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Equal Opportunity from the OtherSideClinton Collins Ph.D. aa University of Kentucky , LexingtonPublished online: 30 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Clinton Collins Ph.D. (1973) Equal Opportunity from the Other Side, TheEducational Forum, 37:3, 323-332, DOI: 10.1080/00131727309339224

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Equal Opportunity from the Other SideCLINTON COLLINS

FOR.MAL ed~cation can be ~iewed asbeing carried on to achieve two

broad general purposes which are in con­flict with one another. On the one hand,formal education is a means of provid­ing training for specialized occupationsin a society where division of labor ex­ists; on the other, it is a means of pro­viding all or most of the young of a soci­ety with similar opportunities to de­velop abilities which are valued withintheir culture. Professional preparationof whatever kind, from that given ini­tiates to the priest class of ancientEgypt , to the professional programs ofmodern universities, and even the voca­tional programs of American highschools, exemplify the effects of the for­mer motive ; wherea s the recurrent em­phasis in contemporary American edu­cation on the equalization of educationalopportunities is evidence of the work­ings of the latter motive .

Beginning with Thomas Jefferson,'the stated rationales for public education

1 See "A Bill for the M ore General Diffusionof Knowledg e," in Gordon C. Lee (ed.) , CrusadeA gainst Igno rance: Thomas Jefferson on Educa­tion ( New York : T eachers College, ColumbiaUniversi ty, 19 6 1).

The real or important meanin g of "e quality ofeducat ional opportunity" cont inues to elude us, asthis phenomenological analysis of the notion indi­cates. CLI NTO N COLLI NS is Assistant Professor ofSocial and Philosophical Studies in Education atthe University of Kentucky, Lexington. He is amember of Kappa Delta Pi and took his Ph.D.degr ee fro m Indiana University in 1970.

in America have treated these motives ascomplementary, seeking by means ofproper classification of students to fulfillboth motives with a single program.Both motives have typically been de­fended on pragmatic grounds of theirutility for democratic societies." Thepurpose of this essay is to indicate whybroad social analyses have failed in thepast to result in prescriptions adequateto the desire for equal opportunity. It ismy thesis that the origins of that desireare to be found more in the needs of theindividual psyche than in the quest forsocial utility.

Professional preparation has been amot ive for formal education in virtuallyevery society which has achieved urban­ization and division of labor . Where suchdivision occurs, societies tend to selectfor certain occupations on the basis ofsome prescribed degree of formalschooling. This can be accomplished ei­ther by selective assignment to schoolsor by competition among students inthe schools, the two processes of selec­tion being largely complementary. For­mal education is thus, preeminently, an

2 For example, A. V. Judges concludes a his­tor ical summary on "T he Me aning of Equalit yin Edu cati on," with the statement that " thepragmatic posit ion supp orting equality has re­ceived less attent ion from educat ional theor iststhan it deserves." H e fu rther credits the arg u­ments of the util ita rian " philosophic ra dicals" ashaving "d emonstrated that the mar k of all thingsthey exposed as biased and obsolescent was socialinefficiency, a detraction fr om well-b eing. " InPaul Nash (ed .), History and Education (NewYork : Random H ouse, 19 70) , Ch. 6, p. 186.

' 323'

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324 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY [March

institution fulfilling a function which isbasic to the form of organization ofmost, if not all, civilized societies. Oneclearly discernible trend in highly indus­trialized societies appears to be to in­crease steadily the emphasis on profes­sional preparation by mean s of formalschooling. From a sociological perspec­tive, it appears almost axiomatic that thedemand for formal education increasesproportionately with the technologicalcomplexity of a society.

