facing the true ‘fortress europe’: immigrant and politics in the ec

Journal of Common Market Studies 0021-9886 $3.00

Volume XXIX, No. 5 September 1991

Facing the True ‘Fortress Europe’: Immigrant and Politics in the EC*

PATRICK R . IRELAND

Connecticut College

Introduction With its impetus coming from the perceived need to make European companies more competitive in the international market, the European Communities’ (EC) 1992 project has largely been economic news. The ongoing creation of a Single European Market has understandably involved first and foremost the removal of internal economic barriers - including those limiting the free movement of persons within the Community - and other business and trade issues. But the 1992 process promises to produce much more than simply a ‘rich man’s club’ (Lodge, 1989, p. 328). In response to fears in certain quarters about the consequences of a deregulated E C for workers and for the Community’s ‘weaker parts’, the Internal Market has also acquired a social dimension. At its most ambitious, the talk of ‘Social Europe’ has extended to the ideal of a genuinely pluralist European society - a people’s Europe.

Central to both the economic and the social dimensions of the 1992 project have been Western Europe’s 13 million immigrants, both workers and their families. The entry of legal and illegal migrants and refugees into the EC, as well as their internal mobility and social rights once within it (social protection, social dialogue, health and safety, etc.), have constituted a key focus of interest for negotiators and a major challenge (cf. CEC, 1991). But until quite recently, government *An earlier draft of this article was presented at the Seventh International Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C., 23-5 March 1990. The author is grateful for the comments of Zig Layton-Henry, Giuseppe Callovi, and several anonymous referees, as well as for funding assistance from the American Political Science Association and Connecticut College.

458 PATRICK R . IRELAND

officials, Eurocrats, and scholars have seen them exclusively as passive subjects of the European integration process.

This article represents an attempt to correct that imbalanced perspective. After considering the positions that European institutions have taken regarding non-citizens’ political rights in the EC, I trace the development of an active immigrant political role at the European level since the early 1970s. The intention is not to exaggerate the extent of that mobilization, or to overemphasize its impact on E C policies. Rather, I hope to fill the existing lacunae of information on the relationship between immigrants and politics at the European level. The argument here is that immigrant political participation has represented an organized response to the institutional dynamics of European integration - the type of transnational pressure-group response that neo-functionalist theories of that integration have predicted.

Immigrants in Western Europe Foreign workers have been the indispensable companion of Western Europe’s economic rebirth since the Second World War. Immediately or shortly after hostilities had ceased in 1945, rapid economic growth and shortages of workers across Western Europe spurred both private- and public-sector programmes for recruiting foreign labour, first from South- ern Europe and then from North and Black Africa and Anatolia (Castles et al . , 1984). Yet what appeared initially as an elementary economic equation - bringing jobs and workers together in an international labour market - had become a source of social conflict by the early 1970s. For a significant number of foreign workers, it became evident that an early return to the homeland was unlikely. Their families began to join them in Western Europe, and a second and even a third generation emerged from the post-war waves of immigration. Instead of disappearing, these immigrants were constituting a sort of ‘Third World in the midst of the developed world’ (Castles and Kosack, 1985, p. 504).

The period between 1970 and 1974 was a crucial turning point for Western Europe’s labour-importing countries. The oil shocks of the period precipitated a rapid shift in economic conditions. Most of the receiving-country, ‘host’ governments soon prohibited additional immigration. The task has since become to absorb the people - from a wide array of cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic backgrounds - that migration has added to the population of Western Europe.

As public officials and public opinion became aware of the durability of the foreign presence in Western Europe, the host societies could no longer dodge the socio-political fallout. At first, the foreigners seemed to play only an indirect political role as the object of immigration policies and host-society political discourse. They paid taxes and utilized a wide range

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 459

of publicly provided services and became symbols in local and national political dialogue. Although disenfranchised, they thereby altered the political agenda and the implementation of public policies (CEDETIM, 1975).

Especially since the outburst of protests across Europe in the late 1 9 6 0 ~ ~ moreover, foreign workers and their families have exhibited noteworthy readiness to complain about their living, working and legal conditions. The increasingly familial nature and slower turnover of what are now veritable minority communities have produced a longer-term interest on their part in the host society, and have reduced their willingness to accept their condition. They have targeted the governments of their countries of origin and of immigration.

Non-citizens in the industrial democracies of Western Europe have on occasion engaged in colourful and even violent protest activities that have attracted the bemused attention of officials and the public. But foreigners have also participated by means of less confrontational political forms. Immigrants enjoy a limited right to vote in local elections in only a handful of cases (Ireland, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and the Jura and Neuchitel Cantons in Switzerland); but in many places governments have granted them limited ‘secondary political rights’ that can be important instruments for such an underprivileged minority group (cf. Dahrendorf, 1963). Immigrants can often join ‘native’ organizations (trade unions, political parties and the like), form their own associations, file law suits, and participate in works councils and union elections. Several host governments have set up consultative councils at the local, regional and national levels. Immigrants have thereby developed a surprisingly wide range of participatory forms and in many respects, then, constitute an ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ (Schnapper, in Kastoryano, 1987, p. 23).

European Integration and Transnational Political Organizing As this article will show, furthermore, the immigrants have not limited their political organizing to the national and subnational levels within each host society: they have demonstrated a growing propensity to develop cross-national contacts and activities, stitching together a continental organizational network. Immigrants are thereby becoming truly Euro- pean political actors.

Such European-level immigrant participation has clear significance for theories of European integration. Other approaches made their appear- ance, but it was neo-functionalism that offered the dominant perspective on the E C in the 1950s and 1960s.’ Advanced most notably by Haas (1958)

‘.See Taylor (1Y83), ch. 1. for detailed treatment of gradualist theories of integration.

460 PATRICK R. IRELAND

and Lindberg (1963), neo-functionalist theory was concerned with the level of popular commitment to integration. But the approach’s pro- ponents held that the establishment of supranational European political institutions had to precede the expected transfer of loyalties from the nation-state to Europe. Key to this process was the concept of ‘spillover’, namely, that once nations integrated one sector of their economies, technical pressures and interdependencies would push for the integration of other sectors. Spillover, additionally, had a political aspect: pressure groups would form around the developing institutional nexus at the European level, thereby generating further pressures for additional integration (cf. George, 1985).

