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From Infancy to Inferences:Current Perspectives onIntentionalityClaire HughesPublished online: 13 Nov 2009.

To cite this article: Claire Hughes (2001) From Infancy to Inferences: CurrentPerspectives on Intentionality, Journal of Cognition and Development, 2:2, 221-240,DOI: 10.1207/S15327647JCD0202_5

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From Infancy to Inferences:Current Perspectives on Intentionality

Philip David Zelazo, Janet Wilde Astington, & David R. Olson (Eds.).Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control,Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1999, 358 pp., ISBN 0–8058–3142–8 (cloth).

Peter Mitchell & Kevin John Riggs (Eds.). Children’s reasoning and the mind,Hove, England: Psychology Press, 2000, 415 pp., ISBN 0–86377–854–2(hardback).

Bertram Franz Malle, Louis Joseph Moses, & Dare A. Baldwin (Eds.).Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition, Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2001, 24 pp., ISBN 0–262–13386–5 (cloth).

Claire HughesSocial, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre

Institute of Psychiatry, London, England

After more than 20 years, research into children’s acquisition of a theory of mind(ToM) remains one of the most dynamic areas of investigation within developmen-tal psychology. The range and quality of the contributions of the three books re-viewed here reflect the vigor of current ToM research. The title of the first book,Developing theories of intention (DTI; Zelazo, Astington, & Olson, 1999), deliber-ately echoes that of its predecessor Developing theories of mind (Astington, Harris,& Olson, 1988), which had a seminal influence on ToM research. This review is,

JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2(2), 221–240Copyright © 2001, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Claire Hughes, Centre for Family Research, University ofCambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, England. E-mail: ch288@cam.ac.uk

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therefore, also a timely opportunity to highlight the shifts in theoretical concernsand methodological approaches within ToM research between these two volumes.

The first theoretical shift is clear from the titles of both the first book (DTI) andthe second, Intentionality (INT; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). Early ToMwork emphasized the representational (and fallible) nature of mental states such asbelief (Dennett, 1978). In contrast, both DTI and INT give center stage to inten-tions and so highlight action rather than representation. My first objective is to out-line the implications of this new focus on intentions for ToM research.

The second shift is the increased scope of current ToM research. Within earlyToM work, understanding mistaken beliefs was thought to be the litmus test forToM. This view resulted in a heavy focus on a single task paradigm (prediction offalse belief) and a single age group (3- to 5-year-olds). The third book for review,Children’s reasoning about the mind (CRM), edited by Mitchell and Riggs (2000),also centers on false-belief understanding in preschoolers. However, CRM pro-vides a new breadth to this debate through its inclusion of several different do-main-general accounts. DTI and INT increase the developmental scope of ToMwork by bringing together authors interested in ToM in nonhuman primates, in-fants, toddlers, preschoolers, school-aged children, and even adults. My secondobjective is, therefore, to chart the normative changes across this extended spanand point to some continuing gaps in our understanding.

The third shift is a focus on the role of language in ToM development; this fea-tures prominently within all three books. Recent research has led to several kindsof account for the link between language and ToM, and these are well representedby the contributors to DTI, especially, but also to INT and CRM. In discussing thistheme, I first outline three different accounts of the role of language in ToM devel-opment. Next, I summarize findings from a recent twin study (Hughes & Cutting,1999) and argue that a genetic perspective can illuminate our understanding ofcognitive mechanisms underlying ToM development.

The fourth shift is a belated emergence of social perspectives on ToM; influ-ences of family interactions, social contexts, and cultural values are considered inseveral chapters that provide a useful counterpoint to the traditional focus on indi-vidual cognitive development. The social context of ToM development has beenhighlighted for some years within infancy research, and cultural differences inToM have been considered in previous reviews (e.g., Lillard, 1998). Therefore, Ifocus on insights from adult social psychology on how ToM research could bebroadened to include contextual influences on social reasoning.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTENTIONS

Bruner (1999), in his foreword to INT, highlights the dramatic shift between psy-chological theory throughout most of the 20th century (in which the idea of inten-tion was considered to be epiphenomenal, if not downright scandalous) and the new

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generation of ToM research in which intentions occupy a center-stage position. Theeditors of INT make this central locus explicit in their opening chapter by arguingthat intention is the foundation for social cognition (on par with space, time, andcausality in the realm of nonsocial cognition). Four justifications for this claim areused to guide the organization of other chapters in the volume: (a) components ofintentionality are basic mental categories (e.g., belief, desire, and awareness), (b)intentionality enables the detection of structure in human activity, (c) intentionalityenables people to explain human behavior, and (d) intentionality is involved in so-cial evaluation of behavior through its link with responsibility. Integrating these is-sues requires an interdisciplinary perspective; this is the first implication of the newfocus on intentions for ToM research.