Equality of educational opportunity isalso frequently understood as a meansof strengthening the institutions of a so­ciety. It is regarded as a means of insur­ing the adequate development of the tal­ent pool from which institutions drawtheir per sonnel. From a broad, sociologi­cal perspective, however, there are prob­ably stronger concerns militating again stefforts to provide equal opportunity.There is an extreme scarcity of the moredesirable occupational opportunities insociety. It would be a highly inefficientpr ocess of selecting applicants for the sepositions if schools were to attempt tomake it possible for every member ofthe society to compete on an equal basisfor these positions. Furthermore, sincethe vast majority of those competing fortop occupational positions in a state oftotal equality of opportunity would, be­cause of the scarcity of such positions,fail to achieve them, the long-rangeeffect might be to increase personal frus­tration and discontent with the politico­economic structure of the society." In

3 T he argument th at providing equal oppor­tun it ies forestalls discontent with the class str uc­ture of society (see J ohn H. Schaa r, " Eq ua li ty ofOppor tun ity and Beyond" in J . R. Pennock and

terms of large-scale social planning,therefore, equality of opportunity couldprove to be exceedingly dysfunctional. '

Evidence for the sociologically dys­functional nature of equality of opportu­nity can be found also in the difficultiesencountered by sociological studies ofthe problems associated with the provi­sion of equality of educational opportu­nity. An example is the sociological datacited in support of the Supreme Courtdecision of 1954 outlawing racial segre­gation in public schools." The Court re-

J. W. Chapman (eds.) , Nomos IX : Eq uality[N ew York : Atherton, 1967J, Ch. '3 ) is, Ithink, cont rary to histori cal exper ience. Else­wh ere I hav e att empted to show that equal oppor­tunity is a value whi ch exacerbates class tensionswit hin a society, demand for it being a recurrentmotive of social revolutions. ("E qual Opp or­tunity and / or Social Revolut ion ," in W. Rich­ard Step hens (ed.}, Proceedings of the '970 An­nual M eetin g of th e Ohio Valley Ph ilosophy ofEducat ion Society, publ ished for the Society byIn diana Stat e University ).

• My goo d fr iend, Marvin Grandstaff ("Inte­gration and Educat ional P ri vilege" ), in DavidW. Beggs III and S. Kern Al exander (eds.) , In­tegrati on and Education [Chicago : Rand M c­Nall y, 196 9J gives a stro ng argument in suppo rtof th e fun ctional nature of societa l mov es toachieve equa l oppor tunity wh ich parallels anear lier posit ion of my own ("Equal ity, Justice,and D esegregati on," Proceedings of the Twenty­Fir st Annual M eeting of the Philosoph y of Edu­cation Society, '965, pp . 101-106), oiz ., thatsymboli c communication is a necessary concom­itant of the higher forms of human reason and itis th erefor e in the int erest of a democratic societyto promote the wid est possible degree of com­mu nications across catego r ies of race, religi on ,socio-econ omi c class, sex, etc. I now believe thatit has been show n that Am er ican society is in­sufficiently democratic at the level o f ind ividu alat titudes to promote unrestr icted communicat ionof th is kind . In othe r word s, the kind of societywh ich Americans wish to pr eserve docs not re­quire such a deg ree of communica tion. It does,however, I hope to sho w, require equality ofopportunity.

5 Br own v. T opeka Board of Education, 34 7U.S. 483, '954, footn ote 11.

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garded it necessary to establish that theeffects of segregated schooling are suchas to create social inequality, which de­prives Negroes of the equal protectionof law, thereby overturning the conten­tion of the Court in Plessy vs. Ferguson"that segregation laws merely recognize

and do not create social inequality. TheCourt, however, concerned itself onlywith the effects of segregated educationon "the hearts and minds" of Negrochildren. It did not consider the possibleeffects of desegration on white children;nor did it consider the possible harmfuleffects on white as well as Negro chil­dren of public schooling, whether it besegregated or racially integrated. Inshort, the Court took on a more difficulttask than its members apparently real­ized in the attempt to establi sh the needfor equality of educational opportunityon the basis of the alleged effects ofschool segregation on a segment of soci­ety. The upshot of the decision has beento raise further questions as to whetherall de facto forms of public school segre­gation are now also unconstitutionalsince the Court has declared in theBrown decision that the effects of educa­tion must not be injurious to Negro stu­dents.