Neo-functionalists were disappointed. The ‘Eurosclerosis’ of the 1960s and 1970s suggested that they had been overly optimistic. The E C had established a number of advisory bodies that invited Euro-pressure-group participation, most notably the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). As William Wallace commented in 1983, however, the EC ‘remain[ed] for its member governments and for the overwhelming majority of their citizens, a secondary and subordinate framework for political activity’.* Few lobby groups operated at the Community level.

Before the release of the famous White Paper and the passage of the Single European Act in the mid-l980s, therefore, neo-functionalism had fallen into disfavour. Yet the 1992 project has altered that situation. Well over 700 national and transnational lobbying groups now direct their efforts toward the EC. Some observers have seen the growth of such Euro-pressure-group activity as evidence of neo-functionalist spillover and, accordingly, further integration (Lodge, 1989, pp. 51-3).

Citing their limited reach and their exclusively consultative role, however, critics have pointed to the relatively weak capacity of the ESC and committees like it to aggregate and articulate crossnational interests. Scholars like Keohane and Hoffmann (1989, pp. 36-7) note that official contacts have primarily involved representatives of capital and industry. They argue that a nefarious asymmetry has resulted: the ‘clouds of corporate lobbies buzzing around the decision-makers’ have contributed to a ‘neglect of the interests of those groups not well represented among the lobbies and consultative committees: consumers, workers, regions and cities’. The imbalance of this institutional arrangement, part and parcel of the intergovernmental bargaining that has characterized the process of European integration, would thereby explain the absence of a truly ‘European public’.

Immigrant workers qualify as the under-represented group par excel- lence. And they are, of course, transnational by their very condition. The extent of their European-level political participation thus becomes a

*Cited in Pridham (1986), pp. 283-4.

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 46 1

potentially highly significant indicator of how far European integration has actually proceeded beyond the purely economic realm.

Immigrant Political Rights and European Institutions

The immigration policies of the major Western European host societies have differed in many respects, especially with regard to the political opportunities that each host society made available to its non-citizen residents. Since the mid-l970s, however, pressures have grown on these nations to bring their respective policies into line. One prominent source has been the supranational bodies overseeing preparations for European co-operation and integration. Just as the rise of social tensions and anti- immigrant movements was precluding any moves by national governments to improve the immigrants’ political access, European institutions stepped in to take up such issues. They have, accordingly, compelled immigrants of all nationalities to organize politically at the European level.

The Treaty of Rome that laid the foundations for the EC in 1958 included provisions for the progressive acceptance of complete labour mobility within the Community and for the aggregation and international transfer of foreign workers’ social security benefits (Articles 48 and 51). The EC has since taken steps to advance toward that ideal, and negotiations over the planned removal of all economic barriers within the Community by 1992 have placed the matter firmly at the centre of preoccupations. It is with good reason that Harlem Desir of France’s anti- racist SOS-Racisrne movement has referred to the immigrants as the ‘thirteenth nation’ of the EC (Le Monde, 13 July 1988).

European-level institutions have voiced escalating concern over the fate of the continent’s immigrant families and refugees. These bodies are worried about the possible socio-political ramifications should the foreign communities’ integration not come about smoothly and with all due speed. European institutions have strived for the harmonization - or at least co- ordination - of national-level policies concerning access. mobility, the provision of social welfare benefits, and living and working conditions ( C E C , 1991, p. 4).

At the same time, with respect to the immigrants’ civil and political rights, the focus has been at local level. Across Western Europe, the concentration of immigrants has varied widely from town to town, and region to region. The general feeling among European officials has been that the neighbourhood, town, and city are the logical contexts within which to involve immigrants in host-society political life: it is there that the problems - both real and imagined - associated with their presence originate. It has been there, too, that immigrants have been most politically active, as they have responded to the institutions and issues that directly affect their day-to-day existence.


The E C Commission, accordingly, has consistently attempted to organize representation of the immigrants’ interests at local level. ‘Excluding them from the exercise of civic and political rights’, the Commission reasoned in the Action Programme for Migrant Workers and Their Family Members that it placed before the Council of Ministers in 1974, ‘seems to contradict the very principle of the free movement of people and the political objectives of the Community as concerns the European Union’ (CEC, March 1976, p. 21). It argued in favour of limited local-level suffrage by 1980 for immigrants meeting certain residency requirements. As a preparatory stage, Member States were urged to involve the immigrants in decision-making in the communities where they resided, by immediately establishing local-level consultative bodies based on Belgium’s well-developed network of Consultative Communal Commissions for Immigrants (CCCI).

The E C Commission reissued its recommendations and Directives in more or less consistent form throughout the 1970s, and the Council complied by passing resolutions encompassing their gist - if not always every one of their often quite ambitious particulars. The 1975 European Summit in Paris, for example, produced a statement emphasizing the important transitional role that consultative organs could play in both the reduction of anti-immigrant discrimination and the advancement of the immigrants’ political integration (Wihtol de Wenden, 1978, p. 33).

The European Parliament (EP), meanwhile, was going even further in its support for greater immigrant political rights in the Community. Through its ‘initiative reports’ on a wide variety of policy areas, it made clear its views on what legislation should become the subject of formal Commission proposals. The EP supported the Commission’s call for immigrant participation in local elections by 1980 and for the establishment of consultative bodies. In a 1975 report the body also came out strongly in favour of widening the political rights of immigrants from E C Member States in preparation for the election of the Parliament by direct suffrage in 1979 (Parlement europeen, 1975-6, p. 22).3

Although it had promised significant changes, however, the EC’s push for widened political access for immigrants, like the entire process of European integration, lost its momentum by the end of the decade. The EC Member States revealed the extent of their determination to assert national control over public life and to prevent non-citizens’ political empowerment. Restrictions on immigrant representation in European trade unions had gradually fallen, and consultative bodies had appeared in

3The Council of Europe, its Conference of European Local and Regional Authorities, and a number of non-governmental European organizations and religious bodies have also consistently urged host-society governments to encourage the immigrants’ participation in host-society decision-making processes, particularly at subnational levels (Landstrom, 1977; Conseil de I’Europe, 1986).

