grief: its nature and significance

Psychological Bulletin1968, Vol. 70, No. 6, 721-748

GRIEF:ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE1

JAMES R. AVERILL

University of California, Berkeley

Bereavement behavior is described and analyzed from cultural, biological, andpsychological perspectives. Mourning is distinguished from grief and the rela-tionship between them examined. Mourning is considered to represent conven-tional behavior as determined by the mores and customs of society. Grief, onthe other hand, comprises a stereotyped set of psychological and physiologicalreactions of biological origin. The hypothesis is presented that the adaptivefunction of grief is to ensure group cohesiveness in species where a social formof existence is necessary for survival. The phylogenetic and physiological evi-dence related to this hypothesis is reviewed and the symptomatology of griefis examined. Finally, it is argued that discussions of grief are conspicuously rarein the psychological literature because the behavior of the bereaved is notexplicable within most current models of emotion. The implications of thepresent analysis for the general study of emotion is therefore discussed.

The emotion of grief poses many questionsof practical and theoretical importance. Prac-tically, it is a painful and almost universalhuman experience which has been implicatedin a wide range of physiological and psy-chological ailments. These include increasedsusceptibility to disease, psychosomatic com-plaints, affective disorders (neuroses and psy-choses), and behavioral disturbances such asdelinquency, alcoholism, drug addiction, andsuicide (Clarke, 1961; Dennehy, 1966;Parkes, 1965; Schmale, 1958; Shoor & Speed,1963). Theoretically, grief raises two generalissues. First, the behavior of the bereaved con-tains many paradoxical features which makesthis emotion difficult to explain from anadaptive point of view. Second, grief raisesdifficulties for certain conceptualizations ofemotion, especially the tendency to subsumeemotional under motivational variables.

This paper deals primarily with the first ofthe above two theoretical issues, although thelatter also is considered briefly. For purposesof analysis, bereavement behavior—the com-plex series of responses following the loss ofa significant object—is divided into two com-ponents: mourning and grief. Both serve to

1 Preparation of this paper was supported inpart by the Rehabilitation Services Administration,Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,Grant No. RH-4. Thanks are due R. S. Lazarusand E. M. Opton, Jr., for their critical commentson an earlier version of this manuscript.

reinforce the social structure; but whilemourning is mainly of cultural origin, griefis the product of biological evolution. Theevidence for, and implications of, this dis-tinction are examined in detail, especially withreference to grief. To adumbrate briefly, thehypothesis is presented that the biological sig-nificance of grief, that is, its adaptive value,lies in the fact that it helps assure group co-hesiveness in species where the maintenanceof social bonds is necessary for survival. Thishypothesis helps explain many of the seem-ingly paradoxical aspects of grief. In addition,it provides a framework in which the sympto-matology of grief may be explored, includingits relationship to other emotions and toclinical depression.

BEREAVEMENT BEHAVIOR

Bereavement behavior refers to the totalresponse pattern, psychological and physiolog-ical, displayed by an individual following theloss of a significant object, usually a lovedone. This behavior may be viewed fromcultural, biological, and psychological perspec-tives.

Cultural Perspectives

Every society possesses certain mores, be-liefs, and customs concerning the appropriatebehavior to be displayed upon the death ofa significant individual. The prescribed be-havior, whether sincere or not, must be fol

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722 JAMES R. AVERILL

lowed if social censure is to be avoided. Thus,the protagonist in Camus' novel The Strangerwas convicted of the murder of another manprimarily on the grounds that he did not cryat his mother's funeral.

Conventional bereavement behavior, here-after referred to as mourning, varies con-siderably from one society to the next (Durk-heim, 1915; Hocart, 1937; Mandelbaum,19S9; Volkart & Michael, 19S7). For example,mourning rites may begin before the expecteddeath of a significant individual, immediatelyupon his death, or be delayed for variousperiods of time; they may last for days, weeks,or years; they may require abstentions fromcommunication concerning the decreased, orthey may enjoin public proclamation. Theemotions of the bereaved may be publiclydisplayed in weeping and wailing, suppressedwith stoic resolve, or camouflaged behind themask of some other affect, for example, withsmiling and laughter. In brief, the varietiesof behavior which society may demand of theindividual during bereavement are consider-able. This has led Durkheim (1915) to pro-claim that:

Mourning is not a natural movement of privatefeelings wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty imposedby the group. One weeps, not simply because he issad, but because he is forced to weep. It is a ritualattitude which he is forced to adopt out of respectfor custom, but which is, in a large measure, in-dependent of his affective state [p. 397].

Society not only prescribes the ritualisticaspects of bereavement behavior, it also helpsdefine the situations in which such behaviorshould be exhibited. In fact, under appropriateconditions, nearly any behavior may be in-terpreted as a manifestation of grief. Thisassertion can perhaps best be illustrated withthe following hypothetical case. Consider a"happy" marriage in our own society andassume that the relationship has been mutuallysincere and affectionate. Under these circum-stances nearly any behavior shown by onespouse following the death of the other maybe interpreted as a sign of grief. The be-havior of the survivor may range from theself-destruction of suicide to the continuanceor intensification of normal activity "in spiteof" the loss. In the latter case, of course, somemanifestation of distress would have to be

exhibited on special occasions, as when pre-sented with reminders of pleasures sharedwith the deceased, or grief would have to bedenied. But a denial of grief would alsoentail a rejection of the original assumptionthat the relationship was meaningful and close.The other alternative would be to consider thelack of response as a sign of actual or po-tential pathology (cf. Deutsch, 1937).

Biological Perspectives

On the basis of the above discussion, itmight appear that bereavement behavior is pri-marily a cultural phenomenon and that littlewould be gained by viewing it from a biolog-ical perspective. Such a conclusion would bepremature, however. In addition to mourning,bereaved individuals typically manifest astereotyped pattern of psychological and phys-iological reactions which is relatively in-dependent of social custom. Engel (1961) haslikened this pattern to a disease syndrome:"We can identify a consistent etiology,namely, real, threatened, or even fantasied ob-ject loss. It fulfills all the criteria of a dis-crete syndrome, with relatively predictablesymptomatology and course [p. 18]."

This "syndrome" is well exemplified in thefollowing description by Wretmark (1959)of a young mother who lost her 9-month-oldson to leucoencephalitis Krabbe. Originallythe woman did not want the child and evenattempted abortion. After giving birth, how-ever, she claimed that she was glad to havethe child, but at times could not rid herselfof the thought that things might have beenbetter had it never been born. When the childdied she had serious guilt feelings that per-haps the abortion attempt had harmed theboy, or that she had consulted the wrongdoctor, etc. Wretmark described her conditionas follows:

On interview with the patient it was obvious thatshe had felt normal but intense grief; a sense oftension around the throat, a feeling of emptiness,and a feeling of heaviness and aching pains in herextremities. She was nevertheless able to arrangefor the funeral and as early as 3 days afterwards sheresumed her work at the factory. The earlier mani-festations of grief, however, were followed by anapathetic attitude and she found it increasinglydifficult to do her work. Work which she had beenable to do easily and almost automatically before,

GRIEF: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 723

now appeared more difficult and she had to con-centrate herself more and more on details which shecould otherwise do at an ordinary rate withoutthinking. It was also noticed that she refused toremove the child's bed, clothes and toys, whichwere kept in the same places as before. She becameincreasingly quiet, she avoided people and 3 monthslater she gave up her work. She had by then lost3 Kg. body weight and was physically exhausted.After admission to the department she reported thatshe saw the boy at his bed every night, but assoon as she stretched her arms to take him, hedisappeared. Sometimes she also had a definite feel-ing that she had him at her breast. As soon as shewas not kept busy, her thoughts immediately ran tothe boy [Wretmark, 1959, p. 295].

The above picture, although extreme, il-lustrates most of the typical features of griefas described by a number of authors under avariety of circumstances (Bowlby, 1961;Gorer, 1965; Lindemann, 1944; Harris, 1958;Parkes, 1965). Three stages in the develop-ment of the reaction may be delineated. Atfirst there is a period of shock 2 and disbelief,with the thoughts and habits of the bereavedstill focused on the lost object. Denial ofreality may be so complete, especially ifother important tasks confront the bereaved,that little or no distress may be evident forweeks or longer. Reality typically prevails,however, and, as awareness of the loss de-velops, a stage of despondency and despairensues. This is a period marked by intensemental anguish; by apathy, withdrawal, or,more rarely, compulsive overactivity; by pre-occupation with thoughts of the deceased andan inability to concentrate on routine tasksor to initiate new activities; and by a widevariety of somatic complaints includinganorexia and other gastrointestinal disturb-ances, loss of weight, and an inability tosleep, manifested both by insomnia and earlywaking. Anxiety, guilt, and hostility are alsocommon during this period of despair. Theabove symptoms are ultimately relieved during

2 Based on a recent study of London widows,Bowlby (personal communication) divides the in-itial or shock stage into two relatively distinctphases: (a) a phase of numbing which usuallylasts from a few days to about a week, and maybe interrupted by an occasional outburst of ex-tremely intense distress and/or anger; and (b) aphase of yearning and searching for the lost objectwhich usually lasts, off and on, for several weeks,and often is characterized by disorganized over-activity.

the final or recovery stage of grief when ac-commodations are made to the loss and newobject relations are established.

Of course, not all bereaved individuals showthe above psychological and physiologicalmanifestations to the same degree; but neitherwill all patients suffering from a particulardisease exhibit the same symptoms. The pointis simply that certain features of bereave-ment behavior are sufficiently uniform to rep-resent a highly reliable syndrome. It is sug-gested that the concept of grief, as opposedto that of mourning, be limited to thissyndrome.

Psychological Perspectives

Within the limits set by social norms andby the biological Anlage, considerable latituderemains for individual differences in bereave-ment behavior. This is a function of suchfactors as the historical and constitutionalpeculiarities of the bereaved, the abruptnessand significance of the precipitating loss, anyincidental demands or responsibilities oc-casioned by the loss, and the availability of asubstitute object as a replacement for theloss. Space limitations and a dearth of reliableinformation do not allow a detailed discussionof these factors. Moreover, the arguments ofthis paper do not require that all sourcesof individual differences be accounted for.Only a brief description of the more commonvariations in the grief reaction is thereforepresented. The following list is based uponanalyses by Lindemann (1944) and Parkes(1965).

1. Normal grief—a stereotyped set of psy-chological and physiological reactions in whichthe three stages of shock, despair, and recoverycan be delineated, as previously described.

2. Exaggerated grief—an abnormally pro-longed grief reaction, frequently with an in-tensification of one or more of the manifesta-tions of normal grief. Neurotic features, suchas undue guilt and identification symptoms,are often associated with this form of grief.

3. Abbreviated grief—a short-lived butgenuine grief reaction due to an immediatereplacement of the lost object (as in an ex-tended family system) or to an insufficientattachment to the lost object.


4. Inhibited grief—a lasting inhibition ofmany of the manifestations of normal grief,but with the appearance of other symptoms,for instance, somatic complaints, in their stead.This form is perhaps most common in childrenand the elderly.

