harmonization and asymmetry: environmental policy co-ordination between the european union and...
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Harmonization and asymmetry:environmental policy co-ordination between theEuropean Union and CentralEuropeJoanne CaddyPublished online: 04 Feb 2011.
To cite this article: Joanne Caddy (1997) Harmonization and asymmetry:environmental policy co-ordination between the European Union and Central Europe,Journal of European Public Policy, 4:3, 318-336, DOI: 10.1080/13501769780000021
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Journal of European Public Policy 4:3 September 1997: 318-36
Harmonization and asymmetry: environmental policy co-ordination between the European Union and Central Europe Joanne Caddy
ABSTRACT This article focuses upon the problem of policy co-ordination and employs an account of co-ordination between technical systems developed by Fritz W. Scharpf (Scharpf 1994) as the framework within which to explore multi-level environmental policy-making between the European Union (EU) and the countries of Central Europe (CE). Current EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination is character- ized as relying upon techniques of technical unification (or 'one-way harmonization') and processes of hierarchical imposition (reflected in 'asymmetrical policy relations'). The article concludes by reviewing the potential advantages of 'policy interface' techniques and 'negotiation-based' co-ordination processes within the EU-CE environ- mental policy relationship.
KEY WORDS Central Europe; environmental policy; European Union; multi-level policy-making; policy co-ordination.
INTRODUCTION
Policy co-ordination has become an increasingly important issue in relations between the EU and the countries of CE, taken here to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. This is in large part a consequence of the fact that future EU membership is now generally accepted as a legitimate goal for CE countries and the recognition that steps must be taken to align their policy frameworks with that of the EU. Hence even in the absence of a precise commitment regarding the timing of accession, efforts to achieve a greater degree of policy co-ordination are now well under way.
EU-CE policy co-ordination is also to be placed within the more general context of increasing global policy interdependence, a phenomenon which leads to a significant reduction in the scope for independent action on the part of national governments, given increasingly porous national borders with respect to both policy ideas and the consequences of policy action (or inaction) on the part of other countries (Majone 1994). One of the policy fields in which this is most apparent is that of environmental policy where the need for concerted global and regional policy co-ordination has been repeatedly underlined (EEA 1995).
0 1997 Routledge 1350-1763
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Yet the challenge of international policy co-ordination remains an especially daunting one for most CE countries whose energies are almost fully absorbed with the task of restructuring their domestic political, legislative and economic frame- works - not to mention the challenge of cleaning up significant environmental damage wrought by decades of resource-extensive economic development which largely ignored the cost of pollution. These countries are now the beneficiaries of numerous bilateral and multilateral technical assistance (TA) programmes especially designed to provide support to their transition efforts. Yet their capacity for the absorption of such aid has proved to be limited- not least owing to weak and ill-adapted national administrative structures and a lack of experience in managing foreign aid programmes (PHARE 1995c: 7).
Thus numerous barriers to the successful integration of policy-making remain despite the good-will, combined resources and concerted effort of all partners involved- CE countries and donors alike. It is against this general backdrop that the following account of the specific EU-CE relationship in the field of environmental policy-making is to be considered.
THE C O - O R D I N A T I O N OF T E C H N I C A L SYSTEMS AS AN ANA LO G Y F O R THE PROBLEM OF POLICY C O - O R D I N A T I O N
The analysis of EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination presented here draws upon a typology of general co-ordination options developed in a 1994 article by Fritz W. Scharpf which focused on multi-level policy-making within the EU (Scharpf 1994). The main features of this account of co-ordination options are set out in a section entitled 'Digression on the Co-ordination of Technical Systems '1 and are summarized briefly below (see Table 1). The present article will then proceed to apply these conceptual categories to the analysis of EU external relations with CE countries in the field of environmental policy.
Under this account, the ultimate objective of technical co-ordination is taken to be that of achieving compatibility among the various elements of the system. Yet this objective may be achieved in a variety of ways, each of which has its own limitations and advantages. The first, namely co-ordination through technical unification, is generally only feasible within a single organization or through a process of strict hierarchical imposition. It represents a trade-off between high levels of technical efficiency (which are ensured through the complete compatibility of all relevant systems) and strong structural limitations to flexibility, innovation and adaptability.
In the absence of unified, hierarchical control and in the presence of a plurality of technical systems, co-ordination may still be ensured through interface standard- ization. This requires that highly diversified technical systems are able to recognize, process and produce standard inputs and outputs. This second co-ordination option sacrifices a degree of efficiency for the sake of the higher level of innovation which is secured through a plurality of autonomous, technical systems which are coupled only at discrete points. The process of co-ordination here is characterized by negotiation between the proprietors of the various technical systems regarding the exact format of the standardized interface. This process is generally facilitated by the fact that all participants in the negotiation have a strong interest in achieving
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a durable consensus regarding interface specifications. A final, less technically efficient option for co-ordination between
incompatible technical systems is that provided by converter technologies. Although the existence of such purpose-built 'bridges' places even fewer constraints upon the innovative potential of a plethora of independent technical systems, the design of converter technologies for each and every possible combination represents a significant additional cost to the system as a whole. The process of co-ordination here is typified by reciprocal adjustment in which the various technical systems recognize and adapt to the presence of one another without engaging in direct negotiation.
