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PERANTE A COMISSÃO AFRICANA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS E

DOS POVOS

FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda)

Cabinda

vs.

República de Angola

Comunicado 328/2006

APRESENTAÇÃO SOBRE O MÉRITO DA CAUSA

Para a Autora-FLEC:

Dr. Jonathan Levy, PhD

International Criminal Bar/ Barreau Pénal No 100465

Advogado da Autora-FLEC

37 Royal Pointe Dr.

Hilton Head Island, SC USA 29926

Tel/Fax 001 202-318-2406

Email jonlevy@hargray.com

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INTRODUÇÃO

A autodeterminação económica foi caluniada como um “primo pobre” da

autodeterminação política. Porém, principalmente na África, este não é o

caso. A antiga luta contra o imperialismo e o colonialismo foi colocada de

lado pelo neocolonialismo e pós-colonialismo. A riqueza e recursos da

África ainda enriquecem fortes interesses externos enquanto o povo

africano definha-se.

O protectorado de Cabinda nasceu da luta europeia por colônias, hoje o

petróleo de Cabinda estimula as economias da Europa e da América do Norte,

enriquece os acionistas da Chevron e possibilita o governo de Angola a se

manter. A maioria dos cabindas é pobre e está desempregada. Cabinda é uma

metáfora da África e a autodeterminação económica de Cabinda é relevante a

todos que se opõem a injustiça.

1. Comunicado 328/2006 trata da autodeterminação económica no território

de Cabinda e em particular a distribuição e a exploração de petróleo,

recursos minerais e naturais em terra.

2. Esta apresentação sobre o mérito da causa defende que a comissão deve

encontrar causa para conceder a solicitação da FLEC e nomear um Relator

Especial para a questão da autodeterminação económica de Cabinda e a

distribuição de recursos em terra.

3. A FLEC argumenta que uma investigação neutra dos factos é

necessária urgentemente devido à situação dentro de Cabinda

permanecer instável e volátil conforme estabelecido na actualização dos

factos a seguir.

4. A Autora alega que o Estado Demandado violou os artigos 14, 19, 20,

21, 22 e 24 dispostos na Carta Africana com relação à sua administração

dos recursos naturais que são patrimônio de Cabinda: 5. Artigo 14

“O direito a propriedade deve ser garantido. O direito somente pode ser

usurpado no interesse do público ou no interesse geral da comunidade e de

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acordo com os termos da legislação apropriada.

6. Artigo 19

Todas as pessoas devem ser iguais; elas devem gozar do mesmo respeito e

devem ter os mesmos direitos. Nada deverá justificar o domínio de um povo

por outro. 7. Artigo 20

1. Todos os povos devem ter o direito à existência. Eles devem ter o direito

incontestável e inalienável de autodeterminação. Eles devem determinar a

sua visão política livremente e devem buscar o seu desenvolvimento social e

económico de acordo com a política que escolherem livremente.

2. Os povos opressos ou colonizados devem ter o direito de se libertarem

dos laços de dominação utilizando quaisquer meios reconhecidos pela

comunidade internacional.

3. Todos os povos devem ter o direito à assistência dos partidos dos Estados

em relação a presente Carta em sua luta pela libertação contra a dominação

estrangeira, seja ela política, económica ou cultural. 8. Artigo 21

1. Todos os povos devem destinar suas riquezas e recursos naturais

livremente. Esse direito deve ser exercido no interesse exclusivo do povo. Em

nenhuma circunstância o povo deve ser privado do mesmo. 2. Em caso de espoliação, o povo espoliado tem o direito à recuperação

legal de sua propriedade assim como uma compensação adequada. 3. A livre destinação de recursos naturais e riquezas deve ser exercida sem

prejuízo à obrigação de promover cooperação internacional com base em

respeito mútuo, troca equitativa e em princípios da legislação internacional. 4. Os partidos dos Estados com relação a presente Carta devem exercer de

forma individual e coletiva o direito de destinar suas riquezas e recursos

naturais de forma livre a fim de fortalecer a união e solidariedade africana.

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5. Os partidos dos Estados na presente Carta devem comprometer-se a

eliminar quaisquer formas de exploração económica estrangeira

particularmente aquela praticada por monopólios internacionais com o intuito

de viabilizar que seus povos se beneficiem completamente das vantagens

provenientes de sua nacionalidade. 9. Artigo 22

1. Todos os povos devem ter o direito ao seu desenvolvimento económico,

social e cultural com a devida consideração pela sua liberdade e identidade,

além do desfrute igualitário do legado comum da humanidade. 2. Os Estados devem ter o dever, de forma individual ou coletiva, de

garantir o exercício do direito ao dever, de forma individual ou

coletiva, para garantir o exercício do direito ao desenvolvimento. 10. Artigo 24

Todos os povos devem ter o direito a um ambiente satisfatório geral

que é favorável ao seu desenvolvimento. 11. A FLEC não busca uma apuração da questão de autodeterminação

política e se contém às questões de autodeterminação económica, direitos de

propriedade comum e desenvolvimento. 12. A FLEC solicita a nomeação de um Relator Especial para Cabinda com

o intuito de investigar e apurar as questões acima. Portanto, a Comissão

deve:

(a) nomear um Relator Especial para investigar a questão de

autodeterminação económica em Cabinda e fazer recomendações após

consultar todas as partes envolvidas inclusive o povo de Cabinda, a FLEC, o

Governo de Angola, a sociedade civil, corporações multinacionais, a igreja

católica romana, ONGs e organizações intergovernamentais. (b) disponibilizar a intervenção da Comissão para resolver essa causa de

uma maneira amigável.

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APRESENTAÇÃO SOBRE O MÉRITO DA CAUSA.

A. Procedimento

13. No dia 29 de setembro de 2006, a Secretaria da Comissão Africana de

Direitos Humanos e de Povos (a Secretaria) recebeu uma queixa da Frente de

Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda - FLEC. 14. No dia 15 de agosto de 2007, a Autora aditou/suplementou os seus

factos e enviou um dossiê de admissibilidade. 15. Informações suplementares adicionais e correspondência também

foram enviadas durante a pendência deste processo.

16. Na 10ª Sessão Extraordinária da Comissão, este comunicado foi

considerado admissível. B. Qualificações e Informações Suplementares

17. A Autora é a FLEC, a Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda com membros e funcionários em Cabinda, Ponta Negra, República do Congo e França. A FLEC é membro da UNPO (Organização das Nações e Povos Não Representados) e da OEAS (Organização de Estados Africanos Emergentes). 1

Os oficiais chefes da FLEC são Afonso Massago (Presidente), Stephane

Barros (Secretária-Geral) e Dr. Joel Batila (Chanceler).2

18. A FLEC se considera a representante aceita e histórica do povo de

Cabinda que são as verdadeiras partes de interesse. Em Cabinda a opinião

generalizada é de que: “Todo o Cabinda é FLEC”. A FLEC está banida da

participação na “democracia” angolana porque defende o direito de

autodeterminação. 19. Durante o preparo desta apresentação, a Autora consultou e/ou solicitou

informações de cabindas comuns, cabindas afiliados a organizações não

FLEC, organizações não governamentais, organizações governamentais

internacionais, da mídia, de representantes da igreja católica, da comunidade

internacional e de representantes das indústrias de petróleo e mineração.

Todos os supramencionados expressaram apoio pela apuração neutra de

factos pela Comissão Africana de Direitos Humanos e dos Povos.

1 www.unpo; www.oeas.info.

2

Também conhecida recentemente como FLEK, Frente de Libertação do Estado de Kabinda.

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20. A Autora também forneceu informações a respeito deste assunto

pendente para a Secretaria da União Africana, agências das Nações Unidas,

para o Tribunal Criminal Internacional, ONGs e diversos estados soberanos. 21. O estado demandado de Angola não discutiu essa questão com a FLEC,

direta ou indiretamente. Da mesma forma, o estado demandado não

participou deste procedimento. C. Informações Suplementares com relação aos Recursos em Terra.

22. Esta queixa exclui a questão da alocação de recursos marinhos do seu

comunicado inicial embora a FLEC não faça quaisquer objeções à Comissão

ampliar o escopo de qualquer averiguação. O regime dos recursos marinhos

difere materialmente do regime em terra, pois a extração dos produtos de

petróleo é contínua e remonta ao menos ao ano de 1954 quando Cabinda era

um protectorado colonial de Portugal. 23. A extração de recursos em terra está praticamente inativa ou em

situação exploratória devido em grade parte à oposição das forças da FLEC

que impedem ou restringem as operações. 24. A FLEC não reconhece a concessão de licenças de recursos ou

subvenções feitas por Angola e reserva-se o direito de efectuar os seus

próprios pactos com as empresas de recursos para conferir a

descolonização de Cabinda. 25. A FLEC avisou em varias ocasiões os empreiteiros estrangeiros que sua

segurança não pode ser garantida no conflito em terra. 26. Em consequência do conflito por causa dos recursos, desde 2006, a FLEC

e as Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) entraram em confrontos diversas

vezes no ano passado no norte de Cabinda com incursões da FAA para dentro

da República do Congo incluindo o assassinato e sequestro de oficiais da

FLEC. C. O incidente de 08 de janeiro de 2010.

27. No dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 membros da equipe de futebol togolesa a

caminho da Copa da África em Cabinda foram mortos e feridos junto à

fronteira com Cabinda. 28. A FLEC e Angola têm divergências sobre a responsabilidade pelo

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incidente. Um Relatório da Comissão sobre o dia 08 de janeiro

autorizado pelo então Secretário Geral da FLEC Dr. Joel Batila

descobriu que as forças da FLEC não executaram o ataque e levantou

sérias questões sobre o envolvimento de Angola. Angola responsabiliza

a FLEC. Apenso como PROVA UM. 29. Em dezembro de 2011, o governo francês libertou o arquiteto declarado

dos ataques aparentemente porque suas alegações não eram críveis.3

A

FLEC também chegou a mesma conclusão. Uma investigação francesa ainda

está em andamento. 30. A posição da FLEC é de que o incidente de 08 de janeiro foi uma

provocação por um elemento do governo angolano para classificar a FLEC

como uma organização terrorista. A FLEC solicitou uma investigação

internacional. Angola usou o incidente para justificar execuções sumárias,

tortura e sequestro de supostos membros da FLEC e oposição civil não

filiada à FLEC dentro de Cabinda e do Congo.

D. Corrupção e Assassinato de Oficiais da FLEC.

31. Após o incidente de 08 de janeiro, Angola deu boas-vindas de forma

incongruente à deserção de vários oficiais de alto ranking da FLEC, os

mesmo oficiais que logicamente teriam sido responsáveis pelos ataques.

Estes incluíam o Vice-presidente da administração civil de Cabinda, o

comandante militar da FLEC e o Ministro de Segurança de Cabinda.

Nenhum destes foi preso ou acusado de terrorismo pelo governo de Angola.4

32. Após a deserção, pelo menos seis comandantes militares da FLEC foram assassinados em 2010-2011 em ou nas proximidades de Ponta Negra, Congo ou dentro de Cabinda inclusive o Chefe Operacional da FLEC, o

Comandante Sabata.5

33. Angola foi além e prendeu ou emitiu mandados de prisão para pelo menos 23 cabindas no exterior que logicamente e de facto não poderiam ter nada a ver com o incidente de 08 de janeiro, inclusive a liderança da FLEC e ex-membros de Mpalabanda. Vários indivíduos desta lista foram mortos ou

desertaram. 6

3 http://www.voanews.com/portuguese/news/01_25_12_Angola_Cabinda-138062653.html 4

http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89930 5

http://www.ibinda.com/noticias.php?noticia=1000091 6

http://www.ibinda.com/noticias.php?noticia=1000379

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E. Situação Actual

34. A empresa de petróleo nacional angolana anunciou que em 2013 a

extração comercial de petróleo irá começar no sul de Cabinda, “a Pluspetrol

da Argentina, Sonangol, Force Petroleum e a Cupet estatal Cubana

planejam iniciar a produção no bloco do poço de Castanha em Cabinda em

2012. Esta será a primeira vez em que haverá produção comercial de

petróleo em terra.7” Especula-se há tempos que as reservas de petróleo em

terra de Cabinda possam rivalizar as reservas marinhas. Caso seja verdade,

as reservas em terra podem ser uma das maiores fontes inexploradas de

petróleo na África 35. A FLEC considera que a hostilidade e a corrupção da actualidade são

sintomáticas de uma política oficial de Angola para fomentar confusão

dentro da FLEC a fim de evitar uma perturbação da extração de petróleo em

terra. Ao criar caos de forma deliberada em Cabinda, Angola justifica a sua

ocupação militar e pode colocar de lado qualquer crítica dos cabindas sobre

suas políticas de recursos. 36. O governo angolano instituiu uma política de recompensar oportunistas

que “desertam” em troca de dinheiro. Isto, por sua vez, cria uma situação

onde a violência é na realidade incentivada e recompensas para os grupos de

pressão armados são feitas ao invés da implementação de uma solução

económica abrangente – a dita “Síndrome Niger Delta.” 37. Em razão do aumento da violência, os cabindas verão um aumento da

repressão e a situação de segurança irá deteriorar para cidadãos comuns em

2012. F. A Posição Política da FLEC

38. A FLEC é uma representante legítima dos cabindas e é reconhecida de

tal forma desde pelo menos 1974. Consulte a PROVA DOIS. O MPLA

reconhece tal facto de forma implícita celebrando negociações

fragmentadas e recompensando comandantes renegados da FLEC e

políticos que fazem negociações utilizando o nome da FLEC para obter

lucro pessoal. O enganoso Acordo de Paz de Cabinda em 2006 também teve

como base a posição da FLEC embora a FLEC não tenha participado e

tenha repudiado o pacto.8

7 http://www.theafricareport.com/index.php/sectors/more-fuel-for-the-engine-51708618.html 8

http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61248

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39. A posição da FLEC é de que o destino político de Cabinda somente

pode ser decidido pelo povo de Cabinda em um referendo supervisionado

internacionalmente. O único acordo negociável aceitável é o que resulta

em uma eleição democrática para legitimar o status de sucessão do

protectorado português. A posição da FLEC é de que isto representa o

partido de total independência para Cabinda e não dá apoio a uma

autonomia ou união federal com Angola. A independência é o motivo da

existência da Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda. G. Análise Actual de Direitos Humanos

40. A situação deplorável de direitos humanos está entrelaçada com a

questão de recursos em Cabinda. Cabinda recomenda o relatório da

Human Rights Watch para a Comissão como uma reflexão precisa da

actual situação. Apenso como PROVA TRÊS. H. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 14

41. A FLEC considera que os recursos naturais de Cabinda devem ser

administrados amplamente para o benefício do povo de Cabinda. Cabinda é

um enclave sem qualquer valor militar ou estratégico para Angola, no

entanto, estima-se que ela fornece pelo menos metade da receita de petróleo

em Angola. Há um incentivo económico para Angola impedir que haja

qualquer desdobramento de Cabinda da Angola. 42. Embora um estado possa certamente conceder direitos de recursos em

nome do seu povo, é menos estabelecido se tais concessões forem legítimas

no caso de um povo dominando outro ou se uma concessão for feita ou

administrada de uma maneira irresponsável. Por exemplo, a União

Africana e as Nações Unidas têm apoiado as reivindicações do povo

saariano pelos recursos do Saara Ocidental embora a potência de ocupação,

o Marrocos, tenha conseguido explorar estes recursos com parceiros

estrangeiros. É desejável que quando um conflito deste tipo venha à tona

com relação ao rumo dos recursos económicos que haja um entendimento

antes que os recursos sejam esgotados. 43. Os cabindas afirmam que são um povo separado com um legado

histórico vinculado ao Congo e a Portugal invés do estado moderno de

Angola. A pedra fundamental desta declaração é o Tratado de Simulambuco

assinado em 1885 que criou um protectorado colonial português em

Cabinda, o dito Congo português. Os cabindas sempre mantiveram uma

identidade separada reforçada pela geografia de Cabinda que não é contígua

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a Angola. Linguisticamente, os cabindas falam o seu próprio idioma e

muitos falam francês devido a estarem circundados por países francófonos.

