Goals and governance of higher education in India

Martin Carnoy • Rafiq Dossani

Published online: 24 August 2012� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract In this paper, we explore the evolution of the Indian State’s role in governance,

and the implications this has for goal setting. We find that the Indian government’s activist

role in governance marked a change from the colonial period. This, we suggest, was not

due to changes in the relative influence of different stakeholder groups. It was instead due

to new national developmental goals, particularly industrialization. Fairly quickly after

independence, we find that higher education governance came to be exercised in different

ways between the center and the states. Control over the system’s governance was to later

become an arena of contest between the national (central) government and the provinces

(states), leading to disagreements on strategies, such as on funding and regulation. In later

phases, particularly in the third phase that began in 1984 and continues to the present,

the disagreements intensified because educational priorities started changing due to

the changes in the relative influence of stakeholder groups and new forces such as

globalization.

Keywords Educational equity � Globalization � Higher education reform � India history �India politics � Market forces � Privatization � State policies � University governance

Introduction

India’s higher education system, as in many other countries, is under pressure from various

constituencies to improve. These constituencies include traditional elites, business inter-

ests, the underprivileged, globalists, and growth strategists, among others. Depending on

the constituency, ‘improvement’ means adequate enrollment growth, quality, cost-effec-

tiveness and equitable access. To achieve these goals, the State1 actively governs the

educational system. It does so through policymaking (defining the vision, mission,

M. Carnoy (&) � R. DossaniSchool of Education, Stanford University, 485 Lasuen Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, USAe-mail: carnoy@stanford.edu

1 When we use the word State with a capital letter, it refers to the political system as a whole, meaningcenter and local state (provincial) governments.

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High Educ (2013) 65:595–612DOI 10.1007/s10734-012-9565-9

objectives, goals and priorities), strategy (long-term and short-term action plans and

resource provision), regulation and operational control (implementation).2

In the past few years, with increasing interest in India’s economic surge, several

excellent analyses have been made of India’s universities, the manner in which they have

been expanding, and their quality (for example, Kapur 2010; Sunder 2010). However, the

recent research does not adequately deal with Indian university systems’ overall goals, and

how governance could be impacting those goals.

In this paper, we explore the governance of Indian higher education in two parts. First,

we describe the evolution of governance and the State’s role, and the implications these

have for goal setting. We thus update the literature on this topic, which has been relatively

ignored since Naik’s seminal work (1963, 1974). Second, we study the causes and out-

comes of this evolution. The academic literature identifies several factors that influence

education governance—such as democratization, conflicts among elites, and globaliza-

tion—and in very recent years, an increased emphasis on educational outcomes which puts

increasing pressure on the State to become ‘‘evaluative’’ (Enders 2004) or ‘‘managerialist’’

(Deem 1998).

We discuss these hypotheses for India. Apart from reliance on secondary sources,

during the period 2008–2011, we also interviewed key actors in 40 higher educational

institutions in four states on their governance practices, and interacted with policymakers

in the national and provincial governments.

Recognizing that today’s governance system may be a ‘‘layered’’ product of past

structures, our approach is historical, and it proceeds as follows. After a literature review

(‘‘Theoretical aspects of governance’’), we present the situation up to independence

(‘‘Higher education governance in the colonial period’’). Governance in independent India

is then presented in three phases defined by national political regimes. The first phase

covers the Prime Ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru (1947–1964), the second covers Indira

Gandhi’s rule (spanning 1966–1984) and the third begins with Rajiv Gandhi’s rule

(1984–1989) and continues to the present day (‘‘Higher education governance in the

Nehruvian period (1947–1964)’’, ‘‘Higher education governance in the Indira Gandhi

period (1966–1984)’’, ‘‘Higher education governance in the reform period (1984–2011)’’).

The logic for the phases is that we observe breaks in education governance co-incident

with national leadership in the first two phases. The third phase, from 1984 onwards,

features more gradual, though no less important, shifts in governance as political power

democratized and devolved, and a new force, globalization, appeared.3

‘‘Conclusion’’ discusses our findings. We find that the Indian government’s activist role

in governance marked a change from the colonial period. This, we argue, was not due to

2 Since the definitions of terms might differ, we clarify with the following example of affirmative actiongovernance: the vision statement might include education for all, the mission statement might specify thatthe focus would be on the lowest 20 % income students, the goal might state that this group should finishhigh school, the objective might be to set up publicly-owned schools that will provide such education withina certain time-line, and the strategy might specify locations, resources and ownership (such as enablingprivate provision).3 Academics largely agree that the Nehru and Indira Gandhi periods were marked by distinct styles ofgovernance. The later period is less commonly agreed on. Kohli (2010), Nagaraj (2010) and Chibber (2010)also specify three phases that roughly coincides with ours. Their logic is based on the phases of economicdevelopment, which moved from SOE-led manufacturing (Nehru), emphasis on equitable growth, reducedimportance for industrialization and a correspondingly greater emphasis on providing social services (Mrs.Gandhi) and economic reform favoring the private sector (Rajiv Gandhi onwards). Others, such as Ah-luwalia and Little (2012) and Joshi and Little (1996) argue that fiscal stabilization, which began from 1991,enabled a new phase of reforms and would separate the pre-1991 and post-1991 periods.

