goodmans semiotic theory of art

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Goodman's Semiotic Theory of ArtAuthor(s): Markus LammenrantaSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 339-351Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231787 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 339 Volume 22, Number 3, Septemberl992, pp. 339 - 352

Goodman's Semiotic Theory of Art

MARKUS LAMMENRANTA University of Helsinki Unioninkatu 40 B SF-00170 Helsinki Finland

In 1968, Nelson Goodman published his Languages ofArf which became one of the most important works on aesthetics in the tradition of ana- lytical philosophy. Goodman offered there a semiotic theory of art, the purpose of which was to explicate our concept of art in terms of different symbolic or referential functions; the theory was further developed in his subsequent book Ways of Worldmaking. Though it is a very subtle and sophisticated theory, I will argue that it is not adequate, that it doesn't even satisfy Goodman's own requirements for a theory of art.

Traditionally, the aim of a theory of art has been to capture the essence of art, to describe what is common to all works of art and at the same time distinguishes them from everything else. As a nominalist, Good- man does not, however, believe that there is any essence of art that we can discover. There is just our practice of calling certain objects works of art. So, the task of defining art is not a matter of discovering a hidden essence.

But neither is it to describe the ordinary use of the term 'work of art.' Ordinary usage is often ambiguous and vague. The task is rather to reform this usage so that it becomes more precise and informative. Sometimes we may need to correct this usage in an even more radical way. This kind of thing happened e.g. when biologists defined the term

1 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Brighton: Harvester Press 1981)

2 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett 1978)



340 Markus Lammenranta

'fish' so that it doesn't apply to whales though ordinary usage may take whales to be fish. Our ordinary concept may not be appropriate for scientific and philosophical purposes, in which case it needs to be revised.3

We can say that Goodman is proposing a rational reconstruction or explication4 of our concept of art. Such an explication must satisfy at least two requirements: First, it must be immune from counterexamples. This doesn't mean that every case where the explication is in conflict with ordinary usage is a counterexample. Explication is sometimes allowed to revise ordinary usage. But we can't allow too drastic revisions, because otherwise we would not have a explication of art at all. For systematical reasons, we can let our definition exclude some cases that we pretheoretically took as works of art and include some cases that wje didn't take as works of art. But they can't be any important cases, cases that we care about. So the definition must be immune from any important counterexamples.

Second, the definition must be illuminating. It is made to serve ex- planatory purposes. For example, it won't do to define 'a work of art' as something made by an artist. If we take any person that makes works of art as an artist, then there may not be any counterexamples; but it would not be very illuminating to be told that the concepts of a work of art and an artist are connected in this way. We have no use for a definition that doesn't help us to understand anything. The definition of 'a work of art' must pick out interesting similarities between different works of art and at the same time relate them to other cultural objects. A good definition of art should increase our understanding of art and its relationship to other parts of our culture.

Many traditional and current theories of art satisfy only one of these requirements: either they are not immune from counterexamples or they are not illuminating. But Goodman promises to give a theory of art that has both of these virtues. Though I think Goodman's theory is the most promising theory in this respect, I must conclude that it doesn't succeed. At first, it may really look that it is both immune from counterexamples and illuminating, but this is just an illusion which is based on his using his central primitive term 'reference' ambiguously. When we resolve this ambiguity, we can see that his theory either gets a large number of

3 Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1984), 198-9

4 Goodman speaks about constructional definitions; see his The Structure of Appear- ance (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1977), 3-23.



Goodman's Semiotic Theory of Art 341

important counterexamples or becomes vacuous. So, it can't satisfy both of the requirements for a theory of art. To make my point clear, I should like first to give a short sketch of Goodman's theory.

Traditionally, a theory of art is supposed to be an answer to the question What is art?' Goodman thinks that this is a wrong question. We can see why if we consider cases of found art - Duchamp's Fountain or just a stone picked out of the driveway and exhibited in the museum. It can be very difficult to decide whether one has here a work of art or not. If we take these as cases of art, shouldn't we take any ordinary urinal or stone as a work of art, too?