The editors of DTI also adopt a historical perspective in their introduction, andthis is useful in drawing the reader’s attention to the origins of the rather confusingdual definitions for the term intention. Some contributors to DTI adopt Brentano’s(1874/1973) philosophical use of the term intentionality to describe the property ofdirectedness at an internal object (that distinguishes not just propositional atti-tudes—e.g., beliefs—but even simple mental states—e.g., pain—from physicalstates). Others (and all the authors in INT) prefer Baldwin’s (1895) everyday useof the term intentionality to describe purposeful or deliberate action. As a result,the same term is used within DTI to describe both states of awareness in infantsand calculated action plans in adults. The second implication of a focus on inten-tions is, therefore, a more extended view of development than is usually seen inToM research.

However, the problem of confusing terminology remains. As noted by Moses(2001 [INT]), the new challenge is to find a vocabulary that does justice to youngchildren’s impressive cognitive capacities without doing violence to the meaningof the full-blown adult concept of intentionality. To resolve this dilemma, severalcontributors in both INT and DTI apply Searle’s (1983) distinctions between in-tentions in action and prior intentions. This in turn leads to the distinction betweenrecognizing an action as intentional and knowing the content of an intention. Tothe extent that intentions are ascribed through language (see chapters in DTI byAstington, 1999; Feldman, 1999; Olson & Kamawar, 1999) the new focus on in-tentions also highlights the role of linguistic factors within ToM development (dis-cussed later).

The fourth implication of the shift in focus from beliefs to intentions is an empha-sis on action (rather than representation). Unlike beliefs, intentions are not true orfalse, but are fulfilled by outcomes in the world and serve to motivate action to bringabout these outcomes. In being neither true nor false, intentions are similar to de-sires. However, unlike desires, intentions are directed at causal actions (e.g., I canwish for a sunny day, but I cannot intend it) and involve a commitment to act (e.g., Ican have conflicting desires, but I cannot have conflicting intentions). In Baldwin’s(1897) definition, intentional acts linked to intentional action to the emergence of

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deliberation and effort. However, (as discussed in INT by Astington, 2001; Malle &Knobe, 2001; Moses, 2001) through the entailed commitment to act, the concept ofintention isalsoclosely intertwinedwith theconceptofbelief (e.g., I cannot intend todo something I believe to be impossible, although I can desire the impossible). Asthese examples illustrate, bringing action to the foreground, therefore, helps to clar-ify the boundaries between, and relations among, different mental states.

An emphasis on action also gives us new insights into how children acquire aToM. For example, Tomasello (1999 [DTI]) argued that infants’ sensorimotor ac-tions develop at around 9 months to include a new form of intention (i.e., commu-nicative intention) that is not seen in nonhuman primates and that is central toinfants’ understanding of intentions in others. Similarly, Moses (2001 [INT]) re-ported that 3-year-olds perform above chance on false-belief questions that refer tounfulfilled intentions. Explaining failed actions may, therefore, facilitate youngchildren’s understanding of belief. Likewise, three authors (Goldman, 2001 [INT];Mitchell, 2000 [CRM]; Moore, 1999 [DTI]) emphasized the need (from infancy topreschool) to combine first-person information (which highlights objects) withthird-person information (which highlights actions) to develop an objective under-standing of intentions and other mental states.

The increased Scope of New ToM Research

The collective scope of CRM, DTI, and INT also extends the scope of previous ToMresearch in three directions. First, the chapters in CRM document a variety of newtask paradigms that are structurally and empirically related to false-belief tasks. Byadopting a domain-general perspective, these chapters link age-related changes infalse-belief performance with more general developments in inferential reasoningand processing capacity (for reasons of space, I am brief in my presentation of theseaccounts but refer the reader to Perner’s, 2000, [CRM] summary chapter, whichpresents a useful overview of the competing positions). Second, by integrating find-ings from nonhuman primates, infants, toddlers, preschoolers, school-aged chil-dren, and adults, the chapters in DTI and INT greatly increase the developmentalscope of ToM research. Third, several authors present hybrid accounts of children’sdeveloping ToM. These chapters highlight the multicomponential nature of pro-cesses underlying ToM development.

