great britain, france and the ethiopian crisis, 1935–1936

1974 293

Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian crisis 193J-1,936~

I

I INTEND in this article to describe the policies of the British and French governments towards the crisis caused by the Italian attack on Ethiopia in October I93 5, to consider the causes of those policies and to explain the ways in which British and French opinions and attitudes limited or even determined the conduct not only of their own government but also of the government of the other country. The Ethiopian crisis was as much a crisis in Anglo-French relations as in Anglo-Italian relations. The sources are principally British - cabinet or foreign office papers in the Public Record Office, London.' French sources remain inaccessible and the published selections in the Documents diplomatiques franfais do not yet cover the year I93 5. I am, therefore, reasonably confident of the validity of my analysis of British policies; my arguments about France are much more tentative.

At the beginning of 1935, the British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, felt hopeful. He wrote to the king on I4 January I935 that 'the early months of the present year may offer the opportunity for a definite improvement in European relations in which. . . Your Majesty's Government will be able to play an important, and indeed the leading part'. On zi December I934, he had written of 'the great Task of I935':

to bring about agreement leading to Germany's return to Geneva while there is time.... This means that we must first persuade the French - and pay the necessary price for such persuasion - then bring in the Italians.... The legalisation of German rearmament and the cancelling of the armament clauses of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles are a bitter pill for the French to swallow; especially as they don't believe in any German promise. But the alternative is not the stopping of German rearmament but its continuation at an ever-increasing rate behind the screen. Germany is more dangerous out of the League than in it.

Simon supported the successful attempt of Laval, the French foreign minister, to make a bargain with Italy: 'a good preparation for a wider European undetstanding'. After Laval's triumphant return from Rome in January I935, Simon talked to him at Geneva and was delighted to find that France had, at last, accepted what had long been British policy: 'Laval quoted with approval Mussolini's

i. Documents cited as CAB, DO or FO are Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office which are quoted by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.

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294 GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE April

remark that there were only three ways of dealing with the German situation in Europe - doing nothing, which was idiotic; going to war to stop German rearmament which was impossible and too late; and negotiating agreement and a return to Geneva. I forebore from replying that this was exactly what we had pressed on France a year ago."

The welcome new flexibility in French policy which had come with the Flandin government, in which Laval remained minister for foreign affairs, made possible a successful result to the talks in London which Simon had suggested in December I934. An agreed Anglo-French programme for the pacification of Europe, the London declaration of 3 February 193 5, called for a general European settlement, including an eastern European pact, a central European pact and the simultaneous negotiation of new arrangements limiting armaments and ending the unilateral disarmament imposed on Germany by the treaty of Versailles, together with a pact of mutual guarantee against air attack between Italy, Germany, France, Belgium and Great Britain. All this would be combined with Germany's resuming her seat at the League of Nations.2

It was to the attainment of these objects, especially the limitation of German rearmament, that British international efforts were primarily directed. This meant persuading the rest of Europe, especially Germany, to accept the proposed general settlement. The announcement, on i6 March I935, of military conscription in Germany, in unilateral defiance of Versailles, induced one of those frequent moments of scepticism which assailed the minds of suc- cessive British foreign secretaries as they continued to seek understandings with Nazi Germany. Sir John Simon wrote to the king on i 8 March, when discussing whether or not to cancel his proposed visit to Berlin, 'it is Sir John's view that the German Government do not really want to make an agreement, or at any rate only wish to do so on German terms, which would be intolerable fot others.... But Sit John feels that there is no advantage in refusing to go to Berlin ... to test German sincerity in the matter of aiming at agreement.'3 However, both the French government and Mussolini, who was still striking the anti-German attitude of concern to defend Austrian independence which he had expressed with some panache the year before, now needed to make new gestures of firmness towards Germany in order to demonstrate their vigilance to their respective publics.4

I. Copy Simon-King George V. FO 8001290 fo. 5. Simon's diary, 2I, 23 Dec. I934, I, 8, I3 Jan. 1935. I am very grateful to Viscount Simon for allowing me to consult his father's papers and to Professor Medlicott, Mr. Das, Mr. Raffel, Miss Pat Lloyd, and Mrs. Jennifer Loach for their help.

2. FO 800/290 fo. 4. FO 371/18823, C305/55/1I8. FO 371/18824, C893155/18. 3. Copy, FO 800/290, fos. I8I-2. 4. For Italian attitude see, ewg. FO 371/18823, C654/55/i8.


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 295

The object of British policy remained, as the cabinet agreed, 'to secure co-operation between the various countries of Europe, including regional pacts, as opposed to the division of Europe into two camps, which was threatened by Herr Hitler's policy'. At the same cabinet meeting, it was noted that Mussolini had suggested a conference of British, French and Italian ministers in North Italy which he himself would attend.1

This was the meeting at Stresa which took place on I I-4 April I935. The British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, and the president of the French council of ministers, Flandin, led their respective delegations. British policy was discussed by the cabinet during two meetings on 8 April. The cabinet generally felt

that, if asked by France and Italy to put an end to conversations with Germany and to do nothing more than indicate our intention to stand firm with France and Italy, we should not agree to it: while we should frankly admit that there was much evidence to show that Germany could not be brought to an acceptable agreement, we should make it clear that we were not finally convinced that this was the case until after further explorations.

To the British cabinet, then, Stresa was intended as a means of persuading Flandin, Laval and Mussolini to co-operate in the British policy of reconciling Germany to a peaceful and disarmed Europe. In return, the British government offered them nothing, no strengthening of their positions against Germany. On the contrary, it agreed 'that our general aim should be peace achieved by some system of collective security under the League of Nations, without an acceptance of new commitments'. The phrase 'collective security', it should be remembered, normally signified a set of arrangements in which Germany should be an equal partner - for instance, the record of this cabinet refers to 'an argument given for collective security against the isolation of Germany'. The British were not trying at Stresa to make sure that Italy and France should resist Germany; on the contrary, they were trying, which seemed much more difficult, to make sure that they should not resist Germany's public claims. One or two voices in the cabinet spoke in favour of showing 'a firm front' to Germany and advocated that 'the keynote of our policy at Stresa should be to keep close to France and Italy', but this latter remark was prefaced by the observation that 'public opinion would admittedly be against assuming any further commitments' so that even this minority had nothing to offer to France and Italy.2

It is not surprising that no one thought of further complicating the Stresa conference by making the curtailment or renunciation of

I. CAB 2318i, I6(35)1, 20 Mar. 1935. 2. Ibid. 20 and 21(35)1.



Mussolini's designs on Ethiopia one of its objectives. To secure continued French and Italian support for the pacification of Europe through the London programme of 3 February in spite of subsequent German truculence was a sufficient task in itself.' It is also understandable that Sir John Simon and his principal advisers disliked the prospect of a quarrel between Britain and Italy which might embarrass Mussolini's French friends and make them less amenable to British promptings over Germany.

Though the Italian attack on Ethiopia began only in October, the preparations for it were obvious throughout the preceding months of I935 .2 By z October, about 225,000 Italian troops had moved south through Suez.3 At the beginning of January the emperor, Haile Selassie, submitted to the League the frontier dispute with Italy over the oasis at Wal-Wal. The use of force against Ethiopia to enlarge the Italian empire and the involvement of the League were the essential bases of the crisis. The British government was torn between two objectives, which it tried, but failed, to make mutually compatible: to maintain co-operation with Italy and France and to support, or at least to appear to support, the League of Nations. On 2i February 1935, Simon wrote to the king, 'Italy is at present preoccupied with the Abyssinian question, as to which Sir John greatly fears that a serious outcome is probable; but this must be handled in a way which will not affect adversely Anglo- Italian relations'.4 On 25 February, Sir Robert Vansittart, the per- manent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, set out his view.

We shd. endeavour to dissuade Italy from going the full length firstly, because it can hardly suit her, when she ought to have her hands free for graver matters in Europe; secondly because of the further, and perhaps deadly, blow that this must deal the League; and, therefore, thirdly on account of the consequent reaction on a large section of public opinion here, just at a period when we want and need, all of us, the most complete confidence and collaboration. (2) But all this must be done in the quietest, most friendly way.... We cannot afford to quarrel with Italy and drive her back into German embraces.

Vansittart added a marginal note on his own minute, 'our own House of Commons will of course hate the whole adventure [i.e. Italy's adventure in Ethiopia] and will do its best to make Anglo-Italian relations even harder than they wd. otherwise be. We shall, in fact, have a very difficult Parliamentary time.'5 Vansittart was not an opponent of negotiation with Germany. He believed, though, in negotiation from strength, which meant the maintenance of British

i. See R. MacDonald's statement after Stresa, ibid. 24(35)I.

2. E.g. FO 37I/I9Io5, J973/I/I.

3. FO 37I/I9I58, J7452/I/I. 4. Royal Archives GV M 245 614. This quotation is published by gracious permission

of H.M. the Queen. 5. FO 37I/I9I05, minutes on J973/I/I.


1974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 297

friendships in Europe and, above all, rapid rearmament - the latter, Vansittart recognized, needed careful political handling at home. His influence on Simon was great, on Hoare complete, on Eden limited.'

At Stresa Ethiopia was not mentioned in the formal conference discussions. Still, the British official most concerned with Ethiopia, G. H. Thompson, went with the British delegation and discussed it with the head of the African department in the Italian ministry for foreign affairs, Guarnaschelli. Thompson reported:

On my telling him that we were rather disturbed by the widespread rumours of a possible forward military movement by the Italians against Abyssinia in September when the rains are over, and that I hoped these rumours were baseless he replied that the possibility of an offensive could not be entirely dismissed. He was not, of course, aware of what was in Mussolini's mind; but he did know that the Duce was seriously disturbed over the whole situation. The Ethiopian question would not be settled by conciliation commissions; at the same time the necessity for a settlement was daily more urgent. It was impossible to believe that the Ethiopian Empire, with its I4th century policy and outlook could effectively continue to resist the march of progress. Contrast the state of affairs in independent Abyssinia (slavery, cruelty, xenophobia, no development of resources and all the rest) with the work that was being carried out under our guidance in British colonies and mandated territories. Italy was largely denied such opportunities for constructive labour - her possessions in Africa were mainly desert areas; and in Eritrea and Somalia they were confined to arid stretches of coastline. Something would have to be done to remedy this situation, and he could only see one way of doing it, either sooner or later. It would be a big task, but its magnitude had been appreciated and taken into account. It was not thought impossible of achievement.2

On I7 May I935, immediately after a cabinet meeting, Simon drafted a message for Mussolini pointing out the 'deep feeling that is entertained in the United Kingdom in support of promoting the peaceful solution of international disputes by or under the League of Nations. This is the avowed policy of His Majesty's Govern- ment from which they cannot depart.'3 This deep feeling which, the government believed, compelled it to display support for the League was enumerated by the League of Nations Union by means of a questionnaire - the peace ballot. The results were announced on 27 June I93 5. Ten million voters favoured the use of economic and non-military measures by the combined action of other nations to

i. For Vansittart's general views see, e.g. CAB 27/599, CP 42(36). Simon's inclina- tions were more isolationist than Vansittart's, but he was not given to imposing his opinions on others; Vansittart was.

2. FO 40I/35, JI488/I/I. References to FO 40I and FO 432 are to the Confidential Print.

3. CAB 23/8I, 28(35)9, Annex.



stop an aggressor as against one and a half million negative votes and abstentions. Six and three-quarter million accepted military measures, if necessary for this purpose, against four and three- quarter million negative votes and abstentions. On 23 July 1935, Stanley Baldwin, now prime minister, told a deputation that 'the foreign policy of this government is founded upon the League of Nations'.' Politicians faced with fashionable preoccupations sometimes make obeisance by creating ministers for them; when Baldwin became prime minister, he named Anthony Eden 'minister for League of Nations affairs'.

