Foreign Policy Crises: Case Studies and Theory BuildingAlan C. Lamborn

Review by Alan C. Lamborn

Department of Political Science, Colorado State University

Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making. By Barbara Rear-den Farnham. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 313 pp., $39.50 (ISBN:0-691-01158-3).

Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Deci-sion Making. By Patrick J. Haney. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.183 pp., $39.50 (ISBN: 0-472-10704-6).

In Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis and Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises, BarbaraFarnham and Patrick Haney demonstrate a shared interest in foreign policy crisesand a common commitment to case study analysis in theory building. The waythey pursue this common agenda is, however, quite different. In Roosevelt and theMunich Crisis Farnham uses primary and secondary sources to construct a theoreti-cally driven case history showing how the Munich crisis affected Franklin Roose-velt’s understanding of the threat posed by Nazi Germany. This approach enablesher to place the theoretical focus squarely on how international-, domestic-, andindividual-level factors interact with each other. In Organizing for Foreign Policy Cri-ses Haney’s approach differs in two fundamental ways. First, he attempts to addressthe well-known problems of using case studies to draw theoretical inferences byconstructing a case-survey method in which case histories are coded and examinedfor theoretically significant patterns. Second, he attempts to identify a set of casesthat are similar in terms of strategic and domestic incentives so that he can, ineffect, hold these variables constant and focus on one detailed piece of the puzzle:variations in the ways presidents structure their advisory groups.

Given these differences, it is not surprising that these books speak to two ratherdifferent audiences. Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis is a significant contribution toour historical understanding of U.S. foreign policymaking on the escalating Euro-pean crisis between 1936 and 1939. It also speaks to the growing theoretical con-versation about international-domestic linkages (Gourevitch 1978; Lamborn 1985;Putnam 1988; Lamborn 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Evans et al.1993; Ray 1995; Milner 1997). Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises will be of particularinterest to scholars who have followed the evolution of Alexander George’s con-cept of “structured, focused comparisons” (George 1979; George and McKeown1985) and those who are interested in how variation in the management of advi-sory groups affects the quality of decision making. Scholars doing work specificallyon crises are likely to find both books interesting but of less theoretical value thanthey might expect. Haney pays careful attention to what he means by a crisis, add-ing Michael Brecher’s (Brecher 1978; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1989) conditionthat there be a “high likelihood that force will be used” to Charles Hermann’s(1969a, 1969b) classic requirements that there be a threat to core values, surprise,and little time to respond. Farnham offers some intriguing speculations about the

Mershon International Studies Review (1998) 42, 346–351

© 1998 The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University.Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

connections between the fears created by the Munich crisis, the likelihood thatdecision makers will frame decisions in terms of avoiding losses rather than achiev-ing gains, and the relevance of prospect theory. Neither author, however, pursuesthe conceptual and theoretical issues involved in crises systematically enough tocontribute significantly to that particular literature.

In Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, Farnham argues that understanding Roose-velt’s response to the developing crisis in Europe involves two puzzles—one his-torical and the other theoretical. The historical puzzle centers on questions offact : what exactly were Roosevelt’s views and actions before, during, and after theMunich crisis? The theoretical puzzle focuses on questions of explanation: why didRoosevelt choose the course he did? As for the historical puzzle, Farnham seesthree large phases in the evolution of Roosevelt’s understanding of the Europeansituation and in the ways he tried to manage domestic and international incen-tives. In the first phase, from his inauguration in 1933 through the end of 1935,Roosevelt was worried about developments in Europe but was far more interestedin focusing his efforts on domestic issues. This overarching preference was rein-forced by the way in which he read the international strategic context. Rooseveltrejected the isolationists’ call for achieving peace and security through a combina-tion of withdrawal and, when action was necessary, unilateralism. But for Rooseveltthe international incentives to act were not strong enough to divert him fromproblems at home. Two reasons stand out. First, he was unsure whether the situa-tion in Europe would create an inescapable security threat to the United States.Second, if he had to act against the dictators, Roosevelt preferred to act in coali-tion with the two principal democracies: Britain and France. Given that their inde-cisive foreign policies foreclosed the possibility of effective coordination, Rooseveltstayed on the sidelines.