False-Belief Understanding andGeneral Cognitive Developments

A clear shift between 3 and 5 years in children’s performance on false-belief taskshas now been demonstrated in over 1,000 studies (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson,2000, for a recent meta-analysis). Four sets of authors in CRM (Amsel & Smalley,

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2000; Harris & Leevers, 2000; Riggs & Peterson, 2000; Robinson & Beck, 2000)related false-belief performance to counterfactual reasoning. One interesting find-ing that emerged from the juxtaposition of these studies is that context is an impor-tant influence on the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning. For example,counterfactual reasoning appears much easier within the context of pretend playthan in false-belief tasks (Robinson & Beck, 2000) and within the context of storiesthat involve a salient negative outcome (e.g., Harris & Leevers, 2000) than in moreneutral scenarios (e.g., Riggs & Peterson, 2000). These contrasts echo findingsfrom naturalistic studies (e.g., Dunn & Slomkowski, 1992; Hughes & Dunn, 1997).This convergence across methodologies lends weight to the view that children’sbehavior and performance is context specific.

A second view is that mastery of false-belief tasks goes hand in hand withimproved executive function (Russell, 1997). This is not just a task effect be-cause correlations are just as strong in modified ToM tasks that have reducedexecutive function demands (e.g., explanation tasks). For Perner (2000 [CRM]),the main stumbling block for this account is the evidence of implicit ToM skills.That is, young children show correct spontaneous actions (e.g., looking in theright place) almost a year before they are able to provide the correct verbal re-sponse to false-belief tasks (Clements & Perner, 1994). This is rather awkwardto explain in terms of inhibitory control, which (according to Perner) is firstmanifest in deliberate action and verbal description. My response to this is two-fold. First, evidence from neuropsychological studies (e.g., Luria, 1965) andneurological studies (Sandson & Albert, 1987) has indicated multiple levels ofinhibitory control (see also Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997, for a distinc-tion between executor and executive functions). Therefore, it is possible that in-hibitory control at a motor output level (e.g., control of gaze direction) developsbefore higher order systems of inhibitory control (e.g., verbal responses). Sec-ond, it is possible that the link between executive function and ToM is not on-line but distal and indirect. For example, a recent longitudinal study (Hughes,1998) of typically developing preschoolers showed a significant predictive rela-tion between executive function and ToM, even with initial ToM controlled.One plausible explanation for this developmental relation is that executive func-tion is needed both to obtain firsthand experience of intentional action sequencesand to engage in the social interactions that feed our understanding of mind. Al-though weaker than the proposal that inhibitory control directly determinesfalse-belief performance, this mediated account was not affected by Clementsand Perner’s (1994) findings. As Perner noted however, there is probably not toomuch difference between executive function → ToM and ToM → executivefunction accounts. If ToM is integral to executive function and ToM needs to beformed by exercising it, then executive function is probably essential because itis the main grounds for developing a ToM. Executive problems should lead todelayed ToM.

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A third related proposal is that both executive function and ToM performancecan be explained in terms of cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory (Frye,1999, 2000; Zelazo, 1999, 2000 [both in DTI and CRM]), which hinges on thechild’s ability to formulate and use arbitrary embedded if–if–then rules. Perner’s(2000 [CRM]) arguments against this proposal were fourfold. First, rules are onlylearned after practice, whereas false-belief tasks involve novel situations. Second,the analysis leading to an if–if–then description of the false-belief task is arbitrary;simpler parses can be made. Third, Luria’s hand-game inhibitory control task re-quires a simpler set of rules (see Hughes, 1996) but is as hard as false-belief tasks.Fourth, the same rules should also apply to tasks involving inferences about desire(Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) or pretense (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Leslie,1994a) that are passed by most 18-month-olds. In a partial reply, Frye (2000[CRM]) argued that these recent findings on early understanding of pretense anddesire do not contradict CCC theory because both are on a par with true rather thanfalse belief (and so are less embedded). In support of this view, tasks that includeconflicting desires show the same 3- to 5-year shift (Moore et al., 1995).

An Extended View of ToM Development

As noted earlier, the contributions to DTI and INT span ToM issues from infancy toadulthood. This breadth of research reflects recent recognition that a child’s under-standing of mental life is not all of a piece, so there is no single moment at which achild develops a ToM (Meltzoff, Gopnik, & Repacholi, 1999). False-belief under-standing is now seen as just one developmental milestone along a path leading fromthe interpretation of intentional acts by infants to the integration of concepts of in-tention, knowledge, mind, and action to interpret morality, metaphor, and socialsubtexts (Tager-Flusberg, in press).

Milestones in understanding intentions. Laboratory experiments usinghabituation–dishabituation techniques (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, & Koos, 1999;Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995, cited in Tomasello, 1999 [DTI]) showedthat infants are sensitive to the intentionality of actions from around 9 months ofage. Likewise, through an elegant experiment adopting methods traditionally usedto investigate speech segmentation, Baird and Baldwin (2001 [INT]) demonstratedthat 10- to 11-month-old infants take an intentional stance in parsing human actionsequences in just the same way as adults. However, the detection of intentions in ac-tion may require only a relatively low-level cognitive system. For example, Hauser(1999 [DTI]) reported that cotton-top tamarins were surprised by the self-propelledmotion of inanimate (but not animate) objects but did not show any expectationsabout mental states such as beliefs. Alternatively, it may be that low-level detection

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of intentions in action among nonhuman primates (and young infants) is more prop-erly described as an ability to infer behavioral propensities (see Moore, 1999 [DTI];Povinelli, 1999 [DTI]; 2001 [INT]).