Os cabindas nunca foram consultados com relação à rescisão unilateral do

protectorado colonial português e nunca ratificaram a ocupação angolana.

Desde 1974, a FLEC tem mantido um governo civil dentro de porções de

Cabinda de forma contínua, principalmente em áreas não urbanas. A zona de

controle da FLEC mudou de configuração desde 1974 em diversas ocasiões.

Muitas das áreas de extração de recursos estão em ou nas proximidades da

zona FLEC. 44. A saída precipitada e mal preparada dos portugueses de Cabinda

contribuiu para milhares de mortes. A OUA, o Zaire e o Gabão todas em

alguma ocasião reconheceram as aspirações do povo cabinda; estas

esperanças foram frustradas pela conferência de Alvor em 1974 que

concedeu o protectorado de Cabinda a Angola. Independente da

conveniência política, na qualidade de povo separado, os cabindas não se

consideram angolanos e consideram o governo angolano uma ocupação

temporária até que a situação de Cabinda seja decidida por referendo. Os

cabindas que se subordinam ao regime angolano são conhecidos pelo termo

sarcástico “cabingolas”. I. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 19

45. A FLEC considera que a receita proveniente da extração de recursos em

terra irá fluir para Luanda da mesma forma que a receita marinha está a fluir

no momento. O enganoso “Acordo de Paz de Cabinda” de 2006 com Bento

Bembe supostamente prometeu um retorno de 50% da receita do petróleo

para Cabinda, esta promessa não foi cumprida ou auditada. Somente uma

pequena porcentagem, talvez 10% ou menos, irá retornar a Cabinda. A

FLEC embasa esta estimativa nas alocações actuais da receita marinha. Não

está claro se estes 10% também incluem o orçamento da FAA, o que não

beneficia o povo cabinda. Quaisquer tentativas de questionar esta alocação

tem acarretado em apreensões sumárias como no caso da investigadora

Sarah Wykes da Global Witness que foi presa pela polícia angolana e

acusada de espionagem após encontrar-se com representantes locais da

sociedade civil em Cabinda.9

46. Embora haja petróleo marinho em abundância, o desemprego em

Cabinda é bastante elevado. Pobreza, mortalidade infantil e doenças

também são mais elevadas do que na maioria das áreas de Angola.

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http://www.globalwitness.org/library/angola-anti-corruption-campaigner-still-unable-leave-cabinda-

angola

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47. A receita proveniente do petróleo marinho de confiança de Cabinda tem

subsidiado o governo de Angola e representa 50% da sua receita de petróleo;

portanto a receita em terra deve ser reservada ao povo de Cabinda.

48. Um retorno desigual do fluxo de receita para Cabinda proveniente tanto da

receita de petróleo em terra quanto da receita marinha é neocolonialismo predatório.

A administração angolana de Cabinda pode ser considerada predatória na medida

em que tem pouco apreço pelo fornecimento de bens públicos e incentivos para

facilitar o investimento de melhorias e aperfeiçoar o bem-estar da população em

geral. O governo de Angola abusa da sua autoridade política para maximizar a

receita com recursos naturais com o intuito de aumentar a sua própria riqueza e a

riqueza dos adeptos do MPLA, o que resulta em corrupção e queda económica em

Cabinda. J. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 20

49. Os cabindas são um povo distinto dos angolanos de modo geográfico, político,

linguístico e cultural. O único elo entre Cabinda e Angola foram actos pela ex-

potência colonizadora, Portugal, que uniu as administrações de angola e do

protectorado colonial de Cabinda iniciando-se em 1954 e sem autoridade legítima

cedeu Cabinda para a República de Angola na Conferência de Alvor. Angola tem

desde então tentado assimilar Cabinda sem sucesso. 50. Os cabindas têm direito ao desenvolvimento económico e social. No

momento, eles não conseguem exercer este direito porque organizações que

defendem um ponto de vista exclusivamente cabinda como a FLEC e a

Mpalabanda (Sociedade Civil de Cabinda) foram banidas pelo governo angolano. 51. Os cabindas que fazem campanha pela autodeterminação económica são

presos com frequência na qualidade de simpatizantes da FLEC. Estrangeiros que

identificaram corrupção económica em Cabinda foram presos. K. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 21

52. Ofertas de petróleo e direitos minerais em terra foram feitas pelo governo

angolano sem consultar os cabindas. Todas as decisões e concessões de contratos

e licenças são feitas por Luanda. Taxas de licenciamento e royalties são pagas

para Luanda. 53. Toda a gestão dos recursos em terra cabinda são geridos de Luanda ou por

corporações estrangeiras.

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54. O povo cabinda e os seus representantes, como a FLEC, não foram consultados

de forma adequada sobre a gestão dos seus recursos em terra.

55. Actividades de exploração de minerais e petróleo são feitas com medidas de

segurança junta à FAA. Os cabindas são retirados de forma sistemática das

proximidades dos projectos de perfuração. 56. A FLEC contesta legalmente o direito de Angola de destinar e explorar

recursos em terra e considera tais actividades como espoliação reparável por

meios jurídicos tanto contra Angola quanto contra seus licenciados em tribunais

de jurisdição competente fora de Angola. L. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 22

57. O povo de Cabinda é um povo distinto com direito a desenvolvimento

social e económico. 58. A política actual do governo de Angola é um de angolização de Cabinda.

Indivíduos e grupos que afirmam uma identidade cabinda são discriminados e/ou

presos de forma sistemática. M. Violações da Carta Africana Artigo 24

59. O ambiente actual não é útil ao intento do desenvolvimento de Cabinda. A

FLEC não busca um ambiente ideal, somente um que permita uma medida de

equidade para o povo de Cabinda. O regime actual permite que corporações como

a Chevron degenerem o ambiente sem medo de monitoramento civil ou

reparação pelo povo de Cabinda conforme explicado a seguir. N. O Exemplo da Chevron.

60. A subsidiária da Chevron, a Cabinda Gulf Oil (CABGOC), está em

actividade em Cabinda desde os tempos do protectorado colonial português em

1954. Embora tais operações não sejam o tópico desta queixa, elas são relevantes

porque proporcionam um indício das práticas económicas passadas e actuais em

Cabinda que violam a sessão da Carta Africana clamada acima. 61. A Chevron oferece no seu relatório de responsabilidades corporativas oficiais

alguns exemplos de sua generosidade com o povo cabinda. Estes projectos, no

entanto, são minúsculos em comparação com o petróleo e gás extraídos dos poços

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marinhos e faz pouco para atenuar as injustiças feitas com o povo cabinda desde a

traição dos portugueses junto ao protectorado em 1974.

62. O governo de Angola tem estações com aproximadamente 40.000 soldados e

sentinelas adicionais em Cabinda para proteger o território rico em recursos e a

sua receita. A Chevron pagou bilhões de dólares ao governo de Angola que, por

sua vez, perpetua esta ocupação e a concomitante violação de direitos humanos. A

FLEC não recebe nenhuma receita proveniente do petróleo e não tem quaisquer

patrocinadores externos de menção.

63. A exploração de petróleo e as actividades de produção da Chevron, inclusive

testes sísmicos, perfuração, despejo marinho de detritos de perfuração e água

produzida, actividades de alagamento e fractura, vazamentos de oleodutos,

vazamentos acidentais de petróleo e o uso de químicos como dispersantes

devastam a saúde humana e ambiental. Uma degradação ambiental parecida ou

pior pode ser esperada das actividades em terra sob o controle de Angola, não

necessariamente porque as empresas de petróleo não irão cumprir normas

ambientais e sim porque Angola tem pouco ou nenhum interesse em sacrificar a

receita com a produção em detrimento do meio ambiente em Cabinda. A ausência

da sociedade civil, da FLEC e da Mpalabanda em Cabinda impede o

monitoramento eficaz das actividades das empresas de petróleo. O estado de

repressão em Cabinda também dificulta, torna fútil ou impossível que cabindas

comuns postulem recompensa contra a Chevron ou outras empresas de petróleo.

64. A Chevron deslocou diversos trabalhos não operacionais para Luanda

inviabilizando o desenvolvimento da economia local. O complexo da Chevron em

Malongo tem segurança privada e todos os confortos da sociedade ocidental para

os sortudos expatriados e cabindas que moram lá, porém junto ao Malongo, os

cabindas não possuem serviços básicos como água potável, encanamento e

electricidade. Consulte “Chevron em Angola” extraído do the True Costs of

Chevron 2009 & 2010 Alternative Annual Reports, PROVA QUATRO também

no site www.truecostofchevron.com .

O. O Protectorado 65. Em 1885, Portugal e os governantes locais de Cabinda assinaram o Tratado de

Simulambuco que estabelece um protectorado colonial sobre a região. As

circunstâncias da administração portuguesa são muito bem documentadas. Cabinda

era administrada separadamente de Angola e nunca foi considerada parte de

Angola. Portugal violou o protectorado de forma unilateral transferindo Cabinda

16

para Angola na Conferência de Alvor. Até que um referendo supervisionado e

reconhecido internacionalmente seja feito em Cabinda,

66. Angola deve ser considerada sob a legislação internacional como uma

administradora construtiva do protectorado de Cabinda para o povo de Cabinda. Os

portugueses transferiram Cabinda para Angola sem consultar os cabindas. Angola

ocupa a posição de Portugal embora a sua propriedade de Cabinda seja ilegítima.

Contudo, a função de administrador deve ser imputada a Angola. Portanto, Angola

não pode abusar do seu dever de preservar e proteger os recursos de Cabinda para o

beneficio do povo cabinda. P. Mpalabanda

67. A Anistia Internacional divulgou uma declaração condenando vigorosamente

a proibição de Mpalabanda, declarando que, “A anistia internacional considera

os membros de [Mpalabanda] como defensores dos direitos humanos... O seu

fechamento irá tornar Cabinda uma área repleta de violações flagrantes dos

direitos humanos, sem uma organização de direitos humanos para monitorar e

registrar violações dos direitos humanos”. Ver PROVA CINCO. Q. Retaliação de Angola

68. A FLEC é considerada uma organização terrorista pelo governo de Angola.

Os cabindas arriscam sua vida e liberdade ao serem publicamente associados

com a FLEC. A FLEC tem conhecimento de que muitos cabindas desejam dar a

sua opinião com relação às questões discutidas na presente, mas não podem

fazer o mesmo por medo de represálias. Além disso, a FLEC não irá colocar os

cabindas em perigo disponibilizando os seus testemunhos na presente mesmo

quando tenha sido oferecido livremente. Q. Conclusão

69. Sob o protectorado colonial português de Cabinda, a autodeterminação de

Cabinda não foi realizada embora o colonialismo dos portugueses fosse beneficente

em comparação às violações de direitos humanos e corrupção de Angola. Cabinda é

uma entidade pequena tanto em população quanto em área geográfica embora de

vasta importância económica devido ao petróleo. As disparidades económicas

descritas acima são atribuídas pela FLEC ao neocolonialismo de Angola. Cabinda,

diferentemente de outras províncias de Angola, tem uma existência política singular

na qualidade de protectorado colonial. Tais protectorados coloniais frequentemente

progrediram e alcançaram soberania como no caso da Suazilândia, Gâmbia e

17

Botsuana. Angola, sem consentimento dado livremente pelo povo de Cabinda, não

pode revogar o status de protectorado que foi abandonado de forma unilateral por

Portugal e de facto assumida por Angola. Até que os cabindas ratifiquem a

anexação de Angola, o governo angolano é o administrador construtivo de

Cabinda, mas não o seu governante legítimo.

70. A providência solicitada pela FLEC não exige uma apuração específica de

culpa pela Comissão contra Angola. Ao invés disso, a FLEC deseja que a

Comissão tome uma posição proactiva de apuração neutra de factos por um

Relator Especial. O raciocínio da FLEC é o seguinte: 1. Uma conclusão parajudicial terá pouco efeito em Angola, a qual irá ignorar

qualquer crítica percebida. Isto, por sua vez, desgasta o valor da decisão e o

prestígio do processo da Carta Africana e por fim da Comissão. O valor

vinculante é da mesma forma limitado.

2. A nomeação de um Relator Especial é uma solução mais inclusiva. Este

processo permite opiniões de outros seguimentos da sociedade de Cabinda além da

FLEC que são incapazes ou não estão dispostos a arriscar sofrer represálias da

MPLA e do governo de Angola por estarem associadas à FLEC. 3. Os direitos descritos na presente e as violações da presente se enquadram no tipo

adotado no the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights / Nigeria (155/96) e são portanto adequadas para a

ação da comissão.

R. Solicitação para a Convocação de Testemunhas 71. Se a Comissão acreditar que poderia ser útil, a liderança da FLEC se

disponibilizaria para interrogatório e solicitaria da Comissão a garantia de sua

passagem segura, viagem com proteção e acomodações. S. Solicitação de Reparação

1. Nomeação de um Relator Especial para averiguar factos e fazer

recomendações sobre as questões discutidas na presente. 2. A disponibilidade da intervenção da Comissão caso considerados úteis para

auxiliar nas questões discutidas na presente. 3. Custas e honorários advocatícios no valor de US$50.000 a serem pagos

pelo governo de Angola ao representante legal da FLEC.

