enter the dragon: inside chinese human smuggling organizations

ENTER THE DRAGON: INSIDE CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS*

SHELDON ZHANG San Diego State University

Rutgers University KO-LIN CHIN

This paper examines the inner workings of Chinese human smuggling organizations. Contrary to widely held conceptions about Chi- nese organized crime, most alien smugglers are otherwise ordinary citizens whose familial networks and fortuitous social contacts have enabled them to pool resources to transport human cargoes around the world. They come from diverse backgrounds and form temporary alliances to carry out smuggling operations. With the exception of a shared commitment to making money, little holds them together. The smuggling organizations mostly resemble ad hoc task forces and are assembled for specific operations. These organizations have clear divi- sions of labor with limited hierarchical structures. We discuss the theoretical implications of their unique organizational characteristics.

KEYWORDS Chinese organized crime, human smuggling, transnational crime, Chinese criminality.

For decades, literature on Chinese organized crime, although not much, has largely been dominated by research on triad-type secret societies, which are alleged to be the largest, most dangerous, and globally organized crime groups (Black, 1992; Booth, 1999; Bresler, 1981; Chu, 2000; Morgan, 1960). More than a decade ago, Posner (1988:261) quoted a police chief in California as saying that Chinese triads are well on their way to dominating the underworld in both Europe and America and that “they will make the Sicilian Mafia look like a bunch of Sunday-school kids.” Other scholars and law enforcement agencies, in anticipation of the transfer of the former British colony Hong Kong to China, predicted a massive influx of organized crime groups of all sizes and types (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995). These crime groups have gained much notoriety in recent decades in transnational criminal activities such as extortion, gambling, heroin trafficking, counterfeiting, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering, and they have caused great concern to law enforcement and government officials in the United States, Canada, Australia,

* Support for this study was provided by a grant from the National Institute of Justice (1999-IJ-CX-0028). We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the policies or views of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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and much of Europe (Black, 1992; Booth. 1999; Chin, 1990, 1996: Chu, 2000; Dubro, 1992; Kleinknecht, 1996).

In the present study, however, we have found an entirely different breed of organized Chinese criminals who have come to dominate one particular criminal enterprise-transnational human smuggling. Contrary to widely held conceptions about Chinese organized crime, human smugglers have formed organizations that deviate significantly from those of traditional triad societies. In this paper, we will examine the characteristics of human smuggling organizations and explore how these enterprising entities have developed unique organizational and operational attributes to achieve optimal efficiency in the face of uncertain market conditions.

The illegal entry of Chinese nationals to the United States is not new (Tsai, 1986); however, organized Chinese human smuggling is a recent development. Since 1978, when the United States established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (Fairbank, 1983), Chinese nationals have resumed their flow of immigration to America (Zhou, 1992). Because of limited immigration quota for Chinese nationals, few have the legitimate opportunity to immigrate to the United States. Conse- quently, illegal channels are developed by human smugglers to meet the demand (Chin. 1999). Economic growth, greater commercial exchanges, easier travel between countries, and the proliferation of telecommunica- tion devices have provided a global environment conducive to population mobility and increased opportunities for organized criminals (Williams, 1994; Zhang, 1997; Zhang and Gaylord, 1996). As Passas (2000) and Wil- liams ( 1994) pointed out, increased transnational commerce works to reduce social controls but also enhances cross-border criminal activities.

Human smugglers or “snakeheads,” as they are referred to both in China and among overseas Chinese communities, have remained the most elusive element in the research on Chinese human smuggling. Aside from sporadic news media stories and government documents, there have only been a handful of studies in the past decade on Chinese illegal immigration (see Chin, 1999: Kwong, 1997; Myers, 1992, 1994, 1996; Smith, 1997; Wang, 1996; Zhang, 1997; Zhang and Gaylord, 1996).

There are three major strategies for smuggling Chinese nationals into the United States. One strategy has been to enter Mexico or Canada “by some means” and then illegally cross the borders into the United States (Asimov and Burdman, 1993). A second strategy involves flying into the United States either directly or via several transit points outside China. Following a third strategy, a large number of Chinese are smuggled into the United States in fishing trawlers or freighters (Myers, 1992; Zhang and Gaylord, 1996). The use of air routes, far less hazardous and torturous than the fishing trawlers, has become the preferred choice of transportation for entering the United States by those with connections and financial

CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLING 739

resources. The sea route, now reserved mostly for the peasantry and villag- ers from small townships, is usually considered unacceptable to many urban dwellers and better-educated would-be “smugglees.”

Nobody knows how many illegal Chinese immigrants enter the United States each year. Estimates have varied tremendously, depending on the sources of information. Hood (1993) estimated that more than a half-million Chinese were smuggled into the United States since 1984. Myers (1994) estimated that anywhere between 50,000 to 100,000 Chinese nationals enter the United States illegally each year. American officials claim that the Chinese smuggling rings have connections in 51 countries that are either part of the transportation web or are involved in manufacturing fraudulent travel documents, or both (Freedman, 1991; Mydans, 1992). According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S. INS), more than 100,000 Chinese nationals are currently stashed away in countries around the world, waiting to complete their journeys to the United States or other Western countries (Thompson, 2000). Few doubt the mag- nitude of the social and legal ramifications were the influx of illegal immigrants to continue unchecked from the world’s most populous nation.

The U.S. government in recent years has mobilized its resources from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Coast Guards to high- tech underwater listening devices and overseas diplomatic posts to curb the influx of illegal Chinese aliens (Gross, 1996; Marquis and Garvin, 1999; Offley and Connelly, 1999). But the wave of Chinese nationals entering the United States illegally does not appear to be ebbing. The recent death of 58 illegal Chinese immigrants inside a refrigerator truck in Dover, England (Woods, 2000) is an example of the aggressiveness of the smuggling organizations and the resolve of those yearning to reach the foreign shore.

THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME

Traditionally there are two views on the structure of criminal organizations. One, shared by many scholars and law enforcement agencies, describes organized crime groups as a hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic structure similar to that of a modern corporation, such as the Mafia (Abadinsky, 1990; Cressey, 1969). Like their legitimate counterparts, these groups seek to monopolize criminal enterprises by expanding in size and forming large cartels of national and international scope. They operate gambling casinos, prostitution rings, drug trafficking, and offshore banks (Block and Scarpitti, 1986). In some cases, such as in Italy and the republics of the former USSR, crime syndicates have developed a symbi- otic relationship with the government to the point that they gradually assume political and administrative functions (Jennings, 1993; Marotta,

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1997; Nikiforov, 1993). There is a clear division of labor and chain of command; tasks and responsibilities are assigned according to members’ skills and abilities; rules and regulations govern members’ activities; and membership is restricted.

