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Fraudball: Age Falsification and Identity Fraud among Dominican Prospects and its Impact on

Major League Baseball By Arthur “Trey” Hendricks III

Caribbean Law Yearbook, Vol. 1 Issue 1

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“Invent something and make him a ballplayer.”1 This idea has been utilized hundreds of

times in the Dominican Republic, and sometimes nets the players millions of dollars. In a

country where hunger and poverty are the norm,2 baseball is a way off the Island for some

talented young men. Unfortunately, the rules are sometimes broken in order to make these

dreams a reality. In a one year span from 2003 to 2004, over three hundred Dominican prospects

were signed by Major League Baseball clubs, and over forty percent were not who they claimed

to be.3 This is an astounding number, and while the trend has steadily declined since 2004,4 it

remains a problem today.5

This paper will analyze the age falsification and identity fraud problem that has plagued

Major League Baseball (“MLB”) clubs in the Dominican Republic for nearly two decades, and

continues to be a problem today. Part I of this paper will discuss the historical background of the

problem, focusing on some notable cases of age falsification and identity fraud, as well as some

recent headlines that suggest the problem still exists today. Part II will analyze various solutions

that have been proposed and will dissect the pros and cons of each. Part III will examine the

legal issues that arise, including the legality of genetic testing and immigration problems that are

caused by false documents. Finally, Part IV will suggest solutions that could put an end to the

fraudulent conduct among Dominican baseball prospects.

Part I: Historical Background                                                                                                                          1  See  Ortiz,  Jose  de  Jesus,  Lying  About  Age  not  Uncommon  for  Dominican  Baseball  Players,  Houston  Chronicle  (May  4,  2008,  1:28  AM),  http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/sports/5752338.html  (last  visited  Apr.  13,  2011).  2  See  Central  Intelligence  Agency,  The  World  Factbook:  Central  America  and  Caribbean:  Dominican  Republic,  available  at  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/dr.html  (last  updated  Apr.  26,  2011)(noting  that  42.2%  of  the  population  lived  below  the  poverty  line  in  2004).  3  See  Ortiz,  Jorge,  Exploitation,  Steroids  Hitting  Home  in  Dominican  Republic,  USA  Today  (Mar.  29,  2009,  11:08  PM),  http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2009-­‐03-­‐26-­‐dominican-­‐republic-­‐cover_N.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  13,  2011).  4  Id.  5  See  generally  Segura,  Melissa,  Source:  MLB  Nixes  Yanks’  Signing  of  Player  with  Fraudulent  Identity,  SI.com  (July  16,  2009,  7:21  PM),  http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/07/16/yankees.signing/index.hmtl  (last  visited  Apr.  13,  2011).  

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On January 5, 2011, a Dominican talent scout, or “buscon”6, was arrested and charged

with fraud and falsifying documents for prospects he was attempting to sell to MLB clubs.7

While this was one of the most recent incidents involving Dominican prospects, it is nothing

new. In order to understand the problem currently facing MLB clubs, it is necessary to trace the

history of identity fraud and age falsification among Dominican prospects from its known

beginning.

a. Miguel Tejada

In 1993, the Oakland Athletics signed Miguel Tejada8, a Dominican prospect whom the

club thought was seventeen (17) years old. It turned out that Tejada was nineteen (19) at the

time of his signing,9 but it took fifteen (15) years to reveal the truth.10 By the time Tejada’s lie

had been uncovered, he was an established MLB star and the Houston Astros (Tejada’s employer

at the time) did not seem to care about the fraud that had initially brought him to the United

States.11 In fact, his official documents revealed that he was born in 1974, whereas the team’s

media guide and roster listed his year of birth as 1976.12 The Astros quickly corrected their

documents to reveal Tejada’s true age, and the incident was seemingly forgotten.13

b. Adrian Beltre

                                                                                                                         6  See  generally  Ortiz,  supra  note  2  (describing  the  role  a  buscon  plays  in  the  development  of  young  Dominican  prospects).  7  See  O’Keeffe,  Michael,  Fraud  Charges  for  Victor  Baez  After  He  Allegedly  Lies  About  Ages  of  Players  from  Dominican  Republic,  NYDailyNews.com  (Jan.  5,  2011),  http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-­‐01-­‐05/sports/27086486_1_dominican-­‐republic-­‐identity-­‐fraud-­‐dominican-­‐authorities  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  8  See  generally  Tejada,  Miguel,  BaseballReference.com,  http://www.baseball-­‐reference.com/players/t/tejadmi01.shtml  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  9  See  Tejada  Admits  to  Being  Two  Years  Older  Than  He  Had  Said,  ESPN.com  (Apr.  18,  2008,  1:26  AM),  http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3351418  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  10  Id.  11  Id.  12  Id.  13  Id.  

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In 1994, one year after Miguel Tejada signed with the Oakland Athletics, Adrian Beltre14

signed with the Los Angeles Dodgers. However, unlike in the case of Tejada and many

contemporary fraud cases, Beltre signed at the age of fifteen (15),15 which is forbidden by

MLB.16 Instead of waiting until the mandatory sixteen (16) years of age to sign, Beltre falsified

his documents to make himself older than he actually was. This case was rare for two reasons:

first, it was one of the few instances where a Dominican prospect falsified documents to make

himself older, and second, the MLB club seemed to be behind the incident.17 The Los Angeles

Dodgers wanted to secure Beltre’s services even though he was not yet the requisite age to sign

with a MLB club. Though the details differ between Beltre’s case and Tejada’s case, both are

useful in establishing that the problem with age falsification and identity fraud among

Dominican prospects is not a new problem, but rather can be traced back nearly two decades.

c. Modern Cases

i. Esmailyn Gonzalez/Carlos Alvarez Daniel Lugo

In 2006, the Washington Nationals thought they were signing a sixteen (16) year-old

Dominican phenom by the name of Esmailyn Gonzalez.18 Three years later, it was revealed that

Gonzalez was really Carlos Alvarez Daniel Lugo, and he was four years older than he led the