On io July Vansittart urged Samuel Hoare, the new foreign secretary, to try to counteract in the house of commons 'the present impression, which is so markedly anti-Italian that it will end by misrepresenting Abyssinia as a kind of oppressed Paradise'. On 27 July Hoare wrote to Drummond, the British ambassador in Rome, that 'feeling here is becoming more and more anti-Italian and there is every sign of the country being swept with the kind of movement that Gladstone started over Bulgarian atrocities'.2 On 2I August I93 5, Hoare told a meeting of senior ministers of his impression 'that there would be a wave of public opinion against the Government if it repudiated its obligations ... under the principle of collective responsibility, on the assumption that France would go as far as we were prepared to do. It was abundantly clear that the only safe line for His Majesty's Government was to try out the regular League of Nations procedure.'3

In France, too, the government had little freedom in choosing its course towards the Ethiopian question. Since Daladier's resignation after the riots of 6 February I934, the parliamentary majorities of French governments had rested on the support of the Right together with the necessary concurrence of the Radicals. In I935, the Flandin government (November I934-May I935) and the Laval government (June I935-January I936) required Radical acquies- cence. Without it, right-wing government would come to an end, unless a coup d'etat overturned the constitution of the Third Republic. In I935, both Flandin and Laval were trying to work within the constitution. Both were politicans who could expect continued success within it, so long at least as enough Radicals, without whom there would be no parliamentary majority for them or anyone else, were prepared to tolerate them. Neither Flandin nor Laval, however, could play a part in any left-wing French government, whether a Radical administration with Socialist backing, or the Radical and Socialist combination, with Communist support, that provided the governments from June I936 until I938. Though

I. A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs isJ, ii (London, I936) 5I-2. 2. C[ambridge] U[niversity] L[ibrary], Templewood MSS. VIII-i. FO 8oo/295, fo.

78. 3. CAB 23/82, mtg. of ministers 2I Aug. I935.



it was necessary for Flandin and Laval to be acceptable to Radicals, they relied primarily on the approval of the Right. That approval was needed for two reasons - firstly to provide votes in the legis- lature, secondly to tranquillize the Leagues. In 1935 the para- military fascist, or pseudo-fascist, right-wing Leagues, especially the Croix de Feu, were still growing in strength. They demanded a change of regime and threatened the use of force to secure it. Their clientele was partially the same as that of the parliamentary Right and the latter could not neglect their views and attitudes - which, in any case, it largely shared. Among these attitudes were two which mutually strengthened each other: fear of the communists and admiration for Mussolini and Italian fascism. The development of the Popular Front fortified right-wing anxiety to maintain the prestige of anti-Bolshevist forces and therefore to avoid weakening or humiliating Mussolini. Moreover, the Franco-Italian conversations of January I935, in which, as Mussolini believed, Italy secured a free hand in Ethiopia, led to military understandings which freed seventeen French divisions for use against Germany. The army greatly valued these understandings, and the desire to conciliate Mussolini was correspondingly strengthened.'

With the approach of the elections of April-May I936, it was likely that the Radical party would break away from support for Laval's government. Since most Radical deputies had constituencies in which co-operation with candidates further to the left was ad- visable, or essential, a right-wing government was bound to be endangered when the Radicals took up a political position in harmony with their electoral allegiances. Indeed, Laval contemplated an attempt to postpone the elections. A left-wing victory at the elections would not necessarily mean, however, the indefi- nite continuance of left-wing governments. Especially in a period when financial and economic policies were at issue, co-operation between Radicals and Socialists might not last long and, perhaps at a lesser interval of time from the elections than in I926 and I934 the Radicals might work once more with the Right. To right-wing or right-centre politicians such as Flandin and Laval, co-operation with the Radicals offered a practicable prospect of future political power. To both of them, then, it was important not to alienate Radical opinion.

Unfortunately the Radicals were, at least in principle, strongly in favour of maintenance of the covenant of the League. More in- convenient still was the personal position of Herriot, in I935 the president of the Radical party. Herriot was the most prominent and influential of the Radicals who were willing to work with a conservative government and who were reluctant to accept the movement

i. Doc[uments] dipl[omatiques] fr[ansais], 1932-9, 2e serie, tome I (Paris, 1963), no. 8z.



towards the Popular Front of Radicals, Socialists and Communists. It was on the influence of men like Herriot that the future prospects of a government of the right-centre must mainly depend. Unhappily for Laval, Herriot had been particularly zealous in advocacy of support for the League and of collective security. It was impossible for him to be associated with a government which openly betrayed League principles but when he withdrew from Laval's government early in I936, Laval's tenure of office was soon over. Thus Laval had to support both Mussolini and the League. He and Flandin sought to combine these incompatible policies.'

The foreign office was kept informed by the British embassy in Paris about movements in opinion. It resented the hostile attitude of the French press, subsidized, some of it, by Mussolini.2 An especially interesting analysis of French opinion came in a memorandum of I7 October I935 by an anonymous 'senior official' of the League secretariat who told a British official that his French colleagues agreed with his statements.

II n'est pas exclu que le fascisme s'instaure tres prochainement en France. Ceux qui donc cherchent, dans ce pays, a aider Mussolini sont precise- ment ceux qui croient qu'une fois Mussolini tombe du pouvoir, il sera impossible pour les fascistes de France de prendre le pouvoir dans ce pays.... La situation est paradoxale puisque, au point de vue numerique, les gauches, profondement attaches a la Societe des Nations et a la collaboration franco-anglaise dans le cadre de la Societe des Nations, represent le 60% de la population. Par contre, les elements de droite, favorables au fascisme, sont dans le proportion de 40%. Ils ont, en revanche, de leur cBte, l'organisation et l'argent et peut-etre aussi l'armee. L'espoir des elements favorables a la democratie et a la Societe des Nations est que l'Angleterre ne flanchera pas, car, dans ce cas, le fascisme ne pourra pas non plus avoir le dessus en France.3

For French governments the simplest solution was to leave the whole Ethiopian issue to the Italians, the League, the British and the Ethiopians while expressing sympathy all round. Unhappily Musso- lini and the British government made this position impossible. Mussolini was determined to have a military success on a scale appro- priate to a fascist dictator and French and British attempts to help him

i. F. Goguel, La Politique des Partis sous la troisiime ripublique (Paris, I946), livre iv; M. Soulie, La Vie politique d'Edouard Herriot (Paris, I962), 455-78; P. J. Larmour, The Frencb Radical Party in the 1930s (Stanford, I964), pp. I55-96 give accounts of the general political situation in France; F. D. Laurens, France and the Italo-Etbiopian Crisis z93y-6 (The Hague and Paris, I967); P. Milza, L'Italie fasciste devant l'opinion franfaise 1920-40 (Paris, I967); C. A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany (Durham N.C., 1943), PP. 52-66 and E. Weber, Action Franfaise (Stanford, 1962), pp. 287-9I, are valuable on French opinion.

2. See e.g. FO 40I/35, J4260/I/I, J5795I/I; 432/I, J6203/I/I, 37I/I881O, C6658/ 6562/62, 371/I88II, C7IIo/6562/62; 37I/I8793, C6920/33/17, C7226/33/17.

3. FO 37I|/I91I54, J67441I/I.



to peaceful acquisitions were doomed in advance.' As for the British government, it was essential for it to make the French take a definite line whether of support for League action to curb Italy or of total refusal to co-operate in any such action. On 3 July I 93 5, the cabinet recorded that in case of Italian aggression

The responsibility of the Powers on which the burden of fulfilling Article XVI would fall was recognised to be a heavy one, since it involved not only the present dispute and relations with Italy, but also the whole of the existing international system. If France was prepared to honour its obligations, other nations would probably follow. Without French co- operation the application of Article XVI was out of the question, and as yet the attitude of France was uncertain.2

On i z August, Hoare minuted 'There will be no League war. If the French join with us in a veto upon Italy, it will mean that Italy will somehow or other extricate itself from the war. If the French do not join with us in such a veto, coercive action drops out of the picture.'3 At the cabinet meeting of 24 September I935 it was 'repeatedly emphasized that we must be clear as to the French attitude. The strongest assurance we could have for our own security, was that Signor Mussolini should know that if he attacked this country, France would retaliate against him.'4

The British government needed clarity from France. It needed France either to stand firm behind the League, in which case Italy would climb down, or alternatively needed France openly to refuse to support the League, in which case British public opinion could not blame the British government for the failure of the League. On the contrary, Laval was remarkably successful in remaining obscure. On I9 June 1935, Hoare told the cabinet that 'The French Govern- ment, who, according to previous expectations, should in the last resort have supported the League in the event of a clash, were showing every sign that in that case they would be on the side of Italy.'5 Yet on zi August he 'regarded the harmonious Anglo- French front which had been maintained up to the present time as an unexpectedly good factor. . . the Italians had put every sort of pressure on M. Laval to come down on their side; they had been giving it out in Paris that the British Empire was in a state of decline, especially from the military point of view. It was significant that

I. In July I935 Grandi, Italian ambassador in London, 'said frankly that he did not think the Duce could do without some glory for his troops in Abyssinia.' C.U.L. Templewood MSS. VIII-3 Edward Grigg to Samuel Hoare, I4 July.

2. CAB 23/82, 35(35)2. Article XVI of the League Covenant (as interpreted in I92I) required members to take action, under the direction of the Council, against any member which resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant, a resort which would be deemed an act of war against all members.

3. FO 37I|I9686, W7P66/i2o9/98. 4. CAB 23/82, 43(35)I. 5 - Ibid. 3 3(3 5)4.



M. Laval had not listened to them' and on 24 September 'M. Laval had vacillated at times, but had now come round to our view ... and was prepared to join in economic pressure'. On the other hand, in October, Laval 'seemed to be constantly intriguing behind the back of the League of Nations and ourselves' and Hoare went on to refer to the 'equivocal French attitude' which irritated the cabinet so much that Baldwin 'reminded the Cabinet that we must be careful not to be drawn into a quarrel with France as well as with Italy."' Eden noted on 27 November 'France is clearly unreliable, to put it mildly' and Vansittart summed it up: 'The French have not had the the guts either to repudiate or to act up to the League. That is the whole trouble.'2 Blum put the same point in a direct attack on Laval in the chamber of deputies on 27 December, 'Vous avez annule vos actes par des paroles et vos paroles par des actes. Vous avez enve- loppe vos declarations politiques de commentaires, d'insinuations ou d'indiscr6tions calculees qui en detruisaient tout l'effet. Vous avez tout alteret par la combinaison, par l'intrigue et par l'entregent.'3

The other reason for British insistence that the French should take up a clear position was the need for French support in case of an Italian attack on British forces in the Mediterranean, an attack which might be precipitated by British support for League action against Italy. On 6 August I935 Baldwin, Hoare and Eden decided that the chiefs of staff should be asked 'at once to examine the question of what the position would be if Italy took the bit between her teeth'.4 Two days later, the first sea lord, Sir Ernle Chatfield, wrote to Vansittart, after a meeting of the chiefs of staff. 'We are exceedingly anxious lest you should obtain the moral support of France without a definite assurance of her military support also and some knowledge of what that military support would be, which indeed ought to be con- certed beforehand in London or Paris.' On 2z August the cabinet noted the chiefs of staff's insistence on the 'assured military support' of France.5 Laval needed ambiguity, the British government needed clarity; each was bound to harass and inconvenience the other.

II

The Ethiopian crisis moved through four phases: (i) preliminary attempts to buy Mussolini off which went on until September 193 5;

i. Ibid. mtg. of ministers 2I Aug. 43(35)1, 47(35)1. 2. FO 371/|8794, C7853f33/17, C7717f33f17. 3. Journal officiel. Ch. des d6putes, seance du 27 dec. 1935. 4. CAB 23/82 Conversation 6 Aug. 5. FO 37III9123, J36I4/1I, CAB 23182, 42(35)3. Arthur Marder, 'The Royal Navy

and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36', American Historical Review, June I970, is a valuable and up-to-date study.


