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EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2009.

Efficient Cause

An efficient cause1 is that primary extrinsic principle or origin of any action which makes

a thing simply to be, or to be in a certain way. The efficient cause in the example of

Michelangelo sculpting the Piet would be Michelangelo himself. Unlike both the material and

formal causes, the efficient cause is a principle extrinsic to the effect. The efficient cause is

external to the effect for Michelangelo, the sculptor of the Piet, is obviously not part and parcel

with the substance or accidents of the statue itself; he is not in the statue. Therefore, the efficient

cause is an external and extrinsic cause. Alvira, Clavell and Melendo explain that the intrinsic

causes found in corporeal creatures require the action of an external agent. Since matter and form

are two distinct principles by themselves, they cannot bring about the formation of a thing; they

need an external cause that has to put them together. Besides, experience shows that a corporeal

being only acquires a new substantial or accidental form by virtue of an actual extrinsic principle

whose precise role is to make matter acquire a new form.

From this point of view, the efficient cause is by nature prior to the material and formal

causes. The latter cannot exert their causal influence on one another without the prior influence

of the efficient cause. Therefore, the study of matter and form alone is not sufficient; it should

naturally lead to a consideration of the efficient cause

In corporeal beings, the efficient cause always acts by altering some (secondary) matter

so as to educe a new form from it. Hence, it can also be called a moving cause (causa movens).

The efficient cause is the cause of the causality of matter and form, since by its motion or

movement it makes the matter receive the form, and makes the form inhere in matter.2 In the

case of created causes, the agent always requires a potency upon which it exerts its activity, or, in

other words, a subject on which it acts in order to obtain a new effect. God alone causes without

any need for a pre-existing reality, since He produces the totality of the effect.3

1 Studies on efficient causality: O. LA PLANTE, The Traditional View of Efficient Causality, Proceedings of the

American Catholic Philosophical Association, 14 (1938), pp. 1-12 ; F. X. MEEHAN, Efficient Causality in

Aristotle and St. Thomas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1940 ; R. O. JOHANN,

Comment on Secondary Causality, The Modern Schoolman, 1947-1948, pp. 19-25 ; E. GILSON, Avicenne et les

origines de la notion de cause efficiente, in Atti del XII Congresso internazionale di filosofia, vol. 9, pp. 121-130 ; E.

GILSON, Pour lhistoire de la cause efficiente, AHLDMA, 1962, pp. 7-31 ; C. FABRO, La difesa critica del

principio di causa, in C. Fabro, Esegesi Tomistica, Libreria Ed. della Pontificia Universit Lateranense, Rome,

1969, pp. 1-48 ; M. L. COLISH, Avicennas Theory of Efficient Causation and Its Influence on St. Thomas Aquinas,

in Atti del Congresso internazionale (I): Tommaso dAquino nel suo settimo centenario, 1974, pp. 296-306. 2 In V Metaphysicorum, lect. 3. 3 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 201-202.

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Distinctive Characteristics of Efficient Causality

Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo give us some the features of the efficient cause: a) Unlike

the material and formal causes, the efficient cause is a principle extrinsic to the effect. It gives

the effect an act of being which is really distinct from its own, even though that esse actually

stems from it (the efficient cause). The material and formal causes, in contrast, do not have any

act of being other than that of the composite in which they subsist.

b) The efficient cause imparts to the subject the perfection which makes it an effect of

the agent, a perfection which the agent must actually have. A teacher, for instance, is the

efficient cause of the knowledge of the student, because he imparts to the student a portion of his

own actual knowledge.

In this respect, the efficient cause is always an exemplary cause, since no one can give

another a perfection which he does not have. Thus, only an actual being can impart actuality to

an effect, and it can only do so to the extent that it is itself actual (every agent acts insofar as it is

in act).

c) The effect always pre-exists in its cause in some way. The perfection transmitted may

be found in the cause either in a more eminent manner or at least in the same degree. A man, for

instance, can engender another man. To warm another body, the warming body must have a

higher temperature.