4. Outras conclus6es ou reparagdes conforme exigidas pela Comissflo.

Enviadas respeitosamente neste dia 15 de fevereiro de20l2:

{asslnatura} {carimbo - JONAT}IAN LIVY ADVOGADO BARREAU PENAL}

Legal daAutoraFLEC

18

PROVA UM

Página 1 de 9

República de Kabinda Relatório da Comissão sobre o incidente togolês de 08

de janeiro de 2010

Sumário Executivo

Por ordem do Premiê Joel Batila da República de Kabinda, a Comissão de 08 de janeiro foi formada para investigar o ataque fatal do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 feito contra a equipe de futebol togolesa em sua viajem de ônibus do Congo para Cabinda.

Os membros da Comissão são:

Membro da Comissão – Gabriel Homem: República de Kabinda, Ministro de Segurança Interna

Membro da Comissão – Advogado Clement Chigbo – Promotor Especial da República de Kabinda

Presidente da Comissão – Dr. Jonathan levy, Advogado da República de Kabinda e da FLEC.

Escopo da Investigação: os eventos que culminaram, durante e depois, nos eventos de 08 de janeiro de 2010.

Perguntas a serem respondidas:

1. Como ocorreram os eventos do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010?

2. Quem foi o responsável pelo resultado fatal?

3. Por que os elementos da FLEC inicialmente assumiram responsabilidade e em seguida mudaram suas posições?

4. Ações de Angola e da FLEC após o dia 08 de janeiro.

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5. Conclusões e recomendações.

Quem é a FLEC

A FLEC é a Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda. Há apenas uma FLEC.

Muitos indivíduos e grupos, inclusive os agentes angolanos, usam o nome da FLEC como parte da sua

campanha de desinformação.

Uma campanha contínua de desinformação atribuída ao governo angolano alega que a FLEC está fraca e

dividida. Este não é o caso. A FLEC está forte e unida e tem células e brigadas jovens em todas as cidades,

municípios e vilarejos de Cabinda.

A imprensa tem sido enganada por frentes virtuais falsas da FLEC e impostores visíveis na internet, mas

desconhecidos dentro de Cabinda. Dentre estes impostores angolanos, o “Comandante” Lopes, Rodrigues

Mingas e Rui Gabirro também conhecido como “Mangovo Ngoya” se destacam como os piores infratores.

O “comandante” Lopes não comanda nada a não ser um site longo e estagnado – Cabinda.org. Suspeita-se que

Lopes esteja envolvido com fraude imigratória e de asilo político na França com a emissão dos ditos cartões de

identidade de Cabinda idealizados e fabricados por ele mesmo. O seu site serve para enganar o público e

“ocupa” os direitos legítimos da FLEC a tal domínio de internet.

O RT Hon Mangovo Ngoyo Mwana Kabinda, dito “Secretário para os Assuntos Estrangeiros da República de

Cabinda e Membro da Regência de Cabinda”, é Rui Gabirro, um cidadão português, filho de colonialistas

portugueses. Gabirro também se intitula ilusoriamente como “Duque de Cabinda” e estabeleceu uma

operação fantasia chamada de Federação de Estados Livres da África, um dito banco fraudulento e uma

universidade falsa.

O seu “governo” da República Federal de Cabinda inclui Rodrigues Mingas. Gabirro também vende

passaportes, moedas e selos que são de propriedade legal da FLEC. Gabirro também infiltrou grupos de jovens

angolanos anti-MPLA no começo deste ano e interveio na qualidade de porta-voz seguindo o exemplo de

Mingas. Vários anti-Santos foram então presos em Luanda.

Infelizmente, Lopes e Gabirro fizeram uma ocupação cibernética em dois domínios de alto nível, Cabinda.org e

Cabinda.net difamando a causa da FLEC ao olhos da imprensa e do público.

A FLEC é uma organização estável com bases de operação na França e nas imediações de Ponta Negra, Congo.

A FLEC é universalmente distinguida dentro de Cabinda como a única força crível de autodeterminação. A FLEC

tem forças, células e brigadas jovens para se defender espalhadas por Cabinda.

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A FLEC e a luta pela autodeterminação em Cabinda têm sido o movimento de autodeterminação africano mais

persistente e longo que existe desde 1963 e, mesmo contra tudo, tem isolado mercenários das empresas de

petróleo, cubanos, portugueses, sul-africanos e as forças da MPLA, FNLN e UNITA. No momento, a FLEC dá

ênfase à resolução de conflitos sem violência e tem um caso pendente com a comissão da união africana com

relação ao petróleo e aos recursos minerais em terra. A liderança da República de Cabinda e a FLEC não

desejam ver Cabinda virar um campo de batalha sangrento como quando ocorrido durante a guerra civil

angolana entre a UNITA e a MPLA.

Embora a FLEC tenha a capacidade de convocar greves gerais e rebeliões, ela tem de forma deliberada refreado tais ações com o intuito de poupar a população civil que mal consegue sobreviver sob o regime neocolonial angolano. A ênfase actual da FLEC é a de resolução de conflitos através de organizações internacionais, legislação internacional, ajuda a refugiados e educação. A FLEC não é uma organização terrorista e condena o terrorismo, inclusive os eventos de 08 de janeiro.

Eventos Culminantes do dia 08 de janeiro

Foi dada pouca atenção aos eventos que antecederam a copa africana pela FLEC. O testemunho do coronel congolês Cosmas Nzaou indica que detectives desconhecidos no cruzamento da fronteira do Congo com Cabinda distribuíram panfletos antes do dia 08 de janeiro de 2010 avisando sobre os ataques. A FLEC, no entanto, não tinha conhecimento disto e o coronel indica que a fonte dos panfletos pode ter sido a polícia secreta angolana ao invés da FLEC.

Oficiais da Copa da África também avisaram todos os grupos a respeito do uso dos cruzamentos na fronteira, mesmo assim o ônibus da equipe togolesa foi colocado no trajeto do cruzamento da fronteira pelas autoridades angolanas diretamente de encontro a uma emboscada.

Embora a FLEC tenha operações ao longo do norte da fronteira congolesa, os comandos da FLEC geralmente permanecem longe dos cruzamentos que são altamente fortificados na fronteira. Conflitos entre a FLEC e a FAA (exército angolano) têm acontecido em regiões remotas de Cabinda durante os últimos cinco anos e não em municípios com alta guarnição em parte para evitar vítimas civis. Quase todas as operações da FLEC desde 2006 têm como alvo as actividades neocoloniais que envolvem a extração de recursos pela MPLA e os seus empreiteiros estrangeiros. Tais incidentes têm sido curtos e inconstantes.

Reuniões para colectar informações com a liderança da FLEC indicam que não houve nenhuma campanha para ter como alvo a Copa da África e que qualquer campanha de entrega de panfletos não se originou da FLEC. As operações da FLEC tipicamente têm como alvo as forças do MPLA da FAA fora de áreas civis. Além de ter como alvo a FAA, a FLEC também interrompeu a exploração de minerais e petróleo após avisar que tais operações eram ilegais e não seriam toleradas.

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Os Eventos do dia 08 de janeiro 2010

Os organizadores da Copa da África alegam que os participantes foram avisados a não entrar em Cabinda por cruzamentos terrestres, no entanto, a existência de uma escolta da FAA angolana indica que o ônibus estava coordenado e era conhecido da FAA.

O vilarejo de Tchikamba é uma área aberta no meio das guarnições da FAA. Existe uma posição de morteiro nas proximidades. É um local extremamente improvável para as operações da FLEC.

De acordo com depoimentos de testemunhas oculares, quando o ônibus entrou foi emboscado por homens armados. Um tiroteio se iniciou com a escolta da FAA e os passageiros do ônibus sofreram baixas antes que os agressores se retirassem.

Depois do ataque não houve aparentemente nenhuma perseguição eficaz da FAA apesar dos supostos avisos distribuídos previamente e aparente alto estado de alerta existente na área.

É incontestável que algum grupo armado bem preparado atacou o comboio que era composto de vários veículos militares, um ônibus da equipe e batedores. Ao menos três pessoas foram mortas e oito ficaram feridas.

Consequências do dia 08 de janeiro

Dentro de horas após o ataque, um indivíduo relativamente desconhecido, Rodrigues Mingas, se responsabilizou pelo ataque. Mingas, em diversas ligações bem coordenadas com a imprensa internacional de um telefone celular registrado na França, alegou chefiar algo chamado FLEC Posição Militar ou FLEC-PM. Mingas concedeu entrevistas por telefone e por algum tempo colocou material na internet incluindo a sua própria foto em uniforme militar. A imprensa em geral aceitou Mingas como um representante legítimo da FLEC.

Não há evidência, em depoimento ou de outra forma, que a organização de Mingas existia antes dos eventos do dia 08 de janeiro embora Mingas tenha alegado que a FLEC PM tinha sido fundada em 2003. Mingas tinha de facto sido barrado por muitos anos da FLEC devido à associação da família dele com a MPLA em Angola. É inconcebível que Mingas, operando da França ou até mais implausível de Angola e sozinho, poderia ter recrutado e treinado um grupo militar em um dos setores mais militarizados de Cabinda.

Mingas alegou que o ataque foi incidental visto que “suas forças” não tinham nenhuma ideia de que o ônibus estava transportando a equipe togolesa e tinha pensado que este era um comboio da FAA.

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Mingas deu a impressão que seu grupo estava patrulhando a região da fronteira, viu um comboio com seus binóculos e decidiu atacá-lo no local. Mingas em seguida ameaçou fazer mais ataques durante os jogos da Copa da África.

Mingas disse que o seu grupo tinha escrito dois meses antes do ataque para Issa Haayatou, o chefe da Confederação Africana de Futebol, para avisar do problema iminente. Não há nenhuma confirmação que tal carta tenha jamais existido.

A FLEC PM também era desconhecida do ex-general Boma das forças armadas da FLEC assim como do Comandante da Frente Norte, Sabata, posteriormente traído e assassinado nas mãos da FAA angolana. Mingas e a FLEC PM eram desconhecidos da liderança da FLEC no exterior. Mingas, no entanto, alegou ser o Secretário Geral da FLEC em seus comunicados. Nada mais foi jamais ouvido falar da FLEC PM.

Em janeiro de 2011, Mingas foi preso pelas autoridades francesas sob suspeita de terrorismo, no entanto ele foi liberado no dia 18 de janeiro de 2012 após ter sido aparentemente julgado inocente apesar das suas admissões em público. O governo francês chegou a conclusão que era de facto impossível Mingas cometer os actos que confessou ter feito. Mingas foi agora decretado um impostor.

Alegações Confusas e Estranhas da FLEC

No dia 10 de janeiro de 2011, o ex-general Boma da FLEC anunciou uma atitude de não violência durante o restante da Copa Africana. Ele, no entanto, não esclareceu a responsabilidade pelos eventos do dia 08 de janeiro nem condenou Mingas.

Seguindo os passos da provocação de Mingas com a imprensa, o neto do Presidente fez declarações sem autorização plena à imprensa em nome da FLEC. Ele afirmou que a FLEC e não Mingas foi responsável pelo ataque. Acerca do dia 12 de janeiro de 2011, em uma declaração junto à imprensa internacional, Jean Claude Nzita acusou mingas de ser um oportunista e assumiu responsabilidade pelo ataque em nome da FLEC.

Jean Claude Nzita não era um oficial da FLEC e não tinha autorização para fazer declarações em nome da FLEC. Sua única conexão com a FLEC era a sua relação familiar com o Presidente de longa data da FLEC. Jean Claude Nzita é um residente da Suíça e tem tido pouca, se alguma, negociação com a FLEC em anos recentes. Não se sabe o que possa ter provocado a sua declaração e personificação de um porta-voz oficial da FLEC. Contudo, a imprensa internacional divulgou as declarações como críveis.

Coincidentemente com a declaração de seu neto, o Presidente da FLEC assumiu responsabilidade pelos ataques. O Secretário Geral da FLEC Joel Batila, no entanto, negou qualquer responsabilidade da FLEC. O Presidente, no entanto, ignorou Batila e alegou que Batila não estava plenamente informado. Batila, no entanto, não mudou sua posição.

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Como se tivesse recebido um sinal, Rui Gabirro anunciou a formação de um governo da República de Cabinda com ele e Mingas como ministros. Para acrescentar à confusão, um indivíduo desconhecido alegando ser o Ministro da Defesa da República de Cabinda, Tiburcio Tati Tchingobo, negou responsabilidade, mas acusou outros grupos da FLEC em Cabinda. Tudo isso foi transmitido pela imprensa internacional. A imprensa relatou que Tchingobo fazia parte da República Federal de Cabinda.

Uma discussão interna da FLEC se iniciou e o Presidente retratou qualquer envolvimento da FLEC no dia 14 de janeiro de 2011. O comunicado indicava que Mingas era um agente angolano conhecido e que a FLEC PM era pura invenção. O comunicado, no entanto, não explicava as óbvias contradições de tal declaração.

A FLEC então indicou em uma carta autorizada por Batila que prestaria toda a cooperação possível à FIFA em uma investigação do incidente. A FIFA encaminhou a oferta à Federação Africana de Futebol a qual, porém não deu uma resposta.

A Reação de Angola

A reação angolana foi significativa e constante – apreensões e detenções de cabindas dentro de Cabinda e do Congo. As apreensões começaram quase logo após o incidente e tem continuado de forma incansável. O incidente de 08 de janeiro era um mero pretexto para as apreensões já que muitos dos indivíduos apreendidos nem mesmo tinham ligação com a FLEC e não estavam nas imediações do ataque nem plausivelmente poderiam ter qualquer conexão com o mesmo. O seu único crime era a suposta oposição ao domínio angolano em Cabinda.

Angola também emitiu uma dita “lista” com líderes da FLEC os quais considerou responsáveis pelo dia 08 de janeiro e quer tais apreendidos como terroristas.

Tentativa de Golpe de Estado

Em julho de 2010, o chefe militar da FLEC, Stanislas Boma, o vice-presidente Alexandre Tati, chefe de segurança Carlos Luembe e o ministro de assuntos estrangeiros Luis Veras, sem qualquer autoridade aparente, viajaram para Luanda e posteriormente declararam o fim da luta armada. O Presidente repudiou o evento após o facto, no entanto, nenhuma explicação foi fornecida de como os quatro oficiais superiores de linha de frente da FLEC foram corrompidos ou autorizados a ir a Luanda. A liderança renegada da FLEC curiosamente não foi acusada de quaisquer crimes em conexão com o dia 08 de janeiro levantando ainda mais dúvidas. Contudo, estes quatro indivíduos teriam logicamente sido responsáveis pelos eventos do dia 08 de janeiro se estivessem comprometidos pela FLEC conforme Angola tem alegado. A deserção obviamente comprometeu todas as operações da FLEC em Cabinda e seus arredores.

