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Marine Policy 32 (2008) 233–242

www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Fishing for social realities—Challenges to sustainable fisheriesmanagement in the Cape Horn Biosphere Reserve

Gudrun Pollacka, Augustin Berghofera,b,�, Uta Berghofera,b

aFundacion Omora, Reserva de Biosfera Cabo de Hornos, Puerto Williams, ChilebHelmholtz Centre for Environmental Research—UFZ, PermoserstraX e 15, 04318 Leipzig, Germany

Abstract

Social-ecological complexity challenges conservation-oriented interventions even in settings with a small number of actors and

conflicts involved. This article examines the development and trajectory of King and Snow Crab fisheries in the Cape Horn Biosphere

Reserve (BR), the highly remote but globally connected Southern tip of the Americas. The feasibility of the Chilean legal instrument of

Marine Management Areas (MMA) is assessed as a tool for mitigating impacts of overfishing in the area. Examining the local fishers’

perspectives in complement to a context analysis we find that external management models such as the MMA are not suited to make

Cape Horn fisheries sustainable. Instead, efforts should be dedicated to a continuous process of stakeholder collaboration for developing

site-specific management concepts and structures. These should be embedded in the larger BR initiative. Considering the area’s particular

conditions, several recommendations for such a process are formulated.

r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Marine resource use; Marine protected areas; Fisheries co-management; Biosphere reserves; Stakeholder participation; Chile

1. Introduction

Government-based attempts have often failed to managemarine resources in a sustainable way [1]. Co-managementand the recognition of fishers’ knowledge is henceincreasingly considered a remedy for overfishing in coastalfisheries [2–4]. Co-management can be defined as ‘‘thecollaborative and participatory process of regulatorydecision-making among representatives of user groups,government agencies and research institutions’’ [2, p. 423].Despite the recognition of the potential benefits of fisheriesco-management and its close linkages to ecosystem-basedapproaches to fisheries [5,6 this issue], difficulties arefrequently encountered during its implementation [7–9].This article examines such a case.

Over the last years, small-scale artisanal crab fishers ofthe Cape Horn region in southern Chile have noticed a

ee front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

arpol.2007.09.013

ing author. Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Re-

ermoserstraXe 15, 04318 Leipzig, Germany.

350; fax: +49 235 2825.

ess: augustin.berghoefer@ufz.de (A. Berghofer).

strong decline in the amount of commercially extractableKing crab and Snow crab. A marine biological studyconfirms this observation by depicting a reduction in theaverage sizes and lower reproduction rates [10]. Severalfishing grounds are considered either fully exploited oroverexploited, which is threatening the local fishers’ mainsource of income and the region’s most importanteconomic activity.The Cape Horn Biosphere Reserve (BR), declared by

UNESCO in 2005, constitutes a political commitment topursue inter alia the protection of coastal and marinebiodiversity and at the same time to secure local livelihoods.The Marine Management Areas (MMA) concept is so farthe only approach for fisheries co-management in Chileanlegislation. The regional government is currently planning toset up an MMA inside the Cape Horn BR. The instrumentattributes the right to local fishers’ organisations toexclusively use an area of the sea floor and manage itaccording to an extraction plan tailored to the scientificallyconstructed characteristics of the site [11].The field research informing this paper pursued answers

to two questions: (i) What drives current degrees of

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Fig. 1. Map of the Cape Horn region.

G. Pollack et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 233–242234

overexploitation in Cape Horn fisheries? and (ii) Is theChilean legal concept of MMA suitable for tackling theoverfishing problem in the Cape Horn region, and formitigating the growing environmental and social problems?

In addressing these two questions (in the first half of thepaper), we seek to illustrate the complexity whichchallenges conservation-oriented interventions even incontexts with a small number of resource uses, users andconflicts of interest. As a consequence we argue (in thesecond half of the paper) in favour of the participatorydevelopment of a situation-specific and site-specific man-agement structure embedded in the institutional context ofthe Cape Horn BR. Several recommendations for thisstakeholder process are derived from our analysis.

2. Methods

For investigating the development of the Cape Hornfisheries, we construe actors as taking actions withinexisting structures and at the same time altering thesestructures [12]. In this sense, research focussed on (i) thecontextual factors intervening in the Cape Horn fisheriesand (ii) on the insiders’ perspectives, the social realities asexpressed by local fishers.

