final report mv blue star

Ing. Luka A. Frankovic Collision between M/V BLUE STAR & MODU ¨THE 205¨ _____________ Accidents Investigator

Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine

Navigation and Marine Security Department Investigation of Wrecks and Maritime Accidents Section

Panama, Republic of Panama

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PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY

INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ALLISION BETWEEN THE

M/V BLUE STAR AND THE MODU “THE 205”

ON DECEMBER 24TH 2006, IN THE APPROACH TO VERACRUZ, MEXICO WITH NO INJURIES, NO LOSS OFF LIFE AND NO POLLUTION.





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Accident Reporting and Investigation

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is To determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to

apportion liability, nor, except so as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.





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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE BACKGROUND OF EVENTS 4/5 SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 Particulars of the MV “Blue Star” and Accident Details 6/7 1.2 Particulars of the MODU “The 205” 7 1.3 Background (all times UTC less 6 hours, Ship’s Time) 8 1.4 The Crew 8 1.5 Environmental Conditions 9 1.5.1 Beaufort Scale (reference) 9 1.6 Narrative 10 SECTION 2 ANALYSIS 2.1 Aim 11 2.2 How the MV Blue Star collided with the MODU “The 205” 11 2.3 Attempt to Avoid the Collision 11 SECTION 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Findings 12 3.2 Cause 12

SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS 12/13 APPENDIX A1 Chart Copy (Showing positions from anchorage to allision) 14 A2 Chart Copy (Showing positions from anchorage to allision) 15 A3 NKK Damage Survey Report 16/17 A4 Diagram showing location of damage 18 A5 Photographs of Damage 19





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BACKGROUND OF EVENTS : On December 24th, 2006, the MV Blue Star allided with the “Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) 205” while jacked up near the approach to Veracruz harbor. The investigation was ordered by the Panama Maritime Authority and entrusted to Bellem Marine Bureau Inc. Capt Luka A. Frankovic to determine the facts surrounding the incident and report on the same. The Marine Surveyor Eng. John Pope was lead investigating surveyor. The following is the preliminary entry factual information: Eng. John Pope arrived on board the vessel on January 5th 2007 at about 8;50 AM. The vessel was securely moored starboard side alongside the Veracruz dry-dock (Astileros Navales) .Her draft was observed as Fwd. 3.20 M and Aft. 5.4 M. On December 21st, 2006, the bulk carrier M.V. Blue Star completed discharging at the Port of Veracruz, Mexico .Same day s/v proceeded to the Veracruz Anchorage where she was to complete Class annual surveys. The vessel anchored at (see map A-1) which was within Veracruz anchorage limits (see enclosed navigation chart for reference). On December 24th,2006, at 07:10 AM light weather conditions, as reported and as per ships records ,started deteriorating rapidly. Northerly / NW’ly wind speed increased initially from 25 to 30 kts with wind gust of 35 kts. Vessel’s only deployed port anchor (4 schls in water) began dragging. On the December 23rd. 2007 PM HRS LT, the offshore drilling vessel “MODU 205” arrived and was jacked-up out of the water at position approximately 1.3 N/M SSE from the MV Blue Star . She was assisted by 3 tugs. These tugs remained, as reported, in a nearby vicinity. At the time of incident MODU “The 205” was jacked-up and immobile. We found no records or plotting information that would show that the crew on board the MV” Blue Star” recorded The MODU 205’s arrival time and or position. The master of the Blue Star was called upon the bridge. Once on bridge and situation was assessed, and the Master called the Chief Engineer and ordered to prepare the engine, and to be prepared for emergency maneuvering. This was subsequently recorded as done at about 07:12 AM LT. In the mean time, the Master ordered the bosun and mate to the f’cstle deck and ordered the anchor to be slacked in order to get better holding, that did not help and the Blue Star continued to drag her anchor and was closing in on the stationary “MODU 205”. The Master ordered the bosun to start heave up the anchor in attempt to maneuver the vessel away from the MODU 205 using the ships engine. The anchor chain was reported 11 o’clock and hardly coming up.





