Ancient Philosophy 19 (1999) ©Mathesis Publications

The Moral and Intellectual Development of the Philosopher in Plato's Republic

Elizabeth F. Cooke

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The metaphysical knowledge required for the philosopher is often seen as merely abstract and theoretical, though the philosophers share in the same early character education as that of the spirited auxiliaries. This is not a mere oversight by Plato. In the Republic Plato requires that the philosopher be spirited and that the spiritedness be trained properly with the auxiliaries. Only after such training and the achievement of the character virtues can the philosopher go on to training in dialectic, mathematics, and politics. But what is the connection between char-acter training and the requirement of rationality for the philosopher? It is not alto-gether clear how the moral training in early childhood prepares the philosopher for rationality and dialectic. In fact it may even appear that the conformity and respect for authority emphasized in the early education hinders the development of the critical and creative skills necessary for the philosopher. Furthermore while the moral aspect of the early education seems evident, it is less clear what the theoretical training of the philosopher has to do with morality. For these rea-sons many commentators of the Republic see tensions between the early and later education of the philosopher. But the precise relationship between the philoso-pher's abstract metaphysical knowledge and his moral character escapes some commentators of the Republic, in part, because the intellectual virtues of the philosopher are seen from a modern point of view. This view separates morality from the intellect, whereas Plato sees them as inseparable, although distinct (cf. Irwin 1995,230-240).

I shall argue that Plato does not view philosophy merely as abstract and theo-retical and thus as separate and detached from morality. Rather Plato conceives the intellectual training as integral to the philosopher's overall pursuit of the Good. Philosophical knowledge is moral because the objects of such knowledge are closer to the divine. The philosophical quest, therefore, is not merely a scien-tific pursuit directed toward satisfying curiosity or practical needs. Rather it is a moral and spiritual quest with the aim of becoming god-like. Plato never divorces philosophy from morality. In fact philosophy is a higher stage of the moral devel-opment of the philosopher, through which he or she is perfected.

I. The Relationship Between Character and Intellectual Training

The early character training of the guardians emphasizes conformity, obedi-ence, and respect for authority. These habits, however, seem to discourage free

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thought. Yet Plato expects free thought and creativity when it comes to the later development of these same guardians. The intellectual training of those guardians who go on to become philosophers requires critical and creative think-ing. During this time of development the moral rules and practices which are nor-mally taken for granted are questioned and reexamined in a new light. While it is clear why the early character training would be beneficial for most members of the polis, it is not clear why those with a philosophical nature would be given this same character training.

Annas 1981,87 sees a deep tension between Plato's theory of early moral edu-cation as conformity to standards and to peers and the intellectual rigor and cre-ative imagination demanded of philosophical training. Not only does Annas doubt that the early education helps philosophical training, but she also suggests that the early training makes the later difficult, if not impossible. l Along similar lines, Pappas 1995, 120 describes Plato's theory of education as combining pro-gressive recommendations with the most repressive and militaristic ones. In the Republic Plato has Socrates warn against exposing the young to dialectic and the philosophical examination of moral principles because it will fill the youth with lawlessness (537e) and will not provide the young with the stability required to remain good in the face of moral uncertainty (539d). From this, Pappas con-cludes that Plato mistrusts the Socratic method of dialectic altogether and that Plato would rather train citizens to be obedient and not question authority as Socrates had. Pappas 1995, 122 says, however, that 'at the same time, [Plato] cannot gainsay the value of that interrogation for the production of moral theo-ries. He hopes that his propaedeutic of arithmetic and geometry will inspire the same fervor toward abstraction that Socrates had wakened, without bringing the same skepticism to these future rulers'. Annas and Pappas both see Plato's emphasis on conformity and obedience in early education as discouraging the creative and critical aspects of the philosopher.