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changes in the relative influence of different stakeholder groups. It was instead due to new

national developmental goals, particularly industrialization. Fairly quickly after indepen-

dence, we find that higher education governance came to be exercised in different ways

between the center and the states. Control over the system’s governance was to later

become, even during Nehru’s rule, an arena of conflict between the national (central)

government and the provinces (states), leading to disagreements on strategies, such as on

funding and regulation. In later phases, particularly in the third phase that began in 1984

and continues to the present, the disagreements intensified because educational priorities

started changing due to the changes in the relative influence of stakeholder groups and new

forces such as globalization. This was accentuated by shifts in political power between the

center and states towards greater devolution and democratization, as well as new legal

interpretations on the commercialization of education. While these outcomes changed the

relative roles of the central and state governments, it did not change their joint influence on

governance, which remained high and crowded out direct roles for other stakeholders, such

as private providers. In their actions, we find that the center and states do not just represent

various stakeholders, but also display elements of a ‘bureaucratic’ state (Przeworski and

Limongi 1993), i.e., one in which the state seeks to maximize bureaucrats’ share of the

system relative to voters.

We find that, due to the way governance evolved, the impact on achieving goals was

mixed and did not usually match national policy priorities. Despite a national policy focus

on quality, this was the policy objective whose implementation was most sacrificed to

achieve other goals that were important to policymakers, particularly to provincial poli-

cymakers. These included access, equity and low costs per student (in some sense, ‘‘cost-

effectiveness’’), which, as the third phase evolved, were achieved to a remarkable extent.

In particular, provincial policymakers undertook initiatives on affirmative action in

excess of what the center earlier sought to do, sought massification by allocating a larger

share of state budgets to higher education and bringing in private providers, and focusing

on professional education (earlier, a central government priority and largely ignored by the

states).

Theoretical aspects of governance

It is generally accepted that the initial impetus for a higher educational system in almost all

countries comes from elites and is organized by them within their own institutions (Lindert

2004). With economic growth, a new challenge emerges. As Trow (1973) notes, ‘‘As a

system grows, it emerges from the obscurity of the relatively small elite system with its

relatively modest demand on national resources and becomes an increasingly substantial

competitor for public expenditures… And, as it does, higher education comes increasingly

to the attention of larger numbers of people both in government and in the general public,

who have other, often quite legitimate ideas about where public funds should be spent and,

if given to higher education, how they should be spent.’’ (p. 4). The growth usually takes

place both through the expansion of the elite universities and more importantly through the

growth of ‘‘popular, non-elite institutions.’’(Trow, p. 6) Trow further notes that, in the elite

system, decision making in ‘‘elite institutions is dominated by relatively small elite

groups,’’ while, in mass-based education, decision-makers are more subject to ‘‘demo-

cratic’’ political processes (p. 12). Governance, likewise, moves from ‘‘part-time aca-

demics who are essentially amateurs at administration’’ to those who ‘‘were formerly

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academics but who now are clearly full time university administrators. Below them is a

large and growing bureaucratic staff.’’(p. 14–15).

Trow’s thesis that mass higher education needs democracy and results in the expansion

of public education has been examined by Gallego (2010), who finds that greater local

democracy, i.e., federalism, is important for expanding access of the population to higher

levels of education, including tertiary education. In the absence of democratic checks and

balances, however, decentralization of educational decisions may lead to the capture of

local government by local elites and prevent the spending of public money on mass

education (Acemoglu et al. 2003).

Enders (2004) argues that once massification of higher education is largely achieved,

decision-making focuses more on achieving quality parameters to account for changing

demands from the market due to technological shifts and globalization. The state then

withdraws from direct control to ‘steering from a distance’.

In the context of the developed state, Burton Clark’s (1983) study of university orga-

nization stressed the ‘‘triangle’’ of coordination—‘‘market-like’’ coordination, i.e., a

response to market demand from students and their families; state-induced coordination;

and academic-professional coordination (the influence of the professoriate and the pro-

fessional administration of universities). See also Santiago et al. (2006).

Later work by Clark (1998) and Kirp (2003) discussed the rapid transformation of US

higher education institutions into ‘‘entrepreneurial universities’’ concerned with their

‘‘bottom line.’’ This gradually shifts focus to an ‘‘altered’’ version of market coordination,

one in which the university not only tries to attract students, but also becomes business

oriented. Usually, this change is driven by financial constraints and conceptions of a new

managerialism (Deem 1998), which may be accompanied by greater state control over

operations.

More recently, higher education analysts have focused on globalization, its impact on

the role of the nation-state, and how this translates into the relationship between the nation-

state and universities (for example, Enders 2004; Altbach and Teichler 2001; Marginson

and Ordorika 2010). Many of these same writers are concerned with the internationali-

zation of universities—the movements across borders by students and faculty, and even by

branches of universities—and their impact on university systems.

Higher education governance in the colonial period

Prior to independence, India was a British colony. It was under British rule that the first

initiatives towards a modern governance system began, in 1857, with the establishment of

three public universities in the ‘presidency headquarter’ cities of Chennai, Kolkata and

Mumbai.4

The universities were a governance system, not teaching bodies. They replicated the

University of London ‘federal university’ system in which the university is an affiliating

body for local colleges, and reports to its local government. The universities’ role was to

support the goals of its constituent colleges by designing curricula, holding examinations

and awarding degrees. The government was explicit about its lack of interest in providing

education through the university, paying for higher education in the colleges or sponsoring

4 http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/W/16/0W160301.htm, accessed December 8, 2010. The presi-dency in colonial times referred to an administrative subdivision.