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 463 several nations. But no truly concerted action had followed the EC’s strongly worded calls for the extension of voting rights to immigrants (Taylor, 1983, pp. 221-2, cf. Zuleeg, 1987).

The situation of near stasis changed with the inauguration of the 1992 Internal Market project and the European Commission’s new focus on the ‘social dimension’ of the Internal Market. The Council of Ministers had accepted a Social Action Programme in 1974 that provided the basis for a wide range of actions in the field of social policy (Vandamme, 1985), but it was the Single European Act that really legitimated E C action in the social sphere. Concerns about the social consequences of a barrier-free European market led the Commission to issue a working paper on the ‘Social Dimension of the Internal Market’ in 1988 that focused on the importance of protecting Europe’s highly developed systems of social protection and industrial relations.

What is more, ‘Social Europe’ is to go beyond policies to protect employees in the EC. Ultimately, ‘the Europe which has decided by common action to secure the economic and social progress of the Member States refers more and more explicitly to a concept of civilization . . . a type of democracy based on respect for human rights’ (European Documentation, 1990, p. 55) . Part of this ‘human face’ has involved the Commission’s European Social Charter of 1988 - a detailed list of workers’kitizens’ rights that is an expression of Europe’s conception of society and the individual’s rights within a unified labour market.4 Under French pressure and against British opposition, the Commission’s proposal finally won approval at the Strasbourg summit in 1989. The document stipulates 12 basic social rights and principles, supplemented by a 45-point action programme to implement the Social Charter (CEPS, 1990, ch. 3).

The Charter is no more than a non-binding statement of intent, and its weaknesses have evoked ‘cries of protest from the unions and the Socialists in the European Parliament’ (Ross, 1990, p. 57). Still, for Europe’s immigrants the document does at least offer official recognition of their right to freedom of movement and association. The Charter’s action programme includes a memorandum on the social integration of migrants from non-Member States as well.

Over the past three years, the European Commission has continued to push for stronger efforts to integrate immigrants (cf. CEC, 1991, p. 4). At the Commission’s insistence, the Council of Ministers Responsible for Immigration has held conferences to discuss the issue. In September 1990, the Commission reviewed an official report on ‘Immigration Policies and Social Integration of Immigrants in the EC’. Concluding that only the elimination of legal, cultural, linguistic, and other barriers to the immigrants’ complete integration can make possible the achievement of true

JThe Charter completes and complements the one drawn up by the Council of Europe in 1951 and in effect since 1965 (and since ratified by nine EC members), cf. CEC, 1988a.


freedom of movement within the Community, it spelled out the rights that immigrants should enjoy: equal opportunities in housing, employment, education, and social security; and easier access to host-society nationality. The report also argued for the development of a European charter on immigration - a group of fundamental principles on integration. Those principles entail a ‘certain degree of participation [by immigrants] in the management of daily life’ in the host society (Financial Times, 28 September 1990).

The Commission has, in fact, repeatedly underlined its conviction that democratic ideals should also apply fully to immigrants in the Community. It has started work on a European associational law, commissioning several surveys of the immigrants’ organizations throughout Western Europe and consulting with the most representative of their number. In 1988 and again in June 1990, the Commission called for the extension of local-level voting rights to all E C citizens in their community of residence and sent a proposal for a binding Directive to that effect to the Council of Ministers. The Council did not act on that proposal, but at their meeting in Dublin in June 1990, the Ministers concerned with immigration declared that efforts to co-ordinate immigration, refugee and integration policies among E C Member States would persist (Piazza, September 1990, p. 8).

Then, in October 1990, the Spanish government took advantage of its presidency of the Council of Ministers to put forward its concept of ‘Euro- pean Citizenship’. Debate began at the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in Rome in December 1990 on the proposed set of rights of the European citizen, which would include complete freedom of movement and of residence, as well as ‘free participation . . . in political life in the place of residence’ (Europe Documents 1653,2 October 1990). These rights would complement the existing right to petition the European Parliament and to have recourse in certain cases to the European Court of Justice.

Despite the obvious commitment that the Commission and the Council have shown, it has actually been quasi-secret ministerial bodies like the TREVI group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration that have most directly tackled immigration issues in the EC.5 Unhappy with that situation, the European Parliament has moved to ‘democratize’ the process. During its spring 1985 session, the E P passed a resolution asking Member States to grant resident foreigners ‘with origins within the EC’ the right to vote in local elections (Le Monde, 13 July 1986). In February 1987, it reiterated that resolution (Le Monde, 18 February 1987). The

SThc 1975 European summit produced the TREVI group (Terrorisme-Radicalisme- ExtrCrnisme-Violence Internationale), comprising the 12 Member States’ ministers of the interior and of justice, whose objective it i s to reinforce co-operation and information exchange amongst national police forccs and customs officials. The Ad Hoc Group on Immigration is a small co-ordinating body with long-term goals that was set up after the Rhodes European summit in 1988 (Migrations-Sociktk 2, 12 (November-December, 1990), pp. 55-6; CEC, 1991, p. 4.

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 465 following year, the E P debated a proposal offered by a Communist M E P from Italy, Francesca Marinaro, that local-level voting rights and totally equal trade union and social rights be available to all immigrants resident in the EC (Piazza, June 1988, pp. 6-7). The body has also encouraged Western European host societies to allow their foreign populations to lead an active associational life, asking the Commission to lobby governments to grant subsidies to foreigners’ associations on an equal basis with those of their citizens (CAZFZnfos, June 1986, pp. 2-3).

In October 1990, the E P gathered to discuss a report prepared by its Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia. Very controversial, the report included recommendations for multicultural and multilingual teaching programmes in schools, a European Residents’ Card, voting rights in local elections for immigrants with five years’ EC residence, and a European Migrants’ Forum for representative immigrant organizations from EC nations. Badly split, the Parliament eventually sent the report to the Commission with the request that it ‘study seriously’ (not ‘endorse’) its recommendations (New Statesman, 19 October 1990). At the same time, however, the body offered strong support for Spain’s proposed European Citizenship, including its provisions for local-level immigrant voting rights (CEPS, 1990, p. 99).