The first step up from understanding intentions in action is the ability to under-stand prior intentions. Although prior intentions (as ordinarily defined) are di-rected at actions, they are mental states and not physical events. That is, priorintentions are not necessarily followed by actions and so at a minimum can only beunderstood in terms of goals, which in turn entails the development of means–endbehavior (around late infancy to early toddlerhood). Around this age, infants alsobegin to engage in triadic interactions (e.g., joint attention, social referencing, anddeclarative pointing). These constellations of behaviors are taken by some re-searchers as the first real evidence of intention attribution (e.g., Bruner, 1999[DTI]; Tomasello, 1999 [DTI]; Wellman & Phillips, 2001 [INT]; Woodward,Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001 [INT]).

However, others (e.g., Moore, 1999 [DTI]) have taken a more cautious view,arguing that understanding the directedness of intentions is only really evidencedwhen an infant recognizes a mismatch between intended and actual states (or that aperson can have different attitudes toward different objects). This is the rationalebehind a new and elegant series of task paradigms developed to explore the darkages between infancy and preschool. First, studies of language acquisition haveshown that 18-month-olds take into account the intentions of the other person intheir attempts to identify the referent of a novel word (e.g., Tomasello & Barton,1994). Second, studies using nonverbal behavioral reenactment techniques (e.g.,Meltzoff, 1995) have demonstrated that when 18-month-olds witness unsuccess-ful attempts at an action, they reproduce the intended rather than the failed action(e.g., when adults enact the same event [toy toppling off shelf] with different emo-tional responses [Yeah! (+) / Uh-oh (-)], 18-month-olds knock the toy off in thefirst condition but place the toy so that it is stable on the shelf in the second condi-tion). Third, Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) showed that 18-month-olds also dis-play an understanding of the subjective nature of desire (e.g., giving broccoli orbiscuits to an adult depending on his or her previous emotional expression whenfaced with each choice).

The findings show that, by 18 months, the typical toddler has made importantadvances in understanding intentions and desires. Wellman and Phillips (2001)[INT]) argued that the next developmental step occurs around 2 to 3 years of agewhen children begin to distinguish intentions from both actions and desires.Both Moses (2001 [INT]) and Astington (2001 [INT]) were more skeptical,however, and presented experimental data that suggested that 3-year-olds treatintentions and desires as more or less synonymous. For example, Moses (1993,2001 [INT]) reported a study in which 3-year-olds watched three short videos ofan actor failing to achieve a goal. Although the children in the study showed anexcellent understanding of the motivational aspect of intention (i.e., they under-

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stood that the actor did not achieve his goal), it was less clear whether they un-derstood the causal link between intentions and actions (i.e., they appeared totreat intentions as desires). Similarly, in her review of studies (e.g., Phillips,Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998) using a rigged task design (based on Shultz &Shamash, 1981), Astington (2001 [INT]) concluded that even 4-year-old chil-dren who pass false-belief tasks show a primacy of desire over intention (i.e.,unintended acts with desirable consequences are reported to be intentional).Both Moses and Astington argued that although understanding the motivationalnature of intentional phenomena develops early in life, an epistemic understand-ing of intentions does not appear until relatively late in development. Lewis andRamsay (1999 [DTI]) arrived at a similar conclusion from a different perspec-tive: that of pretend play and consciousness.

Thus, the consensus view is that, unlike belief, intentionality is a multifacetedconcept that is acquired in stages spanning several years of development. How-ever, several gaps remain to be filled. The first of these concerns developmentsin middle childhood. The chapter by Chandler, Sokol, and Hallett (2001 [INT])stands alone in considering improvements in school children’s understanding ofintentionality (discussed in relation to the development of moral reasoning). Asecond gap concerns the interpersonal functions of intentionality (discussed laterin the Social Perspectives on ToM section). A third gap concerns the relation be-tween developments in different aspects of intentional understanding, which wecan only begin to guess at because just two of the many studies reported withinDTI and INT involved longitudinal assessments.

Multiple mechanisms. Early ToM work placed competing theoretical ac-counts in opposition to each other (see, e.g., chapters in Astington et al., 1988). Incontrast, the new generation of ToM research includes several hybrid accounts(e.g., Meltzoff et al., 1999 [DTI]; Perner & Lang, 2000). These portray specific de-velopmental mechanisms as either acting in tandem or influencing different aspectsor stages of ToM development.

