eu and south caucasus

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1 Policy making in the periphery of the European Union: the case of the South Caucasus Licínia Simão PhD Candidate, University of Coimbra, Portugal Junior Researcher, NICPRI, University of Minho, Portugal Teaching and Research Fellow, OSCE Academy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan [email protected] – Paper to be presented at the ISA’s 51 st Annual Convention, New Orleans, US, 17-20 February 2010 – Work in progress / Draft. Do not quote or cite without author’s express consent. Comments are welcomed! Introduction Since the establishment of the European Union’s (EU) Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in 2003, institutional cooperation among state actors in the Wider European context has deepened and widened. This has meant closer relations between the EU member states, EU institutions and the states standing on the borders of the enlarged EU, in a growing number of issues. One area where the ENP has been centrally active has been security, not only due to the recognition of the increasing interdependence between security inside the EU and outside its borders, in a context of enlargement and fast changing security perceptions; but also due to the neighbours’ activism is engaging institutional actors in Western Europe in their security concerns. This interplay of interests and perceptions has reinforced the agency not only of EU institutions and member states, but also of its neighbours, demanding a closer observation of the political processes through which state actors define and pursue their foreign policy priorities. This paper focuses on the role of the EU and its Neighbourhood Policy in the processes of foreign policy formulation in the South Caucasus region. Since independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, these states have established independent foreign

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    Policy making in the periphery of the European Union: the

    case of the South Caucasus

    Licnia Simo

    PhD Candidate, University of Coimbra, Portugal

    Junior Researcher, NICPRI, University of Minho, Portugal

    Teaching and Research Fellow, OSCE Academy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

    [email protected]

    Paper to be presented at the ISAs 51st Annual Convention, New Orleans, US,

    17-20 February 2010

    Work in progress / Draft. Do not quote or cite without authors express consent.

    Comments are welcomed!

    Introduction

    Since the establishment of the European Unions (EU) Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in

    2003, institutional cooperation among state actors in the Wider European context has

    deepened and widened. This has meant closer relations between the EU member states,

    EU institutions and the states standing on the borders of the enlarged EU, in a growing

    number of issues. One area where the ENP has been centrally active has been security,

    not only due to the recognition of the increasing interdependence between security

    inside the EU and outside its borders, in a context of enlargement and fast changing

    security perceptions; but also due to the neighbours activism is engaging institutional

    actors in Western Europe in their security concerns. This interplay of interests and

    perceptions has reinforced the agency not only of EU institutions and member states,

    but also of its neighbours, demanding a closer observation of the political processes

    through which state actors define and pursue their foreign policy priorities.

    This paper focuses on the role of the EU and its Neighbourhood Policy in the processes

    of foreign policy formulation in the South Caucasus region. Since independence from

    the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, these states have established independent foreign

  • 2

    policy relations, a process that demanded not only new assessments and skills but also

    the affirmation of their sovereignty and the definition of their national interests in the

    international arena. Interaction with important players such as the United States (US)

    and the EU became a means of achieving these goals. As such, EU impact in these

    states foreign policy formulation can be seen from the view point of its effect on agents

    and structures. As the these states evolve from monolithic agents in the international

    system, shaped by one-party politics and centralised economic planning, to multifaceted

    actors, in which increasing numbers of domestic and international forces come to bear

    pressure on, foreign policy becomes a complex affair. This paper focuses on the

    potential for external actors to shape third actors preferences and decision making in

    foreign policy. The argument is developed by analysing the interplay between the

    increasing agency these states have acquired and the European structure with which

    they directly interact. This work is therefore pertinent, not only to understand foreign

    policy formulation outside the EU, but also to assess the levels of impact of the EU in

    these processes.1

    The first section provides a theoretical background on foreign policy making, dealing

    with the domestic and external dimensions and the agency-structure debate. A matrix of

    analysis is put forward to integrate these four approaches to foreign policy analysis. The

    second section, focuses on the foreign policy options of these states in a post-

    communist context, looking at how each of the three regional states has pursued

    different paths towards achieving their stated goals, as the interplay of the four

    dimensions considered in the matrix explains. The following sections focus on the

    Neighbourhood Policy of the EU and the changes in foreign policy discourse in these

    three countries, by looking at how the EU has sought to shape these states foreign

    policy, according to the matrix presented above. The outcome is a diffuse pattern of

    influence both at the external and domestic as well as the agent and structure level,

    indicating that the EU faces not only increased competition for influence in shaping

    international structures and setting patterns of normative behaviour in the

    neighbourhood, but also that domestic actors have become selectively permeable to

    1 It is acknowledged that the EU is not a monolithic actor, with several layers of actors and structures

    influencing its foreign policy towards third actors. However, the EU has gained its own actorness

    capabilities and often it also works as the meeting point between member states, institutions and

    transnational actors, acting under the umbrella of European interests.

  • 3

    external actors influence, thus limiting their ability to democratise domestic

    environments and consequently promote pluralism, a goal closely linked with a

    normative approach to security. The article finishes with the conclusions.

    1. External actors and foreign policy formulation: agency and structure in

    perspective

    Foreign policy analysis has dealt for long with the question of favouring agent or

    structure-centred approaches to explain decision-making and foreign policy outcomes.

    Hudson (2007: 8) has called this problematic a perennial philosophical conundrum

    and a permanent feature of foreign policy, demanding an integrated approach to explain

    foreign policy behaviour. Brighi and Hill (2008: 119) have suggested a strategic-

    relational approach, focusing on the dialectic interplay between the actors own

    strategy on the one hand, and context on the other hand. Context is seen by the authors

    as different from structure: it is the other actors and the relations, which they entertain.

