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  • 7/29/2019 Enhancing Tax Revenues (1)

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    COMMENTARY

    january 19, 2013 vol xlviii no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly18

    Enhancing Tax RevenuesA Global Priority

    Jomo Kwame Sundaram

    Jomo Kwame Sundaram ([email protected])

    is UN Assistant Director-General, Economic

    and Social Development Department, Foodand Agriculture Organisation of the United

    Nations, headquartered in Rome.

    Drawing on global experiences

    and comparisons, this article

    argues for the need to increase

    cooperation between countries

    to plug tax loopholes and bring

    in systems which enhance the

    tax to GDP ratio without hurting

    investments. Increasing this

    ratio is the only way to improve

    development spending while

    avoiding fiscal difficulties.

    The ability to pursue developmental

    policies depends crucially on avail-

    able fiscal space, which relies

    mostly on domestic revenues, especially

    taxes. However, tax revenues in most low

    and middle income developing countries

    are low. The average tax-GDP (gross

    domestic product) ratios in low-income

    and lower-middle income countries are

    around 15% and 19%, respectively.

    Although non-tax revenues may add

    significantly to total revenues in some

    countries, these ratios are typically low

    compared to the Organisation for Econom-

    ic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

    average of over 35%. Low- and lower-

    middle income countries should take steps

    to increase their revenues after consider-

    ing various options for doing so.

    This is necessary because the main

    approach in recent decades has been to

    increase tax rates only if unavoidable. It

    was presumed that lower rates wouldensure better compliance with tax laws,

    and thus raise revenue as the tax to GDP

    ratio was supposed to rise.

    The prevailing tax wisdom also favo-

    ured broadening the tax base even when

    revenue collection capacities are modest.

    Thus, indirect taxation has tended to

    increase while direct taxation of corpo-

    rations and individuals has tended to

    decline. The latter was supposed to be

    good for investment and growth although

    the empirical basis for this presumption

    is dubious.

    In the vast majority of countries in

    sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America,

    the tax to GDP ratio has actually stagnated

    or declined (Mehrotra 1996), as inter-

    national trade taxes accounted for the

    largest share of tax revenue. As tariffs

    and export duties declined with trade

    liberalisation, the share of trade taxes

    was bound to fall.

    Unfortunately, other taxes have notgrown to compensate for the falling contri-

    bution of trade taxes. India experienced

    a 2% decline in the central governments

    tax to GDP ratio in the 1990s after the

    economic reforms due to lower trade

    taxes alone (Rao 2000). There is an

    urgent need to reverse this trend, with

    greater commitment to revenue genera-

    tion in order to improve social protection,

    create employment and otherwise con-tribute to sustained economic recovery.

    For many developing countries, total tax

    revenues were mainly derived from three

    sources: domestic taxes on goods and

    services (general sales tax, excises), foreign

    trade taxes (mostly import duties), and

    direct taxes (mostly from corporations,

    rather than individuals).1 Wealth/prop-

    erty taxes and social security contributions

    continue to make modest contributions.

    For rich countries, however, income

    taxes (mostly from individuals) make the

    largest contribution (around 36%), with

    domestic taxes on goods and services

    and social security contributions ac-

    counting for slightly over a quarter each

    of total tax revenue, and trade taxes

    quite insignificant.

    With different economic circumstances,

    it does not make sense for developing

    countries to simply mimic developed

    economies in trying to generate revenue.

    Even among developing countries, thereis no one size that fits all. And certainly not

    for all time, as tax systems must evolve

    with changing economic circumstances.

    A key question is: which taxes are most

    likely to meet the requirements of imple-

    mentability, buoyancy and stability?

    Domestic Taxes: Direct or Indirect?

    Inter alia, the revenue to GDP ratio can

    rise in the following ways: the tax base

    is widened; tax avoidance and evasion

    are reduced; and new sources of inter-

    national taxation are found.

