic. Poets are the true speakerssecond. Kant is seen as struggling to achieve a fundamental ontology, with I ~tt~ngu.age,and language ma~ifests our being. In 'On the Origin of the Work oftrue anchor being one's awareness offreedom.. .. wor~' I ~orbBeld~ggerargues that ar~lsts ~peak, not merely the beautiful, but the truth.

This theme offreedom continued to fascinate Heidegger, and In his next . 0 .' tho eautIful poetry and art gives hght, or better throws light on the meaning of. . thlnto' IngSTh· r h . 'On the Essence of Ground he argues that the very Idea of grounding any ne th·· IS rg t ISnecessary for thought, so that poets literally think as they dowhich is a basic principle to all forms of human inquiry, when pressed leads °Nl eoe1r~rt, and their thinking thereby reveals the truth. This is in part ac-to the original awareness of oneself as free. Freedom is the essence of ground. I11Phshedby the tension between 'earth' and 'world,' between one's being

126 127

al

bound to the earth as the source of meaning, and surpassing it to the 'world' asthe projection of possibilities. Man is, after ~ll, transcendence, and th~ meaningand truth of this transcendence cannot be articulated by a language which merelypoints out objects within the visible environment. If we see that to speak is thatway to be in which we confront and bring forth our meaning, then language mustalways be more than any symbol of reference, and it must always be somethingmore than what it describes. Heidegger analyses several poets, above all Hol.derlin, whom he considers the most philosophical of all poets; and in theseanalyses he shows how language awakens a sense of being which is open tothought beyond reference. For Heidegger, the poet's naming the Holy is anarticulation of being, insofar as being eternalizes itself, letting original timeforever be, thereby striking awe and terror in him who is aware of it. This is notarepudiation of man's finitude, as was established in Being and Time, but anauthentic dimension to his finite existence by which he becomes aware of themeaning of eternality.

( proximation of the meaning of the German title). By 'letting things be' Heideggerdoesnot mean a mere passive attitude toward life, but a serious attempt to let themeaningof things be, i.e., to let what things really mean become known. In thissense,the cabinet-maker image is useful: by his work he lets the wood be.

As an essential part of his reflections on thinking, Heidegger takes great painstoshow the extreme limits and, indeed, the very threat of technology on humanthinking.Technology is not only not an instance of thinking; overconcern for itssuccesses leads one away from true thinking. In his constant attacks against thetechnological attitude, many critics have seen an anti-scientific or even ir-rationalistic attitude in Heidegger. This is an erroneous interpretation. To un-derstand the limits of science is not to hate science: to argue for dimensions ofthinkingwhich go beyond the calculus of inferences is not irrationalism. Muchthatis truly characteristic of Heidegger's thinking can be discovered in thesesmallessays on thought, for in them he espouses the basic doctrine which wasmanifesteven in Being and Time; for the inquirer it is possible to ask questionsaboutthe meaning of existence, and these questions require a greater attunementtohow the world speaks to us in all the various ways in which one exists, ratherthanmerely observing objects in a detached way.

3.2.3 The Works on ThinkingConsistent with his revolutionary analysis oflanguage as a way of being, Heideg-ger also recasts the very meaning of thinking along the same lines. One'sunderstanding of thinking cannot be discovered through a mere consideration of 3.2.4 The Works on Major Philosophersformal rules, nor through the psychologically dubious criterion of certainty. , Continuinghis attack on the tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger had publishedRather, thinking must be seen as that enterprise of the mind which lets the severalworks on major philosophers, interpreting them in what he admits is ameaning of things and reality itself be. In a series of essays entitled What is somewhat violent manner, in order to show how the previous thinkers wereCalled Thinking? Heidegger argues, for example, that a cabinet-maker who capableof throwing light on the meaning of being, even though they were boundlovingly lets the wood in his hands speak, who, through his skill brings forth the by the limitations of metaphysical language. Aside from Kant, about whommeaning of wood and lets it manifest itself, is more truly a thinker than a scientific Heideggerhas written three major works, and Nietzsche, who is the subject ofworker who merely applies rules and establishes inferences. The cabinet-maker severalstudies and a two-volume work with his name as title, Heidegger has alsois more truly a thinker because, in thoughtfully concerning himself for the w~ittenseveral works on Hegel, and one on Schelling. Readers of these worksmeaning of wood, he lets the reality of wood come forth in the world. This again WII.I find much more of Heidegger than of the philosopher about whom he isties thought much closer to the beautiful than to the accurate. For in the same wntmg.For example, a major part of the two-volume work entitled Nietzsche iswork he goes so far as to quote Holderlin's poem on 'The Love of Socrates for adiscussion of European nihilism. But since Nietzsche's major influence con-Alcibiades,' in which the poet identifies the deepest thinker as the one who 'loves ~:rnst.heprobl~m of ?ihilis~, this topic is a.part of Nietzsche's thought, and iswhat is most alive.' This bold identification of loving with thinking almost nee Included In Heidegger s analysis of him. Thus, Heidegger's treatment ofsuggests a similarity between Heidegger and the erotic ideality in Plato's wor~s I~~historyof philosophy is by no means ever meant to be a treatment of what theon love. In the later sections of the same work, Heidegger reflects on Nietzsch~~ 1 In~ersthemselves have thought, but rather, what their thinking evokes con-thought, emphasizing Nietzsche's insistence on going beyond the merely f ce~nmgthe question of being. This cannot be seen as a defect, since it is preciselyculative elements in human reasoning and conc.erning r~ther t~e very nat~red~' IV at Heidegger intends and states as his purpose.reason as law-giver. In all of these essays Heldegger IS less Interested IO. Iveloping an epistemological theory than in exploring the creative and revealIng 4. liE} DEGG ER ON ULTIMATE REALITY AN D MEA N I NG