For example, Meltzoff et al. (1999 [DTI]) argued that human neonates have abiologically given capacity for imitation that jump starts ToM development in twoways. First, as they experience their own attempts to control behavior, infantsbuild maps that link effort experiences, goals, and actions and use these to inferothers’ goals from actions. Second, imitative actions serve to maintain the socialinteractions that provide the grounding for learning about the self and others. Thisaccount, therefore, combines starting-state nativism with constructivism. Simi-larly, whereas early simulation theory emphasized children’s own direct experi-ences (in contrast to early theory–theory, which focused on children’sobservations of others), authors from all three volumes (Goldman, 2001 [INT];

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Mitchell, 2000 [CRM]; Moore, 1999 [DTI]) highlighted the importance of com-bining first- and third-person perspectives.

Comparative psychologists working with nonhuman primates also have high-lighted the multiplicity of mechanisms underlying a particular developmentalstage or behavior. For example, Povinelli (1999 [DTI], 2001 [INT]) argued thatthe behavioral similarities between chimpanzees and human 18-month-olds(e.g., tracking of eye movements and using another’s gaze to search a space out-side the immediate visual field) mask important contrasts at the cognitive level.In the human 18-month-old, gaze following is generally held to reflect earlyToM skills. However, Povinelli’s (1999, 2001) longitudinal findings suggestedvery little evidence for a genuine understanding of seeing in chimpanzees, de-spite their evident capacity for complex social behaviors. Povinelli (1999, 2001)explained this paradox by distinguishing behavioral parsing from mentalisticreasoning. From this view, behaviors such as gaze following, deception, selec-tive retaliation, reconciliation, and appeasement are governed by psychologicalsystems that are present in all mammals and that evolved independently fromToM (which Povinelli, 1999, 2001, associated with evolutions in the human ca-pacity for language). Similar two-tiered views were also presented by Baird andBaldwin (2001 [INT]), Astington (1999 [DTI]), and Tager-Flusberg (in press).For example, Baird and Baldwin proposed that a low-level mechanism for de-tecting action structure operates in concert with a higher level reasoning systemfor inferring psychological motivations. Because inferences depend not just onbehavior, but on context and prior knowledge, much of ToM development islikely to reflect more general improvements in inferential skills (see chapters inCRM) and social knowledge (see Ames et al., 2001 [INT]).

Language and ToM

The relation between ToM and language is the third theme in this review. Althoughdistinct from each other, the three main accounts presented in CRM, DTI, and INTshare the view that developmental changes in ToM are at least partially influencedby language development. These accounts contrast with the view that the acquisi-tion of a ToM (as broadly defined) facilitates language development (e.g., Sigman& Mundy, 1993). Note however that there is no necessary conflict between thesedifferent viewpoints because the relation between language and ToM is likely to becomplex, bidirectional, and developmentally sensitive. Moreover, each view as-sumes a functional relation between language and ToM, rather than a common in-fluence of some third factor (e.g., social environment, general developmentalmaturation, or shared neural substrate). I first outline each account and then presentbehavioral genetic findings that provide an alternative perspective on the relationbetween ToM and language.

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Syntax. de Villiers and de Villiers (2000 [CRM]) proposed that understand-ing false belief requires the syntactic ability to form embedded complements (usedwith mental or communication verbs; e.g., “the girl thought/said she saw a pinkfrog”). By representing false complements, children can overcome the salience ofreality-based interpretations. de Villiers and de Villiers did not argue that syntax isimportant for ToM development more generally. Their account was supported byfindings from longitudinal studies of typically developing and deaf children (pre-sented in more detail in Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000) and by in-dependent findings from studies of children with autism (Tager-Flusberg, 2000).However, Perner (2000 [CRM]) argued that the evidence is open to more mundaneinterpretations (e.g., language is a key database for working out a ToM—either di-rectly as a system that can represent and misrepresent or through providing easyand precise access to people’s minds).

Ascription theory. Olson and Kamawar (1999 [DTI]) presented a very dif-ferent conceptualization of how language influences ToM. According to ascriptiontheory, concepts like belief, desire, and intention do not map onto actual cognitivestructures, but are representational inventions that are handy in accounting for talkand action. Ascriptions allow us to furnish our social worlds with ideas, beliefs, andarguments (Olson, 1994). Contrary to the strong theory–theory view (that theseconcepts are the free invention of young children faced with complex social inter-actions; e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1994), ascription theory suggests that conceptsare limited by other fundamental experiences of the child, namely feelings.