    According to the International Mone-

    tary Fund (IMF), In view of the high share

    of agriculture and informal economic

    activity in many countries, corporate and

    personal income taxes are unlikely to be

    a major source of domestic revenues in

    the short to medium term (IMF 2004).

    But there is no reason to be overly pessi-

    mistic about direct taxation as tax reform

    has significantly improved the contribu-tion of direct taxes to overall revenue in

    many countries (Burgess and Stern 1993).

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    Economic & Political Weekly EPW january 19, 2013 vol xlviii no 3 19

    It is certainly possible to enhance tax

    revenues by increasing the share of

    direct taxation of the wealthy through

    more progressive income taxes in devel-

    oping countries. However, greater effort

    should also be given to increase govern-

    ment revenue substantially by ensuring

    better compliance with, and higher col-lection of, existing taxes.

    For instance, as part of a comprehensive

    reform of its tax administration during

    1988-92, the Mexican system awarded

    generous bonuses to collectors. As a result

    the number of, and yield from, audits

    increased almost overnight. The share

    of additional revenue due to these

    audits increased from 38% in 1988 to

    90% in 1990.

    Limiting the discretionary authority

    of tax officials could also help improve

    compliance and reduce evasion. Compu-

    terisation of tax administration can

    help limit corruption, as it makes it

    harder to tamper with records.2 Improved

    tax administration also increased the

    share of personal income tax in total tax

    revenue. A number of innovations ac-

    counted for this shift. Expansion of the

    scope of tax deduction at source has been

    very effective in reaching the hard-to-

    tax group. Moreover, every individualliving in large cities who is a house

    owner, vehicle owner, club member,

    credit card holder, passport, driving

    licence or identity card holder and tele-

    phone subscriber can be required to file

    a tax return.

    Excise taxes are another important

    source of revenue in developing coun-

    tries. They are particularly levied on a

    few products such as alcohol, tobacco,

    petroleum, vehicles and spare parts. From

    a revenue perspective, they are convenient,

    involving few producers, large sales vol-

    umes, relatively inelastic demand and

    easy observability. Excises may be levied

    on quantities leaving the factory or

    arriving at ports, thus simplifying meas-

    urement and collection, ensuring cover-

    age, limiting evasion and improving

    monitoring. Excise taxes currently amount

    to less than 2% of GDP in low-income

    countries, compared to about 3% in

    high-income countries. They have abuoyant base and can be administered

    at low cost.

    Revenue losses due to globalisation

    need to be addressed. There are three main

    reasons for revenue losses: first, capital

    movements increase opportunities for

    tax evasion because of the limited capa-

    city that any tax authority has to check

    the overseas incomes of its residents;

    evasion is enabled as some governmentsand financial institutions systematically

    conceal relevant information.

    International Tax Evasion

    Where dividends, interest payments,

    royalties, and management fees are not

    taxed in the country in which they are

    paid, they more easily escape notice in

    the countries where they live. There

    have been large non-resident aliens

    bank deposits in some countries like the

    United States that impose no taxes on

    interest from such deposits.3

    Second, avoidance (not evasion) may

    increase, given the international differ-

    ences in tax rules and rates, because of

    the choice of tax regime that inter-

    national tax treatment of enterprise

    income commonly offers. This is more

    likely for taxation of profits from corpo-

    rations international operations. Transfer

    pricing for goods, services and resources

    moving among branches or subsidiariesof a company provides opportunities for

    shifting income to minimise tax liability.4

    Third, international competition for

    inward foreign direct investment may

    lead governments to reduce tax rates and

    increase concessions for foreign investors.

    Income tax rates have fallen sharply since

    the late 1970s. There is evidence of sudden

    capital outflows in response to certain

    tax policy changes (Tanzi 1996).

    The tax rates governments can impose

    are thus constrained by international

    competition. Hence, they are reluctant

    to raise rates or to tax dividend and

    interest income for fear of capital flight.

    Yet, it has long been known that direct

    tax concessions have little or no effect in

    diverting international investment, let

    alone in attracting such flows. Hence,

    such tax concessions constitute an un-

    necessary loss of revenue.

