Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises: Syrian ...

Download Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises: Syrian ...

Post on 01-Jan-2017

214 views

Category:

Documents

1 download

Embed Size (px)

TRANSCRIPT

<ul><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises: </p><p>Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy</p><p>Knowledge from the region, action for the region</p><p>Regional Case Study</p></li><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Crises: Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy Regional Case Study </p><p>1www.wanainstitute.org </p><p>ExecutivesummaryThe year 2014 saw the number of asylum-seekers, refugees and internally displaced persons exceed 50 milliongloballymorethanatanypointsincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar.Theinternationalrefugeeregime(thenormsandinstitutionsthathaveevolvedtocoordinateinternationalresponsestorefugeecrises)isstrugglingtodealwiththescaleandcomplexityofthisdisplacement.Hoststatesinrefugeeaffectedregionsareobligedbyinternationallawnottoforciblyreturnrefugeestoareaswheretheyfacethethreatofpersecution,yettheamountofinternationalaidavailabletosupportrefugeesandhostcommunitiesisnormallywoefullyinadequate.ThiscentralproblemisreflectedstarklyinthecurrentsituationofmanySyrianswhohavefoundrefugeinSyrias immediateneighbouringcountries.Therehavebeenchronic shortfalls in fundingsince thebeginningof theSyrian refugeecrisis,butas thesituationbecomesmoreprotracted the gaps in funding have become wider. This has placed increased pressure on refugees and hostcommunities,whooften feel that theyarebeingneglectedby the international community and left todealwith thesituationalone.Itisinthiscontextthatrefugeescancometobeperceivedasaneconomicburdenorevenathreattosecurityinthehoststate.</p><p>The threeorthodoxdurable solutions for addressingmassdisplacement (local integration, third country resettlementand repatriation) are failing to meet the challenges posed by global displacement. It is clear that new ways ofconceptualisingrefugeemanagementneedtobedevisedthatrespondtotheprioritiesofhoststates,theinternationalcommunity and refugees.Host states needmore and better options to encourage them to keep their borders open.Phrasedanotherway,ifrefugeesareunabletoreturnhome,andtheinternationalcommunityisunwillingtohosttheminlargenumbersorfinancethecostofhosting(atleastoverthelong-term),thenstatesmustbeofferedsolutionsthatworkfororare,atminimum,notcontrarytotheirnationalinterests.Thisimploresatransitiontoapproachesthatlookmorecloselyathoststateneedsandprioritiesinthefirstinstanceandthatcreatespacetocraftinnovativesolutions.</p><p>This paper proposes that refugees could be better conceptualised as embodying new opportunities, rather thanhardships,forhoststates.Indoingso,itposesthefollowingquestion:howmighthoststatesraisepoliciestomitigatethe negative impacts associatedwith refugee hosting, whilst simultaneously supporting their long-term security andeconomicpolicy goals?Thepaperbeginswitha comprehensiveoverviewof the currenteconomic trajectoriesof thecountriesneighbouringSyria,identifyingsomeofthemainstrengthsandweaknessesandtheoutlookforthefuture.Itthenconsiderstheimpacts,positiveandnegative,thattheSyrianrefugeesituationhashadonthesecountriesandwhatfurther impacts could ariseover the longer term. Finally, it explores someof theways inwhichhost state economicinterestsmightbereconciledwiththeimperativeofrefugeeprotectioninwaysthatcouldleadtomutualbenefitsforrefugeesandhostcommunities.