george berkeley’s language of vision and the occult tradition of linguistic platonism. part ii...

5/21/2018 George Berkeleys language of vision and the occult tradition of linguistic Platonism. Part II George Berkeleys language of vision and linguistic

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George Berkeleys language of vision and theoccult tradition of linguistic Platonism. Part II:

George Berkeleys language of visionand linguistic Platonism

Michael M. Isermann *

Department of English Language and Literature, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitat Heidelberg,

Kettengasse 12, D-69117 Heidelberg, Germany

Abstract

This case study on the linguistic ideas of George Berkeley is intended to exemplify the clandestineintrusion of linguistic Platonism, i.e. occult conceptions of language, into linguistic theories in mod-ern times. The assumption underlying the study is that occult linguistic thought has played an impor-tant role in the formation of all modern theories of language which argue for a cognitive functionalongside, or instead of, the communicative function of language. In Section 3, I argue that theapparent contradictions and inconsistencies of Berkeleys statements on language can be reconciled,if and only if we view them as grounded in the complex architecture of the two-languages metaphys-ics, or linguistic Platonism. Section4 places the results in the wider perspective of linguistic theoriz-ing in modern times. 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

3. George Berkeley: some preliminaries

In the history of philosophy, George Berkeley figures as a notorious, if brilliant, out-sider. In the history of semiotics, he is known for his account of signs. For historians of

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linguistic ideas and of the philosophy of language, Berkeley is almost non-existent.1 Evenso, what Berkeley has to say on language in general is no less bold and original than hisphilosophy, of which it forms an integral part. For reasons that will soon become appar-ent, Berkeley can be called a linguistphilosopher. His linguistic lines of argument are so

interwoven into the various strands of his philosophical thought that Berkeley couldremark that John Locke, whom he admired, would have fared much better had he onlyduly recognized the importance of language to his epistemology.2 I suspect that the dispar-ity between the coverage Locke has received in the histories of linguistic ideas and the phi-losophy of language and the tabula rasa that Berkeley left is as much due to the firstsimmediate success in the European history of ideas as to the latters somewhat extravagantviews.3

Already as a young man, Berkeley contended that the objects we perceive exist in pre-cisely the way they appear to the senses. More specifically, the objects as perceived are saidto be the only objects that exist. There is no material object, no independently existingexternal physical world that is the cause of our sense impressions. Whatever is, is eithercontent of a mind or a thinking substance, i.e. a mind. Following Locke, Berkeley callsthe contents of the mind ideas, whether these are actual sense perceptions or productsof the memory or imagination. Minds or spirits, as Berkeley prefers to say, are eitherfinite and imperfect as mine or yours or infinite and perfect as Gods mind. If matterin motion is rejected as the cause of our experience, and if ideas, being inert, cannot them-selves cause ideas, the question arises as to what it is that makes us have ideas. Berkeleysanswer is that it is spirits or minds that bring about ideas. Finite minds generate ideas in

1 As for linguists proper, the situations is probably still worse. Although the combination of Berkeley andlinguistics, entered into any major internet search machine, will yield more than 100,000 finds, the famousBerkeley Linguistics Society, to name just one typical result, has not shown any interest in the linguistic ideas ofits ultimate namegiver. As regards the history of the philosophy of language, Berkeley is noted by Coseriu (2003),mentioned passim in the two bulky volumes of the Handbook Sprachphilosophie/Philosophy of Language/Laphilosophie du langage (1992, 1996), but absent from Borsches anthology (1996), Lamarque & AshersEncyclopedia (1997), as also fromMeier-Oesers (1998) and Trabants (1998)surveys. For the history of semiotics,cf. the brief article by Armstrong in the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Semiotics (1994) and the few scatteredremarks in the weighty four volumes of the HandbookSemiotik/Semiotics (19972004). Of the four recent large-scale publications in linguistic historiography, onlySchmitters Geschichte der Sprachtheorie (1987ff) coversBerkeley (Isermann, 1999c) in some detail. Aurouxs Histoire des idees linguistique (19892000) and the

Handbook History of the Language Sciences/Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften/Histoire des sciences du langage(20002005)touch on Berkeley, whileLepschysHistory of Linguistics(19941998)ignores him altogether. So doKoerner and Asher (1995), Robins (1997), Harris and Taylor (1989) and the earlier historiographies, such asArens (1969).2 Cf. Phil. Comment., 467, 567, 717. Since Berkeley almost invariably numbered his paragraphs the

exception to the rule being the Three Dialogues, I follow the common practice in restricting references to his textsto an abbreviated, yet recognizable title of the work, followed by the number that Berkeley assigned to therespective paragraph. Whenever the need arises, such as in referring to the Three Dialogues, I supplement thereference by supplying volume and page number of the standard edition ofThe Works of George Berkeleyby A.A.Luce and T.E. Jessop (nine volumes, 19481957). The abbreviated titles are: New Theory of Vision (An Essaytowards a New Theory of Vision, 1709); Principles (A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,1710); Three Dialogues (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, 1713); Phil. Comment. (Philosophical

Commentaries, notebooks published posthumously); Alciphron (Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher, 1732);Vision Vindicated(The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of ADeity, Vindicated and Explained, 1733); Siris (Siris, 1744).3 For the Lockean legacy, seeAarsleff (1982). Berkeleys influence does not seem to extend far beyond Hume,

Reid and, with some qualifications, Schopenhauer and Peirce.

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themselves through memory and imagination, in others and themselves through (writtenor spoken) language. As a matter of fact, Berkeley argues that it is from our fellowhumans speech and writing, i.e. from linguistic ideas, that we can legitimately infer theexistence of other finite minds, which cannot themselves be the object of possible sense

impressions. It is the regular occurrence and the smooth functioning of interpersonal com-munication which suggests the presence of other intelligent minds (Alciphron, IV. 4ff). Inmuch the same vein, Berkeley argues with a version of the argument from design, we cansafely assume the existence of God: In consequence, I say, [. . .] you have as much reasonto think the Universal Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking anyparticular person speaks to your ears.4 So orderly, variable, constant and meaningful arethe ideas of visual sense experience that they form a language of nature. Since it is clearthat neither we nor other finite minds can evoke the sense impressions that we receive,their miraculous presence calls for an appropriate explanation. Berkeley contends thatthey are directly and continuously caused in us by the divine mind, the author of the lin-guistic fabric of nature. Here is the conclusion of a standard version of the argument:

Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision

constitute the universal language of Nature [1733 ed.: of the Author of Nature],

whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things

that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid

whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their information that we

are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life. And the manner

wherein they signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same

with that of languages and signs of human appointment, which do not suggest the

things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an habitual connex-ion that experience has made us to observe between them. (New Theory of Vision, I,

147)

It will not come as a surprise that those who have commented on Berkeleys concept of alanguage of nature were not willing to take the whole theory at face value. It was one thingto digest Berkeleys reliance on language at two of the critical joints of his overall theory.That the phenomena of nature should form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also amost coherent, entertaining, and instructive [. . .] language or discourse (Siris, 254; cf.Alciphron, IV. 12), seemed, however, a bit too much to swallow. For though similarities

between the manner in which we make use of visual data and the way we use languagemay readily be admitted, to suppose that vision is a language is not only paradoxicalbut borders on the absurd (Creery, 1991, p. 25).5 As one critic noted, Berkeleys exten-sion of language to include the divine visual language has not in fact found acceptance

4 Alciphron, IV. 12. For the full argument, see Kline (1987, p. 130).5 For further criticism of Berkeleys notion of vision as a language, see e.g.Creery (1973, p. 212n); Moore (1984,

p. 331); Armstrong (1994, p. 81). Even Blumenberg takes the language of nature for a metaphor (1986, chapterxi). Berkeley, foreseeing the objections, retorted almost 300 years ago: [N]othing can be more evident to anyonethat is capable of the least reflexion, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds,

producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually affect us [. . .

]. That the discovery ofthis great truth which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained by the reason of so very few, is asad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clearmanifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them, that they seem as it were blinded with excess oflight (Principles, III. 149).