Contextual factors are understood here as ‘‘dynamicforces constituted in the user groups’ social, cultural,economic, political, technological and institutional envir-onment [ywhichy] have an important part to play inestablishing the choice sets from which resource users canselect strategies’’ [13, p. 207]. Edwards and Steins [13]suggest to ‘backsolve’ (to trace back) from resource useoutcomes to contextual factors, via the choice sets availableto resource users. This approach allows distinguishing therelevant aspects amidst the plethora of potentially criticalexternal influences, provided they are not highly inter-dependent. The island character of the Cape Horn BR, i.e.its physical remoteness, the low number of speciesharvested and the clearly identifiable actor groups in-volved, makes it feasible to discern the dominant influ-ences.

To investigate the social realities of the fishers, 12 semi-structured qualitative interviews with local fishers wereconducted in 2006, and several meetings of the fisher’sorganisation and meetings of the fishers with publicauthorities were observed (participant observation). Find-ings were cross-checked with 60 qualitative interviews onrelated issues which had been conducted inside the CapeHorn BR during 2003–2005 [14]. Based on an initialanalysis of the situation and on the fishers’ perspectives ofoverfishing and its social impacts, the institutional, politicaland economic contexts were further investigated by meansof document analysis and key informant interviews. Bothdocument analysis and semi-structured qualitative inter-views were used to investigate the MMA concept. Empricaldata analysis and interpretation followed the methodologyof Grounded Theory according to Strauss and Corbin [15].Finally, both components of the analysis were juxtaposed

in order to evaluate the suitability of the MMA concept forthe Cape Horn fisheries.In this paper, the suitability analysis is informed by

criteria of the IBEFish analytical frame, which allows tosystematise empirical research on participatory processes infisheries management [16,17 both this issue]. This frame-work comprises four thematic areas for characterizinginstances of participation: (i) The ways how information isdealt with; (ii) issues of legitimacy and mandate; (iii) socialdynamics in these processes; and (iv) the costs involved.

3. The Cape Horn region

The region is characterized by numerous fjords andislands with still largely unfragmented ecosystems, lowanthropogenic impact and a very low population density.Only 2200 people live in the region, most of them in theisolated settlement of Puerto Williams on Navarino Island.Very few people live on farms and marine outposts aroundNavarino Island. The costly transport to the next Chileancity, Punta Arenas, takes at least 30 h by boat or 1.5 h byplane. A weekly ferry supplies the island with food, naturalgas, building material, etc. Connectivity to the nearbyArgentine town of Ushuaia is restricted for politicalreasons (Fig. 1).Despite the isolated location, the area has been of great

national interest. In 1953, Puerto Williams was founded asa military base with the aim to enforce Chilean sovereigntyin the face of conflicts over territory with Argentina. Theformerly dispersed rural population was progressivelyrelocated to Puerto Williams and a far-reaching socio-economic transformation took place. Until 1985 when theborder dispute was eventually settled, the region wasadministered by the Chilean Navy. Since then, the civil

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settlement of Puerto Williams gained the formal status of amunicipality. Privatisation and commercialisation of for-merly subsidised public services drastically increased thecost of living in this isolated area with limited workingopportunities. [18].

On the positive side, the region’s isolation constitutes agreat potential as its vast extensions of unfragmentedhabitats have been recognised for their pristine conditionand thus, are of interest not only for local residents but alsofor science, conservation and tourism [19]. However, effortsto maintain this potential are challenged by (i) the opening ofareas for fishing and salmon farming which had formerlybeen protected by the Navy or by national (paper-) parks, (ii)new navigation routes and coastal concessions for tourism,(iii) increasing connectivity and thus, traffic by air and land,and (iv) insufficient and ill-suited instruments for territorialplanning. In order to overcome these challenges the CapeHorn BR was declared and recognised by UNESCO in 2005,and since then awaits implementation [19].

4. Overfishing in the Cape Horn region

For the indigenous Yaghan population, King crabs anda variety of other marine organisms have been an essentialpart of their diet for many centuries already. In the 1970s,commercial King crab fishing started on Navarino Islandwith the construction of the first processing plant. Today,there are three processing plants on Navarino Island andcrab landings are also transported to the regional capitalPunta Arenas for processing. Driven by external marketdemands, King and Snow crab fishing are the mostimportant economic activity South of Tierra del Fuego.On Navarino Island, there are currently about 50 fishers on20 boats who make a living from artisanal King and Snowcrab fishing. Between 150 and 200 boats from PuntaArenas are also fishing in the area.

Several dimensions can be discerned with regard tocauses and impacts of current overfishing.