Difficulties like these show, according to Goodman,5 that we have asked the wrong question. Instead of asking What is art?' we should rather ask When is art?' The real question is not 'What objects are works of art?' but When is an object a work of art?' This is so because an object can function as a work of art at some times and not at others. A stone doesn't usually function as a work of art while in a driveway, but may do so when on display in an art museum.

We can make similar remarks on symbols. Just as an object may be a work of art at certain times and not at others, so an object may be a symbol at certain times and not at others. An object functions as a symbol only when it is used as a symbol, i.e., it is used for referring to something or it is used as a member in a scheme of symbols some of which are used for referring. Goodman's general theory of symbols is a presentation of different types and functions of symbols and symbol systems - of different ways objects are used for referring.6

In his semiotic theory of art, Goodman combines these two points: an object functions as a work of art only when it functions as a symbol. To function as a symbol is a necessary condition for an object to function as a work of art. It is, naturally, not sufficient. The world is full of objects that function as symbols but do not function as art. So, Goodman needs to distinguish the cases of art from other sorts of symbolic functioning. Things function as works of art only when their symbolic functioning has certain characteristics which Goodman calls the symptoms of the aesthetic. He distinguishes five symptoms: (1) syntactic density, (2) semantic density, (3) relative repleteness, (4) exemplification, and (5) multiple and complex reference. Such a symptom is neither a necessary

5 Ways of Worldmaking, 66-7

6 The theory is given in Languages of Art; for a summary, see Of Mind and Other Matters, 55-70.




nor a sufficient condition but rather a feature that, in conjunction with others, makes it more probable that something functions as art.7

I shall not discuss here whether the symptoms of the aesthetic sug- gested by Goodman are adequate. I will raise a more important question: whether symbolic functioning is a necessary condition for an object to function as a work of art at all. The answer depends on how we interpret Goodman's term 'symbolic functioning' or 'referring/ because he seems to use these terms in two different senses, in a broad sense and in a narrow sense. If we accept the broad interpretation, symbolic functioning seems to be a necessary condition for an object to function as art. But this broad reading makes the whole theory totally vacuous. If we accept the narrow interpretation, on the other hand, symbolic functioning can't be a necessary condition, because there will be many cases where an object functions as art without functioning as a symbol. The narrow interpretation of 'referring7 thus leaves room for a huge number of counterexamples. So, Goodman's theory fails on both interpretations.

Goodman's theory may look more promising than it is if we mix up these two interpretations. We use the broad interpretation to rule out counterexamples and the narrow interpretation to make theory look illuminating. I think Goodman switches these interpretations all the time without noticing: he is, of course, not allowed to do so. We must keep the interpretations distinct.

Goodman uses 'reference' as a primitive and most general term of his system. It covers all sorts of symbolization, all cases of standing for. There are two main forms of reference: denotation and exemplification. 'Denotation' applies to cases, such as naming, predication, and descrip- tion, where a word or string of words applies to one object or to each of many objects: e.g., 'Gdansk' denotes a single city, and 'city' denotes each of the cities of the world. But denotation includes also depiction by drawings, paintings, sculpture, photographs, films, and so on: e.g., a portrait denotes its subject, and a drawing of a tiger in a dictionary may denote each of all tigers. So, denotation covers all cases of representational art.

7 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 67-70, and Of Mind and Other Matters, 135-8. Goodman doesn't thus give a complete definition of art that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions. He gives just one necessary property and a cluster of typical properties of art. This may, however, be taken as an early stage in a search for a definition (Of Mind and Other Matters, 135). And it can be evaluated in terms of the same criteria that are appropriate for a complete definition. His one necessary condition makes it possible to look for counterexamples, and, of course, we can assess how illuminating it is. See also n. 11.




Exemplification is reference of a sample to a feature of the sample. Take, e.g., a swatch of cloth in a tailor's sample book. It functions as a symbol exemplifying certain properties. It exemplifies color, weave, texture, and pattern, but not size, shape, or weight. It refers to some of its properties, not to all of them. Exemplification is possession plus reference. Samples are thus used to refer to some of their own properties. Goodman's notion of exemplification explains how abstract works can function as symbols. They refer to their own properties. They exemplify colors, sounds, forms, structures, rhythms, even feelings.