Much of the discourse on Chinese crime organizations follows the traditional school of thought in mainstream criminology, which, perhaps articu- lated best by Donald Cressey (1969), describes organized crime as corporate-like entities that are hierarchically structured with a clear division of labor, such as the Mafia and Colombian drug cartels. Similar to the Italian crime families (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999), many triad societies, while operating independently, share a common and consistent internal composition: They are all characterized by a rigid hierarchical structure surrounded by an extreme emphasis on secrecy. “Godfathers” at the top of the organizational structure direct local and overseas branches to engage in a variety of criminal activities (Black, 1992; Booth, 1990). Although contemporary triad societies are said to be far more fragmented than their traditional counterparts, they still possess well-defined organizational structures with at least five levels of hierarchy and clearly assigned roles and responsibilities at each level (see Chu, 2000:27-28). These organizations are governed by rules, and members are recruited through ritual- ized procedures.

The other view argues that the concept of organized crime should be abandoned in favor of an “enterprise model” (Block and Chambliss, 1981; Passas and Nelken, 1993; Van-Duyne, 1997). This model suggests flexible and adaptive networks that can easily expand and contract to deal with the uncertainties of the criminal enterprise. The entrepreneurs are organized only to the extent that they can effectively carry out illicit activities, which is a utilitarian or rational behavior, as the economists have advocated (Reuter, 1983; Savona, 1990). A number of studies have focused on the entrepreneurial nature of organized crime and described the transitory alliances of bold risk-takers who seize opportunities to make large profits on their investments (Dobinson, 1993; Potter, 1994). Apart from a rela- tively small core group, most associates are brought in as needed to provide special services.

To reconcile these two different perspectives on the structure of organized crime, Hagan (1983) and Smith (1980) argued that the continuum perspective is more conducive to our understanding of organized crime. Criminal organizations respond to varying market demands by contracting or expanding in size; their organizational structures are shaped by external social-legal factors rather than by design. Certain crime groups, such as those involved in construction or gambling businesses, may require an elaborate hierarchy and clear division of labor. These are necessary organizational prerequisites to remain viable in the illicit business. On the

CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLING 74 1

other hand, crime groups such as those involved in pawnshops and the fencing of stolen goods must respond rapidly to changing demands in the street and, therefore, require little or no formal organizational structure. It is clear that the two major schools on the nature of organized crime describe realities that stand at opposite ends of a continuum.

Based on his survey in New York, Chin (1999) found that illegal immigrants often grouped smugglers into two categories: big snakeheads and little snakeheads. In general, big snakeheads invest money in and oversee smuggling operations. They are often overseas Chinese and seldom known to the people who are being smuggled. Little snakeheads work mainly as middlemen or recruiters. They usually live in and around the sending communities in China and are mainly responsible for signing up clients and collecting down payments. Big snakeheads are often perceived as capable business people with power, wealth, formidable reputations, and connections.

Most believe that organized crime groups are behind most smuggling activities because moving human cargoes across the Pacific or other conti- nents requires a global network of committed individuals (U.S. Senate, 1992; Zhang, 1997). In other words, human smuggling requires organizational structures and sets of activities, not just individual endeavors. Amer- ican law enforcement agencies operate under two similar assumptions (Thompson, 2000). First, an elaborate international network exists to facilitate the transport of Chinese nationals via various transit points, and many people of prominent backgrounds, including high-ranking government officials, are involved in the process. Second, Chinese human smugglers are connected with traditional crime organizations such as Hong Kong-based triads and U.S.-based tongs and gangs. Despite their clear policy implications, these assumptions and speculations are made with little empirical evidence.

Much of the information about smuggling activities as presented in government reports and news media as well as a few research papers is based on interviews with illegal Chinese immigrants. Systematic gathering of information directly from the smugglers about their organizations and operations has thus far not been attempted. This is partly because human smuggling, except in the very limited context such as the Chinese, has not been a traditional choice of business for organized criminals. More impor- tantly, illegal Chinese immigrants have largely been “invisible,” due to lin- guistic and cultural barriers erected by the Chinese enclaves.

In our effort to uncover the attributes of Chinese human smuggling organizations, we hope to build on current knowledge of the structure of criminal organizations, to expand, and even to explore alternative conceptual models that can adequately explain why and how snakeheads assume roles or perform functions that are imperative to this illicit business.

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METHOD

The data for this paper were obtsined through structured interviews with 90 individuals who were directly involved in organizing and transporting Chinese nationals to the United States (i.e., snakeheads).

SITE SELECTION

We selected three primary sites for data collection-New York City, Los Angeles, and Fuzhou, China. New York City was selected because the majority of undocumented Fujianese eventually settle in New York City’s Chinatown (Myers, 1994; U.S. Senate, 1992). It is the most common final destination for illegal Chinese immigrants from Fujian province. New York’s Chinatown is a well-established social and commercial center for newly arrived Chinese immigrants (Loo, 1991; Zhou, 1992).

Los Angeles is a major port of entry for illegal Chinese, regardless of how they enter the United States (Chin, 1999). It has also become a major final destination for illegal Chinese immigrants, especially the non-Fuji- anese. For smuggled Chinese who fly to the United States, the Los Ange- les International Airport (LAX) is a common destination. For illegal Chinese who are smuggled across the Mexican border, most arrive in Los Angeles before they are transported to New York or other parts of the country. For those coming by the ocean route, ports near Los Angeles with their many container yards are often used for unloading purposes.

Fuzhou, with a population of more than 5.4 million, is the capital city of China’s Fujian Province, which directly faces Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. The city and its adjacent counties have long been the center of the sending community. It has been estimated by the U.S. law enforcement agencies that up to 90 percent of all illegal Chinese immigrants have originated from this region (Hood, 1993).

SUBJECT SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION

In this study, a smuggler (or “snakehead”) was defined as anyone who played an active role in assisting a person to enter the United States illegally for a fee. Because of the clandestine nature of the smuggling business, we used ethnographic strategies such as community contacts and the snowballing technique to reach our subject population. As budgeted in our grant, we offered $75.00 per subject for a completed interview, which was significantly higher than any of our previous projects involving primary data collection. However, this amount was found far from sufficient to entice potential subjects to come forward. Most of those who agreed to


talk to us refused to accept the payment. Those who declined to be inter- viewed said the money was not worth the risk or their time. We subse- quently used the money to purchase food and drinks to facilitate the interviews.