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Assassinato dos Comandantes da FLEC

O Chefe Militar da FLEC Pirilampo foi sequestrado do Congo, torturado e assassinado pelos angolanos em março de 2011. Muito provavelmente ele foi traído pelos indivíduos de dentro da FLEC.

Este golpe foi seguido de sequestro, tortura e assassinato do Comandante Sabato da Frente Norte duas semanas depois sob circunstâncias parecidas.

A facção de Bomo e Tati em Luanda aparentemente teve conhecimento do evento.

Desde julho de 2011, ao menos meia dúzia de oficiais da FLEC foram sequestrados, assassinados ou emboscados pelas forças angolanas inclusive Vinagre, Buna Roi, Damas Makunda, Larry, Dominique Makoumbou e Razao. Há suspeita de traição em todos estes casos também.

Estes assassinatos entre fronteiras foram justificados por Angola com base no incidente de 08 de janeiro e como uma resposta à alegação de terrorismo pela FLEC.

Conclusões

1. Os eventos de 08 de janeiro implicam a polícia angolana e possivelmente o Congo DTC. As identidades exatas dos atiradores são desconhecidas, porém eles não estavam agindo mediante as ordens da FLEC.

2. Mingas, Jean Claude Nzita e Gabirro cumpriram as ordens da MPLA após o dia 08 de janeiro propagando desinformação e se colocando como representantes legítimos da FLEC em um conluio para implica a FLEC como uma organização terrorista e justificar a violência angolana que resultou em assassinatos e apreensões ilegais. Estes indivíduos prejudicaram bastante a FLEC e são indiretamente responsáveis pelas execuções sumárias realizadas pela MPLA após o dia 08 de janeiro de 2010.

3. A facção Tati e Boma traiu a FLEC ao desertar para a MPLA. As mortes dos comandantes militares da FLEC recaem sobre eles.

4. A posição do Presidente indica no mínimo uma interrupção fatal na comunicação em um momento crucial e uma incapacidade de conter uma grande crise.

Recomendações

1. Para que a FLEC sobreviva ela deve instituir medidas de segurança internas sólidas, é

inaceitável que seus comandantes de linha de frente sejam assassinados, no que parece,

de forma arbitrária pelos angolanos sobre o pretexto de 08 de janeiro.

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2. Os FLECs falsos devem ser extirpados e legalmente destruídos – Gabirro, Mingas, Lopes e

Nzita Mbemba Antonio devem ser impedidos de usar o nome da FLEC de maneira falsa

para fornecer desinformação, para obter lucro e para colaborar com a MPLA.

3. As ditas negociações em andamento com Luanda devem cessar enquanto os comandantes

de linha de frente da FLEC forem mortos arbitrariamente em violação da lei internacional.

4. A FLEC deve agir para repudiar a cadeia de eventos lamentáveis iniciadas em 08 de janeiro

e chamar a atenção em voz alta quanto ao envolvimento angolano nas mortes de

desportistas inocentes para promover a campanha da FAA contra a FLEC.

5. Os indivíduos que estão implicados neste relatório devem ser convocados para explicar

suas ações. Se os membros da FLEC ou os ex-membros da FLEC colaboraram com os

angolanos em 08 de janeiro, eles devem ser expostos e levados à justiça também.

6. Os eventos de 08 de janeiro devem ser investigados por uma organização internacional. A

FLEC apresenta acusações de terrorismo apoiado por estado contra o governo de Angola.

As vítimas são togoleses, cabindas e membros da FLEC.

7. A FLEC envia este relatório à Comissão de Paz e Segurança da União Africana, à

Confederação Africana de Futebol e ao Órgão da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da

África do Sul sobre Defesa e Segurança para maiores investigações e ações.

Enviado ao Premiê Batila: Levy Homem Chigbo

20 de janeiro de 2012

Recebido por: janeiro 22/01/2012 {assinatura} Dr. Joel Batila, Premiê da República de Kabinda {carimbo –República de Kabinda}

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Copies for action to: Mr. MARTIN A. EWI ANTI-TERRORISM ANALYST PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT COMMISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION P.O. BOX 3243 ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA Confederation of African Football Executive Committee 3 Abdel Khalek Sarwat Street El Hay El Motamayez, P.O. Box 23, 6th October City Egypt South African Development Community Organ on Defense and Security PO Box 0095 Gaborone, Botswana

jonlevy

Text Box

EXHIBIT TWO

H U M A N

R I G H T S

W A T C H

Angola

“They Put Me in the Hole”Military Detention, Torture and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda

“They Put Me in the Hole”

Military Detention, Torture, and Lack of

Due Process in Cabinda

Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-503-2 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 hrwnyc@hrw.org Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 berlin@hrw.org Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 hrwbe@hrw.org 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 hrwgva@hrw.org 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 hrwuk@hrw.org 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 paris@hrw.org 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 hrwdc@hrw.org Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org

June 2009 1-56432-503-2

“They Put Me in the Hole” Military Detention, Torture, and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda

I. Glossary of Acronyms ...................................................................................................... 1

II. Summary ........................................................................................................................ 2

III. Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 4

To the President and Government of Angola ................................................................... 4

IV. Methodology ................................................................................................................. 5

V. Background .................................................................................................................... 6

VI. Individuals Arrested for Security Crimes since September 2007 ..................................... 8

1. Fernando Lelo and co-accused FAA members .............................................................. 9

2. Persons Arrested in Rural Areas ................................................................................. 10

3. Former FLEC Members Arrested in the DRC and Cabinda ............................................ 10

VII. Abuses by the Angolan Armed Forces ......................................................................... 12

Arbitrary Arrests ............................................................................................................. 12

Incommunicado Detention ............................................................................................ 13

Torture in Military Custody ............................................................................................. 14

VIII. Treatment in Civilian Prisons ..................................................................................... 20

IX. Violations of Due Process Rights ................................................................................. 21

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 25

Annex: Persons Held for Security Charges at Yabi Prison .................................................. 26

Current Detainees ......................................................................................................... 26

Previous Known Detainees ............................................................................................ 27

1 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

I. Glossary of Acronyms

ANR Congolese National Intelligence Service (Agence Nationale de

Renseignement)

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

FAA Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas)

FCD Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (Fórum Cabindês do Diálogo)

FLEC Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente de Libertação do

Enclave de Cabinda)

FLEC-FAC Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda – Cabindan Armed Forces

(Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas

Cabindesas)

GOI Operative Intelligence Group (Grupo Operativo de Inteligência)

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

MPLA Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (Movimento Popular de

Libertação de Angola)

OAA Angolan Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados de Angola)

UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional

para a Independência Total de Angola)

VOA Voice of America

“They Put Me in the Hole” 2

II. Summary

At least 38 people who have been arrested by Angolan military and intelligence officials in

Cabinda, Angola’s oil-rich enclave, from September 2007 to March 2009 have been

subjected to torture and cruel or inhumane treatment in military custody and been denied

basic due process rights as well as the right to a fair trial. The detainees are accused by the

authorities of involvement in armed opposition in Cabinda in the context of a separatist

insurgency.

The intensity of the armed conflict in Cabinda has declined as a result of large-scale

counterinsurgency operations in 2002-2003, and the government publicly claims that the

Cabinda conflict came to a close in 2006, when a peace agreement was signed with a faction

of the rebel Liberation Front for the Independence of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). But the

campaign for independence remains unresolved, and sporadic guerrilla attacks have been

ongoing.

Despite its insistence that the insurgency is no longer active, the military’s systematic

arbitrary detention and torture of people in Cabinda suggests that the government has

resorted to unlawful means to retaliate against people with perceived sympathy for the

FLEC’s armed independence campaign. Angolan military and intelligence services have a

widespread presence in the small territory, and they have intimidated and harassed people

with perceived dissident views.

Human Rights Watch has previously reported on government intimidation in Cabinda. In a

February 2009 report on the parliamentary elections of September 2008, Human Rights

Watch showed how the government has continued to use security concerns in Cabinda to

justify restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and movement, as well as

arbitrary arrests and unfair trials. In December 2008, Human Rights Watch called attention to

the Angolan government’s use of torture and unfair trials in state security cases, in

connection with 14 civilians who were arbitrarily detained and tortured in military custody in

Cabinda.

This report extends that work with new first-hand, field-based information and shows a

disturbing pattern of human rights violations during pre-trial detention of persons accused

of state security crimes in Cabinda. In most of the 38 cases that Human Rights Watch

investigated, those accused of security crimes endured arbitrary arrests, lengthy

3 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

incommunicado detention, and interrogations under torture in military custody. All 38

detainees were eventually brought to the judicial authorities and a civilian detention facility.

But trial records in several cases show that due process rights were violated.

In addition to providing further detail on the high-profile case of Fernando Lelo, a former

Voice of America correspondent who was convicted of national security crimes in September

2008, this report also draws attention to those cases that have attracted much less public

attention and risk being overlooked.

The Angolan government should immediately adopt all necessary measures to ensure that

the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) act in accordance with Angola’s obligations under

international human rights and humanitarian law. In particular, the government should

ensure, in accordance with Angolan law, that the armed forces promptly transfer individuals

detained for security crimes to the competent civilian authorities, hold them according to

international standards for pre-trial detention, and provide a prompt and fair trial.

The Angolan courts should also promptly review the proceedings against detainees currently

or previously held for state security offenses, and then release unconditionally or fairly retry

individuals convicted in trials that violated basic fair trial standards. The Angolan

government should investigate allegations of serious human rights violations by members of

the military and intelligence services, and prosecute alleged perpetrators.

In order to prevent further abuses, the Angolan government should set up an independent

and impartial inquiry into human rights violations allegedly committed by the Angolan

Armed Forces and branches of intelligence in Cabinda and establish mechanisms to

compensate victims of torture and arbitrary detention.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 4

III. Recommendations

To the President and Government of Angola

• Take all necessary measures to ensure that the Angolan Armed Forces act in

accordance with Angola’s obligations under international human rights and

humanitarian law.

• Ensure that persons taken into custody are promptly brought before an independent

officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power, and held only in official places of

detention; that all detainees are provided with immediate and regular access to

family members and legal counsel, and that criminal proceedings are in accordance

with international fair trial standards.

• Ensure that coerced confessions, particularly those made under torture, are not

admitted as evidence against persons at trial and that prosecutors and judges have

the independence to investigate torture and illegal detention by any branch of the

military and domestic intelligence services, free from obstruction or interference.

• Release prisoners that have been convicted in unfair trials or appropriately retry

them in accordance with international fair trial standards.

• Provide adequate remedies, including compensation, for persons arbitrarily arrested

or tortured or otherwise mistreated in detention.

• Ensure that military and intelligence officers committing torture or other human

rights violations against persons in their custody are appropriately disciplined or

prosecuted.

• Allow independent scrutiny of detention facilities where detainees allege having

been held illegally and tortured by security forces, including the detention center at

the headquarters of the second regional command of the Angolan Armed Forces and

all military garrisons.

• Set up an independent and impartial inquiry into human rights violations committed

by the Angolan Armed Forces and branches of intelligence services, including the

arbitrary detention of persons in military custody.

• Ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol and allow visits by the Protocol’s

Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture.

5 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

IV. Methodology

Between March 2008 and March 2009, a Human Rights Watch researcher visited the

Angolan enclave province of Cabinda (capital and municipality of Cacongo) three times and

conducted interviews there, in Luanda, and elsewhere. The researcher interviewed 60

persons, in person, by phone, or email, including lawyers, members of religious groups and

civil society organizations, activists, journalists, diplomats and officials of the government,

military, police, and the judiciary. In March 2009, the researcher also conducted in-person

group and individual interviews with 20 persons detained at Yabi prison in Cabinda who had

been charged with “crimes against the security of the State” and related crimes. Interviews

with detainees were conducted freely, without interference or the presence of government

officials. Yet, provincial government, military, and police officials were less open for Human

Rights Watch interviews in March 2009 than previously. In response to official meeting

requests, most claimed being unavailable. The researcher also consulted legal documents

referring to the cases. The initials of detainees whose accounts were quoted have been

changed to protect their security.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 6

V. Background

The Angolan enclave province of Cabinda, with an estimated population of 300,000, is

separated from the country’s other 17 provinces by a strip of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC). It produces half of Angola’s oil.

The armed separatist FLEC movement, founded in 1963, first fought for independence from

Portugal, Angola’s colonial rulers, and then from Angola itself when Angola became

independent in 1975. Following the end of a civil war in Angola in 2002 between the

government, dominated by the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), and the

main opposition movement, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),

the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) re-deployed some 30,000 government soldiers to Cabinda

to wipe out the remaining separatist insurgency. These military efforts led to the destruction

of FLEC’s main bases in the interior and considerably weakened the guerrilla’s military

capacity.

In 2004, Human Rights Watch documented human rights violations against civilians in

Cabinda in the course of these counter-insurgency operations, including extrajudicial killings,

arbitrary detention, torture, and excessive restrictions on freedom of movement. According

to that research, most of the human rights violations were committed by the Angolan Armed

Forces with impunity.1 In 2004, the government claimed that the war in Cabinda was over,

but dialogue would continue. However, successive attempts to reach a formal peace

agreement with several wings of the FLEC remained unsuccessful, and sporadic insurgent

attacks continued.

In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Angolan government and

António Bento Bembe, the former leader of the FLEC Renovada wing and president of the

Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), sought to formally end the armed conflict. The FCD had

been established in 2004 as a joint commission including representatives of the two main

FLEC factions—FLEC Renovada and FLEC-FAC—as well as members of civil society and the

churches, to facilitate peace negotiations with the government. The MOU included an

1 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Between War and Peace in Cabinda, briefing paper, December 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/12/22/angola-oil-rich-cabinda-army-abuses-civilians. Local civil society, including the civic association of Cabinda, Mpalabanda, and the Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission also issued several human rights reports detailing abuses in Cabinda, most of them by the FAA.

7 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

amnesty, a demobilization and reintegration plan for former FLEC combatants, and the

allocation of a number of government posts to a range of former FLEC officials.2

The peace agreement, however, has enjoyed little credibility in Cabinda, because the most

active FLEC wing, FLEC-FAC, as well as other members of the FCD, had been excluded from

the talks, and no political concessions were made to the separatists. The armed insurgency

has continued, but since 2006 the government has claimed the war ended in Cabinda and

has attributed continuing sporadic attacks to “bandits.” FLEC-FAC has claimed responsibility

for a number of armed attacks targeting government forces and expatriate workers of private

companies. The intensity of the armed conflict and the level of serious human rights

violations have decreased since 2004, but the FAA presence is proportionately higher in

Cabinda than elsewhere in Angola today, suggesting the government’s continuing concern

about the separatist movement.