5. Anticipatory grief—many of the symp-toms of normal grief may result from an ex-pected loss, with only an abbreviated re-action being manifested upon the actual loss.Should the loss not materialize, as when asoldier returns from combat, the reestablish-ment of the former relationship may be quitedifficult if there has been an extensive amountof anticipatory grief.

6. Delayed grief—normal or exaggeratedgrief may be delayed for an extended periodof time, ranging up to years, especially if thereare pressing responsibilities to occupy thebereaved. A full grief reaction may eventuallybe initiated by some event related to theoriginal loss; in the meantime, only an in-hibited form of grief may be observed.

THE OCCASIONS FOR GRIEF

Grief, like other emotional concepts, refersto behavior occurring within a context. Be-havior alone, for example, a woman weeping,need not be a sign of grief—she may beweeping for joy. A mother weeping at thedeath of her child, however, would be judgeda manifestation of grief except under the mostunusual circumstances. To examine grief onemust therefore analyze the occasions for grief,as well as the behavior of the bereaved.

On a superficial level it may be said thatgrief is occasioned by the loss of a significantobject. This object is typically another person,for example, a spouse or child, but it mayalso be a material object such as wealth, ora symbolic one such as reputation. The pur-pose of this section is to examine the com-munality behind these diverse determinantsof grief. Again, the problem will be ap-proached from cultural, biological, and psy-chological perspectives.

Cultural Determinants

The typical occasion for grief is the disrup-tion of a social relationship through the deathof one of the principal participants. Since

the culture determines to a large extent thestructure or social relationships (e.g., thefamily and kinship systems) the natureof the involvement, and hence the gravity ofthe loss, are very much dependent upon socialpractice. Thus, for the Trobriand Islanders,where the maternal kin form the most sig-nificant family relationships, the grief of awife for her dead spouse may be much moretransitory and ceremonial than is the griefof his maternal relatives (Volkart & Michael,1957).

The concept of death itself has manycultural and religious connotations which can-not help but influence the interpretation of,and reaction to, the loss of a significantperson. Some cultures draw a line betweenhealth, on the one hand, and illness anddeath, on the other. The Melanesian wordmate, for example, covers both illness anddeath, and means the opposite of health andvigor (Hocart, 1937—the importance of sucha temporal distinction can be seen from theprevious description of anticipatory grief).At the other extreme are the Kotas, a peopleof South India (Mandelbaum, 1959). Theyextend some of a dead man's prerogative untila second funeral, which is held approximatelya year after his death. If a Kota widow be-comes pregnant before this funeral, the childis considered that of her late husband. Afaithful wife may therefore attempt to be-come pregnant during this period in order toprovide her former mate with an heir.

Early speculation concerning the etiology ofgrief placed major emphasis on the lost ob-ject per se. But the loss of a significant ob-ject also entails the disintegration of socialrelationships, with a consequent alteration inthe living pattern and social condition of thebereaved. Within our culture, for example,the function of a wife vis-a-vis her husbandis rather well defined. Should this relation-ship be disrupted by death, her whole pat-tern of living may be altered. This change infunction may be as important in the etiologyof her grief as the loss itself. Severe griefreactions may, in fact, be occasioned by thedeath of a husband even when the marriagewas not characterized by mutual satisfactionor affection. The significance of the deceasedin defining the social role of the bereaved


appears to be the important factor in suchcases (Lindemann, 1944; Harris, 19S8).

The disruption of a functional relationshipthrough the absence of a significant objectmay be characterized as role-loss as opposedto object-loss. This is, of course, only a rela-tive distinction but it is useful in analyzingindividual and cultural differences in bereave-ment behavior. Some societies, for example,provide for a continuity of role in the eventof the death of a significant individual. Thismay be done by providing for immediatereplacement of the loss or by minimizingpsychological and material dependency of anindividual on any one other member of thegroup. Tribes from the Ubena region in Africaillustrate the first of these alternatives. Thisculture provides that a widow resume herrole as wife with a new mate soon after thedeath of her husband. Her grief is correspond-ingly brief, although apparently genuine(Culwick & Culwick, 1935). An example ofthe mitigating influence of reduced dependencyis offered by the Ifaluk, a Micronesian culture.The rearing of an Ifaluk child involves manypersons outside the family and these becomeas important to the individual as his ownparents and siblings. When a family memberdies, the immediate survivors display con-siderable grief but their distress appears toend with the funeral (Spiro, 1949, cited byVolkart & Michael, 1957).

Object-loss, real or symbolic, in the ab-sence of role-loss helps to explain other com-mon instances of abbreviated grief reactions.For example, the death of a national leader,especially if it is untimely, may elicit sincerebut relatively short-lived grief in the popula-tion (Orlansky, 1947; Sheatsley & Feldman,1964). In this case there is object-loss inthe sense that a person has died who wasof considerable significance, symbolic or other-wise, in the life of his countrymen. With theorderly transition of government, however,there is little role-loss for the ordinary citizen.His professional and family life proceeds muchas before, as does his identification withcountry and, typically, its new leaders.

The fate of the hero in a dramatic tragedyis another familiar occasion for mild grief orsadness. Through identification with the pro-tagonists, the spectator may experience sorrow

at a tragic turn of events. Upon leaving thetheater, however, customary roles are re-assumed and the sorrow quickly dissipates.Dramatic portrayals would thus seem to pro-vide a convenient means of inducing mild grieffor experimental purposes. Film-induced sad-ness has, in fact, been used in the investiga-tion of physiological changes during grief(Averill, in press; Sternbach, 1962).

When role-loss is viewed as an importantetiological factor, grief reactions to the lossof such things as material goods and reputa-tion, or to physical mutilation and deformity,are easily explicable. These events may dis-rupt the performance of an accustomed roleas clearly as may the death of a significantindividual. Of course, not all changes in rolesare the occasion for grief, but primarily thosewhich entail a loss of self-esteem (Bibring,1953) or deprive a person of the meaningand rationale for his actions (Becker, 1962).

Although the roles that a person assumes,for example, in marriage, parenthood, occupa-tion, etc., are largely defined by the socialsystem, they also greatly depend on thebiological characteristics of the individual,such as age, sex, ability, etc. The biologicaland cultural determinants of behavior con-verge in role taking, or as Newcomb (1950)phrased it: "Protoplasm meets society ashuman organisms learn to perceive themselvesand one another in terms of shared normsand become motivated to interact with oneanother by means of role behavior [p. 331]."It is to the protoplasmic that we now turn.

Biological Determinants

The above emphasis on role-loss does notmean that some occasions for grief are notbiologically more basic than others. (By"biologically basic" is meant that, as a resultof evolutionary pressures, some situations aremore likely than others to induce grief.) Theevidence regarding this question is meager,but this may reflect as much on our scientificbiases as it does on the way things are.American psychology is still suffering from theeffects of a rather rigid environmentalism, aswell as from a somewhat limited view ofwhat should comprise the "S" in the S-O-Rformula. The first of these factors need not


concern us here; the second, however, is ofdefinite relevance to the present analysis.

The occasions for grief are complex; thereare no physical energies, simple sensations,or sensory receptors to mediate a "griefstimulus" in a fashion analogous to the lightand sound stimuli described in most texts.What, then, could constitute a natural orbiological stimulus for grief? To answer thisquestion we must step outside the venerableempiricist tradition which maintains thatperceptions are cognitive elaborations ofsimple sensations, and hence are a functiononly of prior experience. We must allow thatthe perceptual systems evolved to processinformation, and that this information may bequite complex and may be mediated by avariety of sense modalities (Gibson, 1966).The question then becomes: Is there anyinformation in the environment which is ofpotential significance for the survival of thespecies and which might induce a reactionsuch as grief? For species which require themaintenance of a social bond—either tem-porarily or as a permanent mode of existence—-separation from the group, or from certainmembers of the group, might constitute such asource of information.

The possible phylogenetic origins of griefwill be examined in detail subsequently. Atpresent, the above contention will simply beillustrated by one relationship that is ofobvious biological as well as social significance,namely, the mother-infant dyad. If there is a"natural" occasion for grief, in the sense ofpossessing important biological consequences,it should be the separation of an infant fromits mother. Observations would indicate thatdissolution of the mother-infant relationshipis, in fact, one of the most potent occasions forgrief-like reactions in subhuman primates,from the point of view of both the infant(Hinde, Spencer-Booth, & Bruce, 1966; Kauf-man & Rosenblum, 1967; Seay & Harlow,196S) and the mother. With reference to thelatter, for example, Carpenter (1942) hasdescribed two rhesus monkey mothers whocarried dead babies until only skins andskeletons remained. Similarly, Schaller (196S)observed a female gorilla who carried her deadinfant for 4 days before discarding it on thetrail. It is well known that separation alsoproduces severe grief reaction in human in-

fants (Bowlby, 1960) and their mothers(Lindemann, 1944; Wretmark, 19S9).8

To say that certain occasions for grief, forexample, the dissolution of the mother-infantrelationship, are biologically more basic thanothers, such as the loss of material goods,does not mean that the former are independentof prior experience or that they cannot bedisrupted readily under appropriate condi-tions. The prevalence of infanticide in most,if not all, species attests to this. The work ofHarlow and his associates (Harlow & Harlow,1966) on the development of affectional sys-tems in monkeys also indicates how early ex-perience may disrupt development of the socialbonds which are necessary conditions forgrief.

Psychological Determinants

The demise of a bird may not be a cul-turally sanctioned occasion for bereavement,nor a very basic one biologically; nevertheless,for an elderly woman living alone, the deathof her pet canary may induce a genuinegrief reaction. The occasion for grief is afunction of the peculiar history and presentcircumstances of each individual, as well asof cultural and biological determinants. Weshall not now expand upon this point—notbecause it is unimportant from a theoreticaland practical point of view, but because it islargely irrelevant to the immediate argument.A subsequent section deals with the role ofpsychological processes in the mediation ofemotional responses in general.

8 The loss of a mother has, of course, a verydifferent biological significance than the loss of aninfant. This raises the possibility that grief reactionsin infants and mothers are not homologous. Bowlby(1960) has presented strong arguments for the es-sential continuity between grief in human infants(which becomes apparent at about 6 months ofage) and adults. This would be the most parsimoniousanswer, but the issue remains open. In a similar vein,one might question whether the grief of one adultfor another is biologically related to the grief ofan adult for an infant. The present analysis wouldindicate an affirmative answer. According to Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1967), the extension to other adults ofbehavior related to care of the young (which isnot limited to the mother) provided the basis ofsocial contact behavior in animals and first madealtruistic cooperation possible. As will be arguedsubsequently, it is also in relationship to such socialbehavior that grief evolved.


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOURNINGAND GRIEF

On the basis of the preceding discussion,two aspects of bereavement behavior may bedistinguished. The first, mourning, representsconventional behavior as determined by themores and customs of the society; the second,grief, comprises a stereotyped set of psycho-logical and physiological reactions of biolog-ical origin.4 These two response patterns mayoccur quite independently of each other. Thus,a grief reaction may be elicited under circum-stances where no set mourning practices areprescribed, although no response ever occurscompletely free of social and cultural in-fluences. Similarly, mourning, at least in itsritual aspects, may possess little or no affec-tive component. Generally, however, the twoare closely related and may even complementone another.

