www.freedomhouse.org

FREEDOM ON THE NET2015

Key Developments: June 2014 – May 2015

● AccesstotheinternetbecamemorechallengingforSudanesecitizensasinternetpricessurgedwhilespeedsdeclineddramatically(see Availability and Ease of Access).

● Extremelyslowinternetspeedswereexperiencedinpartsofthecountryduringseveralpoliticallycontentiousperiods,leadingtostrongsuspicionsofgovernmentthrottling(seeRestrictions on Connectivity).

● AnewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLawpassedinJanuary2015classifies12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens.Observersbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinformationanditscensorshippowers(seeLegal Environment).

● IntheleaduptotheApril2015generalelections,severalonlinejournalistsandactivistswerearrestedwhilenumerousonlinenewsoutletswerehacked(seeProsecutions andDetentionsandTechnical Attacks).

Sudan2014 2015

Internet Freedom Status Not Free

Not Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 18 18

LimitsonContent(0-35) 19 19

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 28 28

TOTAL* (0-100) 65 65

* 0=most free, 100=least free

Population: 38.8 million

Internet Penetration 2014: 25 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: No

Political/Social Content Blocked: No

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2015 Status: Not Free

1

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

Introduction

InternetfreedominSudanremainedunderthreatin2014and2015,asauthoritarianPresidentOmaral-Bashir’sgovernmentintensifieditscrackdownoncriticalvoicesinthelead-uptogeneralelectionsheldinApril2015.Inanattempttoexpandcontroloverthepoliticalspace,thegovernmentenactednumerouslawsdesignedtoincreaseitspowerswhileminimizingopportunitiesforopposition.InJanuary2015,forexample,theSudaneseparliamentapprovedconstitutionalamendmentsthatgavethepresidentpowerstoappointandremoveseniorofficials,1andestablishedanewbodyofsecurityforcesunderthecontroloftheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityService(NISS),whichwasprevious-lylimitedtointelligencegathering.2

AnewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLawpassedinJanuary2015withthepurportedaimofin-creasingtransparencyhasinsteadledtogreaterlimitations,withprovisionsthatdetail12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens,suchasnationalsecurityandforeignpolicyinformation.Thelimitseffectivelyleavenoroomforjournalistsorthepublictoaccessanyinformationofconse-quence.Observersbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinfor-mationanditscensorshippowers.

Meanwhile,governmentauthoritiesmadeotherconcertedeffortstorestrictcriticalinformationandsilencetheopposition,includingproactivelymanipulatingtheonlineinformationlandscapeandar-restingseveraljournalistsandactivistsfortheironlineactivities.Severalhackingattacksagainstcrit-icalnewswebsitesandactivists’socialmediawebpageswerereported,escalatingaroundtheApril2015generalelections.Whilenocriticalnewsoroppositionwebsiteswereblockedduringthecov-erageperiod,Sudaneseofficialsregularlydemandedtheblockingofonlinenewsoutlets,particularlyaftertheoutletscriticizedgovernmentofficialsorpublishedarticlesaboutcorruption.

Obstacles to Access

Access to the internet became more challenging for Sudanese citizens in 2014-2015 as a result of increasing costs and declining quality of services. Extremely slow internet speeds were experienced during several political contentious periods, leading to strong suspicions of government throttling.

Availability and Ease of Access

Accesstoinformationandcommunicationstechnologies(ICTs)inSudanslightlyincreasedoverthepastyear,withinternetpenetrationreaching25percentin2014,comparedto23percentin2013,accordingtotheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU).3Thenumberofusersmaybehigherasinternet-enabledmobilephoneshavebecomewidespreadandcheaperinrecentyears.

DespitethespreadofICTservices,accesstotheinternetbecamemorechallengingforSudanesecitizensin2014-2015asthecostofaccesssurgedamiddecliningqualityandspeeds.4Telecomcom-

1 “Sudan:ConstitutionalamendmentsgiveBashirnewpowers,”Asharq Alawsat,January5,2015,http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340104/sudan-constitutional-amendments-give-bashir-new-powers.2 “Sudaneseconstitutiontobeamendedtograntmorepowerstosecurityservices:official,”Sudan Tribune,April30,2015,http://bit.ly/1GBIqVh.3 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,”2000-2014,http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.4 “DeteriorationoftelecommunicationservicesinSudanandcompaniescomplainofpiracy,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,April

2

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

paniesintroducednewbundlesathigherratesthatdidnotdeliverspeedsasadvertised,whileoldbundlesexperiencedworseningspeeds.AccordingtoAkamai’s2014“StateoftheInternet”fourthquarterreport,5Sudan’saverageconnectionspeeddeclinedby73percentduringtheSeptem-ber-December2014quarteralone,6decreasingfrom3.6Mbpsto1.0Mbps(significantlylowerthantheglobalaveragespeedof4.5Mbps).IncreasingtensionsandviolentclashesbetweengovernmentforcesandrebelfactionsinSudan’sconflictregionshavealsoledtofrequentservicedisruptions.

Asofmid-2015,monthlymobileinternetsubscriptionscostbetweenSDG2.62to68(US$0.62to$11),upfromSDG2to9in2014—anincreaseof31percentfor100MBofdataandaround600per-centfor1GBpackages.Asaresult,mobilephonepenetrationinSudandecreasedslightlyfrom73percentin2013to72percentin2014.7USBinternetmodemsforpersonaldesktopsorlaptopscostbetweenSDG124and261(US$22to$46)permonth,andmonthlyfixed-linebroadbandsubscrip-tionsrangefromSDG26to200(US$5to$35),dependingonthepackage.

Internetaccessatcybercafes,whichareconcentratedinmarketareasandpopulararounduniversi-tiesanddorms,hasalsobecomemoreexpensive,withminimumchargesrangingbetweenSDG3-15(US$0.50-2.51)perhour,upfromSDG2-5(US$0.35-0.87)in2014—a50and200percentincrease,respectively—thoughthenumberofcybercafesinKhartoumstatehasdecreasednoticeablysincetheearly2000sasmobileinternethasbecomecheaperandmoreaccessibletothepublic.Asare-sultofincreasingprices,mobilephoneandinternetaccessisstilloutofreachforthemajorityofthepopulationinSudan.

