FMIFRP 12-110

Fighting on Guadalcanal

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 129921 00

FMIFRP 12-110

Fighting on Guadalcanal

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 129921 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-1 10, Fighting on Guadalcanal, is published to en-sure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine orto be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category of pub-lications: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication is essentially the after-action report of the Marines and soldiers who foughtand defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Published initially in 1943, this publication was commissionedby General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Guadalcanal was the first offensiveground campaign conducted against the Japanese in World War II. Both Marines and soldiers were veryinexperienced, and Guadalcanal proved to be the critical learning experience on how to meet and defeata tenacious and proficient enemy in very difficult terrain under most adverse conditions. Viewpoints andsuggestions came from every level within the First Marine Division and the Army's America! Division.The focus, however, is at the small-unit level where the experiences of the combatants are very vivid andvery personal. Interesting and instructional, it is a book which every Marine should read and absorb themany experiences highlighted.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF TFLE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. AULILDMajor General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, MAGTF Warfighting CenterMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14012992100

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-110, Fighting on Guadalcanal, is published to en-sure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine orto be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category of pub-lications: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication is essentially the after-action report of the Marines and soldiers who foughtand defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Published initially in 1943, this publication was commissionedby General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Guadalcanal was the first offensiveground campaign conducted against the Japanese in World War II. Both Marines and soldiers were veryinexperienced, and Guadalcanal proved to be the critical learning experience on how to meet and defeata tenacious and proficient enemy in very difficult terrain under most adverse conditions. Viewpoints andsuggestions came from every level within the First Marine Division and the Army's Americal Division.The focus, however, is at the small-unit level where the experiences of the combatants are very vivid andvery personal. Interesting and instructional, it is a book which every Marine should read and absorb themany experiences highlighted.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF TITLE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. AULILDMajor General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, MAGTF Warfighting CenterMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14012992100

FOREWORD

of viewmen in the Solomon Islands, Lt. Colonel

P. Reeder, Jr., of the Operations Di-vision of the War Department General Staff,was designated a my personal representative.He reported to Major General Vandegrift,

Maj or4..rmy, on Guadalcanal, and discussed withmany officers and soldiers thei.r experiences injungle fighting against the Japanese.

The stories of these men as told to ColonelReeder have been printed for your informa-tion. The American Marines and Dough-boys show us that the Jap is no superman.He is a. tricky, vicious, and fanatical fighter.But they are beating him clay after day.Their's is a priceless record of the gallantryand resourcefulness of the American fightingman at his best.

Soldiers and officers alike should read thesenote.s and seek t.o apply their lessons. Wemust cash in on the experience which theseand other brave men have paid for in blood.

To secure the point.

Rus se 1

of the fighting

TI. S. NI. C., and General Patch, U. S.

FOREWORD

To secure the point of view of the fightingmen iii the Solomon Islands, Lt. Colonel

P. Reecier, Jr., of the Operationsvision of the War Department General Staff,was designated as my personal representative.He reported to Major General Vandegrift,TI. S. M. C., and Major General Patch, U. S.4imy, on Guadalcanal, and discussed withmany officers and soldiers their experiences mjungle fighting against the Japanese.

The stories of these men as told to ColonelReecler have been printed for your informa-tion. The Americanboys show us that the Jap is no superman.

vc ious,But they are beating him clay after day.Their's is a priceless record of the gallantryand resourcefulness of the American fightingman at his best.

Soldiers and officers alike should read theseapply their lessons.

must cash in on the experience which theseand other brave men have paid for in blood.

Russel Di-

He is a tricky,

Marines and Dough-

and fanatical fighter.

notes and seek t.o We

MAJOR GENERAL 1/ANDEGRIFT, Com-manding General First Marines Division.

"I desire to thank General. Marshall forthe message which he has just sent me. Ipassed this message of congratulations on tomy men.

"My message to the troops of General Mar-shall's in training for this type of warfareis to go back to the tactics of the French andIndian days. This is not meant facetiously.Study their tactics and. fit in our modernwea.pons, and you have a solution. I referto the tactics and leadership of the days ofROGER'S RAINGERS)'

(V)

MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT, Com-manding General First Marines Division.

"I desire to thank General. Marshall forthe message which he has just sent me. Ipassed this message of congratulations on tomy men.

"My message t.o the troops of General Mar-shall's in training for this type of warfareis to go back to the tactics of the French andIndian days. This is not meant facetiously.Study their tactics and fit in our modernwea.pons, and you have a solution. I referto the tactics and leadership of the days ofIROUER'S RANGERS

(V)

1

GUNNERY SERGEANT H. L. BEARDS-LEY, Company G, Fifth Marines.

"I been in the Marines 16 yeaTs, and I beenin three expeditions to China and five engage-ments since I have been in the Solomons. Iwill say that this 1942 model recruit. we aregetting can drink more water than six oldtimers. We have to stress water disciplineall t.he time. They don't seem to realize whatreal water discipline is. We have too manyNCO's in the Marines who are 'namby-pam-by' and beat around the bush. Our NCO'sare gradually toughening up and are seeingreasons why they must meet their re.ponsi-bilities. Respectfully speaking, Sir, I thinkthat when officers make a NCO, they shouldgo over in their miids, 'what kind of NCOwill he make in the field.' "

SERGEANT MAJOR B. METZGER, FifthMarines.

"I have just been promoted from FirstSergeant. In the fire fighting the MarineFirst, Sergeant 1elps the Company Corn-nandei. He checks up on tiic Comnpam

1

GUNNERY SERGEANT H. L. BEARDS-LEY, Company G, Fifth Marines.

"I been in the Marines 16 yeaTs, and I beenin three expeditions to China and five engage-ments since I have been in the Solomons. Iwill say that this 1942 model recruit. we aregetting can drink more water than six oldtimers. We have to stress water disciplineall t.he time. They don't seem to realize whatreal water discipline is. We have too manyNCO's in the Marines who are 'namby-pam-by' and beat around the bush. Our NCO'sare gradually toughening up and are seeingreasons why they must meet their responsi-bilities. Respectfully speaking, Sir, I thinkthat when officers make a NCO, they shouldgo over in their minds, 'what kind of NCOwill he make in the field.' "

SERGEANT MAJOR B. METZGER , FifthMarines.

"I have just been promoted from FirstSergeant. In the fire fighting the MarineFirst, Sergeant helps the Company Corn-nander. He checks up on tiic Comnpam

2

•a whole, even down to checking on the evacu-ation of the wounded. I was available to theCompany Commander for any emergency or-ders during the fire fight. Teach your sol-diers., Sir, that when a man is hit in the as-sault to leave him there. Too many of ourmen suddenly became first-aid men.

"Your men have to be rugged and rough,and to win they must learn to disregardpoliteness and must kill."

PLATOON SERGEANT H. IR. STRONG,Company A, Fifth Marines.

"Some of my men thought their handgrenades, were too heavy. They tossed themaside when no one was looking. Later theywould have given six month's pay for onehand. grenade.

"I hear that in the new jungle kits the menwill get water sterilizing tablets. These willhelp as my men dip water out of streams."

PLATOON SERGEANT F. T. O'FARA,Company B, Fifth Marines.

"After the Japs had been located, my pta-toon has gained the element of surprise bymoving in fast. with b.ayonets and handgrenades.

2

•a whole, even down to checking on the evacu-ation of the wounded. I was available to theCompany Commander for any emergency or-ders during the fire fight. Teach your SQl-diers, Sir, that when a man is hit in the as-sault to leave him there. Too many of ourmen suddenly became first-aid men.

"Your men have to be rugged and rough,and to win they must learn to disregardpoliteness and must kill."

PLATOON SERGEANT H. IR. STRONG,Company A, Fifth Marines.

"Some of my men thought their bandgrenades were too heavy. They tossed themaside when no one was looking. Later theywould have given six month's pay for onehand. grenade.

"I hear that iii the new jungle kits the menwill get water sterilizing tablets. These willhelp as my men dip water out of streams."

PLATOON SERGEANT F. T. O'FARA,Company B, Fifth Marines.

"After the Japs had been located, my pla-toon has gained the element of surprise bymoving in fast. with bayonets and handgrenades.

3.

"In turn, they have surprised us by beingin a defensive position on the reverse slopeof a ridge. I think the snipers look for BARmen." (Note by Col. Ecison: "No doubtabout this. In one engagement, in one pla-toon, every BAR. man was hit.")

PLATOON SERGEANT IR. A. ZTJLLO,Company C, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, I would like to tell you that a man'skeenness or dullness of eye may determinewhether or not he will live. Ten men in myplatoon were killed because they walked upon a Jap 37mm gun. I went up later, afterthe girn had been put out by our mortars, tohelp briiag back the dead. The Japanese gunwas so well camouflaged that I got withinfour feet of the gun before I saw it."

CORPORAL W. A. McCLTJSKEY, Com-pany D, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, the other day on 'Bloody Ridge,'riflemen protecting our light machine gunspulled out and left us. We were doing okayat the time, but their pulling out caused ourwhole outfit to withdraw. I think men inthese rifle companies should receive trainingin the work and in the mission of the ma-

3.

"In turn, they have surprised us by beingin a defensive position on the reverse slopeof a ridge. I think the snipers look for BARmen." (Note by Col. Ecison: "No doubtabout this. In one engagement, in one pla-toon, every BAR. man was hit.")

PLATOON SERGEANT IR. A. ZTJLLO,Company C, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, I would like to tell you that a man 'skeenness or dullness of eye may determinewhether or not he will live. Ten men in myplatoon were killed because they walked upon a Jap 37mm gun. I went up later, afterthe gun had been put out by our mortars, tohelp bring back the dead. The Japanese gunwas so well camouflaged that I got withinfour feet of the gun before I saw it."