0

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1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986

Unloading of King Crab in 1000 kg Unloading of

Fig. 2. Unloading of King and Snow Crabs in the Magellan Region between 19

4.1. Economic aspects

Since the 1970s national policies promote the economicliberalisation process of the country that produced highdemands for Chilean natural resources like forest andfishery products [20,21], accounting inter alia for thetremendous growth of the fishing sector [22]. The demandfor King and Snow crab by North American and EastAsian markets affects the supply-chain in multiple waysdown to the fishers [cp. 23]. Modernisation of fishingtechnologies, foreign direct investment in the processingindustry, migration of fishers form Chilean regions furthernorth and facilitated by only rudimentary harvestingrestrictions, the landings’ quantity for both King andSnow crab in the Magellan region has substantiallyincreased (see Fig. 2).Even though this overall trend still seems to be

continuing, fishers from Puerto Williams (referred to aslocal fishers) have noticed a strong decline in individualcatch of up to 80% over the last 5 years.When catch in the fishing grounds further north went

down, fishers from the area around Punta Arenas (referredto as regional fishers) increasingly moved southeast to theCape Horn region in search for more profitable fishinggrounds. The observed decline in catch by local fisherscoincides with the tremendous influx of regional fishers tothe CAPE HORN BR during the last 5 years. According toestimations of local fishers, non-local fishers today makeup about 90% of the total number of resource usersoperating in the area and their share on total catch consistsof 95% approximately.Local fishers mainly reacted to the declining catches by

increasing fishing effort: staying out longer, fishing indeeper waters and going further out. However, thesemeasures cannot balance the losses anymore and thus, itbecomes increasingly difficult for the fishers to sustainthemselves and their families. Fishers fear losing their mainsource of livelihood if this trend continues until crab

1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004

Snow Crab in 1000 kg

71 and 2005. Modified from Guzman et al. [10], Sierpe and Sanhueza [43].

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fisheries completely collapse. The perceived lack of alter-native employment opportunities enhances the socialproblems as it produces a strong economic dependenceon crab fishing and, with ongoing scarcity of crabs, furtherincreases the need to keep fishing.

4.2. Institutional aspects

The regulations for King and Snow crab fishing havebeen imposed in a stepwise manner, and were constructedas reactions to declining catches and the ongoing growth ofthe fishing sector without a long-term planning strategy,nor considering the precautionary principle. They comprisea close season (7 months for King crab and 2 month forSnow crab), a minimum size, the prohibition to fish femalecrabs and extraction only by means of traps. Additionally,King and Snow crab fishing is limited to fishers residing inthe Magellan region who are registered for these resourcesas artisanal fishers, which implies restrictions on boat sizeand ownership of boats [24]. There are no limits, however,with respect to the amount of crabs caught per season.Even though there is no reliable data available regardingillegal fishing (e.g. outside the season or by non-registeredfishers) local fishers consider this a major problem. Limitedresources of the local fishing authority (SERNAPESCA)and the geographic extensions impede effective control.

The fishing regulations in the Magellan region considerstocks of single species and ignore the ecological particula-rities of the different fishing grounds. Regulations have notprevented overexploitation and do not address the socialimpacts thereof. Poor appropriateness of regulations canpartly be attributed to the top-down character of fisheriesgovernance with central decision-making being very distantfrom local resource users in a physical and societal sense.

5. The chilean concept of MMA

The Chilean MMA concept (Areas de Manejo yExplotacion de Recursos Bentonicos—MMA) is a formof marine tenure which grants local fishers’ organisationsthe right to exclusively use an area of the sea floor underthe premise that extraction is carried out according to asite-specific management plan. The management plan isdeveloped by scientists together with fishers of therespective organisation. It has to be approved annuallyby the national fishing authority (Subsecretarıa de Pesca)and its compliance is monitiored by the local fisheriesservice.

MMA developed as an bottom-up initiative initiated bya fishers community together with marine biologists [25]. Acrisis in several important mollusk fisheries, especiallyLoco–Concholepas concholepas, in the 1980s, marinebiologists, convinced fishers of Quintay, a small coastalvillage in central Chile, to ban fishing in their traditionalfishing ground for 3 years in order to allow the repopula-tion of the molluscs. This mechanism turned out to besuccessful and after that period, fishers could extract Loco

again. However, this way ofmanaging the fishing groundneeded legal backing in order to ensure the exclusion ofnon-local fishers [26]. In 1991, the concept was embodied inthe General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture (Ley Generalde Pesca y Acuicultura) and in 1995, the regulations for theapplication process, the installation and maintenance, aswell as the rights and duties of all involved stakeholders inan MMA were specified. Since then, more than 400MMA’s have been established in Chile and about 700 areeither in the implementation process or have lost the statusof MMA [27].

6. The suitability of the MMA concept for Cape Horn

fisheries

In this section, the suitability of the MMA concept forCape Horn fisheries shall be explored, beginning with thepositive aspects.

