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Ethical Dimensions of Advertising ExecutionsAuthor(s): Israel D. Nebenzahl and Eugene D. JaffeSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 17, No. 7 (May, 1998), pp. 805-815Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25073125 .

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Ethical Dimensions of w D NehenzM

Advertising Executions Eugene D. Jaffe

ABSTRACT. This paper suggests a framework for

determining the ethicality of disguised and obtrusive

advertising. While most discussions of advertising ethics deal with deception or fraud, the proposed framework is based on the way messages are

presented

to audiences. Suggestions for measurement and future

research are given.

Introduction

In this paper the authors examine the ethics of

what we call disguised and obtrusive advertising.

Disguised advertising messages are those that

individuals may not perceive as being sponsored

Israel D. Nebenzahl is a Senior Lecturer at the Graduate

School of Business Administration, Bar-Ilan University, in Ramat-Gan, Israel. He holds B.S. (Economics) and

MBA (Prod. Mgt. Systems) from Columbia University and Ph.D. (Marketing) from New York University. His

research interests are in International Marketing,

Consumer Behavior, Marketing Research, Business

Ethics and Hi-Tech Product Development. He has pub lished in the Journal of Marketing Research, Journal

of International Business Studies, Management

International Review and Simulation & Games and

others.

Eugene D. Joffe is an Associate Professor at the Graduate

School of Business Administration, Bar-Ilan University, in Ramat-Gan, Israel. His research interests are in

International Marketing and Business, and Business

Ethics. He has published in the Journal of Marketing Research, Management International Review,

Columbia Journal of World Business, Public

Opinion Quarterly, International Marketing Review, European Journal of Marketing,

International Journal of Advertising, Journal of

Business Ethics, International Journal of Value

Based Management and others.

because the source of the message is unclear, or

because they are presented as editorial material, rather than advertisements. Obtrusive advertising consists of messages that are background to more

salient stimuli or messages. Zinkhan (1994) ques tioned the ethics of employing such advertising and suggested that the issue be investigated. We

accept this challenge by first discussing the

subject of advertising and ethics. This will be

followed by outlining the dimensions of what

may be considered disguised and obtrusive

advertising. Finally, we suggest a framework for

determining whether disguised and obtrusive

advertising messages are ethical.

Advertising has been defined (Kotier, 1997, p.

637) as "any paid form of non personal presenta tion of ideas, goods, or services by an identified

sponsor' [italics ours]. Thus, the criteria for

defining advertising is that it is a paid for com

munication and the intended audience can

identify the sponsor. Advertising is a selling cost

whose purpose is to "provide information to . . . individuals and organizations who may want

it for their decisions" (Dirksen et al., 1977, p.

66). On the other hand, there are occasions when a sponsor may promote a product or service by

means of public relations, namely, by "planting" information in the news media designated as a

"press release", or "news release", which is

presented in the form of an editorial. These

publicity messages are not paid for by the sponsor and in most cases the sponsor/source is not

identified because the media editors are free to

edit the content as well as decide whether to

communicate them or not. There is increasing use of "paid attempts to influence audiences

for commercial benefit using communications

that project a non-commercial character"

Journal of Business Ethics 17: 805-815, 1998.

? 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



806 Israel D. Nebenzahl and Eugene D. Joffe

(Balasubramanian, 1994). Here we have cases

where a paid advertisement disguises the fact of

sponsorship to give the impression of publicity rather than a commercial message. For example, the market entry of the Ford Mustang was first

mentioned in a newspaper editorial in which the

Ford Motor Company was not identified as the

sponsor, nor the fact that the editorial was paid for by Ford (Softness, 1976). Disguising of

messages in this manner raises an ethical question as to whether consumer autonomy is lessened by the fact that vital information (about the fact of

paid sponsorship) is being withheld.

The second problem that we address in this

paper deals with what we call "obtrusive" adver

tising. Obtrusive advertising consists of messages

secondary to the main stimulus perceived by an

audience. Most advertising messages act as

primary stimuli, communicated via the broadcast

media and to some extent through printed media. In these cases, the intended audience is

focused almost entirely on the message and

perceives it consciously. On the other hand, there

are cases where the advertising message stimulus

is secondary to other stimuli. A case in point is

sideboard advertisements in sports arenas. When

a game is broadcast, the camera focuses on the

sports event, but viewers also get glimpses of the

advertisements placed on the sides of the arena.