The Court might possibly haveavoided these further complications intracing the legal implications of theirdecision had they ruled in the Br owndecision that the establi shment or en­forcement by law of school segregationinvolves the law in sanctioning belief inthe intellectual or social inferiority ofthe Negro race and is thus a denial of

" Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 3 U.S. 37,1 89 6.

equal protection to members of thatrace. In practical terms, this is what the1954 decision accomplished : It ended de

jure segregation while leaving open thequestion of the constitutionality of d e

fact o segregat ion. Certainly in the shortrun it can be persuasively argued thatthe effects on society of legally enforceddesegregation have been no more desir­able than the earlier effects of segre­gated schooling.

It is not sociological effects to whichthe call for "equality of opportunity"answers; it answers rather to the de­mands of individual conscience. Ameri­cans tolerated racially segregated publicschooling for the better part of a cen­tury, because generally they shared thebelief in the inherent social and intellec­tual inferiority of Negroes as a race. Solong as that belief was dominant inAmerican society it did not matter tomost Americans what effect being re­quired by law to attend schools com­monly recognized to be inferior hadupon Negroes, or upon the society atlarge. What mattered was that peoplegot what they deserved; and Negroesseen as naturally inferior, deserved infe­rior education.

The chief import of the 1954 Su­preme Court decision was the evidence itbore that some highly influential seg­ments of American society had under­gone a collective change of conscience onthe question of the alleged racial inferi­ority of Negroes. In part this was un­doubtedly a repudiation of the racism ofthe Nazi enemies of World War II. Ingeneral, then, the fundamental source ofthe demand for equality of educational

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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY [March

opportunity is the need of indi viduals tobelieve that people get what they de­serve.

One handicap to the provision ofequal opportunity in American societyhas been that, by and large, Americansocial science lacks a methodology forexploring the consciences of individuals.Since social scientists have been calledupon by the federal government to clar­ify what the factors inhibiting the provi­sion of equality of educational opportu­nity-witness the monumental "Cole­man Report," authorized by act of Con­gress'<-the lack is a serious one. Fur­thermore, American psychology, domi­nated by behaviorist methodology, hasproven inadequate to study the work­ings of individual conscience.

A particularly poignant example ofthe limits of behaviorist methodology isseen in the recent studies of justice con­ducted by the social psychologist, Mel­vin Lerner. Lerner's work has been in­genious in devising experimental situa­tions which yield empirical evidence of asubject's efforts to believe in a very basicnotion of the justice of the universe:viz., that people get what they deserve,and deserve what they get. "Justice" istherefore treated as an explanatory "in­tervening variable" accounting for thedirection of the subjects responses to theexperimental situation. Summarizing hisconclusion from one set of studies, Ler­ner writes:

In one series of studies we found that ourdesire to live in a just world can lead us to

, James S. Coleman , et al., Equality of Ed u­cati on Opportunity ( Washington : U.S. Govern­ment Printing Office, 196 6).

help a victim or to condemn him if, we areunable to help. Subsequent studies indicatedthat if we can't relieve his suffering or per­suade ourselves that the victim deserved hisfate after all, our vulnerability to his fatecan lead us to try to run away from him­or at least from the awaren ess of his plight.At other times, we have learned to be indif­ferent to the suffering of "losers" in thefair and just competition of the marketplace. They have got what they deserve."

As intriguing as the results Lerner re­ports, however, is a question which is un­answered in the article: oiz., why dopeople "desire to live in a just world."Lerner engages in some speculation onthis question in an earlier article, inwhich he is apparently struck by the que s­tion of why people maintain their beliefin th e justice of the universe despiterepeated evidence to the contrary.There he writes :

W e learn of an innocent child killed orbrutalized, or of a man whose security de­rived from a lifetime of hard work is wipedout by an illness, a flood , the closing downof a mine, the act of a criminal. Each suchincident may be frightening or sickening ...we do not want to believe they can hap­pen to people like ourselves- good decentpeople. If these things can happen, what isthe use of struggling, planning, and work­ing to build a secure future for one's selfand family? No matter how strongly ourbelief in an essentially just world is thr eat- .ened by such incidents, most of us must tryto maintain it in order to continue facingthe irritations and struggles of daily life.This is a belief we cannot afford to give upif we are to continue to function. "

• M elvin Lerner , " All the World Loathes aLoser," Psycholo gy To day, 5, 51 ff (June, 19 71).