6.1. Positive aspects of the MMA concept

In contrast to the current management approach whichis based on the idea of restricting access to the resourcesystem (e.g. close seasons) MMAs follow the concept of‘conservation by wise use’ [28]. Resource users areconsidered protagonists who have the right to extractnatural resources to make a living but at the same timeassume responsibility for protecting the resource system.While the current fisheries management in the Magellan

region focuses on single species, the MMA concept adoptsan ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management(EBAFM), although restricted to a relatively small area.Additionally, the regulations concerning resource extrac-tion are based also on a local diagnosis, i.e. specificregulations are adapted to the biophysical characteristics ofthe site.Furthermore, the MMA concept facilitates knowledge

integration: Regulations require the collaboration (a)among fishers, (b) between fishers and scientists (c) andbetween fishers, scientists and the fisheries agency for thedevelopment and implementation of MMA managementplans [29]. This collaboration can stimulate a learningprocess that leads to improved capacities on all sides andacross different types of knowledge. Interviews in theQuintay MMA, central Chile, indicate that mutual learninghas played an important role for the successful implemen-tation of the instrument.Furthermore, the MMA has legal backing which is

important for two reasons: First, earlier experience withfisheries co-management, e.g. in Quintay, revealed that theofficial recognition by the Chilean government substan-tially strengthens the position of fishers in the midst ofconflicting interests with non-local fishers. Second, theMMA reduces the fishers’ uncertainty regarding top-downimposed changes in regulations, such as periodic bans onfishing, by ensuring, at least to some extent, that inside theMMA fishers take a lead role in management. The above

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reasons contribute to the overall legitimacy of the MMAconcept as perceived by different actor groups.

6.2. Problematic aspects of the MMA concept

Although the MMA concept combines a regulated spacefor co-management with a more ecosystem-orientedapproach to fisheries management, it reveals seriousconstraints when considered for the Cape Horn fisheries.The following analysis of these constraints has been guidedby the IBEFish analytical frame on participatory processes[16,17 both this issue]. Most criteria of the framework arerelevant in our case, but we have chosen another structurethan the four IBEFish categories—information manage-ment, legitimacy, social dynamics and costs—becausestakeholder processes do not exist yet and our analysiscomprises the overall suitablity of the MMA concept.

6.2.1. Bio-physical aspects

The MMA regulations reflect the original focus of theconcept on sedentary benthic species in coastal habitatslike molluscs or algae. This produces difficulties whenattempting to implement an MMA for King and Snowcrabs. Both species are mobile with wide ranging and alsochanging habitats over time, but little is known about theirmigration patterns [10]. This mobility makes monitoringdifficult, and subsequently also the setting of upper catchlimits.

Additionally, finding a suitable location for an MMA inthe Cape Horn region is complicated: The Navy may notallow an MMA in an area which is considered of strategicimportance, especially in border areas. Furthermore,significant enforcement costs can be expected: If theMMA is located close to Puerto Williams, the settlementof local fishers, it will be directly alongside the principaltraffic route of non-local fishers. Alternatively, choosinglocations further away would increase enforcement as wellas appropriation costs due to the larger travel distance.Infrastructure for remote monitoring of the MMA is alsovery cost intensive.

6.2.2. Economic aspects

The underlying idea of the MMA concept is to conciliatemarine protected areas with marine tenure [26]. Managingan MMA in a profitable way implies that the generatedturnover, subtracting all involved costs, leaves enough toprovide sufficient income for all participating fishers overtime. The costs fishers have to bear comprise the annualcharges for the marine concession depending on the size ofthe area, cost of monitoring which is part of annualreporting requirements, enforcement costs, transactioncosts incurred by the internal decision-making process,and finally opportunity costs due to harvest restrictionsand restrictions on other uses.

One of the critical aspects of the MMA concept is thatwhile the control and sanctioning mechanisms specified inthe MMA legislation are intended to ensure that conserva-

tion goals are met, they do not respect the livelihoodgoals which remain the sole responsibility of the fishers.The MMA concept bears considerable risk for fishers,because it implies considerable fixed costs whereas benefitsfluctuate according to changes in catch and marketconfiguration.A further challenge is to find a very productive area of

the right size for an MMA, i.e. large enough for the usergroup but small enough to keep concession fees down,containing a high density of target species in a high qualityand not prone to external negative interferences. Thiscannot be expected for King and Snow crabs.As charges, implementation costs and opportunity costs

apply from the very beginning, the economic impact ofestablishing an MMA is even more severe in overfishedareas, such as the Cape Horn BR because recovery of crabstocks should take several years.Since the MMA concept does not provide for arrange-