                                                                                                                         14  See  generally  Beltre,  Adrian,  BaseballReference.com,  http://www.baseball-­‐reference.com/players/b/beltrad01.shtml  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  15  See  Chass,  Murray,  Baseball;  Dodgers  Get  to  Keep  Beltre,  but  Are  Penalized,  The  New  York  Times  (Dec.  22,  1999),  http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/22/sports/baseball-­‐dodgers-­‐get-­‐to-­‐keep-­‐beltre-­‐but-­‐are-­‐penalized.html  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  16  See  Segura,  Melissa,  In  International  Market,  MLB  Teams  are  Buying  Costly  Lottery  Tickets,  SI.com  (July  2,  2009,  4:48  PM),  http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/melissa_segura/07/02/international.signing/index.html  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011)(explaining  that  amateur  free  agents  must  turn  17  years  old  before  the  end  of  their  first  professional  season,  and  that  July  2  is  the  first  day  that  a  team  can  sign  a  player  to  a  contract  effective  the  following  season).  17  See  generally  Chass,  supra  note  14  (detailing  the  events  that  led  to  Commissioner  Bud  Selig  shutting  down  the  Los  Angeles  Dodgers  Dominican  Academy  for  a  year  as  punishment  for  falsifying  Beltre’s  documents  and  assisting  in  the  defection  of  two  Cuban  prospects  to  the  Dominican  Republic).  18  See  Ladson,  Bill,  Nats’  Top  Prospect  Falsified  Name,  Age,  WashingtonNationals.com  (Feb.  18,  2009,  11:30  AM),  http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090218&content_id=3843196&vkey=news_was&fext=.jsp&c_id=was  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  

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Nationals to believe.19 The signing would not have been newsworthy if Lugo had signed for the

$2000 Tejada had signed for,20 but Lugo’s $1.4 million bonus was the largest given to an

international player in club history.21 The Nationals believed they were signing a young prospect

with elite skills that could be developed in the United States minor leagues and would one day be

a star. However, when the truth was revealed, the Nationals were defrauded for over a million

dollars and four years of lost development time. As one scout explains, “In the eyes of baseball,

there’s a huge difference between 16 and 19 year olds . . . [I]t’s night and day.”22

ii. Jose Ozoria/Wally Bryan and Damian Arredondo

Two other notable cases occurred in 2008 and 2009 involving the Cleveland Indians and

the New York Yankees, respectively. In 2008, the Cleveland Indians thought they were signing

a seventeen (17) year-old, high-profile shortstop named Jose Ozoria. However, a subsequent

MLB investigation revealed that the player’s real name was Wally Bryan, and he was three (3)

years older than the Indians believed.23 While the $575,000 bonus Bryan received was not

astronomical by modern standards, it was nearly one-quarter of the Indians’ international free-

agent signing budget for 2008.24 With that money saved, the Indians could have targeted a

different international prospect or spent it in the MLB draft.

                                                                                                                         19  See  Id.  20  See  Brazil,  Eric,  Ball  Player  Dreams  of  “Grandes  Ligas”,  SFGate.com  (May  3,  1999),  http://articles.sfgate.com/1999-­‐05-­‐03/entertainment/28598480_1  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  21  See  Ladson,  supra  note  17.  22  Schmidt,  Michael  S.  &  Schwarz,  Alan,  Baseball’s  Use  of  DNA  Raises  Questions,  The  New  York  Times  (July  21,  2009),  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/sports/baseball/22dna.html  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011)(quoting  an  international  scout  for  a  major  league  team).  23  See  generally  Hoynes,  Paul,  Cleveland  Indians  Will  Dive  Into  International  Free-­‐Agent  Market:  Indians  Insider,  Cleveland.com  (July  1,  2009,  10:53  PM),  http://www.cleveland.com/tribe/index.ssf/2009/07/cleveland_indians_will_dive_in.html  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  24  Id.  

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One year later, in 2009, the New York Yankees signed a sixteen (16) year-old Dominican

shortstop for $850,000.25 After the MLB Department of Investigations discovered that Damian

Arredondo was not who he claimed to be and was older than he led the club to believe, the

Yankees revoked his contract.26 This case was significant because a new MLB rule had just

been instituted where a player found to have used fraudulent identity or to have misrepresented

his age could not sign with another MLB club for one (1) year.27 Weeks after his contract was

revoked by the Yankees, Arredondo tested positive for performance enhancing drugs,28 and he is

now subject to a fifty (50) game suspension if he signs with another MLB club.29 The

Arredondo case is significant because it is the first high-profile prospect punished by MLB for

falsifying documents and misrepresenting his age,30 and it probably had a deterring effect on

prospects in similar positions. The system is, however, still flawed and sweeping changes are

necessary in order to rectify the problem.

d. The Buscones

Buscones, which means “seekers” in Spanish,31 are influential people in a lot of young

Dominican prospects’ lives. While most buscones claim to be well-intentioned,32 and some

                                                                                                                         25  See  generally  Segura,  supra  note  4  (describing  the  events  that  occurred  in  2009  when  the  Yankees  pulled  the  contract  of  Damian  Arredondo  after  an  MLB  investigation  revealed  he  was  not  who  he  said  he  was).  26  See  generally  Buggenhagen,  Matt,  Yankee  Prospect  Damian  Arredondo  Discovered  To  Be  A  Fraud,  MLBDailyDish.com  (July  16,  2009,  8:46  PM),  http://www.mlbdailydish.com/2009/7/16/952068/yankee-­‐prospect-­‐damian-­‐arredondo  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011)(explaining  that  although  MLB  contracts  are  guaranteed,  international  signings  are  not  finalized  until  MLB  has  conducted  investigations  and  approved  the  deal).  27  See  Segura,  supra  note  4.  28  Dominican  Prospect  “Damian  Arredondo”  Suspended  for  Steroids,  DominicanToday.com  (Sept.  12,  2009,  1:10  PM),  http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/sports/2009/9/12/33222/Dominican-­‐prospect-­‐Damian-­‐Arredondo-­‐suspended-­‐for-­‐steroids  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2011).  29  Id.  30  The  author  recognizes  that  other  prospects  have  given  all  or  a  portion  of  their  signing  bonus  back  to  the  club  upon  being  caught  of  identity  fraud  or  age  falsification,  but  this  was  the  first  instance  where  a  high-­‐profile  prospect  was  forced  to  wait  a  year  before  signing  with  another  MLB  club.    MLB  was  presumably  trying  to  deter  prospects  by  forcing  them  to  wait  another  year,  and  devalue  them,  so  as  to  prevent  similar  occurrences.    31  See  Ortiz,  supra  note  2.  32  Id.  