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growth through publicly owned institutions. It was primarily interested in regulating

quality (Wood 1854; Schenkman 1954).5

The colleges were largely privately owned and prepared Indians from the upper classes

for work in the British colonial bureaucracy (Naik 1974, p. 8). They taught English and

subjects in the arts and sciences to students who had mostly completed their secondary

education in the vernacular. Engineering colleges were later affiliated as well, and started

awarding degrees from 1864.6

Evidence from Chaudhary et al.’s (2012) study of BRIC spending on education in 1910

confirms that in India, as in the other BRIC countries, elites drove the system. They

ensured a relatively high spending by the state per enrolled student which, as of 1910,

exceeded that in richer countries like Japan, while being well below spending per capita of

the eligible population than that of countries at similar levels of per capita income, such as

Peru (p. 7). Similar to Gallego (2010), Chaudhary et al. argue that decentralization, which

was a feature of higher education in all the BRIC countries, should have allowed for a

tighter fit between local preferences and policies, especially when accompanied by ade-

quate localization of fiscal authority. In the BRICS, however, the absence of fiscal

authority in the provinces along with the absence of democracy, led local elites ‘‘to capture

local governments and influence education policy,’’ (p. 15), as predicted by Acemoglu

et al. (2003).

Despite some experiments with direct university education, the federal structure in India

remained largely intact through the colonial period. The only significant exception

occurred with the passage of the Indian Universities Act of 1904. This both enabled the

establishment of unitary universities and led to greater involvement of the national gov-

ernment (Naik 1963, p. 3). However, the Government of India Act of 1919 undid this

change, transferring education to the province as part of a general devolution of powers. As

a result, both the umbrella (federal) university and its governance by the provinces were re-

established (Naik 1963, p. 4).7

5 Charles Wood, who authored the government’s report on establishing the presidency universities notedthat education was ‘‘to be mainly supported by those who are anxious for it’’. Wood added: ‘‘if they(Indians) choose to educate themselves, well and good, but I am against providing our own future detractors,opponents and grumblers’’. Wood noted that ‘‘the form, government and functions of the University ofLondon are best adapted to the wants of India’’. (Wood’s Despatch to Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-Generalin India: http://www.caluniv.ac.in/About%20the%20university/Some%20Defining%20Events.htm, accessedApril 11, 2012). Schenkman (1954) notes that universities were not to be themselves ‘‘places of education’’but were to test ‘‘the value of the education given elsewhere.’’ (p. 24). For information on how theUniversity of London was organized as a federal university, see: http://www.london.ac.uk/history.html,accessed April 11, 2012.6 INSA (2001, Ch. 6, p. 85).7 In 1882, a state education commission reemphasized the federal role calling for the withdrawal of the statefrom the management and direct financial support of higher education in favor of self-financed privatecolleges. In 1886, another government report noted that ‘‘low grade technical and industrial schools wereopened and were run variously by education departments, district boards and privately.’’ (INSA 2001, Ch. 6,p. 86 op cit). In response, a University Commission of 1902 recommended ‘‘a much more strict andsystematic supervision of the colleges by the university; and the imposition of more exacting conditions ofaffiliation; a much closer attention to the conditions under which students live and work; the assumption ofteaching functions by the university within defined limits; substantial changes in curricula and in themethods of examination.’’ This change in direction was probably influenced by trends towards greateruniversity control in Britain at the time. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_London, accessedDecember 13, 2010). The Universities Act of 1904 sought to implement these recommendations. The Actdefined the powers of universities thus: ‘‘The University shall be… deemed to have been incorporated forthe purpose (among others) of making provision for the instruction of students, with power to appointUniversity professors and lecturers, to hold and manage educational endowments, to erect, equip and

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In 1921, the national government established the Central Advisory Board of Education

(CABE) to bring consensus on policy matters among provincial governments.8 In 1945, the

Sarkar committee formed by CABE under N.R. Sarkar recommended the establishment of

one higher technical institution in each zone of the country—north, south, east and west.

The All India Council of Technical Education was formed in 1946, to supervise tertiary-

level technical education.9

In summary, the colonial government created the federal university system, in which the

lead institution—the university—was owned and operated by the provincial government. It

affiliated the institutions that actually provided education, which were in private hands.

Their goal was to provide a high quality education to elites for careers in the colonial

administration. The state government prescribed policies which the universities imple-

mented through setting standards, with no further involvement through strategy setting,

funding or operational control.

Our analysis confirms the importance of elites as the system evolved from a set of

private colleges to the federal university system. It corresponds to the earliest typology in

the literature of an elite system consisting of ‘‘elite institutions … dominated by relatively

small elite groups.’’ (Trow 1973, p. 6). As Agarwal (2006, p. 12) notes, ‘‘At the time of

India’s independence, the capacity of the higher education system in India was small. It

catered only to a small elite group.’’ The focus on quality over other goals, such as equity,

was an outcome of elite influence.

Higher education governance in the Nehruvian period (1947–1964)

With independence, India became a federal democracy whose federalism was defined by

its post-independence Constitution, which came into effect in 1950. Under the federal

division of powers, education was made a provincial responsibility, thus continuing the

precedent set by the Act of 1919. However, the Indian constitution also gave the center

(national government) particularly strong, residuary powers over matters of develop-

ment—so strong, in fact, that some have described Indian governance as ‘quasi federal’

because of the lack of autonomy it affords to the provinces (states) (Hardgrave and

Kochanek 1986, p. 44; Jain and Nair 2000).10

Apart from its residuary controls, the center was required to play a role in ensuring the

free and compulsory education of children (Indian Constitution, Article 45), coordinate and

determine standards of higher education (Indian Constitution, Entry 66 of List 1) and

assume responsibility for nationally funded (including partly funded) institutions for

Footnote 7 continuedmaintain University libraries, laboratories and museums, to make regulations relating to the residence andconduct of students, and to do all acts, consistent with this Act, which lead to the promotion of study andresearch’’. http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/n/2D/3P/2D3P0501.htm, accessed December 10, 2010.Despite this, private colleges proliferated—this was attributed to the reluctance of the colonial state to spendresources. Likewise, unitary private institutions funded by citizens and recognized by acts of Parliament orother vesting powers were established. These included the Indian Institute of Science, in 1910, BanarasHindu University, in 1915, and Aligarh Muslim University, in 1920. (INSA, op.cit., p. 86.) The number oftechnical institutions grew to 21 by 1939. Enrollment is recorded as 126,000 by 1936–1937.8 CABE was, however, not operationalized till 1935. Source: Government of India (2005).9 INSA (2001, p. 87).10 In the event of conflicts between state and central law, for instance, the latter always prevails. (Hardgraveand Kochanek 1986, p. 146).