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even within the confines of British philosophy at any time in a period of over 200 yearssince his death. I would not seem rash to predict that it will not find acceptance in the nearfuture (King, 1991, p. 43). From what I know of British philosophy, the prediction seemswell-founded. But neither would it seem rash if I may pick up the thread to predict that

historians of linguistic ideas, if they began to interest themselves in Berkeley, would followsuit. Like historians of philosophy, they have either completely disregarded the construalof the sensible world of things as a language of nature or discarded it as fantastical or inap-propriately metaphorical.6

Absurd or not, there canbe no doubt that Berkeley wants the term language of natureto be understood literally.7 Nowhere does he suggest that the visual sense data are merelylikea language. Instead, he takes pains to convince his readers time and again that theyarea language in the strict sense of the word:

That is really and in truth my opinion; and it should be yours too, if you are consis-

tent with yourself, and abide by your own definition of language, since you cannotdeny that the great Mover and Author of Nature constantly explaineth Himself to

the eyes of men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no simil-

itude or connexion with the things signified; so as, by compounding and disposing

them, to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of objects, differing in nature, time,

and place; thereby informing and directing men how to act with respect to things dis-

tant and future, as well as near and present. In consequence, I say [. . .] you have as

much reason to think the Universal agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can

have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears.8

3.1. Berkeleys version of a representational theory of language

I suspect that a good many of the misgivings concerning Berkeleys concept of a divinelanguage of nature have their roots in the difficulty of accommodating it to what practi-cally all critics agree is a general, if incoherent, theory of language.9 However, this problem

6 Cf. also Armstrong, who speculates that Berkeleys metaphysics of signification may be as fantastic to themodern reader as it was to most of Berkeleys contemporaries ( Armstrong, 1994, p. 83). Not surprisingly, the

sweeping rejection of the underlying model of language by theorists of language and historians of philosophy hasa longer and more venerable tradition than that ushered in through its adaptation by Berkeley. A notableexception in modern historiography of linguistic ideas is Nates (1999)contribution toSchmittersGeschichte derSprachtheorie (vol. IV, 1999). Once again, however, the exception proves the rule. For Nates linguistic studies onthe concept of a language of nature (1993, 1995, 1999) undermine their own efforts when the author admits thatthe texts he has discussed do not primarily deal with linguistic questions (1993, p. 178). In the same vein, Natestates: The Language of Nature can be experienced in a language, but it is no language ( Nate, 1995, p. 194).The same unwillingness to follow unfamiliar historical demarcations of the historiographic object language canbe found in Vickers influential articles (1982, 1984, 1991) and in Demonets study of Renaissance ideas oflanguage (1992, p. 575ff). The irony here is that the implicit or explicit complaints about an undue meaningextension of the term language are voiced by historiographers who have been trained to disapprove of theallegedly naive idea that the true object of linguistics might be found in concrete, verbal communication.7

This is admitted, though not really appreciated, byCreery (1973, p. 212), Kline (1987, pp. 131, 134), Creery(1991, I, p. 26f), Turbayne (1991, I, p. 56), Land (1991, p. 107) .8 Alciphron, IV. 12; cf. ibid. IV. 5; Siris, 254.9 Cf.Gelber (1952, pp. 492, 501), Creery (1973, p. 219), Moore (1984, p. 327), Creery (1991, p. 30), King (1991,

p. 46), Armstrong (1994).



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can easily be handled if we assume that underlying Berkeleys philosophy is not one, buttwo theories of language. Accordingly, I will argue in the following, firstly, that there aretwo theories of language in Berkeley and, secondly, that they join to produce a modernversion of the two-languages metaphysics. In order to condense my account, I will focus

the discussion on what I think is a covert presentational theory of language. Seeing thatthere is general agreement that Berkeleys is basically a representational theory of lan-guage which grants overall priority to thought, I will presuppose rather than argue thatBerkeleys description of ordinary language (what he calls artificial language) meets allrequirements of a representational or Aristotelian theory of language.10 However, asBerkeleys version of a representational theory of language is markedly different fromthose of its predecessors in the Aristotelian tradition, a few remarks might be helpful.

As might be expected, written wordsare said to stand for spoken words, and spokenwords, in turn, to represent idea-things.11 As to the latter two, it is imperative to pointto the merging of things and thought in Berkeleys philosophy, which leaves us with ideasinstead of things as the ultimate signified. However, on close inspection, things are notquite so simple. For Berkeleys inclusion of the world of things in the mental world doesnot prevent the newly established mental things from displaying clear traces of their des-cent. There is, in fact, a strict dividing line in the mental world that separates perceptionfrom conception, i.e. ideas of sense from those of memory and imagination. In ordinaryconversation, then, words will for all practical purposes evoke ideas in a listener thatare imagined or memorized. And this is what they represent or stand for. But how do theseconcepts relate to the original ideas of sense? What, for example, is the relationshipbetween an imagined apple and one presented to the senses? Given that in Berkeleys meta-

physics the world of sense has taken over the function of the world behind sense, the pro-totypical representational model predicts that an object present to the senses and the sameobject as imagined relate in terms of representation. In fact, the prediction is entirely borneout when Berkeley writes that the ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Natureare called real things: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid andconstant,are more properly termed Ideas, or images of things, which they copy and rep-resent.12 The fact that words in ordinary discourse regularly represent or stand for ideas

10

For an account of the continuity of representation from Locke to Berkeley, see Land (1991, pp. 9096).Kearney (1991)argues at length for a representational theory of language in Berkeley. Cf. alsoCreery (1991, I, p.21f), Woozley (1991).11 Cf. Alciphron, VII. 13. Ideas are clearly prior to words (Phil. Comment., 356, 522, 638), although Berkeley

departs from Lockes position in admitting the usefulness of discourse unaccompanied by ideas (cf. Sections3.5and 4). However, speakers have to make sure they can cash in their words for ideas whenever the need arises:Words, it is agreed, are signs: it may not therefore be amiss to examine the use of other signs, in order to knowthat of words. Counters, for instance, at a card table are used, not for their own sake, but only as signs substitutedfor money, as words are for ideas. Say now, Alciphron, is it necessary every time these counters are usedthroughout the progress of a game, to frame an idea of the distinct sum or value that each represents? [. . .] it beingsufficient that we have it in our power to substitute things or ideas for their signs when there is occasion(Alciphron, VII. 5).12

Principles, 33. Cf. the opening sentence of the Principles: It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of theobjects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, [. . .] or lastly ideasformed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originallyperceivedin the aforesaid ways (Principles, 1; my italics, MMI). Cf. also Three Dialogues, where ideas are said tobe images and representations of real things (Three Dialogues, I, WorksII, p. 203).



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of the imagination, which, in turn, stand for the respective ideas of sense, does, however,

not seem to preclude that words may also represent ideas of sense directly.Recognition must also be given to the fact that since there are nothing but ideas and

minds in Berkeleys universe, written words and spoken words are, strictly speaking, typesof ideas, a conclusion which might prompt us to rename them accordingly as linguisticideas or ideas of written and spoken words. But as things are, this does not seem to preventthem from occupying the respective position in the traditional chain of representation con-necting writing, speech, thought and the world (see Fig. 15; cf. part I,Fig. 1). Except forthese minor alterations, the representational model seems to remain unaffected.

3.2. Berkeleys presentational theory of language: the language of vision

Compared to Berkeleys fairly transparent treatment of verbal language in a represen-tational framework, the mapping of his divine language of nature on what I have calledthe presentational theory of language is not quite so straightforward. I think there is a sim-ple reason for that: Berkeley does not, and cannot,embracea presentational theory of lan-guage in the strict sense of the word (cf. Section 4). I will argue, however, that henevertheless relies heavily on it. Let me begin the discussion with one of Berkeleys manylinguistic portrayals of the divine language of nature. Characteristically, the introductionof the language of vision is preceded by a definition of language in general:

What I mean is not the sound of speech as such, but the arbitrary use of sensiblesigns, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with the things signified;

so as by the apposite management of them to suggest and exhibit to my mind an end-

less variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place; thereby informing me,

entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not only with regard to things near

and present, but also with regard to things distant and future. No matter whether

these signs are pronounced or written; whether they enter by the eye or ear: they have

the same use, and are proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing cause. [. . .] it shall

appear plainly that God speaks to men by the intervention and use of arbitrary, out-

ward, sensible signs, having no resemblance or necessary connexion with the things

they stand for and suggest; [. . .