The snakeheads in our study were all self-identified human smugglers residing in either China or the United States. Two types of interviews were conducted-72 formal interviews in which a consistent protocol was followed with semistructured questions, and 18 informal interviews, which were essentially social conversations that occurred in places where formal questioning was neither appropriate nor possible, such as at social gather- ings or restaurants where other parties were present. The interviews (or conversations) revolved around five main themes, in addition to standard demographic questions-( 1) the initial entry into the business; (2) current smuggling practices; (3) interactions and affiliations of key players in the smuggling network; (4) relationship with government and law enforcement officials; and ( 5 ) views on smuggling as a business. Field observations were also conducted in the sending communities in China and the receiving communities in the United States.

Other sources of data included U.S. government documents, as well as news reports, feature articles, and editorials published in the English and Chinese language press around the world (mostly from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, the United States, Canada, and Australia).

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

A study of this nature faces many challenges in terms of validity and reliability. After all, our subjects had little to gain by telling us about their business and much to lose if the information they provided wound up in the hands of law enforcement agencies. Several strategies were employed in this study to increase the validity and reliability of the data.

Our focal concern was on building trust and confidence in our subjects. We spent many months in the field to meet and talk to human smugglers. Although skeptical at first, many became convinced that our guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality were sincere. Because our profession (i.e., being a college professor) garners special prestige and respect in Chinese culture, many of our subjects were willing to “teach” us about their trade expertise once their suspicion subsided.

Another factor that helped us gain trust from our potential subjects was the various guanxi that we had cultivated in our previous research projects in the Chinese communities.’ By using our social resources and language

1. Guanxi can be loosely translated into English as “relationships” or “connections,” except that it is often a complex social protocol. The practice of giianxi to a Chinese is similar to the American idiom of “pulling strings.” One’s social standing can

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ability to assist our subjects in dealing with the mainstream society, we made several “friends” who later provided us with valuable information about smuggling operations. After all, human smuggling is essentially a business built on a myriad of guanxi. By tapping into this common cultural practice of guanxi, we were able to gain trust and confidence from our subjects.

Our hired interviewers, on the other hand, provided a vital access to a wider smuggler population with their extensive network in the Chinese communities. The four interviewers (two in New York and two in Los Angeles) recruited for this project were themselves at one time or another involved in human smuggling activities. We were able to reach a much larger population through their direct connections in the communities. Because our interviewers knew the subjects personally, spoke the same dialect, and lived in the same community, it required much less time to build sufficient trust and confidence to allow the interview to take place.

Internal validity was further strengthened by our cross-checking the data obtained from formal interviews against those of informal interviews and our field observations. Most of the questions in our interview instru- ment were constructed to reflect our knowledge of the human smuggling business based on our previous studies. In other words, we were not navi- gating in an entirely foreign territory.

Unlike interviews with subjects from a geographically concentrated location (such as drug dealers from the neighborhood or gang members from the same street corner) where subjects know one another and may share information about the type of questions asked or information sought by the researchers (see Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2000), all the formal interviews in this study were scheduled and conducted individu- ally with no one else knowing when, where, or whether the conversation would take place. Most of our informal interviews were either conducted spontaneously or scheduled, depending on the availability of the subjects, without the knowledge of their referrals. Therefore, it would be all but impossible for our subjects to conspire to mislead us.

Although we can never rule out the possibility that some of our subjects lied to us or told untrue stories, the methods employed in this study were probably the only viable way to gain entrance into the secret world of human smuggling.

Reliability, however, is more problematic in the present study, in which

also be defined by the extent of one’s guanxi. The maintenance of guanxi is a never- ending process of giving and receiving favors, which often becomes the binding element in one’s social network.


much of the data are based solely on confidential interviews or conversations. Repeated interviews or conversations over time with the same subject were not only unrealistic, but also prohibitively expensive. The fact that responses from our subjects (based on both formal interviews and informal conversations) became repetitive and patterned gave us confidence that the data are reliable. Still, such repetition could have resulted from the artifact of the sampling design (Jacobs, 1996). Findings from this study must therefore be read with caution and should be verified with other sources of information.

As for external validity, we are fully aware of the many limitations in the use of personal contacts and the snowball-sampling technique (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). To increase the representativeness of our subject sample, we strove to (1) interview smugglers specialized in different stages of smuggling operations (e.g., recruiters, transporters, and debt collectors); (2) recruit subjects at multiple sites (i.e., New York, Los Ange- les, and Fuzhou); (3) include smugglers specialized in different smuggling schemes (e.g., fraudulent marriages, business delegations, and passport substitution); and (4) solicit both retired and active smugglers. Despite these deliberate efforts to capture a wide variety of smugglers, the findings reported in this paper should be considered exploratory in nature.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

The majority of our subjects were male (82%) and with an education of high school or less (87%), as shown in Table 1. They were generally in their 30s and 40s (76%) and married (75%). The majority of them (70%) described themselves as either unemployed or self-employed. As we found out later, those unemployed were mostly self-employed. They are called unemployed only in the sense that they did not have salaried jobs, and it would be hard for them to describe where they drew their income. They were not destitute by any means.

FINDINGS SMUGGLERS AND THEIR DEMOGRAPHICS

We have found a wide range of backgrounds of those participating in human smuggling. Our subjects included government officials, police officers, small business owners, housewives, handymen, masons, taxi driv- ers, massage parlor owners, fast food restaurant owners, fruit stand owners, and gang members. As one of our subjects described:

It’s not easy to define a “snakehead.” Not only are many government officials working with the snakeheads, some snakeheads are people who have been smuggled abroad. Like a friend of mine who went to Japan as a foreign student-he paid a snakehead a lot of money to

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Table 1. Demographics of Snakehead Subjects

Interview Format (1) Formal (2) Informal

Total (N) Gender

(1) Male (2) Female

Total ( N ) Age

(1) 21-30 (2) 31-40 (3) 41-50 (4) 50 and over

Total ( N )

(1) Grade school (2) Middle school (3) High school (4) College

Total ( N ) Employment Status

Education

(1) Full-time employed (2) Part-time employed (3) Self-employed (4) Unemployed ( 5 ) Retired

Total ( N ) Marital Status

(1) Married (2) Single (3) Divorcedheparated (4) Other

Total (N)

Frequency Percent

72 18

(90)

74 16

(90)

11 20 39 11

(81)

22 1

32 31 4

(90)

65 16 5 1

(87)

82.2 17.8

(100)

13.6 45.5 30.7 10.2

(loo)

13.6 24.7 48.1 13.6

(100)

24.4 1.1

34.4 35.6 4.4

(100)

74.7 18.4 5.7 1.1

(100)

achieve that goal. When he got there, he worked for a bakery store. After he befriended his boss, he came back to recruit people to go to Japan as students and arrange for them to work in his boss’s bakery store. His goal is simply to earn back the money he had initially spent for his trip to Japan.