    Such perspective favours a more relational approach, in which the context is not

    deterministically given, but results from the interaction between actors choices and

    actions and a given environment. From the constant interplay and feedback between

    actors and context, foreign policy is formed and in turn feeds into this process changing

    both the environment and the actors perceptions (Brighi and Hill, 2008: 120).

    An approach that looks at the dynamic process of interaction between agents and

    structure in foreign policy analysis is useful when looking at how external actors

    influence foreign policy outcomes. How do the choices, perceptions and actions of one

    international actor influence events, perceptions and outcomes in the foreign policy

    behaviour of another actor? Structuralist approaches such as realism enhance the fact

    that some actors are more powerful in the international system and therefore might

    coerce and impose a course of action upon others. The focus on material power and

    capabilities has been particularly visible in neo-realist analysis by authors such as Waltz

    (1959) and Mearsheimer (1995). Realism thus favours a structural orientation, since at

    the core lies the notion of state power, defined in terms of structure of the international

    system or in a combination of domestic power resources and international structures

    (Carlsnaes, 2008: 92). Agency-based approaches such as liberalism favour a bottom-up

    view of the political system, [in which] individual and social groups are treated as prior

  • 4

    to politics, because they define their interests independently of politics and then pursue

    these interests through political exchange and collective action (Carlsnaes, 2008: 95).

    Moreover, and according to Moravcsik (1997), state preferences are set by a limited

    number of actors, namely state officials, according to their interests, and depending on

    the constrains imposed on state behaviour by interdependent preferences.

    In an attempt to look at the process of mutual shaping between agents and structure in

    the case of the foreign policy of South Caucasian states, the proposal of this article is to

    focus on the way the EUs Neighbourhood Policy has shaped actors perceptions and

    preferences and the context within which they act. Moreover, there is an

    acknowledgement that foreign policy is a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), where

    domestic and international context and actors interact. As Hill (2003: 38) argues, the

    domestic and the foreign are two ends of a continuum, and foreign policy analysis is not

    complete if an account of the domestic is not included. The EU is particularly well

    positioned to illustrate this overlap between domestic and external issues, in its foreign

    policies. As Ruggie (1993: 172) has argued, the European Commission can be

    conceived of as a multiperspectival institutional form, where territoriality is

    questioned, both as source of legitimacy and identity. Distinctions between domestic

    and international dynamics become fundamentally blurred and agents and structures

    become increasingly interdependent. The EU has also been a purposeful exporter of its

    norms and governance models to regions outside the Union (Christiansen, et al., 2000;

    Lavenex, 2004), increasingly linking the states and peoples standing outside the EU to

    the developments occurring inside it.

    The EU stands as an important international actor both on its own and through its

    member states. It shapes the international context on several levels, namely through

    organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations or the

    International Monetary Fund (IMF). These sources of power and influence are

    particularly relevant if the focus shifts from hard power to soft power, to include issues

    such as trade, ideas and norms. Whitman (2006: 105) argues that the decisive criterion

    for distinction [of the EU and European international society] rather is the degree of

    identification and of the acceptance of being bound by the rules and norms of the

    respective international society. Then, if we recognise that the EU has established itself

  • 5

    as a normative model for others, its ability to shape the international context

    exponentially increases as third actors take EU rules and norms as their own.

    These processes of both contamination by transfer and contention by shaping,

    however, are not automatic, meaning that agents involved in foreign policy exercise

    their preferences and mediate processes, affecting outcome. Bureaucracies in Brussels

    horse-trade extensively, searching for consensus to advance EU decision making,

    resembling the illustrations provided by Graham Allisons Bureaucratic Politics theory

    (Allison, 1971). EU foreign policy making has still to overcome, not only the famous

    capabilities-expectation gap (Hill, 1993), but also a consensus-expectation gap (Toje,

    2008). Therefore, EU impact on other actors is largely dependent on how actors inside

    the EU manage power relations, how they are socialised and socialise each other and

    how institutions evolve. Kelley (2006: 32) illustrates these dynamics by looking at how

    the ENP built on previous enlargement experiences and how actors inside the European

    Commission structures adapted to assure survival.

    In keeping with the logic of dynamic interaction between agents and structures in the

    process of foreign policy making, it is necessary to notice that EU transfers towards the

    neighbours are by no means unidirectional. Adoption of EU rules, as has been argued

    by other authors, can happen through socialisation processes, but also through rational

    choice and a cost-benefit analysis (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2006), implying

    that the receiving end also plays an important role in this interaction. I would suggest

    the notion of selective permeability to rules and norms coming from the EU,

    evidenced during the negotiation of the ENP action plans, between the European

    Commission and the Foreign Ministries of the ENP countries. Georgia, for instance,

    was particularly successful in promoting a selective convergence with the EU (Vieira

    and Simo, 2008). A final note must also be made to the increasing competition for

    influence over the contexts within which agents make their decisions. Particularly in the

    former-Soviet space, the EU has increasingly faced the open competition of Russia, in

    setting up the institutional and normative frameworks for interaction.

    Thus, EU impact on the external actors foreign policy choices can be conceived of as a

    matrix, affecting both the external (international society) and the domestic structures

    (governance export) and both domestic (selective permeability) and external agents () of

  • 6

    foreign policy formulation. The table below illustrates the spectrum of approaches

    through which foreign policy can be influenced. Overall, four major trends have been

    identified, depending on the point of entry. If favouring an external dimension one can

    affect outcome by dealing with agents (point A) or by shaping the structure of

    interaction (point B). If one decides to influence the domestic level, the same process

    can be conceived, focusing on agents (point C) or on structures (point D). Naturally,

    most actors attempting to influence other actors foreign policy-making will attempt to

    act on all four points simultaneously, although the constraints to achieve high quality

    results in all fronts are high.