The second period, from 1936 through the Munich crisis in September 1938,was, Farnham argues, the watershed in “Roosevelt’s transition from a domestic toan international focus” (p. 47). The events of 1936—the Ethiopian war, the remili-tarization of the Rhineland, and the Spanish civil war—radically increased Roose-velt’s sense that he needed to act. Nonetheless, he was still unsure of Hitler’sultimate intentions and of the extent to which he could reliably work with Britainand France. Consequently, in 1936 and the first half of 1937, he experimentedwith a series of policies designed to reveal German, British, and French intentions.Some of his schemes were designed to see if cooperation with the dictators waspossible; others were designed to see if the French and the British were willing toact in concert to isolate the dictators. In the summer of 1937, having found itimpossible to build an international coalition among the democracies in supportof embargoes and other actions to deter and contain the dictators, Rooseveltbegan an education campaign within the United States about the growing interna-tional danger and the possibility that the United States might need to act.Although this education campaign ignited strong criticism from isolationists, Farn-ham makes the subtle but significant point that the domestic controversy did notconstrain Roosevelt because he had not yet settled on a diplomatic strategy. Thatindecision partly reflected continued uncertainty about Hitler’s intentions, but ithad even more to do with his conclusion that the United States could do little aslong as Britain followed a strategy of appeasement (pp. 73–74). In sum, “beforethe Munich crisis the gap between what he felt he could do politically and what hewished to do was never very large” (p. 49).

Munich fundamentally changed Roosevelt’s perception of the internationalstrategic situation and its implications for constituency politics and coalition build-ing in the United States. Even though Roosevelt and his advisers were briefly

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euphoric that the British and the French had found a way to avoid immediate war,the documentary record reveals that within seven or eight days after Munich, Roo-sevelt had concluded that Hitler’s actions revealed a set of fundamentally incom-patible intentions. What was it about Munich that affected Roosevelt soprofoundly? “It was primarily Hitler’s unconcealed disdain for the processes ofaccommodation that are the essence of democratic politics” (p. 163). Roosevelt,Farnham stresses, had never doubted that Germany had the capability—the eco-nomic and military resources—to be a threat to the United States. The questionfor Roosevelt had been how Hitler intended to use those capabilities. Munichanswered that question (p. 166).

Having achieved closure on his understanding of the international situation,Roosevelt, in the third phase, developed a response that was designed to bridgedomestic and international incentives and constraints. The strategy he pur-sued—aiding the democracies, principally through increased aircraft produc-tion—was not ideal, whether viewed from a strictly diplomatic or a strictlydomestic perspective. A purely diplomatic explanation would predict more sus-tained and significant efforts to counterbalance Hitler. A purely domestic explana-tion would predict isolation. Roosevelt’s choice makes sense only when one placeshis perception of the stakes involved within the linked international and domesticcontexts that he faced (pp. 7, 215). “Roosevelt chose to aid the democraciesbecause it was the one policy that would work both substantively and politically, inthe long run as well as the short” (p. 223). Because his post-Munich policiesaddressed both his diplomatic and domestic objectives, Roosevelt was willing totake far greater political risks to achieve and sustain them.

Farnham’s interpretation of the historical puzzle shows a keen, albeit implicit,theoretical grasp of the politics of strategic choice (Bueno de Mesquita 1994;Lebow 1996; Axelrod 1997; Lamborn 1997). She recognizes how crucial the per-ceived compatibility of preferences was to Roosevelt’s assessment of Germany’smilitary and economic capabilities. Beliefs about the importance of establishinglegitimate relationships play a critical role in her interpretation of Roosevelt’sreaction to Hitler’s behavior at Munich and his estimate of the chances for achiev-ing a mutually acceptable relationship. She pays attention to the role of time hori-zons and the importance of finding reinforcing short- and long-term incentives foracting. Finally, her entire enterprise recognizes that foreign policymakers sit at thejuncture of international and domestic politics. She is, therefore, sensitive to thevarying mixes of international and domestic incentives, and to the ways actorsrespond to the risks they confront.