Furthermore,approximately1.2millioncitizenslivinginrebel-controlledareasinSouthKordofanhaveextremelylimitedaccesstotheinternet.8Nearlytwomillioninternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)livingincampshavenoaccesswhatsoever.

Inapositivestep,previousobstaclestoaccessimposedbyU.S.economicsanctionsinplaceagainsttheal-Bashirregimesince1997weremitigatedinFebruary2015,whentheU.S.TreasuryDepart-mentannounceditwaseasingthelong-standingsanctions.9ThesanctionsbannedtheimportofICThardwareandoriginalsoftwaremadebyAmericancompanies,suchasanti-virus,anti-malware,an-ti-tracking,andanti-censorshipsoftwareandmoresecureICTapplications.Thebanhadbeenpartic-ularlypunitiveonSudaneseactivistsandordinarycitizens,whoseuseofoutdatedtechnologiesandsoftwaremadethemvulnerabletomalwareandothertechnicalattacks.UndertheFebruaryamend-mentstothesanctions,thesevitaltechnologiescannowbeimportedintothecountry.10

Restrictions on Connectivity

Sudanconnectstotheglobalinternetthroughthreeinternationalgateways—thepartlystate-owned

2014,http://bit.ly/1KkHeXp.5 Akamai,“AverageConnectionSpeed,”mapvisualization,State of the Internet, Q4 2014, accessedMay29,2015,http://akamai.me/1LiS6KD.6 Akamai, State of the Internet, Q4 2014 Report, 2015,http://bit.ly/1Lgq4AI.7 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,”2000-2014,http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.8 See“MayorsinSudan’sSouthKordofandemandno-flyzone,”RadioDabanga,February24,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkJ8gf,andUNHCR,“Sudan,”2015,http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html.9 “USEasesSudanSanctionstoAllowCommunicationsGear,”Voice of America News,February17,2015,http://bit.ly/1RSINSX.10 U.S.DepartmentofTreasury,“PublicationofSudanGeneralLicense-RelatedtoPersonalcommunications,”February17,2015,http://1.usa.gov/1GeXnmr.

3

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

SudanTelecomCompany(Sudatel),Zain,andCanarTelecom11—whichareconnectedviafoursub-marinecables:SaudiArabia-Sudan-2(SAS-2),SaudiArabia-Sudan-1(SAS-1),EasternAfricaSubma-rineSystem(EASSy),andFALCON.12Partialcontrolovertheinternationalgatewayhasenabledthegovernmenttorestrictinternetconnectivityduringparticulareventsinthepast,suchasduringtheSeptember2013nationwideprotestswhenthegovernmentshutdownserviceofalltelecomprovid-ersfornearly24hours.13

InAugust2014,afive-dayinternetblackoutwasreportedintheWestDarfurregionofSudan,nega-tivelyimpactinghundredsofstudentswhowereunabletoapplyforuniversity,thoughthecauseofthedisruptionremainsunclear.14Inmanyotherpartsofthecountry,extremelyslowinternetspeedswereexperiencedduringseveralpoliticalcontentiousperiodsin2014-2015,leadingtostrongsus-picionsofgovernmentthrottling.Forexample,inthelead-uptotheone-yearanniversaryoftheSeptember2013protests,broadbandconnectionspeedsinKhartoumdeclinedsignificantlyfromanaveragespeedof3.2Mbpsto2.22MbpsinSeptember2014,15whichobserversbelievedwasanintentionaleffortbytheSudanesegovernmenttoimpedeanniversaryprotests.16InOctober2014,duringalargescalecampaigninitiatedonlinetoraiseawarenessaboutthemassrapeof200womenintheDarfuritownofTabit(see“Media,Diversity,andContentManipulation”),internetconnectionswerereportedlyaslowas1.48Mbps.DuringtheApril2015elections,speedswerealsoslowerthanaverageat2.34Mbps.17

ICT Market

ThereisfairlystrongmarketcompetitioninSudan’stelecomssectoramongfourlicensedtelecom-municationsoperators:Zain,MTN,Sudatel,andCanar.Allfourprovidersareprivatelyownedbyforeigncompanies,withtheexceptionofSudatel,whichhas22percentofitssharesownedbythegovernment;theremainingsharesareheldbyaforeignentity.18TheSudanesegovernmentmanip-ulatesthetelecommunicationssectorindirectlythroughSudatel’sboardofdirectors,whichincludesthecurrentMinisterofFinanceandNationalEconomyastheboard’schairman19andthecurrentGovernoroftheCentralBankofSudanasaboardmember.20

MTNandSudatelbothofferbroadbandinternet,whileZainoffersfastinternetthroughitsUSBmo-demandmobileinternetservices.Canaroffersfixedphonelinesandhomeinternet.Majorinternetprovidersprovide3Gservices.21InDecember2014,theMinisterofCommunicationsandInformation

11 DougMadory,“InternetBlackoutinSudan,”DynResearch,September25,2013,http://bit.ly/1QN46V3.12 Checkinteractive,HuaweiMarineNetworks,“SubmarineCableMapforSudan,”http://bit.ly/1ZRMhKz.13 SeeFreedomHouse,“Sudan,”Freedom on the Net 2014, http://bit.ly/1M2wVig. 14 “OnlineregistrationtoSadnessUniversitiesandInstitutes,”3ayin,August20,2014,http://bit.ly/1M1optw.15 NetIndex“TheGlobalStandardinInternetMetrics,”Sudan’smapvisualization,http://bit.ly/1GPBfK4.16 Author’sinterview.17 NetIndex“TheGlobalStandardinInternetMetrics.”18 RupaRanganathanandCeciliaBriceno-Garmendia,Sudan’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective,AfricaInfrastructureCountryDiagnostic, (Washington,D.C.): WorldBank,June2011)http://bit.ly/1OOZoXz.19 “DirarnamedChairmanofSudatel’sBoardofDirectors,TarigasaCEO,”[inArabic]Alintibaha, May18,2014,http://bit.ly/1jQCymW.20 SudanCentralBank,“ThePresentBoardofDirectors,”http://bit.ly/1jxA7pG.21 3Gshortformofthirdgeneration,isthethirdgenerationofmobiletelecommunicationstechnology.InternationalTelecommunicationunion,“IMT-2000Project,”http://www.itu.int/osg/imt-project/.