In fact, a sequence can be discerned in somemourning customs which closely parallels thethree stages of grief previously described:shock, despair, and recovery. This is well ex-emplified by the funeral rites of the Kotas,a people referred to in the previous section.Two funeral ceremonies are observed by theKotas. The first, or "Green Funeral," occurs

4 As developed thus far, the distinction betweenmourning and grief rests upon two kinds of evidence.One is the diversity of bereavement behavior acrosscultures (and within cultures across individuals), forwhich there is ample documentation. The other isthat the grief reaction remains relatively invariantacross cultures. Unfortunately, nearly all of the evi-dence adduced in favor of this latter assumption comesfrom Western cultures, that is, Europe and NorthAmerica. This naturally raises some question concern-ing its validity. The issue cannot be resolved on thebasis of currently available data, although there isnothing in the anthropological literature which wouldindicate that grief, as an emotional response, differsradically from one culture to another. (This doesnot mean that the expression of grief, and even itsdepth and duration, cannot vary as a function ofcultural factors—but more of that subsequently.)In addition, as is discussed below, there is evidencethat grief-like reactions occur in certain animalspecies, a fact which lends strong support to thenotion that this emotion is fundamentally a biolog-ical phenomenon, and hence pancultural. Indeed,the basic distinction between mourning and grief isnot one of stereotypy, but of origin (cultural andsocial-psychological versus biological). Both aresubject to considerable individual variation de-pending upon the peculiar past history and presentcircumstances of the bereaved.

shortly after a death. It involves the crema-tion of the body and is attended by the closefriends and relatives of the deceased. It isnot unlikely that the period terminating withthis funeral corresponds rather closely to thefirst stage of grief. According to Gorer (1965),the initial stage of shock is generally givensocial recognition in the form of funeralrites.

The months following the Green Funeraloffer a period of relative quietude for thebereaved, as would befit the withdrawal andapathy which typify the second stage of grief.The bereaved is aided in the resumption ofhis role as a full member of society by asecond ceremony, called the "Dry Funeral,"which is held every 1 or 2 years for all thosewho have died since the last such ceremony.

The Dry Funeral is an elaborate affairwhich lasts for 11 days. During the first daysthe bereaved are encouraged to give fullexpression to their grief. At progressive stagesof the ceremony, however, activities becomeless somber and culminate in dancing andfeasting. Widows and widowers are expectedto engage in sexual intercourse on the finalnight, preferably with a sibling of the de-ceased, thus symbolizing their return as nor-mal members of society.

While the complex mourning ceremonies ofthe Kotas undoubtedly aid the bereaved incoping with their loss, they serve importantsocial and religious functions as well (Mandel-baum, 1959). In general, death rites are acomplex blend of customs fashioned to meetthe needs of society as well as those of theindividual bereaved. When these needs arein conflict, social prerequisites typically takeprecedent over the desires and well-being ofthe individual. Perhaps this is best illustratedby the custom of suttee, that is, the immola-tion of the wife at the husband's funeral.Suttee has been practiced by a large numberof cultures (Hocart, 1937); fortunately forthe majority of widows, however, it hastypically been restricted to the members of acertain class, such as the chief's wives. Forthe others, a symbolic act suffices.

In brief, mourning rites serve two func-tions: They help reinforce the religious andsocial structure of the group, and, when noconflict is involved, they help assuage theemotions of the bereaved.

728 JAMES R. AVBRILL

THE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GRIEF

The concept of grief as a biological phe-nomenon must now be made more explicit. Inthis section, an hypothesis is advanced con-cerning the evolutionary or adaptive value ofgrief. The limitations of this hypothesis, itsrelationship to other formulations of grief,and its phylogenetic and physiological im-plications also are examined.

The Adaptive Value of Grief

The behavior of an individual during griefis in many respects paradoxical. As previouslynoted, grief is a time of intense mentalanguish and of reduced psychological andphysiological resistance to stress. Yet the be-havior of the bereaved is often inimical tothe establishment of new relationships, andhence the alleviation of his grief. Apathy,tendency to withdraw, and inability to initiatenew actions, for example, hinder any breakwith the past. In addition, although the be-reaved may seek help from others, the de-mands are frequently unreasonable and theproffered aid is often met with hostility andaggression. Such behavior would appear bettercalculated to prolong the period of grief thanto shorten it.

Thus, from an individual point of view,grief would not appear to be a very adaptiveform of behavior. In addition, it is detrimentalto the reproductive efficiency of the indi-vidual, once considered the hallmark of naturalselection. Not only does the bereaved oftenwithdraw from, and show hostility toward,potential new mates, but a loss of sexual de-sire is one of the most common manifestationsof grief.

In view of the above considerations, itmight seem difficult to assign a biological orevolutionary significance to grief. In recentyears, however, it has become evident thatnatural selection favors successful reproduc-tion of the population and not necessarily ofany particular individual (Simpson, 1958).Some social insects, such as the honeybee,provide an excellent example of this prin-ciple: Only a small fraction may actuallyreproduce, but their success depends upon

the nonreproductive members of the society.Similar examples of "altruistic" behavior maybe found in higher mammals, for example, theanimal who signals the approach of a predator,thus warning the group but increasing thelikelihood of his own detection and capture.Moreover, the evolutionary development ofsuch behavior can generally be explained interms of a neo-Darwinian theory of naturalselection, even when the behavior leads tothe death of the individual displaying it. Allthat is needed is a sufficient genetic correla-tion between the altruistic individual and hisbeneficiary (Williams, 1966).

Many of the paradoxical aspects of griefare readily explicable when it is recognizedthat the well-being of the individual may besacrificed to the evolutionary demands of thespecies. Furthermore, since the primary oc-casions for grief lie in the severance of inter-personal bonds, it is not unreasonable to as-sume that the evolutionary demands placedupon this emotion were integrally related tothe maintenance of social relationships. Inmany species social behavior is one of theprincipal adaptations for survival (Washburn& Hamburg, 1965). The group affords, amongother things, protection from predators andefficiency in locating and obtaining food.Separation from the group, in turn, greatlydiminishes chances for survival.

There are undoubtedly many positive fac-tors contributing to group cohesion, such assatisfaction derived from social interaction inthe form of grooming and play, attraction toinfants and sexual partners, etc. Sex, in par-ticular, has often been postulated as theprimary source of primate sociability (see,for instance, Sahlins, 1960; Zuckerman, 1932;for a critique of this view, see Washburn &DeVore, 1961). Positive incentives alone,however, would not be a very sure way ofmaintaining social cohesion. During periodsof satiation there would be little reason forremaining with the group. A more certainmechanism would be to make separation fromthe group punishing for the isolated animaland also for significant individuals remaining


within the group. This is the proposed func-tion of the prototypic grief reaction.6

The preceding analysis may be summarizedin the following hypothesis: Grief is a biologi-cal reaction the evolutionary function ofwhich is to ensure group cohesiveness inspecies where a social form of existence isnecessary for survival. This is accomplishedby making separation from the group, or fromspecific members of the group, an extremelystressful event both psychologically and phys-iologically.

Limitations. The above hypothesis does notimply that grief is the only mechanism con-tributing to group cohesiveness. When it comesto vital functions, nature provides most sys-tems with considerable redundancy, and thereis no reason to expect that the maintenance ofsocial bonds is an exception. Nor does thehypothesis imply that grief is important forall forms of social organization. Animal so-cieties differ from one another in many re-spects which are poorly understood. It is cer-tain, however, that there is no simple con-tinuum with social species at one end andsolitary species at the other. Rather, there area variety of continua or mechanisms whichindependently or in combination may lead togroup formation.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1967) has distinguishedthree forms of social organization among ani-mals. The first is an aggregation of animalsheld together by some ecological or environ-mental condition, for example, a common feed-ing or nesting area. Aggregations may achievequite complex levels of organization, as in thecase of some lizards, but there is no socialattraction among members of the group. Thesecond form of social structure is the anony-mous group which is held together by socialattraction, but which does not depend uponindividual recognition. Rather, membership isdetermined by some common signal or char-acteristic, such as a specific behavior pattern

5 Cairnes (1966) has presented an alternative inter-pretation of attachment behavior based on con-tiguity learning theory. He explicitly ignores, how-ever, any emotional states which might accompanyor underlie the formation of social bonds or theirdisruption; he also has little to say concerningphylogenetic differences in social behavior. Hisformulation would therefore seem to be of limitedgenerality.

or odor. Anonymous groups may be eitheropen or closed. In the former the attractivecharacteristic is not limited to members ofthe group and hence individuals are readilyexchangeable, as in most schools of fish andflocks of birds. Closed anonymous groups, asexemplified by rat packs, confer upon theirmembers an identifying characteristic andoutsiders are not tolerated. The third form ofsocial organization is the individualized group.It is held together by a bond of individualacquaintance and attachment. The individual-ized group may be considered the most ad-vanced from an anthropomorphic point ofview, but it appears at many points along thephylogenetic scale, including certain teleostfishes, birds, and mammals.

The three forms of social organization de-scribed by Eibl-Eibesfeldt are not mutuallyexclusive. In general, species capable of form-ing individualized groups may also form ag-gregations and anonymous groups under ap-propriate circumstances. The reverse is notalways true, however. The above hypothesisconcerning the adaptive value of grief islimited to individualized groups. This meansthat grief-like reactions need not be observedin all species, nor in all forms of social be-havior even within species capable of formingindividualized groups. Rather, grief is of sig-nificance in maintaining social bonds onlywhen these are based upon individual recogni-tion and attachment.

Relationship to other formulations. Onlywithin psychoanalysis has there been a con-sistent effort to deal with the psychology ofgrief. And although the present formulationhas little relationship to psychoanalytic the-ory, it is heavily indebted to the insights andobservations of individual psychoanalyticwriters. The psychoanalytic concept of griefmay be summarized briefly as follows: In theprocess of development, libidinal energy is at-tached or cathected to important persons orobjects. If a cathected object is lost, thelibidinal ties must be broken. This is a painfuland difficult task which is at first met withconsiderable resistance, often in the form ofdenial that the loss is real. Reality testingmakes this position increasingly untenable,however, and, in order that the ego not beoverwhelmed by a flood of painful feeling,

730 JAMES R. AVER1LL

decathexis proceeds piecemeal. This is ac-complished with the aid of introjection, inwhich the relationship with the lost object isinternalized. The relationship is thus pre-served while the many libidinal ties areabandoned.

In the preceding discussion it is noted thatthe behavior of the bereaved is often para-doxical from an individual point of view. Thisparadox was resolved with the evolutionaryassumption that grief aided group survival byreinforcing social cohesion. Freud was alsostruck by the difficulty of explaining grief interms of individual psychodynamics, but hedid not pursue the implications of this fact.