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At 0743 AM LT master engaged main engine with SLOW AHEAD in attempt to ease up on anchor chain, which would ultimately allow him to gain headway and depart from collision course with MODU 205. Vessel reportedly was able only to make speed of 2 kts in rough seas. At 0811 AM LT the anchor was aweigh at SLOW AHEAD, the vessel started to move ahead, when the wind speed increased drastically. At 0813 AM LT the Master engaged the main engine to HALF AHEAD, but the vessel could not increase it’s distance away from the MODU 205. At 0815 AM LT the Master engaged the main engine to FULL AHEAD, on the telegraph but it was too late. At 0818 AM LT the Blue Star allied with the MODU 205 causing substantial damage to both vessels. Note : All times indicated in this report are expressed as local Central Standard Time, on the Twenty four hour clock.





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M/V BLUE STAR

SECTION 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 VESSEL PARTICULARS OF MV “BLUE STAR” Name : BLUE STAR Flag : Panama Classification : Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK) Class No. : 854048 IMO No. : 8306852 Call Sign : 3 ECO 7 Type of Vessel : Bulk / Log Carrier Gross Tons: 14,889 Net Tons : 8,920 Deadweight (DWT) : 25,694 MT Length (LOA) : 159.46 M Breadth (Moulded) : 26.00 M Depth (Moulded) : 13.60 M Date Built : 1985 Place Built : Imabari, Japan Owner : Atlas Shipping Company 53 Street, Swiss Tower 16th Floor, Panama Operator : Tradeline LLC 839 Office Tower,





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Al Ghurair City, Deira, Dubai Propulsion : Diesel Direct Horsepower : 5,080 @ 119 rpm Master : Jesia Rusi Yezdi

ACCIDENT DETAILS Time and Date : Approximately 08:18 AM LT Ships time on 24th

December 2006 Location of the Allision : Veracruz Anchorage Persons Onboard : 22 Crew Members Injuries / Fatalities : None Damages : to the Blue Star No. 4 WBT (Top Side) starboard from frames No. 32 to

70. Upper Deck iwo Hatch No. 4 Starboard. Hatch Cover No. 4 Cargo Hold No. 4 Cargo Crane No. 3 Starboard Boat Deck Starboard Access Gangway to the MODU “The 205” The extent of the damages to the MODu is unknown at this time 1.2 PARTICULARS OF THE MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT “THE 205”

Name : MODU “THE 205” Flag : USA Class : ABS IMO No. : 8755390 Call Sign : WDB5532 Service : MODU Rig Type : JACKUP Gross Tons: 5,340





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Length (LOA) : 150.70 FT Breadth (Moulded) : 132.00 FT Depth (Moulded) : 18.00 FT Date Built : 1979 Place Built : Bethlehem Steel, Beaumont, Texas Shipyard Owner : TODCO

2000 W. Sam Houston Pkwy S. Suite 800 Houston, Texas 77042, USA

Operator : Same as Owner Propulsion : None Master : Unknown

1.3 VESSEL BLUE STAR

The vessel Blue Star(ex Refioglu) is a geared bulk/log carrier owned by Atlas Shipping Company and operated by Tradeline LLC. The vessel was built 1985 in Japan flying the Panamanian Flag. The vessel’s main propulsion engine is a single 2 stroke diesel engine rated 5,080 hp @ 119 rpm. For maneuvering purposes (arrivals /departures) vessel uses MDO . Maintenance records were found all to date with no reports of major problems. The class quarterly machinery report showed no remaining outstanding recommendations. From the previous records it is observed that engine preparations take normally an average of 25-30 minutes.

At the time of incident , the vessel was in ballasted condition. Class NKK had just

completed all statutory annual surveys on the 26th. December 2006. All regulatory and statutory as well as Class certificates were found valid and all annual

endorsements were found up to date . The vessel was found to be in compliance with the Panamanian Minimum Safe Manning certificate. The ISM (SMC/DOC) and ISPS(ISSC) certification was also valid and the Safety Management manual was found on board .

1.4 THE CREW The Master of the MV “BLUE STAR” Captain Jesia Rusi Yezdi is Indian national. Captain Yezdi is licensed by the governments of Britain and has an endorsement issued

by Panama as a Master (F.G) (Foreign-Going).