] by innumerable combinations of these signs, an end-less variety of things is discovered and made known to us; and [ . . .] we are thereby

instructed or informed in their different natures; [. . .] we are taught and admonished

what to shun, and what to pursue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and

IDEAS (ideas of written words)

IDEAS (ideas of spoken words)

IDEAS (ideas of imagination/memory)

IDEAS (ideas of sense)

Fig. 15. Berkeleys representational theory of language.



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how to act with respect to things distant from us, as well in time as place [ . . .] therein

consists the force, and use, and nature of language. (Alciphron, IV. 7)

It is obvious that this characterization is meant to bridge the differences between ordin-

ary language and the language of nature. Since his aim is to argue for the linguistic natureof vision, the tendency is for Berkeley to play down the peculiarities of each medium aswell as to emphasize the common ground. Thus, for example, both are said to consistof sensible signs that stand in arbitrary relationship to their signifieds. In addition, bothare described as rich systems of signification with an almost infinite expressive power, serv-ing various communicative purposes.13

But whatever we can make of this without having treated the universal language ofvision in some more detail, nothing so far suggests that Berkeley shaped his universal lan-guage of vision in the mould of a presentational theory of language except for the termlanguage of nature itself. Quite on the contrary: similitude, a concept that following

Foucault is often said to epitomize the thinking of Renaissance occultism, is expresslyexcluded from linguistic signification.14 Instead, linguistic signs including the visual signsof the language of nature are said to rest on what looks like a Berkeleian linguistic prin-ciple of arbitrariness: the foremost criterion for something to be a language is that there isan arbitrary relationship between sign and signified.15 According to the argument of partI, however, arbitrariness can be seen to be a reliable indicator for arepresentational theoryof language (cf. part I, Fig. 7). Adding to this major incompatibility, Berkeleys languageof nature is said to function as a medium of communication between spirits, no less thanordinary language. And it is said to do so not only in the traditional terms of conveyinginformation, but alsointerms of more mundane functions such as entertaining us and reg-

ulating our daily life.16

As things stand, this is not all that can be brought to bear against the assumption thatBerkeleys language of vision rests on a presentational theory of language. Thus, Berkeleyconsistently employs a representational terminology in his account of the workings of thedivine language. In a manner reminiscent of the Aristotelian tradition of representation,visual signs are said torepresentorstand forideas of touch.17 Related to the terminologicalissue but clearly more disconcerting is the observation that sign and signified in thedivine language of nature, i.e. visual sense data and tactile sense data, do not seem tobe identical in any tolerable sense of the word. On the contrary, they are said to maketwo species, entirely distinct and heterogeneous (Principles, 44). This divergence is allthe more disturbing considering that the identity of sign and signified was singled out

13 Cf.Forest (1997, p. 443).14 In repudiating necessary deductions and similitudes to the fancy from linguistic signification, Berkeley

primarily opposes rival theories of visual perception that would block a construal of visual perception in terms ofsigns and signifieds and thus, ultimately, in linguistic terms. SeeLuce & Jessops introduction toTheory of Vision(1948, WorksI, pp. 143163).15 Cf.New Theory of Vision, 64, 65; Vision Vindicated, 43.16

The latter functions are repeatedly pointed to by Berkeley in order to instantiate (against Locke) usages oflanguage that do not seem to require concomitant ideas as their meaning. It is clear, though, that Berkeley viewsthe informative function, i. e. the conveying of ideas, as primary and fundamental. Cf. Introd. to Principles, 25;Principles, 22, 24, and below.17 Cf.New Theory of Vision, 144, 152; Alciphron, III. 4 (WorksIII, p. 149).



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as the principal axiom of a presentational theory of language on which all other criteriamore or less depend (part I, Fig. 7).

To make things worse, there does not seem to be anything like a mystic descent intothings or words involved in Berkeleys account of visual perception. The occult subjects

assimilation to the world of sign-signified objects, one of the corollaries of the Neoplato-nist view of the language of nature, is certainly not a precondition for the Berkeleian sub-jects capacity of reading in that great volume of nature (Principles, 109). Berkeleysfinite spirits act autonomously with regard to nature, being exposed to, and acquiring,its peculiar dialect in a most natural setting from the cradle (AlciphronIV. 11). And insteadof being granted access to the secrets of nature, they actively advance in their understand-ing of Gods visual language, the more industry, care, and observation they invest into itsstudy (Siris, 253, 254). While human beings cannot help but acquire Gods idiom at leastto the extent that they are familiar with most of its words and letters, others may devotetheir time to discovering the grammatical rules of the divine language. Thus, in a furtherextension of what the majority of historians have seen as too bold a metaphor, Berkeleyrefers to the natural philosopher as the grammarian of nature (Principles, 65, 66). That, inturn, seems to imply that the divine language can be learned and studied in a way similarto learning and studying ordinary languages. In a nutshell, the evidence to the contrary isso impressive that it might seem to prohibit the placing of Berkeley in the tradition of thetwo-languages metaphysics.

On the other hand, the amount of evidence for the assumption that underlying Berke-leys thought is a version of Linguistic Platonism is just as compelling. If, for example, thescientist is at the same time a grammarian of nature (and a psychologist at that), then this

surely presupposes the fusion of language, thought, and the world that is characteristic ofthe Neoplatonist tradition. It is also due to this merging of the semiotic levels that Berke-ley can address the contents of the mind variably as things,ideas, or linguistic items in away that is basically in accordance with occult parlance.18 Even the medial distinctionbetween writing and speech is leveled out into a transient yet permanent divine idiom thatpreserves the distinctive features of both. In visual sense experience the voice of theAuthor of nature [. . .]speaks to our eyes in a constant creation, an instantaneous pro-duction and reproduction of aviva vocestretch of writing.19 Accordingly, science or nat-ural philosophy cannot profitably be carried out with the instruments and methods ofcontemporary mechanical philosophy. If nature is a text, science must be a thoroughly

hermeneutic business:

Hence it is evident, that those things which under the notion of a cause co-operating

or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether explicable, and run us into

great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious

use assigned them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our informa-

tion. And it is the searching after, and endeavouring to understand those signs insti-

tuted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural

18

See e.g. Principles, 33, 34, 38. In response to some critics, Berkeley emphasizes that through his philosophywe are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear or any wise conceive or understand,remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever (Principles, 34; cf. 51). And: I take not away substances. [. . .] Ionely reject the Philosophic sense (which in effect is no sense) of the word substance (Phil. Comment., 517).19 Alciphron, IV. 14. Cf. ibid., 11, 12; New Theory of Vision, 152.



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philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes; which

doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active prin-

ciple, that supreme and wise spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our being.20

Notice also that the elements of Berkeleys language of vision cannot be used to refer, atleast in the sense that whatever they can refer to is already pre-established by the author ofnature. But even for the infinite spirit, visual sense data cannot in the remotest sense besaid to representideas of touch. It is true that Berkeley confidently employs a representa-tional metalanguage that makes divine signs stand for,represent,refer toor evensubstitutedivine signifieds.21 And there is no reason to assume that this practice was an insinceremove meant to underpin his arguments for the essentially linguistic nature of vision.Rather, Berkeley seems to have treated representation as the most typical function ofsigns, albeit not the only one.22 And one must not forget that he lacked an appropriatenon-representational terminology. Yet visual impressions escape such representational

description in that they are co-original with tactile sense impressions. Clearly, Berkeleydoes not want to imply that the tactile world of sense should be accorded logical and onto-logical priority, while the visual world was created by God in order for him to be able totalk or write aboutideas of touch. Ignoring for the moment the fact that Berkeley arguesfor a linguistic priority of vision over the other senses (cf. Section 3.4), all sense data arelogically and ontologically on a par by virtue of their being constantly and indiscriminatelyissued by God.