In this case, viewers perceive the advertisements

subattentively, that is, below the conscious

threshold. Such subattentive perception, as we will

discuss below, may influence consumers more

than at the attentive level. If so, the question of

whether to use obtrusive advertising presents an

ethical dilemma. In order to answer these ques

tions, the next sections of the paper consider

advertising ethics in general and the ethics of

disguised and obtrusive advertising in particular.

Ethics and advertising

In a recent survey of the advertising ethics

literature, Hyman et al. (1994, p. 6) found that

"only a handful of topics dominate . . . recent

research [in advertising ethics]". And, these topics tend to be highly concentrated in two areas:

advertising deception and advertising content.

Deception is generally defined (Hyman, 1990) as false or misleading claims in advertising. For

example, the Federal Trade Commission in the

United States has ruled that misleading claims

need only encourage, not cause mistaken actions

by consumers that may cause injury. A classic case

in this regard was a complaint made to the FTC

Commission against the Ted bates advertising

agency regarding an advertisement for Palmolive

Rapid Shave. A claim was made that Rapid Shave

would soften sandpaper sufficiently to permit

shaving the sand grains from the paper. To illus

trate this claim on television a sheet of Plexiglas covered with sand was substituted for sandpaper

(Engel et al., 1983). The advertisers claimed that

the use of Plexiglas was needed because of

"technical requirements" of television in order

to properly carry out the demonstration. The

Commission, however, held that the advertise

ment was false and misleading. Thus, from an

deontological perspective, an advertising claim

is potentially deceptive if it can be shown to

encourage mistaken actions by consumers, i.e.,

actions that have the potential to be harmful. In

the Palmolive case, leading consumers to believe

that the product possesses attributes that it does

not have.

Ethical issues related to advertising content

include the use of informative versus emotional,

persuasive advertising (Arrington, 1982; Durham,

1984; Crisp, 1987; Lippke, 1989), using messages such as fear (Rotfeld, 1989; LaTour and Zahra,

1989) and sexual appeals (Boddewyn, 1991; LaTour and Hawthorn, 1994), advertising to

children (Kunkel, 1988) and minorities (Hacker et al., 1987). Another issue is whether restric

tions should be placed on the advertising of

so-called harmful products such as cigarette, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.

While both advertising deception and adver

tising content have received considerable atten

tion in the ethics and legal/marketing literature

(see, e.g., Nicosia, 1974; Olson and Dover, 1978;

Barbour and Gardner, 1982; Carson et al., 1985; Grunert and Dedler, 1985; Hyman, 1990; Kaid,

1991; Pierce et al., 1991; LaTour, 1994), the

ethicality of disguised and obtrusive advertising has not been investigated.

The ethicality of advertising may be deter



Ethics and Advertising 807

mined by the extent to which it harms con

sumers. Harm may be defined as: (1) violation of

autonomy by control or manipulation, (2) invasion of privacy and (3) the violation of the

right to know.

Violation of consumer autonomy

Most individuals want to determine their own

destiny and be rather free to do so with a

minimum of external control (Young, 1986).

Therefore, consumers' desires will be auto

nomous if they are not induced by some outside

influence -

such as advertising -

against their will

(Crisp, 1987). What sort of desires are we talking about? Arlington (1982) Crisp (1987) and Lippke (1989) distinguish between the recognized

(Dworkin, 1988, p. 20) schema of first and

second-order desires:

. . . autonomy is conceived of as a second-order

capacity [a desire to fulfill a first-order desire] of

persons to reflect critically upon their first-order

preferences, desires, wishes [e.g. a desire for a Club

med vacation] . . . and the capacity to accept or

attempt to change these in light of higher-order

preferences and values.

Arlington argues that an autonomous desire is

a first-order desire. He gives the example of a

product such as Grecian Formula 16 bought (a first-order desire) because the consumer wants to

look younger. However, the question is whether

the desire to look younger is inherent, i.e.,

originated with the person, or is a consequence of advertising. If the desire is inherent, than it is

autonomous.

Crisp (1987) and Lippke (1989) raise objec tions to the sorts of advertising that use puffery, i.e. imply that by using the hair preparation, the

person will not only look younger but will

become more attractive to the opposite sex. If

the advertisement for Grecian Formula 16

implied that by looking younger the consumer

of the product would have a better sex life, then

it is questionable whether Grecian formula 16 is

a first-order, ergo autonomous desire. Such

advertising (puffery) is an invasion of a person's

autonomy because it "links, by suggestion, the

product with . . . unconscious desires for [for

example] power and sex". Thus, according to this

argument, appealing to unconscious desires

through implicit messages violates consumer

autonomy.