1974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS 1935-1936 303

(2) war, sanctions and attempts to bribe Mussolini into stopping the war, culminating in the Hoare-Laval plan of December 1935;

(3) the period of apparent Italian failure and prospective League success; (4) the collapse of Ethiopian resistance. The first phase was accompanied by much talk about the Wal-Wal incident, frontier demarcation, grazing rights and other issues between Italy and Ethiopia which could have been settled with ease if a settlement had been all that Italy wanted. Simon and Vansittart issued cautious and mild warnings to the Italian government and hoped that the French would add their own warnings. Early in May, after Simon had expressed his 'gravest anxiety as to what would be the effect of Italy's contemplated action upon British public opinion', the British government sought French help in persuading Mussolini to allow Britain and France 'to recommend the Abyssinian Govern- ment to follow a policy more in accordance with modern conditions by recognizing Italy's claims to take a fuller part in increasing the trade between Abyssinia and the outside world, and in assisting the development of the economic resources of the Abyssinian Empire'.' The French government agreed but the French ambassador in Rome objected that Mussolini might meet such inadequate suggestions with 'an outburst which he would afterwards regret'.2 Early in June the British ambassador in Rome reported that Mussolini would not consider anything less than the equivalent for Italy in Ethiopia of the British position in Egypt.3

At this stage the Anglo-German naval agreement strained relations with France. The British government wanted to improve the chances of new general naval limitations, to be negotiated in 1936, by bringing Germany in. Hitler had agreed to preliminary discussions. When they began, on S June 1935, the German delegates, led by Ribbentrop, startled the British by demanding immediate British acceptance of a German naval strength of 3 5 per cent of the British as a prior condition of any further discussion. Ribbentrop brushed aside the British objection that there was a tacit understanding with the other naval powers that there should be no bilateral arrangements made in advance of any conference. The next day the cabinet thought that the German demand should be accepted, rather than risk unlimited naval building, but that there must be 'a prior communication to the French and Italian Governments. This, however, was a matter in which we were entitled to take the lead'. The relevant cabinet committee agreed with Simon's suggestion that the other powers should not 'be asked whether they would per- mit or agree to our coming to an understanding with Germany; we should tell them that we proposed to do so.'4 Hostile observations

I. FO 40I/35, Ji65/I/I, J785/I/I, JI7II/I/I. 2. CAB 23/8I, 28I(35) App. II. 3. FO 40I/35, J2205/I/I. 4. CAB 29/148, NCM 35(50); CAB 23/81 32(35)2; CAB 29/I47, NCM 35(IIth. mtg.).



came from France and 'Laval ... was clearly moved from his usual serenity', but the agreement was concluded on i8 June. The effect was to weaken French faith in British reliability as exponents of collective security. As the British ambassador in Paris reported, 'M. Laval (a man whose instinct is to reach agreement whenever and wherever he can get it) having only been brought round with some difficulty to collective policy of the Quai d'Orsay ... plainly feels he has been let down'.1

There followed another essay in separate diplomacy. Eden was sent straight on to Rome, on 24 June, after stopping in Paris to soothe Laval. He put to Mussolini a proposal about which he had given no hint to Laval. This was the idea of giving a part of British Somaliland, including the port of Zeila, to Ethiopia in return for substantial territorial cessions by Ethiopia to Italy in the Ogaden.2 On 27 June, Laval protested to Eden at British indifference to the interests of the French-owned Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway and at the lack of consultation. When Eden suggested that the French should take the lead in buying off Mussolini, Laval argued that the 'best solution would probably be for Italy to have some form of protectorate over the whole of Abyssinia.'3 The failure of the offer put by Eden to Mussolini caused the British cabinet to consider, on 3 July, the question of applying article XVI to Italy, 'including the possible closing of the Suez Canal'. The feeling grew that, as Hoare told the cabinet on zz July, 'the only card in our hands was the deterrent, by which he meant publicity and conversations with the French in order to get them to put pressure on Italy' and there was general agreement 'that it was most important to induce M. Laval to take the question more seriously'.4 The result was an elaborately argued plea to Laval for his help in restraining Mussolini and to get him to abandon the idea attributed to him of creating a situation in which Italy could make war on Ethiopia while avoiding a breach of the Covenant by using the 'gap' in the Covenant.5 Laval was threatened with a British withdrawal from interest in Europe: 'The popular movement in this country in support of the principle of security by collective action might well be arrested unless the principles of the League were steadfastly upheld even at the cost of the apostasy of one more of its principal members.' Again, on 8 August I93 5, Vansittart told M. Corbin, the French ambassador in London,

I. FO 37I/I8734, A5398, 5399, 5465/22/45. 2. CAB 23/82, 33(35)4.

3. FO 401/35, J2510/1I/I. 4. CAB 23182, 35(35)2, 39(35)1. 5. If a member submitted a dispute to the Council and it had been unable to make a

unanimous recommendation for settlement, the member could, after a 3 month delay, go to war without violating the covenant. Laval's help to Italy, though, proved more subtle than the mere use of France's vote to block recommendations and so open the 'gap'.



that failure to check Italy would strengthen isolationist tendencies in Britain.'

From i6 to I8 August I935 talks took place in Paris between Laval, Eden and Aloisi, Mussolini's representative. Laval promised Eden that he would try to make the Italian government 'understand the realities of the present situation.' A plan was evolved for a disguised Italian protectorate of Ethiopia under the auspices of the League. Mussolini rejected it; he wanted a visible Italian triumph following a prestigious military success. In September, a League body, the Committee of Five, produced a similar proposal which Mussolini rejected on the zoth.2

In August and September, therefore, the British and French governments were compelled to decide what to do. On August zz I935, the British government agreed to try out the procedure of the League. This meant acceptance of economic sanctions if other powers did so. Hoare thought it unlikely that economic sanctions would, in fact, be applied.3 It was taken for granted that there could be no military action against Italy such as armed blockade or closing the Suez canal. Thus 'the Cabinet, who were most anxious if possible to avoid a war with Italy ... agreed .., that [U.K. delegates at Geneva] should keep in step with the policy of the French Government, and, more particularly in the matter of sanctions, they should avoid any commitment which France was not equally prepared to assume.'4 Hoare wrote to Clerk, British ambassador in Paris, on 24 August:

Most people are still convinced that if we stick to the Covenant and apply collective sanctions, Italy must give in and there will be no war. You and I know that the position is not as simple as this and that the presumptions that, firstly, there will be collective action including full collective action by the French, and, secondly, that economic sanctions will be effective are, to say the least, very bold and sanguine. None the less, whatever may develop it is essential that we should play out the League hand in Septem- ber. If it is then found that there is no collective basis for sanctions, that is to say in particular that the French are not prepared to give their full cooperation, or that the action of the non-member states, for example Germany, the United States and Japan is so unhelpful as to make economic sanctions futile, the world will have to face the fact that sanctions are impracticable. We must, however, on no account assume the impractica- bility of sanctions until the League has made this investigation. It must be the League and not the British Government that declares that sanctions are impracticable and the British Government must on no account lay itself open to the charge that we have not done our utmost to make them practicable.5

I. FO 401/35, J3204, 3650/I/I. 2. FO 401/35, J368i, J4768/i/i. F. D. Laurens, op. Cit. pp. 97, 135-6. 3. CAB 23/82, mtg. of ministers 2I Aug. I935 at fo. I62-4. 4. Ibid. 42(35)1. 5. FO 800/295. Copy letter Hoare-Clerk 24 Aug. 1935.

VOL. LXXXIX-NO. CCCLI L



Two actions made Britain seem the determined leader of firm League action. The first was the reinforcement of the British Mediterranean fleet in the second half of September by two battlecruisers and three cruisers drawn from the Home Fleet. The cabinet agreed to this, and to a temporary concentration of the Home Fleet at Gibraltar, on zz August.' It was intended as a defensive measure to deter a violent Italian response to threats of coercion by the League, 'taking every possible precaution to prevent the possibility of a mad-dog act giving the Italians any advantage.2 The other action was Hoare's speech to the general assembly of the League on i i September. In fact, this speech was aimed at the French as much as at the Italians.

In August, Laval had warned Eden that he would enquire whether or not the British government intended to apply the League covenant in Europe, against Germany, with the same energy as against Italy in Africa. Though this question was not formally put until io September, Hoare's speech was intended for use as a reply. Thus Vansittart included this passage in his draft: 'The League stands and my country with it, for resistance to all unprovoked aggression in whatever quarter such a danger to the peace of the world may arise.' The phrase 'unprovoked aggression' was intended to exclude the idea of automatic resistance to mere failures to carry out the terms of a treaty, such as the clauses of Versailles forbidding the presence of German troops in the demilitarized zone of the Rhine- land, or a peaceful German-Austrian union.3 Hoare altered Vansit- tart's draft to make it read: 'for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.'4 Hoare's stress on the word 'collective' was meant to put the blame on other countries, and particularly on France, if League action failed. Laval had no intention of accepting the blame and worked to avoid incurring the enmity of Italy without directly challenging the advocates of League action. The result was the Anglo-French diplomatic duel of the autumn of 193 5 in which the British tried, without success, to drive Laval to make an open choice for or against Italy.

On io September 1935, Hoare and Eden met Laval at Geneva. Laval suggested giving Italy military control of Ethiopia. Hoare insisted that it was essential to make a full investigation into the working of economic pressure organized by the League 'with the intention not of proving that economic pressure is impossible'. Britain would not begin economic pressure by proposing any

I. CAB 23/82 42(35)3- 2. CAB 2I/411 Copy Vansittart-Hoare S Aug. 1935 and FO 371/19123, J3614/I/I

Hoare-Vansittart 9 Aug. 1935- 3. This was made plain in the British note of 26 Sept. F. D. Laurens, op. Cit. p. 192. 4. FO 800/295, fo. 199.



extreme measures or any step involving belligerent rights (blockade or closing the Suez canal). Hoare asked Laval to make it clear to Mussolini that Britain was not bluffing. Laval told Hoare and Eden, later in the day, that Mussolini feared military sanctions and the closing of Suez but warned that France would be 'faithful to the Covenant in the measure in which ... His Majesty's Government would be moderate in their application of it.'"

Hoare and Laval met again after Hoare's famous speech the next day, which made Hoare, to his own surprise, appear as the dedicated advocate of British support for the League.2 Hoare insisted to Laval on economic pressure which 'should convince the world that it was intended to have a definite and concrete effect upon the duration of the war' but Laval 'did not hide ... with what prudence he would approach the whole question of sanctions'. On 17 September Laval asked the British government to agree to assure Mussolini that no military sanctions were intended nor any economic sanctions 'likely to affect the life of the nation'. Eden told Laval that real economic pressure might have to be applied and commented to London that it was unwise 'at this time' to assure Mussolini that no military sanction was intended. On the I 9th, however, Laval informed Eden that he had told Aloisi that there had never been any question of closing Suez or of military sanctions. Eden complained that Laval was telling Aloisi too much and Laval, switching to his other role as partner of the British, quoted from a strongly-worded appeal he had sent to Mussolini. On the same day Eden telegraphed urging Hoare to tell Mussolini only that 'We hoped that question of sanctions of military character would not arise, but it would be impossible to give any undertaking for a future which must remain unknown'. On 23 September, however, Hoaire took his turn in reassuring Mussolini by despatching a 'personal message', which was probably drafted by Vansittart, which included the statement 'there has been no discussion of closing the Suez Canal or military sanctions'. Vansittart still hoped that peace might be preserved.3

On IO September the French ambassador in London presented a formal enquiry on the hypothetical British attitude faced with violation of the League covenant in Europe. Vansittart wrote to Eden that he had learnt that Laval was hoping 'that our reply would be sufficiently unsatisfactory to give him ground to continue his present unreliable attitude'. But the British, as we have seen, had their own evasions prepared in advance and answered, on z6 September, by drawing attention to Hoare's Geneva speech. The British cabinet also agreed to ask 'what France would do supposing, per im.possible, Italy were to make an attack on our forces or interests

I. FO 4OI/35, J4768, 4769/I/I. 2. Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, I954), pp. I69-70. 3. FO 4OI/35, J48i8, 489I, 4977, 498I, 5033/I/I; FO 37I/I9I37, J5I79/I/I.



in the Mediterranean' before article XVI came into effect. At the end of the discussion Baldwin commented that 'it was essential that Signor Mussolini should be made to know that any action he might take against us would be met equally by France.... He thought all were agreed that the last thing that must be allowed to happen would be a single-handed war between this country and Italy.'"