4

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

Technologystatedthat4GwouldbeintroducedinSudanmid-2015,22thoughasofJune2015,4Ghadnotbeeninstalled.23

Increasingpricesontelecomservicesin2014-2015werepartiallyduetotaxincentivesgiventotele-comprovidersalongsidehighervalueaddedtaxes(VAT)imposedonconsumers.In2013,thegov-ernmentofSudanexemptedthetelecommunicationssectorfroma30percenttaxonallprofitsuntiltheendof2015.24Despitetheexemption,thegovernment’srevenuefromthetelecommunicationssectorgrewin2014-2015duetoVATrevenuestotalingUS$600millionperyearfromconsumers,25whilerevenuetaxesontelecomsdidnotexceedUS$40millionperyear.26

Regulatory Bodies

Foundedin1996andhousedundertheMinistryofTelecommunicationsandInformationTechnol-ogy,theNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation(NTC)istaskedwithproducingtelecommunica-tionsstatistics,monitoringtheuseoftheinternet,introducingnewtechnologyintothecountry,anddevelopingthecountry’stelecommunicationsandITindustry.Itisalsoresponsiblefordecidingwhatcontentshouldbeaccessibleontheinternet.Althoughitisastatebody,theNTCreceivesgrantsfrominternationalorganizationssuchastheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentandtheWorldBank,anditswebsitedescribesthebodyas“self-financing.”

Limits on Content

Online self-censorship increased notably in 2014-2015 in response to the government’s heavy-handed crackdown against both print and online media in advance of the April 2015 elections. Government ef-forts to manipulate the online information landscape also became more concerted and systematic.

Blocking and Filtering

NewswebsitesandsocialmediaplatformswerenotblockedinSudanduringthecoverageperiod,thoughaccesstoFacebookandtheonlinenewsoutletAl Rakobawasreportedlyverysloworattimesvirtuallyinaccessibletomanyusers.27Meanwhile,Sudaneseofficialsregularlydemandedtheblockingofonlinenewsoutlets,particularlyaftertheoutletscriticizedgovernmentofficialsorpub-lishedarticlesaboutcorruption.28

TheSudanesegovernmentopenlyacknowledgesblockingandfilteringwebsitesthatitconsiders“immoral”and“blasphemous.”TheNTCmanagesonlinefilteringinthecountrythroughitsInternetServiceControlUnitandissomewhattransparentaboutthecontentitblocks,reportingthat95

22 “Futureplanstoreducetelecommunication’tariff,”[inArabic]Alkhartoum,December23,2014,http://bit.ly/1MzSAbR.23 SeeWorldTimeZone:http://www.worldtimezone.com/4g.html24 MattSmith,“Sudanshelvestelecomprofittaxforthreeyears,”Reuters,June16,2013,http://reut.rs/1MQ13w3.25 “AninterviewwithAlfatihErwah,”[inArabic]Alssayha,March11,2015,http://bit.ly/1OERWzU.26 “NationalCouncilstressestheneedtorevisethelawonprivatization,”[inArabic]Almighar,December22,2014,http://bit.ly/1ZRNMIz.27 Author’sinterviews.28 “TabitaBoutroscallsforclosingsomeonlinenewsoutlets,specificallySudanMotion,”[inArabic]Sudan Motion,March14,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2w8ma.

5

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

percentofblockedmaterialisrelatedtopornography.29TheNTC’swebsitealsogivesuserstheop-portunitytosubmitrequeststoeitherblockorunblockwebsites“thataredeemedtonotcontainpornography,”30thoughitdoesnotspecifywhethertheappealsextendtopoliticalwebsites.Usersattemptingtoaccessablockedsitearemetwithablackpagethatexplicitlystates,“ThissitehasbeenblockedbytheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,”andincludeslinkstofurtherinfor-mationandacontactemailaddress.31

InadditiontotheNTC,NISSagentsreportedlyhavethetechnicalcapabilitytoblockwebsitesdeemedharmfulandthreateningtoSudan’snationalsecurity,32whiletheGeneralProsecutoralsohastherighttoblockanysitethatthreatensnationalsecurityorviolatessocialmores.33

DuringaJune2014workshopononlinemedia,theSudaneseInformationMinisterdescribedFace-bookandindependentonlinenewsoutletsAl Rakoba,Hurriyat,andSudanese Onlineas“anomalous”and“mercenary”andstatedhisintentiontocensorthesitesfortarnishingSudan’simageandblock-ingpotentialforeigninvestmentopportunities.34Theministerreiteratedthesameofficialpositionagainstonlinemediainatelevisedinterview,35affirmingthatthegovernmentblockscontentthatitperceivesasimmoralorathreattonationalsecurity.

Content Removal

Theextenttowhichthegovernmentforceswebsitestodeletecertaincontentisunknown,thoughanecdotalincidentsin2014-2015suggestedthatsomedegreeofforcedcontentremovalbythestateexists,andthatsuchadhocrequirementslacktransparency.Forexample,inMarch2014,thegovernmentforcedthreenewsoutletstodeletearticlesfromtheirwebsitesthathadcitedagov-ernmentpressrelease,whichquotedanofficialfromtherulingNationalCongressParty(NCP)usinganoffensiveslurtocharacterizetheopposition.36Criticismofthequotewentviralonsocialmedia,promptingtheNCP—beleagueredbystrongpushbackfromtheoppositionintheleaduptotheApril2015presidentialelections—todeletetheoriginalpressreleasefromitsownwebsite,inad-ditiontoforcingotheroutletstobothdeletethestoriesandpostaretraction.37Furthermore,theNCPdismisseditsKhartoum-chapterwebmasterfromhisjobforpublishingthestatementthathadcausedthesocialmediauproar.38

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Despiteincreasinginstancesofinternetcensorshipinrecentyears,onlinenewspapersinSudancon-

29 NationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,“BlockingOrUnblockWebsites,”lastmodifiedOctober22,2014,http://bit.ly/1GnidzI.30 “BlockingOrUnblockWebsites.”31 Imageofablockedsite:http://bit.ly/1GeYxyn.32 “Expert:NISSiscapableofblockingwebsitesthatareposingathreattoSudan’snationalsecurity,”Aljareeda,November7,2014.33 “Cybercrimeisanactofterrorismthatthreatensthesovereigntyofthestate,”[inArabic]Alintibaha,August13,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRfFg5.34 “AhmedBilal:Thesewebsitesareanomalous”and“mercenary,”[inArabic]Alrakoba,June30,2014,http://bit.ly/1RSLYKi.35 SeeYouTubevideoinArabic,Sudan national TV,29:50to34:00,June20,2013,http://bit.ly/1RSM7gJ.36 “NCP:thosewhocallforabstentionareriffraff,”[inArabic] Alyoum Altali,March7,2015,http://bit.ly/1LGV2Ro.37 “ClarificationformNCPaboutthestatementattributedtoYasserYoussef,”Alyoum Altali, March8,2015,http://bit.ly/1jxBdBR.38 “Webmasterexpelledfromhisposition,”Al-Tayar,March8,2015.