dimensions of human understanding. . tic I Fo .In another work, H~idegger expands even f~rther.this essential charactefl:1l8 ~ 10 ~~eldeg~er, the ~uesti~n of ultimate reality and meaning can only be referred

of thinking as that which lets the meamng of things SImply appear before us. ", ~t ?se pnmary dimensions of human existence which go to make up thework entitled. Gelassenheit (dubio~sly tra~slat~d in .Englis~ as f!isC?Urse:p- ou~~hgibilityof all the things ~e are and d? ~ny refere~ce to something outsideThinking) Heidegger develops the Idea of letting things be (which IS an elves as the source of ultimate meanmg IS thus senously questioned, if not

128129

al

bound to the earth as the source of meaning, and surpassing it to the 'world' asthe projection of possibilities. Man is, after ~ll, transcendence, and th~ meaningand truth of this transcendence cannot be articulated by a language which merelypoints out objects within the visible environment. If we see that to speak is thatway to be in which we confront and bring forth our meaning, then language mustalways be more than any symbol of reference, and it must always be somethingmore than what it describes. Heidegger analyses several poets, above all Hol.derlin, whom he considers the most philosophical of all poets; and in theseanalyses he shows how language awakens a sense of being which is open tothought beyond reference. For Heidegger, the poet's naming the Holy is anarticulation of being, insofar as being eternalizes itself, letting original timeforever be, thereby striking awe and terror in him who is aware of it. This is notarepudiation of man's finitude, as was established in Being and Time, but anauthentic dimension to his finite existence by which he becomes aware of themeaning of eternality.

( proximation of the meaning of the German title). By 'letting things be' Heideggerdoesnot mean a mere passive attitude toward life, but a serious attempt to let themeaningof things be, i.e., to let what things really mean become known. In thissense,the cabinet-maker image is useful: by his work he lets the wood be.

As an essential part of his reflections on thinking, Heidegger takes great painstoshow the extreme limits and, indeed, the very threat of technology on humanthinking.Technology is not only not an instance of thinking; overconcern for itssuccesses leads one away from true thinking. In his constant attacks against thetechnological attitude, many critics have seen an anti-scientific or even ir-rationalistic attitude in Heidegger. This is an erroneous interpretation. To un-derstand the limits of science is not to hate science: to argue for dimensions ofthinkingwhich go beyond the calculus of inferences is not irrationalism. Muchthatis truly characteristic of Heidegger's thinking can be discovered in thesesmallessays on thought, for in them he espouses the basic doctrine which wasmanifesteven in Being and Time; for the inquirer it is possible to ask questionsaboutthe meaning of existence, and these questions require a greater attunementtohow the world speaks to us in all the various ways in which one exists, ratherthanmerely observing objects in a detached way.

3.2.3 The Works on ThinkingConsistent with his revolutionary analysis oflanguage as a way of being, Heideg-ger also recasts the very meaning of thinking along the same lines. One'sunderstanding of thinking cannot be discovered through a mere consideration of 3.2.4 The Works on Major Philosophersformal rules, nor through the psychologically dubious criterion of certainty. , Continuinghis attack on the tradition of metaphysics, Heidegger had publishedRather, thinking must be seen as that enterprise of the mind which lets the severalworks on major philosophers, interpreting them in what he admits is ameaning of things and reality itself be. In a series of essays entitled What is somewhat violent manner, in order to show how the previous thinkers wereCalled Thinking? Heidegger argues, for example, that a cabinet-maker who capableof throwing light on the meaning of being, even though they were boundlovingly lets the wood in his hands speak, who, through his skill brings forth the by the limitations of metaphysical language. Aside from Kant, about whommeaning of wood and lets it manifest itself, is more truly a thinker than a scientific Heideggerhas written three major works, and Nietzsche, who is the subject ofworker who merely applies rules and establishes inferences. The cabinet-maker severalstudies and a two-volume work with his name as title, Heidegger has alsois more truly a thinker because, in thoughtfully concerning himself for the w~ittenseveral works on Hegel, and one on Schelling. Readers of these worksmeaning of wood, he lets the reality of wood come forth in the world. This again WII.I find much more of Heidegger than of the philosopher about whom he isties thought much closer to the beautiful than to the accurate. For in the same wntmg.For example, a major part of the two-volume work entitled Nietzsche iswork he goes so far as to quote Holderlin's poem on 'The Love of Socrates for adiscussion of European nihilism. But since Nietzsche's major influence con-Alcibiades,' in which the poet identifies the deepest thinker as the one who 'loves ~:rnst.heprobl~m of ?ihilis~, this topic is a.part of Nietzsche's thought, and iswhat is most alive.' This bold identification of loving with thinking almost nee Included In Heidegger s analysis of him. Thus, Heidegger's treatment ofsuggests a similarity between Heidegger and the erotic ideality in Plato's wor~s I~~historyof philosophy is by no means ever meant to be a treatment of what theon love. In the later sections of the same work, Heidegger reflects on Nietzsch~~ 1 In~ersthemselves have thought, but rather, what their thinking evokes con-thought, emphasizing Nietzsche's insistence on going beyond the merely f ce~nmgthe question of being. This cannot be seen as a defect, since it is preciselyculative elements in human reasoning and conc.erning r~ther t~e very nat~red~' IV at Heidegger intends and states as his purpose.reason as law-giver. In all of these essays Heldegger IS less Interested IO. Iveloping an epistemological theory than in exploring the creative and revealIng 4. liE} DEGG ER ON ULTIMATE REALITY AN D MEA N I NG