Invasion of privacy

Another argument is that advertising invades an

individual's privacy (Rotzoll, 1986, p. 138). While in most cases an individual has the option

to read an advertisement, such as in newspapers and magazines, or to zap television commercials, there are cases where ads are not easily avoided, such as in public transportation vehicles (espe

cially when they are crowded making moving about very difficult) and sports arenas. Therefore,

exposure to advertising is not always voluntary

(Lippke, 1988, p. 49). Moreover, a person may be unaware that s/he is being exposed to adver

tising as in the cases of product placement and

sponsor unidentified press releases.

Violation of the right to know

A special message was sent to the U.S. Congress

by President Kennedy in 1962, with the purpose of strengthening consumer protection. Contained

in this message were four basic consumer

"rights": Safety, choice, a hearing of consumer

interests and the right to be informed. In our per

spective, the right to be informed is synonymous with the right to know if a message is sponsored. Of all the media, the only attempt to regulate

sponsor identification was initiated by the Federal

Communications Commission for broadcast

media under the principle that "listeners are

entitled to know by whom they are being per suaded" (Federal Communications Commissions

Reports, 1963). However, this ruling does not

cover feature films that contain product place ments and in many cases even television

programs.




Disguised advertising

Because disguised advertising is not perceived as being sponsored, the perceptual process

generates an impression that is deceptive because

the message may be misinterpreted or a dis

claimer may not pass through the attention filter

(Aaker and Myers, 1975). Take for example,

product placement in movies. Product placement

(PPL) is defined as the inclusion of consumer

products or services in motion pictures distrib

uted in theaters by major Hollywood studios in

return for cash fees or reciprocal promotional

exposure for the films in marketers' advertising

programs (Fleming, 1990; Clark, 1991;

Balasubramian, 1994). Examples are a soft drink

product served in a filmed setting or a fast food

restaurant whose name is prominently displayed while being frequented by the actors in several

scenes. Both the restaurant chain and the soft

drink processor pay for this exposure. Movie

studios actively promote product placement. For

example, the Walt Disney Company provided a

price list for the film "Mr. Destiny". A visual

product display cost $20,000, a brand-name

mention, $40,000 and $60,000 if an actor used

the product (Magiera, 1990). In most cases

however, filmgoers do not realize that product

placement is in fact a paid commercial. From a

category-based social psychology framework

(Chaiken et al., Petty et al., 1983; Maclnnis et

al., 1991), we would say that filmgoers lack the

opportunity and ability to filter product place ment advertising, because it does not appear to

be sponsored by a commercial source (disguised).

Disguise is deceptive and violates the consumers

right to know.

The degree to which the sponsor is disguised is determined not only by the extent to which

the source is concealed, but also by the degree that consumers believe the message to be non

sponsored information and news. Cases in point are video news releases (VNR) such as

Info Vision, broadcast on channels 7 and 25 in

Boston, called "New England Today." This

program is styled as a newsmagazine detailing stories about a broad range of companies

including food, educational and health care

institutions, which costs the sponsor about

$22,000 for two and a half minutes. While this

particular program begins each broadcast with a

disclaimer that the show "is not produced by the

television station that you are watching. It is

created by Info Vision, a company dedicated to

shaping the future of informational television", not all video programs do. Moreover, even with

such a disclaimer, not all viewers discern the

program as a paid advertisement. Note that in the

case of Info Vision, the company does not disclose

who actually paid for the news story. It is the

concealment of the sponsor or of the fact that

the message is in essence a paid advertisement

that presents an ethical dilemma. Not knowing that communication is in essence a paid adver

tisement, consumers may not attempt to mentally tune-out the message, something they might choose to do if they had knowledge of its com

mercial nature. Moreover, consumers may be led

to believe the veracity of messages when they are

communicated by a media source that is taken

to be independent of a commercial sponsor.

Obtrusive advertising

An example of obtrusive advertising is the use

of billboards in sports arenas when games are

broadcast on TV. When a viewer watches a game, his attention is focused on the action that takes

place on the playing field, while the billboards

serve as background to that activity. An analo

gous situation in advertising is the controversial

area of subliminal persuasion, messages that are

below the threshold of normal perception.

Although the intended audience exposed to such

messages does not sense them on a conscious

level, it is purported to perceive them subcon

sciously (Bargh, 1988; Marcel, 1988; Janiszewski,

1990). While obtrusive advertising is clearly

supraliminal, it is subattentive, i.e., it escapes the

attention of the viewer and may, not unlike sub

liminal communications, impact the consumer's

buying behavior while s/he is not aware of it.