To sum up, since the revival of the European integration process in the mid-l980s, the institutions of the EC have voiced increasing concern about immigrants’ social integration and have come out strongly in favour of widening their political rights. Even so, verbal support has not always been matched by forceful implementation. And more ambitious initiatives have foundered when divergent Member State interests have come into play.

More seriously, the 1992 process has threatened to aggravate discrimination between immigrants from within and outside the EC. Texts covering labour mobility, access to employment, and social benefits long bore evidence of bias in favour of ECnationals. Earlier European documents relat- ing to immigrant political rights, however, usually applied to the citizens of EC and so-called ‘third’ countries equally (Beauthier, 1990, pp. 46-7).

Yet the pendulum has since swung in the direction of favouritism for Member State nationals within the Community in that area as well. The 1979, 1984, and 1989 elections to the European Parliament - which saw eligible EC immigrants participating in homeland contests while resident elsewhere - drew special attention to the EC/non-EC dichotomy. The European Parliament’s most recent proposal for local-level immigrant voting rights, unlike that of 1987 or M E P Molinaro’s project in 1988, declined to call for their extension to citizens of third countries (GISTI, 1989-90, pp. 83-7). Likewise, the Spanish concept of European citizenship and the 1990 Commission report on the integration of immigrants both effectively exclude those from outside the Community (cf. Costa- Lascoux, in Lorreyte, 1989, pp. 335-51).


European-Level Immigrant Participation

As a more exclusively European legal and political space has evolved, the E C has thus pressured national governments to co-ordinate their policies and to widen at least EC nationals’ access to host-society political life. Neo-functionalists might therefore expect the E C to serve as an active stimulus and focus of European-level immigrant political mobilization. And, indeed, there is evidence to suggest European integration may indeed be having that kind of political spillover. The immigrants seem to have responded directly to institutional developments in the EC in developing transnational modes of political participation since the mid-1970s.

One such mode has concerned immigrants of a single national origin targeting the government of their homeland. This form of participation originally had little to do with developments in the EC, but has since witnessed their effect. The original impetus came not from Brussels but from the homeland governments themselves, intent on shoring up political support among emigrant communities. With that goal in mind, governments have set up webs of consular services and other official organizations throughout Europe (cf. Miller, 1981).

Such organizations have served as much as a means of control as of representation. The Algerian regime, in particular, has exerted great influence abroad through the Fraternal Association of Algerians in Europe (Arnicale des Algtriens en Europe- AAE). Several other non-EC homeland governments - the Moroccan, Turkish, Tunisian, Senegalese, etc. -have established similar networks of official organizations in the host society .

Italian post-war governments, by contrast, have chosen to maintain emigrants’ identification with Italy by granting financial assistance to trade union and social welfare organizations across Europe, be they affiliated with the Catholic Church and Christian Democrats, Socialists or Commu- nists. The government also reactivated and enhanced the consultative organs for Italian emigrants attached to the consular offices that had existed in several countries before the fascist period. Since they have gained democratic regimes, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have also set up advisory bodies on which delegates of their nationals sit grouped by their respective host societies. Competition can be fierce between, say, the ‘German’ Portuguese and the ‘French’ Portuguese - with each ‘country’ working hard to press an agenda whose priorities reflect the particular institutional realities of its host society.6

6Personal interview with M. Ferreire, President, Conseil de la communauti portugaise en France, Paris. See the position adopted by the National Council for Economic and Labour Questions in ‘Rappresentativita e partecipazione negli organismi di tutela degli emigrati: il case del CCIE’. In Conferenza Nazionale dell’Ernigrazione (Rome, December 1974) 1, pp. 79-80.

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 467 The growth of a European dimension to the immigration issue has had a

clear impact on such homeland-directed participation. Expatriate Italians have cast ballots in elections to the European Parliament since 1979, as did Spaniards and Portuguese in the 1989 contests (Foschi, 1978, p. 121). E C Member States with large numbers of nationals resident elsewhere in the Community - i.e. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece - have intervened with the EC Commission and the European Court of Justice on their behalf. Homeland governments have even moved to use their transnational organizational networks to exert pressure for policy changes within the EC (Agoru, 14 September 1988, pp. 15-20).

A similar shift in focus has been evident among non-EC homeland governments. Turkish officials have protested the treatment of ‘their’ migrant workers in Western Europe and have attempted to gain leverage on the EC through their network of homeland fraternal organizations. The Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, Libyan, and Mauritanian governments have done likewise. Facing pressures for democracy at home and in direct response to the EC’s Single Market programme and its plan to focus on economic development in the North African countries of emigration, they formed a regional grouping of their own in 1989, the Arab Maghreb Union. Within the EC, these governments have begun to co-ordinate the activities of their organizations for emigrants, who have co-ordinated their homeland-directed participation accordingly (CEPS, 1990, pp. 241-51 ;

Of particular concern to E C authorities has been the development of Islam as another vector of political and cultural mobilization among immigrants. A number of foreign-controlled multinational religious organizational networks have brought together segments of Western Europe’s Muslims: the Saudi-based World Islamic League, the Iranian- backed Islamic Council of Europe, the Turkish Dzyanet Zsleri Buskunligi, the Libyan Committee for the Islamic Vocation, a plethora of,Islamic brotherhoods (tariqu), and several militant terrorist movements (Etienne, 1989). The rapprochement among the conservative governments of the Maghreb has resulted in greater structuring of the religious institutions and organizations under their purview, most notably the Grand Mosque of Paris. Fearing an escalation in Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian feuding and terrorism, the E C Commission has encouraged such developments and has issued special pleas for an improvement in relations with Islamic immigrants and their organizations (Financial Times, 28 September 1990).

Homeland-oriented immigrant participation has thus remained significant. Yet with immigration becoming a fairly stable, family affair by the rnid-l970s, the immigrants’ political demands came to revolve more and more around the concrete problems of life in the host societies. Initially, they were almost all members of the lowest strata of the working

GISTI, 1989-90, pp. 120-3).


class. It was therefore at the workplace and through membership in trade unions, where they have enjoyed a stronger legal position and more equal rights of representation than in any other host-society organizations, that immigrants first mobilized politically in actions oriented toward European host societies.