dimensions of human understanding. . tic I Fo .In another work, H~idegger expands even f~rther.this essential charactefl:1l8 ~ 10 ~~eldeg~er, the ~uesti~n of ultimate reality and meaning can only be referred

of thinking as that which lets the meamng of things SImply appear before us. ", ~t ?se pnmary dimensions of human existence which go to make up thework entitled. Gelassenheit (dubio~sly tra~slat~d in .Englis~ as f!isC?Urse:p- ou~~hgibilityof all the things ~e are and d? ~ny refere~ce to something outsideThinking) Heidegger develops the Idea of letting things be (which IS an elves as the source of ultimate meanmg IS thus senously questioned, if not

128129

thoroughly undermined philosophically. A closer look, then, at the nature of hisargumentation is advisable.

Heidegger's anti-substantive argumentation has a precedent in Kant's refuta.tion of Descartes' cogito . Since the argument is so similar, it is worthwhile to I

recall the earlier thinker's formulation. Descartes, as we remember, had argUedin the following manner. Because I think, it follows that I am an existing andthinking thing. From the awareness of my own consciousness it follows thatthere must be a kind of thing which thinks and which actually exists. ForDescartes, then, whatever must be accepted as true by the mind must be due tothe kind of thing that it is; no inference is true unless there are substances aboutwhich the inference is made. His argument has the following structure: I think,therefore I am; therefore I am a thinking thing. Kant calls this argument aparalogism. He admits the first but denies the second inference, recognizing the Ifirst as a purely formal inference, whereas the second is a substantial one. Why,Kant asks, is it necessary for me to attribute substantial reality to my cognitiveawareness of myself? Surely the concept 'thing' is added spuriously to the'argument without sufficient justification. For Kant, the idea that one adds thecategory 'substance' to such understandings is due to the a priori apparatus by rwhich I interpret my experiences within the world of appear~nce, which is Iinvalid without experience. Thus it is an unwarranted assumption that purely Icognitive enterprises can establish a direct intuition of the real world.

Kant's argument against Descartes is revealing of Heidegger's ar~ument for Ithe ontological difference. Heidegger simply takes the argumentation of theparalogism and extends it ultimately to the very inquiry into the meaning ofexistence. Not only is it wrong for Descartes to substantize the ego found in thecoglto , it is equally wrong to substantize whenever the mind considers the nat~re Iof ultimate reality. To say of any meaningful existence that there must ~e a kind Iof thing which exists in such a way is to commit the fallacy of a paralogism onacosmological rather than a psychological level. The reason for this is that our Iunderstanding of ultimate reality is never about things at all, but about ways toexist. The classical argument that one's existence therefore needs a special andultimate kind of entity outside itselfto ground its meaning (whether it be GodorMatter or even Mankind in the abstract) is hereby denied. Since, according toHeidegger, I can think about ultimate reality independently of any entity what-soever it is invalid to argue that the awareness of meaning implies the eXlsten.~of any entity. Heidegger's argument is quite forceful: in order to make his pOintall he needs to do is to show that there is a kind of reasoning about mo~es toexistence. For, ifthere is such reasoning, then it is obvious that it is pOSSiblerYreason without reference to entities, but if that is possible, then any nece~saisinference which establishes that entity on the basis of an awarenes~ of.mea~:~es Iinvalid. Thus Heidegger' s .actual accomplishment ~f modal. reasonmg mval~ :niYany metaphysical reasonmg about ultimate entities. This argument no tsllldiscredits the classical and metaphysical proofs for the existence of God bu weclassical cosmologies, including the mat~r~alists and the humanists. Th.U~argumentation is neither atheistic nor theistic. Not the former for that main

130

thatthere is no special kind of supreme entity, and that the absence of this entity·ssomehow relevant to man's existence. Not the latter, for that maintains that:heexistence of the special entity grounds meaning.