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Captain Yezedi’s Provisional Panamanian Master’s and provisional G.M.D.S.S. endorsements both expired on December 21st 2006. The Masters National COC and GMDSS GO, was found valid through to 7/2011 .

The Master sailed as a 3rd Officer in 1990. He has been sailing as a Master since 2nd

April 2002, with a total sea time of approximately 26 months excluding the current Blue Star’s voyage. His sea time experience as master includes 5 bulk carriers (3 Panamax and 2 Handymax size).

It should be noted , with the exception of the Ch/Eng, that all of the officers and ratings

are holding expired provisional Panamanian endorsements .(validity three months). Their National certificates of competencies were all found valid .

1.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS(MARINE WEATHER) On the day of the incident ,as per the master’s statement, the weather conditions

deteriorated rapidly . The wind speed and sea state were recorded by the crew of the MV Blue Star during the day of December 24th, 2006 as follows :

Watch Wind Sea State Barometer 0000 - 0600 Lt Air 3 1015 0600 - 1200 NW 7/8 6 1017 1200 - 1600 NW 7/8 6 1018 1600 - 2000 NW 7/8 6 1021 2000 - 2400 NW 7/8 6 1021

Please note that we find quite unusual that barometric preasure was rising with wind /

seas conditions worsening .

THE FOLLOWING IS THE BEAUFORT SCALE (FOR REFERENCE ONLY)

Force Mean Speed(knots) Description State of sea Ashore

Probable Wave Height

(m) Probable Max Wave

Height





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0 0-1 Calm Flat Smoke rises vertically 0 01 1-3 Light air Ripples Smoke shows wind direction 0.1 02 4-6 Light breeze Small wavelets, non breaking Leaves rustle 0.2 0.3

3 7-10 Gentle breeze Large wavelets, crests breaking

Wind extends small flag, leaves in motion 0.6 1

4 11-16 Moderate breeze Fairly frequent white horses Small branches begin to move 1 1.5

5 17-21 Fresh breeze Moderate waves, many white horses, some spray Small trees begin to sway 2 2.5

6 22-27 Strong breeze Large waves, white foam crests, some spray Large branches move 3 4

7 28-33 Near gale White foam blows from crests Branches move, difficult to walk against the wind 4 5.5

8 34-40 Gale Mod high waves, foam in streaks along surface Twigs break off trees 5.5 7.5

9 41-47 Strong gale High waves, tumbling crests, dense streaks of foam, much

spray

Slates, chimneys begin to be moved 7 10

10 48-55 Storm Very high waves with long overhanging crests, heavy

tumbling sea

Trees uprooted, structural damage to buildings 9 12.5

11 56-63 Violent storm Sea completely covered with long white foam patches

Wide spread damage to buildings etc 11.5 16

12 64 + Hurricane Air filled with foam and

driving spray. Visibility very seriously affected

As above 14 Above 16

1.6 NARRATIVE (All times UTC less 6 hrs) On December 21st 2006 the bulk carrier MV Blue Star completed discharging at the Port of Veracruz and shortly thereafter proceeded to Veracruz anchorage to complete the class inspections. At 07:10 hrs on December 24th, 2006, the Chief Officer S. Hamidur Rahman was at watch on thenavigational bridge when he noticed that the winds began to increase from N’ly 5-10 kts to N’ly/NW’ly 20-25 kts. This soon resulted with vessel dragging its port anchor. The Master was informed and was asked to come on the bridge. Few minutes later master was on the bridge and have been briefed by Chief Officer. Wind speed at this time was recorded at 25 knots. At this time the MODU “The 205” was approximately 1.3 miles off the starboard aft quarter. At about 07:12 AM LT the Master informed the Chief Engineer and the engine crew to prepare the main engine for emergency maneuvering . By all accounts this took approximately 25 minutes. At about 07:16 AM LT the Master reacted by ordering bosun to paid out 2 shackles on the port anchor. This