ments with buyers, the fishers’ organisation bears theresponsibility for successful marketing of their productswhich have incurred comparatively higher productioncosts. In the Cape Horn region, local fishers are confrontedwith a weak market position: (i) Their share of the regionalcrab production is negligible due to the high amount ofnon-local crab fishers. (ii) The international market forKing crab determines demand and influences the prices anddelivery conditions on the local level; furthermore, manyregional processing plants are foreign owned and managed.(iii) Client–patron relationships are common practice withfishers borrowing money from processing plants tomaintain their boats under the premise to sell their wholecatch to the borrower under their conditions. Access toother buyers is limited by the high costs of transport to theregional capital Punta Arenas.In fact, in the eyes of local fishers, the miserable situation

is not caused by non-local resource competitors but byowners of fishing fleets from Punta Arenas who find waysto circumvent regulations for artisanal fisheries, using ahigher number of traps and new boats on which badly paidregional fishers work. The power of the non-local fisheriesindustry became evident some years ago when an attemptto give exclusive use rights to local fishers failed withinweeks because they were boycotted by the regionallyowned transport vessels.

6.2.3. Institutional aspects

The mandates and resources for supporting and decidingabout a new MMA and for subsequent controls are dividedamong several government agencies: the Undersecretary ofFisheries at national level has the decision-making author-ity. The Maritime Zone’s Fisheries Council situated inPunta Arenas and connected to the Undersecretary ofFisheries is supposed to communicate between the localand the national level but is de facto absent for localfishers. The National Fisheries Service (SERNAPESCA) isresponsible for the control but often lacks the requiredresources (e.g. the local officer is not equipped with a boat).

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The Chilean Navy has sovereignty over the sea and theright to prohibit other uses of the ocean. To set up anMMA in this remote border region would imply a slow andconflictive administrative process.

There are also conflicting governmental interests withregard to short-term economic growth on the basis ofexporting natural resources, on the one hand, and theprovision of livelihoods, on the other. For example, duringthe preparation phase prior to the international recognitionof the Cape Horn BR (in 2005) which involved all relevantgovernmental actors at regional level, parts of the Albertode Agostini National Park, located inside the then futureBR, were declassified in 2004 so as to allow for the settingup of salmon farms, the most controversial form of naturalresource use in Southern Chile [30].

In general, the remoteness of the Cape Horn regioncomplicates the situation for both local fishers anddecision makers: The physical distance and poor accessi-bility of an MMA for government agencies imply thatrelevant knowledge on the area is limited within govern-ment and does result in poorly informed decisions. Theremoteness also presents an obstacle for local fishers toaccess information and to defend their own interests in theregional capital Punta Arenas. The interviews with localfishers but also with a regional government officer revealedaccusations and stereotyping of the respective other groupwhich are grounded, at least to some extent, in commu-nication and information deficits resulting from thedistance.

6.2.4. User group aspects

By national law, all fishers of the Magellan region areallowed to fish in all parts of the region, including CapeHorn. For local fishers there is no clear separation betweenlocal and non-local fishers as they all operate in the samefishing grounds, work under the same conditions and sell tothe same middlemen and processing plants. Concerning thedistinction between local and external fishers underlyingthe MMA concept, local fishers do not have a commonopinion: some welcome the idea as remedy against resourcescarcity; others reject the idea of exclusive use rightsbecause they strongly believe in the right of artisanal fishersto freely choose their fishing grounds.

In general, the local user group is highly diverse. Fieldstudies in the region on the societal relationships withnature [15] indicate that fishers have diverse modes ofrelating to their natural environment, ranging from aresource-oriented to a life-world-oriented relationship.Differences cannot be explained straightforward, but therelative lifetime spent in the region, the upbringing in afishers’ family and the adherence to one of the twoindigenous communities in the BR, seem to play importantroles. Thus, the composition of the local user group andsocietal relations with the natural environment are hetero-genous [cf. 31].

The fishers’ perception regarding their role in theoverfishing problem creates high initial barriers for an

MMA. Many fishers do not recognise significant agency ofthemselves in the situation and therefore reject the notionof them being responsible for it. Also they feel incapable tosolve the overfishing problem because of economicpressures, political marginality and a centralistic top-downgovernance system. This comes along with a low self-esteem with respect to other actors.Furthermore, the organisational capacity of the local

fishers is low due to prevailing personal discrepanciesand a lack of trust. The local fisheries organisation lacksfinancial resources and also the professional capacities toaccess government funding and to influence decision-making. Nevertheless, the ongoing crisis as well as theapparent attempt of the organisation to explore alternativesources of income (i.e. harvest other species) seems toincrease the fishers’ willingness to collaborate within thelocal organisation.