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‘‘scientific or technical education’’ (Indian Constitution, Entries 64 and 65 of List 1).

Further, if Parliament legislated an institution to be of ‘national importance’, it automat-

ically came under the national government’s control.

In consequence, the states’ control over higher education was never legally secured. In

practice, the balance of political power between center and states and the central leader-

ship’s interest in education combined to determine whether center or state controlled

governance.

During the Nehruvian period, the dominance of the Congress Party in both the center

and the states, and control of the Congress Party by Nehru ensured that political power

resided in Delhi, not in the states. Nehru was a secure and powerful leader, though

reluctant to impose his views. As Kohli (1997) notes, ‘‘On a dimension of leadership

strategy that varies from accommodating to unaccommodating, Nehru was closer to the

accommodating end of the spectrum. This was in part a function of his own personality and

… a reflection of his relatively secure power position.’’ Kohli adds, ‘‘the Nehru period in

India… is best understood as a period when India’s central state was relatively well

institutionalized and leadership strategy, though firm, was also flexible.’’ (p. 332–333).

Following-on from the Constitutional exceptions allowed to the central government for

education, Nehru took measures that showed his interest in greater central involvement in

higher education to meet the nation’s goal of industrialization. Apart from Acts of Par-

liament for setting up several educational institutes of national importance, two key reports

under CABE—the University Education Commission of 1948 and the Secondary Educa-

tion Commission of 1952—prescribed national entry standards into the university system,

standardized (nationally) the time periods for transition to university and completion, and

called for the promotion of technical education to meet national standards. The 1948

Commission also recommended the establishment of a national standards regulator.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Sarkar Committee and the Education Com-

missions, and the formation of AICTE, the first Indian Institutes of Technology were set up

as centrally governed unitary institutions between 1950 and 1961. Unitary regional pro-

fessional colleges, jointly promoted by state and central governments, were also estab-

lished.11 All these institutions were either set up under special Acts of Parliament or were

declared institutions of national importance, thus ensuring the center’s control over their

governance.

In 1956, Parliament established the University Grants Commission as a national reg-

ulator of standards.12 When enacted, however, two important provisions in the draft bill

were removed. These related to the prior approval of the UGC for setting up of a university

and power to derecognize a university degree. With these changes, UGC became a rec-

ommendatory entity with little real authority (Agarwal 2006, p. 81).

11 Despite these institutions, the growth in professional enrollment was low for many decades. Comparedwith 1947, when 211,894 students were enrolled in technical institutions, the intake had risen by just 58 %by 2000 (INSA 2001, p. 89).12 The UGC was empowered to: (1) promote and coordinate university education; (2) determine andmaintain standards of teaching, examination and research. This included defining teachers’ qualifications,standards of instruction and fee scales; (3) financially aid the universities, both those created by the federalgovernment and others (the latter from 1972); (4) advise universities on implementing actions for main-taining standards; (5) inspect universities for financial and educational standards; (6) recognize and de-listcolleges within a university system for not meeting financial standards. This would be done upon therecommendation of the university. Prior to the formation of UGC, universities were responsible for rec-ognizing and de-listing colleges. (Government of India, Education Commissions and Committees in Ret-rospect). In practice, the universities continued to control the recognition of constituent colleges since theywere not obliged to obtain UGC permission.

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The provincial governments were allocated funds for education from a national tax

pool, under a demography-based formula. The funds were allocated in the form of ‘grants-

in-aid’, i.e., for meeting operating expenses rather than infrastructure.

An important outcome of this was that it left the states short of funds to invest in

infrastructure and was, in fact if not by design, an effective way to reduce state autonomy.

Certainly, the provinces felt short-changed. As Naik (1963, p. 2) notes, ‘‘the state gov-

ernments have grown more and more critical and resentful (of Nehru’s centralization).

They claim that education is essentially their preserve.’’ Yet, they could do little given that

Nehru controlled the Congress Party, which ruled in both center and states.

Taking advantage of Nehru’s accommodative stance, yet lacking funds for expansion

while seeking expansion under the influence of local elites (see below), the states

responded by offering private colleges the use of central funds to pay their operating

expenses. Most accepted this offer and came to be known as ‘grants-in-aid’ (or, simply,

‘aided’) institutions. In consequence, in aided institutions, the private sector financed a

major part of the capital costs, while public subsidies paid for most of their operating

expenses. In return for meeting the running costs, control over key parts of governance—

expansion, appointment of senior staff, determining tuition fees, courses of study, teacher

salaries, etc., was transferred to the state government’s umbrella universities. This led to

the de facto nationalization of the once predominantly private higher education system

(Agarwal 2006, p. 8) and, from the provincial government’s viewpoint, enabled its

expansion.

Thus, both the center and the states directly expanded higher education. The driver for

the central government was to generate graduates of adequate quality to meet the needs of

industrialization. As a result, centrally-controlled institutions were relatively well-funded,

with the government paying for infrastructure and most operational costs. By contrast, the

states’ expansion strategy initially focused on taking over private colleges and expanding

their capacity through a public–private partnership as described above. Over time, the

states allocated funds from their own budgets to higher education and set up new public

colleges.