    Beggar-thy-neighbour policies will lead

    to losses of revenue for all developingcountries in a larger race-to-the-bottom,

    also involving labour and environmental

    standards and conditions. This also un-

    dermines the possibility of balanced, in-

    clusive and sustainable development.

    Finance ministries and tax authorities

    in developing countries need to cooper-

    ate among themselves and with their

    counterparts in the OECD economies to

    learn from one another and to close ex-isting loopholes in their mutual interest.

    With the huge and growing size of public

    debts and the real and imagined fiscal

    constraints to sustained global economic

    recovery, such cooperation is more urgent

    than ever.

    Notes

    1 IMF (2004) notes that lower income countries (LICs) 14% tax to GDP ratio is accounted for byforeign trade taxes (4.2%), excises (1.8%), gen-

    eral sales tax (3.1%), and social security (1.8%).For lower-middle income countries (LMICs),their 18.5% tax/GDP ratio is accounted for by alower share for foreign trade (3.4%), and highershares of excises (2.3%), general sales tax(4.9%), and social security taxes (3.7%). Forupper-middle income countries (UMICs), their23% tax/GDP ratio has even lower shares forforeign trade taxes (3.1%), and higher sharesfor excises (2.5%), general sales tax (5 .9%) andsocial security (6.4%).

    2 In developing countries, a large proportion ofthose not in organised formal manufacturingactivities are in agriculture and the informalsector. However, tax administration in manycountries is either unable or unwilling to cope

    with this sector of largely untaxed incomes.

    There is also a need to motivate high-level offi-cials to evaluate the performance of their sub-ordinates. Autonomy over budgets, personnel,and controlled increases in tax administrationreforms in Argentina, Colombia, Ghana, Jamaica,and Peru. In some cases, budgets have beenlinked to revenues collected while some coun-tries have contracted out tax collection opera-tions to the private sector (Das-Gupta andMookherjee 1997)

    3 Some suggest ions based on the following prin-ciples have been made to deal with theseproblems. First, withholding-taxes on interest,dividends, royalties and management fees,if these payments are to cross borders, shouldbe collected universally, at uniform rates agreedto internationally. Second, there should be a

    single international code system for identify-ing payers of individual and corporate incometax, so that tax authorities can share informa-tion about taxpayers without revealing theinformation to others. Third, a tax-return toany tax authority of the income of a corpora-tion or other enterprise should be requiredto give information relating to its total worldincome.

    4 Tax havens provide the possibil ity of avoidanceby forming holding companies and shiftingostensible residence (Tanzi 1995).

    References

    Burgess, R and Nicholas Stern (1993): Taxationand Development,Journal of Economic Litera-ture, 31 (2): 762-830.

    Das-Gupta, A and D Mookherjee (1997): Designand Enforcement of Personal Income Taxes in

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    january 19, 2013 vol xlviii no 3 EPW Economic & Political Weekly20

    India in Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998),Incentives and Institutional Reform in TaxEnforcement: An Analysis of Developing Countr yExper ience (New Delhi: Oxford UniversityPress).

    IMF (2004): Global Monitoring Report 2004, Inter-national Monetary Fund, Washington DC,available at www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/

    gmr/eng/2004/041604.pdf, accessed on 3 Jan-uary 2013.

    Mehrotra, Santosh (1996): Domestic Liberalisa-tion Policies and Public Finance: Poverty Impli-cations in UNCTAD, Globalisation and Liber-alisation: Effects of International Economic Re-lations on Poverty, Geneva.

    Rao, Govinda (2000): Fiscal Decentralisation in

    Indian Federalism, processed, Institute ofEconomic and Social Change, Bangalore.

    Tanzi, Vito (1995): Taxation in an Integrating World(Washington DC: Brookings Institution).

    (1996): Is There a Need for a World TaxOrganisation?, paper at the 52nd Congress ofthe International Institute of Public Finance,Israel.