Reality-testing has shown that the loved object nolonger exists, and it proceeds to demand that alllibido shall be withdrawn from its attachment tothat object. . . . Each single one of the memories andexpectations in which the libido is bound to the ob-ject is brought up and hypercathected, and detach-ment of the libido is accomplished with respect to it.Why this compromise by which the command ofreality is carried out piecemeal should be extra-ordinarily painful is not at all easy to explain interms of economics. It is remarkable that this pain-ful unpleasure is taken as a matter of course by us[Freud, 1917, pp. 244-245, italics added].

In a series of very provocative papers,Bowlby (1960, 1961, 1963) has presented ananalysis of grief which is in certain respectssimilar to the present one. Although hisorientation is basically psychoanalytic, Bowlbyviews grief as a biological phenomenon, vari-ants of which are apparent in both animalsand men. Its adaptive value, he believes, liesin the urge to recover the lost object. Thepeculiar symptoms of grief arise in thosestatistically rare cases where this urge isthwarted, for example, through death. Theseideas are in essential agreement with thosedeveloped above. Bowlby, however, seems toplace undue importance on anger and weepingas means of regaining the lost object. As isargued below, anger is a secondary reactionto the frustration and pain of grief and notone of its essential aspects. And althoughweeping probably does serve a communicativefunction, eliciting succor and empathy, it istypically absent during abject grief and de-pression. According to Lund (1930), weepingmost often occurs when a depressing situationgains some redeeming feature, or when ten-

sion is relieved (see, also, Parkes, 1965, p.19). Moreover, weeping is a peculiarly humanphenomenon not observed in animals. Thepresent analysis, therefore, does not assign acentral role to anger and weeping. Rather, theavoidance of separation or, in Bowlby's terms,the urge to recover the lost object, is postu-lated to be the evolutionary basis of griefper se.

Following Engel (1962), Kaufman andRosenblum (1967) postulate two basic, op-posing response systems to mounting stress:(a) a mobilizing fight-flight system, whichis the biological Anlage for anxiety; and (b)a conservation-withdrawal system, which isthe biological Anlage for depression. They in-voke these response systems to explain thegrief-like reactions of infant monkeys toseparation from their mothers. The initialreactions, based on the fight-flight system, arecharacterized by a high level of motor-visceraland expressive activity. These responses or-dinarily effect reunion, but if unsuccessful andtoo long lasting, metabolic changes may occurwhich bring the conservation-withdrawal sys-tem into play. The reactions of this systemare characterized by postural collapse, im-mobility, withdrawal from the environment,and reduced visceral and expressive activity.These reactions supposedly allow the recoup-ing of expended energy resources and, throughtheir communicative features, the attractionof substitute sources of comfort.

The above speculations by Kaufman andRosenblum generally are compatible withthose developed in this paper, although thereare some fundamental points of disagreement.In the first place, the initial stage of grief isnot viewed here as simply another manifesta-tion of anxiety or the fight-flight system. Al-though they have much in common, anxietyand initial grief reactions are based upondistinct physiological mechanisms; but moreof that subsequently. In the second place,the assumption that depressive reactions dur-ing grief are conservative of energy resourcesis seriously open to question, as is the assump-tion that the expressive features of depressionhave the adaptive function of eliciting succor.According to Kaufman and Rosenblum's ownobservations, the depressive reactions of theirinfant monkeys did not elicit maternal be-


haviors by other animals, although adultmales did tend to be more protective thanusual. Much more evidence is needed on thesepoints, but in the meantime the possibilityshould be entertained that depressive reactionsduring grief have little or no adaptive value.That is, grief may be based upon adaptivemechanisms which facilitate group survival,as previously described, but this does notmean that all manifestations of grief arenecessarily beneficial to the individual.

Although not specifically concerned withgrief, Hamburg (1963) has presented anevolutionary analysis of emotion which is ofdefinite relevance to the present argument.After reviewing the literature on the socialstructure of nonhuman primates and primitivehuman cultures, Hamburg (1963) made thefollowing points:

Primates are group living forms; the primate groupis a powerful adaptive mechanism; emotional proc-esses that facilitate interindividual bonds (participa-tion in group living) have selective advantage; theformation of such bonds is pleasurable for primates;they are easy to learn and hard to forget; their dis-ruption is unpleasant and precipitates profound psy-cho physiological changes that tend to restore closerelations with others oj the same species [p. 305,italics added].

Hamburg also observed that the disruption ofgroup bonds is an important factor in pre-cipitating depressive reactions and psycho-somatic disorders, and is often associated withemergency-type physiological responses. Theevidence related to this last assertion will bereviewed shortly.

The Phytogeny of Grief

Most of the symptoms typically observed inhuman grief have also been observed in ani-mals which form individualized groups (forreviews, see Bowlby, 1961; Pollock, 1961).The most common occasions appear to be thedeath of an infant (cf. previous discussion)or, especially in captivity, separation from acompanion or mate. At first there typically isan unwillingness to relinquish the lost object;this may be followed by restlessness and/orapathy, withdrawal, aggression directed to-ward self and others, a loss of appetite andsexual interest, an inability to establish newrelationships, and so forth. The qualification

must be added that not all of these symptomshave been observed in one animal, and fre-quently they appear to be quite transitory.This may represent a real difference in thegrief reactions of humans and animals, or itmay reflect the unsystematic character of theobservations. Precise phylogenetic compari-sons are not possible on the basis of the datapresently available.

All higher primates (apes and monkeys)are social, although the size and structure ofthe group differ considerably from species tospecies, and even within species dependingupon locale and season. In spite of this di-versity, the primate group is essentially heldtogether by bonds among its individual mem-bers. Moreover, according to Jolly (1966),primate social life provided the evolutionarycontext for, and determined the nature of,the further intellectual development of thesespecies. It is therefore not unreasonable toassume that the bonds which held a member tothe group were important in the evolution ofearly hominids, and that these bonds wereprimarily emotional and not intellectual inorigin.

There is ample evidence for grieflike re-actions in apes and monkeys. According toYerkes and Yerkes (1929), the fact "thatdepression, grief, and sorrow are occasionallymanifested by the chimpanzee is beyond dis-pute [p. 652]." This would seem to be a well-supported conclusion (A. Brown, 1879;Garner, 1900; Hebb, 1949; Nissen, cited byBowlby, 1961). Similar behavior has beenobserved in the orangutan (Zedtwitz, 1930),baboon (Zuckerman, 1932), and rhesus mon-key (Tinkelpaugh, 1928).

The case described by Tinkelpaugh is espe-cially interesting because of the detailed na-ture of the observations. It involved a youngmale rhesus monkey, named Cupid, who hadbeen housed with an older female. He becamevery attached to her and she provided himwith his first sexual experiences. When shewas removed Cupid exhibited many of thesymptoms of grief, including depression andhostility. Eventually, however, he did estab-lish a seemingly satisfactory relationship withanother young female. But some time laterCupid was led past the cage of his former


mate. When their eyes met she shrieked ex-citedly: It was a very traumatic experience.Cupid became agitated and restless, bit him-self repeatedly and severely, would not eat,and withdrew all contact from the secondfemale and his human attendants.

Evidence for grief-like behavior in animalsbelow the level of the social primates isscanty. Anecdotal but apparently reliable de-scriptions of grief-like reactions in dogs arequite common (Bowlby, 1961; Lorenz, 19S2;Pollock, 1961). This makes some sense bio-logically, for most common species of dogsare descendant from the wolf (Scott & Fuller,1965). Wolves are social animals which, likethe higher primates, form individualizedgroups and show a great deal of mutual co-operation. Indeed, it has been speculated thatthe prehominids possessed many of the char-acteristics of a wolflike primate, of whichthe baboon might be a modern example (Hall,1964).

Descending further along the phylogeneticscale, Lorenz (1952, 1966) has describedgrief-like reactions in several species of birds,namely, jack-daws and geese.

All the objectively observable characteristics of thegoose's behavior on losing its mate are roughly identi-cal with those accompanying human grief. . . . Justas in the human face, it is the neighborhood of theeyes that in geese bears the permanent marks ofdeep grief. The lowering of the tonus in the sym-pathicus causes the eye to sink back deeply in itssocket and, at the same time, decreases the tensionof the outer facial muscles supporting the eye regionfrom below. Both factors contribute to the forma-tion of a fold of loose skin below the eye which asearly as in the ancient Greek mask of tragedy hadbecome the conventionalized expression of grief[Lorenz, 1966, p. 209].

Behaviorally, the loss of a mate by one ofthese birds typically occasions frantic search-ing and calling. If this is unsuccessful in re-uniting the pair, a period of depressed ac-tivity may ensue, including a loss of sexualinterest in potential new partners. This pe-riod of "mourning" may last a year or more,depending upon the sex and age of the sur-vivor (females who have had a long standingrelationship with a single male are especiallyvulnerable).

Grief-like reactions have been described inother social species, especially ungulates such

as sheep, but these are not considered here.The fragmentary nature of the reports makesinterpretation difficult; moreover, the socialstructure of these groups is little understood.Even the above description of avian griefmust be viewed with caution. Although Lorenzis an astute observer of animal behavior, heis not averse to drawing rather loose analogiesto human conditions. It might therefore bewise to limit any conclusions concerning thephylogeny of grief to the social primateswhere it is a well-established phenomenon.The appearance of grief-like behavior in suchwidely diverse species as dogs and birds, ifit occurs, is most likely the result of con-vergent evolution (independent selection dueto similar ecological demands) and hence oflittle direct significance for the evolution ofthe human emotion. However, the possibilitythat such convergent evolution did occur is anindication of the potential biological sig-nificance of grief.

Physiological Changes during Griej

The hypothesis that grief is a basic biologi-cal phenomenon implies that it should be ac-companied by consistent physiological changes.Before reviewing the evidence related to thisimplication, some qualifications must be in-troduced. In practice, there is no one patternof physiological activity which corresponds togrief; rather, physiological changes can beexpected to vary as a function of many fac-tors, including the stage of development ofthe grief reaction, the presence of confound-ing affects such as anger and anxiety, situa-tional demands placed on the individual, etc.(for a detailed review of the problems involvedin the psychophysiological assessment of emo-tion, see Averill & Opton, 1968). The follow-ing discussion therefore is concerned with anidealized grief reaction, that is, idiosyncrasiesdue to individual and situational differencesare ignored. Moreover, only the second (de-spair) stage of grief is considered, for itpresents the problems of most theoretical in-terest. The initial or shock stage should be ac-companied by physiological changes similarto those observed in other periods of acutestress. Finally, the dearth of available evidencedemands that the following discussion remainon a rather general level. The primary ques-


tions concern whether the period of despair(a) is accompanied by decreased physiologi-cal activity, corresponding to the inhibition ofphysical and mental activity common at thistime, or (b) is a catabolic state, for example,characterized by increased activity of thesympathetic nervous system (SNS).