Whereas enrollment grew significantly during this period (see Fig. 1), the quality of

education by the end of the Nehruvian era was bi-modally distributed. The upper tier

consisted of a small number of centrally-controlled, well-funded, high-quality unitary

technical institutions. The list of high quality institutions also included a small number of

private, aided institutions from colonial times that were governed by state universities (see

below). The centrally-run institutions were subject to considerable state control over

budgets and senior appointments. In return, they were expected to manage the academic

functions autonomously and were well-funded. As a result, they were able to cater to the

best-educated high school graduates of the country, who paid relatively low tuition fees for

their educations.

The provincial institutions were subject to greater control over their operations and

could access much less funding. They focused on generalist education. Terming the

expansion of provincial institutions as ‘‘unplannned, haphazard and indiscriminate,’’ Naik

(1974) notes, the state ran ‘‘a ‘dual’ educational system which has, at all stages, a core of a

small number of good quality institutions which are surrounded by a large periphery of

substandard institutions. The gap between the best and the weakest group of institutions is

also very wide because our system has an almost unlimited capacity to tolerate institutional

inefficiency.’’ (p. 10–11). The provincial government controlled their budget and senior

staff appointments. Through its membership of the university’s senate, the provincial

government influenced academic policy as well.

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The beneficiaries of the state-level initiatives, just like the central initiatives, were the

‘classes in power’ (Naik 1974, p. 9), located in the larger cities.

During the Nehruvian period, as Naik (1963, p. 2) notes, ‘‘the real authority to deter-

mine policies, priorities and programmes has now passed on from the states to the centre…In short, the trend to centralization in policy-making in all fields of education has been the

most dominating note of this period.’’

In summary, the federal university system survived independence and became the

vehicle through which the provincial governments governed higher education. To achieve

their goals of meeting elite interests, they took control of the hitherto private system and

expanded it. This matches Gallego’s (2010) assertion that federalism expands the access of

the population to higher levels of education. The provincial governments played a sub-

stantial regulatory role at the policymaking, strategic and operational levels. The unitary

institutions set up by the center enjoyed greater autonomy over academic functions,

although they were subject to controls over budgets and senior appointments. The center

established regulatory bodies for maintaining standards per its constitutional mandate, but

their powers were limited to making recommendations, while real power was exercised

either directly by the center in its institutions or by the states through federal universities.

This description of higher education under Nehru corresponds to Trow’s (1973) second

stage of expansion, when higher demands on national resources emerge with the expansion

of the system. Elites continued, through this period, to capture a large share of public

expenditure on higher education. The goal of higher education continued to be quality-

focused, but this, after independence, was interpreted in favor of more professional edu-

cation to meet the needs of industrialization. Governance moved away from philanthropists

and academics running private institutions. However, it did not move, as in the US, to those

who ‘‘were formerly academics but who now are clearly full time university administrators

(supported by bureaucrats).’’ (Trow, p. 14–15). Instead, the state co-opted academics and

converted them into full-time university administrators. They were supported by bureau-

crats who represented the state’s political interests. The center and the state exercised high

levels of controls in their own domains—the provincial federal university system and the

unitary, centrally-owned universities respectively.

The importance of the Nehruvian period was that it sought to ‘‘resolve’’ the dual

objectives of expansion and improved quality by dividing responsibility for the objectives

into two separate forms of governance: the central government—through a few newly

created autonomous institutions recruiting the very best students in the country—focusing

Fig. 1 India: number and growth of higher education institutions

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on ‘‘improving quality;’’ and the states, largely through governance by local politicians

(although ostensibly maintaining standards through academics at the state universities)

satisfying local demands by the upper middle class for places in higher education by

expanding the number of colleges in each state with little or no attention to the capacity of

those colleges to deliver quality education. In practice, the autonomous, nationally gov-

erned institutions were too small to offset declining quality driven by the growth of

enrolment in the provincial institutions.

Higher education governance in the Indira Gandhi period (1966–1984)

The period after Nehru’s rule ended in 1964, and up to 1984, coincides largely with the

Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi focused on rural and poverty issues,

marking a shift from Nehru’s emphasis on industrialization (Nagaraj 2010). Thus, she

brought the concerns of the general public to education. This marked a change from the

central government’s approach to educational provision, with its elite-oriented focus on

engineering and other professional education.

The Education Commission report of 1966 and the subsequent National Policy on

Education of 1968 (NPE-68) reflected Mrs. Gandhi’s priorities. They stressed multi-lingual

instruction, agricultural education and adult education.13 NPE-68 also called for a slowing

down in the provincial expansion of higher education, recommending that states charter

new universities only after considering funding and quality requirements. A UGC report of

1969 called for the states to promote quality by granting autonomy to universities through

long-term funding and a withdrawal of political representation in the university’s decision-

making bodies.14

The Constitutional Amendment of 1976 placed education in the Concurrent List (i.e., it

became a joint responsibility of the national and provincial governments), a de facto

recognition of post-independence central initiatives in direct provision. The 1976 Law also

recognized that the primary responsibility for educational provision lay with the states,

while the center would maintain quality standards.

Whereas the Congress Party continued to dominate national politics, its control over

state politics weakened during the second half of Mrs. Gandhi’s tenure due to the advent of

provincial-level political parties. Some, such as the Communist Party, which succeeded in

coming to power in Kerala (and ruled intermittently with the Congress Party) and West

Bengal, and the DMK in Tamil Nadu were ideologically sympathetic to Mrs. Gandhi’s

rural and pro-poor educational policies. However, they faced dilemmas in acquiescing to

Mrs. Gandhi’s initiatives because, as in most states, their main provincial rival was the

Congress Party. Acquiescing to her initiatives might have been viewed as allying with her

politics.