Although Farnham’s implicit theory is quite sophisticated, her explicit theoreti-cal argument is less persuasive. She sees four basic approaches to choice: (1) ananalytical approach (an apparent synonym for rational choice), which stresses try-ing to achieve the greatest utility “by comparing all known alternatives to a fixedstandard of value and trading off, sacrificing some values to serve others”; (2) anintuitive approach, which assumes that decision makers “are driven by the desirefor simplicity and/or consistency”; (3) a motivational approach, which assumes thatdecision makers are “dominated by a need to preserve emotional well-being”; and(4) a political approach, which assumes that decision makers are “driven by theneed for acceptability, [and] characteristically deal with competing objectives bytrying to reconcile them” (pp. 14–15). The political approach obviously ends upfitting the historical pattern in this case, but the two critical differences betweenthe political and the analytical approaches seem arbitrary. Stipulating that analytical(rational choice) approaches seek maximization through trade-offs is arbitrarybecause value-maximizers will only trade off if they perceive no way to achieve all

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the goals they seek. Moreover, placing the concern for legitimate relationships andthe issue of acceptability only in the political model arbitrarily restricts rationalchoice approaches to cases in which coalition building and social choice areunnecessary. Finally, the cameo appearance of prospect theory (pp. 92, 120ff) rep-resents more an argument by assertion than a well-supported critique of the abilityof rational-choice approaches to explain the impact of Munich on Roosevelt’sdecision making. Although it is plausible that Roosevelt framed Munich in termsof losses rather than net gains, it is equally possible that Munich provided convinc-ing evidence of Hitler’s intentions and, hence, the nature of the game. Farnhamherself repeatedly stresses that Roosevelt’s approach was a rational, open-mindedsearch for information about intentions and possible strategic responses (pp. 132,134, 135–136). Consequently, despite Farnham’s impressive historiographic skilland implicit theoretical sophistication, her explicit theoretical framework remainsdistinctly unpersuasive.

In Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises Patrick Haney takes a quite different tack inanalyzing crisis and foreign policy choice. Haney’s goal is to explore the impact ofmanagement structures on the quality of foreign policymaking processes. His realinnovation, however, is the development of a methodological extension of Alexan-der George’s concept of structured, focused comparison: a case-survey researchdesign.

Haney is intrigued by the possibility that different types of advisory structuresmay affect the quality of decision making. To explore that possibility, he choosesnine cases, codes them for the type of advisory structure in place, and evaluates sixaspects of the decision-making process.

Haney’s nine cases include two from the Truman administration (Berlin in 1948and Korea in 1950), two from the Eisenhower administration (Indochina in 1954and Suez in 1956), two from the Johnson administration (Tonkin Gulf in 1964 andtwo phases in decision making around the Tet offensive in 1968), two from theNixon administration (the 1970 and 1973 Middle Eastern crises), and one fromthe Bush administration (Panama in 1989). He argues that a survey of these casescreates an intermediate strategy for exploring theoretical issues that combines theadvantages of George’s structured, focused comparison and large-n studies. In par-ticular, Haney is looking for a way to deal with the threats to internal validity thatundercut case study analyses while retaining the case detail that is usually lost inlarge-n studies (p. 38).

The cases Haney selects are intended to be comparable in all respects exceptthe structure of the advisory systems. He uses six criteria for picking cases: (1) therole of allies is small, so the cases can be treated as unilateral decisions by theUnited States; (2) the nature of the crises is roughly comparable; (3) the oppo-nents are roughly commensurable (and, when they are not, differences can beexplicitly taken into account); (4) the strategic contexts are comparable; (5) thepoints within the presidential term at which the crises took place are comparable;and (6) the crises involve instances in which the president sought advice (pp.40–42). Haney acknowledges that two of the most important criteria (2 and 4) arethe hardest to meet, which significantly limits the confidence one can place in hisinferences (pp. 42–43).

Haney then codes the advisory structures in the nine cases. He uses an existingmanagement typology based on three “ideal” types: (1) a formal model in which aclear hierarchy and a structured staff system are designed to guarantee thoroughanalysis and a presentation of options that will minimize the drain on the presi-dent’s time; (2) a competitive model in which the president facilitates an open andunstructured discussion through which advisers offer competing arguments; and

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(3) a collegial model in which the president coordinates a team motivated by thenorm of consensus.