Despite the peace agreement in 2006, freedom of expression and association remains

restricted in Cabinda. The government has used state security concerns to crack down on

peaceful opposition and scrutiny. In late 2006 and early 2007, two high-profile civil society

activists were arrested for alleged state security crimes in Cabinda and were later released,

following local and international public pressure, without having been formally charged.3 In

July 2006, the provincial court banned the civic association of Cabinda, Mpalabanda,

founded in 2003, and alleged that the organization had incited violence and acted as a

political party campaigning for Cabinda’s independence. The new bishop who took office in

June 2006 temporarily dissolved the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, which had

been essential to documenting human rights violations since 2002. As a result, local and

international organizations have struggled to obtain independent information from the

interior to corroborate allegations of human rights abuses committed by both the FAA and

FLEC since 2006.

2 The Memorandum of Understanding for Peace and Reconciliation in the Province of Cabinda was signed on August 1, 2006 and approved by the Angolan parliament on August 16, 2006. See Resolution 27-B/06 of August 16, 2006, published in the state gazette (Diário da República) on August 16, 2006. 3 Raul Danda, then spokesperson of the civic association Mpalabanda, was arrested under state security charges on September 29, 2006 in Cabinda, allegedly for carrying newspaper articles that expressed criticism of the government’s policy in Cabinda. He was released on November 3, 2006 and later formally pardoned under the amnesty law, despite never having been charged. Sarah Wykes, a campaigner for the international organization Global Witness, was arrested in Cabinda on February 18, 2007 under alleged charges of espionage, and was later released and allowed to leave the country in March 2007.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 8

VI. Individuals Arrested for Security Crimes since September 2007

Officially, since the MOU in 2006, the Angolan government has denied the continued

existence of an armed FLEC guerrilla movement. Senior FAA and police officials explained to

Human Rights Watch in March 2008 that those people who were arrested for national

security crimes were “bandits who oppose development,”4 or “people who still identify with

FLEC, seeking to call attention to compromise the government’s cooperation with countries

and companies.”5 Bento Bembe—former FLEC Renovada and FCD leader and current minister

without portfolio—explained to Human Rights Watch in March 2009 that “those people

cannot be from the FLEC, because I represent the guerrillas.”6 However, the cases

documented in this report clearly contradict this claim, as many of the charges in the cases

refer to alleged involvement in concrete acts of armed insurgency. Court records also often

explicitly refer to alleged cooperation with FLEC-FAC.

Between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 persons, including six members of

the Angolan Armed Forces, (see list in Annex) were arrested by military and intelligence

agents for alleged “crimes against the security of the State,” including armed rebellion and

sabotage, and other crimes relating to the armed FLEC insurgency in Cabinda, such as

homicide, illegal possession of arms, and desertion. The Angolan law on crimes against the

security of the state from 1978, which allows for up to 215 days pre-trial detention,7 includes

an overly broad and ambiguous range of offenses: “Every and any act, not provided for by

law, that endangers or may endanger the security of the State...”8

All 38 detainees were initially held in military custody for long periods—from 26 days to six

months—before being transferred to the civilian prison at Yabi in Cabinda and brought either

before a prosecutor or to be formally charged or before a judge.9 So far, two trials have taken

place, as a result of which seven persons were convicted and four were acquitted.

4 Human Rights Watch interview with Miguel José Luís Muhonga, provincial first superintendent and second commander of the National Police, Cabinda, March 26, 2008. 5 Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Antonino Pessala, spokesperson of the second regional command of the FAA, Cabinda, March 27, 2008. 6 Human Rights Watch interview with General Bento Bembe, Luanda, March 26, 2009. 7 Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da prisão preventiva em instrução preparatória), arts. 25-26, allows 90 days pre-trial detention in cases of crimes against the security of the state, which can be extended three times for 45, 45 and 35 days. 8 Law on crimes against the security of the State (Law 17/78 of May 26, 1978), art. 26. 9 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in article 9 requires that “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him” and

9 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

The 38 individuals targeted, arrested and charged can roughly be grouped into three

categories:

1. Fernando Lelo and co-accused FAA members

The Angolan Armed Forces in September 2007 arrested six FAA personnel: António Santos

Nguimbi (soldier), Lourenço Ila Dembe (soldier), Alberto Suami (1st sergeant), Alberto João

Chimbinda (soldier), Basílio Muanda (1st corporal), and Custódio Nguimbi Sumbo (1st

sergeant). Their arrests led to the November 15, 2007 arrest of former Voice of America (VOA)

journalist José Fernando Lelo by the Angolan military at his workplace in the oil compound of

Malongo.

All of these men were eventually charged with having organized or carried out three armed

attacks between December 2006 and July 2007; the FAA members were additionally charged

with having committed military crimes such as desertion.10 Lelo and the six were put on trial

before the Cabinda military court from May 5 to June 11, 2008 and convicted on September

16, 2008. Lelo was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment. Five of the co-accused were

sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment. Custódio Nguimbi Sumbo was acquitted. Lelo and

the five convicted military personnel are currently prisoners at Yabi prison in Cabinda, which

Human Rights Watch visited, while an appeal against their conviction to the Supreme

Military Court is pending.

Human Rights Watch and other organizations believe that Lelo was primarily targeted for

arrest and conviction as a result of opinions he expressed as a VOA journalist until

December 2006, which were perceived to be critical of the Angolan government and the

2006 Memorandum of Understanding.11

that “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power.” 10 The Cabinda military prosecutor’s accusation quoted the following attacks: On December 29, 2006 against a military vehicle in Buco Zau, killing three and injuring two soldiers; on July 27, 2007 against military guarding a cell phone antenna in Buco Zau, killing one soldier and injuring another; and on September 13, 2007 against a military vehicle, killing two soldiers and seriously injuring five. Cópia do Despacho da Pronúncia, Procuradoria Militar da Segunda Região, Cabinda, March 5, 2008. 11 Human Rights Watch, “Angola–End Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda”, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda ; see also Amnesty International, “Angola: Unfair Trial of Fernando Lelo”, AFR 12/008/2008, September 22, 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR12/008/2008/en (accessed June 5, 2009).

“They Put Me in the Hole” 10

2. Persons Arrested in Rural Areas

Most of those who were arrested and charged with security crimes between January 2008

and March 2009 were residents of villages in the interior of Cabinda. The majority were

arrested in groups during military raids, which followed armed attacks attributed to the FLEC

separatist guerrilla movement in the municipalities of Buco Zau and Cacongo.12

So far, only five of those arrested—João Mateus Luemba, Elias Menos, Garcia David António,

António Zau, and Natalício Mbatchi—were tried by the provincial civil court from March 24 to

April 22, 2009. On May 7, the judge acquitted four of the accused for lack of evidence, while

sentencing Mbatchi to 18 months in prison for illegal possession of arms. All five had been

arrested in January 2008, over a year previously, and charged with “crimes against the

security of the State” and related crimes. At that time, all were released from custody,

including Mbatchi, who had already spent 17 months in pre-trial detention.

Local human rights activists told Human Rights Watch that more people have been arrested

during such military raids and were later released from military custody without having been

charged and presented to the public prosecutor.13

3. Former FLEC Members Arrested in the DRC and Cabinda

Seven detainees at Yabi prison interviewed by Human Rights Watch confirmed that they

previously were FLEC members. Five had been living in the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC) since 2005 and 2006. They said that they had not been FLEC members since. They

were arrested in different places in the DRC in October 2008 by the Congolese Agence

Nationale de Renseignement (ANR) and later transferred to Angola. Two former FLEC

members were also arrested in Cabinda in Dinge (Cacongo) and in Cabinda city in the same

month. They alleged not having yet been formally charged with any crime.

12 Five men were arrested in January 2008 in the village of Sevo da Vula, Buco Zau, following an attack on December 29, 2007 against border police, killing one. Five men were arrested in January 2008 in the village of Tando Malele, Buco Zau, after an attack against the oil company Grant on December 29, 2007, which killed a Brazilian worker. Five men were arrested in April 2008 in Micuma I, Buco Zau, following an attack against staff of the private company Emcica on December 31, 2008, which killed two workers. One man was arrested in January 2009 in Cossuenda, Buco Zau, after the assassination of a traditional leader on December 30, 2008. Three men were arrested in the village of Sassa Zau Velho, Buco Zau, on the day of an attack against a military vehicle on January 7, 2009. Five men were arrested in the village of Liamba-Lione, Cacongo, on the day of an attack against a vehicle, which killed one Chinese worker and seriously injured two on March 26, 2009. 13 Local human rights activists documented 11 such cases between June 2007 and January 2008. This includes the case of José Gabriel Puati, who was allegedly killed by FAA soldiers upon his arrest on December 29, 2007. Human Rights Watch interviews with three human rights activists (names withheld) in Cabinda, March 2008 and March 2009.

11 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Human Rights Watch also interviewed two registered refugees from Cabinda, including one

former FLEC member now in Lisbon, Portugal, and the current Voice of America

correspondent in Kinshasa, both of whom allege having been threatened with arrest and

transfer to Angola in early 2008 and early 2009, respectively.14 These firsthand accounts and

secondary reports received by Human Rights Watch suggest a wider pattern of arrests of

Cabindans in the DRC at the request of the Angolan authorities.

14 Human Rights Watch phone interviews with VOA correspondent in Kinshasa, February 11, 2009, and with José Luis Luemba Veras, in Lisbon, April 6, 2009. Human Rights Watch also had access to a letter of complaint written by Mr. Veras to the regional UNHRC delegation in Kinshasa from March 24, 2008, describing the threats he was subjected to, which led him to seek refuge in Portugal in July 2008.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 12

VII. Abuses by the Angolan Armed Forces

This chapter details key human rights violations committed by the Angolan Armed Forces

against persons detained under the charge of “crimes against the security of the state” and

related crimes since September 2007.

Arbitrary Arrests

The 20 detainees interviewed at Yabi prison and lawyers of those and other detainees told

Human Rights Watch that all were arrested without warrants, most of them by the military.

Arrests without a warrant are permitted under Angolan law when the persons are caught in

the act of which they are accused, but the arrests need to be validated by the public

prosecutor on the same day, or within five days maximum, when a public prosecutor cannot

be reached immediately.15 This time limit is often exceeded in Angola, as even the Cabinda

public prosecutor conceded to Human Rights Watch.16

According to the detainees, lawyers, and legal counsel, none of those arrested was

apprehended in combat situations or with arms alleged to have been used in guerrilla

attacks, nor were the detainees presented to any authorized magistrate immediately

following their arrest, as required by law. Lelo was presented with an arrest warrant, with no

issuing authority, at his work place in Cabinda and was taken in handcuffs to the military

section of São Paulo prison in Luanda, where he was held for more than three months before

being transferred back to Cabinda on March 30, 2008. Most of the detainees arrested in

villages said they were arrested following a guerrilla attack that had taken place close to

their village or several villages away. In addition, several detainees told Human Rights Watch

that they were arrested when they presented themselves to the authorities, either because

they had heard a military commander was looking for them at their homes, were seeking

information about an arrested relative, or, as in the case of three former FLEC members in

the DRC, because they formally announced to the Congolese authorities their intention to

return to Cabinda.

15 Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da prisão preventiva em instrução preparatória), art. 9 and 14. 16 Human Rights Watch interview with António Nito, public prosecutor, Cabinda, March 18, 2009. See also: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum–Mission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Macedo, member of the Angolan human rights organization Association Justice Peace and Democracy (Associação Justiça Paz e Democracia or AJPD) in Luanda, March 20, 2009.

13 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Incommunicado Detention

All detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were held incommunicado in military

custody for long periods of time—in several cases, for more than 35 days and in some cases

for up to 50 days—before being presented to an authorized magistrate (the public

prosecutor) and the criminal investigation police and eventually brought to the civilian

prison of Yabi. During military custody, they were unable to contact legal counsel or family

members. Only Fernando Lelo had access to a lawyer five days after his arrest.

FAA members co-accused with Lelo (but arrested before him) were held incommunicado in

military custody for up to six months in Cabinda and Luanda, without access to a legal

counsel, until they were transferred to Cabinda on March 30, 2008, brought to the prison at

Yabi, and presented to the Cabinda public prosecutor.17

Those detainees who were arrested in rural areas told Human Rights Watch that they first

were held in different military garrisons and in the FAA headquarters in Cabinda, before

eventually being brought to the prison at Yabi and presented to the public prosecutor.18

Detainees arrested in the DRC by Congolese intelligence agents said they were first sent to

and held in unknown places in the capital, Luanda, before being directly transferred to the

FAA headquarters in Cabinda, where they were held for more than three weeks before being

presented to the public prosecutor and finally brought to the prison at Yabi.19

According to Angolan law, incommunicado detention is allowed until the public prosecutor

interrogates the detainee. This must occur on the same day, or within five days maximum.

Incommunicado detention can be extended after the first interrogation—for national security

crimes for up to 10 days—but only if authorized by the public prosecutor.20

Extended incommunicado detention violates the fundamental human rights to humane

treatment and access to counsel, as provided under the International Covenant on Civil and

17 Their legal counsel, Arão Tempo, spoke with his clients for the first time on April 7, 2008. Human Rights Watch phone interview with Arão Tempo, May 30, 2009. 18 Human Rights Watch interviews with detainees at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 19 Human Rights Watch interviews with detainees arrested in the DRC at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 20 Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da prisão preventiva em instrução preparatória), art. 3. Angolan human rights activists of the Association Justice Peace and Democracy (AJPD) challenge this provision. See Pedro Romão and Fernando Macedo, Anotações à Lei da Prisão Preventiva e Legislação Complementar, Coimbra, May 2008, p. 18.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 14

Political Rights (ICCPR), which Angola ratified in 1992.21 The UN Commission on Human

Rights has repeatedly said that incommunicado detention should be prohibited.22 In

addition, Angola’s practice is contrary to the minimum international standards of detention

as set out in the UN Standard Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.23

Torture in Military Custody

Many detainees told Human Rights Watch that military officers and soldiers under their

command tortured them to force them to incriminate themselves and others. Others said

they were threatened that they would be killed unless they “say the truth.” Some were

forced to sign written confessions at gunpoint in local military garrisons, before they were

transferred to the FAA headquarters in Cabinda city.

All detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch were specific about where and how they

were tortured. Several practices of torture and degrading treatment described to Human

Rights Watch in March 2009 are consistent with practices documented by Human Rights

Watch in 2003—a period when the armed conflict in Cabinda was more intense.24 A Human

Rights Watch researcher saw that most of the detainees had visible scars on their arms near

their elbows, consistent with their accounts of having been tied up with cords across their

back.

One of the legal counsel of the FAA members convicted along with Lelo in 2008 told Human

Rights Watch that his clients were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment—including

mock executions, severe injuries with firearms, beatings with various objects, and public

humiliation of relatives—in several FAA garrisons. One soldier lost a leg as a result of injuries

suffered in military custody.25 Lelo was the only detainee interviewed by Human Rights

Watch who said he had not been physically mistreated.

21 See ICCPR, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, arts. 10 (1), and 14 (3). 22 See, e.g. UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2003/32, para 11. 23 United Nations Minimal Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted 1955, U.N. Doc A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (n° 1) at 11, U.N. Doc E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62. U.N. ESCOR Supp. (n° 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977). 24 These practices include, for example, tying detainees’ elbows together at the back or holding detainees in pits dug into the ground. See Human Rights Watch, Between War and Peace in Cabinda, p. 16f. 25 See “Angola–End Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda”, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda.

15 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Three other detainees described to Human Rights Watch their treatment by the military as

follows:

I slept at the police post, and the morning after, the FAA came to fetch me,

and a military security commander took me to the military garrison at Loma.

There soldiers tied me up with cords across my back and beat me, shouting

‘because you are FLEC’, ‘because you attacked a car of a company and killed

a worker’, ‘You are the head of the group’. I bled a lot. They took me—tied

up—to the military garrison at Caio and put me in a hole full of water. I stayed

there for 19 days, after which they took me back to Loma where I was

presented to a group of senior military. I insisted I was innocent. Then they

put me again in the ‘hole’ in Caio where I stayed for another nine days.26

They beat me, squeezed my testicles and my tongue with a pincer, telling me

to ‘say the truth.’ I cried in pain. They called a nurse to give me an injection.

Commander Lacrau then asked, ‘Tell us how many arms the coordinator gave

you to attack this car.’27

In the village, the military tied our arms up with bootlaces, stripped our shirts,

and beat us. I vomited blood. They searched the village for arms and

ammunition but didn’t find any. We were taken to the next military garrison in

Necuto where they stripped us naked and tied my testicles to a mortar. Then

they took us to the military unit at Loma, Buco Zau. There, the military

commander, Lacrau, accused me of having taken arms to the village from the

city. He gave a guard a weapon and a bucket and told him to dig a grave and

execute me. Then he fired a shot in the air and told the guard to lock me in

the latrine and tell the others arrested with me that I was dead and the same

would happen to them if they didn’t tell the truth… throughout the night

military counter-intelligence operatives came to beat us. They threatened us

with pistols and knives ‘to tell the truth.’ At some stage we said anything. The

beatings were too much. Later we were taken by state security agents and

two military in a civilian Land Cruiser to the military garrison at Dinge. There

26 According to the detainee A.B.C. (fictitious abbreviation), these abuses took place in April 2008. Human Rights Watch interview at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 27 According to the detainee D.E.F. (fictitious abbreviation), these abuses took place in April 2008. Human Rights Watch interview at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 16

they shouted at us, ‘You are FLEC.’ They beat us with whips and rifle butts

and burned our testicles with cigarettes.28

Detainees told Human Rights Watch that they were eventually held for varying periods of

time under inhumane conditions at the FAA headquarters in Cabinda in a dark, dirty cellar

without windows and sanitation facilities, which floods when it rains. This detention facility

is commonly known and feared as “the hole.” The FAA spokesperson in Cabinda in March

2008 denied to Human Rights Watch the existence of such a prison.29 Some detainees said

they met military personnel who were being held there for internal disciplinary offenses.

Most who had been detained there complained that they were prevented from washing for

up to 17 days and defecating for up to five days. A lawyer acting as defense counsel for the

six FAA members co-accused with Lelo told Human Rights Watch that the detained FAA

members were handcuffed for three months in the “hole,” where they were beaten and often

denied food.30 Another defense lawyer told Human Rights Watch his client was beaten at the

FAA headquarters with whips until he fell unconscious.31

Former FLEC members arrested in October 2008 in the DRC and transferred to Angola told

Human Rights Watch that they were held in the “hole” for long periods of time—between 25

and 30 days—where they were threatened with execution, beaten, and kicked by officials

identified only by aliases—“Colonel Walter,” “Major Cafundinho”—and several unidentified

military, including military police officers from the FAA headquarters. As a former FLEC

member arrested in Cabinda described:

Members of the military police who arrested me threatened to shoot me, tied

me up with bootlaces, and took me to the headquarters of the second

regional command of the FAA. There, “Major Kafumbira” beat me with metal

sticks and rifle butts and shouted “Take off your clothes! We will kill you!”

They took my money and ordered me to tell them the names of all the people

28 Human Rights Watch interview with G.H. (fictitious abbreviation), at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 29 Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Antonino Pessala, FAA spokesperson and head of the department for patriotic education, Cabinda, March 27, 2008. See “Angola–End Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda”, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda. In March 2009, the office of the second regional FAA command in Cabinda declined a meeting with the Human Rights Watch researcher by referring to an outstanding authorization from the head of the general chief of staff of the FAA in Luanda. 30 Human Rights Watch email interview with Arão Tempo, November 25, 2008. See also “Angola–End Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda”, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008. 31 Human Rights Watch interview with Francisco Luemba in Cabinda, March 25, 2008; Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, presented by Francisco Luemba regarding the process 490-C/08of the public prosecutor against Luís Geraldo Barros and others, Cabinda, January 31, 2009.

17 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

I work with, whether I knew guerrilla members in the forest, and why I came

to the city. Blood poured out of my ears.32

The local representative of the Angolan Bar Association (OAA) told Human Rights Watch that

10 people arrested on March 26, 2009 in the village Liambo-Lione (Cacongo municipality)

alleged that they were severely beaten by military personnel inside the FAA headquarters.

Only five of the men—after 26 days of incommunicado detention—were eventually presented

to the public prosecutor. The other five, including the wife of one detainee, were released

directly from military custody after five days.33

According to Angolan law, only the public prosecutor has the power to interrogate

detainees.34 However, detainees and lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that,

in all cases, military intelligence officers carried out interrogations. In addition, military

officials in command of interrogation sessions that involved torture, in which some

participated actively, never formally identified themselves, either by name or affiliation. Thus,

soldiers and commanding officers involved in the torture of detainees are only known by

aliases, or noms de guerre, the most quoted being “Colonel Fuchi,” “Colonel Walter,”35 and

“Major Cafundinho.” Some detainees, lawyers, and others told Human Rights Watch that the

officers belong to a unit called the Operative Intelligence Group (Grupo Operativo de

Inteligência or GOI), created some years ago to coordinate the counter-insurgency activities

of Angola’s domestic and military intelligence services in Cabinda.36 Human Rights Watch

could only identify the full name of one well-known senior military officer, Col. António José

da Conceição Kambanda, alias “Lacrau,” commander of the Third Infantry Regiment of the

FAA, who oversaw the torture of detainees in Buco Zau. Several detainees told Human Rights

Watch that some local administrators and military commanders as well as senior military

officials tried to intervene on behalf of detainees they perceived to be innocent, but were

overruled by Colonel “Lacrau.”

The provincial public prosecutor and former military prosecutor, António Nito, denied having

“any knowledge” of unofficial military detention places, as well as interrogations under

torture in military custody, and questioned the credibility and accuracy of detainees’ 32 Human Rights Watch interview with I.J. (fictitious abbreviation), detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 33 Human Rights Watch phone interview with Arão Tempo, Cabinda, May 4, 2009. 34 Law on Pre-trial detention (18-A/92) (Lei da prisão preventiva em instrução preparatória), art. 4. 35 Former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Cabinda in 2004 had referred to an officer called “Walter” as head of the intelligence. See Human Rights Watch, Between War and Peace in Cabinda, p. 18. 36 Human Rights Watch interviews with a local lawyer and journalist (names withheld) in Cabinda, March 2009 and follow-up email and phone interviews in May 2009.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 18

accounts. He told Human Rights Watch: “They would say anything, but this is not sufficient.

They have to present evidence and file a legal complaint.”37 Nevertheless, the accounts

collected by Human Rights Watch are remarkably consistent and suggest a systematic

pattern of abuse by the Angolan military and intelligence services.

The prohibition on torture is a fundamental principle of international human rights law;

torture is prohibited at all times and under all circumstances. Angola has yet to ratify the

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

which obliges states to prevent and sanction acts of torture and other mistreatment. The

Angolan government has on several occasions promised to ratify the convention and its

optional protocol, which allows international monitoring of detention facilities. It reiterated

this promise in its voluntary pledges submitted to the UN General Assembly in May 200738

before being elected as a member of the Human Rights Council for 2007-2010.

As a member of the United Nations, Angola has agreed to abide by the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights, which bans all use of torture and other mistreatment.39 Angola is party to

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human

and People’s Rights, both of which prohibit arbitrary detention and outlaw the use of torture

and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.40 In addition, Angola is bound by international

humanitarian law, the laws of war. Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which

applies during internal armed conflicts, protects captured combatants and detained civilians

against torture and cruel, humiliating, and degrading treatment.

In addition, Angola’s constitution, which is currently under review in parliament, states that

“Constitutional and legal norms related to fundamental rights shall be interpreted and

integrated harmoniously with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African

Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other international instruments to which Angola

is party,” and that “In the assessment of disputes by Angolan courts, those international

instruments shall apply even when not invoked by parties.”41 These international

37 Human Rights Watch interview with António Nito, public prosecutor, Cabinda, March 18, 2009. 38 Angola’s voluntary pledges to promote human rights, Annex to the letter dated 3 May 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/331/59/PDF/N0733159.pdf?OpenElement (accessed May 12, 2009). 39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 5. 40 ICCPR, art. 7; The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted on June 27, 1981, entered into force on October 21, 1986, ratified by Angola in 1990, art. 5. 41 Lei Constiticional (1992), art. 21. See also comments by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum - Mission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008, p. 11, para 32.

19 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

instruments place a legal obligation on Angola to end its arbitrary detention, torture, and

mistreatment of detainees in Cabinda.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 20

VIII. Treatment in Civilian Prisons

Detainees at Yabi prison told Human Rights Watch that detention conditions at the newly

built prison facility, where all were eventually brought, were generally good. That was less

true for the former VOA journalist Fernando Lelo, who told Human Rights Watch that he was

only allowed to leave his cell for the prison yard after several months. “My detention

conditions are not determined by the prison director, but by orders from his superiors,” he

said. “It’s as if I was in a private prison here.”42

However, several detainees at Yabi prison told Human Rights Watch that after finally being

presented to the public prosecutor and criminal investigation police, they were first shuttled

back and forth to different cells of the “Cadeia Civil,” a transit detention center for military

and civilian detainees, including illegal migrants.43 Some detainees told Human Rights

Watch they were “forced under the seats” of the cars by officials shuttling them to and from

the Cadeia Civil.44

Others described to Human Rights Watch the inhumane conditions at that jail:

We stayed 17 days in the ‘dark cell’ of the Cadeia Civil. We had to do

everything there—urinate, defecate, eat—but they didn’t beat us. After being

presented to the public prosecutor, we were taken back to the military

headquarters, where we stayed for seven days. Then they took us back to the

Cadeia Civil, to the civilian part, for another four days.45

One detainee described his stay in the Cadeia Civil as “cramped into a cell of four

square meters maximum together with 17 other people.”46

42 Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Lelo at Yabi prison in Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 43 An official request by Human Rights Watch to visit the Cadeia Civil in March 2009 was not responded to. 44 Human Rights Watch interview with K.L., M.N., O.P. (fictitious abbreviations), detainees at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 45 Human Rights Watch interview with K.L. (fictitious abbreviation), detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009. 46 Human Rights Watch interview with Q.R. (fictitious abbreviation),detainee at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.

21 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

IX. Violations of Due Process Rights

Human Rights Watch’s research into the criminal proceedings and trial of Fernando Lelo and

the co-accused FAA members found that their treatment fell far short of international due

process standards.

The six FAA members were arrested in September 2007 without a warrant and were held

incommunicado in military custody for up to six months, during which time they were forced

to confess and incriminate Lelo and themselves under torture and degrading and inhumane

treatment.

Lelo and the six co-accused FAA members were formally charged by the military prosecutor

of Cabinda in March 2008 with crimes against the security of the state and military crimes.

They were tried by a military court in hearings lasting from May 5 to June 11, 2008. This was

in violation of Angolan law, because crimes against the security of the State and cases

against civilians, like Lelo, should be tried in civilian courts.47

No credible evidence, either during the criminal investigation or at the trial, was presented

against any of the detainees, while evidence in defense of the accused was not taken into

account. The military prosecutor and military judge dismissed all objections regarding

arbitrary arrest, evidence obtained under torture, and the jurisdiction of military courts.48

Lelo was accused of having “undertaken a vast recruitment” of former FLEC soldiers

integrated into the FAA, with the aim of carrying out armed attacks against the FAA in order

to influence national and international opinion that the separatist insurgency in Cabinda

continues to be active.49 However, the co-accused FAA members had not identified Lelo

during two lineups. They allege that they were tortured to incriminate themselves and Lelo.

47 Law on Military Crimes (4/94 of January 28). See also United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum–Mission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008, p. 11, para 28. 48 See: Objection to the President Judge of the Military Court of the 2nd Region presented by defense counselors Francisco Luemba and Arão Tempo regarding the process 19/2008 of the military prosecutor against Alberto João Chimbinda and others, Cabinda, May 5, 2008. According to the Angolan Criminal Procedure Code–currently under review–defense lawyers may only challenge an accusation alleging procedural irregularities after the criminal investigation is completed. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention expressed concern with the fact that a detention cannot be effectively challenged during the investigation phase and judges are not involved before trial in Angola. See: United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Addendum–Mission to Angola, A/HRC/7/4/Add. 4, February 29, 2008, para 40-45 and 75-77. 49 Cópia do Despacho da Pronúncia, Procuradoria Militar da Segunda Região, Cabinda, March 5, 2008.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 22

No other evidence was presented to suggest that Lelo had met the FAA soldiers whom he

was accused of paying and instructing to carry out armed attacks.50

The trial was further tainted by government statements that infringed upon judicial

independence and Lelo’s right to a fair trial. Long before the start of the trial, Attorney

General João Maria de Sousa, stated repeatedly in the state media that there were “strong

indications” of Lelo’s guilt.51 Such statements were widely viewed as intended to exert

pressure on the judge to hand down a conviction.