Both denotation and exemplification are divided into literal and metaphorical forms of referring. The notion of metaphorical denotation is used to explain how fictive works of art can denote something. Though terms like 'Don Quixote,' 'Don Juan,' and 'Lolita' don't denote literally anything, they denote metaphorically many of us. Expression, on the other hand, is analyzed as metaphorical exemplification. So expression of feelings and other properties is understood as one sort of reference, reference to metaphorical properties of a work.

There are also complex forms of reference, chains of reference made up of simple links, each of which is constituted of either denotation or exemplification. So, a work can also hint or suggest something by referring indirectly to it.

So we have here a very simple theory constructed in terms of just a few primitive notions. Even exemplification is further analyzed in terms of reference and the converse of denotation. But at the same time it explains a lot. It gives an illuminating account of several important phenomena in the arts: representation, expression, fiction, allusion, abstract art, and so on. At the same time, it seems to explain how works of art differ from other cultural objects, from non-symbols, like hammers, axes, knifes, and pencils, and from other symbols, like scientific theories, thermometers, traffic signs, and gestures. We seem to have a very effective theory.

However, there is an ambiguity that may not be so easily detected. Goodman uses his term 'reference' in two distinct ways. This ambiguity resides in one of the subspecies of reference and derives from there. His use of the term 'denotation' is reasonably clear. But we can't say the same about 'exemplification.' My claim is that Goodman's use of 'exemplification' is ambiguous.

Let's take another look at exemplification. The basic motivation for introducing this term is to explain how non-representational works can refer. It is here where the most semiotic theories get into difficulties. Here, we have just structures of paint or sound. How are we supposed to use them for referring to something? Goodman has an ingenious answer: we use these works as samples of the structures and other properties they instantiate. So, these works exemplify some of their own properties.




Because exemplification is the only form of reference available for some works of art, like abstract paintings, buildings, and musical works, Goodman's semiotic theory implies that those works function as art only when they exemplify their properties.8 But do non-representational works always exemplify their own properties? Do they always function as samples? To answer this questions, we must consider a little more carefully what the conditions are under which we can correctly say that an object exemplifies some of its own properties. By reading Goodman carefully, I think we can get two wholly different answers to this question. There are two distinct interpretations of 'exemplification/

In some passages Goodman seems to say that he uses the term 'exemplification' just to make a distinction between the artistically relevant properties of a work of art and the irrelevant properties: to say that a work exemplifies certain properties is just to say that these are the artistically relevant properties of the work. E.g. to Monroe Beardsley's criticism that the whole idea of exemplification might be dropped without a loss, that mere possession of properties is all that matters, Goodman gives the following response:

Surely he [Beardsley] does not suppose that critical comment consists of random

listing of properties a work possesses, or that understanding a work amounts to

noting such properties indiscriminately. A vital part of aesthetic understanding, especially but not exclusively in the case of abstract works, is determining which

among its properties the work not only possesses but also conveys. The significant properties of a work, we might say, are those it signifies. This must be taken fully into account in one way or another, and my way is in terms of exemplification.9

In another passage, he writes:

8 I don't want to deny that there are some buildings and musical works that denote and represent something. Some musical events may represent e.g. a gunshot or

singing of birds. Goodman notes himself that some buildings contain statues that

represent and that even a whole building may sometimes represent something. E.g. Jorn Utzon's Opera House in Sydney represents sailboats, though even in this case we are more interested in the form it exemplifies. See Goodman, 'How Buildings Mean,' Critical Inquiry 12 (1986), reprinted in Nelson Goodman & Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy & Other Arts & Sciences (London: Routledge 1988) 31-48. These are all quite exceptional cases. For my purposes, it is enough that there are

typical cases of paintings, buildings, and musical works that do not denote anything.

9 Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters, 84




Why not, then, speak simply of properties possessed rather than properties exem-

plified or expressed? Because not all the properties the object possesses, but only those it exemplifies or expresses when functioning as a symbol of a certain kind, are relevant to it as a work of art.10

So, these two passages suggest that the point of using the term 'exemplification' is just to pick out certain relevant properties of an object. This means that the necessary and sufficient condition for an object to refer to some of its properties is just that these properties are relevant to it as such an object. To say that non-representational works of art always refer to something would be just to say that the work always have some properties that are relevant to it as a work of art. This is an extremely liberal view of exemplification or self-reference. It becomes trivially true that objects function as art only when they function as symbols. To use something as art is always to distinguish some of its properties from others. But to use almost anything for any purpose, we must distinguish some of its properties from others: e.g., we can't use any tool without knowing how to distinguish its relevant properties. Some properties of a hammer are relevant to it as a hammer, some properties of an axe are relevant to it as an axe, and so on. So this interpretation of symbolic functioning would not give us a way to distinguish art from these other human practices.