• M elv in Lern er , "The Desire for Justice andReaction to Victims" in J . Macaulay and L.Berkowitz (eds.} , Altruism and H elping Be-

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A page later, he appears to summarizehis conjectures with the statement that,"for their own security, if for no otherreason, people want to believe in a justworld where people get what they de­serve."!" Thus Lerner introduces a kindof biological constant, "the desire for se­curity" to explain at least part of the ac­tion of the intervening variable "beliefin justice" which he has tested for.

The current methodology of behav­ioral social psychologists allows for test­ing only one intervening variable at atime, so that in this instance the reader'sunderstanding of "justice" is likely to bedirected to some common attribute suchas desire for security, a rather passive at­titude to which to attribute the desire ofhumans that their struggles bear fruit ,and their plans succeed with some de­gree of consistency.

Lerner has arrived at an extended(and not directly testable) theory,which does not appear in print." Hisstudies have led him in the direction ofa theory of implicit contract, not amongmembers of a society, but by each personwith himself. In so far as a person planshis activities and perseveres in them inthe face of obstacles, it is with the as­sumption that there is "justice," a princi­ple operating in the universe which in­sures a tolerable degree of correlationbetween a person's merit and the returnhis efforts bring. One is therefore en­abled to plan his activities in expectationof their probable results. Every cataclys-

haoior (New York : Academic Press, 19 70), P:20 7.

ro Ibid., p. 2 0 8.

11 T aken from a pr eliminary manuscr ipt ofthe author.

mic event of which the individual isaware casts doubt on such expectationsand calls into question this personalview of justice, thereby threatening toabrogate his implicit contract with him­self.

A theory of this kind, however, is notsubject to experimental verification bytraditional empirical means. The evi­dence for such a contract is not to befound in behaviors which indicate beliefin justice alone; it is manifest, rather, asa factor in consciousness which estab­lishes a degree of continuity to all of aperson's moral choices. Explication ofthe workings of such an implicit contractcould not be traced by the study of a sin­gle category of moral action, such as thedesire for justice, since other categoriesof moral experience such as empathy,guilt, reciprocity, together with recogni­tion of the moral status of the "other"as authority or as equal. Behavioral so­cial psychologists typically resist suchsynoptic theorizing undertaken in thearea of moral judgment and confinethemselves to the study of single con­cepts (guilt, empathy, justice, etc.),which can be defined behaviorally andtested for experimentally."

It is my contention that the categoriesof moral behavior are not isolable fromtheir position in a general theory ofmoral action. Moral action is inade­quately understood as a response moti­vated by a drive to restore equilibriumto a social situation." The individual has

"Consult, for example, the essays in J. Ma­caulay and L. Berkowitz (eds.}, Altru ism andHelping Behavior ( New York : Acad emic Press,19 70 ) .

13 See G. C. Homans, Social Behaoior : I ts

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328 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY [March

unifying purposes which govern hismoral choices, and his specific behavi orsare not intelligible apart from the pur­poses they attempt to advance. Thethesis of my inquiry is that morality in­volves application of a personal-culturalworldview, with the long-range aim ofencompassing one's environment withinone's own control, in the face of the simi­lar but competing projects of others. Theint imate relationship between moralityand education is thus assumed in this es­say (and will be explicated in a later es­say) .

An insight into an important but ne­glected perspective on equality of oppor­tunity is provided by the late phenome­nological sociologist, Alfred Schutz."Schutz points out that the concept has adifferent meaning when interpretedsubjectively from what it means inter­preted objectively. (Schutz follows MaxW eber's terminology, wherein, "sub­jective meaning . . . is the meaningwhich . . . a relation or situation has forthe person or persons involved therein;objective meaning is the meaning it hasfor anybody else, be it a partner or ob­server in everyday life, the social scien­tist, or the phil osopher.":")

The distinction appears simple, but itis basic to the meaning of the concept. Inrecent years, the concern of school offi­cers with legally pre scribed means of

Elementary Forms (New York : Harcour t,Brace, 1961 ) .