CORPORAL W. A. McCLTJSKEY, Com-pany D, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, the other day on 'Bloody Ridge,'riflemen protecting our light machine gunspulled out and left us. We were doing okayat the time, but their pulling out caused ourwhole outfit to withdraw. I think men inthese rifle companies should receive trainingin the work and in the mission of the ma-

4

chine gun company. They should be ableto act more intelligently."

SECOND LIEUTENANT ANDREW CIII-SICK, Fifth Marines.

"I think that in the regimental supplythere should be extra canteens so when anoutfit gets in a place like the 'table plateau'where there is no water, an extra canteen ofwater can be issued. Sir, this would reallyhelp our men stay in there. (Note by Col.Edson: 'This idea is being used on certainparts of the terrain here. The turn-over inthe canteens will be great if this is continued,but it is a big help at times. At one time wehad a battalion without water for 24 hoursand only two men were evacuated by heat èx-haustion—Major Lou Walt was the BattalionCommander.') My flank men in each squadin the advance are responsible to maintaincontact with the squad on the right or left.Of course, we have a base squad."

MARINE GUNNER E. S. RUST, FifthMarines.

"I hate to admit it, but it's the truth; whenwe got here, a lot of our young men wereconfused at night. They were not used tojungle at night. They could not use their

4

chine gun company. They should be ableto act more intelligently."

SECOND LIEUTENANT ANDREW CIII-SICK, Fifth Marines.

"I think that in the regimental supplythere should be extra canteens so when anoutfit gets in a place like the 'table plateau'where there is no water, an extra canteen of• water can be issued. Sir, this would reallyhelp our men stay iii there. (Note by Col.Edson: 'This idea is being used on certainparts of the terrain here. The turn-over inthe canteens will be great if this is continued,but it is a big help at times. At one time wehad a battalion without water for 24 hoursand only two men were evacuated by heat èx-haustion—Major Lou Walt was the BattalionCommander.') My flank men in each squadin the advance are responsible to maintaincont.act with the squad on the right or left.Of course, we have a base squad."

MARINE GUNNER E. S. RUST, FifthMarines.

"I hate to admit it, but it's the truth; whenwe got here, a lot of our young men wereconfused at night. They were not used tojung'e at night. They could not use their

5

compasses at night, and we did not haveenough compasses.

"We have 'earned that when we get off thebeaten trails, it seems to confuse the Japs,and we have better success."

PLATOON SERGEANT J. C. L. HOL-LINGS WORTH, Company H, FifthMarines.

"When we move around on these jungletrails, we have learned to have men at therear of each platoon who carry light loadsso they can get their weapons into actionquickly to help overcome ambush fire fromthe rear.

"Put the big rugged men into the heavyweapons company.

"Some of our new men were so scared ofour hand grenades when they were first is-sued, that they jammed down the cotter pin.Then, later in actor they could not pull thepin!

"I noticed, and I pointed this out to my pla-toon, that when men get hit, the men close byget to yellin', 'Corps man, Corps man, Corpsman,' and they get so excited sometimes thatthey actually forget. to use first-aid packets.

"In first-aid traimng', teaeli cmTeCt use of1 fl 1 ( F (V

5

compasses at night, and we did not haveenough compasses.

"We have learned that when we get off thebeaten trails, it seems to confuse the Japs,and we have better success."

PLATOON SERGEANT J. C. L. HOL-LINGS WORTH, Company H, FifthMarines.

"When we move around on these jungletrails, we have learned to have men at therear of each platoon who carry light loadsso they can get their weapons into actionquickly to help overcome ambush fire fromthe rear.

"Put the big rugged men into the heavyweapons company.

"Some of our new men were so scared ofour hand grenades when they were first is-sued, that they jammed down the cotter pin.Then, later in actjor they could not pull t.hepin!

"I noticed, and I pointed this out to my pla-toon, that when men get hit, the men close byget to yellin', 'Corps man, Corps man, Corpsman,' and they get so excited sometimes thatthey actually forget. to use first-aid packets.

"In first-aid training', teach correct use of1 1 fl i1)' ii 1 ( F (V

6

'cause what you gonna do when the Corps mangets hits

"I'd give $75.00 for a pair of tennis shoesto rest my feet and for use in night work. Ihave only been in the Marine Corps fouryears, but I have learned that you have gotto develop a sense of responsibility in themen wearing chevrons.

"In action we. have had unauthorized per-sons yelling, 'Cease firing,' or 'Commencefiring..' This caused confusion."

PLATOON SERGEANT GEORGE E. AHO,Company F, Fifth Marines.

"I put five years in the U. .S. Army beforejoining the Marine Corps. Sir, I like theMarines better than the Army because theaverage Marine officer is closer to his menthan the average Army officer whom I ob-served. We have comradeship in the MarineCorps. Also, the Marine enlisted men aremore Spartan-like. I believe, Sir, we babyour soldiers too much in peace-time. I hopewe are not doing this now. (I asked

.

Col..Edson. what kind of NOO Sergeant AhO was,and he told me he was one of the outstandingmen in his Regiment, and that he was a. veryrugged individual.)

6

'cause what you gonna do when the Corps mangets hits

"I'd give $75.00 for a pair of tennis shoesto rest my feet and for use in night work. Ihave only been in the Marine Corps fouryears, but I have learned that you have gotto develop a sense of responsibility in themen wearing chevrons.

"In action we. have had unauthorized per-Sons yelling, 'Cease firing,' or 'Commencefiring..' This caused confusion."

PLATOON SERGEANT GEORGE E. AHO,Company F, Fifth Marines.

"I put five years in the U. .S. Army beforejoining the Marine Corps. Sir, I like theMarines better than the Army because theaverage Marine officer is closer to his menthan the average Army officer whom I ob-served. We have comradeship in the MarineCorps. Also, the Marine enlisted men aremore Spartan-like. I believe, Sir, we babyour soldiers too much in peace-time. I hopewe are not doing this now. (I asked

.

Col..Edson what kind of NCO Sergeant AhO was,and he told me he was one of the outstandingmen in his Regiment, and that he was a. veryrugged individual.)

7

"In our training for this jungle warfarewe had a great deal of work in hand-to-handindividual combat, use of ife, jiujItsu, etc.With the exception of bayonet fighting wehave not used this work. I have been inmany battles since I hit this island and Ihave never seen anyone use it.

"Bring back the siga1 flags; needed badly."Sir, tell the Army to get the knee mor-

tar. It's hell."Sir, every man should have a watch."We could use pack artillery here."Our Battalion Commander, Major Walt,

wants every last man in our Battalion toknow as much as he does about the situation.It pays.

"Get rid of the gold-bricks. It's better tobe short-handed having good men around thanhaving a lot of undependables."

CORPORAL J. S. STANKUS, CompanyFifth Marines.

"Unnecessary firing gives your positionaway, and when you give your position awayhere, you pay for it.

"It's helpful in using the field g'ass iii thistropical sun to cup your hand over the frontend in order to keep out the glare.

7

"In our training for this jungle warfarewe had a great deal of work in hand-to-handindividual combat, use of knife, jiujitsu, etc.With the exception of bayonet fighting wehave not used this work. I have been inmany battles since I hit this island and Ihave never seen anyone use it.

"Bring back the signal flags; needed badly."Sir, tell the Army to get the knee mor-

tar. It's hell."Sir, every man should have a watch."We could use pack artillery here."Our Battalion Commander, Major Walt,

wants every last man in our Battalion toknow as much as he does about the situation.It pays.

"Get rid of the gold-bricks. It's better tobe short-handed having good men around thanhaving a lot of undepeiadables."

CORPORAL J. S. STANKUS, CompanyFifth Marines.

"Unnecessary firing gives your positionaway, and when you give your position awayhere, you pay for it.

"It's helpful in using the field glass iii thistropical sun to cup your hand over the frontend in order to keep out the glare.

8

"The men in my squad fire low at the baseof the trees. There is too •much high firinggoing on. I have observed the Japs often getshort of ammunition. They cut bamboo andcrack it together to simulate rifle fire to drawour fire. They ain't supermen; they're justtricky bastards.

"Put 'bug dope' in your jungle equipment."A palmetto log looks sturdy for use in

machine gun emplacements and dugouts, butit is spongy and rots. I have seen it collapseand pin the gun. It is better to use the hardwood."

SECOND LIEUTENANT H. M. DAVIS,Fifth Marines.

(Promoted on the field of battle)."Travel light. For example, to hell with

the mess equipment! We used our mess cupand spoon for the first 15 days here and en-joyed our chow. You don't have to live likea gentleman in jungle warfare. Our messequipment is too bulky for this type of war-fare and makes noise.

"Not every man can lead a battalion. Findout who can lead your battalions before yougo into the combat areas. (Remark by Col.Edson: 'I would like to concur in that state-ment.')

8

"The men in my squad fire low at the baseof the trees. There is too much high firinggoing on. I have observed the Japs often getshort of ammunition. They cut bamboo andcrack it together to simulate rifle fire to drawour fire. They ain't .supermen; they're justtricky bastards.

"Put 'bug dope' in your jungle equipment."A palmetto log lOoks sturdy for use in

machine gun emplacements and dugouts, butit is spongy and rots. I have seen it collapseand pin the gun. It is better to use the hardwood."

SECOND LIEUTENANT H. M. DAVIS,Fifth Marines.

(IPrômotecl on the field of battle)."Travel light. For example, to hell with

the mess equipment! We used our mess cupand spoon for the first 15 days here and en-joyed our chow. You don't have to live likea gentleman in jungle warfare. Our messequipment is too bulky for this type of war-fare and makes noise.

"Not every man can lead a battalion. Findout who can lead your battalions before yougo into the combat areas. (Remark by Col.Edson: 'I would like to concur in that state-merit.')