The French reply, delayed until 5 October, combined a disguised refusal with an elegantly contrived return to European issues. The French argued that if either of the two countries wished to take military measures in preparation to carry out its obligations under the League or Locarno it should first consult the other, and if those measures were agreed to in advance, then the latter power would assist its partner against any failure by a third state to fulfil its international obligations. This meant two things: firstly that the French government could claim that the British reinforcements in the Mediterranean had been provocative, had not received prior French 'accord' and would justify a French refusal to support Britain against consequent Italian action; secondly that the note demanded British acceptance of the principle of bilateral Franco-British military discussions on threats to Austria and the Rhineland. Laval published this document - pro-League opinion would see the promises, Mussolini the reservations. 'I regret to say', Vansittart noted at once, 'this is not an honest document.... The fact that there has been no "accord" in this case ... leaves, and is meant by M. Laval to leave, a loophole for French inaction if we get into trouble.... The point is subtle and yet obvious. My suspicion is confirmed by a message which we have received from a French Minister - probably one of those who trust M. Laval as little as I do - that there is a trap in the document.'2

On i i October, the British naval attache in Paris reported on his visit to the French ministry of marine to discuss an exchange of plans for Anglo-French naval co-operation in the Mediterranean. He gathered '(a) That it had been decided by either Monsieur Pietri [minister of marine] or Monsieur Laval, or both, that they wanted to be able to say that no exchange of plans for co-operation had taken place. (b) That there probably are no definite plans for this co-operation. (c) That at present the French do not envisage such a situation arising. (d) That the Admirals had been told to shuffle me out without committing themselves to anything.... The meeting was friendly but the Admirals seemed a little embarrassed.'3

On 2 October I935, the Italian attack on Ethiopia began and, on 7 October, article XVI came into effect against Italy. On I i October, Chatfield complained that 'we have no assurance of French support

i. FO 40I/35, J5o64/I|I, C6693/6562/62. CAB 23/82, 43(35)I- 2. FO 371/188io, C6952/6562/62. 3. FO 37I/I9203. J6oI9/5499/I.



or of the use of their Ports'.1 On 14 October, the British ambassador asked Laval for an assurance of French support in applying article XVI. Laval gave it, but with a reservation. He argued that the reinforcement of the British Mediterranean fleet went beyond the application of article XVI and that its strength should be reduced in return for an Italian promise not to attack Great Britain and a reduction of the number of Italian troops in Libya. At the same time Laval proposed a new attempt at a settlement based on an Italian mandate for the peripheral regions of Ethiopia and a League-administered mandate for the central territories.2 On I 6 October the British cabinet agreed that the two battlecruisers could be withdrawn, that the British ambassador in Paris should insist on a categorical abandonment of his reservation by Laval but 'that great caution must be exercised in the application of sanctions, and that it would be well to postpone the application of any new sanctions until the position with the French Government had been cleared Up'.3 That afternoon Clerk read a long and severe telegram to Laval demanding 'a plain and unequivocal assurance' of full French support in case of Italian attack on Britain. As conditions for a reduction in British naval sttength in the Mediterranean, the British stipulated reduction in the Italian forces in Libya and, from the French, 'an unqualified assurance of immediate military support in its widest sense in case we are attacked'. A threat was added. 'If this suggestion is not willingly and promptly met. . , the consequences cannot but be grave, for they will imperil Locarno itself', and the telegram ended with a reference to 'the extraordinarily hostile attitude of a large part of the French press and public' - Gringoire had just published Beraud's silly article, L'Angleterre doit-elle etre riduite a l'esclavage? On the same day, Vansittart remarked to Corbin 'that there was now more Anglophobia in France than at any time since Fashoda' and added that the British government 'had had more than enough of this state of things'.4

The British won a point by linking the prospect of a withdrawal of warships from the Mediterranean with firmer assurances of French naval support. On 22 October, the Admiralty set out its requirements: the use of French ports, especially Toulon and Bizerta, for repair, docking and fuelling and agreement that the French would contain the Italian naval forces in the western Mediterranean after the withdrawal of the British battlecruisers. On z6 October the French government promised the use of ports and suggested talks about co-operation between British and French naval forces. On 30 October Chatfield and Rear-Admiral Decoux met in London.

i. FO 371/19204, J6i6i/549911. 2. FO 432/I, J62031/1i, J6214//I. 3. CAB 23/82, 47(35)1. 4. FO 432/I, J62031I1I, J6362/i/i.



Decoux admitted that the French 'had, in accordance with the instructions of their Government, taken no action to prepare the -navy- in any wvay'. Accordingly in case of an Italian attack on British forces the French naval staff proposed to delay going to war until their own mobilization was complete. This the British accepted and, with French naval co-operation agreed, at least in principle, the way seemed open for the 'detente': the withdrawal of the British battlecruisers in exchange for the reduction of Italian forces in Libya.'

With the British fleet thus being secured against a 'mad-dog act' and the Italian propensity to a fit of madness apparently lessened, the main British policies moved fotward: co-operation with the League to restrain Italy combined with attempts to maintain good relations with Italy, above all by finding concessions sufficient to cause Mussolini to call off his war. Laval had refused either to check Mussolini or openly to sabotage sanctions and the British government was compelled to deal with its own problem. To Hoare's surprise, sanctions were agreed on. An embargo on arms and loans to Italy came into effect in October and it was agreed that member states should ban imports from Italy and prohibit the export to her of rubber, 'key' ores and metals (but not finished iron and steel). The latter proposals came into effect on i 8 November.2

The seatch for terms on which Mussolini could be persuaded to make peace was not relaxed. Hoare told the cabinet on 23 October that tentative proposals for a settlement were coming from Mussolini and that, though vague, they represented an advance on any previous suggestions. He had sent a foreign office official to Paris - this was Peterson. The proposals, which Laval had extracted from Mussolini and which he passed on to the British on 24 October, involved Italian administration in the Ethiopian periphery and Italian participation in collective 'assistance' in the central territory. Clerk reported from Paris that 'M. Laval entirely agrees that Mr. Peterson and Monsieur de St. Quentin should get to work at once and see how far they can rearrange the map of Abyssinia'. Befote the end of October they had worked out proposals and Peterson had returned to London. Their suggestions accepted the idea of exclusive Italian administration in peripheral provinces, with an exchange of territory involving Italian annexations in return for the granting of a port to Ethiopia. On the z8th, Hoare, Eden, Vansittart, Oliphant and Peterson discussed the plan; they agreed that the concessions to Italy must be shrouded in deeper obscurity: 'agreement cannot be expected for an attempt to make a more clear-cut division of the

i. FO 37I/19154, J6739/I/I. FO 371/I9I55, J6886/i/i. FO 371/19201, copy of

J7543 in J91561386ijI at fos. 76-79. 2. For Hoare's surprise, CAB 23/82 mtg. of Ministers, 2I Aug. Copy Hoare to Clerk,

24 Aug. in FO 800/295 and CAB 23/82, 50(35)2: 'The various countries concerned had provided a more solid front than we had reason to expect.'


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 3II

country as a whole than that which is implied in the report of the Committee of Five."

In the middle of October, perhaps influenced by the enthusiasm the apparent government support for the League had aroused, Baldwin, the prime minister, decided to hold a general election that autumn, on I8 November, rather than waiting until I 936.2 Ministers were well aware that opposition to Italy was a popular vote-winning course however much high policy, strategy and the evasions of Laval might dictate caution. On I November Hoare and Eden met Laval, Massigli and St. Quentin at Geneva. The conclusion of the peace negotiations was not now expected to come soon. Hoare said he thought it was 'important to make it clear that if there was any delay it was due to the intricacies of the problem and not to any feeling about public opinion in England or France'. This coy and evasive utterance was easily understood by Laval: 'M. Laval said . . . that he would ask Mussolini not to let the Italian press make any connexion between the slowing down of the negotiations and the British elections.' Among themselves, British ministers were more direct. When the Defence Policy and Requirements committee, which included the most important ministers, met on 5 November, the prospect of the d6tentce through the withdrawal of the British battlecruisers was again discussed. Hoare was 'somewhat nervous of this withdrawal taking place in the next few days and being misrepresented to the public during the Election. There was a good deal to be said for not carrying out the movement for ten days or so', and the discussion showed that 'The line proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was generally agreed to, emphasis being laid on the importance of avoiding any announcement of the above arrangements until the Election was over.'3 On 28 October Vansittart, while believing that negotiation at Rome was then the best hope of advancing towards a settlement of the Ethiopian problem, added the words: 'if it had not been for the election' and that it would 'in theatrical parlance "look bad from the front".'4

On I i November, at a meeting in Hoare's room at the foreign office, it was decided to make a new effort, as soon as the elections were over, to work out with the French government the lines of a settlement. Hoare thought 'that, since there was no likelihood of an immediate or even rapid settlement, it was very desirable that the League should be brought into the picture'.5 Meanwhile the

I. CAB 23/82, 48(55)2. FO 371/19154, J6789, 6790/I/I. FO 371/I9155, J6885/I/I. Sir L. Oliphant was an assistant under-secretary, Peterson was head of the Abyssinian dept.

2. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin (London, I969), p. 863. 3. FO 401/35, J73I7/I/I. CAB i6/136, DPR I3th mtg. 4- FO 371/19156, J6988/I/I. 5. FO 371/I9I60, J77791I/I.


3I2 GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE April

attempted ditente with Italy failed when Mussolini insisted on a written document, leading on to an Ethiopian settlement and a limitation on the size of the British fleet in the Mediterranean.'

Sir Eric Drummond reported from Rome his belief that if sanctions increased the cost of living in Italy, an Italian attack on the British might be provoked. In consequence, on I9 November, Vansittart asked Hankey to remind the service chiefs of this danger.

We must therefore be prepared to face an increasing risk in a very short while unless there is a settlement, and that is at present definitely unlikely.... I do not say that this risk will necessarily materialise, but that it will increase is, I think, unquestionable. When Parliament meets there will certainly be a considerable demand to put oil on the prohibited list, and if and when that stage is reached, we shall in my opinion be definitely in the danger zone.2

The French remained shifty. Vansittart commented furiously when it appeared that M. Pietri, the Ftench minister of marine, had agreed with an Italian interlocutor that the French might not, in fact, support the British in case of Italian attack. 'If we are really to be told that ... they ate impotent for aught but treachery or collapse, what view do you expect any practical politician in this country to take? ... they must reluctantly - and some will not be at all reluctant - write France off for keeps.' It was one reason for Vansit- tart's preoccupation with ensuring French support that he wished to avoid 'the disclosure of an irreparable secret', i.e. that the French alliance might not be worth having. Vansittart, of course, hoped that this 'secret' was unreal; still the notion that Vansittart and his subordinates were pro-French bigots seems strange in the light of their comments on France.3

British policy at this time was weaker towards Italy than the devout supporters of the League would have wished. Gilbert Murray wrote to Baldwin, on behalf of the League of Nations Union, at the end of October, that 'we remain convinced that the severing of communications between Italy and Abyssinia by the fleets of the League - not, of course, by the British fleet alone - would be the most rapid and least distressful method of ending the war, and we earnestly hope that the speeches of Ministers explaining that no such step has ever been contemplated are not to be taken as meaning that the Government has absolutely ruled it out as a possibility in the future'.4 In fact, the government had ruled it out because the French would not join in full League action. This, indeed, was the flaw in the position of the League supporters in Britain - like the government, they sought only collective action, which in this context meant

I. Ibid. J7739/I/II 2. FO 371/I88II, C7837/6562/62, fos. 227-8.

3. FO 37I/I9I60, J767I/I/I. 4. FO 37I/19159, J7546/I/I.


1974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS 1935-I936 313

French action; unlike the government, they thought it attainable. Still, the British government, surprised though some of its members were at finding themselves doing so, was following a League policy: it was joining in collective action to compel Mussolini to accept a settlement more modest than he wished and it was working for a settlement acceptable to the League - that is, one which the smaller powers would accept as representing some check on the Italian aggressors and on which they would be consulted in advance.