Table I Typology of co-ordination techniques and processes for technical systems
Co-ordina tion Co-ordination Technical examples techniques processes
Technical Hierarchical unification imposition
Interface Negotiation standardization
Converter Reciprocal technologies adjustment
Single firm producing fully integrated computer systems (up until late 1960s)
Proliferation of PCs and computer accessories (1990s)
Software programs which allow access to files produced by 'incompatible' systems
Source: based on Scharpf 1994; Genschel and Werle 1993.
EU-CE E N V I R O N M E N T A L POLICY C O - O R D I N A T I O N : ONE-WAY H A R M O N I Z A T I O N AND ASYMMETRICAL POLICY RELATIONS
The proposition that the typology of technical co-ordination options described above may be usefully applied to the problem of policy and administrative co- ordination is explored in this section for the specific case of EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination. In carrying out such a transposition, however, the terms of the analysis must necessarily be expanded to capture the distinct nature of co- ordination in the context of social, as opposed to technical, systems. Such features of policy co-ordination as strategic behaviour, the mobilization of networks and human agency in general clearly cannot be ignored.
That the analogy is a useful one, however, has already been shown in the case of multi-level policy-making within the EU (Scharpf 1994). Here, it will be employed as an analytical framework in which to explore the external policy relations of the EU with the countries of CE. This section will draw upon concrete examples of
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EU-CE policy co-ordination initiatives in order to support the claim that this relationship is currently characterized by co-ordination techniques of technical unification, here made manifest through one-way harmonization, which are achieved through a process of hierarchical imposition, manifested in asymmetrical policy relations.
One-way harmonization
In the context of the EU-CE relationship, technical unification goes by the name of harmonizatmn (or approximation). The general legal basis for harmonization is provided by the 1991 Association Agreements (which were followed by formal applications for EU membership on the part of each CE country), 2 and the 1995 White Paper on Integration into the Internal Market. Assistance to the translation into action of such legal documents has, instead, been largely achieved through the PHARE Programme. A brief overview of the general instruments for policy co-ordination in preparation for membership is presented below before we turn to the specific issue of environmental policy co-ordination between the EU and CE countries.
a) The Association Agreements: (also known as 'Europe Agreements') signed on 16 December 1991 with Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia provide for the gradual elimination of trade barriers and the approximation of CE national legislation to that of the EU in a wide range of areas including that of environmental protection. The main legal basis for harmonization activities on the part of CE Associated Countries is thus to be found in their respective Association Agreements with the EU - and initial efforts to achieve harmonization within Associated Countries date from that period. Further impetus to such efforts came with two key European Council meetings: the first, in Copenhagen in June 1993, which confirmed the prospect of future EU membership for the Associated Countries of CE and the second, held in Essen in December 1994, which agreed upon the broad outlines of a pre-accession strategy for Associated Countries (PHARE 1995a: 1);
b) The 1995 White Paper: entitled "Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union', adopted by the EU Commission on 3 May 1995, sets out the objectives for harmonization with respect to Internal Market provisions, presents a general programme of actions to be undertaken and identifies the key measures to be adopted in each sector (Commission of the European Communities 1995).
c) The PHARE Programme: constitutes the main EU vehicle for the provision of technical assistance, training, grant finance and investment in eleven countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is operated under the auspices of the Directorate-General for External Relations responsible for relations with Central and Eastern Europe and New Independent States (DG IA) and is the largest single grant assistance programme to the region, with a total of ECU 5,416.9 million committed during the first six years of full operation from 1990
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to 1995. Since its establishment, PHARE has gradually changed its nature, 'from being a vehicle for the delivery of emergency aid in 1989 to being an integration tool by the end of 1994' (PHARE 1995d: 3). As a result, one of the key areas of activity of the PHARE Programme has become that of assisting Associated Countries in their efforts to make their legislation compatible with that of the EU.
Efforts to pursue harmonization within the Associated Countries are thus underpinned by three main elements: the Association Agreements which constitute the fundamental legal basis for such action, the 1995 White Paper which sets out a general road map for future policy adjustment with regard to Internal Market provisions and, finally, the PHARE Programme which provides focused technical assistance to harmonization activities within the Associated Countries.
The Associated Countries of CE have, in turn, responded with a series of initiatives aimed at harmonization, one of the most important measures being the requirement that all draft legislation be evaluated for its correspondence to existing EU legislation. Such efforts have been given greater focus with the 1995 White Paper and have galvanized CE governments into the adoption of comprehensive law harmonization programmes - such as the Hungarian Government Resolution 2174/1995 which approved a detailed timetable for harmonization during the first five-year stage of the Europe Agreement (Vasuigh 1995).
Taken together, these constituent elements of the pre-accession strategy reveal a co-ordinated and highly focused convergence policy within which the objective of harmonization with EU legislation is treated as a top priority by both partners in the policy co-ordination relationship.