" "Equality and the M eaning Structure of theSocial World," in Collected Papers II ( T heHa gu e : M artinus Nijolf, 1964 ), pp. 226-273 .

15 Gp. cit ., p. 275 . Schutz adds the caveat," the ter m 'objective mean ing' is obv iously a mis­nomer, in so far as the so-called 'obj ective' inte r­pretat ions are, in turn , rela tive to the par ticularatt itud es of the int erpre ters and, therefore, in acerta in sense, 'subj ective'."

equalizing the opportunities of studentshas obscured this distinction , so that fewof the policies implemented are evertested against the subjective meaningthey have for tho se whose opportunitiesare to be equalized . The data of theColeman Report , for example, do notcontain the subjective evaluations by stu­dents of the opportunities which theireducation affords them. Given a limited,empirical view of scientific methodol­ogy, sociologist s working on such a proj­ect understandably restrict themselvesto inquiry into the objective mean ing ofequal opportunity.

Schutz confronts the question, withthe weight of th at restriction behind it ,but though he sees the objective andsubjective distinction with in the concept,he concedes to the obj ect ive sociolog ist sthat the term is only applicable to situa­tions viewed from the objective per spec­tive. He notes that

. .. opportunities which are equal from theobjective point of view may be, and in astrict sense must be, unequal in term s of thesubjective chances of the particular individ­ual, and vice v ersa. This is so, because,merely from the objective viewpoin t, socialroles constitute the conceptual unit of thesocial system . . . (a nd) everyone withequal qualifications can be deemed anequally eligible incumbent of the role.

F rom the subjective viewpoint, however ,the ind ividual does not look at himself as aneligible i~cumbent of a social role but as ahuman being who is involved in multiplesocial relations and group memberships, ineach of which he participates with a part ofhis personality.!"

From this he concludes th at since, "theindividual human being would weigh

I. Ib id ., p. 272 .

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the chances in terms of his personalhopes, anxieties, and passions, which arehis alone," it follows that "'Strictlyspeaking . . . equal opportunity existsmerely from the objective point ofview."!"

Schutz introduces the term "typifica­tions" to describe the conventional ex­pectations held for each type of socialrole, which the social scientist can dis­cern in the workings of a culture. Hedistinguishes between the analysis of thesocial scientist and the personal experi­ences of everyday life ( which Schutz,following William James, considers theworld of paramount reality). WhatSchutz overlooks in his analysis of equalopportunity is, I believe, the possibilitythat individual members of a discrimi­nated-against group are able to applythe "typifications" of the social scientistto their own situation. A person is awarewhen he is seen by others as an exampleof one or another type. If the type towhich he is assigned by others is gener­ally' regarded as inferior in some re­spect, that is not likely to escape his no­tice. He is, therefore, likely to be sensi­tive to the possibility th at his opportuni­ties are limited by virtue of his participa­tion in the type. While this may involveseeing himself as an object for others,the perspective thus taken is neverthe­less subjective by Schutz's definition,and includes data that are not availableto a strictly objective view.

Suppose, for example, th at a blackstudent in an integrated public schoolclassroom has a white teacher, who,aware of the legal requirements of equal

11 tu«, p. 273 .

educational opportunity, is scrupulouslycorrect in carrying out school policy to­ward black and white students regard­less of race. Nevertheless, the black stu­dent perceives that the teacher expect srelatively low academic performancefrom him as well as from other Ne­groes, as compared with white studentsin the class. He therefore believes thathis opportunities for teacher encourage­ment and support are unequal to thoseof white students by virtue of his racialidentification. In fact, such situations areoften reported in recent phenomenolog­icalliterature on the schools." Althougha social scientist could conceivably de­sign a test which will detect such differ­ences in attitude towards whites and Ne­groes on the part of teachers, that wouldin no way dissolve the distincti on be­tween the subjective and objective mean­ing of equal opportunity. The black stu­dent simply is privy to data the out sideobserver cannot have without directlyasking him and receiving a truthful re­ply, viz., whether or not that individualbelieves his opportunities are unequal byvirtue of the way in which he is cultur­ally typed.