Self-regulation. Zelazo (1999 [DTI], 2000 [CRM]) provided a third view ofthe relation between language and ToM. According to this levels of consciousness(LOC) model, language has a two-pronged influence in the genesis of action: en-abling experiences to be stored in working memory and guiding behavior. Al-though the first two accounts focus on representation, the focus of the LOC model isaction (and, hence, intentions rather than beliefs). Arguing from Brentano’s (1874/1973) definition of intentionality, Zelazo (1999, 2000) proposed that action inheritsits intentionality from the consciousness that controls it.

Although framed in very different theoretical perspectives, each account por-trays language as providing a functional foundation for ToM. Yet, as theorists whoregard ToM as independent from language (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie,1994b) have argued, associations between ToM and language may simply reflectcommon effects of biological maturity or genetic variance. As a result, an age-con-trolled genetically sensitive design is needed to elucidate the relation betweenToM and language. One such investigation is a recent twin study of ToM (Hughes& Cutting, 1999). In this study, an extensive battery of ToM tasks (including eight

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false-belief tasks) and two tests of verbal ability (Stanford-Binet comprehensionand vocabulary subtests; Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986) were presented to238 three-year-old twins (61 pairs, 58 same-sex pairs; 58% girls; M = 44 months ofage, SD = 25 days). Hughes and Cutting (1999) found that individual differences inToM were pronounced. Model-fitting analyses showed that genetic factors ac-counted for two-thirds of the variance in ToM scores (h2 = 66%), whereas the re-maining variance was explained by nonshared environmental influence. Hughesand Cutting (1999) also found a strong phenotypic correlation, r(238) = .45, be-tween ToM and language; 53% of this correlation was explained by common ge-netic influences. These findings have two implications for the relation betweenToM development and language. First, shared environmental influences on ToMperformance were negligible. Effects of linguistic environment, therefore, appearto be child specific. This conclusion fits with recent reports that the influence ofsiblings on ToM development is not general but specific: It is the presence of oldersiblings that has a beneficial effect (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements,1998). However, the negligible shared environmental influence appears to be atodds with the view of ascription theory regarding beliefs, intentions, and desires asconvenient representational inventions of linguistic communities. Second, geneticcovariance accounted for half the association between ToM and language. At firstglance, this finding suggests that it is not necessary to invoke psychological mech-anisms (e.g., embedded complementation or LOC) to explain the link betweenToM and language because the association may simply reflect either genetic orneurological proximity. However, this leaves open the question of why ToM andlanguage share common genes (e.g., is it because ToM requires language, or viceversa?). Answering this question of causal direction requires longitudinal behav-ioral genetic research.

Social Perspectives on ToM

This section is divided into two parts. First, I review the work in DTI and INT on theinterpersonal origins of intentionality. Next, I summarize the accounts presentedabout the interpersonal functions of intentionality in the social evaluation of dis-course and behavior, especially moral reasoning.

Interpersonal origins of intentionality. The essential role of the Other inthe development of intentionality has long been a central concern for social theo-rists and psychologists. Baldwin (1897) argued that it is by understanding oneselfin relation to the Other that one acquires means for acting intentionally and comesto conceptualize oneself as separate from the world (see Olson, Astington, &Zelazo, 1999). Similarly, Vygotsky (1978) applied a developmental framework to

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Marxist social theory to argue that behaviors first engaged in interpersonally cometo be managed intrapersonally. To benefit from social and cultural practices, chil-dren first require (biologically given) cognitive resources. Several chapters in DTIand INT focus on the interaction between these cognitive resources and the socialenvironment.

For example, Bruner (1999 [DTI]) discussed the supporting role played bymothers in the development of communication. Reznik (1999 [DTI]) suggestedthat individual differences in mothers’ willingness to attribute intentions to infantactions may contribute to cultural and socioeconomic differences in very earlyToM development. This view of mind reading as beginning in the family was de-veloped further by Dunn (1999 [DTI]) in her review of findings from naturalisticstudies. Dunn argued that four types of interactive events reveal, particularly viv-idly, very young children’s mind-reading abilities: conversations about innerstates, joint pretend play, talk about negative emotion, and deception. Individualdifferences in each of these predict individual differences in false-belief under-standing. These event types also highlight two important features of everydaymind reading. The first of these features is the salience of emotion, especially neg-ative emotions. Family life is full of emotional dramas, and the need to understandwhy a family member is upset or angry is a powerful incentive for children to de-velop their understanding of mind.