</p><p>One clearoption is to view refugeesas a structural economicopportunity: toharness their skills andexpertiseasanassetforprivatesectorgrowth,withaviewtobothcreatingaself-sufficientpopulationandeffectingmacroeconomicpolicygoals.Chapter6detailssomebasicexamplesofhowthismightmaterialise:encouraginglarge-scaleinvestmentinmanufacturingandagricultureandcreatingemploymentopportunitiesforbothSyrianrefugeeandhostcountryworkersatpre-establishedratios.Thismodelhasthepotentialtoreducehostingcostsbyincreasingrefugeesself-sufficiencyinthe context of severe shortfalls in international humanitarian assistance.Moreover, itwould constitute an importantsteptowardshoststateslonger-termeconomicresiliencebypromotingstrategicinvestmentinunderdevelopedareasoftheeconomyandbyfacilitatingincreasedtaxrevenues.</p></li><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Crises: Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy Regional Case Study </p><p>2www.wanainstitute.org </p><p>IntroductionThecivilconflictinSyriaposesthemostcomplexandimmediatehumanitarianchallengetotheWestAsia-NorthAfrica(WANA) region. It is estimated that over half of the Syrian population has nowbeen forcibly displaced,with severalmillionhavingfledacrosstheborders intoneighbouringstates.Morethan2millionSyriansarecurrentlyregisteredinTurkey, and Lebanon has become the highest ranking country globally in terms of numbers of refugees per capita,closelyfollowedbyJordan.Thereareover249,000SyrianrefugeesintheKurdistanRegionofIraq,representingjustoneofmyriaddisplacementchallengesaffecting thisarea,andover134,000 inEgypt.1The scaleofdisplacementand theincreasingly protracted nature of the Syrian crisis are having a dramatic impact on the ability of host states andinternationalactorsaliketorespondeffectively.Theorthodoxapproachunderwhichrefugeecrisesaremanagedaroundtheglobefollowsapredictablesequence:hoststates,overwhelminglyintheso-calledglobalsouth,provideaprotectionspacewhilethecostsofrefugeehostingareborneby the international community.There isa serious flawwith thismodel,namely:whereas theexistenceof theperemptorynormofnon-refoulementobligeshoststatesnottoreturnarefugeetoterritorywheretheyfearagenuinethreatofpersecution,thereisnoequivalentonusofresponsibilityontheinternationalcommunityintheprocessesofburden-sharing.Whena crisis becomesprotracted, host states andhumanitarian agencies routinely face thedifficultsituationofhavingtocontinuetosupportadisplacedpopulationbut inacontextofdiminishingdonorcontributions.Thisimbalancebetweenprotectionandburden-sharingiscompoundedbythefactthat,inmosthoststatesintheglobalsouth,therearerestrictionsonrefugeesabilitytoentertheworkforce,exceptinveryspecificcases.Theresultisthatrefugees very often are caught in themiddle of the competing interests of host states and the various internationaldonors.Refugees predominantly rely on savings and assistance from humanitarian agencies. As these resources wain, morerefugeesmayseekworkintheinformalsector,wheretheyareexposedtoexploitation,unsafeworkingconditionsandotherrisks.Growthoftheinformalsectorhasnegativeimplicationsontheeconomicdevelopmentofthehoststate,byunderminingthetaxbase,distortingspendingandcompromisingtheruleoflaw.Thissituationfeedstheperceptionofrefugees as inherently burdensome. The three orthodox durable solutions for addressing mass displacement (localintegration,thirdcountryresettlementandrepatriation)arefailingtomeetthechallengesposedbyglobaldisplacementandhencealternativesolutionsneedtoevolve.Inrecognisingthesefactors,theWANAInstitutehassoughttore-frametheproblemandproposenewapproaches to refugeemanagement. For instance,howmight thepresenceof a largerefugeepopulationcometobereconceivedasagenuineopportunityforthehoststate?Whatscopeisthereforgreaterinclusion of refugees in the economic development of host states inways thatwould also yield tangible benefits torefugees themselves? Might it even be possible to harness refugees skills and expertise on a larger scale to effecttransformationalchangevis--visthehoststatesmacroeconomicdevelopmentgoals?</p><p>1UNHCRetal,3RPRegionalProgressReport(2015)at24November2015.