Harmonization of environmental legislation
The requirement of harmonization introduced with the Association Agreements also applies to environmental legislation and this is underlined in the 1995 White Paper with respect to the specific subset of environmental provisions directly related to the Internal Market - namely product-related environmental standards which by their very nature have a direct impact on trade (Commission of the European Communities 1995:2 i5).
None the less, the need to address the entire range of EU environmental law still remains, given that one of the preconditions for membership will be the successful integration of the entire acquis communautaire into the legal framework of each Associated Country. Hence, environmental policy constitutes an important area for harmonization in its own right and the goal for CE countries is to ensure that environmental policy will not constitute a hindrance to accession.
The need for a strategic document addressing the full corpus of EU environ- mental legislation was expressed by the Associated Countries soon after the release of the 1995 White Paper on the Internal Market. This led to the drafting of a Working Document entitled 'Preparation of the associated CEECs for the approxi- mation of the EU's environmental legislation' which was presented at the joint meeting of EU and Associated Countries Environment Ministers on 4 March 1996.
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This 1996 Working Document identifies seven main criteria for the establishment of priorities for approximation including: imminent dangers to human health, protection of species or habitats of European or international importance, significant trans-boundary impacts, 'framework' legislation, horizontal measures, impacts on the EU Internal Market, and implementation of existing international obligations (Commission of the European Communities 1996a: 4-5).
In keeping with the general evolution of PHARE Programme priorities, the environmental sector has also witnessed a shift from urgent ad hoc interventions to a programme approach centred upon policy formulation, the strengthening of implementation and enforcement capacities, and legislative harmonization. Funds are allocated by country (see Table 2) while the proportion of overall funding for environment and nuclear safety within the PHARE Programme remained under 10 per cent of the budget during the period 1990-94.
Table 2 PHARE Programme funds committed in the environment and nuclear safety sector, 1990-95 (million ECU)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1 9 9 ~ ~ t a l
Poland 22 35 18 0 12 18 105 Hungary 27 10 10 0 15.5 7 69.5 Czechoslovakia 30 5 . . . . 35 Czech Republic - - 0 0 0 0 0 Slovak Republic - - 0 0 0 1 1
Total'* 102.5 100 87.3 34.1 77.5 n.a. n.a.
Source: PHARE 1995b: 40; PHARE Information Office, Brussels. *No funds committed for nuclear safety. **Total funds committed for all PHARE country and multi-country programmes in the environment and nuclear safety sector.
Projects in support of harmonization in the field of environmental legislation provided under the PHARE Programme include the appointment of legal advisers to the environmental ministries of CE countries (charged with reviewing all draft legislation for compatibility with EU environmental law), the financing of translations of EU environmental legislation into CE languages and the provision of expert advice on specific harmonization issues. A further indication of the EU's financial commitment to harmonization was given in early 1996 with the establish- ment of an ECU 10 million PHARE Environmental Approximation Facility charged with providing targeted technical assistance in response to specific requests advanced by Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs).
As part of the general shift towards the preparation of CE countries for future membership, the 'functional' Directorate-Generals (DGs) of the Commission are
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assuming an increasingly active role while harmonization and relations with the Associated Countries are no longer the exclusive preserve of DG IA. This is true also in the case of environmental policy, as shown by the decision of DG XI in 1995 to commission a ten-country survey of the current status of harmonization of the environmental legislation of CEECs with that of the EU. The survey was carried out by the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) based in Budapest and the findings presented in Brussels in early February 1996. The potential value of such a survey to both EU and CE policy-makers alike is clear and a wide distribution has been ensured with its publication as a REC report (REC 1996).
Such initiatives illustrate the prime position occupied by the harmonization of environmental legislation within the context of EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination.
Harmonization as technical unification ?
Amid the flurry of activity aimed at assisting the harmonization process which, as we have seen, commands significant attention from institutions in both the EU and CE, a basic fact should not be overlooked. Namely, that harmonization is a one-way process under which CE countries adopt EU legislation- in the words of a PHARE Legal Adviser, harmonization represents 'a unilateral obligation' (Wajda 1995: 1).
Technical unification throughout the EU and CE is to be achieved through harmonization and the wholesale adoption of EU environmental legislation, regulations and standards on the part of the CE countries. This will undoubtedly bring with it significant advantages in terms of technical efficiency - which, of course, is considered to be the prime strength of this co-ordination technique and in itself constitutes strong grounds for its adoption. However, the general drawbacks associated with this option described above remain, namely those of a significant degree of rigidity, resistance to change and, hence, reduced capacity for innovation.
In the case of CE countries, the practical consequences of the technical unifi- cation approach to policy co-ordination include a near-exclusive focus of attention, resources and expertise on the challenge of legislative harmonization with the EU to the detriment of other equally urgent tasks - such as that of ensuring the effective implementation of the avalanche of new laws and decrees through specific institution-building measures (such as retraining) and general public administration reform.