    Table 1. Points of entry in foreign policy shaping.

    A Agent-centred domestic view B Agent-centred external view

    C Domestic structuralist view D External structuralist view

    According to this model, four major variants to shaping third actors foreign policy can

    be conceived: an agent-centred domestic view (A), an agent-centred external view

    (B), a domestic structuralist view (C) and an external structuralist view (D). An

    agent-centred domestic perspective looks at how external actors reinforce agency at the

    Agency

    Domestic External

    Structure

    A

    B

    C

    D

  • 7

    domestic level. As we have seen, states are far from monolithic elements and a growing

    number of actors are shaping policy making, including in foreign policy. Such a variety

    of domestic agents opens the possibility for third actors to influence foreign policy from

    within. An agent-centred external view, on the other hand, favours the reinforcement of

    external agency, including International Organisations, transnational corporations and

    international non-governmental organisations. Agents working at this level often have

    to deal with all the remaining dimensions, making their actions highly unpredictable.

    The domestic structuralist view favours a focus on the structural level within each state.

    These include issues such as changing the political systems, the constitutions and the

    domestic contexts, within which agency is exercised. We can include at this level

    democracy promotion policies, as well as legislative reforms supporting freedom of

    speech and human rights. The goal of such policies is often to empower domestic

    agents, beyond the state, increasing their impact on policy making, and therefore closely

    linked to the agent-centred domestic perspective. The external structuralist view, on the

    other hand, privileges action at the international level, thus shaping global material and

    ideational structures and providing means and value to agency from one specific group

    of actors. Dynamics such as the global competition for energy and the competition for

    hearts and minds in the former-Soviet space have impacted the foreign policy choices

    of the states in Eurasia to a large extent.

    Whenever, an external actor has enough power to influence all the four levels, it has

    potentially a high level of control of other states foreign policy options. However, it is

    from the interplay of interests, perceptions and choices that action is conceived, thus

    creating constant alternatives to escape pressure and to selectively engage with external

    actors. This is further developed, in the final sections as regards the EUs policies

    towards the three South Caucasian states.

    2. Explaining foreign policy choices in post-communist South Caucasus

    The process of state-building in South Caucasian states, following the dissolution of the

    USSR and the end of the cold war, was the point of departure for their emergent foreign

    policy. In Georgia, transition from communist rule was marred by conflict and a process

    of violent fragmentation of the state, which led to a civil war, by late 1993. In

    Azerbaijan and Armenia, the violent contention over Nagorno Karabakh blurred the

  • 8

    processes of nation-state building and the development of independent institutions

    capable of articulating national interests at the domestic and international levels.

    Moreover, these states have had very limited experiences of independence, prior to

    1991. They had been part of former empires, such as the Russian (Soviet), Persian and

    Ottoman, for most of their existence. This has limited their ability to develop a national

    identity, state structures or the ability to relate with the outside world, which in turn

    made the process of defining their national interests and the means to achieve and

    protect them even harder (Hunter, 2000: 25).

    With the demise of the Soviet structures, the new independent states of Eurasia faced

    multidimensional transition challenges, including complex state-building processes

    demanding the transformation of institutions centred around Moscow and a one-party

    system, into modern multiparty systems, whose centre was now independent and

    sovereign. It included economic transition from central planning to a liberal capitalist

    system of open competition, and also a cultural transition into a globalised world,

    dominated by Western conceptions of democratic development, individual and

    collective rights. This is part of what Huntington (1991) has called the third wave of

    democratisation, although transition processes should be acknowledged as being far

    from complete or irreversible. The Soviet legacy lingered in the South Caucasus most

    prominently in the form of a control mentality (Altstadt, 1997: 115), legitimising the

    control of the masses by the authorities and of the local authorities by the centre.

    Moscow was regarded as the centre of all political, economic and security aspects and

    the maximum authority. This led to a centralisation of power in the hands of the

    political leaders, perceived as necessary to safeguard the interests of the state.

    Moreover, looking at the Georgian case, Derlugian (2005: 199) convincingly argues

    that the neopatrimonial relations developed between the nomenklaturas in Moscow and

    in the Soviet republics, the dependence on Moscows subsidies and protection, and the

    lack of a strong bureaucratic ethos among the Georgian nomenklatura, partly explain

    why the process of national consolidation proved highly divisive in Georgia. In all, the

    Soviet heritage characterised the transition processes of the region and conditioned the

    post-communist choices of the new independent states, including the development of

    power relations at the domestic level, the management of wealth and economic assets,

    and their security concerns.

  • 9

    Foreign policy has thus been affected by the peculiarities of the post-communist context

    of these states. Priorities among the Caucasian states include the assertion of a national

    identity, through which national interest could be established; the consolidation and

    defence of their sovereignty and independence; and a related goal, that of integration

    into the international society. Foreign policy emerged as a central vehicle to attain this

    last goal and thus assure a more effective transition. Economically, international actors,

    particularly in the West, represented the possibility of macro-economic assistance and

    foreign direct investment, much needed to develop the economies of the region.

    Membership in international organisations such as the IMF and the WTO provided

    recognition and assistance. Moreover, economic development also demanded political

    stability, which the Caucasus lacked. Although the international environment was

    propitious to the democratisation efforts of these countries (Parrott, 1997: 8), post-

    communist democratisation varied in depth and speed.