Even with the above rather severe limita-tions, there is actually very little evidencerelated to physiological changes during nor-mal grief. In the following discussion, there-fore, collateral evidence is drawn from re-search on clinical depression. No attempt ismade, however, to review the extensive litera-ture on the psychophysiology of depression(for this, see Bellack, 1952; Campbell, 1953;Davies, 1964; Grinker, Miller, Sabshin, Nunn,& Nunnally, 1961). It is recognized, of course,that extreme caution must be exercised indrawing inferences from clinical syndromes tonormal grief. In the first place, the relationshipbetween the various forms of depression is notat all well understood, let alone that betweendepression and grief. (The relevance of thepresent hypothesis to the problem of depres-sion is considered in detail subsequently.) Inthe second place, research into the psycho-physiology of depression has too often yieldedinconsistent and contradictory results.

Evidence for decreased physiological ac-tivity during grief. It is a common assump-tion that grief is characterized by decreasedphysiological as well as overt activity. Wenger(Wenger, Jones, & Jones, 1956, Ch. 21), forexample, has noted that such terms as sorrowand grief typically imply a previous period ofexcitement (the shock stage). This, he postu-lated, is followed by a parasympathetic (PNS)overcompensation, or perhaps by actual de-pression of both branches of the autonomicnervous system. Gellhorn (1964) also haspostulated PNS dominance during grief.

Most of the evidence for decreased physio-logical functioning during grief is indirect.Gellhorn, for example, based his hypothesison the assumption that grief is characterizedby flacid muscles and hence a lack of proprio-ceptive feedback to, and stimulation of, hypo-thalamic sympathetic centers. The result isapparent PNS dominance. The assumption ofdecreased muscle tonus during grief has, how-

ever, little empirical support. Electromyo-graphic studies would indicate that duringclinical depression, at least, the opposite is thecase (Goldstein, 1965; Watmore & Ellis,1959, 1962). Indeed, the lack of overt ac-tivity during grief and depression often maybe more apparent than real. Ekman and Frie-sen (1968) have found by means of motionpictures that depressed patients do not differfrom normal subjects in the total amount ofbodily movement during an interview situa-tion. The nature of their movements, how-ever, gives the impression of impoverished ac-tivity.

Another indirect argument in favor of thehypothesis that grief entails a reduction ofphysiological, and especially SNS, functioningis that many antidepressive drugs are sym-pathomemetic. There are, however, no simplerelationships between a drug's autonomic prop-erties and its antidepressive action. The pri-mary site of action of antidepressive drugs isundoubtedly on the central nervous system,and here their mode of action is poorly under-stood (although the best hypothesis appearsto be that they facilitate central noradrener-gic mechanisms—Jacobsen, 1964; Schild-kraut, 1965).

There have been many attempts to assessautonomic activity during depression. The fol-lowing two studies illustrate the often con-flicting nature of the results. Schildkraut,Green, Gordon, and Durell (1966) have re-ported that urinary excretion of normetadrena-line showed a gradual increase as depressedpatients improved following treatment withimipramine. They concluded that: "These andother findings . . . suggest that noradrenergicactivity may gradually increase during clinicalimprovement from depression, and that nor-adrenergic activity may be relatively de-creased in retarded depression and increasedin mania [p. 690]." On the other hand, Nel-son, Masuda, and Holmes (1966), also study-ing the urinary excretion of normetadrenaline(NMA) and metadrenaline (MA) in psy-chiatric patients, reached the following con-clusion: "From the present data it is ap-parent that depression, at least the varietiesobserved in this study, is not a quiet orphysiologically hypoactive state. High levels


of NMA and MA reflecting vigorous secretionof noradrenaline and adrenaline can be seenin the most withdrawn, depressed individuals[p. 224}."

Sternbach (1962) has presented evidencefor decreased physiological activity during anabbreviated form of grief, namely, film-in-duced sadness. He studied autonomic activityin children as they watched the movie "Bambi"and found a shift toward decreased SNS ac-tivity and/or PNS dominance during thescene which the children rated as the saddest(the shooting of Bambi's mother). However,Averill (in press) observed increased SNS ac-tivation in a group of male college studentsin a similar testing situation (but viewing afilm depicting the life and death of PresidentKennedy).

As the above studies would suggest, theevidence in favor of the assumption that griefis characterized by a decrease in physiologicalfunctioning is meager and often contradictory.If the assumption is to be maintained, thiscontradictory evidence (other examples ofwhich will be discussed shortly) must be ex-plained. One possible explanation is that in-creased activation during grief results whennatural expression is inhibited for cultural orother reasons. That is, if grief is a basic bio-logical phenomenon, then some form of reac-tion would be expected whenever an occasionfor grief is present. Under natural conditionsthis reaction might entail a reduction of physi-ological as well as behavioral activity. If,however, this natural reaction were inhibitedwhile the occasion for grief remained unal-tered, then the physiological response could bemodified in the direction of increased activa-tion, reflecting the tension and conflict in-herent in the situation.

Popular literature is replete with the no-tion that failure to express grief openly maylead to grave physiological disturbances.There is also some medical evidence that emo-tional inhibition during grief and depressionmay produce heightened physiological activity.Lindemann (1944) observed, for example, thatmale patients during mourning tend to be in a"state of tension with tightened facial mus-culature, unable to relax for fear they might'break down' [p. 143]." Board, Wadeson, andPersky (1957) reported that depressed patients

who are not able to express their sufferingshow higher blood levels of hydrocortisonethan do those who are able to express them-selves. Cobb (1950) has even described thedeath of an apparently normal medical stu-dent who, because of situational (and un-doubtedly personality) factors, was unable toexpress her grief upon the death of her father.

Obviously, it is a highly speculative assump-tion that grief is naturally accompanied by adepression of physiological functioning, andthat increased activation results when normalexpression is inhibited. Much more evidenceis needed before its validity can be evaluated.An alternative assumption is, of course, thatgrief is a catabolic state, that is, it is nor-mally accompanied by an expenditure ofenergy.

Evidence for grief as a catabolic state. Thenotion that grief is a catabolic state is implicitin the writings of many investigators. Lange(1887), for example, postulated a close rela-tionship between grief and fright. He be-lieved that the symptoms of grief could beaccounted for by an increased tonus of thesmall vessels, and hence a decreased bloodsupply to the tissues. Cannon (1929), in hiswell-known attack on the James-Lange theoryof emotion, maintained that all emotions, in-cluding grief, are characterized by SNS ac-tivation when they become sufficiently in-tense. In the case of emotions such as angerand fear, the rationale provided for thisactivation was that it prepared the organismsfor the strenuous effort of fight or flight; itspossible function in grief received no explica-tion. Funkenstein (1954; Funkenstein, King,& Drolette, 1957), combining the views ofCannon with those of psychoanalysis, con-sidered depression in normal and clinicalpopulations to be the human counterpart ofthe "fight-flight" reaction in animals. In thiscase, however, aggression is directed towardthe self. The resulting physiological pattern ispostulated to be similar to that of fear andanxiety (adrenalinelike), in contrast to thatof outwardly directed anger (noradrenaline-like).

Indeed, many of the symptoms of grief,for example, anorexia, sleep disturbances,coldness in the extremities, can be interpretedas indicative of increased SNS activity. With


the possible exception of gastrointestinal dis-turbances, however, these symptoms have re-ceived little direct investigation. During griefand depression there does appear to be amarked inhibition of gastrointestinal activity,including salivation, gastric secretion andmotility, and colonic functioning (Almy,1951; Busfield & Wechsler, 1961; Engel,Reichsman, & Segal, 19S6; Kehoe & Ironside,1963; Peck, 1959; Wolff, 1953). This is cer-tainly compatible with, although not proof of,SNS activation during grief.

Hamburg (1963) and his associates haveinvestigated endocrine responses (includinghydrocortisone, aldosterone, adrenaline, andnoradrenaline secretion) in patients hospital-ized because of depression, often followingthe dissolution of important interpersonal re-lationships. The results of this research havebeen summarized as follows:

Disruption of interindividual bonds may have pro-found consequences in carbohydrate, protein, fat, elec-trolyte, and water metabolism, and on crucial func-tions of the circulation. Such disruption is felt asdeeply unpleasant, and an extraordinary variety ofcoping behavior patterns may be mobilized to re-store acceptance, affection, and mutual respect. Per-haps serious threat to a key relationship may be asmuch emergency in psychophysiological terms asthreat of attack by predator [Hamburg, 1963, p. 316].

Electroencephalographic investigations alsoindicate a state of increased activation duringdepression (e.g., Wilson & Wilson, 1961;Zung, Wilson, & Dodson, 1964). These,together with previously cited reports of in-creased muscle tension and adrenal activity,have led Stern and McDonald (1965) tosuggest that "depressed patients suffer froma heightened level or heightened responsivenessto stimulation of the brain stem reticular ac-tivating system [p. 253]." Whether this con-clusion applies to normal grief remains to bedetermined.

In summation, although results are meagerand far from conclusive, the weight of theevidence would seem to indicate that grief isprimarily a catabolic state. This does notmean, of course, that systems not normallyassociated with catabolism are not intimatelyinvolved in its normal expression—weeping,for example, is a PNS function. (As previouslynoted, however, weeping is typically absentduring abject grief and depression). Neither

does it mean that the grieving individual is ina state of continual physiological activation.Grief is an emotion of long duration, especiallythe second stage now under consideration. Itundoubtedly includes stretches of relativehomeostatic and psychological equilibrium, aswell as periods of distress.

The interspersion of periods of relativeequilibrium and distress during grief and de-pression is well illustrated in a study bySachar, Mackenzie, Binstock, and Mack(1968). These investigators observed thecorticosteroid excretion of six women under-going psychotherapy for reactive depression.During periods when the patients successfullydefended themselves against acceptance of theprecipitating loss, corticosteroid excretion wasrelatively low and stable. On the other hand,confrontation with the loss, accompanied byfeelings of grief, anguish, and helplessness,was marked by increased corticosteroid ex-cretion. Similar observations have been madeby Wolff, Friedman, Hofer, and Mason (1964)on the anticipatory grief of parents awaitingthe death of their children from neoplasticdisease; that is, corticosteroid excretion waselevated during periods of experienced griefwhen defenses failed. That such physiologicalactivation is not just a function of increasedovert activity during confrontation is il-lustrated by one mother whose psychologicaldefense involved a distracting agitation. Inspite of this agitation, her corticosteroid ex-cretion remained relatively low. When shefaced the fact of her child's imminent death,however, the agitation was replaced with aquiet grief, accompanied by a rise in corti-costeroid excretion.

If the conclusion is correct that grief is pri-marily a catabolic state, it poses a problemconcerning the functional significance of thephysiological changes during grief: Why shouldphysiological activation accompany behavioraldepression? Perhaps some insight into thisproblem may be obtained by drawing ananalogy between grief and passive avoidancereactions. Both are characterized by physio-logical activation, an inhibition of overt ac-tivity, and an unpleasant subjective quality.Pursuing the analogy further, electroconvul-sive shock, one of the most effective therapiesfor depression, is also especially effective in


disrupting passive avoidance reactions (Huds-peth & Gerbrandt, 1965; Lewis & Maher,1965). It would appear that this effect is duein part to a disinhibition of motor activity(Chorover & Schiller, 1966).