Several considerations underline the importance of an attentive evaluation of this trade-off in the case of CE countries and their environmental policies:
1 The novelty, scope and continued revision of the legislative, institutional and economic reforms currently under way in CE countries call for regulatory approaches in the field of the environment which are characterized by their capacity for renovation, adaptability and flexibility.
2 The tendency to treat the CE countries as a single block of'transition countries' ignores their diverse institutional, political and economic backgrounds and
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risks undermining any attempt to formulate appropriate regulations and institutions for the environment in these countries. Few calculations of the potential cost of harmonization to the CE countries have been undertaken and, given the severe budgetary restrictions of most CE countries as well as the novelty of the legislation introduced, there is a strong possibility that the implementation of newly harmonized regulations may be hampered by inadequate financial, technical and professional resources. Finally, even though EU policy advice and technical assistance activities within the sphere of environmental policy undeniably represent an opportunity, they must also be recognized as constituting a constraint in so far as they effectively restrict the variety of policy options on offer by narrowing the focus to EU legislative approaches, while, at the same time, reducing the need for 'policy initiative' on the part of CE policy-makers.
Of particular interest is the fact that the emphasis on strict harmonization which characterizes the current EU-CE policy co-ordination relationship completely ignores the recent history of regulatory harmonization within the EU itself. Although the pursuit of scrupulous harmonization may have distinguished the early regulatory history of the EU, by the mid-1980s the goal of maximal uniformity through the application of highly detailed EU regulations was abandoned in favour of the principle of mutual recognition (Scharpf 1994: 19; Majone 1994: 163). In terms of the analogy of co-ordination between technical systems, the EU may be said to have, at that point, abandoned technical unification for a policy interface-based strategy.
The fact that CE countries are actively pursuing harmonization, with few manifest signs of such reservations as those raised above, testifies to their tacit assumption that the advantages of EU membership tomorrow will far outweigh the 'cost' of harmonization today. In this, the CE countries may yet be proved right. However, there is a possibility that many of the objectives of harmonization may be achieved at less cost than those incurred under the current policy co-ordination approach. It is with this in mind that alternatives to the harmonization as technical unification approach to EU-CE policy co-ordination will be explored in the final section.
Asymmetrical policy relations
If the focus so far has been on the technique by which EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination is carried out (which was characterized as being one of 'technical unification'), the remainder will examine theprocess by which such a technique is applied. To return to the typology of general co-ordination options set out in Table 1, the task is now to determine whether these co-ordination processes are more akin to hierarchical imposition, negotiation or reciprocal adjustment. Given that reciprocal adjustment entails no direct contact between the systems subject to co-ordination, it may be safely assumed not to hold in the case of the EU-CE policy co-ordination relationship where contacts are ongoing and increasingly close.
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On one reading of events, the recent history of EU-CE relations may be depicted as a process of mutual rediscovery between EU and CE countries which has taken place in a number of areas. In the economic sphere, a significant redirection of the trade patterns of CE countries led to large increases in exports to (and imports from) the EU, while trade with the formerly predominant trading partners of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) fell dramatically (Dr~ibel and Smith 1995). In the political sphere, the foremost foreign policy objective of all CE countries became that of securing membership in such key institutions as NATO, the OECD and the (then) European Community which, in turn, rapidly developed specific departments and programmes to respond to such new demands. Freer movement across the one-time divide allowed for the develop- ment of cultural and scientific exchanges between EU and CE countries, which were accompanied by growing floods of tourists initially directed towards CE but soon counterbalanced by like-minded travellers headed in the opposite direction.
Such developments were mirrored by the establishment of a set of general mechanisms for policy consultation between the EU and the CE Associated Countries including:
a) regular meetings between Associated Countries' heads of state and sectoral ministers with EU counterparts within the Association Council (PHARE 1995d: 2) to discuss matters of mutual concern and to review progress under the terms of the Association Agreements;
b) the establishment of European Commission delegations in CE capitals and the accreditation of CE country delegations to the Commission in Brussels;
c) the development of day-to-day working relations with beneficiary govern- ments through the PHARE Programme by means of direct contacts with the network of PHARE Co-ordinating Units and Project Management Units (PMUs) present throughout the region.
Despite the establishment of such mechanisms for mutual consultation, the EU-CE relationship remains one marked by a substantial element of asymmetry. This was clearly illustrated by the fact that the political and economic changes of the 1989-90 period were greeted by all concerned as an historic opportunity for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc to 'return to Europe'. The prevailing attitude thus regarded 'Europe' as being, to all intents and purposes, synonymous with 'Western Europe' and this definition has provided a backdrop to the relationship between the EU and its newly discovered neighbours of Central and Eastern Europe from the outset.
The underlying asymmetry of the EU-CE relationship is especially evident with regard to the importance that each partner attaches to its success and their respective viewpoints with regard to its ultimate objective. The very fact that future EU membership has become one of the overriding foreign policy goals of the CE countries shows that membership ranks high among the set of vital national interests. For the EU, on the other hand, the admittance of new members from CE can hardly be defined as a pressing policy issue at the present time, given its current preoccupation with the review of its own internal institutional framework under the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) which began on 29 March 1996 in
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Turin. The CE countries, however, made it clear from the start that the ultimate goal was full EU membership- preferably by the year 2000 or soon after. For the EU, in contrast, the Association Agreements and other initiatives launched in favour of the CE countries were regarded as sufficient measures in themselves and were primarily aimed at containing the potential disruptions (economic collapse, political instabihty, unchecked westward migration) which could result from the isolation of CE countries.