    2.1. Agent-centred domestic view

    In the South Caucasus, the role of political leaders was particularly important, as well as

    the ideas they carried. As argued by Jones the collapse of institutional life, the

    displacement of universal values with particular identities, the tasks of state building,

    the rise of nationalist movements all this has made ideas and ideologies singularly

    important (Jones, 2003: 85). In these turbulent times, leaders provided guidance and,

    more importantly, they appeared as unique guarantors of independence, stability, and

    communal harmony (Akiner, 2000: 96). However, the example of Azerbaijans and

    Georgias accession to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can be seen as

    an illustration of the coercion external actors can exercise on weaker states, even in the

    presence of strong leaders. Despite the attempts by Azerbaijans first government to

    limit the channels for Russian influence, namely by declining to participate in the CIS,

    the coup that brought Heidar Aliyev to power has been speculated to have had Russian

    support, justifying his decision to enter the CIS shortly after (Kononczuk, 2007: 33).

    Georgias President Zviad Gamasakurdia also sought to disconnect Georgia from

    Russias influence. However, Moscows manipulations of the separatist conflicts proved

    a powerful pressure tool to bring Georgia into the CIS (Jackson, 2003).

    Besides foreign policy bureaucrats and elected leaders who are the main responsible for

    foreign policy elaboration, civil society and opposition movements can certainly

  • 10

    influence foreign policy outcomes. Although the domestic structures within which these

    actors operate have increasingly been restricted and placed under control by the current

    regimes, they represent an important voice in society. Often, these agents develop

    strategies to enhance their independence and influence, by integrating international

    networks, or by developing public relation campaigns domestically and abroad,

    including through the internet, exposing the realities of their countries and forcing

    policy revisions.

    Moreover, the ultimate domestic test to foreign policy lies with domestic constituencies

    and can be reflected in electoral results (Hudson, 2007: 127), a situation illustrated by

    the negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Over the last fifteen years of

    negotiations one of the closest moments for agreement was the meeting of the Armenian

    and Azerbaijani Presidents, in Key West, in 2001. The lack of agreement has often been

    linked by analysts, with both Presidents domestic agendas and fears that a compromise

    would cost them their mandates. In President Kocharians mind was the price paid by

    President Ter-Petrosyan by displaying his willingness to accept the principle of

    Azerbaijans territorial integrity as part of a final agreement, which eventually cost him

    his mandate (Petros, 2003: 3; Waal, 2004: 258-261). For President Aliyev, his attempt

    to solve the conflict by conceding on crucial issues such as Karabakhs status was too

    much too fast for his domestic constituency and soon he withdrew from this position.

    Moreover, both former Azerbaijani Presidents Abulfaz Elibey and Ayaz Mutalibov had

    been taken from power, mainly due to their failed policies on Karabakh, something

    President Aliyev was not willing to repeat (Waal, 2004: 260, 266-268).

    A further illustration of how domestic actors play a crucial role in foreign policy choices

    can be taken from the way European integration notions have been widely supported

    by most domestic actors. Official statements by the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of

    the three countries have welcomed the ENP. Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan

    Oskanian said in 2007, in Brussels, that We in the neighborhood and in Armenia

    embraced this invitation [to share [the EUs] values, duplicate its economic successes

    and meet its democratic standards]. We appreciated deeply the farsightedness and the

    generosity of spirit (Oskanian, 2007). On June 19, 2007, President Ilham Aliyev spoke

    of the ability of countries in the Caucasus and Black Sea to strengthen [their]

    independence, economy, and have the criteria of [their] countries close to the ones of

  • 11

    developed countries. He added in [the] Caucasus we are acting within the EU New

    neighboring programme for South Caucasus countries, [which] in [the] coming 5 years

    will let us have our criteria close to [the] ones of EU in all directions political reforms,

    democratic processes, solution of social issues, lifting prosperity of population, poverty

    reduction etc (Aliyev, 2007).

    It is thus clear that domestic actors are foreign policy agents on their own and bargain

    over their views on foreign policy orientations, and their preferences should be taken

    into consideration both in foreign policy analysis and formulation.

    2.2. Domestic structuralist view

    A shift from agent-centred approaches to look at the role of domestic structures is also

    necessary. This includes issues such the political system, socio-economic models and

    constitutional orders, for instance (Hill, 2003: 203-248). These represent the web of

    concepts, rules, institutions and values which have been institutionalised to create a

    domestic system of interaction. Decision-making in foreign policy must fit the rules that

    have been legitimised by the domestic constituencies and therefore must not contradict

    the common understanding of what is expected of a certain type of state. The most

    widely generalised approach on the impact of domestic structures on foreign policy

    action is the democratic peace theory (Russett, 1993). Democracies do not fight each

    other and are less prone to engage in wars with each other, due to institutional

    constrains inherent to their domestic systems, as well as due to their normative

    proximity (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Russett, 1998). These hopes were partially replicated in

    western actors approaches to the region.

    The argument can be made that the democratic peace theory failed to develop in the

    South Caucasus, not so much because the notion that democracies do not fight each

    other, did not apply there; but because the early process of liberalisation, initiated with

    Perestroika, was insufficient to promote sustainable democracy. Although in all three

    states nationalist movements arrived to power by mid-1992, they were unprepared to

    manage the hardships of economic transition and to implement liberal democratic

    values. This would prove to be a fundamental aspect in the development of violent

    contention for territory and identity, which in turn facilitated the consolidation of semi-

    authoritarian leaders in all three states (Cornell and Starr, 2006: 39).

