ARTICLE IN PRESS

0969-8043/$ - se

doi:10.1016/j.ap

�CorrespondE-mail addr

Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 737–740

www.elsevier.com/locate/apradiso

Efforts of Uzbekistan to prevent nuclear terrorism andsmuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials

V.D. Petrenko�, Yu.N. Karimov, A.I. Podkovirin, N.N. Shipilov,B.S. Yuldashev, M.I. Fazylov

Institute of Nuclear Physics, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, Tashkent 702132, Uzbekistan

Abstract

Uzbekistan is located on the cross-roads from the north—Russia, Western Europe—to the south—Afghanistan,

Iran, Iraq and others. The appearance of terrorist organizations urged some Asian countries to make the nuclear

weapons, the making the task of stopping the transportation of nuclear materials and technologies from the north (from

countries possessing nuclear weapon) to the south (to countries desiring to have weapons and its components) a reality.

To resolve this problem, on the main transportation routes, ‘‘Yantar’’ stationary radiation monitors of Russian

production were installed, and development and production of monitors of our own make was started. This paper

covers these works as well as those on preventing possible terrorist attacks on nuclear objects of Uzbekistan.

r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The events of September 11 demonstrated the

inhuman essence of terrorism. As you probably

know, terrorism acts also took place in our Republic.

Terrorism acts using radioactive or nuclear fissile

materials are especially threatening either as ‘‘clean’’

or ‘‘dirty’’ bombs. Therefore, countering smuggling

of radioactive and fissile materials is an important

task.

The Republic of Uzbekistan is situated on the cross-

roads by which transit from the north—Russia, Western

Europe, Kazakhstan—to the south—Turkmenistan,

Afghanistan and further Iran, Pakistan, China and

others–is performed (see Fig. 1).

The Great Silk Road went through Uzbekistan, and is

still in use. The quality and the number of highways

have increased, and railroads and aviation have been

added. We know that terrorists are in need of both

explosives and radioactive materials in order to create a

e front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve

radiso.2005.05.027

ing author.

ess: petrenko@inp.uz (V.D. Petrenko).

‘‘dirty’’ bomb. It is, therefore, important to prevent the

illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials

through Uzbekistan.

The problem of nuclear smuggling becomes compli-

cated by the fact that the Republic of Uzbekistan has

signed the agreement on transit transportation system,

(Transport International Routing (TIR)), whereby

transit vehicles of other signatory countries are allowed

to pass through border crossing points without inspec-

tion. In this case, the cargo can only be inspected if there

is sufficient suspicion that it does not correspond to that

indicated in the cargo manifest. As a first step to counter

illicit trafficking of nuclear and/or radioactive materials

involving TIR cargo, radiation monitoring devices have

been installed at key customs border crossings (see Fig.

2). With the assistance of the US Government, three

radiation monitors were installed at the Gisht-Kuprik

customs complex, through which transit from Kazakh-

stan was made. Two of them were installed at the

entrance from Kazakhstan, and one at the Uzbekistan

side (Fig. 3).

d.

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 1. Map of Uzbekistan and of the countries surrounding it.

V.D. Petrenko et al. / Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 737–740738

At a later time, two radiation monitors for pedestrians

and bus passengers passing through the complex were

also installed.To control vehicles going to Turkmeni-

stan, two radiation portal monitors were installed at the

Alat customs complex (see Fig. 2).

At every complex, the data from the monitors are

transferred to a computer installed at the duty customs

officer’s office. Video-cameras survey entering vehicles

or passing pedestrians, and in case of an alarm several

dozens of video-images are saved in order to determine

the license number or face of a passenger/pedestrian

who caused this alarm.

After liberation of Afghanistan from theTaliban and

the opening of the bridge across Amudarya river around

the town of Termez, this has become the shortest way to

the South—Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and others. In

order to counter nuclear smuggling on this route, we

have developed and installed a radiation monitor at that

border crossing and two more vehicle radiation portal

monitors at the Ayritom customs complex (Fig. 2).

After construction of the Ayritom customs complex,

two vehicle monitors were installed at two lanes at the

entrance to the complex from Afghanistan.Thus, we

believe that we were successful in closing key routes of

nuclear smuggling transported by vehicles across Uzbe-

kistan.We have also installed radiation portal monitors at

the Tashkent International Airport to prevent trafficking

of radioactive materials by departing passengers.

Obviously, this number of monitors is not sufficient to

make a statement that a barrier on the way of nuclear

smuggling is completed. Completion of a road across the

Ust-Urt Plateau will give an opportunity for a short trip

to Turkmenistan via Nukus and Khodjeyli. The ques-

tion of radiation monitor installation in Ferghana

Valley, where the routes to Kyrgyzstan exist, is not yet

solved. At present, the project according to which the

number of equipped customs complexes will increase is

under preparation.

These radiation portal monitors (apart from the one

installed at the Ayritom truck line and made at the

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Fig. 2. Map of Uzbekistan, with red circles indicating border crossings where radiation portal monitors have been installed.

Fig. 3. Radiation portal monitors at the border crossing with

Kazakhstan.

V.D. Petrenko et al. / Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 737–740 739

Institute of Nuclear Physics) are produced by the SIC

‘‘Aspect’’ (Dubna, Moscow region).

We have also increased the protection of our Institute

from possible terrorist acts. The 10MW research nuclear

reactor is the largest hazard in case of destruction.

Therefore, a physical protection of the reactor from

possible terrorist attack was implemented, using stan-

dard fences with various sensors alarming in case of

intrusion. The perimeter is illuminated at night. Video-

surveillance cameras are located along the perimeter and

allow operators ‘‘to see’’ the whole perimeter around the

clock. Isotope storage and gamma-facilities in which

160,000Ci of 60Co are located are also protected.

Along with the above, we have developed a number of

radiation monitors, which were installed at the key

points of the Institute—reactor, cyclotron, laboratories,

personnel and vehicle passages. The background mon-

itoring is conducted continuously, whereby for 10min, a

total gamma-background is measured, a radiation dose

is determined and a gamma-radiation spectrum up to

1.5MeV is measured, allowing one to estimate the

contribution of separate sources to the background.

Such systems are currently tested at a number of

customs points of Uzbekistan, and one of them

successfully operates at the Navoi Metallurgical Com-

plex for background control of the uranium tail-mine.

ARTICLE IN PRESSV.D. Petrenko et al. / Applied Radiation and Isotopes 63 (2005) 737–740740

Currently, the Institute of Nuclear Physics is design-

ing a facility for the inspection of vehicles for weapons,

illicit drugs, and explosives.

In summary, the Republic of Uzbekistan, with the

assistance of the Institute of Nuclear Physics has

increased its vigilance against smuggling of radioactive

and nuclear materials across its borders, by installing

several radiation portal monitors at key border cross-

ings. Furthermore, the Institute has increased the

security of all sources of radioactivity in its grounds,

by installing portal monitors and monitors of back-

ground radiation. Although these measures do not offer

a complete protection against illegal transport of radio-

active materials in Uzbekistan, they are indicative of the

importance assigned to this threat by the Republic.

We express our gratitude to the Science and Technol-

ogy Center in Ukraine for support of this project. We

also thank the team of the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory for fruitful cooperation and

wonderful results.