Three weeks after the election there was something different: the Hoare-Laval plan. This was hastily put together, without prior consultation with the emperor of Ethiopia or with other members of the League. It was a fait accompli designed to satisfy Mussolini and to be pressed on the emperor and the League. The ideas behind it were not new. The concessions to Italy, however, were more clearly set out and their extent greater than in any previous British or League plan for an agreed settlement. The proposals of the League Committee of Five, made in September I93 5, and accepted as a basis for negotiation by the Ethiopian government, included the suggestion of exchanges of territory between Ethiopia and Italy and of a possible cession of British or French territory to Ethiopia to set off against Ethiopian cessions to Italy and suggested the recognition of 'a special Italian interest in the economic development of Ethiopia'.' The same principles were applied in the Hoare-Laval plan.

British opinion, however, felt that Mussolini should be offered less after his attack on Ethiopia; more would be a 'reward for aggression' and contrary to the 'spirit of the covenant'. The foreign office was fully conscious of this situation. Peterson, who conducted all the detailed negotiations with the French for a settlement, minuted on z November, while arguing for reliance on a settlement through Italian participation in a League 'scheme of assistance' for Ethiopia rather than through exchanges of territory, that 'exchange of territory is likely to be much more closely scrutinised by what is now a thoroughly aroused world opinion. . . such an arrangement [the offer of access to the sea to the emperor of Ethiopia in return for the cession of Ethiopian territory to Italy], while it might have passed uncriticized in pre-war conditions, will be very apt to be regarded as a decisive Italian success when it forms part of a post- war settlement'.2 By contrast, on I December, Thompson, another member of the Abyssinian department, suggested a 'reward for aggression' when he wrote 'we may have to recommend to the League - lest worse befall - the basis of a settlement which, while not giving Italy nearly all she sought, may yet be more favourable than anything she could have secured purely by negotiation' and

I. S. Heald (ed.), Documents on International Affairs r,9s ii (London, I937), io6-io. 2. FO 37I/I9I57, J72IO/I/I.



went on to set out the possible need for 'some compromising with the spirit of the Covenant, a slight sacrifice of principle'.'

Why did Hoare, Eden and the foreign office change course? The answer is clear and simple: fear that the Italians, encouraged by the belief that France would, in practice, stand aside, were about to attack the British fleet in the Mediterranean. This fear increased during the second half of November and Laval exploited the British desire for renewed assurances of French armed support to force through the Hoare-Laval plan. On zo November, Vansittart wrote: 'In my opinion, the possibility of Italy attacking the British fleet - without warning of course - will soon become little better than an even money chance.'2 Two days later he was deeply impressed by an interview with Grandi, the Italian ambassador. Without waiting for approval from Hoare or Eden, he sent a telegram to Drummond in Rome.

I believe that what he [Grandi] has in mind and what Signor Mussolini has in mind is that an embargo on oil will be decided upon at the forth- coming meeting in Geneva. The latter also believes that indications of action by USA in a similar sense are direct result of pressure by us. In that case the Italians would consider their position desperate and might consider themselves driven to attack us at the first opportunity however little favourable.

Drummond was told to let Mussolini know that he and Hoare would soon see General Garibaldi, an emissary of Mussolini's, to hear his latest terms. At the same time Vansittart minuted to Hoare and Eden that he had held up the paper on the oil sanction that had been drafted in the foreign office for the cabinet. 'We ought to walk very warily in this matter until we have weighed the possible results of such action very carefully and decided that we (and the French) are prepared to take the full consequences.'3 On 23 November, the Rome embassy telephoned a message from Drummond. He referred to

Mussolini's belief that we definitely intend to force him to make terms which he and the Italian nation would consider as humiliating or even that we wish to rid ourselves of a potential rival. He will not and perhaps cannot accept such terms and possibility that he would prefer to fight us even with the certainty of ultimate defeat must not be excluded. Finally there is a strong belief here that if Italy attacks us we shall receive no material help of any kind from the French and that if a French government tried to give us military, naval or air support civil war in France would ensue.

Vansittart at once wrote a long minute for Hoare and Eden. 'I most earnestly press that we should not proceed, or allow others to

I. FO 37I/I9i65, J8568/i/i. Vansittart agreed and sent the minutes to Hoare who initialled them on 3 Dec.

z. FO 37I/I9I62, J7997/I/I. 3. FO 37I/I9I64, J84I8/I/I.


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 3I 5

proceed at Geneva with measures against oil imports into Italy', until British defences were adequate, until the French were genuinely in line, having cured their internal cleavages and demonstrated that they had done so by taking precautionary measures against Italy, and until the support of other states concerned was assured. 'The situation, and my anxiety, would be very different, but for our glaring deficiencies, and the impossibility of counting on France - which will make it impossible to count on anyone else. I beg you and Mr. Eden to take this into consideration.... To run the risk alone and unprepared would surely be unthinkable.'1

The sanctions that came into effect on I 8 November had included a prohibition on exports to Italy of those 'key' materials whose supply was largely controlled by members of the League. They left out iron and steel, coal and oil. The Spanish representative at Geneva had objected to this exclusion of iron and steel, while iron ore was included, on the ground that an embargo on Spanish ore exports to Italy would result only in increased sales for countries exporting finished iron and steel. Accordingly, on 2 November, Dr. Riddell, the Canadian delegate, proposed the addition, in principle, of all the omitted items; he did not expect such an embargo to be attempted since he assumed that the need for non-member states" co-operation would render it inapplicable - his object was only to defeat objections to the original list.2 The question of the practicability of the extended proposals was put to governments. It soon appeared that states which controlled at least three-quarters of the normal supplies of oil to Italy were willing to accept an embargo and that the U.S. administration was ready to try to restrain American suppliers from increasing their exports to make up the deficiency. On 2z November it was agreed that the relevant League committee would meet on the zgth to consider the oil sanction.3 Hence Vansittart's mounting excitement and alarm.

The 'glaring deficiencies' of the British armed services were a favourite theme of Vansittart's. He pined after a situation in which the United Kingdom alone could defend itself against all threats. So did the Admiralty, and its major objection to a single-handed war with Italy was not that the British would lose it but that it might leave the fleet too weak to deter Japan. The Mediterranean fleet was greatly superior to the Italian navy, although the defence of its ships and bases against air attack was inadequate.4 When the situation was discussed by the Defence Policy and Requirements sub-committee of the C.I.D. on 26 November, thoughts turned again to what could be expected from France. Monsell, the first lord, Chatfield, first sea lord, and Ramsay MacDonald all agreed with Baldwin: 'The Prime Minister said he had always felt that France

i. FO 371/19i64, J8419/1I/I. 2. DO 35/I58, 6IO9, K/8o. 3. A. J. Toynbee op. cit. ii, 273-7. 4. A. J. Marder, op. cit. pp. 1343, 1346.



would not come in with us if real trouble occurred.' Hoare's suggestion was approved that Laval should again be pressed to make it clear to Italy that France would 'automatically and at once give us assistance, and that, consequently, she should now take material steps to ensure that her assistance would be effective'.'

In fact, Hoare had done it already. Laval had acted as soon as news had reached him of the summoning of the League Committee of Eighteen to discuss the oil sanction on 29 November. On 23 November, he told the British ambassador in Paris that he (or his successor) ought to attend this meeting and that since he had to be in Paris then to defend himself in the Chamber he would like British support in asking for a postponement. Sir George Clerk added that Laval feared that an embargo on oil might drive Mussolini into war 'against the arch-enemy, that is ourselves, and to perish gloriously rather than submit'. Next morning, Vansittart minuted

I trust that we shall hasten to agree to M. Laval's most reasonable request.... It is an excellent let out for us. My only reluctance is that M. Laval will get the credit. I would therefore (a) this afternoon telegraph to Rome letting Signor Mussolini know that we are taking part in the postponement (b) tbis evening only agree with France in postponement, and let Geneva know that we are doing so in deference to French internal difficulties.

It was sincere and honest fear that moved Vansittart, not the search for some treacherous betrayal of League principles. He wrote on 25

November: 'If French unreliability and trimming proved so incur- able that we were in effect unable to advance with any safety on the oil front, we would certainly see to it that the French, and not we, held the baby of responsibility! But I hope this won't happen.' Hoare, whose fear of provoking Mussolini lagged behind Vansit- tart's, rejected the proposed telegram to Rome but agreed to accept Laval's proposal for delay.2 On z5 November, Hoare approved another telegram to Paris. It quoted Clerk's report of Laval's fear that Mussolini might attack the British, but 'you say nothing to the effect that he realizes this must also involve war with France' and quoted Drummond's report that Mussolini believed that France could not or would not support Britain. Clerk was to induce Laval 'to send to Rome instructions for an intimation to Signor Mussolini in whatever form may be thought best, to the effect that any attack upon this country would lead to war with all members of the League including France'.3

i. C.AB I6/I36, DPR I4th mtg. z. FO 3711i92I6, J8334, 8335, 834I/5499/I. FO 37I/I9I64, J84I9/I/I. Hoare's

somewhat less panicky attitude is shown also in FO 37I/I9I20, J7271/5499/I where Hoare, but not Vansittart, was ready to take the lead in pressing Romania, at the end of Oct., not to give credit to Italy to purchase oil.

3. FO 37I/I9I64, J84221/I/I.


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 3I7

Clerk repotted on the 28th that Laval had told Cerruti, the Italian ambassador in Paris, to tell his government that any attack on England would find France ranged with England.' On the same day, Vansittart asked the French to instruct their ambassador in Rome to tell Mussolini directly. On 3 December it was learnt from Rome that the French ambassador there had received no such instructions. An exchange of telephone calls with Paris on the 5th showed that 'a very full telegram. ... has been on M. Laval's table for three days, but it seems that "internal preoccupations" have prevented his approving it'. Vansittart wrote at once to Hoare showing his profound mistrust of Laval.

This is another instance where M. Laval is playing fast and loose with us.... He has, of course, had plenty of time to go through the simple and honest action of initialling the draft ... we shall have to ask very pointedly why it was apparently impossible to take this very necessary action at Rome, without which we cannot of course be sure that Signor Mussolini got the message which we are told M. Laval gave to Signor Cerruti. Even if M. Laval spoke to Signor Cerruti as he alleges (and I have doubts on this point) we may be pretty sure that Signor Cerruti has not given the full dose to Signor Mussolini.2

By this time arrangements had been made for Hoare and Vansittart to go to Paris on 6 December to meet Laval. On 28 November, Leger, the secretary general at the French foreign ministry, pressed vigorously for a meeting between Hoare and Laval. Next day Hoare and Vansittatt discussed this and it was probably then that the decision was made that Hoare should stop in Paris on the way to a holiday in Switzerland.3 Hoare wrote to the king's secretary on z December

My doctor has been insistent upon my getting off as soon as possible, particularly as I have recently had a series of fainting fits which have rather worried him, one of which took place last night . . . if I leave at the end of the week, I shall be passing through Paris and can accept M. Laval's urgent invitation to have a talk with him on Saturday.... So far as the Abyssinian controversy is concerned ... we intend to go all out for bringing the conflict to an end.