Thus the objective on the part of the EU, at least up until the 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council which established the principle of future membership, was one of encouraging CE countries to stick to their course of economic, political and institutional reform with EU membership being a secondary issue to be faced at an undefined future date. Indeed, it is with respect to the issue of EU membership that the element of asymmetry is brought into stark relief- quite simply, the decision to accept applications for membership remains the prerogative of the EU which thus evidently has the upper hand with respect to CE applicants.
Environmental policy relations
Such general considerations of underlying asymmetry in policy co-ordination are also reflected in co-ordination mechanisms within the specific policy area of the environment. In this policy field, however, the all-pervasive element of asymmetry might be expected to be tempered by the nature of the policy field and the impor- tance attributed to it by both partners. This is particularly so with regard to trans- boundary pollution and trade-related environmental standards - two areas of environmental policy in which both parties have a clear interest in achieving a degree of policy co-ordination.
The extent of the environmental clean-up efforts needed and persistent environmental health problems in CE countries, not to mention the possibility that poor environmental protection records may negatively influence the EU's decision on eligibility for membership, ensure that a certain level of attention to environ- mental policy actions is maintained in CE countries despite the predominance of other pressing policy issues. On the part of the EU, action to address CE environ- mental problems is based in part upon the recognition of the trans-boundary nature of many pollution problems as well as of the advantages represented by the lower marginal cost of tackling pollution at source in CE countries. Finally, in the case of both partners there is a need to address the issue of product-related standards within the new trade relationship established under the Association Agreements, albeit from rather different standpoints. Such a configuration of interests would appear to constitute strong grounds for co-ordinated policy action between the EU and the CE Associated Countries in the field of environmental policy (far from evident, for example, in the case of agricultural policy).
Co-ordination of environmental policy between the EU and CE takes place in a variety of arenas, both multilateral and bilateral. The 'Environment for Europe' process is one such multilateral policy forum, formally embodied in the periodic meeting of the environmental ministers of participating countries from across
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Europe and beyond. The first such meeting was held in Dob~i~ Castle in June 1991, followed by one in Lucerne in April 1993, with the most recent meeting held in Sofia in October 1995. One of the foremost objectives of this process is that of achieving greater policy co-ordination and one of its outcomes was the publication, in August 1995, of a comprehensive report on the state of the environment in Europe entitled Europe's Environment: The Dob~3~Assessment which also includes an outline of strategic policy options (EEA 1995).
In terms of bilateral EU-CE co-ordination of environmental policy, three main vehicles are available: first, the regular meetings of environmental ministers from the EU and CE within the Association process and, second, the provision of policy advice under the PHARE Programme as described above. The third, more recent, addition to the gamut of bilateral policy co-ordination options is represented by the establishment of the European Environmental Agency (EEA) which effectively began its operations, following the European Council decision of 29 October 1993 on its seat of operation, with the investiture of the first Executive Director in Copenhagen in late 1994. Given that participation in the EEA is 'open to other countries which share the concern of the Community and the Member States for the objectives of the Agency' (Council of Europe 1990), the establishment of this agency constitutes an unprecedented opportunity for non-member CEECs to participate in the activities of an EU institution. The 'variable geometry' configuration of the EEA, developed to cope with the different demands of EU member states and Associated Countries, poses significant challenges and the effective inclusion of CEECs, planned for 1996--7, will, as a consequence, be depen- dent upon the availability of funding provided under the PHARE Multi-Country Programme (Jim~nez-Beltr~in 1996).
Asymmetry in policy relations as hierarchical imposition ?
That provisions for mutual consultation and exchange are included in the EU-CE multi-level policy-making process is undeniable. What is equally clear, however, is that all exchanges relating to public policy within this relationship are substantially conditioned by the fact that both sides take as their point of reference western systems of policy-making. The terms of the 'policy dialogue' are thus skewed heavily in favour of the EU, leaving little room for consideration of the policy experience of the CE countries - which has, in any case, been rejected wholesale by the majority of CE policy-makers themselves. Such inputs as there are from the CE are taken as limiting factors or constraints to be acknowledged and accounted for when 'importing' EU policies. The one-sidedness of the policy relationship between the EU and the CE countries is further reinforced by the significant discrepancies which exist between the two partners with regard to financial and technological resources as well as cumulative experience of pursuing public policies within a market-based economy.