6

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

tinuetohavemorefreedomthantraditionalmediaoutlets,whicharefrequentlysubjecttopre-pub-licationcensorship,confiscationsofentirepressrunsofnewspapers,andwarningsfromNISSagentsagainstreportingoncertaintabootopics,whichincludehumanrightsviolationslinkedtothecountry’sconflictregions,statecorruption,theeconomicrecession,andcriticismofnationalsecurityagents.39RestrictionsonprintandbroadcastnewsoutletsincreasedfollowingtheNationalSecurityActof2010,whichgavetheNISSpermissiontoarrestjournalistsandcensornewspapersunderthepretextofnationalsecurity.

Comparedtothehighlyrestrictivespaceinthetraditionalmediasphere,theinternetremainsarela-tivelyopenspaceforfreedomofexpression,withboldvoicesexpressingdiscontentwiththegovern-mentonvariousonlineplatforms.Manyprintnewspaperscirculatecensoredorbannedmaterialontheirwebsitesandsocialmediapages,leadingSudanesecitizenstoincreasinglyturntoonlineout-letsandsocialmediaforuncensoredinformation.Continuouspressureontraditionalmediahasledanumberofindependentjournaliststoestablishonlinenewsoutletsinthepastfewyears,thoughseveraloutletsweresubjecttofrequenttechnicalattacksbygovernmentforcesthroughout2014-2015aspartofanapparentattempttolimitaccesstoindependentnewsandvoicesinthelead-uptotheApril2015elections(see“TechnicalAttacks”).

Bloggingisanimportantplatformforjournalistsandwriterstopublishcommentaryfreefromtherestrictionsleveledonprintnewspapers.Blogsalsogiveethnic,gender,andreligiousminoritiesavenuetoexpressthemselves.Asofmid-2015,therewereabout300SudaneseblogsregisteredwiththeSudaneseBloggersNetwork.ThemoreactiveSudanesebloggerswriteintheEnglishlanguage.

Nonetheless,onlineself-censorshipincreasednotablyin2014-2015inresponsetothegovernment’sheavy-handedcrackdownagainstbothprintandonlinemediainadvanceoftheApril2015elec-tions.40Themajorityofjournalistswritingforonlinenewspapers,suchasthenewlyestablishedAlta-reeqandAltaghyeer,writeanonymously.41

Governmenteffortstomanipulatetheonlineinformationlandscapehavebecomemoreconcertedandsystematic.Duringthecoverageperiod,thegovernment’sCyberJihadistUnitcontinuedtospreadmisinformationonnewsrelatedtohumanrightsviolationsandcorruptionallegations.Theunit,whichfallsundertheNISS,proactivelymonitorscontentpostedonblogs,socialmediawebsites,andonlinenewspaperforumsandinfiltratesonlinediscussionsinanefforttoascertaininformationaboutcyber-dissidents.

AlargescalecyberjihadistcampaignwaslaunchedinNovember2014inresponsetoglobalonlineandofflineactivismsurroundingthemassrapeofover200womenandgirlsinTabittowninNorthDarfurbySudanesesoldiers,42whichwasfirstreportedbyRadioDabanga.43LedbyKhalidEwais,a

39 “ChairmanoftheSudaneseNationalPressCouncil:securityservicesintervenewhen“redlinesarecrossed”andthreatennationalsecurity,”[inArabic] Asharq Alawsat,February,15,2015,http://bit.ly/19IMgmC;“President:Wewillnotallowthepresstogobeyondtheredlines,”Ashorooq,February25,2015,http://bit.ly/1XfYExM.40 Author’sinterview.41 Altaghyeer[Arabicforchangewithpoliticalconnotation]wasestablishedin2013followingthegovernment’scrackdownonindependentjournalists,whowereeventuallybannedfrompracticingtraditionaljournalisminSudanin2012.Formore,seeReemAbbas,“Sudan’sShiftfromPrinttoOnlineNewspapers,”DohaCentreforMediaFreedom,May16,2013,http://bit.ly/1GniAKB.AltareegwasestablishedinJanuary2014,andits“Whoweare”sectiondoesnotincludenamesofstaffbutrathertheinstitution’sreportingcodeofconduct.42 “Massrapeof“200”inNorthDarfur,”Radio Dabanga,November2,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2wEk9;HumanRightsWatch,“Sudan:MassRapebyArmyinDarfur,”February11,2015,http://bit.ly/1E9pI7e.43 LaunchedfromtheNetherlandsinNovember2008,RadioDabangafocusesonreportingonDarfurandhasastrongonlinepresenceandwideaudienceinconflictsareas.Itwebsiteisbilingualandrunsindepthreportsandfeatures.Itisa

7

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

SudanesejournalistbasedintheUnitedArabEmirates,thesocialmediacampaigntoraiseaware-nessaboutthemassrapeledtoseveraldemonstrationsaroundtheworldandinSudan.44Variouscounter-campaignsfromtheCyberJihadistUnitweresubsequentlylaunchedonbothgovernmentandostensiblyapoliticalsocialmediapagesthataimedtodelegitimizetherapeatrocitybysmearingRadioDabangaandKhalidEwais.45Forexample,cyberjihadistscirculatedamessageonWhatsAppclaimingthatEwaishadreceivedaUS$1millionbribefromtheAfricanUnion/UnitedNationsHy-bridoperationinDarfur(UNAMID),46whichEwaisdeniedinaninterviewwithaKhartoum-basednewspaper.47