9

"We learned from the Nips to make the'stand-up covered Japanese spider hole..'(Camouflaged American fox-ho'e.)

"In de'fense in t.he dense jung'e sometimesyou make a line—then, on other types of ter-rain you make strong points.

"In an advance in a jungle it is hard for aplatoon leader to keep control of his men.Corporals and their men must be taught toact indliviclually.''

PLATOON SERGEANT C. M. FEAGIN,Company I, Fifth Marines.

"We are learning the hard way to movequietly in this jungle.

"I have been fired at many times by snipersand haven't seen one yet.

"The sabers which the Japanese officerscarry have proved to .be worthless. I killedtwo Japs who came at me with sabers ana Igot them first by shooting them. But, Iwished I bad 'in reserve' a good jungle knife.I don't meati a bob, which we should havefor cutting trails, but a knife with a 12-inchblade of good steel. We could use thisagamst these Japs as well as cutting vinesthat catch on us at night" (Note: Manymen expressed their wish for a jungle knifesuch as described here. This desire is being

9

"We learned from the Nips to make the'stand-up covered [apanese spicier hole..'(Camouflaged American fox-hole.)

"In de'fense in t.he dense jungle sometimesyou make a line—then, on other types of ter-rain you make strong points.

"In an advance in a jungle it is hard for aplatoon leader to keep control of his men.Corporals and their men must be taught toact individually.''

PLATOON SERGEANT C. M. FEAGIN,Company I, Fifth Marines.

"We are learning the hard way to movequietly in this jungle.

"I have been fired at many times by snipersand haven't seen one yet.

"The sabers which the Japanese officerscarry have proved to .be worthless. I killedtwo Japs who came at me with sabers ana Igot them first by shooting them. But, Iwished I bad 'in reserve' a good jungle knife.I don't meati a bob, which we should havefor cutting trails, but a knife with a 12-inchblade of good steel. We could use thisagamst these Japs as well as cuttmg vinesthat catch on us at night.!' (Note: Manymen expressed their wish for a jungle knifesuch as described here. This desire is being

10

omitted in further remarks to avoid repeti-tion.)

MOTOR SECTION SERGEANT T. E.RIJMBLEY, Company I, Fifth Marines.

"Our 60mm mortars are fine weapons ifyou have observers who know their stuff. Themortar was not stressed enough in our training. I love our mortar.

"If the numbers on the mortar sight wereluminous, with a luminous strip on the stick,we would not have to use the flashlight. Thisflashlight business is dangerous."

CORPORAL FRED CARTER, Company 1,Fifth Marines.

"On the Matanikau River we got to firingat each other because of careless leadershipby the junior le.aders. We are curing our-selves of promiscuous firing, but I shouldthink new units would get training to makethe men careful.

"We learned not to ftre unless we had some-thing to shoot at; Doing otherwise disclosesyour position and wastes ammunition.

"Sergeant Dietrich of Company I, of ourRegiment, recently used his head. One nightwhen the Japs advanced, a Jap jumped into

10

omitted in further remarks to avoid repeti-tion.)

MOTOR SECTION SERGEANT T. E.RIJMBLEY, Company I, Fifth Marines.

"Our 60mm mortars are fine weapons ifyou have observers who know their stuff. Themortar was not stressed enough in our training. I love our mortar.

"If the numbers on the mortar sight wereluminous, with a luminous strip on the stick,we would not have to use the flashlight. Thisflashlight business is dangerous."

CORPORAL FRED CARTER, Company 1,Fifth Marines.

"On the Matanikau River we got to firingat each other because of careless leadershipby the junior le.aders. We are curing our-selves of promiscuous firing, but I shouldthink new units would get training to makethe men careful.

"We learned not to ftre unless we had some-thing to shoot at. Doing otherwise disclosesyour position and wastes ammunition.

"Sergeant Dietricli of Company I, of ourRegiment, recently used his head. One nightwhen the Japs advanced, a Jap jumped into

11

Sergeant Dietrich's fox hole. Sergeant Diet-rich pulled the pin of a hand grenade and.jumped out. There was a hell of an explosionand one less Nip.

"I have been charged twice by the Japs. inbayonet charge. Oir Marines can out-bayo-net fight them and I know our Army men wiUdo the same. (Note by Cot. Edson: 'mci-dentally, in the last push we executed. 3 bayo-net charges.')

"A Japanese trick to draw our fire was forthe hidden Jap to work his bolt back andforth. Men who got sucked in on this andfired without seeing what they were firing at,generally drew automatic fire from anotherdirection.

"Every scout should be taught to look inthe trees. I was a scout and. got shot in theshoulder by a Jap ix a tree. I look m thetrees now.

"We take turns being scouts; so, all shou'dbe trained as scouts."

SERGEANT 0. J. MARION, CompanyFifth Marines. A Platoon Guide.

"You crawl in the advance—unless you areto ehaige. aicl make it. The reason for thisis that. all men lit, are hit from the kimes

5í)(; 4G—42---——-2

11

Sergeant Dietrich's fox hole. Sergeant Diet-rich pulled the pin of a hand grenade and.jumped out. There was a hell of an explosionand one less Nip.

"I have been charged twice by the Japs. inbayonet charge. Our Marines can out-bayo-net fight them and I know our Army men willdo the same. (Note by CoL Edson: 'mci-dentally, in the last push we executed. 3 bayo-net charges.')

"A Japanese trick to draw our fire was forthe hidden Jap to work his bolt back and.forth. Men who got sucked in on this andfired without seeing what they were firing at,generally drew automatic fire from anotherdirection.

"Every scout should be taught to look inthe trees. I was a scout and got shot in theshoulder by a Jap in a tree. I look in thetrees now.

"We take turns being scouts; so, all shouldbe trained as scouts."

SERGEANT 0. J. MARION, CompanyFifth Marines. A Platoon Guide.

"You crawl in the advance—unless you areto charge. and make it. The reason for thisis that all men hit. are hit from the knees

í)(; 4G—42---——-2

12

up, except for ricochets. We have craw'edup to within 25 yards of a machine gun fir-ing over our backs. The Japs don't depresstheir machiiie guns. (Note by Col., Ecison:'I saw men of Company L doing this.')

"Men get killed rushing to help a woundedman. If. the wounded man would crawlabout t.en yards to his flank, he can generallybe aided in safety, as the Japs seem to firedown lanes in the jungle. (Remark bj Col,Edson: 'We have taught our men that thebest way to aid a wounded man is to. pushahead so that the wounded man can be caredfor by the Corps Men.)

"The men have to be trained individually,for. when t.he fire fight starts, the Corporalcan't see all of his men and further, whenthe order for attack is given, any number ofmen are unable to see the man, on his rightor left. So you see, Sir, it takes guts formen to get up and move forward when thesignal is given. The men have to depend onone another and have confidence in .eachother.

"I was in one advance when the Japs letus come through and' then rose up out ofcovered fox holes and shot us in the back.The best cure for that is a rear guard look-ing towards the rear."

12

up, except for ricochets. We have crawkdup to within 25 yards of a machine gun fir-ing over our backs. The Japs don't cleprestheir machine guns. (Note by Col., Ecison:'I saw men of Company L doing this.')

"Men get killed rushing to help a woundedman. If. the wounded man would crawlabout ten yards to his flank, he can generallybe aided in safety, as the Japs seem to firedown lanes in the jungle. (Remark by Col,Edson: 'We have taught our men that thebest way to aid a wounded man is to. pushahead so that the wounded man can be caredfor by the Corps Men.)

"The men have to be trained individually,for. when the fire fight starts, the Corporalcan't see all of his men 'and further, whenthe order for attack is given, any number ofmen are unable to see •the man, on his rightor left. So you see, Sir, it takes guts formen to get up and move forward when thesignal is given. The men have tO depend onone another and have confidence in •eachother.

"I was in one advance when the Japs letus come through and then rose up out ofcovered fox boles and shot us in the back.The best cure for that is a rear guard look-ing towards the rear."

13

CORPORAL E. J. BYRNE, Company L,Fifth Marines.

"Get used to weird noises at night. Thisjungle is not still at night. The land crabsand lizzards make a hell of a noise rustlingon leaves. And there is a bird here thatsounds like a man banging two blocks ofwood together. There is another bird thatmakes a noise like a dog barking. Ithought, Sir, this might give you an idea foryour training."

CORPORAL F. R. McALLAN, CompanyL, Fifth Marines.

Sometimes the information doesn't getdown to us and then we are really in thedark. When we get the orders. and informa-t.ion we can get in there and pitch better.

"My platoon is the best one in the com-pany because we are like a baseball team.Our Lieutenant is like the Captain of theteam. lie is close to us and we like him andyet respect him. We have a wonderfulplatoon. I am not bragging. That's a fact!(Note: When I read this to Col. dson atthe end of the day, he was so delighted thathe sent a runner to find out who CorporalMcAllan's platoon leadei was.)

13

CORPORAL E. J. BYRNE, Company L,Fifth Marines.

"Get used to weird noises at night. Thisjungle is not still at night. The land. crabsand lizzards make a hell of a noise rustlingon leaves. And there is a bird. here thatsounds like a man banging two blocks ofwood together. There is another bird thatmakes a noise like a clog barking. Ithought, Sir, this might give you an idea foryour training."

CORPORAL F. R. McALLAN, CompanyL, Fifth Marines.

Sometimes the information doesn't getdown to us and. then we are really in thedark. When we get the orders. and. informa-tion we can get in there and pitch better.

"My platoon is the best one in the com-pany because we are like a baseball team.Our Lieutenant is like the Captain of theteam. lie is close to us and we like him andyet respect him. We have a wonderfulplatoon. I am not bragging. That's a. fact!(Note: When I read this to Col. clson atthe end of the day, he was so delighted thathe sent a runner to ftnd out who CorporalMcAllan's platoon leader was.)