As the principal vehicle for the delivery of EU policy solutions in CE, the PHARE Programme merits particular attention with regard to the issue of asymmetry in policy relations. Three aspects will be examined in this light:
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1 Overall framework ofproject (and thereforepolicy) options is of exclusively EU design. Consultations with CE beneficiary governments are undertaken when defining the policy priorities for specific sectors and when drawing up specific programmes of technical assistance. None the less, such strategic choices on the part of the CE countries are made within a pre-existing framework- that of the PHARE Programme itself- in whose establishment they had little active part;
2 Expert inputs mtoprojects arepredominantly of EU origin. In the initial phase of PHARE operations, EU nationals were often the sole source of expert input into projects. This practice not only led to the accusation that the PHARE Programme allowed the EU to provide high-profile technical assistance to CE countries with one hand while, with the other, collecting the same funds in the form of high professional fees charged by EU consultants. More seriously still, this practice meant that policy advice was often offered to CE governments by experts with little or no previous knowledge of local conditions, resulting, on occasion, in ill-adjusted or superficial recommendations. Partly in response to such criticism, the PHARE Programme has recently introduced several changes in its operating practice including: the requirement to include local experts in TA projects (thereby accessing their in-depth knowledge of local conditions and of the potential constraints to project feasibility); the introduc- tion of the Decentralized Implementation System (DIS) under which an increasing number of strategic decisions on programme development are taken by the local PMUs based within the government institutions of the beneficiary countries and which are often headed by a local expert; and the allocation of responsibility for project management and oversight to local PMUs operating under a set of standard PHARE guidelines which are, in turn, subject to budget control and review from Brussels (procedures not unlike those applied to programmes pursued within the EU itself) (PHARE 1995b);
3 Ultimate decision-making power rests with the EU as donor. Despite the inclusion of beneficiary priorities in the programme formulation stage, the introduction of the DIS in the programme development and project tendering stage as well as the closer involvement of PMUs in project management, the bottom line is that ultimate decision-making power is retained by the donor and not by the beneficiary. This is reflected in the fact that all PHARE projects proposed by the technical PMUs based within beneficiary country institutions must obtain prior approval from the local EU Commission delegation before launching tendering or direct contracting procedures. In this way, the effective autonomy of the PMUs granted under the new DIS is curtailed and the underlying asymmetry of the relationship is revealed?
Such examples show that the terms of the EU-CE policy relationship are patently asymmetrical: ultimately, one partner has all the resources (among which positive policy exemplars, financial resources and the power to grant membership) while CE countries can only rely on what are largely negative incentives (the threat of regional instability, trans-boundary environmental pollution, westward migration and so on) to bind their EU counterparts to the policy co-ordination table.
The recognition that such underlying asymmetry exists should not obscure the
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fact that hierarchical imposition risks ignoring the substantial policy experience accumulated by CE countries in certain areas of environmental policy (such as nature protection) under the previous system as well as their introduction of innovative approaches to others in the course of the past six years. Examples of the latter include new measures for environmental financing (with the establishment of Central Environmental Protection Funds), debt-for-nature swaps (pioneered by Poland) and the use of economic instruments (such as Hungary's product charges on tyres and batteries). Such policy experience provides the basis for a less 'top-down' approach to policy co-ordination and a shift to one more conducive to the exchange of policy experience between the two partners.
Add to this the possibility that the failures of hierarchy may, on occasion, outweigh its supposed benefits in efficiency terms - a phenomenon which has been described by authors investigating organizational behaviour and the principal/ agent problem (March and Olsen 1989) - and further reasons for caution in advocating co-ordination through hierarchical imposition appear. In the case of the EU-CE environmental policy relationship, in which both partners are operating under very different incentive structures and where informational disparities are significant, there appears to be a strSng possibility that conditions for failure in hierarchical imposition may hold. On the basis of such considerations, alternatives to current hierarchical imposition through asymmetrical policy relations will be explored in the next section.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR EU-CE E N V I R O N M E N T A L POLICY C O - O R D I N A T I O N
This section will attempt to illustrate the potential advantages of a shift away from strict harmonization and hierarchical imposition to a strategy of policy co- ordination based on interface techniques and negotiation. Such a move may be justified with reference to two sources of policy failure in the field of EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination, namely the 'implementation gap' and the 'moving target' problem.
An 'implementation gap'
The challenges posed to CE Associated Countries by the requirement of harmon- ization are significant. They require the mobilization of a wide range of resources including: in-depth knowledge of the corpus of EU environmental legislation on the part of CE policy-makers, skilled law drafters, sustained parliamentary attention and general support from the national policy community. And yet this challenge pales into insignificance when compared to the difficulties of actually implementing the newly adopted, successfully harmonized legishtion.
One of the contributing factors to such difficulties is an emerging mismatch between the generally high quality of the new environmental legislation passed by national parliaments and the effective ability of government administrations in the region to ensure implementation (Fisher 1992). The 1995 White Paper itself warns against the 'merely formal transposition of legislation', and attaches 'equal
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importance.. , to the establishment of adequate structures for implementation and enforcement' (Commission of the European Communities 1995: 1).