Initsattempttodistortthefacts,cyberjihadiststhenpostedavideoonYouTubeinwhichTabitresidentswereintervieweddenyingtheRadioDabangareport.48Simultaneously,thegovernment’s“OfficialPageoftheRapidResponseOperationsRoom”Facebookpagepublishedphotosshow-ingawomen’srallyinTabitdenyingthereportandclaimingthatRadioDabangahaddishonoredthem.49Allthewhile,membersoftheSudaneseparliamentopenlydemandedtheblockingofRadioDabangainSudan.50ThegovernmenteventuallyyieldedtointernationalpressuregarneredbythecampaignandallowedofficialsfromtheUnitedNationsMissioninDarfur(UNAMID)toconductaninvestigation,51albeitunderthegovernment’ssupervision.52Unfortunately,thegovernmentsubse-quentlyblockedtheinvestigation53andlatercloseddowntheUNHumanRightsofficeinKhartoum.54

Digital Activism

DespitenumerousobstaclesandrestrictionsonICTsinSudan,thecountry’sgrowingpopulationoftechnologicallysavvycitizensregularlyengagesindigitalactivismtodemandgovernmentaccount-abilityandsocialchange.Digitalactivismwasparticularlyvibrantinthelead-uptotheApril2015generalelections,asexemplifiedbythe“Leave!”campaignlaunchedinFebruary2015inresponsetoPresidentOmarAl-Bashir’sstatementthathewouldnotleavethepresidencyunlesshewasvotedout,whichcitizensrejectedgiventheAl-Bashir’srecordofriggingelectionsinthepast.55Thecam-paignencouragedawholesaleboycottoftheelectionasaformofprotestagainstAl-Bashir’sau-

projectoftheRadioDarfurNetwork.Dabnga,“AboutUs,”http://bit.ly/1LkMr5H.44 “Sudan:WorldwideProtestsandSocialMediaforDarfurMassRapeGrow,”All Africa,November23,2014,http://bit.ly/1Pv2SjN;MarkKerrison,“SudaneseprotestagainstmassrapesinDarfuroutsideDowningStreet,”DEMOTIX,November14,2014,http://bit.ly/1LGWLGr.45 CollectionofthecartonsincludedinthisPDFhttp://bit.ly/1M2BF7p;SeeFacebookpost[inArabic],November20,2014,http://on.fb.me/1Gf02N8;KhalidIbrahimEwais,FacebookPost,November23,2014,http://on.fb.me/1QN8y6i.46 KhalidIbrahimEwais,FacebookPost,November23,2014,http://on.fb.me/1QN8y6i.47 “khalidEwaisdeniesreceivingmoneyfortheUnitedNations,”[inArabic]Almijhar,November25,2014.48 “FactsaboutTabet,”[inArabic]YouTubevideo,9:54,postedbySudan’sHoopoe,November23,2014,http://bit.ly/1RSOmk3.49 PhotosformOfficialPageoftheRapidResponseOperationsRoom:FacebookPhoto,November20,2014,http://on.fb.me/1jxCusL;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1Xg0RJr;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1M1uHcE;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1RSOH6q.50 “ConfrontationwithRadioDabanga,andthesearchformeanstohushit,”[inArabic]Alsaiha,November29,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkOKqI.51 JennPsaki,“GovernmentofSudanDelaysAccesstoInvestigateReportsofMassRapeinNorthDarfur,”pressstatement,U.S.DepartmentofState,November12,2014,http://1.usa.gov/1EEFdp5.52 “Sudan:ArmyFilmedUNAMIDMassRapeInvestigationsinTabit,”All Africa,November12,2014,http://bit.ly/1KkNnTx.53 “SudanagainblocksUNAMIDinvestigationintoDarfurmassrapeclaims,”Sudan Tribune,November16,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkOSqn.54 AFP,“SudanasksUNtoshuthumanrightsofficeinKhartoumoverabuseclaims,”The Guardian, November27,2014,http://bit.ly/1LkOIO9.55 “Sudanesepresident:Iwillnotleaveunlesspeopledecidethatthroughtheballotbox,”[inArabic]Al-Youm Al-Sabie, February26,2015.

8

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

thoritarianism.56Thoughseveralorganizersofthe“Leave!”campaignwerearrestedaroundthecoun-try57andAl-Bashirwasultimatelyre-electedinApril,voterturnoutstoodatbetween30-35percentcomparedto72percentinthepreviouselectionsin2010,reflectingtheboycott’srelativesuccess.58

Violations of User Rights

A new Freedom of Access to Information Law passed in January 2015 classifies 12 types of information that are restricted from citizens, which observers believe was part of an effort to legalize the govern-ment’s censorship powers. In the lead-up to the April 2015 general elections, the government took preemptive measures to restrict critical information and silence the opposition by arresting numerous online journalists and activists. Hacking attacks against critical news websites and activists’ social me-dia accounts also escalated around the general elections.

Legal Environment

Freedomofspeech,expression,andassociationarenominallyprotectedunderthe2005InterimNationalConstitution(INC)thatwasadoptedaspartofthe2005ComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)betweenthegovernmentofSudanandthesouthernrebelgroup,thoughtheconstitutionofficiallyexpiredfollowingtheindependenceofSouthSudaninJuly2011.InJanuary2015,theparliamentapprovednewamendmentstotheconstitutionregardingtheelections;59however,apermanentconstitutionisstillbeingdevelopedasofmid-2015,leavingtheINCasthecountry’shighestbindingdocument.Sudan’sjudiciaryisnotindependent,thoughitrecentlyruledagainstthegovernmentinsupportofpressfreedom,reversingagovernmentordertoshutdowntheAl-TayarindependentdailyinMarch2014.60

Sudanhasseveralrestrictivelawsthatseektolimitpressandinternetfreedom.Forexample,theIn-formaticOffences(Combating)Act(knownastheITCrimeAct,orelectroniccrimeslaw),61criminal-izestheestablishmentofwebsitesthatcriticizethegovernmentorpublishdefamatorymaterialandcontentthatdisturbspublicmoralityorpublicorder.62Violationsinvolvefinesandprisonsentencesbetweentwotofiveyears.The2009revisionstothehighlyrestrictive2004PressandPrintedPressMaterialsLawallowsforrestrictionsonthepressintheinterestsofnationalsecurityandpublicorder