A moment's reflection should revealthat it is the individual's subjective senseof his own equal opportunities which isthe moral desideratum in a system ofuniversal schooling. And for good rea­son, which Schutz among others" hasdescribed. As he puts it, "equal opportu­nity in the objective sense, that is, theexact correspondence of highest qualifi­cations for any given position, is imp ossi-

18 See, for example, Herbert Kohl , 36 Chil­dren (Ne w York: New America n Librar y, 1967 ) .

,. See, for example, My ron Lieberman," Equal ity of Educational Oppor tunity," in B.

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330 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY [March

ble ... There are ... always more per­sons qualified for superior positions thanthere are superior positions.'!" To whichit can be added, as previously noted,that to seek the best qualified person forevery position in society would proveenormously inefficient; often it makesgood sense simply to take the first per­son who comes along, whose chief quali­fication is his availability-a qualificationgenerally kept distinct from consider­ations of merit.

Not only is the provision of objectiveequality of opportunity impossible, evenattempts to move in that direction are ofquestionable desirability. This has beenillustrated by many of the attempts toabolish patterns of racial segregation oc­curring in the public schools as a resultof residential patterns. A recent ex­ample" occurred as the result of a planof an urban school district to achieve ra­cial balance in its elementary schools.The plan called for closing a school lo­cated in a black neighborhood, the stu­dent body of which is almost exclusivelyNegro, and distributing the former stu­dents of this school to seven predomi­nantly white schools. Many residents ofthe Negro neighborhood were under­standably upset by the plan. They fore­saw that their children were likely togain little in the way of a subjectivesense of improved opportunity vis aviswhite children from a plan the primary

Othanel Smith and Robert Ennis (eds.), Lan­guage and Concepts in Education (Chicago:Rand McNally, 1961).

20 Schutz, op. cit ., pp. 270-27 I.

21 The plan of the Jefferson County, Ken­tucky Board of Education involved closing theNewburg Elementary School, whose previous en­rollment had been predominantly Negro, at thebeginning of the school year 1971-72.

purpose of which was to meet Federalrequirements for desegregation of pre­viously segregated schools. It wouldseem that the way to forestall dilemmasof this nature would be to establish asthe criteria for equality of opportunitythe subjective experiences of studentsand their parents rather than the racialcomposition of the school. There is aneed, therefore, to explore how the for­mer might be identified and made thecriterion for equality of educational op­portunity.

Schutz's analysis contributes one fur­ther insight into the nature of equal op­portunity, viz., why it is that peoplegenerally are satisfied with the provisionof objective equality of opportunityrather than its subjective counterpart.Schutz points out that what the individ­ual desires for himself is not equal op­portunity, but unique opportunities, i.e.,those open to him by virtue of theunique individual he is, rather than forhis ability to meet criteria set for the posi­tion available.

Although the two are not necessarilyincompatible, a person, for example,may be the only one who possesses thedesired set of criteria-a person's sensethat an opportunity is unique to him isan important "plus" which brings itcloser to a personal ideal: "They wantme for myself." This reflects the indi­vidual's concept of himself as somethingmore than the sum of roles and typifica­tions he plays for others. Personaluniqueness is central to the phenomenol­ogy of the individual; and justice forthose who see themselves as unique re­quires that they be afforded unique op­portunities.

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Equality of opportunity, therefore, isvalued for others rather than for onself;and hence it has been understood objec­tively in preference to subjectively. Theprovision of equal opportunity assuresthe individual that the social system hemakes use of in the attempt to findunique opportunities for himself is none­theless fair, in that all others have thesame chance to pursue opportunities inkeeping with their uniqueness.

The situation is different, however, incases where the typification of the indi­vidual places him in a category whichoverwhelms his personal uniqueness. Inthe case of members of groups typicallydiscriminated against in a culture, objec­tive equality of opportunity is notenough; it fails to achieve the value it isintended to have because it is not sus­tained on the subjective level. Its valueis limited to that of serving as a constantreminder that a degree of equality isnecessary in order to provide justice tothe discriminated-against group. It is arelatively easy thing to achieve the shellof objective equality of opportunitywithout meeting the emotional needs ofmembers of the discriminated-againstgroup.