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certainly are, critics view them as exploitative and furtive. As one law professor notes,

“[b]uscones in the Dominican Republic are in the business of selling children.”33 The buscones

claim to be part teacher, part caretaker, and part agent.34 The buscones typically find the

Dominican prospects during their formative years (thirteen (13) to fifteen (15) years old) and

attempt to turn them into players that are appealing to MLB clubs. A lot of the kids who join the

buscones at their training academies come from families who cannot support them,35 so this is a

way for them to eat every day and have a roof over their head. The buscones, however, expect a

large return on their investment, ranging from thirty (30) to forty (40) percent of the prospect’s

bonus upon signing with a MLB club.36 Some buscones even seek American investors to fund

their academies, with promises that the investors will see a large return once the prospects sign

with MLB clubs.37

e. Recent Problems

In May 2009, Juan Collado signed with the Arizona Diamondbacks for $17,000.38 In

March 2011, Juan Paniagua signed with the New York Yankees for $1.1 million.39 The problem

is that Juan Collado is Juan Paniagua. Paniagua played a one-year suspension for fraudulent

paperwork into a huge payday. After sitting out his year-long suspension mandated by MLB,

                                                                                                                         33  See  generally  Schmidt,  Michael  S.,  New  Exotic  Investment:  Latin  Baseball  Futures,  NYTimes.com  (Nov.  17,  2010),  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/sports/baseball/18investors.html?pagewanted=1  (last  visited  Apr.  29,  2011)(quoting  David  P.  Fidler,  a  professor  of  international  law  at  Indiana  University).  34  See  Ortiz,  supra  note  2.  35  Id.  36  See  Ortiz,  supra  note  2;  see  also  Segura,  Melissa,  Ties  Between  Dominican  Prospects  and  Bookie  Raise  Concerns  for  MLB,  SI.com  (July  22,  2008,  11:24  PM),  http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/baseball/mlb/07/22/segura.drcrisis/  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  37  See  generally  Schmidt,  supra  note  33  (describing  how  some  controversial  American  investors  spend  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  investing  in  the  buscones  academies  in  the  Dominican  Republic).  38  See  Badler,  Ben,  Suspension  Helped  Former  Diamondback  Net  $1.1  Million  From  Yankees  (Mar.  14,  2011),  BaseballAmerica.com,  http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/prospects/international-­‐affairs/2011/2611408.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  39  Id.  

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Paniagua signed a contract sixty-five times higher than his original.40 A similar case involved

Carlos Martinez (Carlos Matias), who had originally signed a low-six-figure contract with the

Boston Red Sox. After serving his MLB mandated one-year suspension for fraudulent

documentation, Martinez signed a $1.5 million contract with the St. Louis Cardinals.41 After

MLB enacted the mandatory one-year suspension for false documents following the Arrendondo

case,42 officials probably did not imagine this would encourage Dominican prospects to use

fraudulent documents. However, these two cases illustrate that this has indeed occurred and

more needs to be done in order to curb the problem.

Part II: Proposed Solutions

Various tests have been implemented by MLB in an attempt to curb the identity fraud and

age falsification issues plaguing the Dominican Republic. However, none of these methods are

completely accurate, and a new piece of legislation may prohibit MLB from continuing these

procedures altogether.

a. DNA Testing

In 2009, the Minnesota Twins signed Dominican infielder Miguel Sano for $3.15 million,

the largest bonus ever given to a Latin American position player.43 Before he signed, serious

questions about his age and identity surfaced, and he consented to DNA testing and bone scans

to prove he was who he claimed to be.44 MLB claims that it uses DNA testing in the Dominican

Republic “in very rare instances and only on a consensual basis to deal with the identity fraud

                                                                                                                         40  Id.  41  Id.  42  See  Segura,  supra  note  4.  43  See  Badler,  Ben,  Miguel  Sano  Agrees  to  Terms  with  Twins,  BaseballAmerica.com  (Sept.  29,  2009,  6:05  PM),  http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/prospects/2009/09/miguel-­‐sano-­‐signs-­‐with-­‐twins/  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  44  See  Schmidt  &  Schwarz,  supra  note  21.  

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problem that the league faces in [the DR].”45 These DNA tests have been utilized by individual

teams for a few years, and MLB’s department of investigations has been doing it for about a

year.46 There are, however, problems with these DNA tests and bone scan procedures.

i. Problems with Genetic Testing

One of the main problems with DNA testing is that the results are limited. The DNA test

does not reveal the player’s age, but it can reveal whether the player is the son of his claimed

parents.47 Players have been known to find families willing to lend a younger child’s birth

certificate so that they appear younger.48 In reality, the DNA tests only help detect the players

who falsify their identity, not their age, so the usefulness of the tests is limited.

Another concern for critics of DNA testing is that teams will use the results for other,

illicit purposes.49 As one scouting director questioned, “Can they test susceptibility to cancer? . .

. I know they’re looking into trying to figure out susceptibility to injuries, things like that.”50 As

long as MLB uses the DNA results for the limited purpose of proving identity, proponents of the

testing argue it should be allowed.51 In addition, some argue that this should be a last resort

method of verifying the player’s identity, that there should be a prior evidentiary basis for

suspecting fraud, and that the results should be controlled by an independent party.52 If these

conditions are met, it may help to legitimize the testing procedure and appease those concerned

with invasion of privacy issues.

                                                                                                                         45  Id.  46  Id.  47  Id.  48  Id.  49  See  Schmidt  &  Schwarz,  supra  note  21  50  See  Schmidt  &  Schwarz,  supra  note  21  (quoting  a  MLB  scouting  director  concerned  where  DNA  testing  will  lead).  51  See  Schwarz,  Alan,  Dominican  Youth’s  Future  in  Baseball  Hinges  on  a  DNA  Test,  NYTimes.com  (July  22,  2009),  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/sports/baseball/23dna.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  52  See  Saletan,  William,  Baseball  and  DNA,  Slate.com  (July  23,  2009,  9:51  AM),  http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/humannature/archive/2009/07/23/baseball-­‐and-­‐dna.aspx  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  

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b. Bone Scans

Like genetic testing, bone density scans have limited results. While the scans can reveal

the age of the patient to a certain degree, there is a margin of error.53 The scans can determine if

a player is several years older than he claims to be, but in cases where the difference in age is a

year or two, the scans have limited effectiveness. In Miguel Sano’s case, he was given a bone

scan along with his seventeen-year-old sister in order to determine that he was, in fact, her

younger brother.54 Only by matching up Sano’s submitted birth certificates, and a combination

of DNA testing to prove his parents were who he claimed and bone scans to prove he was

younger than his sister, was MLB able to determine that Sano was around sixteen (16) years old.