56 FatimaNaib,“BoycottcalldampensSudan’selectionspirit,”Al Jazeera,April10,2015,http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/sudan-gripped-election-fever-opposition-boycott-150410154035525.html.57 “PreemptivearrestsbeforethesecondpubliceventfortheSudaneseoppositionfor“Leave!”campaign,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,February5,2015,http://bit.ly/1M2Ejdt.58 “Sudanelections:Pollscloseafterlowturnout,”BBC,April17,2015http://bbc.in/1HAm4aT;InternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance,“VoterturnoutdataforSudan,”http://bit.ly/1Gf2eUI.59 AFP,“SudanamendsconstitutiontoletBashirnamegovernors,”Daily Mail,January4,2015,http://dailym.ai/1M1w8b2.60 “Sudan’stopcourtreversesnewspaperclosureamidcontinuedcrackdownonpress,”All Africa,March5,2014,http://bit.ly/1NkNtz4.61 TheInformaticOffences(Combating)Act,2007,http://bit.ly/1NkNx1R.62 AbdelgadirMohammedAbdelgadir,Fences of Silence: Systematic Repression of Freedom of the Press, Opinion and Expression in Sudan,(InternationalPressInstitute,2012)http://bit.ly/1Pv7nee.AccordingtoSection4,crimesagainstpublicorderandmoralitySudancyberlaw,ofSudan’sCybercrimeLaw(2007),intentionalorunintentionalproducing,preparing,sending,storing,orpromotinganycontentthatviolatespublicorderormorality,makestheoffenderliabletoimprisonmentof4to5yearsorafineorboth.Themaximumpenaltyforcommittingbothcrimesis7yearsorfineorboth.Also,underthesamesection,creating,promoting,using,websitethatcallsfor,orpromote,ideasagainstpubliclawormoralityispunishedby3yearsinprisonorfineorboth.Cyberdeformationcrimesnecessitate2yearsinprisonorfineorboth.Publicorderisnotdefinedclearlyinthelaw.Subsequently,mostoftheoppositioncontentonlinefallsunderthissectionmakingonlineactivistsliableunderthislaw.

9

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

andholdseditors-in-chiefliableforallcontentpublishedintheirnewspapers.63The2010NationalSecurityActgivestheNISSimmunityfromprosecutionandthepermissiontoarrest,detain,andcensornewspapersunderthepretextofnationalsecurity.64Thoughtherearenospecificreferencestoonlinemedia,thepressandnationalsecuritylaws’broadwordingallowsthemtobeappliedtoonlinecontent.

InJanuary2015,thegovernmentpassedanewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLaw65withthesupposedaimofimprovingSudan’slastplacerankingonTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerception’sIndex.66Whilethegovernmentclaimedthatthelawwouldincreasetransparencyandthepublic’saccesstoinformation,67thelawitselfhasnotbeenmadepubliclyavailableasofmid-2015.Accordingtolocalreportsandobservers,thelawisinpracticehighlylimiting,withprovisionsthatreportedlyclassify12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens,suchasnationalse-curityandforeignpolicyinformation,amongothers.68Theclassificationsystemeffectivelyleavesnoroomforjournalistsorthepublictoaccessanyinformationofconsequence.Moreover,freedomofinformationrequestswillbeoverseenbyaministerappointedbythepresident,givingtheexecutivebranchexclusivecontroloveraccesstoinformation,whilearbitrarilydeterminedfeesimposedforeachinquirywillmaketheprocessofrequestinginformationburdensome.Furthermore,accordingtolocalsources,individualswillbeperverselysubjecttopenaltiesunderotherlawsiftheyrequestcertaintypesofclassifiedinformation,suchasinformationthatthegovernmentcoulddecideisathreattonationalsecurity.69Manyobserversbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinformationanditscensorshippowers.70Otherscontendthelawprovidesthele-galgroundstoargueformoreaccesstoinformation.71

Meanwhile,anewdraftpresslawintroducedinDecember2012isstillintheworksasofmid-2015.AccordingtoastatementbytheheadofthePressandPublicationsCouncilinNovember2014,thenewpresslawwillincludesectionsgoverningonlinejournalism.72AlsoinNovember2014,theSuda-nesepolicedepartmentstatedthatithadover200cybercrimecasesopenagainst250defendantsduring2014,whichtheauthoritiesusedasanargumentforincludingonlinejournalisminthenewpresslaw.73Activistsbelievethatthegovernmentexaggeratedthenumberofcybercrimecasestojustifypassingmorerestrictivelawstoregulatetheinternet.

OnlinejournalistshavenolegalstatusinSudan.74Whilethislegallimbocanbebeneficialforonline

63 CommitteetoProtectJournalists,“RepressivepresslawpassedinSudan,”June11,2009,https://cpj.org/x/2c67.64 AmnestyInternational,“Sudanesesecurityservicecarriesoutbrutalcampaignagainstopponents,”July19,2010,http://bit.ly/1OP3OOi.65 NationalCouncil,“SudaneseParliamentpassesnewlaws,” January28,2015,http://bit.ly/1M1wRJh.66 InternationalTransparency,“Sudanvisualization,”http://www.transparency.org/country#SDN.67 LoriBaitarian,“Sudanpassesfreedomofinformationlawbutjournalistsremainwary,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February5,2015,https://cpj.org/x/5ee7.68 Otherclassifiedinformationrestrictedfromaccess:confidentialdocuments;nationaldefensesecrets;informationaboutlawsinprocess;personalinformationsuchaseducation,profession,andfinance;personalcorrespondence;informationthatcouldaffectongoingnegotiations;informationrelatedtopoliceinvestigationsorjudicialcommittees;confidentialpoliticalinformation;andinformationthatisscheduledtobepublic.See:“Governmentclassifies12typesofinformationandchargesfeesobtaintheinformation,”[inArabic]Alyoum Altali, January19,2015,http://bit.ly/1RSQB75.69 AccordingtoFreedomHouseinterviewswithananonymousSudanesejournalist,March2015.70 Author’sinterview,March2015.71 Author’sinterview,March2015.72 “Expert:NISSiscapableofblockingwebsitesthatareposingathreattoSudan’snationalsecurity.”73 “Police:Increaseincybercrimesinthecountry,”Alyoum Altali,November7,2014.74 PressandPrintedPressMaterials2009:https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/laws/sudan-draft-of-the-press-and-printed-press-material-act-2008.pdf.