This being incontestable, it does not, however, follow that they are all signs. But clearly,in order for Berkeleys language of vision to follow the pattern of a presentational modelof language, what is signified by the visual sense data, i.e. ideas of touch, would have to

form, in turn, a system of signs with other ideas as their signifieds and so on, infinitely.Considering that all sense impressions are directly engendered by the author of nature,it would indeed seem natural to assume that they are all meaningful elements of the divinelanguage. Berkeley, however for reasons to be discussed later (Section 3.5) recom-mends that the term language be reserved for vision only. But notwithstanding his appar-ent hesitation to reduce the whole world of sense to one or several languages, Berkeleyreadily concedes that it constitutes a world of signs. Even the ideas of smell and touchagree in the general nature of sign (Alciphron, IV. 12). Thus, the whole universe formsa huge semiotic superstructure in whichvision is assigned the dominating role of a fullyelaborated system of signs, or language.23

For two reasons, this is precisely what one might expect. For one thing, it would cer-tainly be odd, if not downright incoherent, to have God speak in an ideal language con-trived with such wonderful skill (Alciphron, IV. 15), while with respect to ideas of theother senses he would appear to produce meaningless gibberish at whim. Secondly, and

20 Principles, 66; cf. Alciphron, IV. 14; Three Dialogues (WorksII, p. 236.)21 See e.g. Alciphron, IV. 7, p. 149 (stand for); VII. 5 (substitute); New Theory of Vision, 152 (represent).22 SeeAlciphron, VII. 5.23

This is a point on which Berkeley scholars are agreed. Cf.Land (1975, p. 199), Hardwick (1981),Pfeifer (1978,p. 72),Moore (pp. 184, 333, 336), McGowan (1991, I, p. 115f), Land (1991, p. 89); Forest (1997, p. 439f), Meier-Oeser (1997, p. 382). ForTurbayne (1991, I, p. 52) and Moore (1984, p. 338), Berkeleys conception of the worldas a system of signs is a unique feature and his most interesting and original contribution, respectively. Iagree with the predicate interesting.



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more importantly, the concept of a semiotic universe of sense derives directly from Berke-leys definition of signs:

Ideas which are observed to be connected with other ideas come to be considered as

signs, by means whereof things not actually perceived by sense are signified or sug-gested to the imagination, whose objects they are, and which alone perceives them.

And as sounds suggest other things, so characters suggest those sounds; and, in gen-

eral, all signs suggest the things signified, there being no idea which may not offer to the

mind another idea which hath been frequently joined with it. In certain cases a sign may

suggest its correlate as an image, in others as an effect, in others as a cause. But

where there is no such relation of similitude or causality, nor any necessary connex-

ion whatsoever, two things, by their mere coexistence, or two ideas, merely by being

perceived together, may suggest or signify one the other, their connexion being all

the while arbitrary; for it is the connexion only, as such, that causeth this effect.

(Vision Vindicated, 39; my italics, MMI)

Since the ideas caused by God are all contextually embedded and recurring (as opposedto isolated and singular), Berkeleys associationist definition of signs imposes the followingconsequences on the elements of the sensory world: firstly, every sense impression is(meant to be) a sign and has meaning; secondly, the meaning of a sense impression is by virtue of its being an idea itself a meaningful sign; thirdly, if arbitrary, sign and sig-nified maysuggest or signify one the other, i.e. they stand in the relationship ofmutualsignification24; fourthly, an idea-sign has as many meanings as there are ideas habituallyconnected to it, i.e. there is multiple signification; and, as a necessary consequence of

mutual and multiple signification, there is, fifthly, infinite semiosis: there is no end tothe divine chain of signification. For whichever reason, then, Berkeleys terminologymerely suggests that tactile ideas are the ultimate signifieds of the language of nature.Vision as the language of nature, standing out clearly against the non-visual ideas causedby God, is itself suspended in a network of interrelated signs which is not tied to the ulti-mate signifieds of a representational model of language.25

24 Mutual signification as a corollary of Berkeleys associationist semiotics is noted by Land (1991, p. 104) andArmstrong (1994, p. 82). It is interesting to see, especially with regard to the direction of Agrippas chain of

signification, that from among the various types of semiotic relationship which are licensed by his associationistdefinition (listed byArmstrong, 1994), Berkeley utilizes only the paradigmatic, or cross-sensory ones, i.e. thosethat connect the data of one sense with those of another. In particular, it is worth mentioning that he does notseem to consider the potential for visual sense data to entertain semiotic relationships with other qualities of theirown species, although such is assumed by many a commentator. In fact, as Land (1975, 1991) has argued atlength, simultaneous or contiguous sense data serve the function of specifying the contextual use of a particularsign: faintness of a visual impression, for example, signifies the distance of a visual object not in each and everyinstant of occurrence, but only in the appropriate visual context. For this and other affinities between Agrippaand Berkeley, see Section3.5.25 A further, semantic consequence of infinite semiosis, which is also absent from the list of corollaries of the

presentational theory of language (part I, Fig. 7), is the ubiquity, fullness and eternal presence of meaning or,what is genetically and fundamentally the same, the nowhereness and complete absence of sense (cf. Section 4).

While the first seems to have been the peculiar mental condition of the subject in the occult tradition of theRenaissance (and, no less, in the diverse mystic traditions), the latter doubtlessly describes the Modern and, evenmore, the Postmodern experience. Cf. note 58. InIsermann (1999a,b)I argued that the contrast between the twohistorical attitudes towards infinite semiosis is due to a replacement of the pre-modern primordial category ofsubstance by the modern category of relation, or plainly put, of a world of things by a world of written words.



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On balance, then, the majority of linguistic and semiotic features of Berkeleys divinelanguage of vision are at variance with a representational theory of language, but fullyconsistent with a presentational one. Given that a linguistic theory with a foothold inboth representation and presentation borders on the impossible, the assumption sug-

gests itself that the impression of incoherence might arise from Berkeleys representa-tional terminology rather than from a representational foundation of the language ofvision. Indeed, in Section 3.5, I will argue that most of the problematic conclusionsarrived at above may be accounted for in just this way. As a prelude to that, I will firsttry to corroborate the findings by locating what we have good reasons to regard asBerkeleys presentational theory of language in the larger framework of linguisticPlatonism.

3.3. Linguistic Platonism in Berkeley

A central feature of linguistic Platonism, and certainly the most Platonic one, is thepeculiarly Platonic relationship between the two languages and, from a more general per-spective, between the two theories of language that define Neoplatonist metaphysics. Thesignificance of the two-world-metaphysics for linguistic Platonism demands a separate anddetailed treatment of the topic. The feature is missing from the list (cf. part I, Fig. 7),because it sits astride the juxtaposition of a presentational and a representational (theoryof) language. As I have passed over this central feature in the introduction to linguisticPlatonism (part I, Section 2), I will occasionally draw a parallel between Berkeley andthe occult Renaissance, pointing to the structural similarity in the way in which the pre-

carious treatment of the relationship between the two languages makes itself felt. I willapproach the topic first from a more linguistic point of view, starting out from what seemsto be a property oflinguisticNeoplatonism only. Following that, I will look at Berkeleystwo-languages metaphysics with a view to the recurrent elements of Neoplatonism in gen-eral, leaving till the next Section (3.4) the issue of why a critique of language forms anindispensable part of linguistic Platonism.