If there is any validity to the analogy be-tween grief and passive avoidance reactions,then the question arises: Avoidance of what?An answer suggested by the present analysisis simply: avoidance of separation. To re-capitulate briefly, the function of grief is topromote group cohesion. This is accomplishedby making separation from the group, or fromspecific members of the group, an extremelystressful experience, both physiologically andpsychologically. During the initial period ofseparation (the shock stage of grief) strenuouseffort may be made to regain the lost object.If this is not possible, further effort will onlybe met by increased pain and frustration; aperiod of behavioral depression, in some re-spects similar to a passive avoidance reaction,will therefore ensue (the despair stage ofgrief).

THE SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF GRIEF

The hypothesis that grief is a biologicalphenomenon resulting from evolutionary pres-sures accounts for many aspects of this emo-sion, for example, its stressfulness and force-fulness. It does not, however, explain all thesymptoms of grief. Indeed, these are so com-plex it is doubtful that any single hypothesiswould suffice. This section treats briefly somepossible interpretations of a few of the majornonphysiological symptoms of grief, includingthe developmental stages of grief and its rela-tionship to other affects and to clinical de-pression.

The Stages of Grief

As previously described, grief typically de-velops in three stages—shock, despair, and re-covery. The symptoms of the first stage, disbe-lief, activation, orientation toward the lost ob-ject, etc., would appear to be an amalgam ofgeneralized stress reactions and attempts to re-cover the lost object. The stress reactions arepresent because bereavement and its surround-ing circumstances typically involve threat toa person's psychological, and sometimes physi-ological, integrity. The attempts to recover

the lost object are manifestations of theevolutionary function of grief, namely, toprevent separation. These basic reactions are,of course, greatly influenced by situationaland cultural demands, as well as by the per-sonality characteristics and previous experi-ence of the bereaved.

Most separations are temporary. Even whenother incentives fail, the processes underlyingthe first stage of grief encourage successfulreunion. In the statistically rare cases wherethe loss is irretrievable, the symptoms of thefirst stage gradually give way to apathy, with-drawal, and despair; that is, to the depressionof the second stage of grief. In the precedingsection this depression was likened to a pas-sive avoidance reaction. On a strictly descrip-tive level, however, depression is a rather gen-eral phenomenon which can be produced bymany diverse situations. For example, depres-sive symptoms (not simply fatigue) some-times follow a period of extreme mental orphysical exertion (Roberts, 1964), which thefirst stage of grief certainly is. But although itis a possible contributing factor, mere physicalor mental exhaustion cannot explain the de-pression of grief, which is unusually persistentand unalleviated by rest.

From a physiological point of view, thereis a form of neural exhaustion which mightplay an important role in clinical depression aswell as normal grief. This involves the deple-tion of brain catecholamines, particularlynoradrenaline. What would cause such a de-pletion under natural conditions is not clear.However, there is evidence for a deficiency incentral noradrenergic mechanisms during de-pression (Jacobsen, 1964; Schildkraut, 1965).Moreover, the drug reserpine, which producesa depletion of brain catecholamines, can causeclinical depression in humans (Schildkraut,1965) and depression-like reactions in youngpuppies following separation from theirmothers and littermates (Scott, 1967).

A psychological model which has beenwidely used to explain the depression of griefis based upon extinction. Thus, Davis (1964)has observed that when men are given a taskto perform but denied success their behaviorundergoes a series of changes not unlike thatseen during grief. In the beginning, activity isintensified but becomes increasingly disor-


ganized and agitated. Subsequently, the per-ceptual field becomes restricted and attentionis focused on only certain aspects of the task.Finally, a decline in responsiveness and gen-eral inertia set in. On the basis of clinicaland field observations, Bowlby (1961) alsohas argued that the depression, disorganiza-tion, and painfulness of grief result from theextinction of behavior formerly directed to-ward the lost object.

There can be little doubt that the abovearguments are essentially correct on a purelydescriptive level. On a theoretical level, how-ever, extinction is itself poorly understood andhence has little explanatory power in thissituation. Recognizing this limitation, it maybe assumed that extinction of long-establishedand highly motivated behavior underlies manyof the symptoms of the second stage of grief.Moreover, such extinction is a necessary pre-condition for the third or recovery stage. It isnot necessary for recovery, however, that allties with the lost object be extinguished, butrather, only those which interfere with theestablishment of new relationships. The proc-ess of recovery may thus be aided by a varietyof psychological and cultural mechanismswhich allow the preservation of old ties, butwhich render them innocuous (e.g., the de-ceased assumes an honored place in heaven).

Other hypotheses could be presented con-cerning the origins of the various symptomsof grief. There would be little value in suchspeculation, however; the preceding observa-tions are sufficient to illustrate the nature andcomplexity of the problem. We shall there-fore turn to a brief discussion of three otheraffective states which have often been con-sidered symptomatic of grief.

The Relationship of Grief to Anger, Anxiety,and Guilt

Emotions seldom, if ever, occur in "pure"form, uncontaminated by other affects. Anger,anxiety, and guilt are almost invariably as-sociated with grief; so much so, in fact, thatone or another of these affects has frequentlybeen considered to be an essential componentof the grief reaction. No such necessary con-nection is postulated here. Nevertheless, someexplanation must be given for the close rela-tionship between these emotions.

Anger. As previously described, grief evolvedwith the formation of individualized groups,that is, those held together by personal bonds.According to Lorenz (1966), such bonds arefound only in animals with highly developedintraspecific aggression. He speculated furtherthat:

Undoubtedly the personal bond developed at thatphase of evolution when, in aggressive animals, theco-operation of two or more individuals was neces-sary for a species-preserving purpose, usually broodtending. Doubtless the personal bond, love, arose inmany cases from intra-specific aggression, by wayof ritualization of a redirected attack or threatening.Since these rites are tied up with the person of thepartner, and since they later become a need as in-dependent instinct actions, they make the presence ofa partner an absolute necessity and make the partneritself the "animal with home valency"—having thesame emotional value as the home [Lorenz, 1966,p. 209].

If this highly speculative hypothesis has anyvalidity, it implies a close biological relation-ship between grief and aggression. Not onlyare grieflike reactions to be found in aggres-sive species, but the personal bond which griefhelps maintain is a highly ambivalent relation-ship—a fact which few psychologists woulddispute. The hypothesis does not imply thataggression is a necessary accompaniment ofgrief, however, nor does it explain the actualoccurrence of aggressive outbursts. For thelatter, the circumstances of the bereaved mustbe examined for their relevance to aggression.

The loss of a significant individual can bea very frustrating experience. Past actionsperformed in relation to the deceased no longerhave meaning; plans can no longer be ex-ecuted, nor desires gratified. In short, on-going behavior is disrupted, and expectationsare unfulfilled. Moreover, if the death issudden or untimely, it is likely to be viewedas "unjustified." Frustrations of this type areamong the most common causes of anger(Berkowitz, 1962). It is therefore not sur-prising that anger should frequently be dis-played during bereavement. The object ofanger may be the deceased himself, but loyaltyand social sanction typically result in its dis-placement onto others. Some primitive cul-tures even stipulate the individuals againstwhom aggression can be (or must be) directed(Durkheim, 1915). And, of course, under ap-


propriate circumstances, aggression can beturned toward the self in the form of guilt.

Frustration is probably not the only causeof anger during bereavement. Like any re-action, grief may itself serve as a stimulus forother responses. Various forms of physicalpain have been demonstrated to be potentstimuli for aggression (Azrin, 1967), andthere is reason to believe the anguish of griefcan play a similar role. Jacobson (1957) hasobserved, for example, that "aggression isused as defense against a painful experienceof sadness [p. 87]." This mechanism wouldexplain why offers of sympathy and well-meant reminders of the deceased are often metwith hostility. According to Lindemann (1944),the symptoms of grief, including intense sub-jective distress, "can be precipitated byvisits, by mentioning the deceased, and byreceiving sympathy. There is a tendency toavoid the syndrome at any cost, to refusevisits lest they should precipitate the reaction,and to keep deliberately from thought allreferences to the deceased [p. 141]."

Anxiety. Grief and anxiety are closelylinked empirically and conceptually. Empir-ically, the loss of a significant individual isusually a realistic occasion for anxiety, aswell as for grief and anger. This is especiallytrue if the survivor was greatly dependentupon the deceased for psychological or phys-ical support. Conceptually, anxiety is oftenused to refer to the affective state which ac-companies a loss believed to be temporary,that is, when there is hope for recovery; butwhen the loss is recognized as permanent andhope is absent, we speak of grief and despair.According to Bowlby (1961): "Only when weare striving and hoping for better things arewe anxious lest we fail to obtain them. Be-cause, however, hope may be present in anydegree, there is a continuum in feeling be-tween anxiety and despair. During an experi-ence of grief, feeling often travels back andforth along it, now nearer to anxiety, nownearer to despair [p. 320]."

The above should not be taken to mean thatthe difference between grief and anxiety issimply a matter of future expectation orhope. Such an interpretation would be tooanthropomorphic. The present analysis of griefwould indicate that these emotions have

undergone separate evolutionary development.That is, the adaptive value of grief is notthe same as that of fear or anxiety. Grief andsome forms of anxiety may still be closelyrelated, however, in the sense of sharingsimilar, or even overlapping, physiologicalmechanisms (compare) the previous analogybetween grief and passive avoidance reaction).

Reactions during the first stage of grief areoften referred to as "separation anxiety."This terminology may lead to confusion un-less it is recognized that separation anxietyis an integral part of the grief syndrome anddiffers in important respects from other formsof anxiety, such as apprehension over one'sfuture, which also may be occasioned bybereavement. For example, the tranquilizerchlorpromazine has little effect on the separa-tion anxiety of isolated puppies. Reserpine,on the other hand, greatly reduces the distressreactions of such animals, but not by alleviat-ing their discomfort. Rather, they becomeextremely depressed and unreactive to theirenvironment (Scott, 1967). If these resultscan be generalized, it would appear thatseparation anxiety—the first stage of grief—ispharmacologically quite distinct from othermore common forms of anxiety, for whichchlorpromazine is an effective palliative.

Guilt. The guilt feelings which are commonduring grief have typically been interpretedas aggressive tendencies directed inward.While there is undoubtedly some truth to this,the present analysis of grief offers an alterna-tive interpretation. Grief has been viewed asa biologically adaptive reaction, imposed uponthe individual by the exigencies of group sur-vival. This means that grief may occur inrelative independence of higher mental proc-esses. That is, the bereaved may not alwaysexpect or understand the potency of his re-action. Such a discrepancy may produce astate of cognitive dissonance (Festinger,1957) which can be reduced by idealizing thedeceased (hence making the reaction appearmore commensurate with the loss) and/or byself-condemnation and feelings of guilt forreal or imagined transgressions against thedeceased (thereby making grief a form ofpunishment). Both mechanisms provide arationale for the pain and anguish experiencedduring bereavement.

GRIEF; ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 739

Becker (1962) has proposed a mechanismof guilt similar to the above. He started fromthe premise that the loss of a loved one robslife of meaning, which is one of the mostdifficult things to accept. Blame is thereforeshifted to oneself which, although painful, atleast offers meaning. The present formulationdiffers from that of Becker primarily inemphasis. Loss of meaning (role loss, in termsof the previous discussion), although one ofthe precipitating factors in grief, cannot byitself explain the adoption of feelings suchas guilt. Rather, negative attitudes towardthe self are adopted by the bereaved to helpaccount for the torment of his own grief .