6.3. Interpreting the analysis of context and insiders’

perspectives with regard to MMA feasibility

The above analysis reveals to which extent capacityasymmetries, low self-esteem, poor internal and externalrelations and significant costs associated with spatialremoteness and administrative distance impede the localuser group to take an active stance in the management ofcrab fisheries.The analysis also identifies more distant contextual

factors that shape the dynamics of resource use in theCape Horn BR and are beyond the scope of influence forlocal management. Ostrom [32] argues that an appropria-tor organisation

‘‘is more likely to survive if it is fortunate enough not tohave to cope with many simultaneous changes in keyexogenous variables, such as population, technology,number of appropriators, external demands and rela-tionships to central authorities’’ [32, p. 308].

In Cape Horn fisheries, changes of key exogenousvariables are connected and taking place simultaneously:Close connection with crab markets in the US and Asiaproduces a high demand which increases the number ofnon-local appropriators, brings in new technologies andlimits available sales channels for local fishers. Further-more, a shift from military to civil administration of theregion during the last two decades induces discrepanciesbetween de jure and de facto authorities: The Navy stilldisposes of information, infrastructure and resources whichare essential for governing the region—while the civilagencies in charge are under-equipped.That these findings are critical to our issue echoes

Agrawal’s [33] review of enabling conditions for setting upa sustainable common property regime. The MMA conceptneither provides regulation for these aspects in generalterms, nor does it offer the space for dealing with themduring implementation in a specific setting.

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Fig. 3. Location of the Cape Horn Biosphere Reserve.

G. Pollack et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 233–242 239

7. The Cape Horn BR: a management alternative for Cape

Horn fisheries

As shown, the current governance mode—distantdecision-making producing poorly informed top-downregulation—negatively affects the quality of the regulationitself, i.e. its site-specific adequacy and timeliness, andencounters problems of implementation and enforcement.How can these difficult conditions be addressed? Asolution to sustain the Cape Horn fisheries will requirethe collaboration of de jure as well as de facto governinginstitutions, and resource users. In an alternative approachecological aspects, economic context, administrative struc-ture and internal dynamics should be jointly and ade-quately considered.

We doubt that a general model for sustainable fisheries

management can convincingly integrate these perspectives.In a static view on the institutions governing a resource usesystem Ostrom [34] already exposes seven different ruletypes, such as membership rules, separating insiders fromoutsiders, or pay-off rules, determining the distribution ofcosts and benefits of actions and outcomes. A general (anddynamic) management model would have to considercountless combinations of rules from different rule types.

Also, a resource specific management model designed forSnow and King crab fisheries would be of limited valuebecause many resource system characteristics are sitespecific, e.g. Snow crab reproduces at different rates inthe northern and the southern parts of the Region ofMagallanes. Impacts also differ according to the specificsocio-economic situation.

Alternatively, we suggest to collaboratively develop asite-specific management regime by means of a stakeholder

process, embedded in the comprehensive initiative toimplement the Cape Horn BR (Fig. 3).

7.1. The Cape Horn BR

In 2005, the Cape Horn region, consisting of an area ofabout 2 million ha of land and 3 million ha of seascape wasdeclared a UNESCO BR [19]. BRs are intended as modelareas of sustainable development reconciling conservationwith other forms of resource use. However, in this BR wecan neither find an established arena for participatoryplanning, experienced leadership, a management plan nor aculture of dialogue between government and civil society.

Current slow-down of the initially dynamic process ofBR implementation is due to several reasons: Up to now,there has been no significant funding dedicated toimplementing the BR. A project proposal to the GlobalEnvironment Facility was stopped in 2006 by the NationalCommission for the Environment (CONAMA), itself byfar the biggest applicant for GEF funding in the country.Furthermore, national elections in 2006 have replaced mostheads of government agencies in the regional capital whohave taken a lead role during preparations for theUNESCO recognition of the BR. Finally, as many other

BRs in the world, we encounter the specific difficulty ofhaving to form a new management body on issues andterritories that are under the administration of multiple,private and public, actors.Nonetheless, the Cape Horn BR provides a much more

promising platform for addressing the Cape Horn fisheriesproblem, than the MMA concept. Four reasons bring us tothis conclusion: (i) The comprehensive BR concept isperfectly compatible with the problem setting, combiningconcerns for conservation, research, education and thequality of local livelihoods. (ii) The concept emphasises theparticipatory, science-informed and adaptive developmentof management regimes. It does not impose a managementblueprint but prescribes stakeholder processes for thedevelopment of a situation-specific management structure.(iii) Sustainable fisheries management will in any way haveto coordinate with other uses and users of marine andterrestrial resources. Advances in the overall BR imple-mentation is promising to build the capacities and practicesnecessary, such as cross-level and cross-sector dialoguebetween (and among) local and regional actors, inter-agency collaboration, and the successive innovation of theregulatory framework. (iv) The BR concept providessignificant political backing for such a more proceduralapproach. As legal support for sustainable fisheries co-management is limited to the rigid MMA concept, thepolitical backing generated by UNESCO’s recognition ofthe BR is highly relevant.