According to Haney, Truman used advisory structures that were formal andhierarchical. Eisenhower, on the other hand, created a hybrid of the formal andcompetitive approach in which he encouraged debate, used informal channels toget additional information, and created new groups when necessary to get addi-tional options. Johnson preferred a formal-collegial hybrid that stressed consen-sus, until the failure of U.S. policy in the Tet offensive led him to create a newgroup that was instructed to take a fresh look. Nixon preferred a formal hierarchi-cal model but was willing to delegate responsibility to Henry Kissinger to makedecisions. Bush preferred a “do-it-yourself” collegial formalism in which a smallgroup of trusted advisers were given responsibility for delegated tasks in the areasof their expertise.

Finally, Haney codes the quality of the decision-making processes in the ninecases across six dimensions: (1) the comprehensiveness and quality of the analysisof the objectives to be achieved; (2) the canvass of alternative policy responses; (3)the initial search for information; (4) how well new information is processed dur-ing the crisis; (5) the evaluation of the costs, risks, and implications of preferredchoices; and (6) the development of plans for implementation, monitoringresults, and dealing with contingencies (p. 48). Haney finds that the decision-making process under Eisenhower and Nixon generally worked well across all sixdimensions. The pre-Tet Johnson administration was at the other extreme; thestress on consensus produced a very poor process across most of the dimensions.The Truman administration was the “next worse.” Although Truman and his advis-ers did well on the search for information (dimensions 3 and 4), far too littleattention was paid to the other three dimensions. Next up the list was the Bushadministration, which Haney judges to have done far too little on dimensions 1and 2 but to have performed satisfactorily on the remaining four (pp. 114ff).

Haney reaches two conclusions. First, “there is no obvious, direct relationshipbetween a particular advisory structure and the decision process that results. Themanagement models do not seem to have predictable results; nor do they haveinherent advantages” (p. 125). Second, learning, indicated by changes in advisorystructures, only appears to happen if something goes obviously wrong (p. 135).

The first of Haney’s findings is a null result; the second is unsurprising. None-theless, the paucity of results does nothing to undercut the thoughtful and funda-mentally constructive intellectual style that informs Organizing for Foreign PolicyCrises. Haney is on to something in his effort to use multiple case studies to bridgethe strengths of case analysis and large-n studies. Moreover, the conscientious andintellectually honest way in which he makes his arguments contributes to thematuring of a debate that is far too often gratuitously nasty.

References

Axelrod, Robert. (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brecher, Michael. (1978) A Theoretical Approach to International Crisis Behavior. Jerusalem Journal ofInternational Relations 3 (2–3):5–24.

Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. (1989) Crisis, Conflict, and Instability. New York: Perga-mon.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. (1994) Political Forecasting: An Expected Utility Model. In European Com-munity Decision Making, edited by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans Stokman. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press.

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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. (1992) War and Reason: Domestic and International Im-peratives. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Evans, Peter, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam, eds. (1993) Double-Edged Diplomacy. Berkeley:University of California Press.

George, Alexander. (1979) Case Studies and Theory Development : The Method of Structured FocusedComparison. In Diplomacy, edited by Paul Lauren. New York: Free Press.

George, Alexander, and Timothy McKeown. (1985) Case Studies and Theories of OrganizationalDecision-Making. In Advances in Information Processing in Organizations. Volume 2. Edited by RichardF. Coulam and Robert A. Smith. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Gourevitch, Peter. (1978) The Second Image Reversed. International Organization 32:881–911.Hermann, Charles. (1969a) Crises in Foreign Policy. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.Hermann, Charles. (1969b) Crisis as a Situational Variable. In International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed-

ited by James N. Rosenau. Revised edition. New York: Free Press.Lamborn, Alan C. (1985) Risk and Foreign Policy Choice. International Studies Quarterly 29:385–410.Lamborn Alan C. (1991) The Price of Power. Boston: Unwin Hyman.Lamborn, Alan C. (1997) Theory and the Politics in World Politics. International Studies Quarterly

41:187–214.Lebow, Richard Ned. (1996) The Art of Bargaining. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Milner, Helen. (1997) Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.Putnam, Robert. (1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. International Organization 42:427–460.Ray, James Lee . (1995) Democracy and International Conflict. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

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