In addition, according to Angolan law and international human rights standards, trials are to

be public.52 However, several trial observers told Human Rights Watch that public access to

the hearings, including for family members and the privately owned press, was restricted,

while a large number of domestic and military intelligence and police agents occupied the

courtroom.53 Lelo himself described the atmosphere during the trial to Human Rights Watch:

Almost every day they suspended the trial. We spent two hours maximum

there a day. Every time I was shuttled from the prison to court, escorted by a

motorcade of several cars with armed agents of the Public Order Police, the

Rapid Intervention Police, and the FAA. The car I was in didn’t have windows.

This spectacle served to present me to the public as a highly dangerous

criminal and to intimidate the population watching the scene. At court, the

military prosecutor dominated the trial, despite not being familiar with the

legal process.54

On September 16—almost three months after the trial—five FAA members were sentenced to

13 years of imprisonment for military crimes (violence against a superior and subordinate

and desertion) and crimes against the security of the state, including armed rebellion. One

FAA member was acquitted. Fernando Lelo was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment for

inciting the co-accused to commit the crimes.

50 According to the defense lawyer Martinho Nombo, a former municipal police commander whose testimony was quoted by the accusation, denied at court having ever seen Lelo at the village in Buco Zau where he allegedly met the co-accused soldiers on July 12, 2007 , while Lelo’s employer confirmed he had been working within the Malongo compound on the same day. Human Rights Watch interviews with Martinho Nombo, Cabinda, March 2009. 51 For example: “Detention of journalist Lelo is not arbitrary, says Attorney-General” (Detenção do jornalista Fernando Lelo não é arbitrária, diz PGR), Rádio Nacional de Angola/ Angop, January 7, 2008. 52 ICCPR, art 14 (1). 53 Human Rights Watch interviews with local journalists (names withheld), March 2009. 54 Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Lelo at Yabi prison, Cabinda, March 16, 2009.

23 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Human Rights Watch has argued that the court’s verdict was delayed until after Angola’s

parliamentary elections on September 5-6, 2008, in order to avoid potential damage to the

ruling party MPLA’s electoral campaign in Cabinda.55

While Lelo and the FAA soldiers convicted along with him were tried before a military court,

current detainees charged with state security crimes in Cabinda have had their cases signed

by the civilian prosecutor and so will be brought before a civilian court. This is a step forward.

Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch research found that other current detainees have been

denied basic due process rights, even when transferred after varying periods in military

custody, to the civilian prison of Yabi and presented to the criminal investigation police and

the public prosecutor.

Human Rights Watch has documented a number of procedural irregularities in the judicial

proceedings against two groups of detainees, both arrested in January 2008. According to

international human rights standards, evidence obtained under duress, such as

interrogations under torture, must be considered inadmissible in judicial proceedings.56

However, in both cases, records of the criminal proceedings show that lawyers were denied

access to military and intelligence interrogation files quoted by the prosecution as evidence.

In one case, interrogation files were classified as “secret,” according to the Law on the

Secret of the State.57 By withholding essential information to the defense and failing to

dismiss evidence alleged to have been obtained by coercion and torture, the prosecutor

violated international principles guaranteeing a fair hearing.58 In addition, military

intelligence officers who were called for questioning during the investigation by the defense

failed to show up during the criminal investigation and at court.59 In one case, the defense

objected to the public prosecutor’s conclusion that there were “strong indications of a

55 Human Right Watch, “Angola–End Torture and Unfair Trials in Cabinda”, Human Rights Watch news release, December 10, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/05/angola-end-torture-and-unfair-trials-cabinda. 56 Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, para 12. 57 Law on the Secret of the State (10/02) from August 16. See Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Luís Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009. 58 Human Rights Committee General Comment 13, para 15. 59 Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Luís Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009; Objection to the Honorable Judge of the Common Crimes Chamber of the provincial court in Cabinda regarding the process 0470-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Natalício Mbatchi and others, Cabinda, presented by lawyer Arão Tempo, Cabinda, March 27, 2009.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 24

linkage between the accused and the FLEC FAC guerrillas,” simply because several known

guerrilla members “have relatives in that particular village.”60

The Cabinda public prosecutor and two of the three judges in the civil judiciary previously

served as military magistrates in other provinces before being appointed in Cabinda in 2006.

It is not uncommon in Angola for military magistrates to occupy posts in the civilian

judiciary—the Attorney-General himself is a former military magistrate. But rights advocates

credibly fear that, in national security cases, these judges will not show sufficient

independence from the government to provide fair trials. Indeed, a senior military official

told Human Rights Watch that previous civilian magistrates in Cabinda had been replaced in

2006 because they “never managed to convict anybody” for crimes against the security of

the state.61

There are some cautious grounds for hope for fairer trials in national security cases. A judge

in Cabinda on May 7, 2009 cited lack of evidence and the principle of in dubio pro reo to

acquit four men on national security charges, while sentencing one man for a minor

offense.62 The public prosecutor challenged the judge’s sentence at the Supreme Court,

which has not yet issued a ruling. Lawyers have expressed hope that the verdict, if upheld by

the Supreme Court, may reflect a willingness by judges to act independently and impartially

in national security cases.63 However, with more upcoming trials of the remaining

detainees—all with a far lower public profile than Fernando Lelo—and as-yet unconfirmed

reports that more arrests for national security crimes have occurred in April 2009, concerns

about the due process rights of detainees in national security cases in Cabinda remain.

60 Objection to the Judges Counselors of the Chamber for Crimes against the Security of the State of the Supreme Court, regarding the process 490-C/08 of the public prosecutor against Luís Geraldo Barros and others, presented by lawyer Francisco Luemba, Cabinda, January 31, 2009. 61 Human Rights Watch interview with senior military official (name withheld) in Cabinda, March 17, 2009. 62 See Verdict of the Provincial Court of Cabinda, Cabinda, May 7, 2009. 63 Human Rights Watch phone interview with Arão Tempo, May 7, 2009, and email correspondence with Francisco Luemba, May 8, 2009.

25 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Acknowledgements

The report was researched and written by a Human Rights Watch researcher. It was edited by

Jon Elliott, advocacy director of the Africa Division; Rona Peligal, deputy director of the Africa

Division; Iain Levine, program director; and James Ross, legal and policy director. Jeffrey

Severson, associate of the Africa Division, provided production assistance.

Human Rights Watch acknowledges with gratitude the contribution provided by lawyers,

journalists, human rights activists, members of churches, national and international

organizations, officials of the government, military, police and judiciary, and detainees who

agreed to be interviewed for this report. We own special gratitude to those individuals who

gave us invaluable and unfailing support during our research on the ground and follow-up.

We also thank NOVIB for the funding that made this research possible.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 26

Annex: Persons Held for Security Charges at Yabi Prison

Current Detainees

António Santos Nguimbi–soldier in the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), arrested on September

9, 2007 in Buco Zau. Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13

years prison.

Lourenço Ila Dembe–FAA soldier, arrested in Buco Zau on September 17, 2007. Sentenced by

the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.

Alberto Suami–1st sergeant in the FAA, arrested on September 18, 2007 in Cabassango (Buco

Zau municipality). Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13

years in prison.

Alberto João Chimbinda–FAA soldier, arrested in Cabassango (Buco Zau) in September 2007.

Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.

Basílio Muanda–1st corporal in the FAA, arrested in Buco Zau on September 22, 2007.

Sentenced by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008 to 13 years in prison.

José Fernando Lelo–employee of Algoa and former VOA journalist, arrested at the Cabinda

Gulf Oil Company compound Malongo on November 11, 2007. Sentenced by the provincial

military court on September 16, 2008 to 12 years in prison.

Sebastião Sambo–catechist, arrested in Tando Malele (Inhuca commune, Buco Zau) on

January 24, 2008.

Carlos José Sambo–arrested in Tando Malele on January 24, 2008.

João Domingos Mabete–traditional leader and deputy village coordinator, arrested in Tando

Malele on January 24, 2008.

Paulo Simão–arrested in Tando Malele on January 24, 2008.

Luís Geraldo Barros–traditional leader, arrested in the village of Conde (Inhuca commune,

Buco Zau) on January 29, 2008 .

João Paulo Mombo–teacher and coordinator of Micuma I (Buco Zau), arrested in the village

of Micuma I on April 2, 2008.

Joao Baptista Maeia–employee of Encica, arrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.

Zacarias João Zau–arrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.

Marcos Lúbuca Malila Tovo–arrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.

27 Human Rights Watch | June 2009

Joaquim Valentim Culebi–arrested in Micuma I on April 2, 2008.

Armando Muabi–arrested by the Agence Nationale de Renseignement (ANR) in Buendi

Kassanfu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), on October 7, 2008.

Próspero Bianga–arrested by the ANR in Buendi Kassanfu, DRC, on October 7, 2008.

João Alfredo Dumbi–arrested by the ANR in Buendi Kassanfu, DRC, on October 7, 2008.

João de Deus Deu Muanda–arrested by the ANR in Tshela, DRC, on October 14, 2008.

César Déneri Dunge–arrested by the ANR in Kimbadi Kuimba, DRC, on October 19, 2008.

José Fernandes Jorge–arrested in Dinge (Cacongo) on October 20, 2008.

Cornélio Mabiala–arrested in his home in Cabinda city on October 28, 2008.

Clemente João Mavungo–coordinator of Cossuenda, arrested in Necuto (Buco Zau) on

January 2, 2009.

Paulo Mavungo–teacher, arrested in Sassa Zau Velho (Buco Zau) on January 7, 2009.

Rafael Futi–arrested in Sassa Zau Velho on January 7, 2009.

Alexandre Fundo–arrested in Sassa Zau Velho on January 7, 2009.

Massota Vunda–arrested in Liambo-Lione (Cacongo) on March 26, 2009.

Alexandre António Fortunato–arrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.

Francisco Linda Luemba Panzo–arrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.

Luís Massiti Gomes–arrested in Liambo-Lione on March 26, 2009.

João Baptista Puati–village coordinator, teacher and pastor, arrested in Liambo-Lione on

March 26, 2009.

Previous Known Detainees

Custódio Nguimbi Sumbo–1st sergeant in the Angolan Armed Forces, arrested in Buco Zau in

September 2007. Acquitted by the provincial military court on September 16, 2008.

Natalicio Mbatchi–arrested in Sevo da Vula (Necuto, Buco Zau) on January 16, 2008.

Sentenced on May 7, 2009 by the provincial court to one year and six months in prison, and

released.

João Mateus Luemba–nurse, arrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the

provincial court on May 7, 2009.

“They Put Me in the Hole” 28

Elias Menos–arrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the provincial court

on May 7, 2009.

Garcia David António–arrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the

provincial court on May 7, 2009.

António Zau–arrested in Sevo da Vula on January 16, 2008. Acquitted by the provincial court

on May 7, 2009.

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Sentencing of Fernando Lelo and six

soldiers, Cabinda, September 16, 2008.

© 2008 Cristóvão Luemba

“They Put Me in the Hole”Military Detention, Torture and Lack of Due Process in Cabinda

While the intensity of armed conflict in Angola’s oil-rich Cabinda enclave has declined since 2004, sporadicseparatist guerrilla attacks have continued, despite a peace agreement signed by the government and a factionof the armed opposition in 2006. This report gives new first hand, field-based information on a disturbing patternof official abuse—arbitrary arrest, lengthy incommunicado detention, and torture in military custody—of peoplesuspected of involvement in rebel attacks.

Between September 2007 and March 2009, at least 38 persons were arrested by Angolan military and intelligenceofficials in Cabinda and eventually charged with state security crimes. While all were eventually brought to acivilian prison, most were initially subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in military custody and denied basicdue-process rights. The report provides further detail on the high profile case of Fernando Lelo, a former Voice ofAmerica correspondent convicted of national security crimes in September 2008, but also draws attention toseveral other cases that have attracted much less public attention.

In this report Human Rights Watch urges the Angolan government to adopt all necessary measures to ensure thatthe armed forces act in accordance with Angola’s obligations under international human rights and humanitarianlaw. The government should review proceedings against detainees currently or previously held for state securitycrimes, investigate allegations of human rights violations, and prosecute alleged perpetrators. The governmentshould also set up an independent and impartial inquiry into human rights violations committed by the Angolanarmed forces and intelligence services in Cabinda.

Chevron Alternative 2008 Annual Report 21

Agostinho Chicaia is the president of Mpalabanda. Amnesty International released a statement forcefully condemning the ban, stating, “Amnesty International considers [Mpalabanda’s] members to be human rights defenders... Its closure will leave Cabinda, an area rife with egregious violations of human rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor and record violations of human rights.”116 An international

outcry followed, universally acknowledging the peaceful and vital work of Mpalabanda.

CHEVRON IN CABINDA (ANGOLA)

Statement by Agostinho

Chicaia, Extinta Mpalabanda

Associação Cívica de Cabinda

(MACC), Cabinda, Angola

Labor Policies

Discrimination is rampant in the treatment given to Cabindan vs Luandan—or the remainder of Angolan employees. We believe that in the last two years, Chevron has required the compulsory transfer of many Cabinda-based administrative personnel to Luanda. Angola’s General Labour Law requires that

employees be compensated for expenses related to transfers, including “expenses related to the employee himself or the family members for whom the employee is responsible.” We believe that Chevron has adhered to this law only in the case of non-Cabinda employees. This transfer process to Luanda is extremely precarious. It has been dividing and destroying families, as the Cabindan transferred employees’ earnings are not enough to cover the costs incurred for their families.

Human Rights

There have been murmurs and claims all over: we hear shouts of indignation and revolt from employees or members of the communities against Chevron’s way of doing things.

CHEVRON HAS BEEN IN ANGOLA since the 1930s, when Texaco began marketing there. In 1958 Cabinda Gulf Oil Co., Chevron’s Angolan subsidiary, drilled its first well. The company has dominated oil production in Angola ever since. Today, Chevron has four Angolan concessions, the most important of which are the massive offshore Benguela Belize–Lobito Tomboco and the $3.8 billion Tombua-Landana projects. Also in 2008, construction began on a 5.2 million-metric-ton-per-year liquefied natural gas plant.

Angola is the second-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa and the world’s seventh-largest supplier to the United States. Yet its health indicators are some of the worst in sub-Saharan Africa, sixty eight percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and 28% live in extreme poverty.114

Chevron operated in Angola when it was a Portuguese colony, through a bloody 14-year armed struggle to independence in 1975, and through a 27-year brutal civil war ending in 2002, which left as many as one million Angolans dead, 4.5 million internally displaced, and another 450,000 as refugees. Since the end of the Civil War the government has remained rife with corruption, such that Transparency International ranks it as one of the most corrupt governments in the world, and Amnesty International describes its human rights record as “poor” and “plagued” by serious problems.