II. Moral Virtues as Necessary for Intellectual Virtues

While there is clearly a difference in the content and goals of the early and later education of the philosopher, we need not see any tension. Klein 1989 responds to Annas' criticism of the bifurcation of the education of the philosopher by defending Plato's requirement of character education prior to philosophical edu-cation. Klein discusses the preventative role that early character training has for the young philosopher. The early moral education of the guardians emphasizes conformity in order to prevent some of the dangers that would come from too much freedom and too little discipline. First, Plato wants to avoid skepticism by

1 This interpretation of the philosopher's education leads Annas 1981,270 to a second criticism of the training of the philosopher. She claims that Plato's account of the philosopher's role is too impersonal and alienating. He concentrates so much on universal knowledge that he becomes divorced from any sense of his own personal interests. He sees his good as merely part of the good of the whole polis. The problem, for Annas, then becomes how Plato can justify the life of the philoso-pher if it cannot be justified by personal motives.

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encouraging the guardians to conform to the moral ideal without questioning. If the guardians engage in philosophy too soon, then they may be led to skepticism, not having the necessary skills to lead them to truth (Klein 1989,242). The sec-ond point Klein makes is that Plato wants to avoid the distractions of the body that result from untrained appetites and emotions. If a person has the mental health or psychic harmony of justice and is moderate in appetites, then the person will not be distracted when trying to further the education in philosophy. Plato wants to ensure that the appetitive and the spirited parts are prepared for the pur-suit of philosophy. Habituation and conformity to standards at an early, prera-tional age provides a basic order for the soul.

The danger Plato is trying to avoid can be seen in his account of the democratic soul. Plato describes a man who engages in many activities and pleasures with neither harmony nor moderation. He dabbles in many things, including what he thinks is philosophy (561d). But because the democratic soul is inappropriately motivated toward philosophy, he cannot engage in what is actually philosophy. The difference between the aristocratic soul and the democratic soul in their philosophical pursuits is that the former is committed to finding the truth and the latter is merely engaged for amusement's sake (Cooper 1984, 11). The demo-cratic soul treats philosophy as a pleasant game. He cannot engage in philosophy because his appetitive and disorderly nature gets in the way. He has not devel-oped any skills or virtues, much less the most rigorous skills required for philos-ophy.

Klein also emphasizes the positive aspect of the early character training. Not only do the moral virtues cultivated by early education have preventative effects, but they also aid in the advancement of philosophical education. One needs a developed spirit manifested in such characteristics as assertiveness, boldness, and courage in order to engage in philosophy (Klein 1989,252). These traits are useful in rationality but are only available to someone who has developed them in other areas of his life as well. Rather than opposing moral and intellectual training, dialectic requires moral virtue. This point is illustrated in the cave alle-gory. Here we see the need for character virtues, such as courage. It takes courage to go through the painful realization that all of one's beliefs are an illu-sion, to criticize popular opinion, and to learn new things. The journey of the philosopher is both risky and painful; without developing courage in the spirited part, the philosopher will not endure the rigor and pain necessary for coming out of the cave. Of course, spirit is reconfigured in the philosopher. His courage is motivated by love of truth and learning, whereas the auxiliary is motivated by his love of honor. But if courage is cultivated according to the proper stage and for the necessary activities of that stage, then it will be prepared for the next chal-lenge. Plato says, 'For souls, you know, are far more likely to be cowardly in severe studies than in gymnastic. The labor is closer to home in that it is the soul's privately and not shared in common with the body' (535b, Bloom trans.). More courage is needed as the philosopher approaches his or her intellectual training than was needed in gymnastics, yet the courage developed at the earlier

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stage of the guardian will help prepare him or her for philosophical training. In the Republic, we can see how courage or lack of courage affects the inter-

locutors' ability to engage in philosophy. The lack of spirit and courage in Cephalus prevents him from engaging in the dialogue and questioning his con-ventional notion of justice. Thrasymachus has spirit and boldness, which enables him, indeed motivates him, to engage in the dialogue. But Thrasymachus lacks the proper training of his spirit, evident in the bold manner in which he enters the scene and presents his argument. His untrained spirit and lack of discipline causes his impatience, and he is neither able to listen to others nor to respond to arguments. He is much more prepared to give a grand speech on what justice is than to listen attentively to the more subtle arguments. Glaucon, however, is able to engage fully in the dialogue. He has the discipline to listen carefully to Socrates' intricate arguments, along with the intellectual bravery to put forth strong challenges to Socrates. Glaucon' s philosophical abilities require a trained spirit, which both Cephalus and Thrasymachus lack. Their lack of moral virtue interferes with their development of the intellectual virtues.