14

"Some men used. to lag behind in the ad-vance. They have finally learned to rkeep upas lagging is unsafe for all.

"This BAR I have here is my bestfriend."

COLONEL MERRITT A. EDSON, COm-manding Officer, Fifth Marines. (Colo-nel Edson was a Battalion Commanderof the Raider Battalion. He was giventhe Fifth Marine Regiment and hasmade. it into one of General Vande-grift's best regiments. He is an out-standing leader and has been recommended by General Vanclegrift for theMedal of Honor).

"If I had to train my regiment over again,I would stress small group training and thetraining of the individual even more than wedid when we were in training.

"There must be training in difficult obser-vation, which is needed for the offense. it i.smy observation that only 5% of the men canreally see while observing.

"The offensive is the most difficult to sup-port, as you canot tell exactly where yourtroops are.

"Whether the Japs will continue to fight asthey do no'w, I don't know. They defend on

14

"Some men used. to lag behind in the ad-vance. They have finally learned to rkeep upas lagging is unsafe for all.

"This BAR I have here is my bestfriend."

COLONEL MERRITT A. EDSON, COm-manding Officer, Fifth Marines. (Colo-nel Edson was a Battalion Commanderof the Raider Battalion. He was giventhe Fifth Marine Regiment and hasmade. it into one of General Vande-grift's best regiments. He is an out-standing leader and has been recom-mended by General Vanclegrift for theMedal of Honor).

"If I had to train my regiment over again,I would stress small group training and thetraining of the individual even more than wedid when we were in training.

"There must be training in difficult obser-vation, which is needed for the offense. It Smy observation that only 5% of the men canreally see while observing.

"The offensive is the most difficult to sup-port, as you cannot tell exactly where yourtroops are.

"Whether the Japs will continue to fight asthey do nov, I don't know. They defend on

L5

the low ground in the jungle. They digstanding trenches, extremely well camou-flaged.

"We need the rifle grenade, or a weaponto fill the gap between hand grenade and themortar. We need to dig the Nip out of hishole under banyan trees, etc.

"We need. the knee mortar badly. Thename "knee mortar" is a misnomer. It isnot fired frOm the knee. One of my mentried this and broke his leg. The followingare reasons in its favor:

"1. It is a one-man load."2. A man can carry ten rounds on his

person besides his weapon."3. It has a high rate of fire."4. It gives to the Platoon Commander

a weapon of this type which is immediatelyavailable to him.

"5. This mortar uses the Jap all-purposehand grenade—ranges 50 yards to 650, I be-lieve.

"The Japs have three (3) of these mortarsin a Mortar Squad in each Rifle Platoon.They have two ammunition carriers per mor-tar. It can be lowered to a low angle andplaced against a log and shot straight outfurther than a. hand grenade.

"I would recommend one change in theprojectile. The Japs have too much high ex-

L5

the low ground in the jungle. They digstanding trenches, extremely well camou-flaged.

"We need the rifle grenade, or a weaponto fill the gap between hand grenade and themortar. We need to dig the Nip out of hishole under banyan trees, etc.

"We need the knee mortar badly. Thename "knee mortar" is a misnomer. It isnot fired frOm the knee. One of my mentried this and broke his leg. The followingare reasons in its favor:

"1. It is a one-man load."2. A man can carry ten rounds on his

person besides his weapon."3. It has a high rate of fire."4. It gives to the Platoon Commander

a weapon of this type which is immediatelyavailable to him.

"5. This mortar uses the Jap all-purposehand grenade—ranges 50 yards to 650, I be-lieve.

"The Japs have three (3) of these mortarsin a Mortar Squad in each Rifle Platoon.They have two ammunition carriers per mor-tar. It can be lowered to a low angle andplaced against a log and shot straight outfurther than a. hand grenade.

"I would recommend one change in theprojectile. The Japs have too much high ex-

16

plosive in the projectile and.. the case is tocthin. We get a lot of casualties from it., butthey are minor wounds.

"I recommend substituting the M1919—A4(the light machine gun) for the heavy ma-chine gun for offensive operation in thejungle. The heavy machine gms are neededand are very valuable in the defense. I ameven considering substituting BAR's for thelight machine guns in the offensive.

"I think that the Battalion Heavy Weap-ons Company should have t.he 60mm mortarto use in addition to the 81mm mortar. Ilike the 81 but it cannot keep up in certainsituations because of its weight and its heavyammunition.

"I think that in each of our squads thereshould be two BAR's instead of one.

"I suggest that you have maneuvers withball ammunition where possible, even if youget a few casualties.

"The tendency is to overload the infantry-men with. ammunition. It seems to be thestandard practice to start out with a beltfull plus two bandoliers. We soon found outthat 25 rounds was enough for two or threedays if you do not have targets to shoot. at.(Note: Our infantrymen approaching Buna

16

plosive in the projectile and.. the case is tocthin. We get a lot of casualties from it, butthey are minor wounds.

"I recommend substituting the M1919—A4(the light machine gun) for the heavy ma-chine gun for offensive operation in thejungle. The heavy machine guns are neededand are very valuable in the defense. I ameven considering substituting BAR's for thelight machine guns in t.he offensive.

"I think that the Battalion Heavy Weap-ons Company should have the 60mm mortarto use in aclthtion to the 81mm mortar. Ilike the 81 but it cannot keep up in certainsituations because of its weight and its heavyammunition.

"I think that in each of our squads thereshould be two BAR's instead of one.

"I suggest that you have maneuvers withball ammunition where possible, even if youget a few casualties.

"The tendency is to overload the infantry-men with. ámmimition. . It seems to be thestandard

.

practice to start out with a beltfull plus two bandoliers. We soon found outthat 25 rounds was enough for two or threedays if you do not have targets to shoot. at.(Note: Our infantrymen approaching Buna

17

in the jungles of New Guinea were carrying40 rounds.)

"Two ammunition pockets in the beltshould be converted to grenade pockets.Each man should have two hand. grenades.If you don't do that, develop slip-openpockets, which can be quickly opened andwhich will carry two hand grenades.

"Our Marine field shoes have too heavy a'top' which chafes. It should have a typeof hob-nail as it slips on the jungle grasses.Rubber shoes are needed for night work.

"Our basic training is all right. Empha-size scouting and patrolling and really learnit and apply it. In your training put yourtime and emphasis on the squad and platoonrather than on the company, battalion andregiment.

"Your principle of the Command Post upand to the front is certainly true here.

"In your scouting and patrolling, and your'traning 'in patience' (which •you shouldhave) have the men work against each other.Same thing for squads and platoons in theirproblems.

"We should develop better snipers. TheJapanese snipers are really annoying. Allcommanders, up to include the regiment,must realize you cannot clear out all the

17

in the jungles of New Guinea were carrying40 rounds.)

"Two ammunition pockets in the beltshould be converted to grenade pockets.Each man should have two hand grenades.If you don't do that, develop slip-openpockets, which can be quickly opened andwhich will carry two hand grenades.

"Our Marine field shoes have too heavy a'top' which chafes. It should have a typeof hob-nail as it slips on the jungle grasses.Rubber shoes are needed for night work.

"Our basic training is all right. Empha-size scouting and patrolling and really learnit and apply it. In your training put yourtime and emphasis on the squad and platoonrather than on the company, battalion andregiment.

"Your principle of the Command Post upand to the front is certainly true here.

"In your scouting and patrolling, and your'traning in patience' (which you shouldhave) have the men work against each other.Same thing for squads and platoons in theirproblems.

"We should develop better snipers. TheJapanese snipers are really annoying. Allcommanders, up to include the regiment,must realize you cannot clear out all the

18

snipers before you advance. Some will beleft, but they won't be particularly effective.Annoying, yes. You can get these snipersby small groups from the reserves. SomeJapanese snipers, which were by-passed inthe attack, hi.d for two or three days andthen quit. Some will hang around insideyour lines for a month.

"The Japanese night attacks, of course,have limited objectives; and sometimes with-drawing afer dark as much as fifty yardswill fool them and they won't know whereyou are.

"The 'smoking lamp' goes out at dark andjou ha.ve got to be quiet.

"In the Raiders we adopted the custom ofdropping all rank and titles. We used nick-names for the officers. All ranks use thesenicknames for us. We did this because theNips caught onto the names of the officersand would yell or speak in the night, 'Thisis Captain Joe Smith talking.. A Companywithdraw to the next hill.' So we adoptednicknames as code words. Captain Walt be-came 'Silent Lou'. My nickname was 'RedMike'. An example of the use of thesenickiiarnes as code words is: One night theJaps put down smoke and they yelled 'gas.'We were green at that time and two of our

18

snipers before you advance. Some will beleft, but they won't be particularly effective.Annoying, yes. You can get these snipersby small groups from the reserves. SomeJapanese snipers, which were by-passed inthe attack, hid for two or three days andthen quit. Some will hang around insideyour lines for a month.

"The Japanese night attacks, of course,have limited objectives; and sometimes 'with-drawing afLer dark as much as fifty yardswill fool them and they won't know whereyou are.

"The 'smoking lamp' goes out at dark andjou ha.ve got to be quiet.

