habermas__on systematically distorted communication

7/27/2019 Habermas__On Systematically Distorted Communication

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2 The reestablished original scene istypically a situation in which the child ha~once suffered and repulsed an unbearableconflict. This repulse is coupled with a pro-cess of desymbolization and the formation ofa symptom. The child excludes the experi-ence of the conflict-filled object from publiccommunication (and at the same time makesit inaccessible to its own ego as well); it sepa-rates the conflict-laden portion of its memoryof the object and, so to speak, desymbolizesthe meaning ofthe relevant reference person.The gap which arises in the semantic field isthen closed by employing an unquestionablesymbol in place of the isolated symbolic con-tent. This symbol, of course, strikes us as be-ing a symptom, because it has gained privatelinguistic significance and can no longer beused according to the rules of public lan-guage. The analyst's scenic understanding es-tablishes meaning equivalences between theelements of three patterns=-the everydayscene, the transference scene', and the origi-nal scene-and solves the specific incompre-hensibility of the symptom; thus it assists inachieving resymbolization, that is, the reen-try of isolated symbolic contents into publiccommunication. The latent meaning of thepresent situation becomes accessible whenitis related to the unimpaired meaning of theoriginal infantile scene. Scenic under-standing makes it possible to translate themeaning of the pathologically frozen com-munication pattern which had been hithertounconscious and inaccessible to public com-munication.

2 2 Ifwe consider everyday interpretationwithin the range of ordinary language ortranslation from one language into another,or trained linguistic analysis in'general, all ofthem leading to hermeneutic understandingof initially incomprehensible utterances,then scenic understanding differs from thathermeneutic understanding because of itsexplanatory power.2 That is, the disclosure ofthe meaning of specific incomprehensibleacts or utterances developsto the same extentas, in the course of reconstruction of theoriginal scene, a clarification of the genesisof the faulty meaning is achieved. The What,the semantic content of a systematically dis-torted manifestation, cannot be under-

370 Part Two: The Branches-Contemporary Social Theory XIII Critical Theorytions .... (c) If, finally, we consider the sys-tem of distorted communication as a whole,we are struck by the discrepancy between thelevels of communication; the usual congru-ency between linguistic symbols, actions,and accompanying gestures has disinte-grated .... There is a communication ob-struction in the self between the ego, whichis capable of speech and participates in inter-subjectively established language-games,'/and that inner foreign territory (Freud),which is represented by a private or a pri-mary linguistic symbolism.

2 Alfred Lorenzer has examined the ana-lytical conversation between physician andpatient from the standpoint of psychoanaly-sis as analysis of language. 1 He considers theprocess by which the meanings of specificincomprehensible manifestations are de-coded as an understanding of scenes linkedby analogy to those in which the symptomsoccur. The purpose of analytical interpreta-tion is to explain the incomprehensiblemeaning of the symptomatic manifestations.Where neuroses are involved, these manifes-tations are part ofa deformed language-gamein which the patient acts : that is, he playsan incomprehensible scene byviolating role-expectations in a strikingly stereotyped man-ner. The analyst tries to make the sympto-matic scene understandable by associating itwith analogous scenes in the situation oftransference. The latter holds the key to thecoded relation between the symptomaticscene, which the adult patient plays outsidethe doctor's office, and an original scene ex-perienced in early childhood. In the transfer-ence situation the patient forces the doctorinto the role of the conflict-defined primaryreference person. The doctor, in the role ofthe reflective or critical participant, can in-terpret the transference situation as a repeti-tion of early childhood experiences; he canthus construct a dictionary for the hiddenidiosyncratic meanings of the symptoms.Scenic understanding is therefore based onthe discovery that the patient behaves in thesame way in his symptomatic scenes as hedoes in certain transference situations; suchunderstanding aims at the reconstruction,confirmed by the patient in an act of self-re-flection, of the original scene.


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od if it is not possible at the same time toplain the Why, the origin of the sympto-tic scene with reference to the initial cir-stances which led to the systematic dis-

rtion itself. ...Scenic understanding-in contrast to her-

eneutic understanding, or ordinary seman-analysis-cannot be conceived as being aere application of communicative compe-

nce, free from theoretical guidance.3. The theoretical propositions on whichis special kind of language analysis is im-citly based can be elicited from threents of view. (1) The psychoanalyst has a

econception of the structure of nondis-rted ordinary communication; (2) he attri-es the systematic distortion of communi-

to the confusion of two developmen-lly following phases of prelinguistic andnguistic symbol-organization; and (3) to ex-ain the origin of deformation he employs aeory of deviant socialization which in-

es the connection between patterns ofraction in early childhood and the forma-

on of personality structures. I would like tonsider these three aspects briefly.3.1. The first set of theoretical proposi-