Mrs. Gandhi’s style mattered as much as Nehru’s to how the states reacted in education

governance. As Kohli (1997, p. 332) notes, ‘‘Indira Gandhi, in contrast to Nehru, was

13 http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/W/16/0W160501.htm, accessed December 10, 2010.14 UGC University Governance Committee, 1969. http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/n/2D3P0501.htm,accessed April 11, 2012. See also Kumar (1975), pp 215 ff. The report recommended that the three-tiergovernance system of the university, consisting of Senate, Executive Council and Academic Council bereformed, with the Senate (which included external and internal stakeholders) playing a largely consultativerole compared with its then overriding authority over the actions of the internally constituted Executive andAcademic Councils. The Executive Council was recommended to be the normal body for governance, whoseactions would always require the prior recommendation of the Academic Council.

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closer to the unaccommodating end of the leadership spectrum.’’ As a result, he notes, ‘‘the

political situation during his daughter’s reign, however, was quite different, as were her

political instincts. Congress’ hegemony had by then declined and Indira consolidated her

power against considerable odds. She was always suspicious of power challenges. She re-

created a powerful political center in India mainly by portraying herself as a champion of

the poor.’’

While the political challenges to the national’s government’s power limited it capacity

to implement its pro-equity initiatives, the center’s control over funding slowed the sys-

tem’s rate of growth to less than half of that achieved under Nehru (see Fig. 1). Lacking

resources, even a state like Kerala with a stellar record in K-12 education, ‘‘neglected

higher education’’ (Tilak 2001, p. 23).

The second phase corresponds to the beginnings of Trow’s (1973) third phase of

expansion when ‘‘popular, non-elite’’ institutions start to grow. The central government led

this process. The difference between the first two phases was because the ideology of the

central government changed to a popular stance. Thus, Mrs. Gandhi’s tenure was marked

by an effort to ‘‘resolve’’ the dual objectives of equity and elite expansion, the central

government taking up the former and the provinces the latter.

Higher education governance in the reform period (1984–2011)

The period that began in 1984, with the end of Mrs. Gandhi’s rule, is widely identified as

the start of economic globalization as well as the start of devolution of political power. The

latter was an outcome of the continuing progress of provincial political parties that had

begun under Mrs. Gandhi. From 1989 onwards, provincial parties participated in every

national government, and, by 1998, dominated state politics nationwide. (Chibber 2010).

As of 2012, no national party controlled a majority of state governments. Most of the

provincial political parties were organized around ethnic interests—typically, they repre-

sented long-neglected underprivileged groups which were numerically significant within

that province. Devolution thus was a significant step towards the democratization of

political participation.

The combination of globalization, democratization and devolution impacted education

governance by introducing new and potentially conflicting goals.15 Consider, for example,

the impact on affirmative action and professional education. In prior periods, the national

government sponsored affirmative action by reserving a minimum of 22.5 % of student

seats in higher education institutions for certain underprivileged populations, in line with

the minimal Constitutional requirement. With democratization and devolution, the states

took over the affirmative action mandate, often imposing student quotas to benefit ethnic

groups that were more than double the Constitutional requirement, making these applicable

to both private and public institutions and, in some states, funding the students admitted

under quota (as in Maharashtra) or asking the institution (as in Karnataka) to fund them

through cross-subsidies. This outcome demonstrates that while there was often consider-

able commonality in the system’s goals across the tiers of political governance, their

15 The goals are put forth in various policy documents. For example, the Central Advisory Board ofEducation, the apex policy making body of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, stated its goal as‘‘achieving equity, access and balanced development of higher education.’’ (CABE Minutes, June 19, 2010,www.education.nic.in, accessed December 25, 2010). For a review of the objectives and challenges, seeGovernment of India (2008).

High Educ (2013) 65:595–612 605

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interpretation and the methods used to implement the goals could differ between the states

and the center.

The pressure from underprivileged groups for expansion was supplemented by pressures

for expansion from the growing middle classes, who sought professional education as a

response to globalization. This marked a change from earlier expansion strategies focused

on the elite requirements for a generalist education, in line with Trow’s (1973) description

of how democratization leads to popular support for mass education.

The resultant exercise in massification saw the share of state budgets for higher edu-

cation rising sharply and accounting for 19 % of state spending by 2009 and constituting

the single largest item of the states’ budgets (Assocham 2010, p. 9).16 From being pri-

marily reliant on central grants-in-aid up to the 1970 s, the states receive, as of 2010, on

average, less than 5 % of higher education funding from the central government. Overall,

states pay for 76 % of total higher education spending (Agarwal 2006, p. 22).

Of the center’s share of the total (24 %), 85 % is allocated to centrally-run institutions

in which just 3 % of students are enrolled (Agarwal 2006, p. 22). This shows that central

spending is also being influenced by other forces—the renewed influence of the elites after

the end of Mrs. Gandhi’s rule is evident and so are the pressures of globalization. Indeed,

the most globalized parts of the system are the elite central government controlled uni-

versities, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology and the Indian Institutes of

Management.

Facing considerable financial pressure, the states, beginning in the late 1980 s and then

accelerating in the 1990 s, licensed private providers. This was possible, as Agarwal (2006,

p. 8) points out, because the rising income of the middle classes made ‘‘non-subsidized

education’’ a ‘‘viable enterprise.’’ The per capita private expenditure on education almost

quadrupled from 1.2 % of household income in 1983 to 4.4 % in 2003. (Agarwal 2006,

p. 26). The state’s cost burden fell with the shift of tuition costs to students—since, on

average, private institutions charge significantly higher fees.17 This kept public subsidies

low. Together, the central and state governments spend less than one-half percent of GDP

on higher education (Agarwal 2006, p. 2).

