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USA v. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos (96 SCRA 381)US v. Dorr (2 Phil 322)Co Kim Cham v. Tan KehGP v. Monte de Piedad (G.R. 9959)

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[State defined]

Province of North Cotabato and Vice Governor Piol vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Facts of the Case:

On August 5, 2008, Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF through their Chairpersons of respective peace negotiating panels were scheduled to sign a memorandum of agreement on ancestral domains (MOA-AD) aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia..

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiations and concluding of prior agreements between MILF and GRP. On July 18, 1997, GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities and the following year, signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent. However, it was already evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.

A series of attacks by MILF as well as declaration of an all-out war by the Government was declared. Eventually, attacks ceased and negotiations resumed and several exploratory talks were held which eventually led to the crafting of the draft of MOA-AD in its final form.

On July 27, 2008, Province of North Cotabato and Vice Governor Piol filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order invoking right to information on matters of public concern and of declaring MOA-AD to be unconstitutional hence, present petitions.

Issue/s:

-WON there is a violation of people's rights to inform on matters of public concern under a state of policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art. 3, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 28, 1987 Constitution)-WON the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws

Held:

Yes. As provided in Section 7 of Article 3 of the ConstitutionSection 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

As well as Section 28, Article 2 of the Constitution

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The Constitution grants among the people the right to know matters and issues involving public interest. Upon the disclosure of such trivial matters concerning public interest, it establishes a concrete and ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the main objective. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

In the present case, since the MOA-AD unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro People, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment with the provision in the MOA-AD stating that it covers provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the ARMM. Therefore, it is only just and rightful for the petitioners to invoke their right to information.

Yes. The case invoked an international law on the concept of association to which Keitner and Reisman states that

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free association represent a middle ground between integration and independence

In illustration of the theory of association, let's take the example between Marshall Islands and the US Government wherein the Marshall Islands shall generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation and cultural relations. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands the US government has authority and obligation to defend them as if they were just part of the US territory.

Similarly in the present case, MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association specifically: -Bangsamoro Juridical entity's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries,-the commitment of the Central Government (PH Government) to ensure Bangsamoro Juridical Entity's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and specialized UN Agencies and,-continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense.

Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine Official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to bodies of water adjacent or between islands forming part of the ancestral domain resembles the right of the government of Marshall Islands to be consulted by the US government.

This concept of association is NOT recognized under the present Constitution. It can then be said that the proposed BJE is not merely an expanded version of ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention namely a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming that BJE would not sever any portions of the Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself in use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

[Sovereign Immunity: Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State; Consent]

USA vs. RUIZ

Facts of the case:

The United States of America (USA) had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between Philippines and USA. Sometime in May 1972, US invited the submission of bids for the repair projects of damaged wharves in the said naval base.

Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids and that the company received from US telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company to which Eligio de Guzman & Co. complied with. The company then alleges that US had already accepted its bids because a request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to US' bidding practices. The company then received a letter which was signed by the Director of the Department of Navy of US stating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract. Further, it has already awarded the bid to third parties.

The company then sued United States of America and all members of the Engineering Command of US Navy ordering them to allow Eligio de Guzman & Co. to perform the work on the projects or if specific performance is no longer possible, to pay damages to the company. Company also asked for preliminary injunction to restrain US from entering into contracts with third parties to which US only appeared for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court with the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of individuals of agents of America, a sovereign which has not given her consent to the suit or any other suit. US filed a motion to dismiss but to no avail hence, the present petition.

Issue/s:-WON the US Naval Base in bidding for the said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke State immunity

Held:Yes. The traditional role of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent. Such rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However since the activities of the States have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). It is said though that State immunity only extends to sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) for if a State enters into a contract or commiting private commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis) with a private individual or organization it is said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued which is adhering to that of Article 16, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

In the present case, the reparation projects are an integral part of the Naval Base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, which is considerably a function of the government and cannot be said to be utilized for or dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Therefore, US Naval Base exercised governmental functions as to the repair projects in invoking State immunity and therefore cannot be sued.

Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos

Facts of the Case:

Sometime in 1924, the Government took the parcel of land situated in Cebu City owned by Victoria Amigable for road-right-of-way purposes. The land has since become the streets known as Mango and Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City.

Victoria Amigable then filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover ownership and possesion of land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the Government.

Issue:WON Amigable can sue the Cebu City government in the alleged illegal occupation of land to recover her ownership and possession of said land

Held:No.Sec. 3, Article 16 of the 1987 Constitution states that a State may not be sued without its consent. State immunity however extends only to government or sovereign acts and not to proprietary acts as held in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro,Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized In the present case however, Amigable filed a suit against Commission of Public Highways a government agency in performance of its governmental function through the road of right of way purposes. It only means that since the agency is in its performance of its government vested duty it cannot be sued taking also from the case of Metran vs. Paredes stating that:In a republican state like the Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government of the people, by the people, and for the people- a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare. In so agreeing the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender some of their private rights and interest which were calculated to conflict with higher rights and larger interests of the people as a wholewherein in this case, larger interests pertains to the road-right-of-way projects and higher rights pertaining to state immunity. Therefore, Cebu City government cannot be sued upon the intention of Amigable to recover her ownership and possession of land.

US vs. DorrFacts: Dorr et. al., have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of United States and Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of Manila Freedom of April 6, 1982 under the caption of a few hard facts in violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission which states that:Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish or circulate scurrilous libel against Government of US or Insular Government of PH...

Issue:WON the article cited when it provided Insular Government of PH islands mean in a general and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands or the aggregate of the individuals by whom Government is being administered?

Held:The article of the Commission in question contains no attack upon Governmental system of United States and Government of PH Islands. It is understood in modern political science by the term government which is an institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to hire in a social state or which are imposed upon people forming that society by those who possess power or authority prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By administration, it is understood as the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of the government are of the time being. In the present case, the editorial article was directed towards the character of men who are entrusted with the administration of government and not on the governmental system by which the authority of United States is enforced in these lands.

ESTRADA vs. ARROYO(guys huhu nibasa ko sa case kanang wala man koy nakit-an nga definition sa Government of the Philippines however as an alternative):*Section 2, Administrative Code of the Philippines (E.O. 292)Government of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as contrary appears from the context, various arms through which political authority is made effective in Philippines whether pertaining to autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.

CO KIM CHAN VS. TAN KEHFacts:Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation and that after the liberation of Manila, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the said case saying that a proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the Court of Philippines under Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation and that furthermore, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings in the courts of the defunct Republic of Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Additionally, he contends that the government established in Philippines during Japanese occupation were no de facto governments. Hence, present petition.

Issue/s:-WON under the rules of international law, judicial acts and proceedings of courts established in Philippines were good and valid and remained as such even after the liberation or reoccupation of Philippines by US and Filipino forces -If said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, WON the present courts may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time Philippines was reoccupied and liberated

Held:Yes.It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, and the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.

According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.

Therefore, in this case judicial acts and proceedings of court are good and valid for only political laws are abrogated and not that of judicial as well as administrative acts.

Yes.The proceedings in cases pending in the said courtmay continue without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become laws and courts of Japan. Same Courts may continue exercising the same jurisdictions and cases pending therein before the restoration of commonwealth until abolished and replaced by the said government.

[DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE]Government of Philippines vs. Monte de Piedad

Facts: An earthquake has happened in the Philippine islands on June 3, 1863 to which the Government of Spain provided $400, 000 as aid for the victims and was received by the Philippine Treasury. After the distribution of the allotments to victims, $80, 000 was left untouched and was then invested in Monte de Piedad bank which in turn invested it in jewelries.

On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette. Monte de Piedad bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party and has no right to institute a complaint and further provides that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

Issue:WON the Philippine Government is competent to file a complaint against the Monte de Piedad Bank

Held:Yes. The Philippine Government is competent to institute an action against Monte de Piedad Bank. The state as a sovereign is the paren patriae of the people which means that the government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such rights hence as parents of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people. Moreover, if the said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capabilities.