ons concerns the structural conditions thatust be met if normal communication is tobtain.(a) In the case of a nondeformed language-

ame there is a congruency on all three levelsf communication. Linguistic expressions,pressions represented in actions, and those

ied in gestures do not contradict oneother, but rather supplement one another

y metacommunication ....(b) Normal communication conforms toersubjectively recognized rules; it is pub-

c. The communicated meanings are identi-l for all members of the language-commu-ity. Verbal utterances are constructed ac-ding to the valid system of grammaticals and are conventionally applied to spe-fic situations. For extraverbal expressions,

hich are not grammatically organized,ere is likewise a lexicon which varies socio-ulturally within certain limits.(c) In the case of normal speech the speak-

rs are aware of the categorical differenceween subject and object. They differenti-

e between outer and inner speech and sepa-

On Systematically D is torted Communication 371rate the private from the public world. Thedifferentiation between being and appear-ance depends, moreover, on the distinctionbetween the language-sign, its significativecontent significatum , and the object whichthe symbol denotes (referent, deno-tatum ....

(d) In normal communication an intersub-jectivity of mutual understanding, guaran-teeing ego-identity, develops and is main-tained in the relation between individualswho acknowledge one another. On the onhand, the analytic use of language allows theidentification of objects (thus the categoriza-tion of particular items, the subordination ofelements under classes, and the inclusion ofsets). On the other hand, the reflexive use oflanguage assures a relationship between thespeaking subject and the language commu-nity which cannot be sufficiently presentedby analytic: operations.

... The relation between I (ego), you (alterego), and we (ego and alter ego) is establishedonly by an analytically paradoxical achieve-ment: the speaking persons identify them-selves at the same time with two incompat-ible dialogue roles and thereby ensure theidentity of the I (ego) as well as of the group.The one being (ego) asserts his absolute non-identity in relation to the other being (alterego); at the same time, however, both recog-nize their identity inasmuch as each ac-knowledges the other as being an ego, that is,a nonreplaceable individual who can refer tohimself as 1. Moreover, that which linksthem both is a mutual factor (we), a collec-tivity, which in turn asserts its individualityin relation to other groups. This means thatthe same paradoxical relationship is estab-lished on the level of intersubjectively linkedcollectives as holds between the individuals.

The specific feature of linguistic intersub-jectivity exists in the fact that individuatedpersons communicate on the basis of it. Inthe reflexive use of language we present inal-ienably individual aspects in unavoidablygeneral categories in such a way that wemetacommunicatively comment upon andsometimes even revoke direct information(and confirm it only with reservations). Wedo this for the purpose of an indirect repre-sentation of the nonidentical aspects of the


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cessive phases of human symbol-organiza-tion.(a)Thearchaic symbol-organization, whichresists the transformation of its contents intogrammatically regulated communication,can only be disclosed on the basis of the dataof speech pathology and by means of theanalysis of dream material. ... Freud had al-ready noticed the lack of logical connectionsin his dream analyses. He draws attentionparticularly to the use ofwords with oppositemeaning, a remnant on the linguistic levelofthe genetically earlier peculiarity of combin-ing logically incompatible meanings. Prelin-guistic symbols are emotionally loaded andremain fixed to particular scenes. There isnodissociation of linguistic symbol and bodilygesture. The connection to a particular con-text is so strong that the symbol cannot varyindependently of actions. Although the pa-laeosymbols represent a prelinguistic basisfor the intersubjectivity of mutual existenceand shared action, they do not allow publiccommunication in the strict sense of theword.... Prelinguistic symbol-organizationdoes not allow an analytically satisfying cate-gorization of the objects experienced. Twotypes of deficiencies are found in the commu-nication and thought disturbances of psy-chotics: namely amorphous and frag-mentedspeech disorders.' In both cases theanalytic operations of classification are dis-turbed. In the first, a fragmentation of struc-ture is apparent which does not allow disin-tegrated single elements to be compiled intoclasses according to general criteria. In thesecond, an amorphous structure appearswhich does not allow aggregates of superfi-cially similar and vaguely compiled things tobe analyzed .... Animistic Weltanschauun-gen, for example, are formed in accordancewith such primary classes.(b) The symbol-organization describedhere, which precedes language genetically, isa theoretical construct. We cannot observe itanywhere. But the psychoanalytical decod-ing of systematically distorted communica-tion presupposes such a construction, be-cause that special type of semantic analysisintroduced here as scenic understandingresolves confusions ofordinary speech by in-