"In the Raiders we adopted the custom ofdropping all rank and titles. We used nick-names for the officers. All ranks use thesenicknames for us. We did this because theNips caught onto the names of the officersand would yell or speak in the night, 'Thisis Captain Joe Smith talking.. A Companywithdraw to the next hill.' So we adoptednicknames as code words. Captain Walt be-came 'Silent Lou'. My nickname was 'RedMike'. An example of the use of thesenicknames as code words is: One night theJaps put down smoke and they yelled 'gas.'We were green at that time and two of our

19

ompanies withdrew leaving A Companyexposed oi. its two flanks. In this instanceI was a Battalion Commander. CaptainWalt called me on the voice radio to informme of the situation. He was cautious andused the nickname as follows: He said, 'Whois speakingV and. I said, 'Red'. He said,'What name do you identify with 'Silent'?I said, 'Lou.' He said, 'That is correct.'So, we both know that. we were talking toeach other and were not tafldng to theenemy. He explained the situation to me.At the end of his conversation, a voice brokein and said in perfect. English, 'Our situa-t.ion here, Colonel Edson, is excellent.Thank you, Sir.' This was the enemyspeaking.

"A value of night. training is that it letsmen learn the normal noises of the woods atnight. Woods are not silent at night.

"The Japanese is no superman. He has thesame limitations that we have. They havethe advantage of experience. With, propertraining, our Americans are better, as ourpeople can think better as individuals. En-courage your individuals and bring them out.

"Discontinue the use of tracers for nightfiriig. They give away your position.

"Both our riflemen and machine gunnersmust be taught to shoot low.

19

)ompanies withdrew leaving A Companyxposecl oi its two flanks. In this instanceI was a Battalion Commander. CaptainWalt called me on the voice radio to informme of the situation. He was cautious andused the nickname as follows: He said, 'Whois speakingV and. I said, 'Red'. He said,'What name do you identify with 'Silent'?I said, 'Lou.' He said, 'That is correct.'So, we both know that. we were talking toeach other and were not talking to theenemy. He explained the situation to me.At the end of his conversation, a voice brokein and said in perfect. English, 'Our situa-tion here, Colonel Edson, is. excellent.Thank you, Sir.' This was the enemyspeaking.

"A value of night training is that it letsmen learn the normal noises of the woods atnight. Woods are not silent at night.

"The Japanese is no superman. He has thesame limitations tha.t we have. They havethe advantage of experience. With, propertraining, our Americans are better, as ourpeople can think better as individuals. 'En-courage your individuals and bring them out.

"Discontinue the use of tracers for nightfiring. They give away your position.

"Both our riflemen and 'machine gunnersmust be taught to shoot low.

20

"This leadership business resolves itselfdown to being hardboiled. By that I meangetting rid of the poor leader, even if youlike him personally, because this. is a life anddeath affair. This: goes right on down to thenon-coms.

"At Tulagi the Japanese used wooden bul-lets. I saw some of these wooden bullets.My theorj for their use is that they weredeveloped for troops which were to infiltratebehind our lines and .shoot us in the back.These wooden bullets could not carry farenough to injure their attacking troops."

(Note: Colonel Edson asked me at the endof the day to read back to him what eachman had said when he was interviewed.Notes by Colonel Edson which appear, weremade after the men had been interviewed.)

MAJOR LOU WALT, 0. 0. 2nd Battalion,Fifth Marines. (Note: Col. Edson toldme that. Major Walt was one of his bestleaders, and one of the best men he hasever seen in action. Major Walt. is ayoung man of about 35 years of age.He is extremely rugged and looks like afullback on a football team. I talked tohim over 20 minutes before I was able to

20

"This leadership business resolves itselfdown to being hardboiled. By that I meangetting rid of the poor leader, even if youlike him personally, because this. is a life anddeath affair. This: goes right on down to thenon-corns.

"At Tulagi the Japanese used wooden bul-lets. I saw some of these wooden bullets.My theorj for their use is that they weredeveloped for troops which were to infiltratebehind our lines and shoot us in the back.These wooden bullets could not carry farenough to injure their attacking troops."

(Note: Colonel Edson asked me at the endof the day to read back to him what eachman had said when he was interviewed.Notes by Colonel Edson which appear, weremade after the men had been interviewed.)

MAJOR LOU WALT, C. 0. 2nd Battalion,Fifth Marines. (Note: Col. Edson toldme that Major Walt was one of his bestleaders, and one of the best men he hasever seen in action. Major Walt. is ayoung man of about 35 years of age.He is extremely rugged and looks like afullback on a football team. I talked tohim over 20 minutes before I was able to

9

21

sing'e original note as hisseem to echo Col. E cison's.)can report officially to you that we had

men killed in one company in the last as-sault! 4 of these men were killed by awounded sniper who had three holes in him.

my CP.- He was camouflagedpassed over for dead.Plt themshoulder to shoulder.on. the Matanikau River.

Iap Territory

riese beach head was a. thick jungle with

we captured in. this action."At 6:30 p. m. they smoked our two right

companies, and when the. smoke had en-veloped these two companies, they broke out.

make a ide as

He was laying in thick brush 15 yards fromand had been

You have to KILL toout. They attack in bunches,

An example: we were(See fig. 1.) Our

Matanikau River ____Jcp 8ridehead150 Japs n here

S1NDSPIT

FIGr 1.

Companies were at half strength. This wasa Raider Battalion plus two companies ofthe 3d Battalion, Fifth

camouflaged

ii\ffarines. The. Japa-

standing—type fox holes.had with them in their beach head 6 heavymachine guns and 8 light machine guns which

They

21

single original note as hisseem to echo Col. E dson's.)can report officially to you that we had

9 men killed in one company in the last. as-sault! 4 of these men were killed by awounded sniper who had three holes in him.He was laying in thick brush 15my CP.-. He was camouflagedpassed over for dead.put themshoulder to shoulder.on the Matanikau River.

Jap Territory

nese beach head was a. thick jungle withcamouflaged standing-type fox holes. Theyhad with them in their beach head 6 heavymachine guns and 8 light machine guns whichwe captured in this action.

''At 6:30 p. m. they smoked our two rightcompanies, and when the. smoke had en-veloped these two companies, they broke out.

make a Id e as

yards fromand had been

You have to KILL toout. They attack in bunches,

An example: we were(See fig. 1.) Our

Matanikau River _________

Jcp 8ridehead150 Japs n here

FIGr 1.

Companies were at half strength.

SANDSPIT

the 3d Battalion, Fiftha Raider Battalion pius two companies of

This was

Marines. The. Japa-

22

They came out in a mass formation, 20abreast, yelling, bayonets fixed, automaticweapons working, rear ranks throwing handgrenades, (heavy arrow in. the above sketchshows the Japanese route). They were, try-ing to escape to the sand spit at the mouth ofthe river in order to cross the river to getback. Our right front company had justcompleted a double-apron barbed-wire fence.When the Japanese hit the left flank of theright• company, they killed 9 out of the first11 men they met. Then they hit the barbed-wire. Two of our heavy machine gunsopened up, shooting down along this barbed-wire fence and dispersed their attack. Itgot dark—quickly like it does here. Therewas smoke, Japs and Marines all mixed up.Three Jap officers were, swinging their two-hand swords. There ws hand-to-hand fight-ing all night long... We mopped them up atdaybreak. We killed 78 Japs. They killed12 Marines and wounded 26 of us.

"The Jap has a great deal of respect forour hand grenade, and it is a valuable weaponto us. Do jou eve'r practice throwing it inwooded country?

"The Jap is not 'an individual fighter. Hewon't fight with a bayonet unless backed upwith a dozen other Japs.

22

They came out in a mass formation, 20abreast, yelling, bayonets fixed, automaticweapons working, rear ranks throwing handgrenades, (heavy arrow in. the above sketchshows the Japanese• route). They were, try-ing to escape to the sand spit at the mouth ofthe river in order to cross the river to getback. Our right front company bad justcompleted a double-apron barbed-wire fence.When. the Japanese hit the left flank of theright• company, they killed 9 out of the first11 men they met. Then they hit the barbed-wire. Two of our heavy machine gunsopened up, shooting down along this barbed-wire fence and dispersed their attack. Itgot dark—quickly like it does here. Therewas smoke, Japs and Marines all mixed up.Three Jap officers were swinging their two-hand swords. There ws hand-to-hand. fight-ing all night long... We mopped them up atdaybreak. We killed 78 Japs.

.

They killed12 Marines and wounded 26 of us.

"The Jap has a great deal of respect forour hand grenade, and it is a valuable weaponto us. Do you eve'r practice throwing it inwooded country?

"The Jap is not an individual fighter. Hewon't fight with a bayonet unless backed upwith a dozen other Japs.

23

"Here is something that I know the Armyteaches, Sir, but I would like to say it, as wereally believe in it hem, and that is don't puttroops in a skirrnish line until actual physicalcontact is made. Keep 'em in squad columns,with two scouts in front of each squad.Sometimes making files between the columns.

"As in the Basic Field Manual, each manshould know the objective. I make, myPlatoon Leader designate an objective every100 yards in the jungle, and. they work to itand reorganize. They don't push off for thenext objective until they. get word from theCompany Commander. This method, wehave found, insures control.

"I control my companies exactly the sameway. I set up objectives for each company.When the companies reach their objective,they report. Aftei- the reorganization, we goahead.

"I think reserves in the attack should bekept up close so that they can be committedimmediately. The Reserve Company Com-mander continually reconnoiters the groundand is ready to commit his company at oncewhen ordered to do so. If the Reserve Com-pany is not on its. toes and has to take timeout for reconnaissailce, this may delay themto sneii an ex1ent that their effort. iiiav be

23

"Here is something that I know the Armyteaches, Sir, but I would like to say it, as wereally believe in it hem, and that is don't puttroops in a skirnish line until actual physicalcontact is made. Keep 'em in squad columns,with two scouts in front of each squad.Sometimes making files between the columns.

"As in the Basic Field Manual, each manshould know the objective. I make, myPlatoon Leader designate an objective every100 yards in the jungle, and. t.hey work to itand reorganize. They don't push off for thenext obj ective until they

,

get word from theCompany Commander. This method, wehave found, insures control.