At the European level, it bears mentioning, ‘collaboration between nationally-based unions and labor movements on transnational matters is embryonic’ (Ross, 1990, p. 5 5 ) . The most promising effort to date is the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). Formed in 1973, the ETUC has adopted positions on 1992 and other European issues balancing the interests of the 36 national labour confederations - many of them Catholic unions - from 21 countries that comprise it (Davidson, in Lodge,

ETUC leaders helped advance many of the EC’s labour policies in the early 1970s. In their ongoing fight for a Community social policy, they have on occasion voiced demands for more measures to integrate immigrants (Europe, December 1989). The French CFDT, close to President Mitterrand’s Socialist Party, and the German central labour federation, the DGB, are perhaps the most important protagonists of the ETUC (Ross, 1990, p. 59). In their home countries both have shown heightened sensitivity to immigrant concerns since the mid-1970s.

Still, the ETUC’s reaction to the 1992 process has been largely reactive. Divisions between the component national labour organizations remain, and ETUC leaders have had their hands full fighting for the proposals on industrial democracy included in the Social Charter (Economist, 1 December 1990). The ETUC has been intimately involved in implement- ing the 1992 initiatives, bargaining with the Commission and the European Employers’ Association (UNICE); but the fundamental asymmetry of these consultations has robbed them of much of their value to the ETUC’s working-class constituents (George, 1985, pp. 44-6).

Immigrant workers have found their specific interests to have remained generally a low priority for the European-level organization. They are still sorely under-represented and relatively uninfluential even in the most sympathetic national labour movements that comprise the ETUC. The immigration issue has threatened to widen the gap between the ETUC leadership and rank-and-file workers, many of whom fear competition from immigrant labour and have been receptive to the political racism of the Far Right. Furthermore, major Communist trade unions with large immigrant memberships like the French CGT and the Spanish Workers’ Commissions are not members of the ETUC. They have harshly criticized the 1992 process and the ETUC’s failures to defend the immigrants (cf. ETUC, 1989).

The ETUC may eventually develop into a more effective instrument for the immigrants to influence E C decision-making. Far more important to date in articulating the immigrants’ demands at the European level,

1989, pp. 11 1-28).

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 469 however, has been the increasingly extensive co-operation between national-level federations of immigrant associations in the different E C host societies. These crossnational linkages have strengthened dramatic- ally since the early 1980s, in direct response to the growing importance of the E C for Europe’s immigrant populations. Most often, the associations involved have been on the left of the political spectrum. Those representing Maghrebis and other immigrants from outside the E C have usually met with derision if not harassment from more conservative official homeland organizations.’

The initial push and the continuing direction for an autonomous European immigrant movement have come from France. There, seven immigrant associations representing as many nationalities launched an experiment in multi-ethnic collaboration on the eve of the immigration stoppage in the early 1970s, founding the ‘Immigrant Workers’ House’ (Maison des travailleurs immigrks - MTI). All were left-wing, national- level organizations based in Paris. The MTI set as its major objective the co-ordination of member associations’ activities and goals. It hoped to surpass ethnic divisions and improve the lot of all immigrant workers, qua workers, in France (CAIF, 1986a).

In October 1981, the Socialist Mitterrand-Mauroy government lifted restrictions on foreigners’ associations that had been in effect since 1939. That legal change provided the occasion for the multi-ethnic movement to widen its reach and develop a truly political mission. In 1984, the Council of Immigrant Associations in France (Conseil des associations immigrkes en France - CAIF) superseded the MTI. The leaders of 14 national-level umbrella associations now sit on the CAIF, with one or more ethnic-based organizations representing the Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Black African, Spanish, Portuguese and Turkish immigrant communities.*

From the beginning, CAIF leaders have spoken of the ‘Immigrant Worker Associational Movement’. Through its technical and financial assistance and co-ordinating capabilities, the CAIF sees itself as this movement’s nerve centre. It has worked to bring together the very diverse immigrant associational components of all nationalities and thus to defuse the political competition rooted in the politics of the homelands that has often divided associations of immigrants from a single ethnic/ national background. The CAIF’s ultimate objective has been for the immigrants to agree on a set of major demands to advance in common, even while the national communities and associations freely work to fulfil their own individual agendas (CAIF, 1985, 1987).

’See GIST1 (1989-90), p. 121. Not for want of trying. homeland governments and parties have had notably meagre success in co-opting leaders of autonomous immigrant associations, cf. Hammar (1985). p. 289.

8Personal interview with Abderrazak Bouazizi, CAIF, Paris.


Whereas the CAIF has insisted on its autonomy and its espousal of no particular ideology, in reality it has had a very close relationship with the French Communist Party and its allied CGT trade union (and to the left wing of the CFDT union). The CAIF, consequently, has prized the Communist vision of class struggle over ethnic identity, although these bases of mobilization have been seen as complementing one other. It has also criticized the ETUC on the immigration issue (CAIF, 1985,1987).

Perhaps due to the universalistic doctrines of Communist political parties and trade unions, the MTI and then the C A I F took the lead in encouraging crossnational contacts between the immigrants of Western Europe’s host societies. Instigated by the MTI, the first European Conference of Immigrant Associations brought together activists from a handful of host societies in Amsterdam in 1971, Succeeding conferences produced a series of ‘charters’ - lists of common demands addressed to Western European receiving nations. In 1979, a cultural festival brought representatives of 20 compatible associations in half a dozen host societies to MTI headquarters in Paris for celebrations and roundtable discussions (ZCZ, October, 1988, pp. 1-2).