Hoare added that he intended to take Vansittart and continued, 'If, as I hope, M. Laval and I agree upon a basis for peace negotiations, Vansittart will stop on in Paris for a day or two in order to clinch the details.'4 On the same day the cabinet discussed the foreign office paper on the oil sanction, which Vansittart had held up on 22

i. FO 37I/I9I65, J8629/I/I. 2. FO 37I/I9I66, J8766/i/i. 3. FO 37I/I9I65, J8629/I/I. I have not been able to trace the return telegram which

is probably no. 33o, private and personal, of 29 Nov. to Clerk in Paris. 4. Royal Archives GV K25o6/I. This quotation is published by gracious permission

of H.M. the Queen.



November and which had been circulated on 27 November after Laval had got the League to postpone consideration of further sanctions.'

After the Hoare-Laval plan was condemned and abandoned, other members of the cabinet began to treat it as a strange and unpre- dictable personal aberration of Hoare's. In fact, the cabinet gave him a free hand in advance and afterwards approved what he had done. The cabinet meeting of Monday afternoon, 2 December I935, opened with a long statement from Hoare followed by a general discussion, during which the prime minister asked the opinion of every minister. The first lord and the secretary of state for air emphasized

the reaction of possible hostilities in the Mediterranean on our Imperial Defence position in other parts of the world ... our position in the Far East depended on the British Navy. . . The air position was even worse than that of the Fleet ... no anti-aircraft guns would be available for the defence of Alexandria.... The only thing that could deflect an Italian air attack would be to attack the Italian bases and North Italy. That depended on complete co-operation by France. We should require not only facilities for our own aircraft but active co-operation by the French Air Force in attack and defence against counter-attack.

The cabinet was given 'secret information which indicated that the Italian threats of an active retaliation to an oil embargo had been implemented by actual preparations' and Baldwin, summing up, noted 'that in dealing with Signor Mussolini we were not dealing with a normal kind of intellect'. Eden said that he might be able to get the League to postpone the oil sanction 'if there were a good prospect of a result from the peace talks'. The cabinet agreed that in principle Britain should join in an oil embargo but that an attempt should first be made to begin 'peace talks, and that military contacts with the French should be extended to cover the air forces. Hoare was to 'bring the question back for consideration by the cabinet in either of the following circumstances: (i) If the peace talks did not offer any reasonable prospect of a settlement (ii) If the military conversations showed that France was not willing to co-operate effectively'. It is true that Hoare indicated only that he proposed 'to see M. Laval and to try to press on peace talks with him' not that he would discuss a detailed Anglo-French plan for a settlement and declared that 'we must avoid giving any impression of weakening in support of sanctions,' but it remains striking, and surprising, that no one in the cabinet raised the question of what the contents of a settlement should be.2

A final Italian threat kept Vansittart in the right frame of mind to pay a high price for French support. Drummond sent a telegram

I. CAB 241257, CP2I2(35). 2. CAB 23/82, 50(35)2-



from Rome reporting that the Italian under-secretary of state for the interior had warned the papal nuncio that Italy would make war on Britain if an oil embargo were applied. Vansittart minuted to Hoare on 6 December, just before they left for Paris

This confirms me fully in what I have felt and tried to express for some time past, that it would be suicidal for us to proceed with the oil embargo until and unless we have come to a full and concrete arrangement not only with the French but with the other Powers militarily concerned.... Promises alone would give me no assurance whatever. I still believe, however, that if properly faced with this question, and if we make it clear that we shall not budge until it is properly settled and that if it is not properly settled we shall say why we will not budge, the French and the rest will probably come into line.'

The British chiefs of staff, invited on a6 November to set out what help was needed from other powers in case of an Italian attack, replied on 4 December. The French had already agreed in principle to the naval desiderata but it was now stipulated that the French should 'carry out military operations on the Franco-Italian frontier with the object of the capture or the paralisation [sic] of the Italian industrial area, the quadrilateral Milan-Alessandria-Turin-Novara', and carry out operations on the Tunisian frontier. More remarkable still was what was expected from the French air forces. They were 'to undertake offensive air action against military objectives, particularly against Italian air bases and the Italian aircraft industry'. An air staff note of 6 December called for 'determined attacks' upon 'suitable objectives in N. Italy' which would have the effect of making the Italians withdraw 'those portons of her air force which might otherwise be employed in the attack on naval vessels as well as Malta and Egypt'. Italian counter-attacks were certain. These, the air staff noted, 'might be directed against Paris, Marseilles, Toulon or upon objectives of more direct military importance'. The C.I.G.S. protested violendy, objecting that the French might leak the proposals to the Italians and that the British would then be pilloried for proposing the bombing of civilians and that to make these proposals to the French 'in their present mood, would be to bring the conversations to a very early close'. After Hankey had taken it up with the prime minister and the secretary of state for air, the instructions to Air Vice-Marshal Joubert de la Ferte for the discussions with the French were toned down to an enquiry about 'what plan the French have in mind (in the event of hostilities) for the operation of their aircraft from S.E. France'. The French, though, were still 'to play the principal part in exerting pressure on the Italian home country'.2

i. FO 37II9i67, J89I i/i/i.

2. Copy of DPR 59(COS4I6) in FO 371/19201. CAB 211420.



Hoare and Laval began their talks on the afternoon of 7 Decem- ber. Hoare raised at once what he called the 'main issue' that is 'of French military support in the event of an Italian "mad-dog" act.'" Laval skilfully exploited this British anxiety: 'The French people habitually observed their obligations but they must feel that everything possible was being done to find a way out of the present crisis'.2 Following this threat, Laval agreed to further staff talks (which showed that 'the French wished to ... avoid any action which would entail retaliatory measures against France itself' and were 'reluctant to take any action against Northern Italy unless France was first attacked'3) and discussion of a possible settlement began.

Laval opened with an appeal to Great Britain 'to be more generous', i.e. to Italy at the expense of Ethiopia. Hoare replied by emphasizing 'that it was essential not to offer, the appearance of rewarding aggression'.4 Hoare stayed in Paris the next day, 8 December and before he left that evening dictated 'in great haste' a memorandum for the cabinet, together with the proposals he and Laval had worked out - the Hoare-Laval plan.5 The basis of the plan was familiar: the granting of an outlet to the sea to Ethiopia in exchange for the cession by Ethiopia to Italy of territory in the north and south-east of Ethiopia plus a zone in which Italy should have a monopoly of economic development under League of Nations auspices.

To understand and to assess the events that followed it is important to determine how far the detailed application of these principles differed from those accepted in advance by the British government and then to establish what the cabinet thought about them before it came under pressure from adverse opinion outside. On 2 5 Novem- ber a message had come from Peterson in Paris setting out the terms he thought might be acceptable to Laval who was 'evidently prepared to do the Italians' bargaining for them'. He mentioned the cession by Ethiopia (in exchange for a port and corridor to it) of the towns of Adowa and Adigrat in Tigre province, the province of Danakil (excluding Aussa, which adjoined French Somaliland) and 'most if not all of Ogaden'. This was opposed by Scrivener and Oliphant, the departmental officials, but approved by Vansittart, Eden and Hoare.6 The Hoare-Laval plan gave Italy the whole of eastern Tigre, including the town of Macalle as well as those mentioned by Peterson, so permitting Italy to keep what had so far been conquered. The foreign office officials thought that Tigre was the main issue -

i. CAB 24/257, CP 235 (35) 2. Ibid. CP 233(35). 3. CAB i6/I40, Paper DPR 77. 4. CAB 24/257, CP 233(35). Original in FO 371/19I67, J8993/III 3. CAB 24/257, CP 235(35). 6. FO 37I/I9I63, J8384/I/I.


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 32I

'to hand this province over to the Italians will, in the eyes of the world, inevitably put a premium on the aggression of which Italy has been guilty'.' The Danakil and Ogaden proposals reappeared in the plan. Hoare described this part of the plan rather strangely in his message to the cabinet: 'we eventually succeeded in reducing very greatly the scope of the territorial cessions. Indeed we have now reduced them to frontier rectification in Danakil and Ogaden, and... the occupied territory in Eastern Tigre". Perhaps Hoare was deceived by the phrase 'frontier rectification'; perhaps he initialled the communication to London without studying the subannex to Annex II, which contained the details. He went on, with continuing complacency, 'The result of this reduction is to make it more possible to extend the area in which we contemplate that Italy should be given an economic monopoly.'2 In Peterson's message of 25 November, he had not set out any proposal for the size of the Italian zone of economic development and settlement but he had suggested the presence in the zone of non-Italian League personnel for protection of native interests. Eden had commented, and Hoare had agreed, that 'the Emperor could never agere to I/3d of his territory, or more, being so dealt with, and such a proposal would certainly have to be combined with non-Italian League control'.3 In the plan about one-third of Ethiopia was allotted to Italian settlement and exploitation. The Ethiopian administration in the zone would be directly under the control of an Italian official. It is true that this official would be an assistant to a non-Italian chief adviser delegated by the League to assist the emperor in running Ethiopia as a whole, but this left 'non-Italian League control' somewhat tenuous.

The cabinet held a special meeting at 6 p.m. on Monday 9 Decem- ber to consider the plan. Eden explained the proposals. He emphasized that the loss of territory in Tigre would be hardest for the emperor to accept and 'he pointed out the extent of the territory that it was proposed to include in the area for economic development, the whole of which, however, was non-Amharic'. Eden, though clearly uneasy, did not directly oppose the plan: 'While supporting the Foreign Secretary's proposals, [he] felt bound to warn his colleagues that some features of the proposals were likely to prove very distasteful to some States Members of the League'. However, after consulting Baldwin, Eden had told Vansittart, who was still in Paris, to get Laval to agree to send the plan to the emperor instead of first submitting it to Mussolini. Some members of the cabinet criticized the generosity to Italy embodied in the plan, but 'There was general agreement in the proposal of the Minister for League of Nations Affairs [Eden] that the proposed peace terms

i. FO 37I/I9I66, J8837/I/I. 2. CAB 24/257, CP 235(35).

3. FO 37I/I9I63, J8384/I/I.



ought to be communicated to Abyssinia at the same time as to Italy, and that the Emperor should be strongly pressed to accept them as a basis for discussion, or at least not to reject them."

Vansittart saw Laval at z a.m. that night. Laval, tirelessly working for the Italian cause, agreed that the emperor should be informed on condition that there should be no question of enforcing the oil sanction if Ethiopia refused the plan. This compelled the cabinet to meet again at midday on io December. Peterson attended this meeting and explained that the plan 'filled out the original proposals of the Committee of Five rather in Italy's favour. They were rather more favourable to Italy than he himself quite liked.' Laval's demand was rejected but when Eden asked if he was to support the plan at Geneva, 'the Prime Minister agreed that this would have to be done and that there might have to be some plain speaking about the military situation'.2 Laval gave way and withdrew his condition. Telegrams went out later that evening to Rome and Addis Ababa. A telegram, initialled for despatch by Eden, was sent at II p.m. to the British minister in Ethiopia. He was instructed to 'use your utmost influence to induce Emperor to give careful and favourable consideration to these proposals and on no account lightly to reject them.'3

Next morning, on i I December, the cabinet met once more. Unease was growing about the reactions to the plan at home and abroad. Eden now hoped 'that he would not be expected to cham- pion the proposals . . . in detail at Geneva'. Laval would try to make the plan still more favourable to Italy; on the contrary, 'if any alterations were to be made they should be rather in the other direction'. The cabinet agreed that the zone of economic expansion and colonization allotted to Italy in Ethiopia was likely to be the most criticized part of the plan. Indeed most people ignored the screen of League supervision; on io December, The Times had reported the zone simply as an area 'Italy would receive'. Eden, catching up on outside opinion, told the cabinet that 'If he had to choose between two risks, (i) an aggression by Italy, and (z) a collapse of the League, he would consider the former the lesser evil.'4

Next day Eden telegraphed from Geneva 'Impression which Paris proposals have made upon opinion here is even worse than I had anticipated.'5 More ominously, Nigel Law reported from the City of London that 'hard-headed business men who waste no time on idealism ... men of reading and experience who know the difficulties inherent in negotiation ... all combine ... in describing the terms as the most miserable document that has ever disgraced

i. CAB 23/82, Cabinet 52(35)I. 2. CAB 23/82, Cabinet 53(35)I.