Still, the bone density scans had limited conclusive results.

c. Fingerprinting

In Venezuela, children who apply for their cedula (national identification card) are

fingerprinted at local administration offices.55 Some advocates of the fingerprinting system

argue that this could help in curbing the age falsification and identity fraud problems plaguing

the Dominican Republic.56 By fingerprinting Dominican children, well before they are on the

radar of MLB clubs, it is argued that this will assist in identifying the prospects once they reach

sixteen (16) years of age and are attempting to sign with MLB clubs.57 While this method is

imperfect and will take years to implement, it is certainly worth consideration. The problem is

                                                                                                                         53  See  Bull,  R.K.  et.  al.,  Bone  Age  Assessment:    A  Large  Scale  Comparison  of  the  Greulich  and  Pyle,  and  Tanner  and  Whitehouse  (TW2)  Methods,  81  Arch.  Dis.  Child  172-­‐73  (1999),  available  at  http://adc.bmj.com/content/81/2/172.full.pdf  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(concluding  that  bone  density  scans  have  a  margin  of  error  between  2.28  and  -­‐1.52  years).  54  See  Schwarz,  supra  note  48.  55  Farrell,  Charles,  PUTTING  A  FINGER  ON  A  PROBLEM,  Vol.  II,  Iss.  17  DRSEA  Informer  at  2,  available  at  http://www.drsea.org/newsletters/DRSEA_INFORMER_Volume_II_Issue_17.pdf  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  56  See  generally  Id  (describing  how  a  fingerprinting  system  could  assist  in  determining  the  true  identity  of  Dominican  prospects,  and  will  be  more  cost  effective  than  the  current  methods  of  DNA  testing  and  bone  scans).  57  Id.  

11    

that large-scale cooperation from the Dominican government would be necessary, and this has

proven insurmountable in the past.58

Part III: Legal Issues

a. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)59 may have an effect on

MLB’s efforts in the Dominican Republic. GINA, which went into effect in 2009,60 generally

prohibits discrimination in health coverage and employment on the basis of genetic

information.61 Specifically, GINA forbids employers from refusing to hire, or discharge, any

employee on the basis of genetic information.62 Furthermore, GINA “forbids employers from

requesting genetic information from employees, except when ‘the employee provides prior,

knowing, voluntary, and written authorization.’”63 Prospects may, as in the case of Miguel Sano,

voluntarily offer to undergo DNA testing in order to make themselves more attractive to MLB

clubs,64 which would not trigger GINA protection.

i. GINA in the Courts

As of this writing, no GINA decisions have been issued by the courts.65 However,

Pamela Fink, a former employee of MXenergy, filed suit in April 2010 claiming that MXenergy

                                                                                                                         58  Id.  59  42  U.S.C.A.  §2000ff.  60  See  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  “Gina”  The  Genetic  Information  Nondiscrimination  Act  of  2008:    Information  for  Researchers  and  Health  Care  Professionals,  Apr.  6,  2009,  available  at  http://www.genome.gov/Pages/PolicyEthics/GeneticDiscrimination/GINAInfoDoc.pdf  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  61  See  generally  Id  (describing  GINA  and  the  impact  it  has).  62  See  Grow,  Nathaniel,  MLB  Confirms  Use  of  Genetic  Testing  on  Latin  American  Prospects,  Sports  Law  Blog  (July,  23,  2009),  available  at  http://sports-­‐law.blogspot.com/2009/07/mlb-­‐confirms-­‐use-­‐of-­‐genetic-­‐testing-­‐on.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  63  Id.  64  See  Grow,  supra  note  59.  65  Sharona  Hoffman,  The  Importance  of  Immutability  in  Employment  Discrimination  Law,  52  WM.  &  MARY  L.  REV.  1483,  1492  (2011).  

12    

violated GINA in dismissing her from job.66 Fink underwent a voluntary double mastectomy

after her doctor informed her that she was predisposed to breast cancer.67 Her former employer,

MXenergy, claims that her position was terminated during her prolonged absence, and that the

company had not violated GINA because it was Fink’s voluntary genetic test that revealed her

predisposition to breast cancer.68 This case should prove interesting, as it will provide a glimpse

of how courts interpret GINA in regard to voluntary genetic testing. In addition, it should

provide insight as to the damages that can be recovered from companies found in violation of

GINA. Fink is seeking reinstatement to her former position at MXenergy, as well as punitive

and emotional distress damages.69

ii. GINA’s applicability abroad?

An important, unanswered question regarding GINA is whether its applicability will

reach to foreign employees.70 There is little doubt that GINA would apply if MLB clubs waited

to test these prospects upon their arrival in the United States. Most often, however, these clubs

perform the DNA testing when the prospect is still in the Dominican Republic, so GINA’s

applicability is in limbo. MLB clubs want the testing done when the prospect has been signed,

or is about to sign, not years later upon his arrival to the United States. Essentially, GINA may

have no effect on MLB’s DNA testing policies because it may not apply extraterritorially.

b. Immigration Issues

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the United States immigration laws have

become more stringent. For Dominican prospects this means that if they are caught falsifying

                                                                                                                         66  See  Friedman,  Emily,  Pamela  Fink  Says  She  Was  Fired  After  Getting  a  Double  Mastectomy  to  Prevent  Breast  Cancer,  ABC  News  (Apr.  30,  2010),  http://abcnews.go.com/Health/OnCallPlusBreastCancerNews/pamela-­‐fink-­‐fired-­‐testing-­‐positive-­‐breast-­‐cancer-­‐gene/story?id=10510163  (last  visited  Apr.  28,  2011).  67  Id.  68  Id.  69  Id.  70  See  Schmidt  &  Schwarz,  supra  note  21.  