Nevertheless at this point it might seem that Heidegger argues atheistically,sincehe denies the necessary existence of any entity whatsoever. But as we shallsee, such a judgment is completely misguided. The question of God can bereintroduced on the level of modal awareness: are there certain ways to exist,suchas to worship or to be in awe of the holy, which, as essential dimensions ofour existence, make up the structure of our being? As we shall see shortly,Heidegger does establish these modes. The error, however, would be to arguethatJrom these modes one can then establish the ultimate referent of meaning toaspecial kind of entity beyond us. There may indeed be a God or gods who aresomehowresponsible for the fact that we exist, but they (or He) cannot, in termsofour existential make-up, ever be the source of ultimate reality and meaning,sincethat must always be found in our existentiality.

The very form of the ultimate question must therefore be changed. Supposeoneasks the question: What is the purpose of man? (Or: why do I exist?) Suchquestions seduce the mind to seek beyond itself, for the question as formulateddemandsa response to the further question: for whose purpose does man exist?God's? Even to ask the question in its more direct form exposes the sameorientation toward substance metaphysics: when I ask, 'why do I exist?' I ampresupposing that there is some external ground needed to explicate my exis-tence.But one can answer such questions in the negative: man has no purpose;hehas rather a meaning. To deny purpose, when understood properly, is as farfromnihilism as one can get.

It is not by accident that the Aristotelian notion of the final cause leadsinevitably to a metaphysics of substances; and Aristotle's insistence that finalcause is the highest form of causality supports his doctrine of ousia. But it islikewiseobvious that Plato's doctrine offormal cause does not lead to a substan-tivemetaphysics (for the Forms are not substances, in spite of what Aristotlesaysabout them), and in the Platonic dialectic one can speak about ultimatemeaningwithout reference to kinds of things. In this sense Heidegger is morePlatonicthan Aristotelian. The ultimate question for Heidegger is not: what ismypurpose? but rather, What does it mean to exist? This formulation is moreultimate precisely because even if I were able to answer the question as torurpose, the question of 'what it means' could still be asked. The proper answert~.thepur~ose-question is: I have no purpose, if by purpose one means some-pIng OutSide of me somehow justifying my existence. Doorknobs have pur-o~es, and so do typewriters, because they are used for the sake of somethings kerthan themselves. But man is himselfthat 'for-the-sake-of' and is not for the: e of anything else. Otherwise the doctrines of determinism and fatalismp:Uld be inevitable. It is precisely because I can deny that I have any externalit rpose that I have any meaning at all. Thus the ultimate question is: What does

tnean to be?lieidegger's answer to this is care. The meaning of my existence lies in the

131

thoroughly undermined philosophically. A closer look, then, at the nature of hisargumentation is advisable.

Heidegger's anti-substantive argumentation has a precedent in Kant's refuta.tion of Descartes' cogito . Since the argument is so similar, it is worthwhile to I

recall the earlier thinker's formulation. Descartes, as we remember, had argUedin the following manner. Because I think, it follows that I am an existing andthinking thing. From the awareness of my own consciousness it follows thatthere must be a kind of thing which thinks and which actually exists. ForDescartes, then, whatever must be accepted as true by the mind must be due tothe kind of thing that it is; no inference is true unless there are substances aboutwhich the inference is made. His argument has the following structure: I think,therefore I am; therefore I am a thinking thing. Kant calls this argument aparalogism. He admits the first but denies the second inference, recognizing the Ifirst as a purely formal inference, whereas the second is a substantial one. Why,Kant asks, is it necessary for me to attribute substantial reality to my cognitiveawareness of myself? Surely the concept 'thing' is added spuriously to the'argument without sufficient justification. For Kant, the idea that one adds thecategory 'substance' to such understandings is due to the a priori apparatus by rwhich I interpret my experiences within the world of appear~nce, which is Iinvalid without experience. Thus it is an unwarranted assumption that purely Icognitive enterprises can establish a direct intuition of the real world.