Guilt has often been considered an etiolog-ical factor in clinical depression, as opposed tonormal grief. Some authors, however, have re-versed this causal sequence, taking a positionnot unlike that described above. Accordingto Singer (Sherman & Broder, 1943), there isa forcefulness about depression which leadsthe patient to adopt ideas such as self-condemnation to help justify his own re-actions. Such ideas are a result, and not acause of the depression. A similar relationshiphas been posited by Rado (19S4).

The Relationship between Grief and ClinicalDepression

Many of the symptoms of normal grief arealso found in the various depressive illnesses.As previously noted, depression is a rathergeneral phenomenon, at least on the descrip-tive level, which may accompany many diversesituations, such as extreme physical exertionand the nonreinforcement of well-motivatedbehavior. There is therefore no need to postu-late grief as an etiological factor in all de-pressive syndromes. Nevertheless, the fact thatdepressive illness is often preceded by object-loss (Stenbach, 1965), real or symbolic;indicates that there may be a relationship be-tween grief and at least some forms of clinicaldepression. The present analysis of grief sug-gests two possible mechanisms by which thismight occur.

Clinical depression as a pathological griefreaction. Grief has been viewed as a biologicalreaction with a rather well-defined symp-tomatology and course, which normally leads

to recovery and the establishment of newobject relations. Following an analogy byEngel (1961) and Bowlby (1963), the lossof a significant object may be likened to aphysical injury, and grief to the biologicalprocess of healing. Healing is also a biologicalreaction which normally leads to recovery.Under certain circumstances, however, healingmay be disrupted, and the injury may be-come morbid and pathological. In an analo-gous manner, due to situational or psycho-dynamic factors, grief may take a deviant orpathological course. There is not space todiscuss all the ways in which this might occur,but the classical psychoanalytic theory ofdepression may be used to illustrate the gen-eral principle.

According to psychoanalytic theory, intro-jection or internalization of the relationshipwith the lost object allows decathexis oflibidinal ties to proceed piecemeal. If, how-ever, the relationship was highly ambivalent,aggression which ordinarily would have beendirected toward the lost object may becomedirected toward the self. The result is a lower-ing of self-esteem, guilt, and other symptomsfrequently observed in depressed patients. "Ingrief it is the world which has become poorand empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself[Freud, 1917, p. 246]."

In recent years there has been a tendencyamong psychoanalytic writers to place lessemphasis on aggressive tendencies and toexplore other ways in which the normal courseof grief may be arrested or diverted into mor-bid channels (Bibring, 1953; Bowlby, 1963).This is an encouraging trend which unfortu-nately has been hindered not only by ortho-doxy within psychoanalysis, but also by apaucity of reliable information concerning theexact symptomatology of grief and depression.Nevertheless, the hypothesis that grief may bepathogenic if it fails to develop properly cer-tainly deserves further consideration.

Clinical depression as a result of physiolog-ical and genetic abnormalities. It is possible toexamine the relationship between grief andclinical depression from a physiological as wellas a psychodynamic point of view. If griefis the result of evolutionary pressures, as waspreviously argued, then it should be based


on physiological systems which, in turn, areunder genetic control.

Little can be said at the present time con-cerning the physiological basis of grief (com-pare previous discussion), although the cen-tral noradrenergic mechanisms discussed byJacobsen (1964) and Schildkraut (1965)might represent a good starting point forfuture investigation. In any case, some de-pressive illnesses may result from the mal-function of physiological systems underlyingnormal grief, for example, through disease orother trauma, and endocrine imbalance follow-ing childbirth. This would explain why de-pressive syndromes are often quite resistantto psychotherapy, although ECS and drugsare frequently successful in alleviating symp-toms.

The evolutionary hypothesis implies, ofcourse, a genetic factor in grief. Severalqualifications must be added, however. In thefirst place, it is not precise to speak of a com-plex behavior pattern such as grief as thoughit were a unitary response. Rather, it consistsof many different reactions, each of whichcould be more or less, or not at all, undergenetic control. Secondly, any genetic in-fluence in human grief is probably largelyobscured by the great variability imposed bysituational, psychological, and cultural fac-tors. Nevertheless, it is possible that certainindividuals are genotypically predisposed topathological grief reactions, either through in-creased susceptibility to the occasions forgrief and/or the exaggeration of one or moreof the symptoms of grief. In this connection itis worth noting that there is strong, thoughnot conclusive, evidence for a genetic factorin manic-depressive illness (for a summary,see Kraines, 1957).

The relative importance of psychodynamic,physiological, and genetic factors undoubtedlyvaries from individual to individual, and fromone depressive syndrome to another. Althoughthe previous analysis of the biological sig-nificance of grief does not suggest specificmechanisms relating grief to clinical depres-sion, it does provide a framework in whichsuch mechanisms may be sought.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE GENERAL STUDYOF EMOTION

Recently there has been an upsurge of in-terest in topics related to death,8 includingthe care and treatment of dying patients(e.g., Hinton, 1967), attitudes toward death(e.g., Lester, 1967), and the role of bereave-ment in the development of physiological andpsychological disorders (see introduction forcitations). Discussions of normal grief are,however, still conspicuously rare in the psycho-logical literature. This is due in part to theobvious difficulty in eliciting this emotion inan experimental situation and to social orethical resistance to testing subjects in anatural setting.7 But the neglect of grief bypsychologists cannot be completely explainedby these factors: Similar problems exist withreference to sexual behavior, an active areaof research. Of equal importance is the trendin psychological theory to identify emotionalwith motivational variables, such as driveor activation. The behavior of the bereaved,however, is not readily explicable on thebasis of most current motivational para-digms. The withdrawal, fatigue, and inabilityto initiate new actions which are so typicalof grieving individuals do not fit the notionof a heightened drive state. But neither canthe bereaved be characterized as motivation-ally deficient; grief is not at all like a stateof deactivation or satiation.

As a consequence of the above lack ofcongruence between theory and behavior, therehas been a tendency to ignore grief in com-parison with other emotions. This confers upongrief a special theoretical significance be-cause it reflects upon the adequacy of currentformulations of emotion. Moreover, it is prob-

8 One indication of this interest is the establishmentof a newsletter, Omega, "concerned with time per-spective, death, & bereavement," under the editorshipof R. Kalish, University of California, Los Angeles,and R. Kastenbaum, Wayne State University.

7 This latter obstacle has probably represented agreater hindrance than is objectively necessary ordesirable, reflecting more the attitudes of the in-vestigator than those of the bereaved, Several in-vestigators (e.g., Marris, 19S8; Parkes, 196S) haveremarked that grieving individuals often expressappreciation for the opportunity to discuss theirproblems.


able that grief will tend to remain an ignoredand isolated phenomenon until it can be as-similated into the broader study of emotion.The purpose of the following discussion istherefore twofold: (a) to examine briefly theemotion-as-motivation model and illustratesome of its deficiencies; and (6) to indicatehow the present analysis of emotion as aresponse may be extended to affects other thangrief.

Emotion as Motivation

There are three general reasons for thetrend to subsume emotion under motivation.The first, and probably most important, hasbeen the conceptualization of emotions asintervening variables (IVs) possessing driveproperties (J. Brown & Farber, 1951). TheIV approach to emotion has had a number ofunfortunate consequences (Lazarus, 1968).In the first place, since an IV is essentiallya conceptual device linking antecedent andconsequent conditions, attention has beendiverted from the analysis and descriptionof actual emotional responses. For exam-ple, although fear has been postulated asan IV in avoidance learning, experimentalinterest has been on the parameters whichdetermine the probability of the avoidanceresponse. Whether the animal shows overt orcovert signs of fear (which the well-con-ditioned animal does not—Atkinson, 1964,pp. 285-292) is largely irrelevant. In thesecond place, since an IV need have nosubstantive properties of its own, a singleemotional concept may be postulated to ex-plain a wide range of behavior, regardless ofthe actual reactions and experiences of theindividual. Anxiety, especially, has been in-voked as an explanatory concept for manydiverse behaviors, even exploration and thedesire for money (J. Brown, 1961). Finally,the IV approach has tended to limit researchto only a few emotions, primarily fear (anx-iety) and anger. Since substantive emotionalreactions need not be considered, and a fewconcepts can be greatly generalized, otheremotions can expediently be ignored—espe-cially if they do not fit theoretical precon-ceptions or are not amenable to convenient

laboratory manipulation. Grief is a primaryexample of this.

A second way in which emotion has becomelinked with motivation is through the conceptof activation. This link has its historical rootsin the assertion by Cannon (1929) that allemotions, if sufficiently intense, are char-acterized by mass sympathetic discharge.Duffy (1962) has through the years been aconsistent champion of this view, maintain-ing that there is little physiological differ-entiation between emotions except in termsof direction and energy mobilization. Activa-tion theories received their greatest impetus,however, when Lindsley (1951) related emo-tion to the activity of the reticular activatingsystem.

In spite of its physiological origins, the con-cept of activation has been viewed by manypsychologists as being essentially the same asthe intervening variable of drive (e.g.,Hebb, 1955; Malmo, 1959). To the extentthat they are similar, the same criticismsapply to both. But grief is also of considerableembarrassment to any theory which equatesemotion with activation even on a strictlyempirical level. During grief there appears tobe a dissociation between behavioral (depres-sion) and physiological (arousal) indices ofactivation. Actually, such a dissociation isnot uncommon. The drug atropine, for ex-ample, produces a pattern opposite to that ofgrief, namely, behavioral arousal and physi-ological depression (as measured by the elec-troencephalogram). Indeed, it is becoming in-creasingly difficult to defend a unitary con-cept of activation, either physiologically orbehaviorally (Lacey, 1967). There are dif-ferent patterns of activation corresponding todifferent psychological states; grief representsone such pattern.

A third reason for subsuming emotion undermotivation stems from a conceptual confusionconcerning the connotation of emotional con-cepts. Most words which refer to emotions canplay a dual role (Pitcher, 1965). In one sense,they refer to dispositions or propensities torespond in certain ways; in another sense, theyrefer to actual emotional episodes or responses(compare the distinction between trait and


state anxiety, for example, in Spielberger,1966). Emotional dispositions share manycharacteristics with motives, which are alsodispositional variables (Peters, 1960). Mosttheory and speculation, however, traditionallyhave been directed toward emotions as re-sponses, in terms of physiological, behavioral,and/or subjective reactions. The argument forconceptualizing emotions as motives oftenoverlooks this fact and fails to make the dis-tinction between the dispositional and epi-sodic uses of emotional concepts. As a result,properties of emotional dispositions have beenattributed to emotional responses, and viceversa, as in Leeper and Madison (1959).