</p></li><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Crises: Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy Regional Case Study </p><p>3www.wanainstitute.org </p><p>1:Turkeyseconomy:anoverviewTurkeyisanupper-middleincomeeconomythatiswell-regardedasoneofthefastestgrowingeconomiesintheworld.Despite large domestic energy consumption and a lack of abundant natural resources such as oil and gas, theGrossDomestic Product (GDP) in Turkey stood at USD799.54 billion in 2014, positioning it as the sixth largest economy inEuropeandeighteenthintheworld.23WithaGDPpercapitaofUSD8871.91in2014(anall-timehigh),Turkeyisgloballyidentifiedasanewlyindustrialisedeconomyoranemergingmarketeconomy.4</p><p>Turkeyseconomyisperhapsmostnotableforundergoingaprofoundtransformationthatcommencedinthe1970sandgave rise to the solid growth trajectory upon which its current successes are built. Much can be attributed to anambitiousqualitativeleapthatwasmadeinthecountrysmanufacturingsector.Intheyearsbetween1990and2014,Turkeyspercapitaincomenearlytripled,whilethetotaleconomyexpanded110percent.5 Theaveragegrowthrateinthelastdecadewasaround5percent,thefastestamongtheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD) economies, which grew at an average of 1.7 percent.6 Fundamental reforms carried out after 2001 allowedTurkeys financial sector to remain relatively strong during the global economic crisis. As the rest of Europe wasgrappling,theTurkisheconomyexpandedby9.2percentin2010,and8.5percentin2011.7Moreover,Turkeywastheonlymember state of theOECD that did not provide public sector support to the banking sector in thewakeof theglobal financialcrisis.8Awell-articulatedandwell-implementeddevelopmentplancontinuestocontributetoTurkeyscommendableregionalandglobaleconomicposition.Insum,andinthewakeofcross-bordereconomicslowdownsandrefugeecrises,Turkeyservesasausefulmodeltolearnfrom,butalsoonethatcanbeimprovedandbuiltupon. </p><p>Likeanyotheremergingeconomy,Turkeysimpressiveeconomicconditionsarecoupledwithchallenges.Theseriesofeventsthatoccurredin2012,bothinternallyandexternally,revealedthattheTurkisheconomicsuccessstoryisnotasresilientasoncepresumed.9Afterbeingamongtheworldsfastestgrowingeconomiesin2011,thecountryplungedintoweakergrowthandhigherspending,andgrowthfelltojustunderthreepercentin2014.10Thiscanbeattributedtoacombinationofdomesticfactorslikecorruptionscandalsandmismanagementcoupledwithexternalevents,suchastheEurozone crisis andmassive refugee influx. In order to decipher which of these factors contribute themost to thefragility of Turkish economic performance, it is first important to understand what drives the Turkish economy, thecomponentsofitsbalancesheet,thechallengesitneedstoovercome,andthedirectionitneedstobetakinginordertosustainthesuccessfulpoliciesthathavecontributedtotheTurkisheconomicmiracle.</p><p>MainIncomings</p><p>Industrialandmanufacturingactivity2Turkey:latestkillerfactsabouttheeconomy(2014)UKForeignandCommonwealthOfficeat5November2015.3TurkeyGDP(2015)TradingEconomicsat10November2015.4TurkeyGDPpercapita(2015)TradingEconomics</p></li><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Crises: Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy Regional Case Study </p><p>4www.wanainstitute.org </p><p>Turkeysstatusasanewlyindustrialisedeconomyisderivedfromthestrongandcompetitivemanufacturingsectorithas built for itself. While the sector made considerable progress in the 1960s and 70s, it remained mostly inward-orientedwithfewexports.11Ironically, industrialelitesatthetimewereopposedtoeconomicintegrationwithEuropeforfearthattheywouldnotbeabletocompetewithEuropeanproducts.12However,theeconomiccrisisthecountryendured in theendof the1970s instigatedmorecompetitiveand liberaleconomicpolicies, includingthoseaimedatdrivingexports.13Totalexportsincreasedfromlessthan3billiondollarsin1980to20billiondollarsin1990,andmorethan100billiondollarsin2007,whereasexportsasapercentageofGDProsefromlessthan3percentin1980tomorethan25percent in 2007. Critically, almost all of this increasewasdue to the rise in exports ofmanufactured goods;manufacturedgoodsasapercentageoftotalexportsrosefromabout35percent in1979tomorethan95percent in2007.14 Today, the manufacturing industry is one of the main drivers of the Turkish economy, accounting for 24.2percentof totalGDP.15 Improvements inmanufacturingqualityandcompetitivenessmean that thesegoodscompetewithAmerican,EuropeanandJapaneseproducts.