Kant's argument against Descartes is revealing of Heidegger's ar~ument for Ithe ontological difference. Heidegger simply takes the argumentation of theparalogism and extends it ultimately to the very inquiry into the meaning ofexistence. Not only is it wrong for Descartes to substantize the ego found in thecoglto , it is equally wrong to substantize whenever the mind considers the nat~re Iof ultimate reality. To say of any meaningful existence that there must ~e a kind Iof thing which exists in such a way is to commit the fallacy of a paralogism onacosmological rather than a psychological level. The reason for this is that our Iunderstanding of ultimate reality is never about things at all, but about ways toexist. The classical argument that one's existence therefore needs a special andultimate kind of entity outside itselfto ground its meaning (whether it be GodorMatter or even Mankind in the abstract) is hereby denied. Since, according toHeidegger, I can think about ultimate reality independently of any entity what-soever it is invalid to argue that the awareness of meaning implies the eXlsten.~of any entity. Heidegger's argument is quite forceful: in order to make his pOintall he needs to do is to show that there is a kind of reasoning about mo~es toexistence. For, ifthere is such reasoning, then it is obvious that it is pOSSiblerYreason without reference to entities, but if that is possible, then any nece~saisinference which establishes that entity on the basis of an awarenes~ of.mea~:~es Iinvalid. Thus Heidegger' s .actual accomplishment ~f modal. reasonmg mval~ :niYany metaphysical reasonmg about ultimate entities. This argument no tsllldiscredits the classical and metaphysical proofs for the existence of God bu weclassical cosmologies, including the mat~r~alists and the humanists. Th.U~argumentation is neither atheistic nor theistic. Not the former for that main

130

thatthere is no special kind of supreme entity, and that the absence of this entity·ssomehow relevant to man's existence. Not the latter, for that maintains that:heexistence of the special entity grounds meaning.

Nevertheless at this point it might seem that Heidegger argues atheistically,sincehe denies the necessary existence of any entity whatsoever. But as we shallsee, such a judgment is completely misguided. The question of God can bereintroduced on the level of modal awareness: are there certain ways to exist,suchas to worship or to be in awe of the holy, which, as essential dimensions ofour existence, make up the structure of our being? As we shall see shortly,Heidegger does establish these modes. The error, however, would be to arguethatJrom these modes one can then establish the ultimate referent of meaning toaspecial kind of entity beyond us. There may indeed be a God or gods who aresomehowresponsible for the fact that we exist, but they (or He) cannot, in termsofour existential make-up, ever be the source of ultimate reality and meaning,sincethat must always be found in our existentiality.

The very form of the ultimate question must therefore be changed. Supposeoneasks the question: What is the purpose of man? (Or: why do I exist?) Suchquestions seduce the mind to seek beyond itself, for the question as formulateddemandsa response to the further question: for whose purpose does man exist?God's? Even to ask the question in its more direct form exposes the sameorientation toward substance metaphysics: when I ask, 'why do I exist?' I ampresupposing that there is some external ground needed to explicate my exis-tence.But one can answer such questions in the negative: man has no purpose;hehas rather a meaning. To deny purpose, when understood properly, is as farfromnihilism as one can get.

It is not by accident that the Aristotelian notion of the final cause leadsinevitably to a metaphysics of substances; and Aristotle's insistence that finalcause is the highest form of causality supports his doctrine of ousia. But it islikewiseobvious that Plato's doctrine offormal cause does not lead to a substan-tivemetaphysics (for the Forms are not substances, in spite of what Aristotlesaysabout them), and in the Platonic dialectic one can speak about ultimatemeaningwithout reference to kinds of things. In this sense Heidegger is morePlatonicthan Aristotelian. The ultimate question for Heidegger is not: what ismypurpose? but rather, What does it mean to exist? This formulation is moreultimate precisely because even if I were able to answer the question as torurpose, the question of 'what it means' could still be asked. The proper answert~.thepur~ose-question is: I have no purpose, if by purpose one means some-pIng OutSide of me somehow justifying my existence. Doorknobs have pur-o~es, and so do typewriters, because they are used for the sake of somethings kerthan themselves. But man is himselfthat 'for-the-sake-of' and is not for the: e of anything else. Otherwise the doctrines of determinism and fatalismp:Uld be inevitable. It is precisely because I can deny that I have any externalit rpose that I have any meaning at all. Thus the ultimate question is: What does

tnean to be?lieidegger's answer to this is care. The meaning of my existence lies in the

131

structure of my caring. This formulation does not beg the existence of the Isupreme entity outside of me. It focuses rather on the structure of m.y existenceas intelligible. It is also a question that can be carried out, as Heidegger hasactually done in Being and Time. The variou~ w.ays to be manifest th~msel~es in Ia structure, and according to the supreme principle of success and failure: i.e., Ican exist in such a way that the meaning of my existence is covered up (I can benot-myself: inauthentic) or I can exist in such a way as to let my meaning presentitself to me (I can be myself: authentic). Hence, there is already a structure ofintelligibility about my existence before I ask about my relation to anything elsein the world whether it be to other people, to objects, or to God. Thus it isbecause my existence already matters to me (i.e., it is because I already care)that such things as my relationship to God or to the world concern me at all.