On this broad interpretation of 'exemplification,' symbolic functioning is a necessary condition for something to function as art. But this is so just because it is a necessary condition for anything to function as anything. So, on this interpretation, there are no counterexamples for Goodman's view that to function as art is to function as a symbol. But it also makes his view vacuous. If the semiotic theory of art says only that some properties of every work of art are artistically relevant, it doesn't say much. The theory ceases to be illuminating. It can't make an interesting distinction between works of art and other cultural objects, e.g. tools like a hammer, a pen, an axe, etc. So on this broad interpretation of 'symbolic functioning/ Goodman's theory doesn't satisfy one of the requirements for such a theory, the requirement that a theory or an analysis of art should be illuminating.11

10 Goodman, Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1972), 126

1 1 One of the referees of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy made the point that it is quite inappropriate to concede that functioning as a symbol is a necessary condition of art but to complain that it is not an interesting or illuminating necessary condition. Not all necessary conditions are expected to be interesting. There may be other

necessary conditions which together with this one make the theory illuminating.




On the other hand, giving an account of artistic relevance in terms of reference is unilluminating in another way. It doesn't tell us why certain properties of a work of art are artistically relevant while others are not. To get an illuminating account, we should be able to tell what is the purpose for which we use works of art, in other words, what is the function of art. This would explain why certain features of a work of art are relevant while certain others are not. The relevant features are those that help the work of art to serve its function well.

Of course, Goodman has also an account of the function of art. But if we take the function into account here, we get a narrower notion of exemplification. This narrower notion is more illuminating. It explains why certain properties are artistically relevant while others are not, and it also makes an illuminating distinction between works of art and other cultural objects, like hammers and other tools. The problem is that it makes Goodman's theory of art vulnerable to a large number of serious counterexamples.

According to Goodman, art has a cognitive function. So if we accept the narrow interpretation, the artistically relevant features are those that make the work cognitively efficient. And on this interpretation, we may say that the work refers only to those of its features that are cognitively relevant in this sense.

There is some evidence that Goodman ties up the symbolic function and the cognitive function in this way. He says that the primary purpose

This is a good general point, but it doesn't save Goodman's theory. First of all, Goodman gives only one necessary condition of art. So it is expected that it does some work in the theory. Second, if one still insist that this doesn't need to be so and that all the illumination comes from the symptoms of the aesthetic that are

supposed to distinguish artistic functioning from other symbolic functioning, I can

deny this, too. If we understand 'exemplification' in the broad sense and concede that tools exemplify their properties, the symptoms of the aesthetic doesn't help us at all. This is because tools would also satisfy most of the symptoms: at least (1) syntactic density, (2) semantic density, (3) relative repleteness, and (4) exemplification. The only symptom about which I hesitate is (5) the multiple and complex reference. So, the symptoms would not help us to distinguish art from ordinary tools, like hammers and axes, and tell us anything that is specifically illuminating about art. I can't explain here what Goodman means by his symptoms because of the technicalities involved, but I urge interested readers to study Goodman and confirm my point themselves. See Goodman, Languages of Art, 127-73, Ways of Worldmaking, 67-8, and Of Mind and Other Matters, 135-8.