III. Plato's Developmental Theory of Education: The Emphasis on the Capabilities and Motivations of Each Stage

Plato realizes that the educator must recognize the needs and the capabilities of each stage, and define the educational goals accordingly. The young guardians are prerational, so their education must aim toward the training of their spirited and appetitive parts through appropriate music, poetry, and physical training. The educator cannot train the guardian beyond his capabilities. Any attempt to try to instill critical and intellectual rigor before a child is fully capable would probably be unsuccessful, and perhaps even dangerous. The creativity and intellectual rigor of the philosophical training should not begin in early childhood because the young guardians are as yet incapable of profiting fully from it. There will come a time later in the development of the philosopher when dialectic will not involve the same risk. The young guardian is not encouraged to think critically, but he is not taught to reject reason either. The spirited part which is trained in early childhood will be responsive to reason later. Meanwhile rules, obedience, and conformity to authority play an important role in his early development. They are not valued for their own sake, but are valued because they give types of noble behavior to which spirit is responsive. When reason comes to examine the rules which are emphasized in early childhood, the guardian may change his mind about what is noble, for better or worse.2 Thus the early education does not make later criticism impossible. Criticism is not emphasized early on because the guardian is not capable. But later, when he is capable, his views of what is kalon are open to change.

In addition to capabilities of the student, the educator must look at what moti-

2 lowe to an anonymous referee this point that what is noble (kalon) is open to the guardian's criticism

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vates a person at each stage of development. During the early education stories are the vehicle for teaching the proper moral standards to prerational people. In developing the spirited part, stories are meant to combine morality and aesthetics in order to produce children who are not tempted by evil, but are repulsed by it (Annas 1981, 83). Plato recognizes that the spirited part is evaluative and capable of having a sense of justice (see Gosling 1973, 41-49). But at this stage the moral ideal appeals more to the young auxiliary's sense of honor and reputation than it does to his reason or his knowledge of the whole. But this is not a problem for Plato. In fact it is a necessary task of education to present moral ideals reflecting the Good in a way appropriate to the age and capabilities of the group. For exam-ple, in his discussion of when to begin the training in calculation and geometry, Plato suggests that it begin when the guardians are children, but that they should not be forced. Rather they should be trained in the form of play (536c-e). It is the task of educators to understand how people are motivated to act morally at their different levels of maturity.

The philosopher does not need to be presented a story since he or she is able to be motivated by and toward the Good itself. Just as the spirited auxiliary when educated properly will move toward the proper moral ideal, so too will the philosopher, when educated, move toward the Good. Ultimately the love of learning combined with intellectual virtues will lead to knowledge of the forms and thus bring him or her closer to moral perfection.

IV. Philosophy as a Higher Stage of Moral Development

We have seen how Plato's early moral education does not preclude the study of philosophy, but actually makes philosophical studies possible. We may now dis-cuss the moral aspect of the philosophical education. The theoretical part of the philosopher's training is not independent from the early moral development; Plato's account of education is moral throughout all its stages, though education takes on different tasks according to the different abilities and goals of each developmental stage. While the moral aspect of education is clear in the early education, it is easy to overlook Plato's emphasis on the moral value of the philo-sophical training. Yet this is the most important part of Plato's moral theory. The moral value that Plato attaches to the study of philosophy is evident in Plato's Pythagorean conception of philosophy as communion with the divine. In recog-nizing how philosophy itself has internal moral value for Plato, we see how the intellectual studies contribute to the philosopher's moral transformation and per-fection of soul.