If we recall the earlier discussion about how guilt comes before ethics thispoint can be anchored in the actual working-out of the existential analytic. Wemust first be guilty, i.e., we must first be able to care about doing right before weconcern ourselves with which actions and deeds are commendable. To care isthe ultimate presupposition for ,any inquiry into meaning whats?ever. Ther~ is rnothing more basic about man s mquiry into anything than his fear of beingmeaningless. As Nietzsche puts it: man would rather have the void for his I

meaning than be void of meaning. Heidegger has shown this ultimate dime~sionwhich is presupposed by all other inquiry to be to care. Therefore, the ultimatereality and meaning is our own caring, for without that, even our concerns for \God and the world would not make sense. This doctrine, however, is about as farfrom humanism and modernity as can possibly be imagined. It is preciselybecause my existence does matter to me that I cannot accept nihilism (that the.reis no meaning) or humanism (that man as object is the concern of man). There IS,for Heidegger, in the structure of one's existentiality an enormous sense. of awefor the very question that forfeits cosmological metaphysics: What do~s It meanto exist? This question does not make the in~uiry earth-bound or pro~alc. F~r~: Iawe of things greater than us (even to a certam extent, our own meanmg, whicsomehow 'beyond' us) sponsors profound questions of finitude and care forgreatness and an awareness that there is more to reality than what we are asactual beings, even if the ultimate question of our reality is grounded in conce;or care. After all, one of the essential ways we exist is to wonder, and thatwhich we wonder is a part of our understanding of ourselves. !be

For Heidegger, it is not the scientific kind oflanguage which should at~ra~oSIphilosopher's attention, but the language of the poet, ~ho names th~ H~:'rnan'Sthoughtful men recognize, for example, that there IS more meamng I dillunderstanding of his finitude and more awe for supreme reality to be foun !be

. A ., entsforBach'sMassorWagner'sGotterdiimmerungthanm qumas argum . ~"l. B t is thiS II"existence of God. The arts tell us what It means to be what we are. u I gbl.•

. . bsti fi li c r thOU Iemotionalism? By no means. Heidegger IS not su stitutmg ee tng 10 d)illThe undisciplined emotionalism of one's 'feeling' a truth (or even a falseh~o t of

. f han one' 'feelIngan artwork does not exhaust the meaning 0 art any more t an one s

certitude has anything to do with scientific proof. The question is not what onefeels psychologically in the presence of the artwork or poetic language, but whatthe artwork provokes in our thinking about our meaning. The inevitable idealityin art and poetry is not a species of emotional intensification but a form ofdialectic by which the form or ideal of something is projected by means of theartist's skill and understanding. We learn to think precisely because the beauty ofthe artwork has provoked our a wareness of meaning beyond the actual.

Thus the very meaning of divinity or eternality presupposes the structure ofcare. It is only because I already (a priori) care about the meaning of myexistence that I can be awed by the almighty, that I can worship the beautiful,seek the truth, and emulate the good. If the ground of my meaning were de pen-denton an entity beyond myself, my understanding of that relationship would beeither impossible or totally servile. To be sure, Heidegger's analysis of humanexistence and the meaning of being does not (and ought not) to make reference tothedivinity; but those who respect such things can find no source of alienation inHeidegger's thought. He is not specifically theistic any more than he is atheistic.Hehas argued that the supreme or ultimate source of reality and meaning is one'sown concernful awareness ofthe meaning of existence. He has also shown howsuch a concern can be thematically carried out through fundamental ontology,and how such concerns are in part the result of the thought of the artist and thecraftsman. But it is only because of the ultimacy of meaning that ideas such asworship and awe are possible.

Further, it must be emphasized that Heidegger's philosophy does not constitutean ideology or even, strictly speaking, a doctrine. His is essentially an inquiry,and as such must be seen in the great tradition of philosophers who continuallyseek to understand their meaning rather than to establish doctrines of one sort oranother. It is true that one must answer the question: what is Heidegger's theoryofultimate reality and meaning? with a definite and non-equivocal response thatemphasizes one's understanding of one's existence in terms of care - that care istheultimate source of our understanding of meaning and reality - but this cannotbe seen as a psychological doctrine. It is rather a genuinely philosophical truth, inthat it makes intelligible our continual searching for truth, our eternal longing formeaning, our worship of the beautiful, and even more amazingly, our finalacceptance and embracing of our own finitude.

I{eidegger,M. 1927. Sein und Zeit. 7th edition, Tiibingen: Neomarius Verlag. Engl.: 1962.Being and.... 19T1rne.New York: Harper and Row.

29. Vom Wesen des Grundes. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. Engl. 1969. The Essence of....19R.easons.Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

49. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in Existence and Being Chicago: Regnery, pp.293-315.

structure of my caring. This formulation does not beg the existence of the Isupreme entity outside of me. It focuses rather on the structure of m.y existenceas intelligible. It is also a question that can be carried out, as Heidegger hasactually done in Being and Time. The variou~ w.ays to be manifest th~msel~es in Ia structure, and according to the supreme principle of success and failure: i.e., Ican exist in such a way that the meaning of my existence is covered up (I can benot-myself: inauthentic) or I can exist in such a way as to let my meaning presentitself to me (I can be myself: authentic). Hence, there is already a structure ofintelligibility about my existence before I ask about my relation to anything elsein the world whether it be to other people, to objects, or to God. Thus it isbecause my existence already matters to me (i.e., it is because I already care)that such things as my relationship to God or to the world concern me at all.