Emotion as Response

In the emotion-as-motivation paradigm, anobject is avoided because of fear, attacked be-cause of anger, mourned because of grief, andso forth. The present analysis posits no suchcausal chain; on the contrary, emotions areviewed as responses parallel with, but notcausally related to, more conventional, instru-mental acts. If IVs must be invoked to ex-plain emotional behavior (and there is littledoubt of this), they should refer to the psy-chological and cognitive processes which in-fluence the appraisal of emotional stimuli,and not to the emotional responses per se(Lazarus, 1966). The nature of the latterwill now be examined briefly.

Dimensionality. Emotional responses aremultidimensional; they encompass subjectiveexperiences, physiological changes, and be-havioral reactions. Too often theorists haveemphasized one of these dimensions to theexclusion of others, only to be met with seem-ingly crucial objections. Subjective experiencesare too ephemeral; physiological changes, tooundifferentiated; behavioral reactions, toovariable. Attempts to answer such criticismshave generated some fruitful research, butnot in proportion to the polemics involved.Each dimension has its own peculiar ad-vantages and liabilities as a source of informa-tion, and none should be considered the sinequa non of emotion.

Restrictions of emotional concepts to asingle dimension or level of analysis has theappeal of simplicity, but the simplicity isillusory for it does not conform to reality.

Indeed, it is only a conceptual convenience tospeak of an emotion as though it were a singleresponse, regardless of its dimensionality. Anyemotion may be subdivided into many com-ponent reactions, occurring concurrently andsequentially, and these are often as poorlycorrelated within as between dimensions. Acomplete analysis of an emotion must be ableto specify the biological and situational factorsgoverning the expression of these componentreactions, as well as their integration into abehavioral whole.

Relational properties. The mere listing ofreactions, no matter how complete, is in-sufficient to specify a response as emotional.The concept "emotion" implies an object, justas the concept "answer" implies a question.That is, emotional terms refer to relational aswell as to intrinsic properties of the response.As Tolman (1923) noted: "It is not a re-sponse, as such, nor a stimulus situation, assuch, that constitutes the behavior definitionof an emotion, but rather the response asaffecting or calculated to affect the stimulussituation [pp. 222-223]." This should not, ofcourse, be taken to mean that an emotion ismore than its manifestations, any more thanan answer is more than the statement whichexpresses it.

The concept of object as it applies to emo-tional responses is quite complex (Gosling,196S; Kenny, 1963) and is not discussedhere. At the risk of oversimplification, it maysimply be said that each emotion is logicallyappropriate to a certain class of objects.8

The identification of an object (such as roleloss) therefore helps classify a response asbeing an instance of a particular emotion(such as grief), but it does not explain theoccurrence of that response. The latter must

8 It might be objected that there are some emo-tions, such as depression and anxiety, which mayoccur without an object. This may be granted with-out affecting the present argument. In the first place,"objectless" depression and anxiety are often not soin fact—their objects simply appear inappropriate ortrivial and hence are not considered. In the secondplace, these emotions, when truly without an object,are typically afforded special status, both conceptuallyand empirically (for example, they are consideredsymptomatic of neuroticistn or even of man's "ex-istential dilemma"). We are here discussing normalemotions, and not such derived cases.

GRIEF; ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 743

be separately investigated in the cultural,biological, and psychological determinants ofbehavior.

Determinants. The distinction betweencultural, biological, and psychological deter-minants of emotion is relative. Some emo-tions, for example, grief, fear, rage, andsexual arousal, appear to have strong biolog-ical components, and separate concepts areoften used to refer to their more conven-tional or instrumental display, such as mourn-ing, avoidance, aggression, and courting. Otheremotions, such as envy, guilt, shame, andcontempt, would appear to be determined pri-marily by psychological and cultural factors.The type of analysis developed in this paperis applicable with little change in detail toemotions of the first type.9 These have oftenbeen referred to as "primary" or "basic" emo-tions in recognition of their biological sig-nificance. The extrapolation of this analysisto emotions of the second type is, however,direct—only the relative importance of cul-tural, biological, and psychological factors willvary.

An Analogy between Emotion and Disease

It might be objected that the concept ofemotion-as-response outlined above is toobroad and imprecise for theoretical purposes,that is, to serve in a rigorous deductive sys-tem. This is true, but there is little reasonto suppose that the concept of emotion ingeneral, or of any specific emotion, will bea necessary construct in psychological theory.Indeed, the whole question of the role oftheory in psychology is in need of considerableclarification. Most psychologists still adhereto the view that a psychological theory, to berespectable, must be cast in a hypothetico-deductive framework. There is considerabledoubt, however, whether the hypothetico-deductive model is appropriate to psychology,except perhaps for some limited and highlyspecialized problems. Scriven (1964) has

9 For example, in basic orientation the presentanalysis of grief is similar to that used by Ford andBeach (1951) in their classic analysis of sexualbehavior. These authors attempted to provide athree-dimensional background (incorporating phylo-genetic, physiological, and cultural perspectives)against which sexual activity could be interpreted.

argued that most problems in psychology aremore similar to those in meteorology, where astrict deductive model does not apply, thanthey are, for example, to those in classicalmechanics. This analogy seems especiallyappropriate to the psychology of emotion. Anemotional outburst is more akin to a thunder-storm, in terms of prediction and explana-tion, than it is to a solar eclipse. Perhaps aneven better analogy, and one which has beenfrequently used in the previous discussion, isbetween emotion and disease.

Both diseases and emotions are classified ac-cording to etiology, symptoms, and prognosis.The etiology of a disease, when known, is ofutmost importance for diagnosis. Thus, if apatient displays all the symptoms of a diseasebut the normal etiology is absent, he is saidnot to have the disease (but perhaps someother, such as hysteria). We have already seenhow the analysis of the stimulus situationplays an essential role in the interpretationof an emotional response. With referenceto symptomatology, diseases, like emotions,are multidimensional. That is, physiologicalchanges, subjective experiences, and behavioralreactions may all show characteristic modifica-tions during the course of an illness. Typically,however, no one symptom or class of symp-toms can be considered necessary and suffi-cient conditions for the disease. Moreover, in-dividual eccentricities and social custom mayinfluence the manner in which a disease ismanifested (Opler, 1967), just as they do inthe case of emotion. Finally, if a disease doesnot follow a normal prognosis, the diagnosis islikely to be reconsidered, or other etiologicalfactors postulated. In the same manner, ifthe development of an emotional responsedeviates greatly from normal expectations, itmay be labeled as "pseudo-affective" or"sham" (compare the "sham" rage of adecorticate cat).

This is not to say that emotions arediseases, as Engel (1961) seemed to imply inthe case of grief. Emotional concepts pre-suppose systems of social relationships andjudgment, moral and otherwise (Bedford,1957). The concept of disease is typicallydevoid of such connotations—in theory, atleast, if not in practice. Thus, one may havejustifiable wrath or irrational fear, but a case


of measles is neither justifiable nor irrational.Moreover, the concept of disease has a nega-tive or pathological connotation which doesnot apply to normal emotional reactions.

In spite of its limitations, the analogy be-tween emotion and disease has important im-plications for theory and research. To take butone example, there is no more reason topostulate sex and fear drives to explain matingand avoidance behavior than there is topostulate a measles drive to explain the symp-toms of that disease. In this respect, it isinteresting to note that Beach (1956) hasfound little use for the concept of drive in theanalysis of sexual behavior. And Leventhal(1967), in order to account for the ratherloose manner in which fear is related to at-titude change and related behavior, has re-cently proposed a parallel response paradigmto replace the traditional fear-drive model.

What is needed for the study of emotion,as in the case of disease, is a complete de-scription of component reactions, their his-tory and development, and a knowledge of thephysiological and environmental factors whichgovern their expression. If this seems platitu-dinous, it need only be noted how the field ofemotion has failed to participate in the gen-eral scientific advance of psychology. Thishas not been due to a lack of theoreticaldebate, but rather to a dearth of empiricalobservation.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to place grief andmourning in biological and cultural perspec-tive, and to indicate how this type of analysiscan be applied to other emotions. Withinsuch a broad framework, it has not been pos-sible to discuss all factors of potential rele-vance to bereavement behavior. For example,the role of personality factors and early ex-perience in the determination of grief reactionshas not been covered, although these are ofundoubted importance. Moreover, much ofthe preceding discussion concerning specificmechanisms of grief has been highly specula-tive, as evolutionary analyses often are. Theintent of the argument has been, however,largely atheoretical. That is, no attempt hasbeen made to incorporate grief into existingtheoretical models, such as psychoanalytic or

drive theory, nor has there been an attempt todevelop a new "theory" of emotion basedupon the facts of grief.

The major features of grief, as opposed tomourning, may be summarized briefly as fol-lows: (a) grief is a complex but stereotypedresponse pattern which includes such psycho-logical and physiological symptoms as with-drawal, fatigue, sleep disturbances, and loss ofappetite; (b) it is elicited by a rather well-defined stimulus situation, namely, the realor imagined loss of a significant object (orrole), and it is resolved when new object rela-tions are established; (c) it is a ubiquitousphenomenon among human beings and appearsin other social species as well, especially inhigher primates; (d) it is an extremely stress-ful emotion, both psychologically and physio-logically, and yet behavior during grief isoften antithetical to the establishment of newrelations, and hence the alleviation of thestress.

The above features would indicate that griefis fundamentally a biological phenomenonwhose significance goes beyond the well-beingof the single individual. The hypothesis hasbeen advanced that the biological function ofgrief is related to the maintenance of long-term social bonds where such are needed forthe survival of the species. This is accom-plished by making separation from the group,or from specific members of the group, a pain-ful and stressful experience, and hence one tobe avoided. In cases where separation cannotbe avoided, for example, through death, thegrief reaction nevertheless must run its bio-logical course. This course may be greatlytempered, however, by the past history andpeculiar circumstances of the bereaved, as wellas by the customs and mores of society. Inextreme cases, it may even be diverted intopathological channels leading to clinical de-pression, psychosomatic complaints, and otherdisorders.

Although there is strong presumptive sup-port for the above hypothesis, further evidenceis required for the determination of its valid-ity. This evidence should come from threemain sources. First, there is a great need fordetailed descriptions of grief reactions in avariety of cultures. Most cross-cultural re-search into bereavement behavior has con-


earned the conventional or ritualistic aspectsof mourning; relatively little attention hasbeen paid to the psychological and physio-logical symptoms of grief as denned in thispaper. Second, more systematic and rigorousfield observations of grieflike reactions inanimals are required. Information is especiallyneeded concerning phylogenetic differences inreaction, the eliciting conditions, and the typeof social organization of species in whichgrief is observed. (It goes without saying thatcontrolled laboratory investigation of grief inanimals is not only possible but essential fora variety of purposes.) Third, more knowl-edge must be obtained concerning physiologi-cal changes during grief, both centrally andperipherally.

The present dearth of information on griefdoes not reflect its practical or theoretical im-portance. Rather, it reflects, in part, inade-quacies in current approaches to the study ofemotion. The type of analysis that increasesour understanding of grief is therefore likelyto have ramifications for other emotions aswell. Whether or not the present analysis issuccessful in this respect must await the out-come of research along the lines indicated.

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(Received February 19, 1968)

grief: its nature and significance

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