An exclusive focus on strict harmonization with EU legislation risks overlooking the difficulties of implementation of such regulations in CE contexts and, as a result, may lead to the failure of newly harmonized environmental policy to address effectively the host of environmental problems with which the CE countries are beset. In addition to general implementation problems (Majone and Wildavsky 1978) there are those specific to transition countries such as the absence of (or delays in issuing) decrees or regulations which set out the measures to be taken, limited resources (in terms of skills, budgetary allocations and institutional capacity) and, finally, a general neglect of the issue of 'appropriateness' with respect to the newly imported legal approaches to be applied.
The advantages offered by interface co-ordination techniques in the case of EU- CE environmental policy co-ordination could potentially be even greater than those which have obtained within the EU given the disparities in policy-making and implementation capacities which exist between the two partners. Interface techniques for environmental policy co-ordination could offer more opportunity for successful implementation by focusing upon the introduction of the central elements of EU environmental policy and regulations into CE national legal frame- works. In this manner, the rate of 'effective harmonization' (i.e. legal harmonization which actually leads to successful implementation) could be enhanced in two main ways. First, the number of measures with which to harmonize would, in an initial phase, be reduced with the inclusion of only key regulations - thereby alleviating pressure upon the limited legislative and institutional resources of CE countries. Second, there would be greater opportunity for flexibility and innovation with respect to the design of strategies for implementation.
Such an interface approach would represent a decrease in 'efficiency' with respect to the technical unification option of strict, all-encompassing harmon- ization, but, on the other hand, it might increase the chances of successful implementation by allowing for flexibility and innovation - arguably two of the greatest assets for policy-making strategies under conditions of transition. Success- ful negotiation regarding the 'format' of the policy interface should be greatly facilitated by the fact that both parties have a strong interest in achieving a durable consensus regarding a common approach to environmental policy-making activities.
In terms of practical policy options for CE initiatives for harmonization with EU environmental regulations, the following might be considered:
a) the definition of a set of priorities for environmental regulations which are to be included in CE Associated Countries' programmes of harmonization from the start. The 1995 White Paper goes some way in providing such indications; however, its exclusive focus upon environmental legislation as related to the Internal Market makes it of limited application. The 1996 Working Document goes one step further, by establishing a set of criteria for prioritizing approxi- mation efforts, yet the brevity of its treatment appears to require further efforts to expand upon the key issues raised;
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b) the elaboration of a set of guidelines for the development of institutional frame- works through which newly harmonized legislation may be successfully implemented. The value of such an exercise could be greatly enhanced by drawing upon case studies of the variety of institutions and policy instruments adopted within individual EU member states as well as the organization of bilateral or multilateral exchanges between CE and EU member state environ- ment officials with regard to their practical experience in implementing EU environmental legislation;
c) the equitable allocation of PHARE funding for the environment between the equally pressing objectives of legislative harmonization and capacity-building for implementation - particularly with reference to the selection of projects to be funded under the new ECU 10 million PHARE Environmental Approxi- mation Facility.
The 'moving target' problem
Equally defeating is the 'moving target' problem by which the best efforts of CE countries to harmonize with EU environmental legislation may be undermined by a significant 'temporal lag' given that the object of harmonization is itself subject to continuous modification and change. The problem is one of ensuring that today's best efforts at harmonization are not undermined by the evolution of EU environ- mental policy tomorrow.
The 1995 White Paper recognizes the importance of attention on the part of Associated Countries to key measures which are in the legislative 'pipeline' and states clearly that '[m]easures in the process of being adopted are likely to form part of the 'acquis' to be accepted by future Member States' (Commission of the European Communities 1995: para. 3.19). The need to incorporate ongoing changes in EU law into domestic legislative programming has also been recognized by CE countries whose concern is to ensure that CE environmental policy is in step with the legislative processes under way in the EU and not only following some years behind (KTM 1995: 5).
In the case of the EU-CE policy relationship the need for improved access to information is mutual, and the explicit recognition of this fact greatly undermines the hierarchical imposition approach adopted to date. Just as CE Associated Countries require timely indications regarding the future environmental policy directions of the EU, the EU needs information on the degree of harmonization with and implementation of EU environmental legislation by the CE Associated Countries in order to assess applications for membership effectively. Furthermore, the two partners in the policy relationship are operating under conditions of inter- dependence, both within the global and regional context, providing an additional incentive to adopt an interface-based strategy of policy co-ordination based on dialogue and negotiation.
An underlying element of asymmetry in the EU-CE policy co-ordination relationship may be expected to persist - it is, in large part, an unavoidable consequence of the massive (and peaceful) paradigm shift of CE societies towards democratic systems of governance and a market-based economy which introduced
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an entirely new set of public policy practices to be mastered by CE policy-makers 'overnight'. As a result, the negotiating position of CE countries is weak and rests in large part upon the extent to which the EU is prepared to grant standing within the policy co-ordination relationship. Yet once the basic terms of the framework for policy co-ordination have been established there remains substantial leeway with regard to the process by which the two partners choose to achieve co-ordination. This choice may go a long way in compensating for a persistent element of 'structural asymmetry'. In this regard a negotiation-based strategy appears to serve the long-term interests of both the EU and CE countries by:
a) contributing to the development of domestic capacities for environmental policy-making and general international policy co-ordination within CE countries through active 'policy learning' within the scope of the EU-CE approximation exercise;
b) increasing the commitment of CE policy-makers to follow through with the implementation of agreements reached through policy co-ordination with the EU;
c) strengthening the legitimacy of specific outcomes of the policy co-ordination, the overall Association process and the goal of future EU membership in the eyes of CE public opinion through due emphasis upon the active contribution of CE representatives within the framework of harmonization.