The second feature of everyday mind reading is that intentions can be shared aswell as private. Although especially evident in joint pretend play, shared intentionsare also central to the construction of joint plans between parents and toddlers (de-scribed as a goal-corrected partnership by Bowlby, 1971). Bowlby’s work focusedon toddlers, and yet joint plans form part of negotiating relationships throughoutlife (see Gibbs, 2001 [INT]; Jenkins & Greenbaum, 1999 [DTI]). Intentions oftenconcern what we want from others, what we think they want from us, and what wewant others to believe about us. There are, therefore, three key components in agoal-corrected partnership: an affiliative social goal (i.e., the desire to cooperaterather than dominate), the formation of an accurate model of the others’ intentions(rather than a biased view; e.g., “he’s always out to get me”), and the negotiationand repair of these models through language (e.g., talking about feelings).

Each component can vary independently, allowing a more refined analysis of in-dividualdifferences in termsofeither socialgoals, reading intentions,ornegotiationof models. Jenkins and Greenbaum (1999 [DTI]) focused on the first of these com-ponents and presented a longitudinal comparison of children with externalizingproblems and typically developing children. Their findings demonstrated that chil-dren with externalizing problems show a stable bias in relational goals, prioritizingdominance over affiliation. From this view, the interpersonal problems experiencedby disruptive children reflect not so much a difficulty in reading intentions (cf.Dodge & Frame, 1982) but rather a deviance in social goals. This account fits withour recent finding that pretend play in disruptive preschoolers is characterized by vi-

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olent themes (Dunn & Hughes, in press). Interestingly, our disruptive preschoolersdid not differ from their typically developing peers in their overall frequency of pre-tend play, suggesting a deviance rather than a deficit in social cognition. This devi-ance may well reflect hostile or controlling family interactions; Jenkins andGreenbaum illustrated this point very effectively in their chapter, using excerptsfrom a recent Roddy Doyle novel, “Paddy Clarke Ha! Ha! Ha!”

The second component of a goal-directed partnership (i.e., the formation of anaccurate model of the other’s intentions) is the focus of several chapters in INT,which share the view that detecting intentions depends on an inferential system.Importantly, inferences are based not just on behavior itself but also on contextualcues, prior knowledge about the agent, script, and so on. Take, as an example,Searle’s (1983) famous walk through Hyde Park. Although he may be walking inthe general direction of Patagonia, few of us would infer that this was his intention(unless his dress suggested that he was equipped for such a trip). In other words,social knowledge is key to forming an accurate model of others’ intentions. ToMresearch is, therefore, likely to benefit from the inclusion of social psychologicalperspectives.

In particular, as noted by Ames et al. (2001 [INT]), unlike developmentalists,who focus on revealing child’s hidden competencies, social psychologists focuson factors that lead to fallible inferences (e.g., stereotyping, overly dispositionalattitudes, and self-enhancement motives on reasoning). These factors are bothintra- and interpersonal. For example, individuals may use top-down heuristic pro-cesses or bottom-up (situation-specific, and accurate but demanding) systematicinferences depending on their concurrent cognitive load or their motivational state.The likelihood of heuristic versus systematic inferences is also influenced by theperceiver’s status relation to the target (i.e., subordinates are outcome dependentand, therefore, more motivated to make accurate predictions). As noted earlier, de-velopments in inferential processes are the main topic of several chapters in CRM(although the scope of these discussions is limited to the preschool years). How-ever, very little is known about interpersonal influences on children’s inferentialreasoning or their developmental course.

Interpersonal functions of intentionality. Of relevance to the third compo-nent to the goal-corrected partnership, Malle and Knobe (2001 [INT]) presentedlinguistic and experimental data that demonstrated systematic contrasts in adults’use of desire and intention terms and suggested that these can be used to influencesocial perceivers. Specifically, Malle and Knobe found that adults were more likelyto use intention than desire terms if the pro-attitude was directed at an action or en-tailed commitment or if the agent was the self rather than another. Given these sys-tematic differences, Malle and Knobe concluded that through this lexical choice(i.e., intention vs. desire terms), speakers can shape the listener’s model of his or her

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goals (e.g., persuade the other that he or she is committed or uncertain about a par-ticular action). This conclusion fits nicely with the account given by Jenkins andGreenbaum (1999 [DTI]) concerning negotiation or repair of the listener’s modelof a speaker’s intentions.

However, as argued by Ames et al. (2001 [INT]), there are boundaries to theusefulness of intentions for explaining human behavior. Although intentions playa prominent role in explaining unexpected actions (especially by strangers), mostof our real-life observations of human behavior involve familiar people acting in away that conforms to routine scripts or social norms. Among adults (especially innon-Western cultures), these normative acts by familiar individuals are morelikely to be explained by appeal to deontics (i.e., social conventions). Addressingdevelopmental changes in children’s deontic explanations would considerablybroaden the scope of research into children’s social understanding.