If we recall the earlier discussion about how guilt comes before ethics thispoint can be anchored in the actual working-out of the existential analytic. Wemust first be guilty, i.e., we must first be able to care about doing right before weconcern ourselves with which actions and deeds are commendable. To care isthe ultimate presupposition for ,any inquiry into meaning whats?ever. Ther~ is rnothing more basic about man s mquiry into anything than his fear of beingmeaningless. As Nietzsche puts it: man would rather have the void for his I

meaning than be void of meaning. Heidegger has shown this ultimate dime~sionwhich is presupposed by all other inquiry to be to care. Therefore, the ultimatereality and meaning is our own caring, for without that, even our concerns for \God and the world would not make sense. This doctrine, however, is about as farfrom humanism and modernity as can possibly be imagined. It is preciselybecause my existence does matter to me that I cannot accept nihilism (that the.reis no meaning) or humanism (that man as object is the concern of man). There IS,for Heidegger, in the structure of one's existentiality an enormous sense. of awefor the very question that forfeits cosmological metaphysics: What do~s It meanto exist? This question does not make the in~uiry earth-bound or pro~alc. F~r~: Iawe of things greater than us (even to a certam extent, our own meanmg, whicsomehow 'beyond' us) sponsors profound questions of finitude and care forgreatness and an awareness that there is more to reality than what we are asactual beings, even if the ultimate question of our reality is grounded in conce;or care. After all, one of the essential ways we exist is to wonder, and thatwhich we wonder is a part of our understanding of ourselves. !be

For Heidegger, it is not the scientific kind oflanguage which should at~ra~oSIphilosopher's attention, but the language of the poet, ~ho names th~ H~:'rnan'Sthoughtful men recognize, for example, that there IS more meamng I dillunderstanding of his finitude and more awe for supreme reality to be foun !be

. A ., entsforBach'sMassorWagner'sGotterdiimmerungthanm qumas argum . ~"l. B t is thiS II"existence of God. The arts tell us what It means to be what we are. u I gbl.•

. . bsti fi li c r thOU Iemotionalism? By no means. Heidegger IS not su stitutmg ee tng 10 d)illThe undisciplined emotionalism of one's 'feeling' a truth (or even a falseh~o t of

. f han one' 'feelIngan artwork does not exhaust the meaning 0 art any more t an one s

certitude has anything to do with scientific proof. The question is not what onefeels psychologically in the presence of the artwork or poetic language, but whatthe artwork provokes in our thinking about our meaning. The inevitable idealityin art and poetry is not a species of emotional intensification but a form ofdialectic by which the form or ideal of something is projected by means of theartist's skill and understanding. We learn to think precisely because the beauty ofthe artwork has provoked our a wareness of meaning beyond the actual.

Thus the very meaning of divinity or eternality presupposes the structure ofcare. It is only because I already (a priori) care about the meaning of myexistence that I can be awed by the almighty, that I can worship the beautiful,seek the truth, and emulate the good. If the ground of my meaning were de pen-denton an entity beyond myself, my understanding of that relationship would beeither impossible or totally servile. To be sure, Heidegger's analysis of humanexistence and the meaning of being does not (and ought not) to make reference tothedivinity; but those who respect such things can find no source of alienation inHeidegger's thought. He is not specifically theistic any more than he is atheistic.Hehas argued that the supreme or ultimate source of reality and meaning is one'sown concernful awareness ofthe meaning of existence. He has also shown howsuch a concern can be thematically carried out through fundamental ontology,and how such concerns are in part the result of the thought of the artist and thecraftsman. But it is only because of the ultimacy of meaning that ideas such asworship and awe are possible.

Further, it must be emphasized that Heidegger's philosophy does not constitutean ideology or even, strictly speaking, a doctrine. His is essentially an inquiry,and as such must be seen in the great tradition of philosophers who continuallyseek to understand their meaning rather than to establish doctrines of one sort oranother. It is true that one must answer the question: what is Heidegger's theoryofultimate reality and meaning? with a definite and non-equivocal response thatemphasizes one's understanding of one's existence in terms of care - that care istheultimate source of our understanding of meaning and reality - but this cannotbe seen as a psychological doctrine. It is rather a genuinely philosophical truth, inthat it makes intelligible our continual searching for truth, our eternal longing formeaning, our worship of the beautiful, and even more amazingly, our finalacceptance and embracing of our own finitude.

I{eidegger,M. 1927. Sein und Zeit. 7th edition, Tiibingen: Neomarius Verlag. Engl.: 1962.Being and.... 19T1rne.New York: Harper and Row.

29. Vom Wesen des Grundes. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. Engl. 1969. The Essence of....19R.easons.Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

49. 'Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry' in Existence and Being Chicago: Regnery, pp.293-315.

_ 1951. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: V. Kolstermann. Engl.: 1962.Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_ 1954. Was heisst denken? Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer. Engl.: 1968. What is Called Thinking? NewYork: Harper and Row.

_ 1959a Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1966. Discourse on Thinking. New York:Harper and Row.