First, the linguistic perspective: Among the effects of linguistic Neoplatonism thatlack a counterpart in the Platonic two-world metaphysics, there is one that needs par-ticular attention: The relationship between the divine, presentational language of visionand the ordinary, communicative language of representation is such that the latter

appears to be the metalanguage of the first.26

After all, even Berkeley himself has tofall back on ordinary language in order to argue that what we talk about when we talkabout things we have seen is, in fact, the divine language of nature. Indeed, this is pre-cisely the situation that motivated many of Berkeleys writings: His main objectiveoften is to convince the reader that the world around us is nothing but Gods meansof literally expressing himself. In other words, it is Berkeleys self-proclaimed task toget the reader to recognize that what he has been referring to in everyday discourse(in the sense of ultimate signifieds) are really signs that are themselves signs of signsand so on, infinitely. This raises the following question: If the language of nature isa self-sufficient and self-referential system of signs without a representational founda-

tion, then does this not mean that the ordinary (meta-)language of representation

26 Cf.Gelber (1952, p. 501); Turbayne (1991, p. 52).



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would also lack an ultimate signified? Does the reformulation of the world of things asa language of nature without a representational grounding not do away with an ulti-mate signified altogether?

I believe that such a compact view of the interplay of the two languages is little more

than a theoretical speculation, and a highly implausible one at that. It is theoreticallyimplausible, because it combines two opposing theories of languages that have to be keptdistinct. In ordinary, practical affairs of life the elements of the language of nature, i.e.visual impressions, do indeed function as ultimate signifieds, as what is ultimately repre-sented. In this respect, and in some others too, Berkeleys two languages behave more liketwo unrelated languages (as depicted in part I, Fig. 6) than like one language with twofunctions or two languages with a common joint (cf. part I, Fig. 5). As long as we under-stand the term metalanguage to mean simply that a language is used to talk aboutanother, it is appropriate that we call Berkeleys artificial language the metalanguageof the divine language of vision. In all other respects it is not. Two implications of the com-parison are particularly misleading: For one thing, object language and metalanguage areneither different languages nor different functions of the same language in Berkeleys meta-physics. Secondly, Berkeleys ordinary language does not perform the function of a meta-language. Whereas usually the typical function of a metalanguage is to make the objectlanguage accessible to the linguistic understanding, Berkeley sees ordinary language asconcealing the divine language of nature (cf. Section 3.4). In short, it is the Platonic rela-tionship between the two languages that blocks their interpretation in terms of object lan-guage and metalanguage.

So instead of cutting the ground from under the feet of the ordinary language user, the

language of nature serves as the safe ground on which the representational significationprocess comes to rest. It is, to quote Berkeley, of excellent use in giving stability and per-manency to human discourse (Alciphron, IV. 15). No doubt, the same is true of scientificdiscourse, even if it is about the language of nature. Whether or not we accept Berkeleysmetaphysics, we (including Berkeley himself) generally talk about what we believewe see,hear, and touch, not about what these things might turn out to bewhen subjected to thescientific linguistic scrutiny of the philosopher or the grammarian of nature. This is whatBerkeley is prepared to accept as inevitable and sensible at the same time. What he lamentsis that not even when we stop and contemplate do we recognize that what we have beentalking about all along is evidently the language of the author of nature, a spirit, who is so

actually and intimately present (AlciphronIV. 14) to our minds and in whom, Berkeleyadds with St. Paul, we live, and move, and have our being (Principles, 149). A commonman, says Berkeley with an air of indignation,

would probably be more convinced of the being of God by one single sentence heard

once in his life from the sky than by all the experience he has had of this Visual Lan-

guage, contrived with such an exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to his eyes, and

so plainly declaring the nearness, wisdom, and providence of Him with whom we

have to do.27

27 Alciphron, IV. 15; cf. Principles, 57.



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The disappointment about his fellow men not recognizing the language of nature forwhat it is is probably that of the theologian Berkeley. As a grammarian-philosopher ofnature, Berkeley offers several reasons for human ignorance vis-a-vis the immediate pres-ence of Gods visible voice, one of which deserves special mention in the present context;

not least, because it relies heavily on a linguistic observation.In a line of argument that anticipates Benjamin Whorfs concept of background phe-

nomenon, Berkeley points out that it is a characteristic feature of the human perceptivefaculty to assimilate (sensible) sign and (imagined) signified to the point of identificationwith increasing frequency of occurrence. The more habitual the sequence of two senseimpressions, the stronger the illusion of the mind to perceive both when only one is pres-ent. Thus to draw on one of Berkeleys favourite examples we take it for granted thatwe seea distant, extended or moving object, although distance, extension and movementare sensible qualities proper to tactile experience only. Careful introspection, however, willreveal that the tactile qualities are merely suggested, i.e. signified by certain elements ofvisual perception. Thus, for example, the faintness, smallness or obscurity of a visualimpression signify greater distance of an object, given appropriate perceptual contextconditions.

By blending sign and signified into each other, we fail to distinguish them and depriveourselves of the opportunity to grasp the semiotic nature of vision in the first place. Sim-ilarly, our discriminating faculty is suspended in the perception of everyday discourse. Isee, therefore, in strict philosophical truth, says Berkeley in a nicely condensed analogicalargument, that rock only in the same sense that I may be said to hear it, when the wordrockis pronounced (Alciphron, IV. 10). We believe we have direct access to what some-

body means by assuming it to be what we read or hear:[I]t comes to pass that the mind often overlooks them [i.e. signs], so as to carry its

attention immediately on to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we

run over the characters with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Hence

it is frequent for men to say, they see words [as acoustic-auditory entities], and

notions, and things in reading a book; whereas in strictness they see only the char-

acters which suggest words, notions and things. And, by parity of reason, may we

not suppose that men, not resting in, but overlooking the immediate objects of sight,

as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention onward to the very

thing signified, and talk as if they saw the secondary objects? which, in truth and

strictness, are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper

objects of sight, which alone are seen.28

Strictly speaking, the artificial separation of sign and signified and, hence, the experien-tial recognition of the language of nature as such, is almost impossible:

Which will not seem strange to us if we consider how hard it is for any one to hear

the words of his native language pronounced in his ears without understanding them.

Though he endeavour to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless

intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it extremely difficult, if not impossible,

to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never learned the language,

28 Alciphron, IV. 12; cf. New Theory of Vision, 48.



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so as to be affected barely with the sounds themselves, and not perceive the signifi-

cation annexed to them. (New Theory of Vision, 159)

Suggesting a thought experiment that is targeted towards the universality of the lan-

guage of nature, Berkeley brings the argument to its ultimate conclusion:And there are some grounds to think that if there was one only invariable and uni-

versal language in the world, and that men were born with the faculty of speaking it,

it would be the opinion of many that the ideas of other mens minds were properly

perceived by the ear, or hadat least a necessary and inseparable tie with the sounds

that were affixed to them.29

At this point, the subtle reproach of human ignorance with respect to the language ofnature has turned into a full acknowledgment of the intricacies involved in experiencingthe language of nature. We fail to perceive the language of nature as such, because we live

in it.30

In the absence of other languages of vision that might demonstrate the arbitraryrelationship between visual and tactile impressions, we have to resort to a make-shiftdevice in order to grasp the non-identity of sign and signified. What Berkeley is thinkingof is a person with a fully developed sense of touch who has never been exposed to sensa-tions of light and colour. We have to assume the posture of a foreigner to thelanguageof nature and perceive it with the eyes of a person born blind made to see.31

Let me sum up the discussion so far. Although there is some merit in the view that therelationship between ordinary discourse and the universal language of vision is like thatbetween language and metalanguage, there is no evidence in Berkeleys writings that thisis more than just a theoretical thought-experiment. The two languages and, for that mat-

ter, the two theories of language, are kept strictly apart and treated as completely auton-omous. Even when talking about the language of nature, we do so in full accordance withthe requirements of a representational theory of language. A distinguishing feature of thelanguage of nature that has emerged from the above discussion is its paradoxical statusvis-a-vis human understanding. Although ever-present and, in a way, well known to us,it does not seem to be easily and transparently available to the conscious understandingof those to whom it addresses itself. It gives order, pattern and meaning to the flux of per-ceptual phenomena and thereby guides our understanding, our actions and interactions,though apparently in largely imperceptible ways. Thus, both the linguistic path and per-ceptual access to the divine language are barred. The language of nature eludes our per-ception. Employing Renaissance Neoplatonist locution, we might say that the language

29 New Theory of Vision, 66; cf. ibid., 144.30 Cf. Euphranor (i.e. Berkeley), interrupting Alciphron: But they [these strange things] are not strange, they

are familiar; and that makes them be overlooked (Alciphron, IV. 15).31 The famous Molyneux problem that pervades Berkeleys works on vision (e.g. New Theory of Vision, 41, 79,

110, 132f; Vision Vindicated, 71) was already discussed in Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding(1690[1975], II.9.8). Molyneux posed the problem of a man born blind who had learned to distinguish a cubefrom a sphere by touch. He argued as did Berkeley that the man would not be able immediately to distinguish

the two if he were given sight. Berkeleys semiotic theory of vision predicts that since one perceives distance andshapes by sight only mediately through the customary correlation with ideas of touch, and since the latter cannotin principle resemble visual ideas, a person born blind could neither correlate his tactile experience with the novelideas of vision nor perceive distance or shapes by sight. For a survey of the discussion, see Luce and Jessopsintroduction to New Theory of Vision(1948, I, pp. 143163).