One might suggest that tools would thus be a counterexample to Goodman's

theory. This is not so, however, because Goodman does not want to claim that the

symptoms are even conjunctively sufficient for something to function as art (Good- man, Of Mind and Other Matters, 135).




of symbolization is cognition in and for itself and that symbolization is to be judged fundamentally how well it serves the cognitive purpose.12

There are, however, two sides in Goodman's emphasizing cognition in art. This can be seen, for example, in the following passage:

I have held ... that we have to read the painting as well as the poem, and that aesthetic experience is dynamic rather than static. It involves making delicate discriminations and discerning subtle relationships, identifying symbol systems and characters within these systems and what these characters denote and exem-

plify, interpreting works and reorganizing the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world. (Ibid., 241)

On the one hand, our experiences of works of art involve cognition. To understand works of art, we must have certain cognitive skills. We must be able to make discriminations, to discern relationships, and to identify symbols and symbol systems. On the other hand, art increases our knowledge and understanding of the world, or worlds, as Goodman prefers to say elsewhere. We learn to reorganize the world in terms of art, or we learn to make worlds in terms of art, as he also says.

Now, when he speaks about the cognitive function of art, he can only mean the latter role of cognition in the arts. The function of art is to advance our knowledge and understanding of the world. It is not to develop those skills that are needed to understand art. It does not make sense to say that the function of art is to help us to understand art. But even here there is a slight danger of ambiguity. When Goodman empha- sizes cognition in the arts, it is not always quite clear whether he means that cognition is involved in understanding of art or that cognition is the function of art. The role of cognition in the first sense is easy to combine with the broad notion of exemplification. The latter role is required for the narrow notion.

So, if the symbolic function and the cognitive function of art are intimately connected, we get the narrow notion of exemplification. We can say that works of art refer to their properties only when this reference has a cognitive purpose. It is easy to motivate this view by devel- oping Goodman's own example. His paradigm for exemplification was a tailor's sample book. We may say that a sample exemplifies and thus refers to some of its properties, but only because we use it to get knowledge, and not just about the sample itself. We want to know something about another object distinct from it. The point of using the sample is that it is difficult or impossible to get the knowledge by directly

12 Goodman, Languages of Art, 258




inspecting the object itself. We use a tailor's sample book, because we want to know what properties the ready suit will have. We can't get this knowledge by direct inspection, because there is not yet any suit to inspect. So, we can say that a sample refers to its properties, because by referring to these properties, it also refers to the same properties of other objects, and thus gives us knowledge about those objects. This is the whole point of using the sample.

Analogously, the function of art is to give us knowledge about the world, knowledge that we can't get by inspecting it directly. Goodman expresses this metaphorically, as follows:

Works of art are not specimens from bolts or barrels but samples from the sea. They literally or metaphorically exemplify forms, feelings, affinities, contrasts, to be

sought in or built into a world. (Ways of Worldmaking, 137)

We can't find out directly the chemical composition of sea water. We can do this only by inspecting samples from the sea. In the same way, there is no ready-made world that we could directly inspect. We can get knowledge of a world (sic)13 only indirectly by using symbols. By symbols we divide our world or worlds into objects and kinds of objects, and thus in a sense make worlds. So, if works of art are samples from our worlds, then their whole purpose is knowing or making those worlds.14

Consequently, works of art exemplify their own properties only when they are used for the purpose of knowing and making worlds. We have here the narrow notion of exemplification. For a work of art to exemplify some of its properties, it is not enough that these are artistically relevant in some loose sense. They must be cognitively relevant, relevant to the purpose of knowing and making our worlds.15

13 In Ways of Worldmaking, Goodman speaks often about a world instead of the world. Because he now thinks that there are many worlds if any and that they are all made

by us with symbols, it would be misleading to speak about the world out there

waiting to be found. I will, however, go on speaking about the world, too, because I think that Goodman's theory of art is quite compatible with a realistic view about the world out there. See Markus Lammenranta, 'Do We Make Worlds With Sym- bols?' Semiotica, 86 (1991), 277-87.

14 According to Goodman's antirealism, knowing and making go on together. See Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 21-2.

15 Some aestheticians seem to interpret Goodman as claiming that mere making of works of art would count as worldmaking. This is a gross misunderstanding. Works of art are not worlds; they - like other symbols - are the means to making worlds.




But this narrow notion of exemplification makes Goodman's theory open to important counterexamples. There are important cases of artistic functioning that are not cases of symbolic functioning. So the latter can't be a necessary condition for the former. These cases can be found in works of art where the only possible form of symbolization is exemplification. I will argue that there are typical uses of non-representational works that do not serve a cognitive function. So, they would also be cases in which we do not use works of art as samples exemplifying their own properties.