  • 12

    Although these were not democracies by any standard, the politico-ethno-territorial

    conflicts that emerged in the region, in the process of national independence, were

    frozen through cease-fire agreements by mid-1990s, illustrating a growing awareness

    on the ability of democratisation processes of promoting peaceful means of conflict

    resolution. We can therefore say that, as democracy became a clear option to these

    states, their commitment to non-violent means was increased. The accession of Armenia

    and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, in 2001, despite the active conflict between

    the two states, emanated from the commitment to creating democratic systems, as

    established in the Constitutions of both countries.2

    2.3. External structuralist view

    Focusing on the level of external structure, we speak of pre-dispositions and general

    trends that influence state behaviour more than direct causality that is hard to underpin

    on such an abstract scale. Hudson (2007: 161) speaks both of systems attributes and

    transition moments as important references in this level of analysis. Hill focuses on the

    increasingly transnational environment within which state actors act (Hill, 2003: 189).

    Beyond any doubts, the major systemic impact to the South Caucasian states foreign

    policy was the end of the cold war. Not only due to the consequences at the domestic

    and regional levels, but also due to the new forces which gained new qualitative

    attributes to shape the international system, and which had been repressed under

    bipolarity.

    The international context within which these countries sought to integrate changed

    profoundly marked by a fragmentation of the political and social space, while

    economically there was an increasing uniform trend towards capitalism. Security

    concerns widened to include transnational issues such as migration and the

    environment, increasing the complexity of the international governance system. From

    clear spaces of bipolar influence, the post-cold war context opened international

    competition in most geographical spaces, including the Caucasus. No longer was Russia

    the only power exercising influence over local and regional events. Others such as the

    2 The constitution of Armenia states, in Article 1. that The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign,

    democratic state, based on social justice and the rule of law. The Azerbaijani constitution states that

    The people of Azerbaijan [...] declare the following objectives: [...] to guarantee a democratic regime

    within the framework of the constitution.

  • 13

    US and China emerged along with Russia as interested, albeit at times, competing

    forces (Maynes, 2003: 129). Such competition has become more marked, since 2000

    with the arrival of President Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin and following NATOs

    eastward enlargements, and has become a central factor in generating instability in the

    region over the last decade. As argued by Cornell (2004: 126) international interest in

    the region tended to increase polarisation of regional politics. Examples of such rivalry

    and polarisation include the pro-Western democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine

    and the competition for energy resources. A violent culmination of this tendency was

    visible in the war between Russia and Georgia, in 2008, over the region of South

    Ossetia.

    For the South Caucasian states, attracting external interests, particularly those of the US

    and Europe, thus meant first and foremost an assurance against Russian appetites

    towards its near abroad. It also meant a real possibility for diversification, much needed

    both at the economic and political levels (the region is mainly landlocked and trade

    development depends on good neighbourly relations). External engagement with the

    South Caucasus has evolved through different stages and has taken different shapes. As

    Sabanadze (2002: 27) argues, Western engagement in the region carried both a

    normative and a geopolitical agenda, which the West saw as mutually reinforcing.

    Although spreading democracy and liberalism was regarded as both a normative and

    geopolitical end in itself, allowing for the strategic expansion of Western interests in

    friendly environments, the export of such notions as self-determination and territorial

    integrity revealed a fundamental contradiction. The ethno-political conflicts that erupted

    in the region attest for the irreconcilable and fundamentally dangerous nature of such

    dilemma.

    Another fundamental contradiction lies between the pursuit of a normative agenda,

    based on democracy and human rights and the achievement of geo-economic goals in a

    highly competitive environment. Interest in and competition for the Caspian energy

    reserves has led Western companies to lobby for greater engagement with the region,

    even when the political and human rights record of regional leaders was far from

    acceptable by Western standards. Recognising the delicate balance of interests and

    principles at play in the South Caucasus, local political elites have played them to their

    advantage in a more or less successful way. Taking into account both material and

  • 14

    ideational constrains and possibilities, each South Caucasian state acknowledged also

    that external actors had to be accounted for in their foreign policies, and both the West

    and regional neighbours could play to their advantage in the disputes that emerged.

    2.4. Agent-centred external view

    Naturally, the international structures become more visible when international agents,

    become engaged in a region or country. The most significant international presence in

    the South Caucasus, after independence, was managed by International Organisations

    such as the OSCE, the United Nations (including the World Bank and the International

    Monetary Fund) and latter the Council of Europe. These organisations steered not only

    reforms of the domestic system in these states, but they also sought to influence the way

    foreign policy was managed, even if only indirectly. The accession of the South

    Caucasian states to the OSCE and then the Council of Europe has influenced these

    states European vocation very clearly. Similarly, the European Neighbourhood Policy

    has also reinforced the prominence of European values in the region.

    The US also increased their presence in the region, notably through their engagement in

    the energy sector, but also militarily, especially after 9/11 and the war on Afghanistan.

    Other European Union member states, such as the United Kingdom, France or Germany

    also became important and visible supporters of the South Caucasus states, which gave

    them some leverage over their foreign policy choices. Overall, however, regional actors,

    such as Russia, Turkey and Iran remain central actors in shaping foreign policy of these

    states, not least because of their most pressing foreign policy challenges relate to

    regional relations and the prospects of peace and development.

    As early as 1998, Turkey had engaged in military cooperation with both Georgia and

    Azerbaijan, although it refrained from opening military bases in any of these countries

    (Winrow, 2001). Turkey also grew increasingly as a strategic energetic hub linking

    Western consumers to the energy resources in the Caspian. Much like Turkey, Iran

    regarded the demise of the Soviet Union as a challenge to its security, to which Tehran

    responded by adopting a pragmatic approach, concerned with promoting regional

    peace and stability and normal state-to-state relations (Herzig, 2001: 172). Overall,

    both international and regional powers began to define their interests in the region,

    imposing new dynamics on the foreign policy choices of the new independent states.