If our subjects were diverse in their social backgrounds, their contacts were even more so. We soon came to the realization that human smuggling, as complex and daring as it might have been portrayed by the news media, was essentially a frontier enterprise that just about anyone with the right connections and “guts” could participate in.

Because the connection between Chinese human smuggling and triad societies has long been a subject of speculation by the news media and law enforcement agencies (Bolz, 1995; Thompson, 2000; U.S. Senate, 1992), a main area of inquiry in this study was to find out if our subjects were members of organized crime groups. Thus far, we have not found any clear evidence of a connection between human smugglers and traditional Chi- nese crime groups in the United States or elsewhere. Of the 90 subjects in our sample, only three claimed to be members of criminal organizations. One claimed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based crime group (the subject declined to provide the specific organization’s name), one was a member of the Canal Boys (or Born-to-Kill), a New York Chinatown gang, and another claimed to be a retired member of the Fuk Ching gang, also in New York. None were participating in the smuggling activities on behalf of their gangs. On the contrary, we found that the majority of our subjects took efforts not to entangle themselves with street gangs or other crime groups in the Chinese community. However, this does not mean that none of the smugglers have access to gangs when the situation calls for it. After all, illicit transactions are full of contingencies and uncertainties and the only insurance one can obtain is to have someone willing to use violence to enforce an illegal contract. When asked what she would do if her client were to back out of a deal, one of our subjects (who specialized in fraudulent marriages in Los Angeles) said:

I am not afraid. I know these people well, where they live and work. I always have a receipt from people who receive money from me. If a client fails to live up to her end of the agreement, I will have to ask her to return the money. I don’t worry a bit about not getting my money back. I have someone who is a Vietnamese gang member and I will ask him to pay her a visit. I can also ask him and his friends to visit her husband’s work place to spread words about his wife owing me money. I believe she will pay me quickly. But I don’t like to use these debt collectors. They charge 50% of the collected money. That’s why I always tell my clients that they will have to pay me double if they ever back out of a deal.

Although we were unable to substantiate whether her story was a bluff or real, we knew that she never had to use her connection with the Vietnamese gang to extract any payments. Nor did we hear anyone else in our sample having to use street gangs to settle transaction disputes among

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fellow smugglers. Nonetheless, despite occasional claims of access to gangs, we did not find evidence to suggest that traditional Chinese crime groups were actively involved in human smuggling as a group. We found instead that snakeheads were mostly private citizens who converged to take advantage of the market opportunity and utilized their resources, mostly in the form of guanxi, to make money by transporting Chinese nationals to a destination country of their choice (in this case, the United States).

COMMAND CENTERS

Following the U.S. law enforcement agencies’ main focus on seeking out the big snakeheads, we were also interested in learning who these big snakeheads were and where they tended to conduct their business. Although we did not find a clear distinction among our subjects between big snakeheads versus little snakeheads (as Chin had found in his 1993 survey in New York), we were aware that some of our subjects were more successful than others. It appeared that the risk-profit ratio followed the fundamental rule of a market economy. Those who invested most in smuggling operations were also the ones to make the most money, whereas many others were merely playing auxiliary roles by recruiting clients and making referral fees.

We were somewhat baffled by the whereabouts of big snakeheads. Although most of our subjects agreed that big snakeheads would not deal with clients directly and would only coordinate smuggling operations from behind the scenes, they also believed that the big players lived on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. When we were in Fuzhou, the majority of snakeheads as well as local law enforcement officials told us that most big snakeheads were overseas Chinese who would remotely control the operation from outside China, such as in the United States. One ranking police officer in a local police agency told us:

I don’t think the big snakeheads get involved in detailed operations. They are mostly in the United States and control the operation from there. At most, they might be in Taiwan or Thailand. Here in Fujian, the snakeheads are mostly low-level operatives who have little knowledge of the entire operation. Those are the ones we tend to catch.

Another high-ranking police official working directly in the anti-smuggling unit under the provincial Police Department also concurred with this observation. He said all they were able to catch were little snakeheads working for their bosses overseas:

The big snakeheads were better informed, equipped, and connected than the law enforcement agency. Long before we can get close to them, they will vanish. The tips we have received are mostly little


snakeheads. The biggest snakehead we ever caught was someone who organized a 7-people delegation to Vietnam on fraudulent passports.

It appears logical to assume that most big-time players must be either United States citizens or green card holders because the freedom to travel is vital in organizing transnational activities. Consequently, their permanent residence would likely be outside China, as one of our snakehead subjects informed us:

Most snakeheads I know are either American citizens or green card holders. Once there is a problem with their operations, they immedi- ately leave China. There is no way the Chinese authorities can catch them.

On the other hand, being a U.S. citizen or green card holder does not preclude the possibility that the snakehead may spend more time in China than in the United States. Our informants in the United States as well as the anti-smuggling agents of the U.S. INS repeatedly claimed that big snakeheads were mostly in China, not in the United States. These contra- dictory claims on the whereabouts of snakeheads only illustrate the complexity and clandestine nature of the smuggling enterprise. Even the definition of a big snakehead is somewhat difficult to construct. The U.S. law enforcement agencies have a list of so-called big snakeheads, and so do their counterparts in China. The recent arrest of Cheng Chui-Ping (or Sister Ping) in Hong Kong was hailed as a major victory scored by U.S. law enforcement (Barnes, 2000). Cheng, a woman in her early 50s, was alleg- edly involved in the 1993 Golden Venture incident, in which a boat carrying more than 260 Chinese aliens ran aground in New York’s Long Island and 10 drowned while trying to swim ashore. U.S. law enforcement considered her the Mother of All Snakeheads (Barnes, 2000:48); however, our informants in China and the United States claimed that she was probably more successful in her underground banking business than in moving human cargoes. Several currently active snakeheads disputed her reputation as the biggest snakehead and told us that Sister Ping’s reputation was probably ahead of her capability. As one of our informants said:

Sister Ping was fortunate because she got in the smuggling business early. But her reputation was much louder than her actual ability. She was only successful for a short while in the early 1990s, but her days are long gone. I know people in Fuzhou right now who are far more successful than Sister Ping and have made an enormous amount of money.

The definitional issue of who is a snakehead has several empirical and theoretical implications. It affects the direction of our future research effort, providing an indication as to whether market consolidation or monopolization is occurring in the smuggling industry. It appears at this

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point that the size of a smuggling organization depends heavily on the resources each snakehead brings forward. Those who can travel in and out of China, those who have connections with government agencies, and those who have established stable contacts in transit countries are more likely to engage in large-scale and continuous operations. These smugglers can be viewed as big snakeheads. Other smugglers, such as those who live in or near the sending communities, are probably small operatives because of their limited ability to travel and inability to form extensive alliances or develop smuggling routes.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

From our many conversations and interactions with Chinese human smugglers, we have found that the best way to describe smuggling organizations is that they are amorphous. Although Chinese human smuggling rings have been previously described as complex and highly organized (see Bolz, 1995; Hood, 1993; Myers, 1992, 1994), we have not been able to establish any clear hierarchical order resembling that of a formal social organization. Although we talked to a few successful snakeheads, none would consider themselves as occupying a commanding position in their smuggling network and able to exercise a high level of authority. They would describe themselves as working with their “friends.”