"I control my companies exactly the sameway. I set up objectives for each company.When the companies reach their obj ective,they report. Aftei- the reorganization, we goahead.

"I think reserves in the attack should bekept up close so that they can be committedimmediately. The Reserve Company Corn-mander continually reconnoiters the groundand is ready .to conmiit his company at oncewhen ordered to do so. If the 'Reserve Com-pany is not on its. toes and has to take timeout for reconnaissance, this may delay themto sneli. an. extent that their effort. iiiav be

24

useless—the situation may change if thejcannot act at once. I keep my best. CompanyCommander in reserve.

"In the attack we always use the. telephonesfrom Regiment. to the Battalion. The jungleis thick, but. the wire can be made to keep up.The wire is supplemented by the TBX radio.If we get held . up, the wire goes right out. tothe companie.s from the Battalion."

PLATOON SERGEANT C. C. ARNUT,H & S Company, Fifth Marines. ChiefScout for the Regimental IntelligenceSection. (Note: When Col. Edson sentfor his best fighters, be did not includePlatoon Sergeant Arndt. After I gotthrough talking to these men, two ofthem came up to me ad said, "Sir, youdid not see Sergeant Arndt. He hasbeen on more patrols and does morescouting than any man in the Regiment..Could we get him for you, Sir?")

"I practice walking quietly over rocks,twigs, grass, leaves, through vines, etc. Ipractice this around this bivouac area. Ireceived, instructions in scouting and patrol-ling at Quantico, but I still practice thisaround here in the bivouac area. I believebecause I )1'actice this is the reason I am

24

useless—the situation may change if thejcannot act at once. I keep my best CompanyCommander in reserve.

"In the attack we always use the. telephonesfrom Regiment to the Battalion. The jungleis thick, but the wire can be made to keep up.The wire is supplemented by the TBX radio.If we get held . up, the wire goes right out tothe companie.s from the Battalion."

PLATOON SERGEANT C. C. ARNDT,H & S Company, Fifth Marines. ChiefScout for the Regimental IntelligenceSection. (Note: When Col. Edson sentfor his best. fighters, be did not includePlatoon Sergeant Arndt. After I got.through talking to these men, two ofthem came up. to me and said, "Sir, youdid not see Sergeant Arndt. He hasbeen on more patrols and does morescouting than any man in the Regiment..Could we get him for you, Sir?")

"I practice walking quietly over rocks,twigs, grass, leaves, through vines, etc. Ipractice this around this bivouac area. Ireceived instructions in scouting and patrol-ling at Quantico, but I still practice thisaround here in the bivouac area. I believebecause I practice this i.s the reason I am

25

still alive. Some of the other NCO'slaugthed at me because I am always seeinghow quietly I can walk around and becauseI go out and practice on my own. But theyhave stopped laughing because I have beeion more patrols than any man in the Regi-iiient, and I am still alive.

"When I am scouting and come to anopenmg in the jungle, and. have to cross it,I generally run across quickly and quietly.Going slow here may cost a scout his life.Different types of terrain calls for differentmethods.

"Here is the way Japs patrol. I was outon the bank of the river with another man.We were observing and were carefully cam-ouflag'ed. We heard a little sound and thensaw two Japs crawl by about 7 feet awayfrom us. These Japs were unarmed. Westarted to shoot them, but did not do so aswe remembered our mission. Then, 15 yardslater came 8 armed Japs. They were walk-ing slowly and. carefully. We did not shootas our mission was to gain information.When III got back, we had a lot of discussionas to why the two Japs in front were notarmed. Some of the fellows said maybe itWas a form of Japanese company pirnisli—merit. I believe they were the point of the

25

still alive. Some of the other NCO'slaughed at me because I am always seeinghow quietly I can walk around and because1 go out and practice on my own. But theyhave stopped laughing because I have beenon more patrols than any man in the Regi-ment, and I am still alive.

"When I am scouting and come to anopening in the jungle, and have to cross it,I generally run across quickly and quietly.Going slow here may cost a scout his life.Different types of terrain calls for differentmethods.

"Here is the way Japs patrol. I was outon the bank of the river with another man.We were observing and were carefully cam-ouflaged. We heard a little sound and thensaw two Japs crawl by about 7 feet awayfrom us. These Japs were unarmed. Westarted to shoot them, but did not do so aswe remembered our mission. Then, 15 yardslater came 8 armed Japs. They were walk-ing slowly and carefully. We did not shootas our mission was to gain information.When I got back, we had a lot of discussionas to why the two Japs in front were notarmed. Some of the fellows said maybe itwas a form of Japanese company punish-ment. I believe they were the point of the

26

patrol and were unarmed so they could crawlbetter.

"You can tell Jap troops in the distanceby their short, choppy step." (Remark byCoL Edson : This is. true and we think thereason for their short, choppy stride is be-cause they wear wooden shoes in Japan.)

COLONEL DEMIJTH, Division ArtilleTyCommander, America Division.

"The tactics and technique of our artilleryfire as taught by the Field Artillery SchQolat Ft. Sill are okay, and are good here onGuadalcanal.

"However, we have learned we have to fire3600 here. A'so due tO the way these Japscrawl around in the jung'e, we have to paymore attention to the. local security around ourpositions."

COLONEL AMOIR LE R.. SIMS, Commaiid-ing Officer, Seventh Marines, 1st MarineDivision.

"Is the Army stripping dowi to essentialsin eqUipmenH

"Teach not to waste ammunition. Learnto make every shot count.

Don't spare your artillery. Make the mostof it. Every time you get enough hforrna-

26

patrol and were unarmed so they could crawlbetter.

"You can tell Jap troops in the distanceby their short, choppy step." (Remark byCoL Edson : This is. true and we think thereason for their short, choppy stride is be-cause they wear wooden shoes in Japan.)

COLONEL DEMIJTH, Division ArtilleryCommander, Americal Division.

"The tactics and tec.hniqie of our artilleryfire as taught by the Field Artillery Schoolat Ft. Sill are okay, and are good here onGuadalcanal.

"However, we have learned we have to fire3600 here. Also due tO the way these Japscrawl around.. in the jungle, we have to paymore attention to the local security around ourpositions."

COLONEL AMOR LE R.. SIMS, Command-ing Officer, Seventh Marines, 1st MarineDivision.

"Is the Army stripping dowi to essentialsin equipment

"Teach not to waste ammunition. Learnto make every shot count.

Don't spare your artillery. Make the mostof it. Every time you get enough informa-

27

tion, even if the target is not profitable, getaitillery fire on it. They hate it.

"Try to get the Japs on the move; keepbouncing them around; don't let them get set.When you let them get set, they are hard toget out. We have had a great deal ofcess with the 81mm mortar and with artillery

an example (fig. 2)

FIGuRE 2.

We have the Japs surrounded with theirbacks to the river. The .3close contact with the enemy.that we had a large number of Japs sur-rounded and that the best way to get themout was to place field artillery and. 81mm fireon them. However, the problem was to putthis fire on the enemy and not on our owntroops. The movement which we executed wascarefully cooixlinated with .the artillery andwith the mortars.

5O3G4G'—42__3

Each Battalioi, at a cer-

fire. Here is

S

c.

suc-

S

JAP SN

C Dense

C 'I

c 7rrnT CIt0

75.sRange

4000 yds

Battalions were inIt was obvious

27

tion, even if the target is not profitable,artillery fire on it. They hate it.

get

"Try to get the Japs on the move; keepbouncing them around; don't let them get set.When you let them get set, they are hard to

FIGuRE 2.

We have the Japs surrounded with theirbacks to the river. The .3close contact with the enemy.that we had a large number of Japs sur-rounded and that the best way to get themout was to place field artillery and 81mm fireon them. However, the problem was to putthis fire on the enemy and not on our owntroops. The movement which we executed wascarefully coordinatedwith the mortars.

5O3G4G'—42__3

with the artillery andEach Battalion, at a cer-

get out. We have had a great deal of suc-cess with the 81mm mortar and with artilleryfire. Here is

S

c.

an example (fig. 2) SS

JAP SN

C Dense

C 'I

cC /

It075.$

Range

4000 yds

Battalions were inIt was obvious

28

tam time, was to withdraw just before thefiring was due to start. We were very care-ful to explain to the men what we were doingso that they would not get a mistaken ideaof.the order, for withdrawing. The maneuverwas successful. Over 500 Japs were killed inthis action. We had 44 Marines killed and63 wounded. Our men were nOt hurt by theartillery and mortar fire, of course, but werekilled and wounded in the fighting which tookplace before the withdrawal. After the firingceased, we went in and mopped up in hand-to-hand fighting.

"Our Battalion Commanders in theSeventh Marines know that in reporting in-formation a.t once and, if t.hey need help toask fOr it and not just try to bull' thingst.hrough that they are enabling Regiments toact as a team, in the right maimer and in theright direction.

"I have a wonderful S—2 Section in thIsRegiment. I have been working on this S-2Section for over 2 years. I have been puttingmy best men in this .2 Section, and it has paidme. We insisted that •the Battalions havegood 2 Sections. You cannot do any betterthan your information.

"Concentrate on communications. We de-pend to a large extent on wire communica-

28

tam time, was to withdraw just before thefiring was due to start. We were very care-ful to explaii to the men what we were doingso that they would not get a mistaken ideaof. the order for withdrawing. The maneuverwas successfuL Over 500 Japs were killed inthis action. We had 44 Marines killed and63 wounded. Our men were nOt hurt by theartillery and mortar fire, of course, but werekilled and wounded in the fighting which tookplace before the withdrawal. After the firingceased, we went in and mopped up in. hand-to-hand fighting.