  • 15

    3. The ENP and foreign policy in Armenia

    EU engagement with Armenia has been somewhat more limited. Although Armenian

    political leadership stated their European aspirations, the geopolitical context in which

    Armenia finds itself is more limitative. Economic and military dependence on Russia,

    as well as the limited options for cooperation at the regional level due to the Nagorno

    Karabakh conflict, make the prospect of cooperation with the EU both highly attractive

    and hard to pursuit. In the words of Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister, Armen

    Baiburtian: the European integration was and still remains one of the principal lines of

    our foreign policy and we strive for more close cooperation and integration into the EU.

    The ENP opens for Armenia the possibility of institutional access to the EU internal

    market what is one of the most important constituents and stimuli of the program

    (PanArmenian Network, 2006). A similar position has been reciprocated by the

    European Commission former-Desk Officer for Armenia, who stated that Armenia is

    the most consequent of all the South Caucasus countries in terms of ENP work and that

    Armenian leaders are eager to reform (Interview, 2007b). Two aspects, thus seem to

    favour a close cooperation between Armenia and the EU: on the one hand, the economic

    potential for Armenia of cooperating with the EU and a low profile but competent

    approach by the Armenian bureaucrats, which pleased the European Commission.

    Therefore, Armenian bureaucrats can be mentioned as central domestic actors in

    relations with the EU. This partly reflects the advantages of a centralised and

    consolidated regime in Armenia (Stefes, 2008), capable of conducting foreign policy

    without interference from other domestic actors. Nevertheless, although Armenia has

    committed itself to implement important reforms, most civil society actors speak of an

    imitation of democracy which remains an obstacle to true reform (Interview, 2007a;

    2009). Power structures in Armenia remain in the hands of an elite, which controls not

    only wealth, but has also made use of the siege mentality developed with the Nagorno

    Karabakh conflict to increase its power over the society at large (Freire and Simo,

    2007; Stefes, 2008). This has left other domestic actors, including opposition and civil

    society, with apparent room for dissent, but without real power to achieve change. Thus,

    the EU has had limited impact on domestic actors in Armenia, both at the state and civic

    level. There have been positive changes at the level of the domestic structure in

    Armenia, including a constitutional reform and closer cooperation with the Council of

  • 16

    Europe and the OSCE/ODHIR. However, Armenia missed the opportunity to make

    elections a barometer of its commitment to democracy (Freire and Simo, 2007: 7-8)

    and the sustainability of reforms remains highly dependent on the achievement of a

    lasting and peaceful solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, a central feature of the

    external structural context of Armenia.

    Thus, democratization of the Armenian regime has not achieved peace either. Armenia

    still occupies Azerbaijani territory and has used this occupation as a bargain chip in the

    peace negotiations, hoping to achieve independence for the Nagorno Karabakh territory.

    The EU has also provided support to the ongoing process of normalisation of relations

    with Turkey, a EU candidate, although it has never made it an explicit demand in

    Turkeys accession process. This was however an expectation among the Armenian

    society, which regarded Turkeys accession to the EU as an important security

    guarantee, in the regional context (Interview, 2006). Moreover, Armenia remains highly

    dependent on Russia for economic development and assistance, as well as military

    cooperation, under the CIS Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenias largest

    Diaspora resides in Russia and there are close cultural ties between the two nations.

    Further economic and political integration with the EU, although representing and

    important possibility of diversification in Armenian foreign policy, has been counter-

    balanced by a consolidation of Russian presence in the Armenian economy (Giragosian,

    2006). Moreover, the poor state of regional relations and the real danger of renewed

    conflict with Azerbaijan have remained unaltered, raising the question of how the EU

    can shape regional actors choices and regional dynamics.

    The balance of the EUs impact on Armenian foreign policy, according to our model, is

    a mixed record. On the one hand, the EU represents a clear attractive model for

    economic integration, for local elites, with important cultural and political affinities.

    This has made domestic agents at the elite level engage in cooperative behaviour with

    EU actors, although civil society actors represent this process as an imitation of

    democracy, with few visible and significant changes in the domestic structure of

    Armenia. Moreover, over the last years, Armenian leaders have also engaged in further

    consolidation of Russias political and economic influence in the country, increasing

    Armenian dependence on Moscow. Significant failures of the EU in supporting

    effective and inclusive regional cooperation among the South Caucasian states (most

  • 17

    notoriously in the establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad) have important

    consequences for Armenia and for the perception of the EU as a relevant actor in

    shaping the external structure and external actors choices around Armenia. A positive

    note is linked to the normalisation of relations with Turkey, fully supported by the EU.

    4. The ENP and foreign policy in Azerbaijan

    Azerbaijan has entered the ENP as a reluctant partner, which can be explained by

    several central aspects in Azerbaijans foreign policy. One crucial issue for Azerbaijani

    diplomats has been the recognition of Azerbaijans territorial integrity, and the

    importance of this aspect to what they see as a fair resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh

    conflict. Although the EU has been loudly stating its support for Georgian and

    Moldovan territorial integrity, regarding their conflicts with breakaway separatist

    regions, it has been reluctant to clearly include Azerbaijan in this approach. This has

    raised doubts in Baku on the EUs added value for Azerbaijani foreign policy.

    Moreover, since Heidar Aliyev came to power in 1993, Azerbaijani foreign policy has

    been marked by a careful equidistance towards neighbours and international players, a

    trend continued by President Ilham Aliyev. In this view, closer relations with the EU, in

    the framework of the ENP were seen as an important option for diversification, but not

    a major direction. Illustrating this trend, were reluctant to included a clear reference to

    Azerbaijans European vocation in the ENP Action Plan, negotiated with the EU, and

    it was not until pressures from civil society became more visible that such a reference

    was included (Alieva, 2006: 13).