Structurally, a smuggling network can best be viewed as a task force, committed to one task or one operation at a time-that is, to deliver their clients to their destiny and get paid. These task forces are generally small in number, with a core membership of no more than three or four individuals. Smugglers in a task force mostly knew one another in their previous social interactions, either through their family networks or business deal- ings. Although sharing a common ancestry, speaking the same Chinese dialect, or growing up in the same township may increase the shared understandirgs and expectations of the tasks at hand among smugglers, these are not prerequisites for taking part in a smuggling operation. The alliance was a business arrangement involving only those who had valuable resources to contribute. Although it appeared that the more resources a partner brought forth, the more he or she may have influenced the direction and pace of a smuggling operation, we did not discover anyone able to play the role of a godfather whose orders and wishes were to be respected and carried out without question. Smuggling tasks appeared to be carried out solely based on a shared commitment to the eventual profit rather than out of deference to any hierarchy or organizational needs. In fact, most smuggling activities that came to our attention were surprisingly loosely connected in their organizational characteristics and uneventful in their operations. As one snakehead in Fuzhou told us:

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The smuggling network is not a hierarchy. There are big and small snakeheads. They work together. There is cooperation among them but there’s also a one-man show. I don’t think anyone can order people to do anything in this business. At least I have never heard of any.

Although there was little hierarchical differentiation, the division of labor was well developed among smugglers at different levels. All individuals involved in a smuggling operation had a specific function to fulfill, such as travel document procurement, client recruitment, and meeting and delivering clients to safe houses, which was probably another reason that hierarchy was not clearly evident, as one snakehead in Los Angeles said:

Everyone is useful in his own way and does only his own thing. We don’t need leadership in our group. We each do our own thing and you can’t cut me out because only I know where to get what you need.

Consequently, many role imperatives have emerged in smuggling operations to carry out highly specialized tasks. We have identified the following categories of roles in smuggling operations:

Recruiters. These were often the relatives or close friends of the would- be migrants who somehow knew the smugglers. They may or may not have any further involvement in the smuggling operation. For each referral, they make a fee of about $2,000. As one of our subjects in a village near Fuzhou told us:

The local snakeheads all have bosses behind them. They are responsible for recruiting people in China and I don’t think they plny any role in the operations outside of China. I mean, these local snakeheads have very little education, have never traveled abroad, and do not speak any English. That’s why it’s hard to imagine that they play any role in overseas operations. There are a lot of these middlemen (recruiters). They make $2,000 per recruit. If there is more than one middleman involved, the $2,000 will be shared among the two. The middleman who knows the big snakehead will get the $2,000 from the big snakehead and it will be up to that person to decide how much he/ she wants to pay the other middleman.

Coordinators. These were the central figures in smuggling operations; however, they had nothing more than the right connections to acquire necessary services for a fee. Their survival was dependent on a dyadic relationship with other partners who would provide them with specific services. As one such coordinator told us in Fuzhou:

I do only direct flight. My customers fly from China to NYC or Van- couver using photo-sub foreign passports. They do not need to spend any time in transit points. I demand $55,000 per person, and I use

ZHANG AND CHIN

about $15,000 for bribery. Otherwise, it won’t be that easy to have my clients pass through various customs and checkpoints.

Transporters. When an immigrant was to leave China by land or by ship, a China-based transporter would help him or her get to the border or to the smuggling ship. Transporters based in the United States would be responsible for taking smuggled immigrants from airports or seaports to safe houses. A subject in Los Angeles told us that he was once a transporter:

After a boat reached the U.S. shore, I would move the illegal migrants to an apartment that I had already rented. I would provide them food and clothing, and then get in touch with the snakeheads in New York to find out if any of the migrants had paid up their smuggling fees. As soon as the fees were paid, I would drive them to the airport in Los Angeles to fly to New York. What happened after they got to New York was not my business.

Document vendors. These individuals were well connected and able to produce needed documents to facilitate the transportation of aliens. Some of these documents were authentic, obtained through official or unofficial channels, whereas others were outright fraudulent. As one document vendor in New York’s Chinatown told us:

What I do is to help my clients to obtain Indonesian passports. Nor- mally I fly to Jakarta with my clients’ photos and other personal information, and then work with my contacts, who specialize in producing Indonesian passports for overseas Chinese there, for about $10,000 a piece. Next I bring the passports to my clients in China, who will then leave the country as “overseas Chinese” to Indonesia. After they arrive in Indonesia, I will purchase authentic bank deposit certificates, for about $5,000 a piece, from an Indonesian bank, which are used to “prove” my clients’ “assets” in Indonesia. With these bank documents, my clients can then apply for tourist visas to U.S.

Corrupt public officials. Law enforcement authorities in China and many transit countries were paid to aid the illegal Chinese immigrants entering and exiting their countries. As one of our subjects in New York noted:

I used to be a customs inspector in China. I had a good job and comfortable life. But I wanted to make big money and got involved with snakeheads. I became acquainted with a snakehead in 1995 and he asked me to help him with his smuggling business. He paid me $1,000 for each “client.” Each time he would tell me which boat contained his clients and when it was to leave, and I would choose to “inspect” that boat. After I completed the “inspection,” I would write a report confirming that everything was okay. Later my involvement was


found out by the Public Security officials, and I had to ask a smuggler to get me out of China.

Guides and crew members. A guide was someone responsible for moving illegal immigrants from one transit point to another, or for aiding immigrants in entering the United States by land or by air. Crew members were people employed by snakeheads to charter smuggling ships or to work on them. One of our subjects in New York told us:

My contact (the snakehead) gives me instructions to fly to Fuzhou to meet with his clients. I go there and accompany his clients to fly to the U.S. and sometimes to France. We usually leave China from Guangzhou Airport. When we go through the Chinese border control, we stand in the same line. I take the lead and the clients will follow me.

Enforcers. The enforcers, mostly illegal immigrants, were hired by snakeheads to work on the smuggling ships. They were responsible for maintaining order and for distributing food and drinking water. One subject in New York told us:

I only do the smuggling job part time. My snakehead contacts need me because I am a U.S. citizen. It is easy for me to go in and out of China. I fly to China twice a year, usually around February and December. They usually make all the arrangements for me and two to three other enforcers to go to Fuzhou and meet the clients at a certain seaport to board the ship. After we board the ship, we send all the clients down to the cargo hold at the bottom of the ship where we watch them throughout the journey, which usually takes about a month. Once the ship arrives in the U.S., I get paid and go home. The snakeheads pay me $5,000 per trip.