"Our Battalion Commanders in theSeventh Marines know that in reporting in-formation a.t o'nce and, if they need help toask fOr it and not just try to bull' thingsthrough that they are enabling Regiments toact as a team, in the right manner and in theright direction.

"I have a wonderful 5—2 Section in thisRegiment. I have been working on this S-2Section fQr over 2 years. I have been puttingmy best men in this .2 Section, and it has pai.dme. We insisted that 'the Battalions havegood 2 Sections. You cannot do any betterthan your information.

"Concentrate' on communications. We de-pend to a large extent on wire' coinmunica-

29

tions. It is tough work, but it can be done.I have had to loan the Communications IRe-giinental. Section men to help carry wirethrough tough places, but I want communica-tions. Your information has to be timelyand properly evaluated.

"A Regimental Commander caimot be im-patient. Don 't push your Battalion Oom-manders uniless you feel there is a reluctanceon their part.

"Our great leader, General Vandegrift,gives me a job and lets me handle the situa-tion with a regiment in my own way. He isnot impatient with. me. Impatience wouldruin the best plans A mapped plan may notturn out to be feasible. So, we have learnedhere not to be impatient.

"The forward observer of the artillery hasfurnished me with valuable information.Our system is to put the Artillery ObserverGroup with each battalion and keep the Artil-lery Liaison Officer with the Regiment.

"Are you teaching your Regimental Com-manders to understand how to use artillery

"It has been impressed upon us here thatlogistics have to be correctly planned. Thescience of logistics turns out to be your life.In this Regiment., I have a fine forceful Exe-cutive Officer, Lt. Col. Frisbee. I use the

29

tions. It is tough work, but it can be done.I have had to loan the Communications Re-gimental. Section men to help carry wirethrough tough places, but I want communica-tions. Your information has to be timelyand properly evaluated.

"A Regimental Commander caimot be im-patient. Don't push your Battalion Oom-manders unless you feel there is a reluctanceon their part.

"Our great leader, General Vandegrift,gives me a job and lets me handle the situa-tion with a regiment in my own way. He isnot impatient with me. Impatience wouldruin the best plans:. A mapped plan may notturn out to be feasible. So, we have learnedhere not to be impatient.

"The forward observer of the artillery hasfurnished me with valuable information.Our system is to put the Artillery ObserverGroup with each battalion and keep the Artil-lery Liaison Officer with the Regiment.

"Are you teaching your Regimental Corn-manclers to understand how to use artillery

"It has been impressed upon us here thatlogistics have to be correctly planned. Thescience of logistics turns out to be your life.In this Regiment., I have a fine forceful Exe-cutive Officer, Lt. Col. Frisbee. I use the

30

Executive Officer in the rear echelon seeiiigthat the S—4 funct.ions and that supplies getup. Don't misunderstand me. The Execu-tive Officer lets the S-4 run his job. liechecks and aids him if he needs help.

"Here is a thought. I wou]d like to leavewith the Regimental Commanders. Pickyour officers for common sense. Basic FieldManual knowledge is fine, but it is uselesswithout. common sense. Common sense is ofgreater value than all the words in the book.I am 2 deep in my battalions in regard toBattaiion Commanding Officers. That is,each, one of my Battalion Executive Officersis a potential Battalion Commander. Thereason for this is if the Battalion Com-mander gets killed or sick, I won't be caughtout on a limb. My Battalion Commandersuse their Executive Officers in the same wayI use my. Regimental Officers. I back up myExecutive Officer. I never see a BattalionCommander or a Staff Officer about adniin-istration unless they see the Executive Officerfirst. My Executive Officer and I a.re ateam. He is responsible to see that my poli-cies are' carried out.

"I make my Staff Officers get out of thisCP—not to snoop on the troops, but to helpthe battalions and acquaint themselves with

30

Executive Officer in the rear echelon seeingthat the 5—4 functions and that supplies getup. Don't misunderstand me. The Execu-t.ive Officer lets the S-4 run his job. liechecks and aids him if he needs help.

"Here is a thought I wou]d like to leavewith the Regimental Commanders. Pickyour officers for common sense. Basic FieldManual knowledge is fine, but it is uselesswithout common sense. Common sense is ofgreater value than all the words in the book.I am 2 deep in my battalions in regard toBattalion

.

Commanding Officers. That is,each, one of my Battalion Executive Officersis a potential Battalion Commander. Thereason for this is if the Battalion Com-mander gets killed or sick, I won't be caughtout on a limb. My Battalion Commandersuse their Executive Officers in the same wayI use my. Regimental Officers. I back up myExecutive Officer. I never see a BattalionCommander or a Staff Officer about adniin-istration unless they see the Executive Officerfirst. My Executive Officer and I are ateam. He is responsible to see that my poli-cies are' carried out.

"I make my Staff Officers get out of thisCP—not to snoop on the troops, but to helpthe battalions and acquaint themselves with

31

the general situatIon. Insist on night train-big, but don't train day and night. If I\vere training my Regiment again, working 7days a week, I would train three nights andfour clays.

"Our orders to our Marines on the per-imeter defense are, 'You stay on your posi.-tion and do not pull back. If they bustthiough.you, we'll plug up the hole, but youstay there.'

"Our Battalion Commanders have learnednot to pull a company, out of action to useit. elsewhere. For example (fig. 3):

/B C U /

FIQuRE 3.

If a company is needed at point. 'X' don'tsend companies who have been committed at'B', 'C', or 'D'. Send -another companyfrom somewhere else. If you make the mis-takes of 'milling around', as we call it, youwill expend men's lives. It is always ex-pensive. I have never seen it to fail to costtwo times as much as the original commit-ment.

"This Regiment can out-yell the Japs, out-fight them, out-bayonet them, and out-shootthem. This yelling, as in hand-to-hand ac-

31

the general situatIon. Insist on night train-big, but don 't train day and night. If Iw-ere training my Regiment again, working 7clays a week, I would train three nights andfour clays.

"Our orders to our Marines on the per-imeter defense are, 'You stay on your posi-tion and do not pull back. If they bustthiough you, we'll plug up the hole, but youstay there.'

"Our Battalion Commanders have learnednot to pull a company, out of action to useit. elsewhere. For example (fig. 3) :

/B C U /

FIQuRE 3.

If a company is needed at point. 'X' don'tsend companies who have been committed at'B', 'C', or 'D'. Send -another càmpanyfrom somewhere else. If you make the mis-takes of 'milling around', as we call it, youwill expend men's lives. It is always ex-pensive. I have never seen it to fail to costtwo times as much as the original commit-ment.

"This Regiment can out-yell the Japs, out-fight them, out-bayonet them, and out-shootthem. This yelling, as in hand-to-hand ac-

.32

tion, is important. It is like .a foothall team

keelMarines

We'll killFriikiiñ I'

"The Regimentali his personalintErested in.'great interest.

LIEUTENANT ('OLONEL .L. B. P tiLLER,:0. 0. 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, U. S.Marines, First ]arifle Division.

(Note: Lt. Col. Puller is being recommendedby General Vandegrift for the• Medal cfHonor for, leading his Battalion, withholes in him, continually for .24 hours. Imet.laim on the day he came out of the hos-pital. Lt. Col. Puller had considerableexperience in jungle warfare in Haiti.)

"In handing my companiesCompany Commander's word for what is go-rng on. You have to do this to get anywhere.In order t.o get a true picture of what is go-

that talks it. up."The Japs yell at.

1' More blood. f Or the Emperor 1'us, "Marines,, we're gonna

Theyell bad.,. 'You

you .1.Japs.. More blood for

Commander.: must makewatch and be, greatly

sanitation. Because of ourin sthiitatiOn,. our.. sick, list . is

list riin.s lowerlower than normal. Ourthan 40 men per battálion"

7

I take the

.32

tion, is important. It is like .a foothall team

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IL. B. P tiLLER,:0. 0. st Battalion, 7th Regiment, U. S.Marines, First ]airie Division.

is beingby General Vandegrift .f.orthe Medal cfHonor for, leading his Battalion, withholes in him, continually for .24 hours. Imet.laim on the day he came out of the ho.s-pital. Lt. Col. Ptiller had considerableexperience in jungle warfare in HaIti.)

my companiesCompany Commander's word for whatrng on. You have to do this to get anywhere.In order to get a true picture of what is go-

that talks it. up."The Japs yell at.

keel you.!Marines

More blood, fOr the Emperor 1'us, "Marines,, we're gonna

Theyell bad.,. 'You

•you.1.Japs..We!fl killFriiikiiñ I'

"The Regimental

More blood for

it his pe:rsonalint.rested . j11.great interest.

duty'to watchsanitation. Becausein sanitation,, our.

Commander.: must makeand be, greatly

of...Oursick list

.is

lower than normal. Our sick list runs lowerthan 4O men per hattalion "

(Note: Lt. CoL Puller recommended

7

"In handing I take theis go-

33

ing on in this heavy country, I make my staffget up where the fighting is. This CommandPost business will ruin the American Armyand Marines if it isn't watched. Hell, ourplatoons and squads would like the commandpost in the attack if they are not watched!As soon as you set up a Command Post, allforward movement stops.

"The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates.Why can't we have a similar one

"To HELL with the telephone wire withadvancing troops. We can't carry enoughwire. We received an order. 'The advancewill stop until the wire gets in.' THIS ISBACKWARDS!

(flI Go, w/o ordersCo

Point,'A Co moves forward, as

x8 'Gomdrshown, and deploys)

/3 c)3 3 XEI 0 (This group stands tastA Bn Hq Group3 I

Co

(Mortar Sec moves forward,4 Mortar Sec if necessary)

X Train it present(AC" Co—Train guard, moves

Co forward w/o orders)

FIGURE 4.