3. FO 37I/I9I68, J9154/I/I at fo. 159. 4. CAB 23/82, Cabinet 54(35)3. 5. FO 37I/I9I69, J9250/I/I.



the signature of a British statesman'.1 Most alarming of all for the cabinet was the effect of the plan on Conservative members of parliament. Mark Patrick wrote to warn Hoare. 'The trouble lies with our own Party and with few exceptions a state of acute dis- comfort seems to prevail among them ... the exceptions I have come across are a few backwoodsmen ... some weightless die- hards ... and Edward Grigg, who almost alone of informed people seems to be pleased.' Progressively-minded Conservatives objected on 'League and ethical grounds', the more reactionary complained of capitulation to Mussolini. Above all, many Conservative members felt that they could not 'get away with it' after what they had been saying in the election.2 At 9 p.m. on i6 December a group of ministers agreed that Eden, wvho was present, should disown the plan at Geneva.3 At the full cabinet the next day, it was readily agreed that it should be made clear that the government were no longer pressing acceptance of the Paris terms.4

On I 7 December, the cabinet was, however, still thinking of trying to defend the making of the plan in the parliamentary debate due for the igth. It was agreed that Baldwin, Chamberlain and Eden should confer with Hoare as to the general line to be taken. Hoare was at home, in bed, having broken his nose in a skating accident in Switzerland; he emerged only to make his speech on I9 December. The cabinet was therefore able to discuss what to do about him and his plan without the embarrassment of his presence.

Next day, i8 December, the cabinet engaged in a 'very secret discussion' of the record of which Hankey made only one copy which he showed to Baldwin in January 1936 and thereafter kept under seal.5 Chamberlain described what Hoare intended to say in the debate. He made it plain that Hoare would defend the plan and that he had not changed his mind as to the rightness of his action. Chamberlain prefaced his statement with the remark that Hoare 'probably felt himself to be on his trial, though, of course, the Cabinet were with him'. The discussion that followed showed that Chamberlain was wrong. No one was ready to join in a defence of the plan. Baldwin brooded uneasily: 'All he could say was that though he was not rattled, it was a worse situation in the House of Commons than he had ever known.' Five ministers suggested that Hoare should resign. Others insisted, at least, that he should recant. Of these, the most senior and the most emphatic was Sir John Simon, now home secretary. He denied that the cabinet had instructed Hoare to negotiate a peace - a denial frequently repeated

I. FO 371/19I69, J9309/I/I. Law was a former foreign office official. 2. Cambridge Univ. Lib., Templewood MSS. VIII. i. Patrick was Hoare's parlia-

mentary private secretary. 3. CAB 23/82, mtg. of ministers I6 Dec. 4. CAB 23182, Cabinet 55(35)3. 5. CAB 23/goB, Cabinet 56(35).



later on by other members of the cabinet. He spoke in the slightly surprising role of League zealot. He read out the opposition's motion, that the terms 'reward the declared aggressor at the expense of the victim, destroy collective security, and conflict with the expressed will of the Country and with the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the support of which the honour of Great Britain is pledged', and declared that the cabinet felt the same. The next senior minister, Lord Halifax, was more succinct. To him 'the whole moral position of the Government before the world' was at stake, and, in a passage which Hankey recorded in his own hand rather than reveal even to the most trusted of typists, 'he thought the Foreign Secretary ought to resign'.' The message was taken to Hoare that he must own up to error, or go. He resigned that evening.

The political beneficiary was Eden. He won immense and durable prestige from this crisis simply through not being Hoare, through not having been at the meeting with Laval in December, through association with Geneva rather than Paris. Baldwin used his reputation as a screen by making him foreign secretary on z2 December. This was effective because Eden was believed to stand for the League and collective security. So he did, yet the cabinet and foreign office records show that any divergencies between himself on the one side and Hoare and Vansittart on the other were expressed with far less clarity and force than outside opinion supposed. Then, as at other times, Eden gives the impression of hesitancy in argument - perhaps the result of indecision in thought.

The next casualty of Laval's foreign policy was Laval himself, though it was the timing and the occasion of his fall rather than the event itself that were determined by the failure of the plan. Laval was 'much perturbed' when Eden told him on i 8 December that he was not going to press the plan on the League. Laval tried to get Eden to modify his speech, which the cabinet had approved.2 The British government's renunciation of the plan, dramatized by Hoare's resignation, deprived Laval of the respectability lent to him by British co-operation. The pressure on Herriot, the Radical leader whose support was perhaps the most essential for any possible continued combination between Laval and the Radicals, to detach himself from Laval was greatly increased. Although he and over thirty other Radicals voted with Laval at the end of the foreign policy debate on v7 and z8 December, Herriot announced his resignation on 17 January and Laval resigned on the zznd.3

i. The other ministers who called for Hoare's resignation were J. H. Thomas, Walter Elliot, Eustace Percy and Ormsby-Gore.

z. FO 37*/19171, J9545f/I/. Only the F.O. summary of Geneva telegram no. z6I appears to survive.

3. The best account is in P. Larmour op. cit., pp. 184-96.



III

The Laval government was succeeded by a caretaker government to manage the elections. The Sarraut government was prepon- derantly Radical but Flandin, Laval's predecessor as president of the council, now replaced him in his role as foreign minister. Flandin was a pompous, bourgeois version of the more rustic and un- pretentious Laval: his political position was similar. He relied on conservative support, but needed, like all ambitious politicians of the inter-war years, to maintain friendly contact with the Radicals and, in the situation of 1936, to offer a centrist basis of government as an alternative to the left-wing Popular Front. Flandin's policy towards the Ethiopian affair was identical with Laval's, except that, since he had not been associated with the now discredited Hoare- Laval plan, he could afford to be even more openly conciliatory towards Mussolini than Laval had been, especially since the Radicals were increasingly absorbed in pre-election maneouvre.

Thus the change of foreign ministers after the failure of the Hoare-Laval plan made very little difference. Flandin applied as much restraint as Laval had done to the British government's desire to meet its own public's demand for support for the League, a demand which had brought Eden to fame and political fortune. There is no doubt that Eden wished the League to 'succeed', that is to say to bring about something recognizable as a -defeat for Mussolini, yet he gave way to Flandin's continued blocking of the oil sanction - a measure which, whatever its effects might have proved to be, had come to be regarded as a sort of test which true believers in the League must accept.

The renewed Anglo-French exchanges of the early months of I936, however, had two new features. The first was the conviction that the League was winning anyway without further sanctions; the second that the fear of an Italian 'mad-dog act' temporarily receded when this apparent prospect of slow Italian defeat failed to provoke an attack on the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

A war office paper, circulated to the cabinet on I7 January 1936, set out the assumptions on which the expectation of Italian defeat was based. Inadequate lines of communication and defective administrative preparation made it seem improbable that the Italian army could win before April when the opening of the rainy season would prevent active operations for a period of about five months.

The Italians will have to face a long and difficult task, if they are to achieve their aims in Ethiopia; and the probability is that Signor Mussolini will be found to have relied too much upon the regenerating effect of Fascism and his own influence to maintain the determination and morale



of the nation in face of this long drawn test of endurance, combined with the increasing deterioration in the economic situation of Italy.'

In spite of subsequent Italian successes, another general staff appreciation, circulated on 24 February I936, repeated the same views.2 On 8 April, after the Ethiopian situation had become desperate, Eden still thought it possible that 'the Emperor could resist until the rains began'. Flandin replied that 'the rainy season would not necessarily hold up operations. Everybody had made a mistake about the prospects of this Italian campaign. The French General Staff had held the view that it would take the Italian forces several years to achieve their object. The French Ambassador in Berlin had reported that the German Staff had said the same thing.'3

Hence Eden, in January 1936, continued the Hoare-Vansittart line, and recommended to the cabinet that he should- support 'though if possible not himself proposing' - words inserted by Vansittart into the foreign office draft of a cabinet paper - the setting up of an expert League committee to enquire into the practicability of the oil sanction. This was perfectly acceptable to Laval though, as a last service to Italy, the latter secured Eden's agreement that it should be made clear at Geneva that the enquiry did not imply acceptance of the oil sanction.4 The committee was set up on zz January.

Next month, Eden began to worry. On I7 February he told the cabinet that 'There was the danger . . . that Italy might succeed'.5 His fears were heightened when, on 2I February, Barton sent a telegram from Addis Ababa. The emperor asked that Ethiopia should become a British protectorate or mandated territory. It seemed, Barton explained, that the emperor realized that 'recent Italian advances on both fronts render a prolonged struggle in- evitable'. The cabinet quickly approved the rejection of Ethiopian entry into the British Empire, but Haile Selassie's loss of confidence was evident.6

In the same month, the experts reported on the oil sanction, pointing out what everyone knew, that its efficacy would depend on some limitation of exports from the U.S.A. The League Com- mittee of Eighteen was reconvened for z March to consider the report. Eden circulated a paper to the cabinet on zz February. He drew attention to the emperor's message which reinforced his 'conviction that so long as the Italian adventure appeared hopeless there was a strong case for letting the present sanctions have their

I. CAB 24/259, CP IO(36). 2. CAB 24/260, CP 52(36).

3. CAB 21/421, J3043/84/I; 4. FO 371/2o18o, J45o/2x6/i, CP.5(36), J68o/2x6/i. CAB 23/83, Cab 1(36)4.

5. Ibid. Cab 7(36)3. 6. FO 37I/20173, Ji60I, I602/84/I. CAB 23/83. Cab 9(36)5.



effect... . In the circumstances, however ... I feel strongly that inaction by the Committee would be politically disastrous."

On 26 Februaty 1936 Eden told the cabinet 'that on balance he thought the League ought to agree to impose' the oil sanction. Once again Baldwin invited every minister to speak. At the end he summed up and 'agreed in the general view that an oil sanction ought now to be imposed'. His reasons were wholly domestic. 'Politically he thought that his own position as Prime Minister would be much affected according to the decision taken ... a refusal to impose an oil sanction would have a disastrous effect both now and at the next General Election.' The Dominions wanted it. 'He also attached the utmost importance to the labour side of the question which was of vital importance to the Defence Requirements pro- grammes.'2 The first lord (Eyres Monsell) and the president of the board of trade (Runciman) asked for their dissent to be recorded.