One form of social evaluation in which intentionality has undisputed impor-tance is the evaluation of moral responsibility. As outlined earlier, one fundamen-tal distinction within the concept of intentionality is the contrast betweenintentions in action and prior intentions (Searle, 1983). Prior intentions allow forplanning an action and also choosing not to act. As a result, actions with prior in-tentions can be construed as moral. That is, agents can be held morally responsiblefor the outcome of actions that are accompanied by prior intentions. Piaget (1932/1965) was the first to examine children’s understanding of the link between inten-tions and moral judgments. He reported that although young children’s moraljudgments are typically outcome based (e.g., accidents by well-meaning protago-nists are judged as naughty), around 7 years of age children begin to take accountof a protagonist’s intentions in their moral judgments. Early ToM studies demon-strated that when the verbal demands of moral reasoning tasks were reduced, thisshift to intention-based moral reasoning appeared much earlier—around the pre-school years (Nelson-LeGall, 1985; Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & van denEnde, 1996). However, over the past decade, surprisingly little research has beenconducted to examine developmental changes in children’s moral understanding.One exception is Chandler et al. (2001 [INT]) experimental findings that demon-strated clear age-related developments in children’s understanding that an agentcan be held morally responsible for an unintended action. Adults hold agents re-sponsible when they are perceived to have been capable of preventing the trans-gression and had a duty to do so. Chandler et al. (2001 [INT]) reported that by 5years of age, children also begin to take these counterfactuals into account whenmaking moral judgments and argued that this step is tied to the onset of aconstructivist ToM. This conclusion is supported by findings from a series of stud-ies that use a Punch and Judy show format to manipulate the match and mismatchbetween intention and outcome.

Chandler et al.’s (2001 [INT]) provided a valuable bridge between earlier chap-ters on understanding intention (especially Astington’s, 2001 [INT], review of

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children’s ability to differentiate intended from desired outcome) and later chap-ters in INT that focus on moral reasoning in adults. In particular, Weiner (2001[INT]) discussed how normative responsibility lays the foundation for a socialfeedback system (of reward for desirable outcomes and sanction following unde-sirable outcomes). This discussion provides a useful extension of the work notedin the previous section on interpersonal influences on the attribution ofintentionality and also connects the ToM literature to emotion research. For in-stance, Weiner noted that if an agent is perceived as responsible for a transgres-sion, then feelings of anger are aroused that push the protagonist to retaliatoryaction. These later chapters cover much material that may be unfamiliar to manydevelopmental psychologists but are all the more welcome for that. For example,Kaplan (2001 [INT]) contrasted the assumptions about intentional agency or re-sponsibility and justice that are made by liberal-capitalist, Nietschian, and Judeo-Christian models of moral action. This may sound rather abstract, but the humansignificance of this analysis was displayed vividly in Kaplan’s (2001 [INT]) ac-count of two Talmudic scholars, Bonhoeffer and Levinas, who lost their lives inthe fight against Nazism.

CODA: WHAT’S MISSING?

My aim in writing this review is to highlight the scope of the new ToM research pre-sented in CRM, DTI, and INT. In wrapping up, however, I feel it is important toidentify what the reader will not find in these books. First, individual differences inToM receive only a passing mention (for exceptions, see chapters in DTI by Dunn,1999; Jenkins & Greenbaum, 1999; Reznick, 1999; Weiner, 2001 [INT]). How-ever, the introduction of perspectives from social psychology provides a usefulplatform for framing questions about individual differences. For example, althoughthe three components of a goal-corrected partnership (i.e., social goals, detectingintentions, influencing others’ models of one’s intentions) are presented as inde-pendent, Ames et al. (2001 [INT]) suggested that reading intentions is significantlyinfluenced by variations in social goals. Individual differences, therefore, provide auseful means of testing developmental hypotheses about how we process socialinformation.

Second, with two exceptions (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000 [CRM]; Jenkins &Greenbaum, 1999 [DTI]), there is almost no mention of atypical populations orpsychopathology. This gap is striking because the past decade has seen a growingdialogue between normative and clinical perspectives on developmental psychol-ogy (illustrated by the explosion of research into autism and ToM). However, thisabsence may well be deliberate because psychopathology (in particular, autism) isthe focus of two other edited texts that have recently appeared on the shelves. Thefirst, “The development of autism: Perspectives from theory and research”

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(Burack, Charman, Yirmiya, & Zelazo, in press), highlights how autism researchin the past decade has also moved beyond a focus on false-belief performance toadopt a truly developmental perspective on the disorder. The second book, “Un-derstanding other minds” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) is, similar to DTI, a sequel toan earlier book and thus provides another valuable summary of new directions andstate of the art findings within current ToM research.

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