"The staffs are twice as large as theyshould be. The Regimental staff .is too large.I have 5 staff officers in the Battalion and

33

ing on in this heavy country, I make my staffget up where the fighting is. This CommandPost business will ruin the American Armyand Marines if it isn't watched. Hell, ourplatoons and squads would like the commandpost in the attack if they are not watched IAs soon as you set up a Command Post, allforward movement stops.

"The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates.Why can't we have a similar one

"To HELL with the telephone wire withadvancing troops. 'We can't carry enoughwire. We received an order. 'The advancewill stop until the wire gets in.' THIS ISBACKWARDS!

(flI Go, w/o ordersCo

Point,'A Co moves forward, as

x8 'Gomir shown, and deploys)

/3 c)3 3 XEI 0 (This group stands tastA Bn Hq Group3 I

& (Mortar Sec moves forward,

3* Mortar Sec if necessary)

Train it present

I) (AC" Co—Train guard, movesCo forward w/o orders)

FIGURE 4.

"The staffs are twice as large as theyshould be. The Regimental staff .is too large.I have 5 staff officers in the Battalion and

34

I could get along with less. The officershave to dress and look like the men. Onetime the COmmandant of the Marine Corpsasked me why our patrols failed in Haiti. Ireplied, 'Because of the officers' b&ldingroll.' In Haiti at that time the officer. hadto have a pack mule, and the enlisted mensaw the officers lying arouiid in luxury, etc.The patrols were actually held up for thispack mule. Your leaders have to be upfront. Thos& that won't get up there, andare not in physical shape to keep up with themen,. will cause plans to fail.

"It is okav to say that an outfit cannot besurprised, but it is bound to happen in thistype of warfare;. so, therefore, your outfltsmust know wha to do when amounect

''Calliiig back Commanding Othce]:s toBattalion and Regimental CF's to say, 'howare things going ?' is awful.

"My Battalion moving through junglecountry, acting alone, operates as follows(see fig. 4):

"A. platoon of D Company is attached toeach rifie company because of the heavycountry. C Company watches the rear.Each company is responsible for its flank.This is a time-tested and proven formationwhich works. If attacked. from a flank, faceand adjust.

34

I could get along with less. The officershave to dress and look like the men. Onetime the Commandant of the Marine Corpsasked me why our patrols failed in Haiti. Ireplied,. 'Because of the officers' beddingrolL' In Haiti at that time the officer. hadto have a pack mule, and the enlisted mensaw the officers lying around in luxury, etc.The patrols were actually held up for thispack mule. Your leaders have to be upfront. Tbos& that won't get up there, andare not in physical shape to keep up with themen,. will cause plans to fail.

"It is okay to say that an outfit cannot hesurprised, but it is bound .t happen in thistype 0± warfare; so, therefore, our oufi:must kno \ha to do when amoined.

''CalImg back Commanding Othee]:s toBattalion and Regimental CF's to say, 'Howare things going .?' is awful.

"My Battalion moving through junglecountry, acting alone, operates as follows(see fig. 4):

"A. platoon of D Company is attached toeach rifie company because o.f the heavycountry. C Company watches the rear.Each company is responsible for its flank.This is a time-tested and proven formationwhich works. If attacked. from a flank, faceand adjust.

35

"In marching or in camp, we have learnedhere that you must have an all-around cle-fense.

We need more intrenehing shove's.c-five shovels to men who have wire cutters.You neec both the wire cutter and shovels.

"I wish we had the Mi rifle, and when weget eleved fr'orn Gua.claicanal, I am goingto make every effort to get it.

I consider it iinpei'atie that the Armyand Marines be ecuipp ed with knee mortaisaiicl only carry one type gfeiac.e. Hwe thehand grellacle fit m the knee mortar and beof use as ahancl grenade and. also a a

ou neelL a m±e g'ienac.iei 1a eicjuaci for use agaii.lst eiemy rnhiiiellts."

The follo\vin is the resuh of a conferencewith of the best. NCO's in the First Bat-talion of the Seventh Marines. TheseXCO 's were selected by Lt. Col. Puller:

"The Japanese fire is not. ahvay•s aimed.It is harassing fire and scares recruits. Get.the recnaits so they are used to overheadfire. 'Japs who have infiltrated signal toeach other with their rifles by the number ofshots. We get these birds by constantpatrolling.

35

"In marching or in camp, we have learnedhere that von must have an. all-around de-fense.

We need more intrenehing shovels.c-five shovels to men who have wire cutters.You need both the wire cutter and shovels.

"I wish we had the Mi rifle, and when weget relieved fr'om Gua.daica.nal, I am goingto make every effort to get it.

''I consider it iinpei'atie that the Armyand Marines be ecuipp ed with knee mortarsand oniy carry one type grenade. Have thehand grenade fit in the knee mortar and beof use as ahancl grenade and. also at a

on neecL a. rne gIenacLiei in eaisquad for use against enemy machirenests."

The fol1owin is the result of a conferencewith of the best. NCO's in the First Bat-talion of the Seventh Marines. TheseXCO 's were selected by Lt. Col. Puller:

"The Japanese fire is not. always aimed.It is harassing fire and scares recruits. 0-ct.the recruits so they are used to overheadfire. 'Japs who have infiltrated signal toeach other with their rifles by the number ofshots. We get these birds by constantpatrollmg.

"The snipers tie

36

their guns in the trees sothey, can't .drop it carelessly. or if wounded.In putting theirtrees, they lash them in and have relief menready to go up the tree.

"Their machine gunss earch.

"AJap trick:"

The mortar menThe Japanese letrounds.wounded 2.

don't traverse and

thought they were safe.them fire two or three

killed 3 and

"The rifle grenade demoralizes the Jap.Japanese prisoner, told me in English, 'That

Sir.'anese sew grass and leaves to their shirts andhats.

"They hit, hell outdon 't wait until they

our points.. Theycould get more men.

light machine guns in the

JAP LIGHTM.G.. IN

BANYANTREE

60mm MORTARON REVERSE SLOPE

FrGuRc 5.

They cracked down,

30 calibre cannon is terrible,

A

The Jap-

of

"The snipers tiethey, can't drop itIn putting their

ready to go up the tree."Their machine

search."AJap trick:"

The mortar menThe Japanese let

wounded 2.

36

their guns in the trees socarelessly. or if wounded.

light machine guns in the

guns

and have relief men

don 't traverse and

"The rifle grenade, demoralizes the Jap.Japanese prisoner, told me in English, 'That'

Sir.'anese sew grass and leaves to their shirts andhats.

"They hit, hell outdon 't wait until they

of our points.. Theycould g.et more men.

trees, they lash them in

JAP LIGHTM.G.. IN

BANYANTREE

60mm MORTARON REVERSE SLOPE

FrGuRc 5.

rounds.

thoughtthem

they were safe.

They cracked down,fire two or three

killed 3 and

30 calibre cannon is terrible,

A

The Jap-

37

They seek to delay us. When the point goesclown, teach men to get behind big trees, ifclose, but not behind saplings.

"If you shoot their officers, they millaround. Their NCO's are poor. Yoit cantell thej are officers by their sabers andleather p'itttee.s.

"A ]ot of these Japs who infiltrate haveiadios. Think of this advantage in respectto artillery, mortar fire, location of troops.etc.

"My platoon found 9 Japs slipping behindour. lines. (Note by Lt. Col. Frisbee, IRegi-mental Executive Officer: We have killed 38Japs behind our lines during, the period ofAugut .7, 1942,. to November 29, 1942.)

"Their outpost at times is in trees. I sawone tree which was rotten inside. The Jap-anese had a light machine gun and gunnerdown inside, and they had built a. trap dooron our side. Every once in a while the doorwould open, and they would poke the machinegun

.out and fire. We took care of this.

"When we cease firing, they cease firing.When we fire, they open up. They do thisto conceal their positions."

37

They seek to delay us. When the point goesclown, teach men to get behind big trees, ifclose, but not behind saplings.

"If you shoot their officers, they millaround. Their NCO's are poor. Yoit cantell thej are officers by thei'r sabers andleather p'itttee.s.

"A ]ot of these Japs who infiltrate haveradios. Think of this advantage in respectto artillery, mortar fire, location of troops.etc.

"My platoon found 9 Japs slipping behindour. lines. (Note by Lt. Col. Frisbee, IRegi-mental Executive Officer: We have killed 38Japs behind our lines during, the period ofAugust .7, 1942,. to November 29, 1942.)

"Their outpost at times is in trees. I sawone tree which was rotten inside. . The Jap-anese had a light machine gun and guiinerdown inside, and they had built a. trap dooron our side. Every once in a while the doorwould open, and they would poke the machinegun

,out and fire. We took care of this.

"When we cease firing, they cease firing.When we fire, they open . up. They do thisto conceal their positions."

38

LIEUTENANT SHEPPARD, Seventh Ma-rines. (Promoted on the Field ofBattle.)

"Sir, how abotit trainüig in the field withshort rations Put your patrols out from3 to 5 days; every officer in the outfit. to par-ticipate. If I were Commanding Geneia1ofa training base, all people who missed one-third of the training would drop back to thenext unit. I believe that the units shouldhave a minimum of 90 days' training injmi.gle warfare. I would stress in this train-ing team work between the leaders in. allthits. Liaison. between support plans andall leaders. Liaison between artillei'v andinfantry.

"If I were t.raining my unit again. Iwould really have some high-class patroltraining. I would. do .everything with thesepatrols I could possibly think of to includelosing them and making them go across coan-try without maps or compasses.

"The Japanese do a lot of yelling at hmes,and .at other times are deadly silent. Onenight some Japanese got in our marchingcolumn. We discovered them and bayoiiethd.them.

38

LIEUTENANT SHEPPARD, Seventh Ma-rines. (Promoted on the Field ofBattle.)

"Sir, how about