Debt collectors. U.S.-based debt collectors were responsible for locking up illegal immigrants in safe houses until their smuggling fees were paid. There were also China-based debt collectors. These debt collectors sometimes also served as debt reducers depending on which side they were working for. One subject in New York told us:

I do what my snakehead boss tells me to do. That is, I will call the people on a list he gives to me. The list contains the clients’ names, phone numbers, and addresses, and dates when they are supposed to make their payments. I usually give them a phone call first to notify them when and where to make their monthly payment. If some clients fail to show up as they are told, I will wait for them near where they live. When they leave their apartments, I will threaten them or beat them up. I usually go with two or three other people. It is not hard to do. They are illegal immigrants and dare not tell the police.

The specific roles needed for a smuggling operation vary, depending on

754 ZHANG AND CHIN

its complexity and the transportation method. Not all roles were required in an operation, and some snakeheads may assume more than one role. For instance, some smugglers are both coordinators and service providers. These roles usually come in successive stages following the sequence of a smuggling operation, with the recruiter working in the front and the debt collector coming in the end (if there is any payment problem). As one of our subjects in Los Angeles noted:

I don’t always collect debt. I am doing various things to help my friends. Last time I was asked to call on a Taiwanese smuggler to let go his demand for more money from a client of my friend’s. This Taiwanese smuggler first set a price, and then decided to charge more because his group went through a few more countries than he had planned before arriving in the United States. My friend’s client was not happy because of the increased fee and time on the road. His understanding was that the price was for getting the client into the United States regardless of how many countries the Taiwanese smuggler had to go through. So I called this Taiwanese and made a few threats. He got scared and changed all his phone numbers and asked my friend in China to tell me not to call or look for him anymore. I was a negotiator and an enforcer in this case, but I didn’t make any money. I did it just to help out my friend. Who knows? Maybe next time I will need a favor from him.

As a result of these roles in smuggling operations, the service a snakehead provides also tends to be unique and specialized. Redundancy is kept at a minimum. Each snakehead we encountered appeared to have developed his or her own niche in this illicit market over time; some specialized in fraudulent marriages, whereas others would prefer arranging business delegations to the United States. As one snakehead in Fuzhou told us:

The best route nowadays is the pei-du strategy (being a spouse of someone studying abroad). If we can obtain the cooperation of Chi- nese students studying abroad, we can help people to apply for F-2 visas in China. The students just need to send us their information. It will not lead to any problem. Staff at the American counsels won’t bother the applicants, even though these people may not speak a word of English. We are willing to pay those students abroad ten to thirty thousands U.S. dollars, and they don’t even have to come back to China.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SMUGGLING BUSINESS

We have found human smuggling in general to be haphazard in its business formation, irregular in its planning and execution, and uncertain in its


outcomes. Several unique characteristics distinguish Chinese human smuggling from normal legal business transactions.

First, transactions in human smuggling were mostly, if not all, based on verbal agreements between partners. None of our subjects employed formal legal contracts or business procedures to formalize mutual obligations. Payment between smuggling partners was always made in cash, and the amount was rarely disputed. Despite the occasional sensational news cov- erage of failed smuggling operations, the majority of our subjects were able to carry out their operations uneventfully and the smooth transactions between partners reflected a high level of shared understanding and commitment to the eventual goal. As one of our subjects said:

We never enter any written contract with anyone. You are doing business with people you know or your own relatives. If you cheat me once, that will be the end of your reputation. The circle (of smuggling) is not that big and people will know you and people will hear from me.

Second, violence toward fellow snakeheads by other smugglers was rare. Because transactions in illicit businesses are not legally recognized and therefore cannot be legally guaranteed or enforced, violence or intimidation is instrumental in many aspects of traditional organized crime. For instance, violence is often used to maintain order and discipline within a criminal organization, to prevent or settle disputes within or between criminal groups, to silence witnesses, or to eliminate competition (Martin, 1992: Reuter, 1983). Chinese human smuggling, however, did not appear to fit this model. Most of our subjects were aware of the potential problems in payment and service delivery: therefore, various methods of guarantee have emerged to facilitate the transactions. We have uncovered two methods used by human smugglers because of reported fraudulent representations in the smuggling business. To ensure that the service is provided and payment received, fellow snakeheads will go to a bank to open a joint account that will require both signatures to withdraw money. When the operation (or contracted service) is completed, both will go to the bank to settle the payment. Alternatively, a snakehead can open a bank account to deposit the agreed amount of money and then give the passbook to the collaborating partner but not the associated password. Without the password, the partner cannot withdraw the money, but neither can the depositing snakehead make a withdrawal without the passbook. The password is supplied only after the business is completed. Because of the booming economy and rapid financial activities in China, which is still mostly a cash-only society, such bank transactions rarely arouse any suspicion. Furthermore, because most smuggling operations take months, if not years (such as fraudulent marriages), these bank

756 ZHANG AND CHIN

deposits are usually long term and hence are less visible to any official scrutiny.

None of our subjects had ever resorted to violence or intimidation as a measure to guard against unscrupulous fellow smugglers. Although the use of force was often cited as a method of extracting payment from smuggled immigrants (Chin, 1999), perhaps the collective fear of the negative consequences arising from breaching of obligations have kept most snakeheads focused on carrying out their part of the contract. The desire to build and maintain a trustworthy image thus has become a crucial benchmark of success in this business. One full-time snakehead in Fuzhou told us:

People in this business know one another fairly well. Most of them are active in the same place-Fuzhou City. Everybody had his or her own smuggling routes, and sometimes we need to supplement one another to get things done. We (the snakeheads in Fuzhou) sometimes work on our own and sometimes together. We sometimes get into conflicts but we won’t end up having to solve them by force. We are all friends. No one dares to cheat or defraud anyone else. If you dare to do it once, you’d better leave town for good.

Third, self-preservation is pervasive among snakeheads. Because of the risk of detection, arrest, and asset forfeiture, snakeheads have developed several strategies to manage uncertainties inherent in the business. These defense mechanisms include ethnicity (linguistics, ancestry, familial relationships), dyadic business relationship, underground banking, mobile telecommunications, and spontaneous meeting locations. Despite the enormous profits, most subjects in our sample remained extremely cau- tious and conservative in their business approach. As one smuggler in Fuzhou told us:

I only do small-scale human smuggling business because I am not greedy. Some snakeheads, after successfully moving a small number of people out of China, will increase the number of clients they serve significantly the next time, and that’s how they get into trouble. These aggressive snakeheads are mostly young guys. I am more conservative; I don’t get involved if I am not 100 percent sure, nor do I do business with strangers. That’s why I’ve been able to stay in this business for a long time. Of course, after I have saved enough money, I will quit. Come to think of it, why do we have to have so much money? All my children have their own restaurants in the United States; I don’t need to work so hard.