10

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

journalists,freeingthemfromthelimitationsoftherestrictivepresslaw,theyforfeitmanyprivilegesavailabletoprintjournalists,suchasmediaaccessatofficialevents.75

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

Inthelead-uptotheApril2015generalelections,thegovernmenttookpreemptivemeasurestore-strictcriticalinformationandsilencetheoppositionbyarrestingonlinejournalistsandactivists:

• InDecember2014,policedetainedAltayyarjournalistTagelsirWadelhkhairforpublishingonthenewspaper’swebsiteastoryaboutrealestatecorruptionthatinvolvedtheseniorlegaladvisortotheMinistryofJusticeandtheformerdirectoroftheLandRegistryOffice.76Hewasheldforonedayandchargedwithdefamation.

• InMay2015,onlinefemaleactivistSolafaSaadwasarrestedbyplainclothessecurityser-vicesfollowingaFacebookpostdescribingherpersonalexperiencewithracism,whichwaswidelydisseminated.77Shewasinterrogatedforsevenhours,duringwhichherinterrogatorsblamedherforthewidecirculationofherFacebookpost.Theinterrogatorswereparticu-larlyfuriousthatherpostwaspickedupbythesatiricalFacebookpage“Al-BashirDiary.”78Saadwasbeatenbyherinterrogators,whousedracialslursandshavedherheadfortalkingbackatthem.79

• InJuly2015,WaleedAlHussein,thecreatorofthecriticalonlinenewsoutlet,Al Rakoba,wasarrestedbytheauthoritiesinSaudiArabia,wherehehadbeenresidingwithhisfamily.80AsofSeptember,hewasbeingheldinsolitaryconfinementwithoutchargesandsubjectedtointerrogationsabouthisworkwithAl Rakoba.FamilymembersbelievehewasarrestedattherequestoftheSudanesegovernment,whichhadtargetedHusseinforhisworkinthepastandwasseekingtohavehimextraditedbacktoSudan.81

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

UncheckedsurveillanceofICTsisagraveconcerninSudan.TheSudanesegovernmentactivelymon-itorsinternetcommunicationsonsocialmediaplatforms,particularlytargetingonlineactivistsandjournalistsduringpoliticalprotests,andtheNISSregularlyinterceptsprivateemailmessages,en-abledbysophisticatedsurveillancetechnologies.

AccordingtoCitizenLabresearchfromJune2013,Sudanpossesseshigh-techsurveillanceequip-mentfromtheU.S.-basedBlueCoatSystems,atechnologycompanythatmanufacturesmonitoringandfilteringdevices.ThesurveillancesystemwasinitiallytracedtothreenetworksinsideSudan,in-

75 Author’sinterview,March2015.76 “PolicedetainsjournalistTagelsirWadelhkhairandkeepshiminCybercrimeProcuratorateOffice,”[inArabic]Almshaheer, December26,2014,http://bit.ly/1M2GTjH.77 SolafaSaad,FacebookPost,April30,2015,http://on.fb.me/1NRkypr.78 Retrievedfrom:AlBashirDiary,FacebookPhoto,May4,2015,http://on.fb.me/1W1sdk5.79 RetrievedfromtheactivistFacebookaccount-herstatuswassettopublic.SolafaSaad,FacebookPost,April30,2015,http://on.fb.me/1NRkypr.80 JournalistsforHumanRights,“SaudiAuthoritiesDetainsSudanesecitizeninAl-khobarasbeingdemandedandsleekedbySudaneseIntelligenceorgans,”September1,2015,http://bit.ly/1LzJuw0.81 AmnestyInternational,“SudaneseActivistArrested,RisksDeportation,”urgentaction,September9,2015,http://bit.ly/1LH10lk.

11

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

cludingonthenetworksoftheprivatetelecomproviderCanar.82Inaddition,CitizenLabalsolocatedsophisticatedcomputerspywaretechnologyknownasRemoteControlSystem(RCS)bytheItaliancompanyHackingTeaminSudaninearly2014.83AdvertisedbyHackingTeamas“offensivetechnol-ogy”soldexclusivelytolawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesaroundtheworld,RCSspywarehastheabilitytostealfilesandpasswordsandinterceptSkypecallsandchats.84InternalemailsleakedbyhackersinJuly2015confirmedthatSudan’sNISShadpurchasedHackingTeam’sRCSspy-warein2012,85thoughanotherleakedemailfromJanuary2014revealedthattrainingofintelligenceagentswasstymiedbyanoverwhelminglackofcomputerliteracyandEnglish-languageskills.86OtherleakedemailsrevealedthatthecompanyhaddiscontinuedbusinesswithSudaninNovember2014.87

Useofmobilephoneshasbecomeincreasinglydangerousforactivists,givenwidespreadsuspicionthattheauthoritiespossessphone-tappingandlocationtrackingtools.88AnumberofSudanesejournalistsandactivistshavereportedfearsthattheirphonesaretapped,89andthereisastrongbeliefamongSudaneseactivistsandjournaliststhatthegovernmenthasadvancedcapabilitiestoremotelyactivateamobilephone’smicrophonetoeavesdroponconversationsevenifthecellphoneisswitchedoff.Accordingtoanonymoussources,theIranianAmbassadoroncerequestedjournaliststoplacetheirinactivecellphonesfarawayfromtheirconversationwiththeAmbassador,whohadadmittedthatthey[theIranians]themselveshadintroducedthiscapabilitytotheSudanesegovernment.90

SIMcardregistrationrequirementswereenactedin2008,compromisingmobilephoneusers’priva-cyandanonymity,particularlygiventhestrongsenseamongobserversthatthegovernmentisabletoaccessusercommunicationsthroughproviderswithoutdueprocess.91Inarenewedefforttoen-forceSIMcardregistration—whichrequiresanofficialidentificationcardandhomeaddressinforma-tion92—thegovernmentdisconnectedallunregisteredSIMcardsinJune2014andreportedlyplanstolinkSIMcardstousers’nationalidentificationnumbersinthefuture.93

Intimidation and Violence

SecurityagentsinSudanregularlyemployextralegalintimidation,harassment,andviolenceagainstonlinejournalistsandactivists.Theauthoritiesalsoroutinelyabusepoliticaldetaineestoobtainaccesstoprivatecommunicationsthatcouldbeusedasevidenceincourt.94InonecasefromSep-