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of nature is at once manifestand occult(in the original sense of being concealed) or, moreto the Berkeleian point, that it is occult, becauseit is absolutely manifest.

The Neoplatonist bent of the relationship between the two languages stands out moreclearly against the background of Berkeleys philosophy, if we look at it from the broader

perspective of Neoplatonism in general.32 In a way, Berkeleys entire philosophical archi-tecture can be seen to rest securely on a (Neo-)Platonic foundation. For basically two rea-sons, this Platonic foundation was destined to escape the notice of historians. The first isthat the two-languages metaphysics has not yet been recognized as an important variant ofPlatonic metaphysics in any historiographic tradition. The basic reason for that, in turn, isthat historians have not been willing to grant theory-status to occult ideas on language.Nor is the Platonic background easily identifiable in Berkeley, given that he does not intro-duce the two languages in an overtly Platonic context. In fact, the systematic pressure toharmonize the two languages is so strong that their contrastive properties tend to be con-stantly suppressed, concealed behind a representational terminology, or, as in the follow-ing quotation, simply reduced to a contrast of a natural vs. artificial origin:

A great number of arbitrary signs, various and apposite, do constitute a language. If

such arbitrary connexion be instituted by men, it is an artificial language; if by the

Author of Nature, it is a natural language. Infinitely various are the modifications

of light and sound, whence they are each capable of supplying an endless variety

of signs, and, accordingly, have been employed to form languages; the one by the

arbitrary appointment of mankind, the other by that of God Himself. A connexion

established by the Author of Nature, in the ordinary course of things, may surely be

called natural; as that made by men will be named artificial. And yet this doth not

hinder but the one may be as arbitrary as the other. And, in fact, there is no morelikeness to exhibit, or necessity to infer, things tangible from the modifications of

light, than there is in language to collect the meaning from the sound. But, such

as the connexion is of the various tones and articulations of voice with their several

meanings, the same is it between the various modes of light and their respective cor-

relates; or, in other words, between the ideas of sight and touch. (Vision Vindicated,

40)

The second, equally important reason why Berkeleys Platonism has been a closed bookto historians is that the identities of the two worlds that go into the Platonic two-world

metaphysics have been tacitly reversed. What in the Neoplatonist tradition was predicatedof the intelligible world of forms, accessible only to pure thought, is now predicated byBerkeley of the world of sense. Conversely, the attributes of the Platonic world of sense,the realm of appearance, are collectively transferred onto Berkeleys world of thought:

There is indeed this difference between the signification of tangible figures by visible

figures, and of ideas by words: that whereas the latter is variable and uncertain,

depending altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the former is fixed and

immutably the same in all time and places [. . .]. Hence it is that the voice of the

Author of Nature which speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation

32 Although some authors have pointed out that in his last publication, Siris (1744), Berkeley shows distinctNeoplatonist leanings, his mature theory is generally exempted from such a disreputable classification. Cf.Wenzs(1991) discussion of archetypes in Berkeleys writings and McKims response (1991).



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and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably subject to.

(New Theory of Vision, 152)

This modification, profound though it may be, leaves the entire Platonic construction

intact while, at the same time, contributing greatly to the disguising of it. In stark contrastto all other kinds of Platonism, the world of sense, i.e. the language of nature, is investedwith the attributes of the real, intelligible world. It is depicted as universal, fixed, immu-table, perfect, univocal, eternal, and addressed as what has a higher degree of realityand dignity relative to the ideas of human institution. Ideas of sense are more strong,lively, and distinct from those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order,and coherence and can be said to have more realityin them. Perfectly in line with thisrearrangement, ideas of human origin attract the opposite predicates. They are said to beambiguous, heterogeneous, incoherent, changing, irregular and, with regard to theironto-logical status, chimeras formed by the imagination or fictions of the mind.33 Thus,

the world of human thought is portrayed as having a lesser degree of being and the logicaland ontological secondariness that has always been an essential attribute of the Platonicworld of appearances.

3.4. Linguistic Platonism and Berkeleys critique of language

With the neoplatonist basis of his metaphysics thus delineated, we are sufficientlyequipped to assign to Berkeleys radical critique of language its proper systematic andhistorical location. While it is true that Berkeleys philosophy aims at drawing awaythe curtain of words from the truths of things in a way that indeed looks forward to

the early Wittgenstein,34 it is both historically and systematically more appropriate tosee him in the Baconian or, still more generally, in the empiricist tradition of languagecriticism. In keeping with the empiricist tradition, Berkeleys language criticism aims atthe surrender of human, especially verbal, authorship over scientific ideas in favour ofan emancipation of natures own communicative potential. According to Blumenberg(1986, p. 86), it is the fundamental idea of empiricism to rescue nature from its role asan underprivileged object of scientific discourse and to reinstate it as the legitimate nar-rator of its own history, leaving to the scientist the position of the faithful scribe writingdown the dictates of nature or, to borrow Berkeleys term, the grammar of nature. Thebusiness of the philosopher, by contrast, is to sweep away the verbal dust of uncouthparadoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies that centuries of human monologue haveheaped upon the book of nature.35 In other words, the philosopher has to clear theground of human language (and thought) in order for natures hand to become visibleto the grammarian of nature. It is essential to notice at this point that what is clearlymeant as a metaphor by Blumenberg and, with some likelihood, by the authors in theempiricist tradition prior to Berkeley, is turned into a literal programme in Berkeleysphilosophy. And more than that: Berkeleys philosopher is under the obligation to de-

33 Principles, 3036; Three Dialogues(WorksII, p. 235).34 Berkeleys outspoken distrust of language is standardly compared with that of Wittgenstein. Cf.Moore (1984,

p. 337); Turbayne (1991, p. 50); Fogelin (2001, passim).35 Principles, Introd., 13; cf. Phil. Comment., 642.



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intellectualize and to de-verbalize human pseudo-knowledge up to the point where werecognize that the language of nature is not a metaphor.

Berkeleys most extensive attack on human language and its attendant vices extendsover the 25 sections of the lengthy introduction to the Principles. It is clearly not tar-

geted towards his readership, much less to the generality of men which are simple andilliterate [and] never pretend to abstract notions (Principles, Introd., 10). As in Baconscritique of language, it is the philosophical and scholarly traditions that are pilloried.Above all, Berkeley takes issue with what he saw as the most dangerous theories, lead-ing inevitably to scepticism: the doctrine of matter in motion (in science) and that ofabstract ideas (in philosophy). Both the materialist and the abstractionist doctrines,Berkeley argues at length, originate from absurd linguistic theories (cf. e.g. Principles,Introd., 21).