The degree of message obtrusiveness is the

extent to which the advertisement is secondary to more attention grabbing information. In this

context, advertisements range from a low to high

degree of obtrusiveness. For example, most




television advertising is designed to be the focal

point of attention, even though it is a low

involvement (Krugman, 1969) medium. Back

ground "noise" is limited so that the viewers'

attention will not be distracted from the adver

tising message. Therefore, the degree of

obtrusiveness is extremely low. On the other

hand, TV targeted commercial billboards in

sports arenas (CBSA) appear as background to

the central action (the game) and are not the

focus of attention. These types of advertisements

(including, e.g., PPL) are embedded within the

program and are not the focal piece of informa

tion as is the case with all other forms of ads.

Because the stimulus of such ads are secondary to other stimuli, their effectiveness has been

questioned (Nebenzahl and Hornik, 1985). While their conclusions were based on adver

tising recall measures, a more recent brand choice

experiment (Nebenzahl, 1997) has found that

product placement does effect brand choice. In

this study, respondents were shown one of several

versions of a video clip, where some versions

included product placements and others did not.

The proportion of respondents selecting one of

the tested brands was significantly higher when

it was placed in the video clip than when it was

not. Given the nature of such ads (short and

frequent background messages), one might

suspect that they act as a subattentive stimulus

generating perception below the conscious

threshold. As such, obtrusive advertisements

violate consumer autonomy and invade consumer

privacy. The remainder of this article treats two issues

(1) the motivation to use obtrusive and disguised

advertising, and (2) how the dimensions of

obtrusive and disguised advertising may be deter

mined.

The motivation to use disguised and

obtrusive advertising

The motivation to increased usage of concealed

advertising is fourfold: (1) the increased clutter

and distraction in more traditional advertising vehicles (Maclnnis et al., 1991) exemplified by the proliferation of messages and the predilection

of audiences to avoid commercials as in televi

sion "zapping" (Yorke and Kitchen, 1985), (2) the spiraling cost of other media, (3) the fact that

younger and more affluent consumers watch

relatively less television than the average, and

therefore avoid exposure to programs, forcing marketers to find new channels of communica

tion that can help them achieve their marketing communications goals (Bogart and Lehman,

1983) and (4) the refusal of public TV stations to accept commercial advertising. These four

factors together mean that the cost of effectively

motivating consumers has increased substantially.

Disguised and obtrusive advertising is more cost

effective when it succeeds in avoiding audience

alienation.

Dimensions of advertising executions

In this section we propose a two-dimensional

model (Figure 1) to determine the ethics of com

munication disguise and obtrusiveness. The two

determinants are (1) Disguise -

the degree of

source concealment, i.e., the extent to which the

sponsor is identified and/or is able to cloud the

fact that the message is a paid advertisement and

(2) Obtrusiveness -

the degree to which the

message is secondary to more salient communi

cation such as a sports contest or a scene in a

movie.

Application of the model as shown in Figure 1 suggests that communications located in quad rants 2, 3 and 4 are of questionable ethics.

Relatively, the problem of ethics is less severe in

quadrants 2 and 3, and most severe in quadrant 4. For example, a video news release (VNR) is

high on concealment, but low on obtrusiveness, that is the message is the focal piece of infor

mation and is not intended to generate percep tion below the conscious level. TV targeted

billboards in sports areas (CBSA) are high in

obtrusiveness, but low in source concealment,

quite the opposite of VNR. While it is obvious

to the audience that the billboards are paid

advertisements, perception of them may be more

subattentive than conscious attention. Finally,

product placement (PPL) may be both high on source concealment and obtrusiveness and there




High

Disguise

Low

VNR

ISCSF IPR

ADS COMMERCIALS

USCSF UPR

4 PPL

SCENT

TV TARGETED CBSA

Low Obtrusiveness High

KEY:

ISCSF = Identified Short Commercially Sponsored Films IPR = Identified Press Releases

VNR = Video News Releases CBSA = Commercial Billboards in Sports Arenas USCSF = Unidentified Short Commercially Sponsored Films UPR = Unidenfied Press Releases PPL = Product Placement

Figure 1. Ethical dimensions of advertising executions.

fore the least ethical form of advertising. In this

category - even though to a lesser degree

- are

unidentified short commercially sponsored films

(USCSF) in motive theaters and unidentified

press releases (UPR) where the source is con

cealed. An example of the latter is an article in

printed media extolling a product, that in reality has been paid for by the sponsor. UPR is being used in many Russian publications. As a result

of dwindling government funding, many peri odicals are in financial difficulty. Newspapers send a staff journalist to meet with company

representatives and the result is an article that is

reviewed by the client before publication.