372 Part Two: The BranchesContem porary Soci a Theory . XIII. Critical Theoryego, aspects which are not sufficiently cov-ered by the general determinations and yetcannot be manifestly represented other thanby just these determinations. The analyticaluse of language is necessarily embedded inthe reflexive use, because the intersubjectiv-ity of mutual understanding cannot be main-tained without reciprocal self-representationon. the part of the speaking subjects. Inas-,much as the speaker masters this indirect in-

. formation on the metacommunicative level,he differentiates between essence and ap-pearance. The understanding we come toabout objects can be direct, but the subjectiv-ity we encounter when we speak with oneanother remains, in direct information, onlyat the level of appearance. The categoricalmeaning of this kind of indirect communica-tion, in which the indefinable individualizedaspect of a person is expressed, and his claimupon individuality is maintained, is some-thing we merely reify in the ontological con-cept of essence. In fact this essence existsonly in its appearances.(e) Finally, normal speech is distinguishedby the fact that the sense of substance andcausality, of space and time, is differentiatedaccording to whether these categories are ap-plied to the objects within a world or to thelinguistically constituted world itself, whichallows for the mutuality of speaking subjects.The interpretational schema, substance,has a different meaning for the identity ofitems which can be clearly categorized ana-lytically from that which it has for speakingand interacting subjects themselves, whoseego-identity, as has been shown, just cannotbe grasped by analytically clear-cut opera-tions. The interpretational schema of causal-ity,when applied to observable events, leadsto the concept of cause ; when it is appliedto an association of intentional actions itleads to the concept of motive. In the sameway spaceand timeundergo a differentschematism when viewed in regard to physi-cally measurable properties of observableevents from that which they undergo whenviewed according to experienced inter-actions ....

3 The second set of postulates concernsthe connection between two genetically sue-


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preting them either as forced regressionck to an earlier level of communication, orthe breakthrough of the earlier form ofmmunication into language. On the basisthe analyst's experience with neurotic pa-ents, we can, as has been shown, recognizee function of psychoanalysis as languagelysis, insofar as it allows separated sym-lic contents, which lead to a private nar-wing of public communication, to be rein-rated into common linguistic usage. Thence of the analyst in putting an endthe process of inhibition serves the pur-se of resymbolization; inhibition itself canerefore be understood as a process linkeddesymbolization. The defense mechanisminhibition, which is analogous to flight, isvealed by the patient in his resistance tolausible interpretations made by the ana-t. This mechanism is an operation carriedwith and by language; otherwise it would

ot be possible to reverse the process of re-sion hermeneutically, i.e., precisely byeans of a special type of semantic analysis.e fleeing ego, which has to submit to theands of outer reality in a conflict situ-on, hides itself from itself by eliminatinge symbolic representation of unwanted de-s of instinct from the text of its everydaysciousness. By means of this censorshipe representation of the prohibited object isxcommunicated from public communica-

on and banished to the archaic level of pa-mbols. Moreover, the assumption thateurotic behavior is controlled by palaeo-mbols, and only subsequently rationalizedya substitutive interpretation, offers an ex-lanation for the characteristics of this be-vior pattern: for its pseudocommunicativefunction,for its stereotyped and compulsive

, for its emotional load and expressiveent, and, finally, for its rigid fixationpon particular situations.If inhibition can be understood as desyrn-olization, then it follows that there must becorrespondingly linguistic interpretationorthe complementary defense mechanism,hich does not turn against the self butatheragainst outer reality, i.e., for projectionnddenial. While in the case of inhibition theuage-gameisdeformed by the symptomsdin place of the excommunicated sym-

On Systematically Distorted Communication 373bols, the distortion in the case of this defensemechanism results directly from the uncon-trolled penetration ofpalaeosymbolic deriva-tives into language. In this case the therapeu-tic type of language analysis doesn't aim atretransforming the desymbolized contentinto linguistically articulated meaning, butaims rather at a consciously achieved com-munication of the intermingled prelinguisticelements.In both cases the systematic distortion canbe explained by the fact that palaeosymboli-cally fixed semantic contents have encystedthemselves, like foreign bodies, into thegrammatically regulated use of symbols.Language analysis has the duty of dissolvingthis syndrome, i.e., of isolating the two lan-guage levels. There is, however, a third case:the processes ofthe creative extension oflan-guage. In this case a genuine integration isaccomplished. The palaeosymbolically fixedmeaning-potential is then brought into theopen arid-is thus made available for publiccommunication. This transfer of semanticcontents from the prelinguistic into the com-mon stock of language widens the scope ofcommunicative action as it diminishes thatof unconsciously motivated action. The mo-mentof success in the use of creative lan-guage is a moment of emancipation ....3 3 Psychoanalysis, which interprets thespecific incomprehensibility of systemati-cally distorted communication, can nolonger strictly speaking be conceived accord-ing to the translation model which applies tosimple hermeneutic understanding or ordi-nary semantic analysis. For the obscuritieswhich controlled translation fromprelin-guistic symbolism to language does awaywith are ones which arise not within thescope defined by a given language-system,but rather within language itself. Here it isthe very structure of communication, hencethe basis of all translation, that we are con-cerned with. Semantic analysis of this specialtype therefore needs a systematic pre-under-standing which pertains to language and lin-guistic communication as such, while on theother hand our ordinary semantic analysisproceeds ad hoc from a traditionally deter-mined pre-understanding which is tested andrevised within the process of interpretation.