The Italians were bringing their French friends into action again. On 24 February, Suvich, the Italian under-secretary of state, and on 27 February Mussolini himself, warned the French ambassador in Rome that if more sanctions were applied, Italy would leave the League and denounce the Franco-Italian military agreements of the summer of 193 5.3 Flandin was not an advocate of the encirclement of Germany. He did not want France to risk wat to defend Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland or Russia. (As a result he cared little for the demilitarized zone.) Still, he wanted France to be capable of self- defence and the loss of the Italian military understandings could cause the French army to have to plan to defend the Italian frontier. This consideration reinforced the inhibitions of Flandin which derived from his need to keep support on the French right; indeed anything disliked by the French general staff would be disliked by the right.4

In Geneva on the morning of z March, Eden gave Flandin the disagreeable news of the British cabinet's decision to support the oil sanction. Flandin immediately refused to agree to the application of the oil sanction and argued that Italy might be ready to discuss peace terms. Eden agreed to a new attempt at peace-making but proposed that a date for the oil sanction should be fixed 'say three or four weeks ahead'. Flandin 'did not take kindly to this suggestion'.5 After this meeting, Eden telephoned to London and talked to Neville Chamberlain. They decided to modify the cabinet's decision of z6 February. Then, it had been agreed that the United Kingdom should not take the lead in proposing the oil sanction. Instead, Eden

I. CAB 24/260, CP 53(36). 2. CAB 23/83, Cab ii(36)5. 3. Doc. dipl. fr., 2e serie, tome i, nos. 224, 239. 4. FO 37I|I88II, J588I/I/I. FO 37I/I8794, C7717/33/I7. FO 371120i88, JI9771

587/I. FO 37I/20379, R759/I25/67. CAB 24/1262, CPIzz(36). 5. FO 37i/20i89, JI939/757/I.



announced that afternoon that the British government were 'in favour of the imposition of an oil embargo'. This counterbalanced his support for Flandin's peace proposal. Flandin was embarrassed by this move. He retaliated next morning, 3 March, by using Laval's old device of undermining British support for collective security in Africa by threatening to call for it in Europe. Eden's remarks, he claimed, lessened the chances of peace in Ethiopia and he raised 'a more serious question'. The oil sanction might cause Italy to withdraw from Locarno and repudiate its obligations to support France against a German violation of the demilitarized zone. If so, Flandin wished, he said, to count on England 'being ready to support France even alone in the maintenance of the demilitarized zone' l

Flandin had hit upon the line that he maintained during the Rhineland crisis: to extract concessions from the British by threatening to drag them into action against Germany. On 5 March, the British cabinet plunged into agitated discussion. Some members of the cabinet understood what was happening: 'the French Govern- ment's objective ... was not so much to secure our active co- operation which they themselves must know was not feasible in the present state of our public opinion and armaments, but rather to give them an excuse before French public opinion to avoid acquies- cing in an oil embargo on Italy.' Eden, however, got the cabinet to agree to speed up the application of the plan which he and the foreign office had devised, for negotiating the Germans into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in return for an air pact, thus gaining the latter and preventing the French from making Locarno into an embarrassment.2 - Hitler interrupted on 7 March I936, when German forces entered the demilitarized zone. Flandin now demanded coercive action from the British against Germany. He knew well enough that there was no prospect of this - in British eyes a peaceful movement of German forces into German territory was quite different from the Italian attack on Ethiopia. It was now impossible, though, to get the French to agree to further sanctions against Italy; indeed, as Eden told the cabinet on I9 March, it was now a question of persuading the French government to agree to maintain existing sanctions.3

When the League Committee of Thirteen met on z i March it agreed merely that its chairman, M. de Madariaga, and the secretary- general should continue to seek a basis of negotiation between Italy and Ethiopia.4

I. FO 37I/20I89, JI97I/757/I. FO 37I/I19887, J 2045/84/I. FO 371/20I88, JI985/ 587/I.

2. FO 37I/I885I, C7752/55/I8. CAB 27/599, Papers CP42(36), G36(3). FO 37I/19887, C I405/4/I8. CAB 23/83, Cab 15(36)-.

3. CAB 23/83, Cab 23(36)3. 4. CAB 23/83, Cab 24(36)2.


I974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS 193 5-1936 329

These futile efforts dragged on until, on 3 April, a special Ethiopian envoy told Eden that a complete Ethiopian collapse was imminent. Eden told the cabinet on 6 April that 'the only effective action at the present stage would be the closing of the Suez Canal'. This he did not suggest and the cabinet rejected the idea.' Eden proposed to revert to the original British policy of pretence that the League might be able successfully to coerce Italy without risk of war (the moment when it seemed it might come true had gone) and to 'satisfy British opinion' by announcing readiness to engage in further economic or financial sanctions, action which 'was not likely to prove effective'. So Eden went on talking coercion and sanctions and Flandin went on talking peace and inaction. Sarraut, the Radical prime minister, thought of a new argument. The left in France was associated with collective security; if the British were intransi- gent and faced the French electorate with a choice between Italy on the one side and England plus the League on the other, the anti- British right would be strengthened.2

A considerable body of opinion within the foreign office advocated closing the Suez Canal in order to prevent, at the last minute, the triumph of Italian aggression; Eden expressed sympathy but did not try to convert the cabinet. On I 5 April, Mr Makins advocated closing Suez. Eden noted that this was a 'stimulating' suggestion but said nothing of it in a gloomy discussion at the cabinet on zz April.3

On 5 May, Italian troops entered Addis Ababa. The only question that remained was whether or not to keep sanctions going in the hope of securing some limitation on the Italian exploitation of their victory in east Africa. On 4 May, Flandin urged on the British ambassador in Paris that the question should be closed before he ceased to be French foreign minister. He used a new form of the threat to drag Britain into European commitment. He 'thinks that Socialist Government in France may propose fresh sanctions and may then demand our support for sanctions against Germany, which, he said, would be a very embarrassing position for His Majesty's Government.'4 The government was embarrassed enough as it was. An attempt to keep sanctions going might fail and would probably be fruitless in any case. The continued enmity of Italy, it was thought, would make it more difficult to reach a settlement with Germany, and it was difficult enough to restrain the French from provocative gestures towards Germany without having to force them into continued sanctions. On the other hand, British opinion would not relish the acceptance of the defeat of the League implied in the ending of sanctions.

i. FO 371/20I66, J2809/45/I. CAB 23/83, Cab 27(36)I. 2. CAB 2I/421, C3059/4/I8. 3. FO 371/20472, W385I/79/98. CAB 23/84, Cab 30(36)3. 4. FO 371/200174, J3842/84/I.



On 6 May the cabinet decided not to have a policy. It agreed that Eden should not 'take the initiative for a decision either to put on new sanctions or to take off existing sanctions'. It hoped that Mussolini would save the faces of the League and of the British government by being 'reasonable' about 'the future of Abyssinia' in return for the removal of sanctions.' The Council of the League responded by postponing decision until I 5 June, a date later post- poned until z6 June.

The British cabinet discussed sanctions at four meetings: on 27

May, 29 May, io June and I7 June. It was decided that the United Kingdom should propose the end of sanctions. This time French views contirbuted little to the discussions: Corbin told Eden on 9 June that Blum and Delbos, the new French president of the council and minister for foreign affairs, had no clear views about what to do except that they hoped sanctions would not drag on and that they wanted to keep in step with the United Kingdom.2 The most important cause of the British decision was the fear that sanctions would break down anyway, by individual defection, and that a triumphant Italy could therefore assert its claims against the former sanctionists by negotiating with them one by one. Alternatively the fear remained that if, by some unlikely diplomatic triumph, Britain secured the continuance of sanctions and if this brought a crisis in the Italian economy, Mussolini would go to war against Britain and French help could not be relied on.

On 27 May Eden's 'strong inclination, if a good reason could be found, was not to raise sanctions' and Chamberlain thought that 'we ought not to give up sanctions without getting something in return'. On 29 May Eden argued 'that it was not practicable, by the maintenance of sanctions, to ensure the withdrawal of Italy from Abyssinia', but, if the French agreed, he would not propose or join in proposing the removal of sanctions. Chamberlain wished to sound Mussolini out to see what assurances of good behaviour he might offer if sanctions were ended; Baldwin supported him. Eden's attitude had changed further by the time the cabinet met again in the morning of io June. He explained that 'there was no immediate hurry owing to the postponement of the meeting of the Council until June 26th I936. He proposed to circulate a memorandum. He himself was rather veering towards the view that if sanctions were to be removed there was something to be said for our taking the initiative.' The memorandum, dated i i June, recommended the removal of sanctions - it must have been in preparation before the cabinet meeting the previous day.3 On 17 June, the cabinet agreed to the immediate raising of sanctions.4 The crisis was over.

I. CAB 23/84, Cab 34(36)4. 2. FO 401/36, C4194/3511/17- 3. FO 371/20181, J5345/2I6/I. 4. CAB 23/84, Cab 39(36)8, 40(36)5, 41(36)1, 42(36)I.


1974 ETHIOPIAN CRISIS 1935-I936 331

At the time, and since, it has been supposed that Eden, the ardent sanctionist, was outvoted in the cabinet or even outmanoeuvred by Chamberlain's allegedly pre-emptive surrender in his public speech of io June. In fact, Eden himself seems, however reluctantly, to have accepted the arguments against the continuance of sanctions. As for Chamberlain's speech, it went no further than to state positions the cabinet had already reached: that it was 'the very midsummer of madness' to think that Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia could be reversed without war, that members of the League would not risk war except in defence of their own interests and that the League needed reform. Chamberlain was not trying to force a policy change or to defeat Eden, he was expressing his impatience with the apparent dilatoriness of Baldwin and the indecision of Baldwin's protege Eden. It is not surprising that Baldwin rebuked Chamberlain at the next meeting of the cabinet. Chamberlain was the most energetic and effective member of the cabinet; he knew it and wished to demonstrate it. In August 1936, Chamberlain wrote to David Margesson, the Conservative chief whip, 'you know better than anyone how much of other people's burdens I have had to carry. But I don't mind that so long as the side comes out on top.'" He wished also to show that the government was not simply paralysed by the failure of sanctions.

Chamberlain's dramatically-phrased admission of the failure of sanctions made him seem to be the leader in advocating their abandonment. Eden, therefore, was advertised as being more loyal to the League, more hostile to dictators, than his colleagues. One effect of this crisis was to establish Eden's reputation for superior insight and higher morality when the failure of the League came to be regretted and resistance to Hitler and Mussolini to seem the only proper course. Another effect of the crisis on British politics was to strengthen the suspicions, on the left, that the government was composed of imperialistically-minded hypocrites; the national unanimity that followed Hoare's September speech was soon dissi- pated by the equivocations imposed on the government by Laval and Flandin.

Study of the crisis makes it plain how narrow were the choices open to the British government. Indeed, given the prevalent attitudes of the British public and given the assumption that war with Italy must not be risked without the promise of guaranteed and declared French armed support, there were only two courses open to the British government. One was to do what it did; the other was to declare readiness to stop Italy by applying every necessary means of pressure through the League and to lay the blame on the French for failure to stop Italy. The second option was ruled out because it was agreed, sometimes reluctantly, that French co-operation was

i. Churchill College, Cambridge, MRGN I/I/I3.


332 THE ETHIOPIAN CRISIS I935-I936 April

essential in making Britain safe against Germany by whatever mixture of coercion and conciliation might be adopted. Most important, it was impossible to see how Germany could ever be induced to limit her air force except by involving the French in an agreement. On the other hand, if there were no limitation of armaments then France must be kept independent of Germany. Either way, Ftance must not be alienated. Only if British governments had thought it possible that Britain could risk isolation from Europe and pay for the armed forces necessary to defend Britain and the empire against a German-dominated Europe and a hostile Japan, could British policy have been changed.

On its side, the French government was powerless to act in any other way. The internal political situation debarred Laval and Flandin both from encouraging the British to back the League and from an open veto on support for the League. To many French supporters of right-wing politicians a weakening of Mussolini meant strengthening the threat of social revolution; there were enough of them to prevent it.

British policy was dictated by fear of Germany combined with respect for the League; French policy by fear of social change combined with the politicians' need to make sufficient obeisance to the League to save the Radicals from embarrassment. The interaction of British and French policies explains how Mussolini secured his greatest triumph.

The.Queen's College, Oxford R. A. C. PARKER