As a remedy against the delusion of words (Principles, Introd., 25), he recommends,and then promises himself, to

endeavour to take them [the ideas] bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my

thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so

strictly united with them; [. . .] as long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas

divested of words, I do not know how I can easily be mistaken. [. . .] To discern

the agreement and disagreement there are between my ideas [. . .] there is nothing

more requisite, than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understand-

ing. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance

from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing

it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that

betwixt words and ideas. (Principles, Introd., 2123)

Interestingly, the philosopher finds himself in precisely the dilemma that characterizedAlciphrons (i.e. the general readers) problems of recognizing, and assenting to, the lin-guistic nature, and in turn, the divine origin, of vision. Wiping away the theoretical dustof the scholarly tradition requires that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off ourattention from the words which signify them (Principles, Introd., 23). But where the indi-viduals task to disunite the solid aggregates of sign and signified, though arduous, isinstantaneously rewarded with the intuitive knowledge of Gods intimate presence andguidance, the philosophers enterprise is incomparably more complicated. Not only is

he compelled to prolong and sustain the artificial separation of sign and signified throughwhole stretches of discourse, which I dare hardly promise my self; so difficult a thing it isto dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixtwords and ideas (Principles, Introd., 23). Still worse, he has to convey his glimpses oftruths with the aid of the same language that is the source of all problems. It seems asif Berkeley, with all his optimism, was at times aware of the hopelessness in view of theparadoxical situation that is characteristic of the two-languages metaphysics:

Once more I desire my Reader may be upon his guard against the Fallacy of words,

Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk that common

dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys [sic]. Let him not regard my Wordsany otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determind significations

so far as they fail of this [sic] they are Gibberish, Jargon & deserve not the name of

Language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my Book or any where



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but in his own Mind. wtever [sic] I see my self tis impossible I can paint it out in

words.36

On the whole, Berkeleys discussion of the two linguistic worlds and the uneasy position

of the enlightened subject relative to them proves to be a replica of the relevant argu-ments as presented in the esoteric tradition of Renaissance Neoplatonism. As an heir tothis tradition, Berkeley inherits a number of motives attendant on the two-world theoryfrom earlier strands of the Neoplatonic tradition, namely the ideas, for example, thatthe phenomenal world of appearances acts as a veil that covers the true reality ofthings/signs, that the world of appearances is generally mistaken for the real world/sign-world, that the demasking of the phenomenal world as such requires effort and dis-cipline, or that the teaching of the truth will meet with resistance from the side of thosethat believe in the reality of appearances. In addition to these general features, Berkeleyssystem displays those particular aspects of a Platonic metaphysics that originate in its lin-

guistic turn, i.e. the two-languages metaphysics as buttressing Renaissance occultism. Asargued above, the phenomenal language (of communication) has taken the position of theworld of appearances while nature herself has assumed the role of the ultimate sign-reality:it is presented as a real, perfect, natural, auto-referential language or, which is the same,aswhat language essentially is. This linguistic reading of the two-world theory results in apeculiar linguistic constellation that is absent from orthodox versions of Neoplatonism.For once the verbal-intellectual debris covering the reality of language is removed, the phi-losopher finds himself entangled in the paradoxical situation that requires him to eitherdraw the cloak of silence over what he has seen or put the debris back to where it was.This, then, is the linguistic paradox inherent in the two-languages metaphysics: the real

language defies verbalization. And it is the awareness of this paradoxical situation thatis behind Berkeleys pessimistic remark that he cant paint it out in words.

With no viable way out of the quandary, but with the natural desire to communicatethe ineffable, Renaissance authors tried to escape the vicious circle by resorting to make-shift strategies. They either consciously destroyed the conventional make-up of the com-municative language, hoping that a spark of the true language of nature might shinethrough the otherwise opaque fabric of the veil of words a practice which earned themthe reputation of promoting affected obscurity. Or they would temporarily, by plausibleempty talk (cf. last quote), comply with the requirements of the phenomenal language,leading the hearer-reader to the critical point where the logic of the language of commu-nication would break down. Either way, occult writers were well aware that access to thereal language of nature (or the real nature of language) could not be taught nor shown nortalked about. Ultimately, the reader would have to be left to himself. As for Berkeley,being a philosopher,a bishop and a teacher, he clearly opted for the second way to dealwith this paradox.37

Instead of taking a closer look at the contents and thrust of Berkeleys critique of lan-guage, I would rather like to focus on its structural position within linguistic Platonism.From the point of view of the history of linguistic ideas, it may well be important to ana-lyze this part of his linguistic ideas more carefully. But whatever the philologically verifi-

able motive or the proper systematic place of Berkeleys language criticism, the most

36 Phil. Comment., 696. Cf. ibid., 579, 627, 636, 693, 867, 883; New Theory of Vision, 120;Vision Vindicated, 35.37 See quotation above; cf. Principles, Introd., 25.



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important fact for the present argument, at least is that it is there. It is important,because it needs to be there. It is one of the structural ingredients that is essential for atwo-languages theory to make sense. That the critique of language should eventually ren-der itself superfluous in that it needs to be voiced in the same communicative medium that

it is directed against, is just another natural consequence following from linguisticNeoplatonism.

If that is correct, Berkeleys criticism should be aimed at more than just ordinary lan-guage. Recall that the Platonic structure of the two-languages metaphysics imposes a non-affirmative context on the entire representational theory of language. The framework oflinguistic Platonism thus predicts, in the abstract at least, that the critical attitude towardsthe communicative language be extended, firstly, to a critique of theories of language ascommunication or representation much in the same way that traditional Neoplatonism,besides disapproving of the material, sensual side of things, always included an implicitcritique of materialist ontologies. Linguistic Platonism predicts, secondly, that the scopeof the critique spans the entire representational chain (cf. part I, Fig. 6), including whatis immediately represented by language, i.e. human concepts (as representational entities)and what is ultimately represented by language: things conceived of as ultimate signifieds.For if language does not tell the truth in the courtroom of epistemology, why should writ-ing or whatever is merely represented by language do so? Lurking behind the obvious cul-prit language, then, is the whole chain of representation, feeding the suspicion that all ofthem might be involved in the case. In less picturesque wording: It should not come as asurprise if Berkeleys critique of language were embedded in a far more radical critique ofrepresentation in general.

Arguably, these Platonic implications inherent in the metaphysics of the two lan-guages are entirely borne out by Berkeleys metaphysics. On the level of his linguistic ideas,the critique is rather mild and consists in his pointing out many legitimate uses of wordsthat go beyond the mere recording or communicating of words (McGowan, 1991, p.121). Much in the same vein, Berkeley criticizes the linguistic theories that require wordsto stand generally for ideas in order to be used in a legitimate and significant manner,alerting the reader time and again to the fact that this misapprehension is at the root ofmany erroneous doctrines:

But to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract

ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion, that language has no other

end but the communicating of our ideas, and that every significant name stands

for an idea [. . .]. And a little attention will discover, that it is not necessary (even

in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should [ . . .] excite

in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discours-

ing, names being for the most part used as letters are in algebra, in which though a

particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite

that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts, that particular quantity it was

appointed to stand for. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not

the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends,

as the raising of some passion, the exciting to, or deterring from some action, theputting the mind in some particular disposition [. . .]. For example, when a School-

man tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me

to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed



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to that name [. . .]. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given, but why should I

insist on those things, which every ones experience will [. . .] plentifully suggest unto

him?38

Tacitly, but naturally, this criticism feeds into a wholesale attack on a representationalor which in the eyes of Berkeley is basically the same Lockean theory of language. Themost extensive discussion and rejection of representationalism occurs in the seventh dia-logue ofAlciphron. Before again rejecting what he believes to be the fallacies of a repre-sentational theory of language (such as the view that in order for a word to besignificant it has to stand for an idea on each occasion of its use, or the notion that thesole and principal end of language is to communicate ideas), Berkeley lets Euphranors(i.e. his) interlocutor Alciphron present a summary of a Lockean theory of language thatextends over nearly four pages. Its opening premises deserve to be quoted at some length:

Words are signs: they do or should stand for ideas, which so far as they suggest they

are significant. But words that suggest no ideas are insignificant. He who annexeth a

clear idea to every word he makes use of speaks sense; but where such ideas are want-

ing, the speaker utters nonsense. In order therefore to know whether any mans

speech be senseless and insignificant, we have nothing to do but lay aside the words,

and consider the ideas suggested by them. Men, not being able immediately to com-

municate their ideas one to another, are obliged to make use of sensible signs or

words; the use of which is to raise those ideas in the hearer which are in the mind

of the speaker; and if they fail of this end they serve to no purpose. He who really

thinks hath a train of ideas succeeding each other and connected in his mind; and

when he expresseth himself by discourse each word suggests a distinct idea to thehearer or reader; who by that means hath the same train of ideas in his which was

in the mind of the speaker or writer. As far as this effect is produced, so far the dis-

course is intelligible, hath sense and meaning. Hence it follows that whoever can be

supposed to understand what he reads or hears must have a train of ideas in his

mind, correspondent to the train of words read or heard. (Alciphron, VII. 2)

This is the sort of theory that Berkeley sees at the root of the aforementioned evils.Admittedly, neither Alciphrons endorsement of a Lockean theory of language (Alciphron,VII. 24) nor Euphranors (i.e. Berkeleys) rejection of it (Alciphron, VII. 5, 14) takesaccount of the fact that a prototypical representational theory of language is representa-tional throughout, extending the scope of representation to include the relationshipbetween ideas and (material) things. But this should not deceive one into concluding thatthe remaining components of the attack on representation remained implicit or evenabsent. It is just difficult to assemble them in one stretch of argument. In fact, this is alltoo natural, given that they are not meant by Berkeley to unite in a wholesale critiqueof representation. All I am saying here is that the structural make-up of linguistic Plato-nism includes, theoretically, a critical attitude towards all components of a representa-tional theory of language. Whether or not such theoretical implications receive explicittreatment is a question of the systematic requirements of a particular theory as much as

38 Principles, Introd., 19f; cf.Alciphron, VII. 4ff, 14;Woozley (1991). Interestingly, Berkeley seems to recognizein the above quotation and elsewhere (Principles, Introd., 19) a relationship between communicative function andthe representation of ideas as joint features of a Lockean theory of language.



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it is dependent on the concerns and objectives of a particular author. A positive stancetowards the representational functions of any of the joints of the chain of significationis, however, precluded.

As for the critique of human thought (as what is immediately represented by ordinary

language), it is scattered over Berkeleys writings. It pervades, for example, the first threeparagraphs of the introduction to the Principles (where language is not yet his concern),but rarely accompanies, as it does in the following quotation, his language criticism:

The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of most things proceeds from the

fault & scantiness of language, as much, perhaps, as from obscurity & confusion of

Thought. Hence I may clearly & fully understand my own Soul extension, etc & not

be able to define them! (Phil. Comment., 178)

It is also worth noting in this context that Berkeley has been shown to reject contem-porary representational theories of perception in favour of a semiotic theory of percep-tion.39 Likewise, Berkeleys notorious assaults on received ideas of material substances(e.g. Principles, 16ff) should, in the context of linguistic Platonism, be read as a critiqueofrepresented substances, i.e. of the common doctrine that material things are the ultimatesignifieds. For Berkeleys idealist doctrine explodes the basis of representational theoriesof language in at least two ways: firstly, it does away with the idea that things are utterlydistinct from, and thus in a way behind, words and ideas (cf. Phil. Comment., 606); sec-ondly, it postulates that things (and their properties) are in fact signs.40 In sum, then, thekeystones of Berkeleys metaphysics are a unity. The critique of materialist or dualistontologies, the critique of language and the critique of representational theories of percep-

tion combine to form a critique of representational realism the presence of which isencouraged, if not required, by a linguistic Platonism operating from behind the scenes.If the above argument for at least an implicit presence of a full critique of representa-

tion in Berkeleys works is valid, the following problem suggests itself: We have seen abovethat Berkeley notes many important non-ideational uses of language, emphasizing thatthese non-representational functions of language are as important as the representationof ideas. We have also seen that Berkeley explicitly takes to task linguistic theories ofrepresentation including the sub-theory of ideational representation. And, of course,Berkeleys emphasis on non-representing uses of language has not been lost on historiog-raphers, who have argued that Berkeley thereby anticipates more recent, if not modern,

theories of language.41

On the other hand, it is generally agreed among the same histori-ans, and rightly so, that Berkeleys own rival theory of (ordinary) language does notescape the representationalism that it otherwise denounces. How can this be? Why doesBerkeley fail to fashion his critique of Lockean, representational linguistics into a non-Lockean, non-representational theory of language?

A conclusive answer to this question cannot disregard Berkeleys deep involvement inthe two-languages metaphysics. It is precisely this and only this theory that calls forboth the provisional commitment to a representational theory of language and, at thesame time, its denunciation as a theory of what language merely appears to be. The con-

39 Cf.Creery (1991, p. 29).40 The fact that things are signs follows straightforwardly from the semiotic constitution of their elements, i.e.

ideas of sense. See below (Section 3.5); cf. alsoFogelin (2001, pp. 92, 100).41 Land (1975, 1991).



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straints that the two-languages metaphysics places on Berkeleys linguistic ideas are suchthat apart from denying him the possibility of communicating the true nature of lan-guage they also prevent him from painting his intuitions about non-representationaluses of language into an appropriate linguistic theory. This is inescapable to the extent

that a representational theory forms part and parcel of the two-languages metaphysics.Thus, the paradoxical situation that the truth-seeking philosopher finds himself in reap-pears on the meta-level of linguistic theories: the adherence to linguistic Platonismrequires the restoration of the same representational model of language that it is meantto undermine.

3.5. Some problems

The two last sections have provided ample evidence for the claim that underlying thedesign of Berkeleys philosophy is a version of linguistic Platonism. By and large, thehypothesis appears to rest on a basis solid enough to require no further confirmation. Evenso, one must not ignore those features that seem to tell a different story. With Berkeleyslinguistic Platonism being brought to the fore, however, I am confident that many of theaforementioned alien elements can now be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Thus, forinstance, the fact that Berkeley attributes to the universal language of vision a communi-cative function merely shows that in an effort to convince the reader of the linguistic natureof vision he is willing to ascribe to it whatever features are characteristic of ordinary lan-guage. Still, there can be no no doubt that the sole function of Gods own idiom is that ofinstruction.42 There are, nonetheless, at least two pieces of counter-evidence to my general

claim that cannot easily be dismissed as either impostors or minor modifications to theprototypical two-languages metaphysics as illustrated in part I, Fig. 7. And it is to thesemore intricate issues that I now turn.

The first prominent divergence from the Renaissance model of a presentational the-ory of language emerges from Berkeleys discussion of the nature of the sign-signifiedrelationship. Recall that Berkeley takes pains to argue that the semiotic link betweenideas of vision and ideas of touch is arbitrary. Now in terms of the history of ideas,the attribution of arbitrariness to the divine language, far from being puzzling or novel,is part of the gradual secularization of linguistic ideas at the dawn of the modern era.43

With regard to a presentational theory of language, however, ascribing arbitrariness to

42 It should be noted, however, that Berkeleys language of nature no longer informs us about the nature oressenceof things. Following Locke, Berkeley views things as collections of qualities in precisely the same way thatwritten words are collections of letters (see below, Section3.5). As a consequence, the identity of words now restsexclusively on the particular combination of letters. But while Berkeley drew the natural conclusion that thenotions of substance, essence and accidents are vacuous (see below, Section4), Locke stopped short of taking thislast step, assuming besides all these simple Ideas they [ideas of substances] are made up of [ . . .] the confused Ideaof something to which they belong (Essay, II.23.3). Cf. Three Dialogues, Works II, p. 249. What Berkeleyslanguage of nature teaches us about nature herself is, accordingly, of a more practical and less esoteric character:By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such andsuch actions, and what methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such ideas: which in effect is all

that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of theinward part of bodies [. . .] we may attain to know [. . .] the nature of the thing (Principles, 65). The same practicalunderstanding of the nature of things determines the functionally oriented discussion of the language of naturein Alciphron, VII.43 Cf.Grazia (1980). See e.g.Locke (1975[1690], III.6.51).



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the divine language of nature is as irritating as it is unprecedented. It inevitably raisesthe question of whether a presentational theory of langua

george berkeley’s language of vision and the occult tradition of linguistic platonism. part ii...

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