7.2. Collaborative development of a fisheries management

structure inside the BR

The actual scope for stakeholder participation withinco-management structures can differ substantially. Severalarguments suggest that stakeholder participation for

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fisheries management inside the BR should not be limitedto consultations about specific questions within a givenmanagement structure. Instead, this structure should itselfbe the outcome of stakeholder participation:

First, it is a normative political requirement. TheUNESCO explicitly demands stakeholder participation inresource management inside BRs [35]. Furthermore, Chileis signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity andto its Ecosystem Approach which stipulates in its firstprinciple that the management of natural resources is ‘‘amatter of societal choice’’ [36]. With regard to Cape Hornfisheries, this cannot be delegated to parliamentary debate;the complexity and site-specificity involved requires stake-holder dialogue. More generally, operational decision-making is highly determined by the institutional structurewithin which management takes place [37]. It is thereforenecessary to collaboratively develop the managementstructure, if normative political requirements are takenserious.

Second, it corresponds to information needs. The aboveanalysis confirms that insiders’ perspectives are highlyvaluable to the management of Cape Horn fisheries. Inaddition, the remoteness, poor accessibility and largeextension of the fishing grounds in the Cape Horn BRmake it unfeasible to set up an independent monitoringnetwork. Fishers and the Navy have knowledge, expertiseand information relevant for adaptive management. How-ever, neither the Navy nor the fishers will be prepared todisclose potentially sensitive information, unless fisheriesmanagement has become part of their business, i.e. in acollaborative process.

Third, sustainable management regimes fail if stake-holder participation is merely conceived to create ‘a senseof ownership’, to enrich available knowledge and tobargain compromises between a-priori conflicting interests.Preferences and attitudes of actors are subject to changeduring dialogue in a joint effort: Their views on otheractors, their understanding of other actors’ perspectivesand their modes of relating with the natural environmentevolve in response to new insights and positive experiencesin a deliberative participatory arena. This requires skilledfacilitation and an enabling environment for such anarena—often unmet preconditions. But our point here isthat non-cognitive aspects play an important role, whichcannot be captured by a restrictive understanding of ‘‘trust-building’’ in terms of ‘‘acceptance of a given structure’’.The procedural dimension of jointly developing a manage-ment structure is maybe as relevant as the regulations thatcome out of it. The quality of societal interaction, theidentification with an area and its appreciation, theexperienced plurality of positions, the empowerment ofactually influencing a decision, but also the responsibilitiescoming along with it, and finally the experienced limita-tions imposed by legislation and the existing powerrelations—these aspects can develop during a continuedand meaningful stakeholder process and are highly relevantfor the sustainability of a management regime.

These arguments support a far-reaching interpretation of‘participation’, and voices abound that criticise the use oftheoretical arguments to justify the implementation ofoften problematic participatory practices [38–40]. Criticsemphasise the risk of misusing ‘participation’ to whitewashand reify existing power inequalities [41]. Nonetheless, thisdoes not affect the validity of the arguments per se.

7.3. Recommendations for a stakeholder process

In the following, we formulate several concrete sugges-tions for initiating and facilitating a participatory processfor the Cape Horn fisheries inside the BR. They refer toaspects promoting an enabling environment and to theprocess design itself. Recommendations can also be locatedin the IBEFish analytical framework [16,17 both this issue].

�

Influence the public discourse: In Magallanes, nationalterritory that is not cultivated or otherwise exploited isoften considered barren land which needs to be madeuse of for building the country (‘hacer soberanıa’).Consequently, the principal task during preparations forthe establishment of the UNESCO BR (2000–2005) wasto introduce a new vision on the area. Today, theunfragmented vast extensions of boreal forests inside theCape Horn BR are appreciated inter alia for their globalecological significance. However, concerns for thequality of life and for the security of livelihoods havenot yet replaced export-oriented short-term economicgrowth as the leading paradigm in the fisheries sector. Itis therefore important to communicate the equalimportance of these concerns in the UNESCO concept.Without a supportive discourse, recognition of theoverfishing problem will be limited to economicconcerns, and political attention will neglect socialimpacts on local fisheries. � Frame overfishing in a regional perspective: For the

residents of the Cape Horn BR, it takes more than 30 hby boat to reach Punta Arenas, the Region’s capital, andthere are virtually no settlements in between. However,framing the issue as a local problem ignores the mostrelevant factors. As long as the processing industry has astrong grip on fisher boats and transport vessels fromPunta Arenas, any solution needs to be developed atboth levels, in the regional capital and inside the BR.Furthermore, the appropriate institutional level foraddressing overfishing is in Punta Arenas, where theregistration of traditional fisher boats and the issuing offishing quotas take place for the entire Region—but alsobecause non-local fishers are the main resource usersinside the BR.