In terms of concrete policy options, the following measures might be proposed in support of a negotiation-based approach to EU-CE environmental policy co-ordination:
a) more frequent working meetings between Commission officials and their counterparts within CE environmental ministries on specific sectoral issues as well as increased opportunities for the latter to undertake work within the Commission for short periods;
b) timely information regarding the rulings and interpretation of EU environmental law by the European Court of Justice as well as access to key policy analyses and reports produced by the EU and member states on the practical implications of new and emerging EU environmental legislation;
c) granting of observer status to CE Associated Country representatives within certain EU environmental policy-making arenas even before the extended process of accession negotiations has been concluded with the signature of an Accession Treaty (which would certainly represent an unprece- dented innovation with respect to previous accession processes, including the most recent round of EU enlargement involving Austria, Sweden and Finland).
C O N C L U S I O N S
The application of a typology of co-ordination techniques drawn from the realm of co-ordination between technical systems appears to be as fruitful in the context of
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EU-CE multi-level policy-making as in its original application to multi-level policy-making within the EU. By providing the terms with which to analyse the nature of the policy co-ordination relationship between the EU and the CE this approach illustrates the limits of one-way harmonization pursued through hierarchical imposition. Furthermore, it provides the basis upon which to develop potential alternative techniques (based upon interface strategies) and alternative processes (resting upon negotiation). Of course, any such analysis provides only a rough, and generally static, account of what are in fact complex and dynamic interrelations operating within the sphere of EU-CE policy co-ordination.
The issue of multi-level policy-making between the EU and the countries of CE certainly appears to deserve further investigation, both in general terms and by sector, within the very near future. Arguments for haste may, on the one hand, appear premature given that the earliest possible date for the initiation of accession negotiations with CE Associated Countries was established by the European Council meeting in Madrid of December 1995 (and reiterated at Florence in June 1996) as being six months after the end of the IGC (Commission of the European Communities 1996b: 2). Thus, even the most hopeful forecast of progress within the IGC would see the opening of acdession negotiations with CE Associated Countries in early 1998 and, given the host of complex issues to be resolved, these would certainly be protracted with full accession being highly unlikely before the year 2002. On the other hand, preliminary evaluations and decisions which will determine the outcome of future events are being made at the present time. Evidence of this is given by the Council's request, advanced at both Madrid and Florence, that the Commission submit its opinions and reports on enlargement to the Council as soon as possible after the conclusion of the IGC. Given that these opinions will constitute the basis upon which the Council will decide whether or not to open accession negotiations, they are clearly of great importance and the first steps in their preparation are now currently under way. 4 Thus the time is already ripe for increased attention to the EU-CE policy co-ordination relationship as today's Associated Countries progress towards becoming tomorrow's new member states.
Address for correspondence: Joanne Caddy, European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini 9, 1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI). Tel: +39 55 46851. Fax: +39 55 4685 298. email: [email protected]
NOTES
1 In a note where Scharpf acknowledges suggestions by Philipp Genschel (Scharpf 1994: 240).
2 Formal applications to join the EU have been presented by Hungary (1 April 1994), Poland (8 April 1994), the Slovak Republic (27 June 1995) and the Czech Republic (24 January 1996) as well as by Romania (22 June 1995) and Bulgaria (15 December 1995) (European Access 1994: 5; European Access 1996: 6).
3 A recent case of PHARE technical assistance to reform in the field of environmental policy serves as a clear illustration of the nature of 'hierarchical imposition' underlying the EU-CE relationship in general. The project in question falls under the 1994 PHARE
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Programme budget which allocated over ECU 3 million to support environmental policy and legislative harmonization in Hungary (KTM 1995). The tendering process for the project was to have been launched in early 1995; however, terms of reference (TORs) drawn up by the PMU within the Hungarian Ministry of Regional Policy and Environment were repeatedly rejected by the EU Commission Delegation in Budapest whose full use of its prerogative to approve the TORs led to a situation of substantial stalemate by mid-1996. Only the imminent risk that Hungary could lose the entire sum were tendering procedures not launched by the end of 1996 was sufficient to oblige the EU delegation to begin tenders in November 1996 with project implementation due to begin in January 1997 - a full three years after funding allocation. There is an element of irony in the fact that among the issues to be addressed by the project was the harmonization of environmental legislation and policy, precisely those issues considered by both the EU and CE countries to be top priorities but which are, nevertheless, hostage to the underlying asymmetry in effective decision-making power. The first set of technical questions was sent to Central and Eastern European applicants in April 1996 (Commission of the European Communities 1996b: 2).
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Final version accepted for publication 9/1/97
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