The passage of the Single European Act in 1985 galvanized the nascent European-level immigrant organizing, At the fourth European Confer- ence of Immigrant Associations, held in Stockholm later that same year, an unabashedly autonomous European Immigrant Associational Move- ment was born. The conference marked several important breakthroughs: the foreign populations resident in all of the major host societies were represented, and non-European immigrants attended for the first time in significant numbers. Attendees passed resolutions demanding that the EC take urgent measures to combat racism and to integrate immigrant communities. Political rights occupied centre stage in the debates, with the conference expressing its hope that some day elections to the European Parliament would involve the participation of all E C residents, including those not from Member States.9

In a more concrete action, the Stockholm meetings produced an executive body composed of representatives of over 2500 immigrant associations in some 14 host societies, the Council of Immigrant Associa- tions in Europe (Conseil des associations imrnigries en Europe - CAIE). The C A I E executive includes the bulk of Europe’s most representative national-level and single-nationality immigrant federations (umbrella organizations, several of them recognized by homeland government officials, that include hundreds of local and regional associations): the European Council of Moroccan Associations (CEDAM); the Co-ordinating Group of Spanish Immigrant Associations in Europe (CEAEE); the Assembly of Portuguese Associations in Europe

“or the full text, see ‘Rtsolutions de la IVe Conf6rence des associations des immigris en Europe’. reprinted in Presseer immigrks en France (1985) 128, March, pp. 9-13.

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 47 1 (ACPE); the Federation of Italian Workers and Families (FILEF); the Association of Young Spanish Immigrants (JEFES); and national immigrant co-ordinating bodies in France (CAIF), the United Kingdom (National Ethnic Minorities Council), the Netherlands (Landelijke Samen- werking van organisaties van buitenlandse arbeiders) , Luxembourg (Comiti de Liaison et d’Action des Zmmigrks), Germany (Bunde- sarbeitgemeinschaft der Zmmigrantenvereine), and Sweden (Federation of Co-operating Immigrant Associations/SIOS). Based in Brussels, the C A I E co-ordinates the nascent movement’s actions and liaises with E C officials.

The CAIE has emphasized inclusiveness over doctrinal purity, and a wide range of class- and ethnic-based organizations have mingled under its aegis. The component national federations, meanwhile, have been free to pursue their own domestic and EC-related interests, holding workshops and seminars on Community institutions and the 1992project and lobbying host-society governments for their intermediation. In Switzerland, immigrant associations affiliated with the C A I E have criticized that nation’s government for its reluctance to join the E C (Piazza, September, 1990).

Since its inauguration, the CAIE has concerned itself primarily with the evolution of European integration and its ramifications for the immigrants. It has seen the ongoing restructuring of Europe as directly challenging the immigrant associational movement to achieve a more cohesive and coher- ent organizational structure. It has pointed out perceived deficiencies in the EC’s resolutions and recommendations concerning immigrants’ rights, particularly with respect to its inability to implement their more generous aspects. Nor has the CAIE hesitated to file complaints with E C authorities whenever a host-society government has enacted legislation or administra- tive procedures that have appeared to violate Community standards or other international conventions (CAZF’Znfos, October, 1987, p. 3).

The recent tendency for the E C to exclude non-Community nationals from its projects on the integration and political rights of immigrants has caused the CAIE particular concern. It has made the equality of European and non-European immigrants in a post-1992 EC a centrepiece of its mission for the coming years. In general, the rise of racism and anti- immigrant sentiment in virtually every region in Europe has become a major preoccupation.

As has been seen, furthermore, a 1990 EP report advocated the creation of a consultative forum for the EC’s immigrant associations. The C A I E has been quick to offer its services, marketing itself as an appropriate, representative interlocutor for Europe’s ‘foreign’ population. It has already managed to win consultative observer status at UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the International Labour Organization (ICZ, October, 1988, PP- 1-41.


The CAIE’s semi-annual general assemblies, meeting at the EC offices in Brussels, have focused on various aspects of ‘The European Economic Space and Immigration’. In 1988, the movement organized a workshop in Brussels with E C experts on the free movement of persons within the Community and a colloquium in Luxembourg on immigrant political rights. Those were the first two occasions that an immigrant group had instigated such consultations with European officials (ZCI, October, 1988, p. 1). At an off-year Special General Assembly in April 1988 and again at the 5th European Conference of Immigrant Associations in 1990, immigrant associational leaders debated the implications of 1992 and attempted to flesh out the movement’s response to it and to the immigrants’ position in ‘Social Europe’. The C A I E has been citing such initiatives as it has lobbied the EC to be acknowledged as the immigrants’ official representative to its consultative Economic and Social Committee - which status would give the Conseif an additional entrke into the Community policy-making process. 10

There have been other efforts at transnational immigrant political co- ordination in addition to the CAIE: EC residents holding dual nationality have held conferences, for example (Piazza, September, 1985). Even so, the CAIE stands as by far the most inclusive and durable instance of autonomous immigrant political mobilization at European level.

The Second Generation and Europe Although several associations of the so-called ‘second generation’ of post-war immigrants have participated in the CAIE, the foreign-worker parents have predominated. Elsewhere, children of the first generation of immigrants have begun to construct their own transnational web of political organizations and connections. The second generation of immigrants has been the subject of special E C concern, and a number of projects have aimed specifically at improving their lot. They have typically faced more or less the same undesirable occupational possibilities as their parents (OECD, 1981). But members of the second generation in the EC Member States, especially those born and raised there, often enjoy different political rights than their parents; they often have very different political expecta- tions and demands. Not surprisingly, then, the political mobilization of the second generation has presented a somewhat ambivalent picture.

Like the CAIE, much of the second immigrant generation has tended to follow the French model as it has mobilized at the European level. France’s immigrants have taken up a Gallic tradition of direct protest and have faced arguably the most dismal social conditions of any foreign population in Western Europe. A wave of racist-motivated murders hit

‘OPersonal interview with CAIF officials, Paris (October 1990).

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 473 France in the early 1980s. In June 1983, a policeman shot a teenage immigrant leader in the Minguettes housing project in Lyon. That incident gave rise to the ‘March Against Racism and for Equality’ that autumn from Marseille to Paris to denounce anti-immigrant violence. Non-Europeans predominated, but Iberians, Italians, and immigrants from other E C nations also marched. President Mitterrand welcomed what had grown into a crowd of over 100,000 marchers when they arrived at the Place de la Concorde on 3 December (Bouzid, 1984).

The 1983 march electrified the second generation, in particular the Beurs (second-generation North Africans). They began to struggle in earnest for the right to participate in the management of housing, job training and social services. Yet it proved difficult to maintain the momentum that the march had engendered. Cracks quickly appeared in the movement. In 1984, a group of Beurs came up with Convergence ’84, a powerful, symbolic action designed to revive the multi-ethnic perspective that had been clouded. Five squadrons of motorscooters, each representing one of the major ethnic components of France- North Africans and Turks, Iberians, Asians, Black Africans, and the French- left from one of five French cities and converged on Paris for a multicultural celebration (Rodrigues et al., 1985).