13    

their documents, the penalties are more uncompromising and they may be excludable for years.

The vast majority of Dominican prospects that are caught by MLB for document fraud are still in

the Dominican Republic, and have not yet been granted a visa to the United States, so this

section will focus primarily on exclusion rather than deportation. Note that if a prospect is

already inside the United States, however, he could be deported if his fraudulent documents are

discovered.

i. Visas for Minor League Players

Until 2006, there were separate visa categories for MLB players and minor league

players. Whereas MLB players were eligible for “O” or “P” visas,71 of which there is no limit,

minor league players were forced to enter with “H-2B” seasonal worker visas.72 Interestingly, in

2006 the occupations with the most “H-2B” visas were landscaping laborers, cleaners,

housekeepers, construction workers, and forestry workers.73 Because the “H-2B” visas are

capped at 66,000 per fiscal year,74 this meant that minor league players were competing against

unskilled laborers for the visas.

a. Types of Visas

Prior to 2006, MLB players could enter the United States on “O” or “P” visas but minor

league players could not. The “O” visa category required “extraordinary ability . . . which has

been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim.”75 This suggests that only

established MLB All-Stars, or All-Stars from other countries whose professional leagues are

                                                                                                                         71INA  §101(a)(15)(P),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1101  (suggesting  that  an  athlete  eligible  for  a  P  visa  performs  at  “an  internationally  recognized  level…”);  see  also  INA  §101(a)(15)(O),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1101  (outlining  the  “extraordinary  ability”  requirements).  72  See  “Bill  to  Ease  Visa  Restrictions  on  Minor  League  Athletes  Approved  by  Congress,  Goes  to  President’s  Desk  for  Signature,”  [hereinafter  “Minor  League  Athletes”]  (Dec.  11,  2006),  available  at    http://www.visalaw.com/FAS/feinstein1206.pdf  (last  visited  Apr.  28,  2011).  73  THOMAS  ALEXANDER  ALEINIKOFF,  ET  AL.,  IMMIGRATION  AND  CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS  AND  POLICY  420  (6th  ed.  2008).  74  Id.  at  421.  75  See  INA  §101(a)(15)(O),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1101.  

14    

nearly equivalent to MLB (i.e. Japan), could meet the “O” visa requirements. As such, the

majority of MLB players entered the United States on “P” visas. “P” visas were limited, in part,

to “professional athletes,”76 but until 2006 did not include minor league players because these

players did not meet the definition of “professional athlete.”77 In 2006, however, a piece of

legislation amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to include minor league players

under the “P” visa provision.

b. The COMPETE Act of 2006

The Creating Opportunities for Minor League Professionals, Entertainers, and Teams

through Legal Entry Act of 2006 (COMPETE Act of 2006)78 amended §101(a)(15)(P) of the

INA to include minor league players.79 After the COMPETE Act of 2006, minor league players

affiliated with MLB teams could enter the United States with “P” visas, and they were not forced

to compete with unskilled workers due to the cap on seasonal worker visas. This Act eased

restrictions on MLB Clubs in regards to the number of foreign players they could invite to Spring

Training. Before the COMPETE Act of 2006, MLB Clubs were forced to choose between

players of similar skill level, as not all of the foreign prospects in the Academies were able to

procure visas to enter the United States. After the Act, however, the MLB Clubs could “combine

paperwork and bring several players to the United States on P-1 Visas using the same visa

                                                                                                                         76  See  INA  §204(i)(2)(A),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1154  (defining  professional  athlete  as  “an  individual  who  is  employed  as  an  athlete  by  a  team  that  is  a  member  of  an  association  of  6  or  more  professional  sports  teams  whose  total  combined  revenues  exceed  $10,000,000  per  years,  if  the  association  governs  the  conduct  of  its  members  and  regulates  the  contests  and  exhibitions  in  which  its  member  teams  regularly  engage.”).  77  Id.  78  See  generally  S.3821:  Compete  Act  of  2006,  available  at    http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-­‐3821  (last  visited  Apr.  28,  2011)(outlining  the  changes  the  Act  would  make  to  the  INA,  namely  including  Minor  League  Athletes  in  the  P  visa  category).  79  See  Minor  League  Athletes,  supra  note  65  (“The  COMPETE  Act  allows  top-­‐notch  athletes  from  around  the  world  the  opportunity  to  compete  and  perform  in  the  United  States  without  facing  unfair  and  unnecessary  visa  restrictions.  .  .  There’s  no  reason  that  minor  league  athletes  should  face  tougher  visa  restrictions  than  their  counterparts  in  the  major  leagues.    Once  signed  into  law,  this  bill  will  provide  a  level  playing  field  for  all  foreign  athletes  seeking  to  compete  in  the  United  States.”)  

15    

application.”80 The COMPETE Act of 2006 made it easier on MLB clubs to get foreign players

into the country, but those caught falsifying their documents are still subject to the penalties of

the INA.

ii. Penalties for Falsifying Documents under the INA

Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA81 says that:

“Any alien, who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”

This means that if a Dominican prospect willfully falsifies his birth certificate or passport and is

caught, then he is inadmissible and will not be allowed into the United States. Furthermore, if he

is already in the United States and the fraud is uncovered, then he is subject to deportation.82 It

is this “willful” provision that has enabled some prospects to procure visas even after being

caught falsifying documents, as in many instances the buscon or someone other than the player

falsifies the paperwork.83

The penalties for falsifying documents include exclusion for a number of years, 84 and

this can have a dramatic effect on the player’s career. For example, if a player is found to be

nineteen (19) years-old, and is forced to wait five (5) years before reapplying for a visa, his

developmental years are essentially behind him and the MLB club may lose interest. This is to

say that falsifying a document could end a player’s career in professional baseball. For some,

however, the risk is worth the reward.

Part IV: Solving the Problem

                                                                                                                         80  Telephone  Interview  with  Mark  Scialabba,  Director  of  Minor  League  Operations,  Washington  Nationals  Baseball  Club  (May  3,  2011).  81  8  U.S.C.A.  §1182  82  See  INA  §237(3)(C),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1227.  83  See  O’Keeffe,  supra  note  7.  84  See  INA  §212(a)(9),  8  U.S.C.A.  §1182.  