Secrecy was a standard protocol of operation. Our snakehead subjects mostly used mobile phones and pagers to communicate with clients and partners. They would meet in public places first. such as restaurants or


hotel lobbies, and then proceed to mutually comfortable locations to discuss details. Because open advertising is not possible, any networking among snakeheads tends to take place in circumstances and among people where trust can be built quickly, for instance, among members of a family clan or people from the same village. Although personal referrals and “business reputation” are frequently cited as a smuggler’s most valuable asset, most conduct their business transactions in a dyadic manner (i.e., one-on-one). Even partners of the same group withheld details from one another either for self-protection or for fear of being cut out of profit sharing. As one smuggler in Fuzhou told us:

Whenever I want to see my “big brother,” I always call his cell phone. He never tells me where he is except right before our meeting. He calls me and tells me where to meet him and at what time. When I deliver my documents (fraudulent passports) to him, he usually drops them into his briefcase, where I often see dozens of other different passports bundled together. There have been a few times when I asked about his contacts, he would snap back at me, “Why are you asking? It is none of your business.” In this business, as long as you can provide the service as you have promised, no one will ask about how things come about.

Fourth, varied corruption methods were used by smugglers. Systematic corruption is essential in Chinese human smuggling, because without the collusion of government officials, few can leave China with ease. We found that corruption methods varied widely depending on the type of services desired. In the majority of the cases, the corrupt officials occupied low- level but crucial government functions such as border check points, passport applications, and residential registrations. Understandably, only those holding resources relevant to smuggling operations would be pursued by snakeheads, as one of our subjects in Fuzhou said:

We need to know all kinds of people and that’s why our expenses are formidable. Whenever we go out to eat, drink, and have fun with women, we always pay the bills. Otherwise, how else are you going to establish a good relationship with these government officials? We can’t put all the profits in our own pockets. Nobody can by himself move people through various checkpoints. We need the help from those who are capable of getting the passports quickly and we need people who can help us to my gum (or bribing border checkpoint inspectors). At any rate, it is a business where everybody makes money.

Fifth, unlike traditional organized crime, in which organizational continuity is often described as a key element (Abadinsky, 1990; Kenney and

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Finckenauer, 1999, human smuggling organizations were temporary business alliances that were formed as quickly as they were dissolved once an operation was completed. Snakeheads in our sample operated within a limited and well-defined project. None considered human smuggling their sole livelihood. Although some claimed to spend most time in smuggling- related activities, most engaged in conventional business activities as their daily routine, such as selling fruit, organizing tours, or driving taxis. If there were no suitable opportunities, snakeheads would remain dormant between operations. Some even chose to stop smuggling activities for personal reasons, as one of our subjects said that she stopped her business for almost a year because there was an increased report in the news media about the crackdowns by law enforcement in China and the United States:

When I heard that someone was arrested or sentenced to jail, I would become nervous. I read these things in newspapers. I stopped for a year because my instinct told me to stop-it was just my gut feeling. I trusted my instinct and did not do any of the business for a year. Now I feel safe enough to resume my “business.”

Furthermore, most snakeheads realized the illicit nature of their activities and did not plan long-term involvement in the smuggling business, despite its enormous profits. Balancing the risks involved, one smuggler noted:

If I had the money, I wouldn’t want to be in the human smuggling business. I’d rather do something else. This is a high-risk business, even though it is very lucrative. For every person we smuggle out, we make more than 150,000 yuan (almost $20,000). If we can help four to five people out, at least we make about 800,000 to 900,000 yuan (about $100,000). But many customers also owed my brother-in-law (also a smuggler) money, about a million yuan. Some arrived in the United States but said they didn’t have the money. You have to know that many customers are acquaintances and relatives, and it’s not appropriate to force them to pay right away.

The temporary nature of the business was also reflected in the suscepti- bility of smuggling organizations to change in market conditions or other external factors. Because of the task force orientation, secrecy, and the dyadic relationships imperative for the survival of the snakeheads, any removal of a linkage, internal or external, during an operation would lead to an overall breakdown. As one former snakehead in Fuzhou told us:

I used to be a recruiter for my brother-in-law. At the very beginning, before we became red hot, we had to go out to recruit customers but once we established our reputation, customers came looking for us. At that time, my brother-in-law was a “brother” to the head of the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau (PSB), and that’s why we were able to


get our applications for travel documents approved quickly. All together we made about a million yuan (about $120,000) from the smuggling trade. Later, that PSB head stepped down and that’s when we began to get involved in a seafood business and stop the alien smuggling business.

DISCUSSION

Although criminal organizations share some common attributes, such as secrecy and conspiracy to profit from providing illicit goods and services, divergent opinions exist on whether most criminal organizations are hierarchically arranged, monopolistic, and governed by rules and regulations, or loose associations of entrepreneurs who share nothing more than a desire to make money through illicit means. The challenge here is to assess the extent to which a criminal activity is “organized.” As Kenny and Finckenauer have argued (1995:25), organized crime is sufficiently varied and complex that one explanation or one theory cannot cover all the bases.

The continuum perspective appears to offer the most flexibility in accommodating different modes of organized crimes. However, most empirical studies seem to gravitate toward either end of this continuum, with very few examples in between. This paper presents one such example of somewhat mixed organizational attributes. On the one hand, Chinese human smuggling organizations resemble the enterprise model (or the network model), in which groups of entrepreneurs meet through familial networks and fortuitous social contacts, form flexible international networks, and contribute their time, energy, expertise, and money to supply illicit goods and services for profits (Reuter, 1983). These smuggling rings are made up of decentralized associations of criminals of diverse backgrounds, and the relationships among core members are mostly horizontal. Their small size effectively makes the smuggling industry as a whole highly adaptable to market constraints and uncertainties.

On the other hand, although there is limited vertical differentiation within the smuggling organizations, their operations involve highly specialized tasks with clearly assigned roles and division of labor, which resemble those of the corporate model. The flow of information is highly restricted and responsibilities along each successive stage of an operation highly defined. The snakeheads in our study mostly engage in dyadic transactions. Each smuggler has hidher own additional layers of contacts or resources.