From a modern point of view, it is easy to assume that knowledge is separate from morality, spirituality, and religion. But for Plato there is a moral aspect even of the study of mathematics. The study of mathematics is not necessary for the philosopher merely because it provides good training for the mind or because it is instrumental to the knowledge ofthe Good, but because the content ofmathemat-ics itself is a constitutive part of moral understanding. The entire education, the entire ascent out of the cave, is a story of progress toward understanding values,

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and mathematics is the key to understanding objective value. The Sun and Divided Line images applied to the Cave verify that the sun repre-

sents the Idea of the Good, but what do we make of other objects and images? Burnyeat (forthcoming) states:

Socrates instructs us to apply the prisoner's upward journey to the soul's ascent into the intelligible region of the Divided Line (517b4-5). This at once suggests mathematics and dialectic, with their respective objects, as described at the end of Book VI. In that case, the animals and other originals will represent the Forms studied by dialectic, while both reflections and pup-pets will be mathematical objects (perhaps conceived at differ-ent levels of abstraction). But the surrounding narrative, about the journey back to the cave would suggest a different solution. For the examples mentioned in the story are values ... Later, after getting used to the poor light, [the philosophers] will do much better than the prisoners at knowing what the shadows are and knowing what they are shadows of. They will do better at this precisely because they have seen the truth about what is beautiful, just and good (520c). Thus at least some of the shad-ows, hence at least some of the puppet-like figures carried along the wall, represent values like justice. If so, the same must be true of the corresponding reflections and their origi-nals outside the cave. The conversion and ascent is progress towards an understanding of values.3

For Plato, when mathematics is studied in the most abstract way,4 mathematics aims at knowledge or understanding of unqualified being, what is more real than anything encountered in the fluctuating sensible world. Of course the forms, especially the form of the Good, are more real and fundamental to explaining things, and the Good will eventually give mathematics a first principle. Because dialectic simultaneously studies the foundations of mathematics and the founda-tions of ethical and aesthetic forms, Burnyeat concludes that mathematics pro-vides the lowest-level articulation of objective value. The study of unity, order, proportion, and symmetry in mathematics is already the study of the noble (kalon) and value. The student of these internalizes them in him or herself and may employ them as a paradigm for organizing the polis (see Rorty 1998, 167-

3 Similarly Brumbaugh 1970, 217 holds that the aim of Plato's ideal curriculum 'is to clarify the student's knowledge of fact, of logic, and ultimately of value'. Yet Brumbaugh does not think that mathematics can resolve the problems of value because it is limited to descriptive truth and formal consistency (223). This common interpretation of mathematics in Plato's curriculum Burnyeat attacks.

4 Plato recommends the problem-oriented style of mathematics rather than the more empirical and applied approaches. In this regard Plato parts company with the Pythagoreans. As Burnyeat points out, Plato thinks that the Pythagorean's view of mathematics is too empirical, because it focuses primarily on the explanation of the observed phenomena.

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171). By assimilating the structures of the mathematical disciplines, the philosopher

becomes good. The philosopher moves closer toward being and thus closer toward perfection. The soul has irrational and rational parts, the rational part requires intellectual discipline, the mathematical studies assisting its purification. Cornford 1923, 148 suggests that 'because the human soul contained both the divine and the irrational parts that it could, if purified become wholly divine, or, if still impure, sink into the lower forms of life'. Plato says, 'Then it's the philosopher, keeping company with the divine and the orderly who becomes orderly and divine, to the extent that is possible for a human being' (500d). And the philosopher, as ruler, helps to move others toward the divine as well: 'And I suppose they would rub out one thing and draw in another again, until they made human dispositions as dear to the gods as they admit of being' (501b).

When we see Plato's mathematical and metaphysical knowledge as value-laden, we then recognize that the philosopher's training is not divided into moral and scientific parts. The training required for philosophical knowledge is not divorced from the early moral training. Rather the intellectual training of the philosopher, like the original in relation to its image, is a continuation of that moral training.

The allegory of the cave is a description of simultaneous moral and intellectual development. The philosopher does not merely acquire information and satisfy curiosity but also undergoes a transformation toward a higher moral state. The ultimate end of the philosopher, namely, knowledge of the Good, is both a moral and an intellectual ideal. The difference in expectations of the philosopher and the young guardian pertain to their different developmental stages. It is reason-able that the training at different stages of development suit the different needs and abilities of each stage. Philosophical training forms part of the entire project of the individual's perfection.s

Department of Philosophy St. Louis University St. Louis MO 63108

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5 I am deeply indebted to George Terzis for his guidance and encouragement and to Ronald Polansky and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Finally, I have benefited greatly from conversations with and comments from Jerold Abrams.

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