This was the situation in American so­ciety during the decades in which thedoctrine of "separate, but equal" institu­tions formed the basis for social policies.It is very likely the situation in the apar­theid society of South Africa today. Byproviding "matching" public facilitiesfor the use of Negroes, the white major­ity (in the case of the United States)strove to provide justice for all bymeans of what white South Africans to­day refer to as "separate development."

Conceivably, facilities ofthis kind couldbe made objectively equal withouttouching the problem of the subjectiveexperience of equal opportunity on thepart of Negroes. So long as this is thecase, the issue of equal opportunity re­mains unsettled, as the American na­tional experience suggests.

The attention raised by the continu­ing call for equality of opportunity onthe part of members of a discriminated­against group threatens the pursuit ofunique opportunities by one who is not amember of such a group. The latterstarts from a position of relative advan­tage in pursuing his unique opportuni­ties. If he admits the claims of the dis­criminated-against group, his advanta­geous educational opportunities couldthen be seen to fit the model of specialpreparation on the basis of his specialtype, rather than that of the broader ed­ucational goal of equal opportunity forall.

For example, if public schools aredominated by the middle-class attitudewhich tends to regard children fromfamilies living in relative poverty aseducational misfits in comparison withtheir colleagues from middle-classhomes, the effect is to make the publicschools training grounds for the middleclass rather than institutions for provid­ing broad equality of opportunity forchildren from all socio-economic classes.Schools of this kind would be similar inthis regard to the schools of ancientGreek city states, which were intendedto prepare children of the citizen classfor their class-defined roles of the gover­nance and defense of the state. While itwould be a gross over-generalization to

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332 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

make this charge against all Americanpublic schools, I think that there can belittle doubt that it is a factor in the fail­ure of man y public schools to providethe experience of subjective equality ofopportunity to children from discrimi­nated-against groups, such as that of"the poor," generall y.

The pursuit of equality of educationalopportunity, therefore, challenges allmembers of a society to penetrate be­neath the provision of objective equalityof opportunity in order to comprehendthe kind of subjective equality of oppor­tunity which members of a discrimi­nated-against group are demanding.This involves acknowledging the in­compatibility of education for special oc­cupation al status with the provi sion ofeducation for equal opportunity, so longas there are discriminated-against groupswithin the society .

A narrowly "objective" perspectiveon social events and personal experi ­ences makes each of these moves exceed­ingl y difficult. It encourages individualsto regard both their own situation andthat of othe rs from a "third-person"perspective. For example, the personwho does not regard himself as a mem­ber of a discriminated-again st group hasalr eady rationalized for himself the jus­tice and objectively equal opportunitythat the system by which he lives pro­vides . Therefore, his response to a chal­lenge to the justice of the system on thepart of one who considers himself to bea member of a discriminated-againstgroup is predictable. Given the culturalpremium currently placed on "objectiv­ity," his tendency will be to respond

with the objective evidence of equal op­portunity, rather than attempt to under­stand the situation from the perspectiveof the other. "T aking the per spective ofthe other," is a move that is not sanc­tioned in most current scientific method­ologies, since it is not arrived at fromthe third-person perspective; that is, theperspective of the impartial observer.Rather, it is a necessary corollary to theperspective of one who is emotionallyfully committed.

Phenomenological method has beenused extensively to describe reality fromthe per spective of the subject ( which in­cludes elements of will, emotion, andcognition) intending its objective world.It is my supposition that th is should bethe starting point for an inquiry th at in­volves taking the perspective of theother as subject. It is the capacity of peo­ple to view themselves as objects fromthe subjective perspective of otherswhich enables awareness of the subject­object relationship: A per son is immedi­atel y aware of the discrepancy betweenthe object he is for others and what he isas the subjective center of his own real­ity. The first-person perspective is there­fore coextensive with the second-personperspective, i.e., the perspective of theother with whom I am in intimate rela­tionship; who judges me as objectivefrom the perspective of his own emo­tions, will, and cognition.

Until members of society generallyacquire the capacity to take the second­person perspective in order to evaluatethe opportunities available in their soci­ety, the basic demand s for equality ofopportunity will remain unfulfilled.

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