Usually, the text does not indicate that the article

is really a paid advertisement (Babakian, 1993). USCSF and UPR advertisements in quadrant 4

are relatively high on the dimension of source

concealment and somewhat high on the dimen

sion of message obtrusiveness.

Also listed in quadrant 4 is a relatively new

promotional technique - the use of fragrances

to enhance sales in retail stores. The assumption is that because smell is believed to be the most

closely linked of all the senses to memory and

emotions, stores can use it to put people in the

mood to shop (Miller, 1993). Scent however, is

part of store ambiance, like background music or

lighting, all of which are supraliminal. In this

regard it belongs in quadrant 4, because it is

highly disguised as a promotional device and very much in the background.

To sum up, communications positioned in

quadrant 4 are the least ethical because they are

deceptive and violate consumer autonomy,

privacy and the right to know. Communications

in quadrant 3 violate consumer autonomy and

the right to know, while those in quadrant 2 are

deceptive and violate consumers' right to know.




Estimating model parameters

Up to now, we have presented a theoretical

model that describes what we have termed dis

guised and obtrusive advertising. Having sug

gested a two-dimensional model that graphically

displays various sorts of communications, we now

turn to the measurement of these parameters. The measurement of disguised advertising

follows its definition, namely, messages that

individuals may not perceive as being sponsored because the source of the message is concealed, or because they are presented as editorial

material, rather than as advertising. In order to

measure the extent of disguise, one has to deter

mine the likelihood that the average person will

not be able to discern the fact of sponsorship. This likelihood may be measured in two ways,

first, by using content analysis in order to

evaluate a-priori the extent of disguise; and

second, through surveys that estimate the pro

portion of respondents who believe that the

message is not sponsored by a commercial source.

In either case, disguise may be measured on a 0

to 1 scale that represents the probability that the

average consumer believes that the message is not

sponsored. For example, say that 0 represents a

situation wherein all consumers are aware that

the message is commercially sponsored and also

know who the true sponsor is. The number 1

represents a situation wherein no consumer is

aware that the message is commercially spon sored.

Content analysis of messages may follow the

suggested guidelines as shown in Table I.

In applying these content analysis guidelines,

any intermediate value between the suggested anchor values may be assigned to a message,

depending on its degree of sponsorship and

source concealment. In deciding the exact value,

both the format and content of the message should be considered. In printed media, one

should look, for example, for frames that usually

separate ads from editorial material, and consider

the location of the material in the page. In broad

cast media one should consider details such as the

time frame within which the message is broad

cast, the utilization of known broadcast figures as

spokespersons, etc. In either case, one should

TABLE I

Suggested guidelines for disguise content analysis

Scale Information content of the message value

0.00 The message contains a clear statement

that it is commercially sponsored and the

sponsor is clearly identified.

0.25 The message tries to shed its commercial

nature by being presented as a press release.

0.50 The message is presented in editorial

format, but the commercial sponsor is

identified.

0.75 The message is presented as editorial

material prepared by an uninterested third

party.

1.00 The fact of sponsorship is completely con

cealed.

consider the presence (or absence) of source

identifying statements, such as "company sources

claim that . . .", "tests conducted by the XYZ

company prove that . . ." and the like.

The probability that the average consumer

believes that the message is not sponsored may also be measured by consumer surveys. In such

surveys, respondents are exposed to an object

message and are asked to identify the sponsor. The proportion of those who fail to identify the

true sponsor constitutes the measure of disguise. Obtrusiveness

- the degree to which a message

is secondary to more salient communication

?

may be measured by the difference between

unaided recall and recognition (Singh et al.,

1988; Norris and Coleman, 1992; du Plessis,

1994; Babin and Thompson, 1996). In unaided

recall, a person is asked to describe the content

of a message as he or she recalls it. Usually, only salient information is recalled. In tests of

recognition, elements of the message are pre

sented, together with elements that were not

included in the message, and the person is asked

to point to those elements he or she recognizes as being a part of the message. Typically, sec

ondary information that is not recalled may be

still recognized. Thus, consumer surveys may be

conducted in which exposure to the object




message is followed by unaided recall and

recognition tests, in this order. The measure of

obtrusiveness is estimated from the percentage of respondents who recall and the percentage of

respondents who recognize the sponsorship and/or the sponsor using the following formula:

^, . Recall Percent Obtrusiveness = 1

Recognition Percent

In this formula, the ratio between the percent of those who recall to those who recognize the

sponsorship and/or the sponsor is a measure of

saliency and should be in the 0-1 range, because

recognition is known to be always higher than a

previously conducted unaided recall. The closer

the ratio to the number 1, the less the difference

between the two measures and the more salient

is the tested information. By subtracting the ratio

from 1, a measure of obtrusiveness, also ranging from 0 to 1, is obtained. For this measure, high values represent high levels of obtrusiveness.