16    

a. Regulate the Buscones

i. Regulation 3450 and Dominican Republic’s General Law of Sports

Legislation regulating baseball is rare in the Dominican Republic, but there is

“Presidential Regulation 3450 issued in 1985 which, inter alia, (1) regulates schools and baseball

camps in the DR; (2) requires that all baseball scouts operating in the DR be registered with the

DR Professional Baseball Commissioner; and (3) regulates to some degree scouts’ signings of

baseball players in the DR.”85 Notice that the wording of Regulation 3450 is extremely vague,

and does not define the term scout with the requisite precision. Presumably, the law was

intended to regulate official MLB scouts in the Dominican Republic. The buscones sometimes

consider themselves scouts, yet are not affiliated with a MLB club so they are technically outside

the grasp of the law. A buscon could claim that he is merely a trainer if an entity attempts to

force him under the auspices of Regulation 3450. Furthermore, the scope of the regulation

offered by the law is extremely vague, both in regard to the schools and camps, and the scouts’

signings of prospects. Perhaps in 1985 the Dominican government did not foresee the size of

signing bonuses reaching the level they are currently at, but even twenty-six (26) years ago

someone should have noticed how vague Regulation 3450 truly was.

Over twenty (20) years after Regulation 3450 was enacted, Dominican President Leonel

Fernandez took notice and signed the General Law of Sports, a piece of legislation which

included a provision that capped the amount a buscon could claim from a player’s signing

bonus.86 According to this 2006 law, a buscon is limited to fifteen (15) percent of the player’s

signing bonus if he has trained and invested money in that player for two (2) years.87

                                                                                                                         85  Aaron  N.  Wise  &  Bruce  S.  Meyer,  INTERNATIONAL  SPORTS  LAW  AND  BUSINESS  870  (Kluwer  Law  International,  Vol.  2  1997).  86  See  Segura,  supra  note  34.  87  Id.  

17    

Correspondingly, the buscon is limited to ten (10) percent of the player’s signing bonus if the

relationship has lasted a year or less.88 While this piece of legislation is a law in theory, in

reality it is a mere suggestion, because enforcement is nearly impossible.89 This law is

significant because it signaled an attempt, albeit lackluster, on the part of the Dominican

government to curb the corruption in Dominican baseball. More regulation of the buscones is

needed, however.

ii. Buscones should be regulated similar to MLBPA Agents

According to Article IV of the Basic Agreement90 between the Major League Baseball

Players Association (MLBPA) and the MLB Clubs:

“A Player, if he so desires, may designate an agent to conduct on his behalf, or to assist him in, the negotiation of an individual salary and/or Special Covenants to be included in his Uniform Player’s Contract with any Club, provided such agent has been certified to the Clubs by the Association as authorized to act as a Player Agent for such purposes.”91

The key to this provision is that the agent must be certified by the MLBPA. This certification is

to “establish and enforce minimum requirements for eligibility to become a Player Agent and

uniform standards of conduct and fiduciary responsibility for all Player Agents.”92 Furthermore,

this certification aims to “ensure uniformity and consistency in the rules and standards applicable

to Player Agents, whose business activities are often national or international in scope,

notwithstanding the different, and sometimes inconsistent, laws, rules, and regulations of the

many national, state, and local jurisdictions that might otherwise govern these activities.”93

                                                                                                                         88  Id.  89  Id.  90  2007-­‐2011  MAJOR  LEAGUE  BASEBALL  BASIC  AGREEMENT  [hereinafter  “Basic  Agreement”],  available  at  http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf.  91  Id.  92  See  MLBPA  REGULATIONS  GOVERNING  PLAYER  AGENTS  (Oct.  1,  2010)  §1(A),  available  at  http://reg.mlbpaagent.org/Documents/AgentForms/Agent%20Regulations.pdf.  93  Id.  

18    

The problem with the buscones, who sometimes act as an Agent in negotiating player

contracts with teams, is that they are not representing a MLB player. When they attempt to sell

their players to MLB clubs, they are negotiating a contract for an amateur player, and are not

required to be certified by the MLBPA unless they are negotiating a MLB contract for an

amateur player, which is rare. Most often, these buscones are negotiating a minor league

contract for their prospect, so they can skirt the requirements of the MLBPA. As is evident by

the rampant corruption and age falsification occurring in the Dominican Republic, these

buscones should be required to be certified and registered with MLB, or even the Dominican

government. This might help filter out the corrupt buscones from the legitimate ones, and help

clean up Dominican baseball.

b. Increase Penalties for Players Caught in Violation of MLB Rules

Similar to increasing regulation of the buscones, MLB should increase the penalties for

those caught falsifying documents. In 2005, the MLBPA and MLB agreed to drastically increase

the penalties for those caught using performance-enhancing drugs.94 These stricter penalties had

a noticeable effect, as the number of minor league players caught using performance enhancing

drugs declined from eighty-three (83) in 2005 to ten (10) in 2009.95 Minor league players were

forced to reconsider the substances they put in their bodies, as a positive test would result in

them missing one-third of the season.96 This stretch of games missed would have a drastic

impact on the player’s development, and they would not be paid for the missed games.

                                                                                                                         94  See  generally  Barry  M.  Bloom  &  Jim  Molony,  MLB,  Union  Agree  to  Stricter  Drug  Policy,  MLB.com  (Nov.  16,  2005,  3:13  AM),  http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20051115&content_id=1268529&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(outlining  the  new  drug  policy  agreed  upon  by  the  MLBPA  and  MLB).  95  See  “Baseball’s  Steroid  Era  Minor  League  Suspensions”,  available  at  http://www.baseballssteroidera.com/minor-­‐league-­‐suspensions.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  96  See  Bloom  &  Molony,  supra  note  48.  