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resulted in vessel holding position for short period of time. The distance to the MODU “The 205” was now reported as approximately 0.7 N/M off the starboard aft quarter. Meantime at about 07:20 hrs LT the Veracruz Vessel Traffic Services(VTS) called the vessel on CH 10 informing the MV “Blue Star” that they were dragging their anchor. At 07:43 hrs the Master informed the Bosun to begin heaving the anchor and at the same time engaged the main engine to SLOW AHEAD with intention to ease up on the anchor chain. By now wind has increased, as per ships deck log book records, went up to 30-35 gusting 40 kts. The vessel was dragging its port anchor again. At 08:11 hrs the Master had the port anchor aweigh and vessel’s main engine was engaged from slow ahead to half ahead(o8:13 AM LT and full ahead @ 08:15 AM. LT).At this time the 3rd Officer informed the Master, that the wind speed has increased again and that the MODU’s “205” was now only 0.4 miles off the starboard aft quarter and decreasing rapidly. Even , as reported , with the vessel’s main engine now in a Full Ahead mode the vessel’s speed was not increasing . The Ship’s bow was heading due North and ships speed was reported as 2 kts or less. At approximately 08:18 hrs, the MV Blue Star allided with the MODU “The 205”. As the result of impact the helipad cut loose from the MODU”205” and landed on the starboard side No. 4 hatch cover of the MV Blue Star, causing substantial damage to the Blue Star’s starboard side hull, bulwark and timber posts and ballast tank. Substantial damage was caused to MODU “The 205” as well. We did not visite the MODU and do not have confirmed information on the extent of the damages sustained. Following instructions provided by VTS vessel proceeded in steering E’ly course and at about10:50 AM LT cleared out to open seas making approximately speed of 10 Kts through the water. The weather conditions persisted, reportedly, for another 24-30 hrs. Please note that master has produced and presented two quite different chart plottings of the vessel position on the day of the incident. The second chart shows only four positions and was produced several days after the incident? SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS

2.1 AIM The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and circumstances of

the accident, as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.

2.2 HOW THE MV “BLUE STAR” ALLIDED WITH THE MODU “THE 205”





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In this case, the Blue Star allided with the stationary “Jacked Up” Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit “The 205”, without any loss of life, injuries or pollution. Once the Blue Star began dragging its anchor the strong winds and seas prevented the vessel from being able to maneuver away from the collision course with the MODU “The 205”using her own main engine.

It must be also noted that the M.V. Blue Star was in ballast condition giving the vessel a large sail area upon which the storm force wind exerted it forces.Further more it must be noted that engineers on board Blue Star were given not enough time to properly prepare main engine for emergency maneuvering .

2.3 THE ATTEMPT TO AVOID CONTACT WITH THE RIG. The Captain and crew following master orders attempted to re-set the port anchor when it

first started dragging but they never attempted to drop the second anchor? Realizing that one anchor was not sufficient to hold the vessel position the Captain heaved

in the anchor time while going slow ahead with the main engine. This took time and decision of doing so was brought to late ?

It appears that the Master did not realize that danger of a collision was imminent, and

therefore, never raised an emergency distress call “Mayday”, which would as per Intl. regulations, brought him assistance of tugs and vessels in nearby vicinity . There were reported several available in the nearby vicinity.

Several attempts were made but all seamed to be a little bit too late. There is also

noticeable factor of insufficient decisiveness. After the vessel allided with the MODU the vessel’s rudder was ordered to “HARD STARBOARD” which helped the vessel to break free and away from the MODU . This attempt was successful.

SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 3.1 FACTS





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1. The MV Blue Star was properly manned and the vessel was fully certified by Class prior to the allison.

2. The winds and seas ,prior to the time of the allison ,deteriorated rapidly. 3. Master was not fully aware of the upcoming weather conditions and therefore, he did

not take adequate precautionary measures including and not limited to the decision to set sail to open seas to meet stormy weather.

4. The wind, seas followed by strong tidal currents ultimately contributed to this accident.

5. The propulsion, steering and navigation equipment on the BLUE STAR were found operating properly. There was no records of any mechanical failures that we can attribute to this incident. It appears that the order to prepare the machinery was given too late. This would mean that master failed to follow company procedures for Emergency Situations and Response Actions .

6. Lack of communication between the VTS (Vessel Traffic Services) Veracruz, Mexico, the MODU “The 205” and the MV Blue Star also have contributed to the allison.