    Such a careful dealing with the EU has also been perceived as a result of Bakus new

    gained assertiveness in international politics. This is clearly linked to its vast energy

    reserves, providing the country with added leverage in its equidistant foreign policy.

    Thus, relations with the EU were framed as an important step in the Azerbaijani strategy

    of becoming a major alternative to Russian supplies of energy to Europe, elevating the

    strategic importance of Azerbaijan for the EU. With the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-

    Ceyhan pipeline, the EU became a major partner of Azerbaijan, increasing

    interdependence between the two countries. However, the EU has been unable to

    capitalise on this state of affairs and increase its political influence in Azerbaijans

    foreign policy, in many of the levels of our matrix.

  • 18

    Domestic elites in Azerbaijan, although rhetorically embracing European integration,

    have pushed for conservative and authoritarian reforms, incompatible with the

    commitments taken under the ENP Action Plan, with the EU and in their accession to

    the Council of Europe and the OSCE. This has caused an important fracture between

    civil society actors and elites in Azerbaijan, who value their liberal tradition to different

    extents (Freizer, 2003). EU insistence on democracy and human rights, especially

    regarding civic liberties and media rights, has been seen by the elites as unwanted

    interference and preaching and by local civil society as innocuous efforts to make

    authorities accountable to their international commitments, leading instead to

    disappointment. This has a clear influence on the ability of the EU to be perceived as a

    normative actor, capable of influencing the domestic structure. Azerbaijan is therefore

    advancing its own model of political and economic development, based on energy

    revenues and closely shaped by the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Behind the opaque

    notion of national interest the Azerbaijani elites have been increasingly restricting civic

    freedoms and have limited the space for pluralism, promoting a militant form of

    nationalism linked to the recovery of the lost territories during the war (Euronews,

    2010).

    The outcome of Azerbaijans engagement with the EU and the ENP process has so far

    proved very limited. However, this does not mean that the EU has been completely

    unable to shape events and local dynamics. Civil society actors have been emboldened

    by the ENP to become active demanders for democratic reforms in Azerbaijan, which

    could have a direct influence on how Azerbaijani foreign policy could be developed.

    Greater transparency and accountability by political leaders, who in turn are highly

    interdependent with their international partners for energy-related development, could

    produce positive dividends for the peaceful regional relations. This could be seen in

    relations with Armenia, but also with Azerbaijani neighbours in the Caspian, where

    Baku has been instigated to develop cooperative relations with Turkmenistan (Simo,

    2008). This process could in time facilitate an agreement on an international division of

    the Caspian, removing an issue of contention in regional politics that could lead to

    violent conflict.

    EU presence in Azerbaijan must be considered from a multi-actor perspective. This

    means that, besides the politico-institutional relations developed between the

  • 19

    Azerbaijani government and the EU institutions, member states retain specific interests

    in Azerbaijan, namely the United Kingdom (UK), as well as transnational actors, such

    as oil companies, which represent a fundamental axis of the EU presence in the country.

    British Petroleum was present in Azerbaijan before many EU countries opened

    embassies there, and they shape not only UK policies towards Baku, but the EUs, as

    well. This is especially true as the EU has made energy security a fundamental issue in

    its foreign policy. This makes the development of a coherent policy toward Azerbaijan

    hard, with negative effects on many different levels. On the one hand the EU has not

    been able to be a fully pragmatic partner, supporting Azerbaijans energy development

    and its own energy security, and on the other hand, it has also failed to be a normative

    actor, pushing for high standards of democracy and human rights.

    5. The ENP and foreign policy in Georgia

    The announcement by the EU of a new initiative for the neighbours of the enlarged

    Union was received in the South Caucasus with disappointment, since the region was

    not included in the initiative in 2003. But it would take only a few months, from March

    to November, for the EU to be under pressure to revise its decision. The Rose

    Revolution in Georgia, in November 2003, was a landmark event, which forced the EU

    to extend the ENP to the South Caucasian states. Naturally democracy in Georgia

    benefited from the establishment of the ENP, but its leadership showed resolve to make

    the democratic and peaceful revolution a moment of change towards Europe. The

    symbolism of the Georgian decision to display the EU flags on all the administrative

    buildings, of the appointment of French diplomat of Georgian descent, Salome

    Zourabichvili as Foreign Minister and of the introduction of the position of State

    Minister for European Integration, was not left unnoticed in Brussels. The EU displayed

    unprecedented activism towards Georgia, convening a Donors Conference, in Brussels,

    in June 2004, together with the World Bank, and pledging about US$1 billion to support

    the reform programme of the Georgian government (Devdariani, 2004; Vieira and

    Simo, 2008).

    The increasing attention of the EU to the reform processes in Georgia played on two

    different levels. One the one hand the EU committed itself to support domestic reforms

    aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and curbing corruption

  • 20

    (acting on the domestic structuralist level). The EU deployed a Rule of Law mission in

    Georgia, by July 2004, aimed at providing guidance on a new criminal justice reform

    strategy, including support in the planning of new legislation, for example the Criminal

    Procedure Code (Gularidze, 2004). On the other hand, however, the EU displayed great

    caution in engaging in the regions security challenges, including in Georgias relations

    with Russia (external structuralist level). Despite an incremental engagement in the

    frozen conflicts in Georgia, the bulk of EU activities in the South Caucasus have

    focused on assistance to regulatory and administrative reforms, democracy and good

    governance, economic modernisation and poverty eradication, legal harmonisation with

    the EU (Europeanisation) and only to some extent peaceful conflict resolution

    (European Commission, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). As Popescu (2007: 20) argues in the

    Georgian case, EU support for the rehabilitation of the conflict zones were effective in

    easing at least some of the difficulties that people in the conflict regions faced. The

    political effect of EU assistance was less important, however.