The event was to be the harbinger of a new cultural identity, anchored both in the immigrants’ respective ethnic backgrounds and in the contemporary French society of which they were the product. The festive side of Convergence dissipated, however. One of the operation’s organ- izers, Farida Belghoul, used the occasion to denounce the growing emphasis in France on the ‘Beur generation’. She held that it had concentrated attention on racism at the expense of the much broader issue of inequality in France. Belghoul argued for an autonomous, multi-ethnic movement of all the politically powerless (Belghoul, 1984).

In response to the divisiveness that Belghoul’s diatribe created, a new movement formed to smooth over the hard feelings and to revive the optimism and fun of the 1983 march: SOS-Racisrne. It owed its initial organization to a handful of veterans of the 1983 march (many with ties to the French socialists) and militant Jewish students. They oppose an autonomous movement of either the Beurs or the Belghoul variety, and have insisted that SOS-Racisrne is not a class-based, immigration or exclusively French movement: it is a ‘generational movement’, that of the ‘buddy’ (pote) generation. It is multi-ethnic because the youth of the suburban European housing projects and urban ghettoes have grown up and have been educated that way. Non-Europeans have suffered more than other groups, perhaps, and they might well take up again their role as the vanguard of the movement; but it is to encompass the entire age cohort sharing the same upbringing. *

“Personal interview with Harlem Desir, Laure. and other potes, SOS-Racisme, Paris.


The organization of less than a dozen quickly grew to include thousands of immigrants and French citizens alike. Its main organizing tool has been a plastic lapel pin shaped like an open hand and inscribed with a pacifist message: ‘Hands off my buddy’. SOS-Racisme’s activities have involved cultural expression, the defence of young people’s (immigrants’ and non- immigrants’) rights, and media campaigns to advance the movement’s eclectic agenda (Malik, 1984, pp. 28-9).

Developments in the EC, not to mention the interest that Community officials were showing in the social integration of second-generation immigrants, influenced SOS-Racisme almost from its inception. Aided in no small measure by a fawning French and, soon, European media, SOS- Racisme spread its organizing beyond the borders of France. Young immigrants in neighbouring host societies heard about and learned from the French movement, with activists throughout Europe coming to judge their situation in relation to others’ and developing common strategies.12

Profiting from logistical support from the Parisian headquarters, local SOS-Racisme clubs soon took shape in cities throughout French Switzer- land and Be1gi~m. l~ By the mid-l980s, German Switzerland and West Germany were also witnessing the rapid growth of the ‘buddy’ movement. Translating the SOS-Racisme slogan into ‘Mach meinen Kumpel nicht an!’, new local groups in those areas have worked closely with left-wing youth organizations and, in the Federal Republic, have approached such leading lights of the Social Democratic Party as Oskar Lafontaine and Willy Brandt for public backing. It was not long before other Northern European countries and Italy, as well, had their own versions of SOS- Racisme (Piazza, December, 1985, pp. 10-11).

With an anti-racist organizational network quickly taking shape, Harlem DCsir and his fellow movement leaders have worked to formalize trans-European contacts. SOS-Racisme groups from France, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, West Germany, Denmark, and Sweden took a bus tour throughout Northern Europe as the ‘Voyagers for Equality’ in 1985. By the end of that year, the movement had adopted a ‘European Charter Against Racism’ that targeted each Western European host society, as well as the EC and the Council of Europe (Piazza, September, 1985, p. 14).

Then, in December 1988, SOS-Racisme convened at the Sorbonne the first ‘European Estates-General for Youth’. Delegations of young people from France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Britain, Spain, Denmark, Switzer- land, Norway, and Sweden attended. Glyn Ford, UK Labour Party member of the European Parliament, presided. French President Frangois Mitterrand gave a keynote address in which he underlined the need to

l*Personal interview with Eric Montes, SOS-Racisrne, Saint-Denis. 13Personal interview with Guglielmo Grossi, President, Federazione delle colonie libere italiane in

Svizzera, Zurich.

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 475 ‘insert new rights into daily life and into the law’ (Le Monde, 4 January 1989).

The gathering gave participants a chance to compare notes on the state of the anti-racist movement throughout Europe. They praised EC and Council of Europe pronouncements and projects on behalf of the second immigrant generation and youth in general, especially the proposals of the European Commission and Parliament designed to enhance integration and immigrants’ access to political life in the EC. Like the CAIE, attendees also pointed out areas of weakness in such proposals, and the distinction between E C and non-EC nationals drew sharp criticism. A formal request was issued to the E C that by the ‘magic date 1992’ it accord equal rights to all immigrants in the Community, regardless of their national origin. ‘This is a utopia that we will realize tomorrow’, Harlem Desir assured the conference after it had passed a charter defining the ‘rights of immigrants’: the document included demands for free movement of persons within the EC, easier naturalization procedures, and voting rights for all resident immigrants in municipal elections (Libhation, 20 December, 1988).

SOS-Racisme has since pursued its European initiatives. The movement’s close ties to social democratic parties across the continent have opened doors for it in Brussels and Strasbourg, where it has become the de facto mouthpiece for Europe’s second-generation immigrants. That status has not gone unchallenged, as the CAIE and, at the national level in France, the CAIF have both reproached SOS-Racisme for de-emphasizing the special problems of the non-European immigrants and for not seeing the second generation’s actions as embedded in the class struggles of the first generation. SOS-Racisme has earned special ire for allegedly having allowed itself to be ‘co-opted’ by socialist parties. l 4

Motivated by such reservations, the C A I E and the national federations comprising it have laboured to attract second-generation immigrant associations into their folds. In late 1987, for instance, the CAIE and the C A I F encouraged some 20 youth, women’s, and first-generation immigrant associations in France to form Memoire fertile. It has advanced a ‘unitary approach’ involving both the first and second generation of immigrants that echoes the CAIE in stressing the importance of common action between immigrant and minority communities and the indigenous working classes (Perotti, 1988).