3.2 CAUSE

As per above presented facts we are of the opinion that human factor directly contributed to this incident. Master of the vessel did not prepare the vessel in a timely manner . Weather reports and warnings that were available should have been properly evaluated .Since that was note done and because of that vessel and its crew were caught off guard un prepared .We have not been presented with any evidence that would steer us thinking otherwise. Subsequently cause of the vessel finally alliding with MUDU should be attributed to the human factor as well . The lack of experience of the ships master in handling this and similar situations directly contributed to the results of this incident . Also we may say that lack of effective communication between the M.V. Blue Star, VTS and MODU “The 205” also contributed to final result of this incident as well.

SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Operators of the s/v are recommended to amend the shipboard emergency procedure

manual by adding additional entries specifically addressing procedures to be taken in the case of expected and un-expected weather deteriorating factors that may presents danger to the crew and property (vessel) . This sections should include more detailed communication procedures to be taken when vessel is at anchorage and adverse weather is





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expected and or it occurs suddenly and unexpectedly. This section should also include instructions to the officers on watch to positively establish radio contact with any vessel/unit anchored in a nearby vicinity.

2. The Captain’s should ensure that weather facts are closely monitored and constantly evaluated and continuously brought to his attention. The Master should be trained to be more decisive, and to use all the means at his disposal when facing adverse weather conditions or any other situation that presents danger to his crew and vessel.

3. The Captain should have taken an immediate decision to drop both of the vessel’s anchors

when he realized that the port anchor was dragging and would not hold. He also should have been using full capacity of his engine even if that would have resulted in loosing one or both of the vessel anchors .

4. If communication was failing with VTS and nearby vessels or if the reply was not as

expected the Captain should have immediately called out a distress call requesting assistance from all available vessels in a nearby vicinity .

5. The Officer on Watch should have had communicated with VTS immediately upon realizing that the vessel was dragging his anchor and he was heading toward another vessel. The ships position ,engine status with time needed to have engine ready for operation and number of anchors in the water immediately should have been transmitted to VTS along with request for immediate assistance. If such would be refused emergency distress call should have been followed right away instead when it was to late.

6. Complete and detailed weather conditions should been always recorded in the vessels official deck log book including temperatures(air, water),barometric pressure, wind / seas direction / force/state. When noticing significant changes in any of the above listed entries OOW should have taken readings and made entries on a more frequently basis (15-30 minutes intervals) and report changes to the master at once. The above survey report is submitted by the undersigned independent marine surveyor at the request of AMP . The undersigned reserves the right to amend this survey, should and when further information become available.





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Signed : Capt.Luka A. Frankovic Principal Surveyor , BMB Inc., Eng. John Pope Investigating Surveyor , BMB Inc.,

This report is intended for the sole use of the person or organization to whom it is addressed and no liability of any nature whatsoever shall be assumed to any other party in respect of it’s contents. This document does not make any warranty expressed or implied concerning any inaccuracy in any document issued. As to the addressee, neither the Company nor the undersigned shall be held liable for any loss or damage whatsoever suffered by virtue of any act, omission or default (whether arising by negligence or otherwise) by the undersigned, the Company or any of it’s servants.

APPENDIX

A1 BA chart 374, showing where the MV “Blue Star” was anchored and eventually allided

with the MODU “The 205”.





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This map was produced on Jan 7, 2007 long after

Eng. J. Pope left the vessel ???

A2 BA chart 374, showing where the MV “Blue Star” was anchored and eventually allided with the MODU “The 205”.

This was the original map showing vsl’s movement on Dec 24th. 2007

A3 DAMAGE SUSTAINED FROM ALLISION NKK SURVEY REPORT OF DAMAGE TO MV BLUE STAR





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A4 REFERENCE DIAGRAM SHOWING LOCATION OF DAMAGE





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A5 PHOTOS OF DAMAGE TO M/V BLUE STAR

Damage to No. 3 Crane Catwalk Damage to No. 4 TST & Cargo Hold Damage to Starboard Bulwark Damage to Main Deck Damage to Hatch Covers Damage to Fwd Corner of Boat Deck

final report mv blue star

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