Cabinda is the heart of Angola’s oil production. The twenty-four-hour oil operations there are, as lawyer and journalist Daphne Eviatar writes, “what financed the government’s army during a civil war ... And they’re the most obvious sign of the West’s relentless tentacles reaching into Angola today.”115

In 2006, the Angolan government banned Mpalabanda (Associação Cívica de Cabinda), the only human rights organization operating in Cabinda. The group focused not only on abuses by the government, but also by the oil companies.

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CHEVRON IN ANGOLA

22 Chevron Alternative 2008 Annual Report

center there, but these projects are very far from the real problems, concerns, and needs of the communities. Chevron prospers and enriches itself, while the local communities get poorer and poorer, more and more miserable, more and more vulnerable. The very little that Chevron does that is not done unilaterally, without considering the opinions and the priorities of the communities. They don’t walk the talk, considering what they preach themselves. There is neither dialogue nor are there objective partnerships or common goals between themselves and the communities. Cabinda does not in any way reflect the oil-producing giant that generates scandalous amounts of money for the Angolan government as well as Chevron itself.

Chevron says that it recently created a Social Responsibility team to mitigate daily criticisms and to create an internal forum to discuss issues related to social responsibility, environmental problems, health, and safety. But, thus far, these efforts are unproductive, and civil society monitoring capabilities are not yet up to the task.

What the Communities Want

We find that extractive industry practices in Cabinda only stress and deepen poverty levels, for Chevron pollutes and destroys the environment, accentuates social injustice, stops development, and sows frustration. As such, local communities and the Cabindan people demand more social, environmental, and economic responsibility on Chevron’s part and for themselves. Environmental organizations such as Gremio ABC specifically demand that Chevron finally replace its old leaking oil pipelines.

Mpalabanda-Cabinda Civic Association, illegally abolished by the Cabinda Court of Justice as ordered by the Cabinda Provincial Government (and mandated by the Presidency of the Republic Military House), has always held that there was excessive pressure over the oil exploration in Cabinda, which prepared the ground for successive oil spills. It was absurd to deplete all the Cabinda reserves today only to inherit serious environmental problems tomorrow. Mpalabanda demanded the development of an independent environmental impact study to determine the marine resources contamination levels. It asked the Angolan Government to regulate the basic environmental laws and the capacity building of the local structures for a joint monitoring of the oil exploration activities in Cabinda with civil society.

Employees’ rights are simply violated, ignored, and denied; there is discrimination in the workplace, particularly over wages. The employees’ Trade Unions encounter a number of difficulties in exercising their role, as Chevron does not allow it. Collective bargaining is not welcomed. Many times employees are unfairly terminated, in total violation of their rights. Furthermore, there is no distinction between human rights and politics, so talking about human rights is considered a provocation to the government. Standing up for your rights is considered being ungrateful or lacking respect. Dialogue does not exist, and when they talk about “dialogue,” it is to simply communicate decisions already made or to seek pretexts to take actions, because anything you say may be used against you.

Environment

The local communities do not derive any real benefits from activities undertaken in their geographical areas. The communities’ quality of life and living standards continue to deteriorate. The environment has been increasingly degraded. The impact of the pollution has been trivialized by Chevron, particularly with the successive oil spills in Cabinda. No independent environmental impact study has been produced to evaluate the present state of our beaches, the deteriorated mangroves areas, the affected ecosystems in the sea, on the earth, and the transfer to rivers.

In a rare government action in 2002, Chevron was fined $2 million by Angola’s Ministry of Fisheries and the Environment for oil spills from its platform that polluted beaches and damaged the local fishing industry. A government investigation found that leaks from poorly maintained pipes used to transport crude oil from the platform were the cause of the spills. With most oil spills, however, we find that Chevron will deny responsibility and accuse operators in neighbouring countries. On the few occasions when Chevron has accepted responsibility, we have found the number of barrels of oil spilled was generally below 50 in order to avoid being penalized under Angolan law. To indemnify the fishermen, the main victims, Chevron dictates the indemnification value without proper serious and transparent negotiation.

What Chevron Says

Lately, Chevron has carried out some projects to benefit the communities. Chevron builds one school here, a medical

“The solution? As a last resort, discontinue Chevron’s oil exploration in Cabinda,

as it is the mother of our disgrace, bringing poverty, environmental problems, and

armed conflict.”

—Agostinho Chicaia, Angola

“Chevron is the biggest polluter of the environment (seas, lakes, flora) in Cabinda ... Chevron has given very limited attention and provided minimal investment to protect and heal the environment in Cabinda.”

producer of Angolan oil. In 2010, it will extract 580,000 barrels of oil per day from offshore Blocks 0 and 14.208 Producing 1.78 million barrels per day, Angola briefly eclipsed Nigeria as Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest oil producer in August 2009.209 Angola supplies 31% of its crude to the U.S. and Chevron plays a major role in Angolan oil exports with a 39.2% interest in the Malongo Terminal Oil Export project.210

Chevron’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Cabinda Gulf Oil Com-pany, pioneered exploration activitie s before Angola achieved independence from the Portuguese. Chevron boasts of con-ducting Angola’s first seismic operations in 1954, drilling its first onshore well in 1958, and discovering its first offshore oil and gas fields in 1966 and 1971, respectively.211 Yet all of these activities occurred in Cabinda, a Portuguese protectorate dis-tinct from the Angolan colony. Many Cabindans claim Angola illegally annexed the oil-rich territory and they blame Chevron for financing the Angolan government’s repressive hold on Cabinda ever since.

Oil revenues largely financed Angola’s bloody internation-alized civil war until 2002. Despite the ongoing war, Chevron steadily increased offshore production. In 1997, Chevron began developing Kuito, Angola’s first deepwater well. By 2009, Chevron introduced “one of the largest man-made structures on earth” designed for maximum daily production rates of 100,000 barrels per day in 2011.212

Since Angola’s annexation of Cabinda in 1975, Cabindans have sought autonomy, some supporting militant movements for independence. Today, some 30-40,000 Angolan troops are sta-tioned in Cabinda, committing egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population of 400,000, including forced labor, rape, beatings, torture, summary executions and politi-

cal intimidation.213 Journalist Lara Pawson reported that in 2008,“Cabinda appears more militarized than parts of Angola I visited during the height of the civil war.”214

Security forces arbitrarily detain Cabindans “suspected of involvement in armed opposition.” Between September 2007 and March 2009, 38 such persons were subjected to torture and cruel or inhumane treatment, deprived of due process rights, and denied a fair trial.215 Many detainees are human rights and environmental campaigners. A recent wave of “suspects” taken into custody in 2010 included human rights lawyer Francisco Luemba, Catholic priest Raúl Tati, and other members of the banned Mpalabanda Civic Association, which elucidated Chevron’s role in undermining human rights in Cabinda.

The Angolan government uses military force in Cabinda to quash protest and secure resource-rich territory. Chevron is indirectly linked to Cabinda’s militarization by supplying billions of dollars in oil payments to a repressive and opaque government. Improved transparency could help channel oil monies to social services and poverty reduction, rather than corrupt elites or repression.

Chevron’s oil exploration and production activities—including seismic tests, drilling, offshore disposal of drill cuttings and produced water, fracturing and water flooding activities, pipeline leaks, accidental oil spills, and use of chemicals such as dispersants—devastate human and environmental health.216

Oil SpillsOil spills are the most visible negative impact of Chev-

ron’s operations offshore. Chevron reports 182 accidental spills between 1990 and 1998, releasing 5,984 barrels of oil into Cabinda’s artisanal fishing grounds.217 According to one fisher, “The uncontrolled oil spill also poses a big threat for the survival of fishing communities who constantly see their liveli-hoods threatened with no work to do or means to adequately and decently sustain their families.”

Chevron delivers compensation in an uneven and opaque manner, favoring wealthier registered fishers over informal day laborers and entirely disregarding the wider affected population, including women fish traders.218 A fisher recalled, “In 2000, when Chevron destroyed a fish-ing habitat and a lake near Landana, only 14 fishermen were compensated in a total population of about 2,500 people who directly and indirectly depended on fishing.” Overlooked community members sought indemnification in the courts. Yet, one claimant lamented, “The amounts are so little and insignificant compared to the losses that the communities have suffered. There are still court cases of some fishermen against Chevron which have never been resolved because a lot of people who have or are being affected by the spills and pollution have been delib-erately not considered.”

When oil spills occur, Chevron often fails to alert communities.219 Worse yet, some say Chevron relies on security forces to quell community demands—or uses chemical dispersants to mask spills before fishers can make claims to compensation. As one fisher recalled, “This year, after another big spill occurred, the local com-munity tried to organize a demonstration against Chevron’s practices, but the security forces quickly prevented it. Chevron has been a bit more careful of informing the local communi-ties whenever an oil spill takes place and the cleaning of the seas is promptly assumed.” Unfortunately, the use of chemical dispersants in “cleaning” operations may be more dangerous to human and environmental health than oil alone.220

The state of repression and underdevelopment in Cabinda may benefit Chevron by limiting liability and compensation claims. An anonymous Chevron official admitted, “Chevron is the biggest polluter of the environment (seas, lakes, flora) in Cabinda and because there are no independent bodies or civil society organizations capable and efficient to monitor [the company], most of the spills go unreported and unheard of with the exception of those detected by local fishermen. Chev-ron has given very limited attention and provided minimal investment to protect and heal the environment in Cabinda.”

One resident of a community near Chevron’s operations agreed, “Though there is widespread discontentment in the community, there have never been any public complaints against Chevron [because] the majority of the population are illiterate or have low education and do not know their rights.” Cabinda’s artisanal fishers depend on the waters in Block 0 for their sustenance and livelihoods, but few recognize the dangers of oil production beyond oil spills—like eating fish that have bioaccumulated high levels of methylmercury from exposure to drilling wastes.

Chevron’s commitment to reducing flaring in Angola is most welcome. Chevron holds a 36.4% ownership interest in Angola Liquefied Natural Gas, a multi-billion joint venture to produce 5.4 million metric tons of exportable LNG.221 In-creasing prices and rising demand for cleaner fuels in the U.S. encouraged Chevron to seek a profit on associated gases rather than burn them at the wellhead. Nevertheless, Chevron and other oil companies operating in Angola continue to flare most of the gas. Of the 355 billion cubic feet of gas produced from

Angolan fields in 2008, 69% was flared or vented, 23% was reinjected, and 8% went to domestic consumption.222 Flaring abatement and gas reinjection are long overdue for environ-mental and human health.

In 2004, the Angolan government allowed Chevron to publicly disclose a $300 million payment for extension of the Block 0 concession. The transparent moment was short-lived; Angola still refuses to sign the Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-tiative (EITI). The challenge of EITI not only reflects Angola’s intransigence but also reveals Chevron’s lack of political will to promote transparency and become more accountable to the Angolan populace.

The challenges are great: communities neighboring Chev-ron’s oil base at Malongo lack electricity and running water. Some residents acknowledged, “Chevron has some good social assistance programs for the population” and rattled off a few projects. Others criticized Chevron for prioritizing social initia-tives used as political propaganda by the government or ruling party and refusing funding to civil society organizations.

Chevron’s contributions to development and minor attempts at transparency do little to offset the direct harm the corporation has inflicted on human and environmental health in Cabinda or the indirect damage to human rights and democracy in An-gola. We implore Chevron to take the following actions:

Repair faulty, outdated infrastructure contributing to environmental degradation; Cease all flaring of associated gases at the wellhead; Educate communities on environmental and human health concerns associated with activities; Report all risks to environmental and human health (e.g., spills) to com-munities immediately; Distribute compensation to all affected parties in a transparent and equitable manner; Support basic human rights and the development of non-partisan civil society in Angola; Publish all payments to the Angolan government; Lobby for the U.S. Energy Security through Transparency Act of 2009 (S. 1700); and Implement fair practices to promote hiring of local personnel.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Public Statement AI Index: AFR 12/006/2006 (Public) News Service No: 203 4 August 2006

Angola: Human rights organization banned Amnesty International is gravely concerned about the ban of Mpalabanda (Associação Cívica de Cabinda), a human rights organization operating in Cabinda, Angola. In a case instituted by the Angolan government against Mpalabanda, the Provincial Court of Cabinda ruled on Thursday 20 July that Mpalabanda should be banned. Mpalabanda is appealing against the decision, which was apparently based on the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das Assosiações de Maio de 1991). Mpalabanda is the only human rights organization operating in the province of Cabinda. Amnesty International considers its members to be human rights defenders. The organization has been involved in the documentation of human rights violations committed by both the government and members of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC). Its closure will leave Cabinda, an area rife with egregious violations of human rights, without a human rights organisation to monitor and record violations of human rights. Amnesty International is particularly concerned about the effect of the court ruling on Mpalabanda's and human rights defenders' freedoms of association and expression, and consequently, their ability to carry out human rights monitoring and evaluation. These freedoms are contained in the Constitution of Angola, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Angola is a party. Under international human rights law, no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the right to freedom of association, other than those prescribed by law and strictly necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, public order, public health and morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others. While Amnesty International recognises the government's right to restrict the operations of organizations in the circumstances mentioned above, the organization urges it to ensure that this is done only when strictly necessary and in accordance with the Angolan national and international law. Amnesty International calls upon the government to respect and protect the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and expression. In addition the organization urges the government to fulfil the principles contained in the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This Declaration recognizes the right of all, individually and in association with others, to promote and strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international level.

Background Mpalabanda was created in July 2003 in terms of the Law of Associations of May 1991 (Lei das Assosiações de Maio de 1991) and was officially registered in December 2003. In March 2004 the organization was allowed to hold its first meeting after two consecutive refusals by the provincial government to allow a meeting to take place. Since then it has been refused permission on several occasions to hold meetings and marches to commemorate Cabinda Day. In 2004 FLEC, the Catholic Church, and Mpalabanda set up the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (Forum Cabindese para o Dialogo, FDC) to enter into dialogue with the government for peace in Cabinda. According to reports, on Monday 19 June 2006, Agostinho Chicaia the president of Mpalabanda was summoned to court (tribunal da comarca de Cabinda) where he was issued with a copy of a government application to ban Mpalabanda. The application alleged that Mpalabanda incited violence and hatred. It also accused Mpalabanda of carrying out political activities rather than being a civil society organization. The organization was given ten days to submit a responding affidavit, which it submitted within the given time. On Thursday 20 July the Court decided to ban the organization. Mpalabanda was informed of this decision on Monday 24 July. There is no mention in the judgement that Mpalabanda promoted violence and hatred. Nor were any of the cited witnesses called to give evidence to this effect.