</p><p>Turkeysexport volumestoodatUSD157.6billion in2014,more thanquadrupling since2002.16Basicmetalshad thehighest share in total manufacturing exports with 20 percent, followed by textiles and apparel at 18 percent.17 Thetextile and clothing industrywas the first industrial sector thatdeveloped in Turkey. Theestablishmentof a customsunionwiththeEuropeanUnionin1995,allowedittogrowtomakeitthelargestmanufacturingsubsectorinTurkeyinterms of production and employment, Europes largest textilemanufacturer, and the fourth largest producer in theworld.18Many of theworldsmajor textile brands such as Esprit, H&amp;M, Hugo Boss, S. Oliver, Adidas, Nike and Zarasource their clothing from Turkey. Turkeys textile industry employs an estimated 2.5 million people and providesindirectjobsfor6.5millionothers.Thesub-industryalonecontributesaround10percentoftheGDP.19</p><p>Turkey is theworlds sixteenth largestmanufacturerof commercial vehiclesandbuses.20 In2012,1.1millionvehicleswereproduced,66percentofwhichwereexported.21Today,17companiesincludingFiat,Honda,Hyundai,RenaultandToyota,Mercedes-BenzandM.A.Narebased inTurkey. It alsoprovidesautoparts forbrands suchasGM,Mercedes,BMW,Opel,Toyota,FiatandFord.22TurkeyisalsoEuropeslargesthomeappliancesandTVmanufacturer;VestelandBekomakinguphalfofallTVsetsmanufacturedinEurope.23</p><p>An export that deserves particular attention within Turkeys manufacturing sector is its homegrown arms industry.WhiletraditionallyledbytheUnitedStates,Turkey(alongwithChinaandtheCzechRepublic)nowsitatthetopofthelistoftheworld'stopsmallarmsexporters.24Turkey-basedDefenseandAerospaceIndustryExporters'Association(SSI)announced that Turkeys defense exports reached USD1.4 billion in 2013, a 10 percent increase from the previous</p><p>11SPamuk,Globalization,industralizationandchangingpoliticsinTurkeyNewPerspectivesonTurkey(2008)267.12CKarayalcin,RomeswithoutEmpires:UrbanConcentration,PoliticalCompetitionandEconomicGrowth,(2011)34.13SPamuk,aboven11,p26814Ibid.15TheManufacturingIndustryinTurkey(2014)InvestmentSupportandPromotionAgencyofTurkeyat10November2015.16Ibid.17EconomicComplexityofTurkey(2013)TheObservatoryofEconomicComplexityat10November2015.18EuromoneyInstitutionInvestorCompany,TurkeyTextileandClothingSectorReport,(2013)at12November2015.19LBosscher,MappingTurkeysApparelandTextileIndustry(2013)DutchCultureat12November.20UKForeignandCommonwealthOffice,aboven2.21Ibid.22Ibid.23Ibid.24TurkeyandChinaamongmajorsmallarmsexporters:UN,HurriyetDailyNews,(Istanbul)17June2014at12November2015.</p></li><li><p>Forging New Strategies in Protracted Crises: Syrian Refugees and the Host State Economy Regional Case Study </p><p>5www.wanainstitute.org </p><p>year.25Accordingtothesamesource, in2012,60percentofpartsinTurkishdefenseequipmentwerelocallysourced,comparedto25percentin2003.Turkeynowimportsonly10percentofitsequipmentfromforeignsuppliers.26</p><p>Agriculturalactivity</p><p>WhilehistoricallyTurkey's largestemployerandamajor contributor to the country'sGDP, theagricultural sectorhasdecreasedconsistentlyoverthepastfewdecades.AgricultureasapercentageofGDPwasalmost50percentin1950,decreasingto25percentin1980,15.3percentin1990,11percentin2005,andfinallyto8percentin2014.27Thishascauseda (natural) fall intheeconomicstandardsof farmersandcontributedtoemigrationfromrural tourbanareas.Today,agricultureemploysaroundaquarteroft...</p></li></ul>

Recommended

View more >