    Although the EU did get involved in conflict resolution, especially in Georgia, through

    the appointment of a EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and through

    assistance to rehabilitate the conflict areas, its long-term structural approach was in

    direct contrast with the situation on the ground. Under Russian economic and military

    pressure, Georgian leaders took their attention from long-term reforms and economic

    development to the short-term needs of state survival. Their approach was to engage the

    EU in conflict resolution and to secure its commitment to their territorial integrity. This

    in turn, might include increased EU assistance to Georgia, including in border

    management, and ultimately in replacing the CIS-led peacekeeping formats in Abkhazia

    and South Ossetia. Tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow escalated over the last years,

    culminating in a war over South Ossetia, in 2008, despite EU efforts to defuse tensions

    and to commit the Georgian leadership to peaceful conflict resolution principles. As

    argued above, the conflict resulted partly from the escalation of tensions between Russia

    and the US, an area where the EU not only had limited ability to intervene, but was also

    somehow made hostage of global dynamics it did not control. The Georgian State

    Minister for European Integration was quoted saying that the Georgian party welcomes

    more active participation in settlement of problems in the region, but that EU

    participation in conflict resolution in Georgia, visa issues and free trade were among the

  • 21

    most difficult aspects being negotiated in the ENP Action Plan (The Georgian Times,

    2006).

    We can thus argue the EU showed limitations on several levels. First, the EU was

    unable to shape the wider context of increased competition between the US/NATO and

    Russia in the former-Soviet space, and might eventually have contributed to the increase

    in tensions by setting up the ENP and lately the Eastern Partnership. Although the EU is

    a global actor it has limited ability to shape patterns of competition, particularly since its

    foreign policy instruments lack coherence and need to be streamlined. As for Georgia,

    although the Rose Revolution symbolized the beginning of a shift in the former-Soviet

    space towards democracy and the West, followed by similar events in Ukraine and

    Kyrgyzstan, this was by no means a consolidated or irreversible path, as the increasing

    concerns with democracy and peace in the country suggest. Moreover, the EU did not

    manage to exert conditionality on the Georgian government to reform and follow suit on

    its promises of peaceful conflict resolution. Similarly, EU support for civil society

    actors, which had been crucial in bringing about a democratic shift in Georgia, was to

    some extent neglected. This limited their ability to exert pressure on the government

    and keep it accountable. The EU was particularly well positioned in the framework of

    the ENP to address these issues, and was expected to do so, raising expectations that it

    did not match.

    Thus according to our model the EU acted strongly at the domestic structuralist level,

    supporting reforms, and promoting a clear Europeanisation agenda. However, domestic

    agents, including Georgian officials followed a selective engagement strategy with the

    EU, focusing instead on promoting changes at the external structural level. Moreover,

    civil society actors and domestic constituencies, which had been crucial to the

    revolution in 2003, were increasingly left out of the decision-making process, as

    security concerns emerged as the major issue in Georgias foreign policy. While

    European integration was presented as a preferable strategy to help stabilise the

    domestic and regional context of Georgia, local actors engaged in an attempt to

    radically alter the external context, by shifting patterns of regional competition among

    the US and Russia as well. Putting it differently, Georgian leaders expected the EU to

    be more proactive in affecting the behaviour of external agents, particularly Russia,

    which the EU failed to achieve. However, the EU did manage to engage other

  • 22

    International Organisations and EU member states in Georgia, improving the level of

    influence of external agents in Georgian foreign policy options.

    Conclusions

    This paper has attempted to shed light onto the process of foreign policy formulation,

    looking at the South Caucasian countries relations with the European Union. It

    proposes four main axis of analysis, including actor and structure-centred approaches

    and domestic and international perspectives. It was argued that the EU fits well into

    these multiperspectival approaches, since it is a complex actor, working on several

    levels, including both the domestic and international and often addressing both actors

    and context. The next section sought to apply the matrix of analysis to foreign policy

    making in the post-communist South Caucasus, by looking at how agency and context,

    both at the domestic and international level have shaped foreign policy in the region.

    Examples such as the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents reluctance to compromise

    on Karabakh due to calculations over the reactions of their constituencies at home; the

    growing democratisation of the region, which partly managed to halt military hostilities;

    the increased US/Russia rivalry which is equivalent to a new international context

    affecting issues such as democracy promotion and energy competition; and finally the

    role of the international institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe in

    reinforcing these countries Western orientation faced with Russias increased

    competition.

    A similar analysis was then put forward regarding the engagement of the EU through

    the ENP. The main conclusions regard the focus of the EU on the domestic structuralist

    perspective, which had some positive results in Georgia, but failed to deliver credible

    reforms in Armenia (imitation of democracy) and in Azerbaijan (regression of

    democratisation). The EU is also working on the external structural level, seeking to

    mediate tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi (which it failed to achieve) and to

    improve the regional context around Armenia (especially in relations with Turkey but

    with limited results) and reinforcing the strategic importance of Azerbaijan on energy

    (with some positive results). At the level of domestic agency, the EU has focused on

    state agents and engagement with civil society has been minor, so far. Georgian leaders

    promoted a selective engagement, while the Armenian bureaucrats displayed good

  • 23

    technical capabilities but limited commitment to reform and Azerbaijani leaders

    circumvented EU conditionality by engaging the EU at the strategic level. Finally, at the

    level of external agents, the EU has been powerless to influence Russian actions in

    Georgia; it has focused on International Organisations in Armenia; and has been

    dividing attention with member states and transnational actors in Azerbaijan.

  • 24

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