� Ensure flexible funding: This aspect lacks originality but

is very valid. Organising stakeholder collaborationinside the BR and in the Region’s capital should requirefrequent travel and highly skilled and continuedfacilitation over a period of several years. Importantly,as the stakeholder process needs to be open to internal

ARTICLE IN PRESSG. Pollack et al. / Marine Policy 32 (2008) 233–242 241

and external dynamics, it cannot be fully plannedaccording to a project logframe.

� Institute the right leader: Leadership is necessary to

protect the process against short-lived regional politics,as fisheries in Cape Horn is a politicised affair which canbe exploited for party politics. Leadership is thereforerequired to maintain the necessary momentum, and tosecure working relations as an intermediary betweenopposing parties. A leader would have to conductshuttle diplomacy, complementing roundtable encoun-ters. Ideally, leadership could be assumed by acombination of individuals from different organisations,which would bundle complementary resources, capacity,information, credibility in different arenas, and improvethe longevity of the process. For establishing the CapeHorn BR, the complementary leadership of a Chileanresearcher and a civil administrator was very effective—until elections replaced the administrator. Currently, itis unclear which individuals should lead such acollaborative process for fisheries management.

� Differentiate inside the actor groups: It is not enough to

distinguish between local and non-local fishers, ownersof fishing fleets, middlemen, and processing plants. Theadherence to one actor group is not determinant of anactor’s position. Local fishermen have divergent opi-nions, resources, horizons and knowledge, dependent onwhether they have been born in the area or whether theybelong to the significant group of those who arrivedmore recently in the area. Another example: Fishprocessing companies are notorious for their efforts tocircumvent regulations; but recently one companyinquired about the options to establish an environ-mental certification scheme, as their client in the UShad shown interest in the issue. Hence, ignoring theintra-group differences ensures that cross-group alli-ances in favour of sustainability arrangements will notmaterialise.

� Balance public attention with confidentiality: The situa-

tion in Cape Horn fisheries is characterised by a lowpublic perception. If social impacts of overfishing areproducing a silent crisis, it is of minor relevance toregional politics. Hence, local authorities and thosepursuing sustainability of fisheries will have to activelycommunicate. However, public attention will not con-tribute to the disposition of representatives to engage inopen dialogue. The space for creatively exchangingviews, information and ideas first needs to be developedand requires certain confidentiality [42]. Such a processis made difficult by too much of public attention,especially as many actors involved are not experiencednegotiators.

8. Conclusion

While at first sight, the MMA concept seemed to providea useful alternative to the current regulatory system forKing and Snow crab fisheries near Cape Horn, deeper

analysis of both, the concept and the concrete situation,has brought to light that the contrary is the case.Instead the more comprehensive initiative of the Cape

Horn BR should be used as a platform for fisheriesmanagement. Implementing the BR concept, per se impliesaddressing the fisheries issue, as the Cape Horn BR coversalmost 3 million ha of seascape. Those pursuing sustain-able fisheries should not seek to separately implement othermanagement tools, but instead engage in the process ofdeveloping regulations and coordinating activities in linewith the UNESCO concept. This process, in the long run,is promising to provide the broad perspective, politicalweight, the opportunities for funding and the publicattention that is necessary for successfully innovating thefisheries management in Cape Horn.The feasibility analysis of the MMA concept sheds also

light on a principal problem in setting up regulations forbiodiversity conservation and sustainable fisheries: Howcan a management model be formulated in such a way, thatit provides sustainability standards in some precision to bean effective legal instrument, but at the same time allowsfor sufficient flexibility to be appropriate in diversesettings?In the absence of feasible management blueprints, one

way forward is to establish general procedural require-ments orienting the situation-specific processes. In Chile,few efforts have been dedicated to the question of howpublic agencies should proceed to shift from the adminis-tration of sectors to the participatory and integratedmanagement e.g. of BRs. And we assume that this is nota Chilean particularity.The IBEFish framework serves to orient this search for

general procedural requirements, necessary for institu-tional innovation [9] and the case of Cape Horn fisheriesillustrates the importance to progressively develop in situ

and in a participatory way the appropriate institutionalarrangements.

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