_ 1959b. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1971. On the Way to Lan.guage. New York: Harper and Row.

_ 1961. Nietzsche. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske.1971. 'Origin of the Work of Art' in Poetry, Language and Thought. New York: Harper and Row,

pp. 17-87.

I4.1Max Scheler: A Descriptive Analysis of theConcept of Ultimate Reality

r

ManfredS. Frings, DePaul University, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.I

I. INTRODUCTION

MaxScheler, a German philosopher, was born in Munich on August 22, 1874.Afterhaving received his doctorate under Rudolph Eucken at lena, 1887, andafter having completed his Habilitation there in 1899, he began teachingphilosophyfirst at lena and then at Munich. Due to a divorce from his first wife helosthis teaching position in Munich in 1910. It was only in 1919 that he becameprofessor of philosophy at the University of Cologne, where he was also ap-pointeddirector of the Institute of Sociology. In 1928he accepted a new positionatthe University of Frankfurt on the Main, which, however, was understood tobe only a stepping-stone before taking over the then prestigious chair ofphilosophyat the University of Berlin. But Scheler died in Frankfurt on May 19,1928, shortly after the first session of a lecture series that he had also deliveredelsewhere, entitled: 'The Idea of Peace and Pacifism.' In his metaphysics, one ofMaxScheler's main concerns was the determination of ultimate reality.

The Collected Works of Max Scheler (Francke Verlag, Berne and Munich)Whencompleted will comprise fourteen volumes. Throughout his works thus farPUblishedsome influences can be found on Scheler by his contemporaries in thefieldsof psychology, sociology and phenomenology. However, such influenceswereonly utilized by him to provide new directions of thought supplementing hiso~nphilosophy. Although Scheler had developed basic concepts of his own inP enomenology prior to his first meeting with Edmund Husserl in 1901, he~ern~inedindebted to the latter for some insights contained in Husserl's sixthoglcalInvestigation.

F: In.his first two major works: Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathetic/Z~lngSand of Love and Hate (1913) and Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formalst lCSof Values (1913/16) Scheler's own objectives in phenomenological re-i~rc~ are apparent. In contrast to other phenomenologists of his time hef~~Shgated wide ranges of man's emotive experience such as the community ofall lng, fellow feeling, emotional contagion and psychic identification, and

oVeall, love. While his work on sympathy, which was substantially enlarged in

_ 1951. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: V. Kolstermann. Engl.: 1962.Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_ 1954. Was heisst denken? Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer. Engl.: 1968. What is Called Thinking? NewYork: Harper and Row.

_ 1959a Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1966. Discourse on Thinking. New York:Harper and Row.

_ 1959b. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske. Engl.: 1971. On the Way to Lan.guage. New York: Harper and Row.

_ 1961. Nietzsche. Pfullingen: Gunther Neske.1971. 'Origin of the Work of Art' in Poetry, Language and Thought. New York: Harper and Row,

pp. 17-87.

I4.1Max Scheler: A Descriptive Analysis of theConcept of Ultimate Reality

r

ManfredS. Frings, DePaul University, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.I

I. INTRODUCTION

MaxScheler, a German philosopher, was born in Munich on August 22, 1874.Afterhaving received his doctorate under Rudolph Eucken at lena, 1887, andafter having completed his Habilitation there in 1899, he began teachingphilosophyfirst at lena and then at Munich. Due to a divorce from his first wife helosthis teaching position in Munich in 1910. It was only in 1919 that he becameprofessor of philosophy at the University of Cologne, where he was also ap-pointeddirector of the Institute of Sociology. In 1928he accepted a new positionatthe University of Frankfurt on the Main, which, however, was understood tobe only a stepping-stone before taking over the then prestigious chair ofphilosophyat the University of Berlin. But Scheler died in Frankfurt on May 19,1928, shortly after the first session of a lecture series that he had also deliveredelsewhere, entitled: 'The Idea of Peace and Pacifism.' In his metaphysics, one ofMaxScheler's main concerns was the determination of ultimate reality.

The Collected Works of Max Scheler (Francke Verlag, Berne and Munich)Whencompleted will comprise fourteen volumes. Throughout his works thus farPUblishedsome influences can be found on Scheler by his contemporaries in thefieldsof psychology, sociology and phenomenology. However, such influenceswereonly utilized by him to provide new directions of thought supplementing hiso~nphilosophy. Although Scheler had developed basic concepts of his own inP enomenology prior to his first meeting with Edmund Husserl in 1901, he~ern~inedindebted to the latter for some insights contained in Husserl's sixthoglcalInvestigation.

F: In.his first two major works: Phenomenology and Theory of Sympathetic/Z~lngSand of Love and Hate (1913) and Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formalst lCSof Values (1913/16) Scheler's own objectives in phenomenological re-i~rc~ are apparent. In contrast to other phenomenologists of his time hef~~Shgated wide ranges of man's emotive experience such as the community ofall lng, fellow feeling, emotional contagion and psychic identification, and

oVeall, love. While his work on sympathy, which was substantially enlarged in