82 EllenNakashima,“Report: WebmonitoringdevicesmadebyUSfirmBlueCoatdetectedinIran,Sudan,” Washington Post,July8,2013,http://wapo.st/1Pv95fA.83 BillMarczak,etal.,Mapping Hacking Team’s “Untraceable” Spyware, CitizenLab,February17,2014,http://bit.ly/1kPDo0Y.84 HackingTeam,“CustomerPolicy,”accessedFebruary13,2014,http://bit.ly/1GnkbjG.85 PDFofareceiptthatshowstheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityServicesofSudanpurchasedHackingTeam’sservices:http://bit.ly/1Pv9A9p.86 EmailfromAlessandroScarafile,“SudanFollow-Up,”HackingTeam,http://bit.ly/1jxGpWe.87 CoraCurrierandMorganMaqruis-Boire,“ADetailedlookAtHackingTeam’sEmailsAboutItsRepressiveClients,”The Intercept,July7,2015,http://bit.ly/1jxGv0h.88 InterviewinKhartoum,Sudan,August1,2012.89 LoriBaitarian,“Sudanpassesfreedomofinformationlawbutjournalistsremainwary,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February5,2015,https://cpj.org/x/5ee7;Author’sinterview,March2015.90 Author’sinterview,March2015.91 FreedomHouseinterview,March2015.92 “NTCannouncestheendofgraceperiodtoregistersimcards,”[inArabic]Sudani Net,June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2A0n3.93 “Sudan:Telecomscompaniesblocknon-registeredSIMcards,”African Manager, June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRlJ8x.94 “Sudan:Telecomscompaniesblocknon-registeredSIMcards.”

12

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

tember2014reportedbytheSudaneseHumanRightsNetwork,NISSofficialsusedtorturetoforceapoliticaldetaineetorevealhisemailpasswords.95

Sudanesewomenareregularlytargetedforharassmentandcyberbullyingbybothstateandnon-stateactorsfortheironlineactivities.Throughout2014-2015,numerousfemalebloggersreceivedonlinethreatsforactivitiesthatrangedfromsharingtheirviewsonwearingthehijabtowritingfem-inistpoetry.96Therewerealsoreportsofsecurityagentsarbitrarilydetainingfemaleonlineactivistsforperiodsbetweensevenhoursandthreedaysonspuriouschargesofdefamationandspreadingrumors.

Technical Attacks

IndependentonlinenewsoutletsarefrequentlysubjecttohackingattacksbywhatactivistsbelieveistheworkoftheCyberJihadistUnit.AgroupcallingitselfHarasalHudoud(“soldiersofthefron-tier”)alsoclaimedresponsibilityforseveraltechnicalattacksthroughouttheyear,97advertisingitselfonscreenwhenuserstriedtoaccesshackedsiteswhiletheyweredown.98SomeonlinenewspapersreportedhackingattemptstracedtohackersinIndiaandSudan.99

Severalcyberattacksagainstcriticalnewswebsitesandactivists’socialmediaaccountsoccurredduringthecoverageperiod,escalatingaroundtheApril2015generalelections:

• ThewebsiteofNuba Reports,whichprovidesin-depthcoverageofongoingconflictsinSu-dan’swar-tornregions,washitinSeptember2014withamassiveDDoSattack.TheattackcamethreedaysafteraNuba Reportssummaryofhumanrightsviolationsintheconflictregionssince2012wascirculatedatthe27thsessionoftheUNHumanRightsCouncilinGeneva.100Sincethen,thesitehasbeenunderconstantattack.101

• InOctober2014,duringthecampaigntoraiseawarenessaboutthemassrapeof200wom-eninSouthDarfur,campaignleaderKhalidEwais’sFacebookaccountwashackedanumberoftimes,leavingitdisabledforfivedaysinarowduringoneoftheattacks.102

• InNovember2014,independentoutletAlrakobawashackedbyHarasalHudoudandwasofflineforaday.

• OnApril12,2015,theeveofnationalelectionsinSudan,onlinenewsoutletsSudaNileandHurriyatexperiencedsimultaneousDenialofService(DoS)attacks.Theoutlet3ayinwasattackedtwodayslater.Consequently,twoofthewebsitesweredisabledforovertenhours,whileSudaNilewasdownforfiveconsecutivedays.

95 SeethefullreportontheSudaneseHumanRightsNetwork,بيذعتلالخادتلاقتعمزاهج,نملاا2015,http://bit.ly/1NkPgEo.96 Authorinterviews.“HijabisaheadcoveringworninpublicbysomeMuslimwomen” Oxford Dictionary.SudanesePublicOrderLawordersthatwomenwearheadcoverwhentheyareinpublicspace.97 “HarasalHudoudreferstoagroupofthegovernment’sarmedforcesinDarfur,thoughthereisnodirectevidencethatthegovernmentwasbehindthehackingattack.”SeeFreedomHouse,“Sudan,”Freedom on the Net 2014. 98 Alnilin[inArabic],http://www.alnilin.com/1183731.htm.99 Author’sinterview.100 ReportersWithoutBorders,“HACKERSATTACKWEBSITETHATCOVERSSUDAN’SWAR-TORNREGIONS,”September19,2014,http://bit.ly/1BTrNnN.101 “NUBAREPORTSWEBSITEUNDERATTACK,”Nuba Report,September18,2014,http://bit.ly/1LkSdUS.102 Author’sinterview.

13

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2015

www.freedomhouse.org

Sudan

FacebookuserWadGaluba,103whopostsnewsaboutcorruptionandinsidersinsightsofNISSoper-ations,reportedfrequenthackingattemptsanddeaththreatseverytimetheuserpublishedahottopic.104

InternationalexpertsandcommentatorsonSudanalsoreportedmassive,andrepeated,attacksontheironlineaccounts.105

103 FacebookPage,https://www.facebook.com/Wdglibaa.104 Author’sinterview.105 EricReeves,TwitterPost,February22,2015,http://bit.ly/1KkRf6X;EricReeves,“IHaveBeenSilenced,”NewYorkTimes,February25,2015,http://nyti.ms/1Gf5oYJ.

14