The private licensees had to work within the Constitutionally mandated restriction of

non-commercial provision, though the institutions were permitted to generate surpluses

that could be reinvested for education under a liberalized interpretation of non-commercial

provision by the Supreme Court in 1993.18 Driven by visions of providing education

sustainably without public subsidy, and yet subject to personal resource constraints,

thousands of private providers established their own institutions, overwhelmingly in pro-

fessional fields such as engineering studies, thus leading to a large expansion in the number

of institutions (see Fig. 2). For example, in 2008, 1,691 new ‘technical institutions’ (most

offering four-year engineering degrees, but the number includes other professional fields

such as architecture and management studies) were established, the equivalent of over 4

new institutions opening doors every day (AICTE 2011). Over 95 % of these were private,

unaided institutions, with an average enrolment below 1,000 students.

16 Tilak (2001) notes that the corresponding figure was 14 % in 2001.17 In 1996, average tuition at unaided private institutions was Rs. 3,331 compared with Rs. 1,198 for thesystem as a whole (for general education). (Source: UGC, 2008, p. 284).18 The Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the Unni Krishnan case of 1993 is available at: http://www.articlesbase.com/national-state-local-articles/critical-analysis-of-the-case-tmapai-foundation-v-state-of-karnataka-air-2003-sc-355-through-the-view-of-minority-of-educational-rights-2738451.html, downloadedApril 12, 2012.

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As a result of the unexpected private response, very few new colleges were established

by the states or the center. Agarwal (2006, p. 8) asserts that the period was ‘‘marked by the

near withdrawal of the government from taking over of additional responsibility for higher

education in the country.’’

We would not venture as far as Agarwal in asserting that the rise of private education

meant a withdrawal of state responsibility. The role played by private institutions was, in

some key respects, little more than that of an outsourced provider, charged with fulfilling

the mandates of the states and actively governed by the states. This is because the various

aspects of states’ role that influenced access, equity and quality remained intact… The

federal university continued to prescribe academic standards, physical and financial

standards, teachers’ qualifications, course content and textbooks, and conduct examina-

tions. In some cases, the university’s representatives sat on the selection committee for

teachers and principals. The university could also nominate a representative on the private

college’s governing body, as might the state government. The states had the right to

appoint representatives to various managing committees. The states also prescribed tuition

fees and the quota systems that colleges must follow. Finally, the states controlled the

federal university itself through funding and control over senior administrative appoint-

ments and membership of the university senate. Even the private providers were not really

‘‘unaided’’. In some states, such as Maharashtra, the state governments paid a subsidy for

every student who was admitted on quota. In fact, one official report (Government of India

2006, p. 14) noted with reference to college governance that, ‘‘More often than not there is

political control/interference in management and in recruitment of teachers and admission,

leading to a dilution of academic standards.’’

To be sure, the well-off were not reduced to irrelevance. Most of the new institutions

were located in the wealthier areas of the states. As Anandakrishnan (2004) notes,

‘‘generally, states with a higher enrolment in universities and colleges are those with a

higher ratio of urban population and a lower percentage of the population below the

poverty line.’’19

Unlike in Europe, governance of policymaking and strategy setting did not change from

‘‘state control models’’ to ‘‘state supervisory models,’’ and remained distant from the ‘‘rise

of the evaluative state’’ (Enders 2004). This was despite pressures from the central

Fig. 2 Engineering intake per college

19 Quoted in Agarwal (2006, p. 12).

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government on autonomy for colleges, through ministry and regulatory recommendations

over the years.20 For instance, in 2003, UGC published guidelines for autonomous colleges

and stated its target for autonomy to be 10 % of all colleges.21 While the guidelines

lightened the university’s control by transferring responsibility for curriculum and

assessment to the institution, the university still retained the right of dis-affiliation and

served on the institution’s governing boards. Further, accepting autonomy required the

college to come under UGC’s regulation for the first time. In return, a certain proportion of

the college’s costs would be subsidized by UGC. The guidelines failed to attract interest.

There were only about 250 such colleges, less than one percent of the 25,951 colleges as of

December 2011. The apparent failure of autonomy was likely due to several factors,

including fears about dual regulation as well as the unwillingness of federal universities to

yield or share control with UGC (CABE 2005). The federal university, whose advantage to

the colonial government was that it enabled the local administration to efficiently ensure

standards through quality certification, had, since independence, become a structure for the

state governments to exercise much greater forms of control. Hence, there was little

interest among the states to revamp their role or do away with them.

The re-emergence of unaided private colleges transferred to college trustees the gov-

ernance of some operations, notably facilities management, faculty recruitment and the

non-quota categories of student recruitment,. The resulting governance of the colleges, in

these areas of control, strongly resembles the ‘‘entrepreneurial university’’ described by

Clark (1998), driven by financial constraints and conceptions of the university to be

managed as a business, i.e., similar to Deem’s (1998) ‘‘new managerialism.’’ The role

of the professoriate in running the institution is shared with professional administrators.

* = Full-time position open to non academic staff **= Full-time position

Fig. 3 Higher Education Department, India. Source Authors’ survey. *Full-time position open to non-academic staff. **Full-time position

20 The reports favoring autonomy include the UGC reports of 1969 on University Governance, of 1990 onAlternate Models of Management, the Ministry’s National Policy of Education, 1986, a report in 1986 onAlternate Models for the Management of Universities, and the CABE report of 2005.21 UGC’s guidelines for autonomy are available at: http://www.ugc.ac.in/financialsupport/autonomous_13.html, and http://www.education.nic.in/higedu.asp, accessed March 18, 2012.

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The organization charts shown in Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the internal governance of the

academic functions.