19    

Correspondingly, increasing penalties for those caught falsifying documents will have the

same effect in deterring future incidents. When MLB imposed the mandatory one-year

suspension after the Arredondo case,97 it probably was not foreseeable that prospects would use

the suspension to their financial advantage, as evidenced by Juan Paniagua and Carlos

Martinez.98 The modified MLB drug policy had a positive impact in reducing performance-

enhancing drug use and, similarly, stricter penalties for those caught falsifying documents should

have the same deterring effect. Perhaps a three-year suspension, instead of one-year, would

make the players carefully consider their actions before submitting false documents to MLB. In

some cases, a three-year suspension would end the player’s chances of playing professionally in

the United States. However, the first players under the stricter policy would be made an example

of, and most likely help in curbing the fraud problem among Dominican prospects.

c. Increase Education

i. MLB’s Education Initiative

On March 8, 2010, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig appointed former Oakland Athletics

General Manager Sandy Alderson to lead a committee on reform in the Dominican Republic.99

Along with increasing investigations into the true identity of players and implementing a stricter

drug testing policy,100 Alderson recognized the need for increased education among Dominican

prospects.101 Before the reform, teenage prospects rarely went to class and some had only the

                                                                                                                         97  See  Segura,  supra  note  4.  98  See  Badler,  supra  note  35.  99  See  Milani,  Jerry,  Alderson  to  Oversee  Reform  in  Dominican  Republic  Operations,  BaseballDigest.com  (Mar.  8,  2010),  http://www.baseballdigest.com/2010/03/08/alderson-­‐to-­‐oversee-­‐reform-­‐in-­‐dominican-­‐republic-­‐operations-­‐2/  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  100  See  Schmidt,  Michael  S.,  Scrutiny  of  Dominican  Baseball  Prospects  is  Having  an  Effect:  Less  Demand  for  Dominicans  as  M.L.B.  Scrutiny  Increases,  NYTimes.com  (Oct.  9,  2010),  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/sports/baseball/10dominican.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  101  Id.  

20    

equivalent of a sixth or seventh-grade education.102 Under the new program, however, all

sixteen (16) year-olds were required to take an academic aptitude test, with the results given to

all MLB clubs.103 Furthermore, the program mandates that classes are to be given at all MLB

academies on the island and that prospects will undergo regular progress tests.104

While this program was certainly a step in the right direction, stricter guidelines should

be implemented in the future. For instance, requiring all Dominican prospects to have the

equivalent of a high-school education will not only help them on the field (as it will enable them

to learn and process instruction from coaches more easily), but it will also aid the prospects in

their cultural adjustment to the United States, and prepare them for life after baseball. The

author understands the challenges faced with increasing education in the Dominican Republic,

and recognizes the enormous impact the new education program will have on both Dominican

prospects and MLB. Increasing education may assist in the Dominican prospects’ realization

that the buscones are exploiting them, and may enable them to keep a larger portion of the

signing bonuses they receive. It is essential that MLB continues to encourage and demand an

increase in education among Dominican prospects, rather than be satisfied and complacent with

the considerable progress already made.

ii. Dominican Republic Sports & Education Academy (DRSEA)

The Dominican Republic Sports & Education Academy (DRSEA)105 is in the planning

stages, but should be the new model for well-intentioned buscones. DRSEA is modeled after the

                                                                                                                         102  Id.  103  Id.  104  Id.  105  See  generally  DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  SPORTS  &  EDUCATION  ACADEMY  [hereinafter  “DRSEA”],  available  at  http://www.drsea.org/index.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(outlining  the  plans  for  the  DRSEA  and  its  purpose).  

21    

Puerto Rico Baseball Academy & High School (PRBAHS)106, and aims to “[give student

athletes] the tools to qualify for sports scholarships at U.S. colleges and universities.”107

Furthermore, “[t]he academy will be able to take gifted baseball players and prepare them

academically for the college classroom. The academic program will exceed the minimum

requirements for college eligibility now required by the NCAA.”108 Unlike the academies run by

some buscones who are looking to cash in upon sending a prospect to a MLB club, the DRSEA

seeks to prepare their prospects for life after baseball, and gives them different avenues for

continuing their baseball career.

If the DRSEA model becomes more common, Dominican prospects will not be forced to

pigeonhole themselves into signing with a MLB club. By increasing education, the DRSEA

aims to present their prospects with many different options: junior college in the United States,

college in the United States, or professional baseball. As a corollary, MLB will most likely see a

dramatic decrease in age falsification and identity fraud cases. While there will always be

buscones and prospects willing to falsify documents for a large signing bonus, MLB should push

for academies like DRSEA to become more commonplace.

d. Change Rules of Academies

i. Use the English Soccer Model

One possible change to the academy structure that may help in curtailing age falsification

and identity fraud that is so rampant in the Dominican Republic would be to use an academy

system similar to English soccer.109 While the English soccer model applies only to domestic

                                                                                                                         106  See  generally  PUERTO  RICO  BASEBALL  ACADEMY  &  HIGH  SCHOOL  [hereinafter  “PRBAHS”],  available  at  http://www.prbahs.org/  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(outlining  the  purpose  and  mission  of  the  PRBAHS).  107  See  DRSEA,  supra  note  54.  108  Id.  109  See  generally  “US  Youth  Training  Systems  vs.  England”  [hereinafter  “English  Soccer  Academies”],  available  at  http://www.socceru.com/us_youth_soccer_training_vs_england_academy.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  

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prospects (and if a similar system were to be implemented by MLB it would apply to Dominican

prospects) it is worth examining nonetheless. First and foremost, note that this system would

allow MLB clubs to sign players younger than sixteen (16), which would require a change to the

current rules.

The English soccer system allows clubs to sign players to one year contracts between the

ages of six (6) and twelve (12).110 At the end of the year, the club and the player can part ways,

but if the player chooses to go to another club then the new club must pay the old club a transfer

fee to compensate for the time and effort invested into the player.111 At age thirteen (13), the

club can sign the player to either a two-year or a four-year contract, and at fifteen (15) the club

can sign the player to an additional two-year contract unless they are already on a four-year

deal.112 At seventeen (17), the best players leave school to sign a two-year apprenticeship, where

they start earning a living as full-time professionals.113 After this apprenticeship, at nineteen

(19), players are either signed on a normal professional contract or released.114 During this

thirteen (13) year period, “the academies are fully funded by the pro clubs . . . the players do not

pay a cent.”115

Every English Premier League Club116 must have an Academy operating according to a

strict set of rules.117 The objective is to ensure that players possess high skill level, and are

“schooled in proper self care, nutrition, character, and social skills.”118 “The goal is to produce

intelligent, skillful players who behave as professionals, can take care of themselves outside the

                                                                                                                         110  Id.  111  Id.  112  Id.  113  Id.  114  See  English  Soccer  Academies,  supra  note  58.  115  Id.  116  See  generally  ENGLISH  PREMIER  LEAGUE,  available  at  http://www.premierleague.com/  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011).  117  See  English  Soccer  Academies,  supra  note  58.  118  Id.  