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RISK MANAGEMENT AS A DETERMINANT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

As Smith (1975, 1980) argued that the study of organized crime should focus on the activities (i.e., the enterprise) rather than on the group or groups undertaking the enterprise, perhaps the best way to understand the organizational attributes of a criminal organization is by examining the type of illicit activities it practices. The very nature of the illicit market activities (in this case, transnational human smuggling) will determine the organizational characteristics of the crime group. In the context of the present study, we want to add another dimension to Smith’s conceptual emphasis on illicit activities-risk management unique to the transnational human smuggling business.

Because of the illicit nature of the business, and the permanent fear of arrests and asset forfeiture, those involved in human smuggling must stay inconspicuous and seek as little attention as possible. Risk management begins from the very front of an operation-client screening. Although there are many who want to come to the United States, all snakeheads must carefully screen their potential clients for their ability to pay. Thus, only a selective few are qualified as “worthy risks.” The clandestine nature of the business and the limited pool of eligible clientele thus limit the business to only small groups of entrepreneurs.

Once an opportunity arises, risk management by all snakeheads participating in the operation becomes the focal concern in each and every stage of the smuggling process in an environment full of hazards and uncertainties, which to a great extent mediates not only the organizational structure, but also individual behavior within the structure, as shown in Figure 1. The result is a distinctive task force orientation with dyadic interactions that runs through the organizational patterns and operational norms of most Chinese human smuggling rings.

Faced with risky market conditions, small-group exchange relations (with minimal organizational structure and limited hierarchies) serve to maximize profits for each involved member because hierarchical structure creates redundancy and reduces efficiency. Furthermore, shared expectations and commitment are easily promoted in small groups, which further reduces uncertainty and increases smooth transactions. The dyadic exchange relations serve to reduce internal tension, increase personal accountability, simplify transactions, and improve transactional security against unscrupulous fellow smugglers. Exposure to law enforcement activities is reduced and personal safety maximized because of restricted flow of information and limited contacts with other members of the smuggling chain. Therefore, in circumstances where contingent transactions are the norm and sequential operations are hazardous, small groups (or task

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762 ZHANG AND CHIN

forces) are capable of expanding and contracting to market uncertainties. Clearly in an illicit business enterprise such as human smuggling, the terms of small group exchange are far superior to those offered by any traditional triad societies. Satisfaction in smuggling transactions is thus likely and continued operation possible when members of the small exchange are closely linked to one another.

On the other hand, because of their lack of hierarchical differentiation, the snakeheads do not enjoy many organizational benefits that come with established criminal organizations, such as the triad societies, which include a greater ability to control members, better coordinated operations, more efficient resource deployment, greater potential for organizational continuity, and monopolies in illegal markets. Although small exchange groups with temporary alliances and dyadic interactions may respond well to uncertain market conditions, reduce exposure to law enforcement activities, and offer better financial terms for involved snakeheads, they are also faced with many organizational challenges. First of all, the enforcement of contracts and assignments relies heavily on informal social control sustained through a cultural environment that pro- motes shared expectations and understanding of the tasks at hand. Famil- ial relations, speaking the same dialect, or sharing the same ancestral townships thus become important elements that reinforce this informal social control. One’s social position and guanxi network hinge heavily on his or her delivery of promised services. Secondly, lacking connections with triad societies or other traditional Chinese organized crime groups for protection, snakeheads often find loyalty and trust insufficient for self-protection and profit guarantee. Therefore, unique practices have emerged to encourage individual members’ commitment to the shared goal for the eventual profit, such as dyadic transactions and special bank deposit arrangements.

This peculiar tension between trust and suspicion, coupled with the uncertain merket conditions, seems to explain the fact that the smuggling business is dominated by freelance operators who are taskforce oriented and transient in their commitment to the criminal enterprise. Similar to the patterns of drug smugglers and dealers, as described by Adler and Adler (1983), who oscillate in and out of their illicit businesses depending on the rise and fall of perceived social and legal costs, the snakeheads in this study venture into the smuggling business by taking on specific roles only when the “climate” is right and return to their conventional activities when the perceived risk rises. None of the subjects in this study have indi- cated any intention to stay in the smuggling business for long, and all want to quit once they have made enough money, which, when probed, always seems elusive.


Two factors are found to influence interactively on their further involvement in the business-the level of law enforcement activities and the maintenance of the network. Although anti-smuggling law enforcement activities fluctuate according to the political beat of the sending and receiving countries, we have found that the maintenance of the dyadic smuggling network can be challenging. Because dyadic relationships prevent resource sharing, a smuggling operation can only be carried out by specific role imperatives. We believe these highly differentiated roles are a product of necessity rather than design. The ensuing secrecy and self-preservation thus make individual smuggling rings susceptible to external conditions. Because transnational human smuggling is carried out over vast distances and through mostly dyadic transactions, the success of an operation hinges heavily on the success of each successive stage. The loss of a key player or any mishap along this chain event can severely weaken the effectiveness of a smuggling organization and often leads to the demise of the entire group, such as the Dover incident (Woods, 2000).

We believe these nontraditional criminals are responsible for transporting the majority of Chinese nationals who are willing to pay for their services to migrate to countries to seek better employment opportunities. There was no evidence to suggest any connection between these smuggling organizations and traditional Chinese criminal societies (i.e., secret societies, triads, tongs, and street gangs). Although individual members of traditional Chinese crime groups may be participating on their own, we argue that Chinese human smuggling is vastly different from any traditional choice of racketeering activities in the Chinese community, such as extortion, gambling, and prostitution.

As we have argued elsewhere (Chin et al., 1998), we believe that a new generation of nontraditional Chinese criminals has emerged in transnational criminal activities. Because of their diverse backgrounds and extensive involvement in legitimate businesses, the smugglers are more likely than traditional Chinese crime groups to blend into the larger society while carrying out transnational criminal activities. These snakeheads are more sophisticated and better connected than the triad members, and they are not committed to rigid subcultural norms and values (Chin, 1990; Chu, 2000), enabling them to assemble quickly when a criminal opportunity arises and to disband after the criminal conspiracy materializes. The overall business environment is therefore determined by the collective entrepreneurial commitment (willingness to engage in illicit business activities) of these groups of snakeheads, and least affected by the failure of any one group. Because of their significant deviation from any established traditional Chinese crime groups, this new breed of organized criminals should be of great interest to social science inquiries.

764 ZHANG AND CHIN

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Sheldon Zhang is Associate Professor of Sociology at San Diego State University. His research interests include Chinese organized crime, community corrections, and evaluation research.

KO-lin Chin is Associate Professor at the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers Univer- sity-Newark. His research interests include street gangs and organized crime, human smuggling, and drug trafficking. He is writing a book about the penetration of organized crime into politics in Taiwan and conducting a study on the drug trade in the Golden Triangle.

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enter the dragon: inside chinese human smuggling organizations

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