Several official reports note the adverse impact on quality during the third phase

[e.g., GOI (NPE 1986), GOI (CABE 2005), GOI (UGC 1990), and GOI (NKC 2006)]. The

quality decline is attributed to rapid growth and changes in governance. This factor may

have offset the advantages for quality arising from greater management autonomy and

entrepreneurialism, as argued by Fuchs and Woessman (2007). The limited role of the

professoriate and lack of scale may be additional factors. While some of the new private

colleges, including those which are autonomous, offer a better quality of education than the

best public colleges,22 most of the private colleges fare much worse, due to under-spending

on infrastructure and increasing teaching loads, usually in violation of their affiliating

university’s standards. An official report (Government of India 2006) described the vast

majority of colleges as merely serving the needs of ‘‘academic squatters.’’23

Simultaneously with its pro-autonomy regulations, the national government also pro-

moted other measures to improve quality. These included proposals to enable foreign

providers to set up unitary institutions in India, the creation of a new national regulator

with powers over provincial colleges and universities, including the power of accreditation,

and a tribunal to resolve disputes (GOI 2010). Due to provincial political opposition, these

proposals have not, as of 2012, been enacted.24

In summary, the reform period showed that the Indian higher educational system

possessed the capacity to respond to the democratization and devolution of political power

and the pressures of globalization, in line with the experience of other countries, by making

available relatively low cost, market-responsive higher education in large scale. The

growth rate of institutions accelerated to 23.5 % per year during the reform period (see

Fig. 1), with most of the growth occurring in the latest decade (28.2 % annually between

2000 and 2009).

Fig. 4 Faculty-driven Department in the United States. Source Authors’ survey

22 See, for example, the 2010 rankings of Karnataka engineering colleges at: http://www.educationindiaworld.com/2010/05/28/top-ranking-engineering-colleges-in-karnataka-best-engineering-colleges-in-karnataka/, accessed December 27, 2010.23 According to Government of India (2008), the number of unfilled faculty positions at unaided privatecolleges, as of 2008 was 52 % at the entry (Lecturer) level, and for Readers (the next level up), it was 28 %.This compares with 41 and 18 % respectively for all colleges. (p. 17).24 See, for example: http://thestatesman.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=327599&catid=36&show=archive&year=2010&month=5&day=11&Itemid=66, accessed April 9, 2012.

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However, the adverse outcomes in quality suggest that the deep involvement of the

states in governance probably came at a price. During this phase of the system’s evolution,

the provinces increased their control of the system by deploying their own resources and

through their rising political power over policy. Their political power helped to offset the

constitutionally mandated role of the central government over quality. As a result, the

center’s quality initiatives were never legalized. Even beyond this standoff, the desire of

both the center and states to manage provincial education led them to occupy as many

aspects of governance as possible. This contest crowded out direct roles for other stake-

holders, such as private providers. In their actions, we find that the center and states do not

just represent various stakeholders, but also display elements of a ‘bureaucratic’ state

(Przeworski and Limongi 1993), i.e., one in which the state seeks to maximize bureaucrats’

share of the system relative to the interests of the public—in this case, the public seeking

access to quality higher education.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the evolution of higher education governance in India, the State’s

role in governance and the implications for goal setting, causes and outcomes. In line with

the experiences of many countries, the higher educational system began as a small, elite-

owned system (under colonialism) and evolved (after independence) to a publicly run

system for the elites.

The Indian model of federalism subsequently emerged as a key driver of change. By the

late 1980 s, the forces of federalism began to favor the states over the center. With

increasing devolution, the states took over the affirmative action mandate from the center.

This was under pressure from underprivileged groups for expansion. These groups’

interests were supplemented by pressures for expansion from the growing middle classes,

who sought professional education as a response to globalization. Subsequent economic

growth enabled the states to lead a massification program in which the private sector

played a key role in providing unsubsidized professional education to the middle classes.

The role played by private institutions was largely that of an educational outsourcer,

charged with fulfilling the states’ mandates and actively governed by the states. The role of

the states, either directly or through the affiliating state-owned universities, remained intact

in critical aspects that influenced access, equity and quality.

As the third phase evolved, the goals of access, equity and low cost per student were

achieved to a remarkable extent through these state-driven strategies. However, despite a

stated national policy focus on quality, quality was the policy objective least focused upon

due to provincial opposition arising from fears of ceding control to the center. This was

despite the national government actively proposing quality-improving measures that would

distance the State from active governance and provide for greater institutional autonomy.

Each such measure became an arena of contest for control between the states and the

center, ending in stalemates or failures. Stymied by this provincial opposition, State

governance did not evolve from direct control to supervision, and remained distant from

what Enders (2004) calls the ‘‘evaluative state.’’

The reform period showed that the Indian educational system, under the active gov-

ernance involvement of the provincial governments, could respond to the democratization

and devolution of political power and the pressures of globalization, in line with the

experience of other developing countries, by making available a relatively low public cost,

market-responsive higher education on a large scale, and, with the important added feature

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of including previously underprivileged groups. This access/equity-driven model uses

direct state controls on rapidly growing private provision, and a limited commitment of

government financing to the growth and improvement of higher education. As mentioned

earlier, the model is in direct contrast to the evolution of university governance in Western

European democracies, which continued to invest in the expansion and quality improve-

ment of public higher education and moved to more indirect ways of influencing these

autonomous institutions.

Thus, although this phase of Indian higher education expansion and governance has its

advantages, its major downside is the sacrifice of quality improvement. It is difficult to

imagine such improvement without a large commitment of public resources, more places

in public colleges and universities, more focus on policies that increase quality in both

public and private providers, and more thought given to what such policies imply for

higher education governance.

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