I will not deny that such works can be used as samples and that we might sometimes use them so. Some non-representational works can draw our attention to some of their properties that we can 'built into a world.' I will just claim that there are important uses of art where we don't use such works as samples.

How do I know this? I think that there can be good evidence for how people use objects in how they evaluate them. If people can use an object for some purpose, they can, generally, also evaluate how efficient the object is for this purpose. Now, if people agree that a certain object is good, and we know that it is not a good means to a certain purpose, we have pretty good evidence that they are not using the object for that purpose.

A good example of non-representational art that people value highly is classical music: the symphonies of Beethoven, for example. Are these works good means to knowing our world or worlds? I would say that they are not. Of course, they instantiate certain musical forms, structures, themes, and so on. But do we learn to know our worlds better by studying these forms and structures? No, these are properties that are typical of classical music, not of the world or worlds outside it.

How about feelings? Classical music may exemplify feelings that are found in a world outside it, in human beings. This is true, but we might still doubt whether Beethoven's symphonies are typically used for knowing oneself and other people better. Because we can recognize feelings in ourselves, we can also project feelings to music. But it is hard to see how projecting feelings to music can help us to distinguish new feelings in ourselves. Moreover, there is good instrumental music - e.g. the Webern quartets - that is not very expressive of human feelings at all.

This misunderstanding may be encouraged by Goodman's broad notion of exem-

plification. Neither would the making of imaginary or fictive worlds count as

worldmaking in Goodman's sense. There are no fictive, merely possible, worlds.

Only making actual worlds counts as worldmaking.




I don't say that there might not be something in classical music that you can use for worldmaking. The point is that if this were the only basis of its value, the value would not be very high, indeed. It would not explain why people set such a high value on this kind of music. So, we have a good reason to believe that people generally use classical music for some other purpose.

This kind of examples can be multiplied by drawing from the other arts, like abstract painting and architecture. The point remains the same. We can use people's value judgments as evidence for how they use objects as works of art. This evidence suggests that there must be other purposes than the advancement of knowledge for which people use art. Their value judgments can't be explained by supposing that they speak exclusively about the cognitive efficiency of works of art.

At least in some cases, people's value judgment are better explained by supposing that they use works of art to get experiences. They listen to classical music to enjoy the experiences caused by it, and they evaluate it on the basis of the quality of the experience. Of course, they must discern some properties of the piece of music to enjoy it, but they are not using it as a sample of those properties, because their interest is just to enjoy the music, not to get knowledge about something else. So, they are not using the piece as a symbol. Nevertheless, it is clear that they may use it as a work of art. Consequently, symbolic functioning is not a necessary condition for an object to function as a work of art; and Goodman's semiotic theory of art must be rejected.

So, we have seen that there are two interpretations of Goodman's term 'exemplification.' How we should evaluate Goodman's semiotic theory of art depends on which interpretation we choose. If we choose the broad interpretation, then there are no counterexamples for his view that reference is a necessary condition for something to function as art. Every work of art can be said to exemplify some of their properties, because this is just to say that these properties are relevant for them as works of art. But on this broad interpretation, the whole theory becomes vacuous. To say that some properties of every work of art are relevant is not to say very much. It is not to make an illuminating distinction between works of art and other cultural objects.

But if we choose the narrow interpretation and make exemplification essentially connected to a cognitive function, then there will be a huge number of important counterexamples to Goodman's theory. There are many, especially non-representational, works that have no cognitive function. So they can' t be said to exemplify their own properties or refer in any other sense. Symbolic functioning is thus not a necessary condition for artistic functioning. Goodman's theory fails on both interpretations.

All this is not to say that Goodman's theory of art is not useful for our understanding of the arts. Its significance is just somewhat narrower




than Goodman himself thought. It is not adequate as a theory of the general nature of art. But if we interpret it as a theory of one of its functions, then it may be more successful. It may give an illuminating account of how art can serve the important function of advancing our knowledge and understanding.16

Received: August, 1991 Revised: February, 1992

16 I am indebted to Dr. Joseph Tolliver, Dr. Josef Tarnowski, and the editor and the

anonymous referees of Canadian Journal of Philosophy for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of this article.



goodmans semiotic theory of art

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