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soccer field and who can seamlessly adjust to normal productive life after retiring from

playing.”119 While it may seem absurd for MLB clubs to sign a six (6) year-old prospect, this

system could benefit both the player and the club in the long run. “The pay back is theoretically

in the form of players developed for the first team or players sold to other clubs. Since the cost

of an average Premiership player is currently around $3M to $5M, all it takes to keep the

academy financially viable is produce one quality player per year or one exceptional player every

couple of years.”120

One of the main differences between the English system and the proposed Dominican

system would be that the kids in the English soccer academies live in close geographical

proximity to their academy.121 The kids attend their regular school, and train at the academy

with increasing regularity as they get older.122 This may be a struggle to implement in the

Dominican Republic, as many parents would not want their child living hours away from home.

However, many of the current MLB academies are located within an hour or two of the capital,

Santo Domingo, and this could prove to be a valuable change to the current system. If

Dominican kids were placed in the academies before signing professional contracts, and were

exposed to proper nutrition, professional coaching, and a formal education, this would prove to

be a win-win situation for all involved. Even the prospects that did not develop into professional

players would be left with an education and opportunities to succeed in life after baseball. The

MLB clubs, on the other hand, would have the opportunity to develop their own players from a

young age and could separate the prospects from the non-prospects, all the while giving back to

the country that has produced so much talent on the field.

                                                                                                                         119  Id.  120  Id.  121  Id.  122  Id.  

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There are challenges to implementing a system like this, and some modifications would

have to be made, but it is certainly worth a closer look and could help end the age falsification

and identity fraud issues currently plaguing MLB operations in the Dominican Republic.

e. Other Solutions to Consider

Finally, there are two other solutions that could help solve the operational problems in the

Dominican Republic. First, an international draft has been considered.123 Currently, amateur

players from only the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico are eligible for the MLB First-

Year player draft.124 Until 1990, Puerto Rican players were not subject to the MLB draft, and

baseball on the island flourished.125 Before Puerto Rico’s inclusion, players trained at academies

similar to the ones in the Dominican Republic, and they were free to test the market before

signing.126 After Puerto Rico’s inclusion in the draft, however, baseball academies virtually shut

down because the financial incentive to train players was gone. Some argue that a similar fate

would await the Dominican Republic if an international draft were to be instituted.127 By

instituting an international draft, MLB may curb the age falsification problem, and even

eliminate the buscones, but there may be no one left to train the players. In other words, by

solving some of the problems plaguing Dominican operations, MLB may actually dry-up the

talent pool.

                                                                                                                         123  See  generally  Mayo,  Jonathan,  International  Draft:  Easier  Said  Than  Done,  MLB.com  (Dec.  14,  2009,  1:00  AM),  http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091213&content_id=7805266&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(describing  the  pros  and  cons  of  an  international  draft).  124  Id.  125  See  generally  Sanchez,  Jesse,  Puerto  Rico  Wants  Out  of  the  Draft:  Island’s  Sport  Secretary  Proposes  10-­‐year  Hiatus,  MLB.com  (Sept.  12,  2007,  8:04  PM),  http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20070912&content_id=2204904&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(arguing  that  Puerto  Rican  baseball  was  better  off  before  the  Island’s  inclusion  in  the  MLB  draft).  126  Id.  127  See  generally  Hoffman,  Shawn,  Make  the  World  Go  ‘Round:  The  Sketchy  Economics  of  an  International  Draft,  BaseballProspectus.com  (Mar.  12,  2009),  http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=8612  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(describing  the  pros  and  cons  of  an  international  draft).  

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Lastly, some have argued that the international signing age should be increased from

sixteen (16) to eighteen (18).128 Advocates argue that doing so would alleviate some pressure on

these teenagers to support their families, and would remove the financial penalty MLB clubs

currently impose on prospects for being too old.129 In comparison, some argue that this will not

have any effect on the fraud issues in the Dominican Republic, as eighteen (18) will become the

new desirable age and the fraud will relate to eighteen (18) years of age instead of sixteen

(16).130 While both an international draft and increasing the signing age from sixteen (16) to

eighteen (18) are admirable proposals, each solution could create new problems in exchange for

solving old ones.

Conclusion

Over the last ten (10) years, MLB’s efforts at eradicating the age falsification and identity

fraud problems in the Dominican Republic have been fruitful. The number of fraudulent cases

has decreased, but with millions of dollars at stake and the percentage of fraud still around

twenty (20) percent, more needs to be done. DNA testing and bone scan procedures have proven

useful in revealing fraud, but each method is incomplete and may eventually be unlawful if

GINA is applied extraterritorially. Similarly, MLB’s efforts in the Dominican Republic are

producing positive results, but further increases in education and regulation need to be instituted

in order to completely rectify the problems on the island. “We need to change the direction of

                                                                                                                         128  See  generally  Arangure,  Jorge  Jr.,  Fixing  Dominican  Republic  Baseball,  ESPN.com,  available  at    http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3976098  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(proposing  solutions  to  the  problems  in  the  Dominican  Republic).  129  Id.  130  See  generally  Segura,  Melissa,  Alderson  Outlines  Plans  for  Improving  MLB’s  Dominican  Operation,  SI.com  (Mar.  18,  2010,  5:49  PM),  http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/melissa_segura/03/18/alderson.dominican/index.html  (last  visited  Apr.  20,  2011)(interviewing  Sandy  Alderson,  who  was  named  by  MLB  Commissioner  Bud  Selig  to  spearhead  efforts  to  clean  up  Dominican  operations).  

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what’s going on here [in the Dominican Republic]. Somebody has to do something. We need

help. Because I don’t see us solving it ourselves.”131

                                                                                                                         131  See  Baxter,  Kevin,  Dominican  Baseball  Prospects  Frequently  Play  Fast  and  Loose  With  the  Rules,  Los  Angeles  Times  (Sept.  22,  2009),  http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/22/sports/sp-­‐dominican-­‐baseball22/6  (last  visited  Apr.  28,  2011)(quoting  Eddy  Toledo,  Tampa  Bay  Rays  Director  of  Dominican  Operations).