Over the past decade, to sum up, members of both the first and the second generation of immigrants have begun to undertake European-level political mobilization. These movements are still delicate; the process has not been without interorganizational divisions and competition. Those difficulties notwithstanding, immigrant activists of both generations have

‘4Personal interview with CAIF officials.


clearly been responding directly to institutional developments at the European level, in other words, to the evolving pattern of European integration.

Conclusions This examination of immigrant political participation at the European level, therefore, provides evidence of the political spillover that the once discredited neo-functionalist theories of European integration predicted. Increasingly, the immigrants of all major host societies have been offering an eminently political, European-level participatory response to the evolution of the EC. By turning more and more to Brussels and Strasbourg, the immigrants have illustrated both the EC’s growing political weight and its greater receptivity to their positions relative to host-society governments.

The resolutions and press releases that emit from the conferences of the CAIE and SOS-Racisme have not always fallen on deaf ears in the E C capitals. But beyond that limited, purely consultative influence, immigrants have also developed more direct forms of political access. Since the mid- 1980s, for instance, several immigrants have filed complaints against Member State governments at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (GISTI, 1989-90, pp. 82-7).

Fittingly, gains have also been registered in the European Parliament, where the revival of the European integration process began. Direct elections to the E P in 1979 and 1984 brought the issue of immigrant political rights to the ECagendaandspurred the immigrants toorganizeat that level. Since the 1989 European elections, there have been three ‘black’ MEPs: Djida Tazdait, a French Green and second-generation Algerian; Nora Mebrak-Zaidi, who sits with the French Socialists but entered their list through SOS-Racisme; and Dacia Valent, an Italian communist whose brother was murdered by racists (New Statesman, 19 October 1990). This trio has shown a willingness to respond to events affecting immigrant communities in individual host societies as well as at the European level (Politis, 16 October 1989).

For all that, and despite the organizational inroads made, neither immigrant generation has any real illusions about its lack of absolute power to effect thorough-going changes in the nature of European integration. After all, right-wing extremists occupy 23 seats in Strasbourg. MEPs from the French National Front, the Italian Social Movement/National Right, the Greek National Political Union, the Danish Progress Party, and the German People’s Union/List D have constituted a ‘Euroright’ faction in the European Parliament.

As Etienne (1989), Ross (1990), and other observers have pointed out, opposition to both immigrant political participation and the EC’s 1992 process has come almost exclusively from the Far Right. It was quick to

FACING THE TRUE ‘FORTRESS EUROPE’ 477 recognize the implications of the debate over European integration, readily making the connection between a Europe without frontiers and the dangers to ‘national preference’ of new, unchecked inflows of immigrants (Baron Crespo, 1989, pp. 29-44). The discourse that one hears about Europe’s (in)ability to absorb and integrate foreign populations thus reads in part as the expression of the indigenous population’s fears about its own future in the new Europe.

Racial tensions and violence have surfaced even in longtime labour- exporting countries like Spain and Italy - which have themselves received immigration from North and Black Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia in recent years. Most disturbing is growing evidence that explicitly racist movements and bands of neo-Nazi skinheads have begun to enter into cross-national contacts to share information and, in certain cases, weapons (Le Monde, 20 May 1990). Skinhead groups have been active not only in Northern Europe but also in Spain, Italy, Greece, Eastern Germany, and Poland (L’Espresso, 9 December 1990; New York Times, 20 March 1991).

Alarmed at such developments, the E C institutions issued a joint condemnation of racism and xenophobia in June 1986 that they have since repeatedly reconfirmed. Yet those phenomena will doubtless only intensify in years to come, as the revolutionary changes and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in Eastem Europe have produced a new wave of immigrants - including growing numbers of ethnic Germans from Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union - into the EC. The influx amounted to almost 1.5 million people in 1990 alone (New York Times, 27 January 1991).

This Eastern European emigration has been fuelling xenophobia. Anti-Eastern European popular sentiment has grown, as has intolerance of the established Turkish and Southern European communities (Migrations-Societe January-February 1991, pp. 940). Also facing heightened discrimination are the Cubans, Angolans, Mozambicans, and Viet- namese who had come to the former East Germany to work or learn a trade (Der Spiegel, 41,1990; Economist, 16-22 March 1991).

The TREVI group met in Rome in December 1990 in an attempt to co- ordinate Western Europeans’ reaction to the Eastern influx and to protect the Single Market project (Le Mondelhebdo, 6-12 December 1990). The task will not be easy: Europe will have to develop a collective response to the challenge of new migration from the East that also fosters the integration of the EC’s existing immigrant communities.

Here, those immigrants might well show the way. Some observers have seen in their autonomous associations the creative force and grass-roots involvement that will be necessary €or the ‘European experiment’ to succeed. The CAIE and CAIF, for their part, have quickly forged national and transnational networks of local and other associations to


protect the right to asylum for Turks, Southeast Asians, Black Africans, and East Europeans alike (Le Mondelhebdo, 6-12 December 1990). The second-generation movement in particular had its start in and still draws its force from a loose, eclectic collection of associations rooted in Europe’s suburban housing projects. Out of sheer necessity, they have begun to achieve a degree of co-ordination at the European level and have constructed a collective identity that has little to do with the traditional national and ethnic identities that have plagued efforts to integrate both the immigrants and the continent. ‘Europe’, argues Bruno Etienne (1989, p. 50), ‘is constructing itself in the suburbs’.

Few alternatives offer themselves. Only the full socio-political integration of Europe’s immigrants would seem capable of defusing the hatred and violence that the Far Right has preached with such success during this period of dramatic political and social upheavals. It would be dangerous should these events drown out the immigrants’ newfound European political voice. As Keohane and Hoffmann (1989; p. 32) argue,

[i]f the disadvantaged turn to Brussels for relief and find that Brussels simply doesn’t have either the financial means to provide it or the political clout to force the better off to come to the help of the underprivileged . . . revolts may become more serious.

If the immigrants - like other disadvantaged groups - find themselves frustrated in their co-ordinated efforts to have their voices heard in Brussels, then Europe may have to deal with political participation of a less benign sort after 1992.

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