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standing owes its explanatory power-as wehave seen-to the fact that the clarificationof a systematically inaccessible meaning suc-ceeds only to the extent to which the originof the faulty or misleading meaning is ex-plained. The reconstruction of the originalscene makes both possible at the same time:the reconstruction leads to an understandingof the meaning of a deformed language-gameand simultaneously explains the origin of thedeformation itself. Of course, the connectionbetween semantic analysis and causal expla-nation doesn't become evident until oneshows that the categorical framework of thetheory used-in our case the Freudianmetapsychology-is based on an at least im-plicitly underlying language theory. Ihaveoutlined only some ofthe assumptions whichextend to the structure of normal communi-cation and to the mechanisms of systematicdistortion of communication. These assump-tions have to be developed within the frame-work of a theory of communicative compe-tence.Ican sum up my thesis as follows. Thecommon semantic analysis of incomprehen-sible utterances, which leads to hermeneuticunderstanding, makes use of the non-ana-lyzed communicative competence o fanative

speaker. On the other hand, the special typeof semantic analysis which deals with mani-festations of a systematically distorted com-munication and affords .an explanatoryunderstanding, presupposes a theory of com-municative competence. It is only in virtue ofan at least implicit hypothesis concerning thenature-and the acquisition of communicativecompetence that explanatory power can be ac-corded to this (particular) semantic analysis.

374 Part Two: The BranchesContemporary Social Theory XIII. Critical TheoryThe theoretical propositions deal, as de-scribed, with the preconditions of normalcommunication, with two levels of symbolorganization, and with the mechanism ofspeech disorder These theoretical assump-tions can be organized in the structuralmodel.

The constructions of egoand id inter-pret the analyst's experiences in his encoun-tering the resistance of his patients. Egois

the instance which fulfils the function of re-ality-testing and of censorship. Id is thename given to those parts of the self that areisolated from the ego and whose repre-sentations become accessible in connectionwith the processes of repression and projec-tion. The id is expressed indirectly by thesymptoms which close the gap which devel-ops in everyday language when desymboliza-tion takes place; direct representation of theid is found in the illusory palaeosymbolicelements dragged into the language by pro-jection and denial. Now, the same clinical ex-perience which leads to the construction ofan ego- and id-instance, shows also that thedefense mechanisms usually work uncon-sciously. For this reason Freud introducedthe category of superego:an ego-foreign in-stance which is formed out of detached iden-tifications with the expectations of primaryreference persons. All three categories-ego,id, and superego-reflect fundamental expe-riences typical of a systematically distortedcommunication. The dimensions establishedby id and superego for the personality struc-ture correspond to the dimensions of defor-mation of the intersubjectivity of mutualunderstanding in informal communication.So the structural model which Freud intro-duced as the categorical frame of metapsy-chology can be reduced to a theory of deviantcommunicative competence.

Ihave chosen psychoanalysis as my ex-ample in order to differentiate between twotypes of interpretation and two forms of com-munication.From the viewpoint of a logic of explana-tion, this example of the semantic analysis ofspecific incomprehensible manifestations isof interest because, in a unique way,it affordssimultaneous hermeneutic understandingand causal explanation. The analyst's under-

Endnotes1. A. Lorenzer, Symbol und Verstehen im psycho-analytischen Prozess, Vorarbeiten zu. einerMetatheorie der Psychoanalyse, forthcoming,Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt a. M. 1970.2. Cf. S. Arieti, The Intrapsychic Self, BasicBooks, New York 1967; also H. Wemer and B.Kaplan, Symbol Formation, John Wiley, NewYork 1967; P. Watzlawick, J. H. Beavin, and

D D Jackson,Pragmatics in Human Commu-nication, W. W. Norton: New York 1967, esp.chs. 6 and 7.


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. SeeL. C.Wynne, Denkstorung und Familien-beziehung bei Schizophrenen, Psyche, May1965, pp. 82 ff.

On SystematicallyDistorted Communication 3754 For further elaboration see Jurgen Habermas,Erkenntnis und Interesse, Suhrkamp Verlag:Frankfurt a. M. 1968, chs. 10 and

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habermas__on systematically distorted communication

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