Application of these measures will enable the

researcher to position various types of messages on the ethical dimension graph as shown in

Figure 1. Since these concepts have not been

tested empirically, our positioning of communi

cations in Figure 1 may shift somewhat.

Discussion

Empirical research related to the ethical dilemma

of concealed or unidentified advertising has been

limited to only a few of the advertising examples cited above. In a survey of 100 advertising agency senior executives (Sandier and Secunda, 1993), it was found that while they substantially agreed that product placement is a subtle form of

advertising, they disagreed that it is deceptive.

However, the same group of executives disagreed that commercials and newsreels/short subjects

promoting products should be shown in theaters.

Critics like Jacobson (1988) have protested

against product placement in films, observing that

"the infusion of products into films threatens

cinema as an art form. Audiences are never told

that they are the object of a uniquely insidious

and deceitful form of advertising." However, in

a survey of university students' attitudes towards

PPL, Nebenzahl and Secunda (1993) found that

only a small minority objected to the practice on

ethical grounds. Secunda and Nebenzahl (1995) studied con

sumers' attitudes toward intermission time uti

lization in movie theaters. An increasing number

of theaters are using short commercially spon sored films (SCSF) as "time fillers" when the

featured film is of shorter length than normal and

theater management needs to provide program

ming material that would allow them to schedule

programs on the hour, instead of at irregular clock times (Lipman, 1990). When given the

choice of paying higher admission prices or

viewing SCSF, respondents opted for the films.

Respondents were then informed about the

commercial sponsorship of these films, but this

fact did not alter the rating of this medium.

Apparently, utilitarianism was the consideration; it was less painful to be subjected to SCSF than

pay a higher price for admission. This would

seem to imply that consumers are not much

concerned about the morality of using sponsored news films in theatres, although the authors did

not directly address this issue in their study. In our view, consumer attitude toward obtru

sive advertising is but one (normative) indicator

of the ethics of this sort of promotion. What

needs to be answered is whether disguised and/or

obtrusive advertising violates the principle of

consumer autonomy, privacy and right to know.

From a deontological perspective, any reduction

of consumer autonomy and the right to know

and/or invasion of privacy is unethical, such as

advertising that creates a first-order desire using

messages that are either strongly disguised and/or

obtrusive. Even from a teleological point of view,

disguised or obtrusive messages would be uneth

ical because the gains to the sponsors of such

advertising could not outweigh the losses to

autonomy and privacy of the large number of

consumers exposed.

Some may assert that loss of autonomy is a

necessary but not sufficient condition to

conclude that advertising is unethical. A suffi

cient condition is that consumers perceive the

advertising. The claim that disguised and obtru

sive advertising are unethical is based on the




extent to which target audiences attend to such

messages. In other words, such advertising would

first have to capture the attention of consumers

and then be effective in influencing their

behavior. Burnkrant (1976) and Burnkrant and

Sawyer (1983) found that if consumer readiness

to process brand information increases, the level

of information processing increases. The assump tion is that as the degree of disguise increases, consumers are less able to apply defense mecha

nisms against the ad and therefore their motiva

tion to attend to the ad increases. Moreover, the

use of affect-laden executional cues (Petty and

Cacioppo, 1986), rather than strong message

arguments in disguised ads may be effective in

producing brand attitudes.

Most advertising messages are designed so that

the intended audience perceives them at the

conscious level. However, we have shown that

high obtrusive advertising messages may be per ceived at unconscious or subattentive levels.

Therefore, like the case of disguise, as the degree of advertising obtrusiveness increases, consumers

increasingly attend to the ads at the subconscious

level. While there is some evidence - as shown

above - in the marketing and psychology litera

ture to substantiate the relationship between

disguised and obtrusive advertising and audience

attentiveness, more research is needed to deter

mine the degree of causality. Assuming that

causality between disguised and obtrusive adver

tising and consumer attentiveness is shown, what

if any action should be taken and by whom?

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