Consequently, when an agent acts, it always produces something like itself. The likeness

does not refer to any perfection whatsoever, but precisely to that perfection by virtue of which

the agent acts in the given instance. Fire, for instance, does not warm insofar as it is actually

luminous, but insofar as it is actually hot. Producing an effect means imparting to matter a form

which is like that possessed by the cause. Since this form may be possessed in either of two

ways, either naturally or intellectually, the likeness of the effect may refer to either. A colt is like

the horse with respect to the form which is possessed by both in a natural way. A cathedral,

however, is not like the architect, but like the model which the architect conceived in his mind.

Furthermore, the principle by virtue of which something acts in producing an effect is its

form, and not its matter, since it is by virtue of the form that it is actual. This is true both in the

case of the substance and of the accident: 1) The specific actions of a substance stem from its

substantial form and from its consequent operative powers. If man can think and will, this is

because he has a spiritual soul, which is endowed with intelligence and will. 2) Acquired

perfections in the sphere of activity stem from operative habits. Thus, only a person who has the

knowledge and skill of the architect can design houses.4

Formulations of Efficient Causality

There are various formulations of efficient (or agent) causality, all of which express the

basic condition that every effect is in need of a causal basis. Such formulas include:

4 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

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1. Anything which moves is moved by something else, or whatever is in motion is put in

motion by another (quid quid movetur ab alio movetur)5 This formulation of the principle of

causality was first developed by the Stagirite, who used it to arrive at the First Mover, Pure Act,

the First Cause of movement in things. Aquinas uses this formulation of the principle in his

prima via, the demonstration from motion in things. In a general sense, the motion mentioned

here is that transition from being in potentiality to being in actuality, or from a certain non-being

to being. The demonstrative power of this formulation of the principle of causality lies in the

absolute irreducibility of act to potency, as well as the impossibility that anything potential can

ever confer actuality upon itself. Nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by a being

in act.6

2. Everything which begins or comes to be has a cause.7 This is a more precise

formulation of the principle of causality than the popular formula every effect has a cause,

This principle, that anything which begins to be necessarily demands a cause, is applicable to

any perfection of things having a beginning in time. A thing which does not have a certain act

cannot confer that act upon itself, but must receive the influence of something else which does

have that act. Our second formulation of the principle of causality has an even more far-reaching

application in the case of anything which begins or comes to be in the absolute sense, that is,

as substantia.

3. Every contingent being requires a cause. The Angelic Doctor applies this formulation

of the principle of causality to his tertia via demonstration of the existence of God in order to

arrive at the Necessary Being. As regards being, anything which in itself has a potentiality for

ceasing to be is contingent. We limit ourselves naturally to corporeal beings, which are

corruptible because of their composition of matter and form. A thing contingent in itself can

either be or not be. If in fact it is, there must subsequently be a cause of its being actual. And

if that cause be something likewise contingent, we must look to a further cause, inquiring further

until we attain an absolutely necessary being, that is, a being which cannot not be.

4. If a particular being possesses a perfection not derived from its essence, that

perfection must come from an external cause. This last formulation is a causal process that

operates in Aquinas quarta via. When applied to the act of being (esse), the formulation can be

considered as the most perfect and universal formulation of the principle of causality. The act of

being (esse) as a perfection does not pertain necessarily to an essence. Thus, it must originate

from an extrinsic cause which is really distinct from the essence. The act of being (esse) does not

come from the essence for the essence (essentia) is the principle of specification and

differentiation among individual things; it makes a thing to be what it is and different from other

things. The act of being, on the other hand, is the principle of unity and similarity among all

things because all things have it. The common possession of all things, all creatures participate in

the act of being, whatever determinate essence each being (ens) may have. Therefore, we must

conclude that the act of being (esse) of a thing must come from a cause, and it is distinct from the

essentia of the same thing. We also see that esse is possessed by things in various degrees, which

gives rise to a metaphysical or ontological hierarchy of being. The multiplicity and finitude of

5 ARISTOTLE, Physics, VII, ch. 1, 241b 24; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3.

6 Cf. Compendium Theologiae, ch. 7. 7 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 75, a. 1.

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things reveal that no individual thing can possess the act of being in all its fullness, in its full

intensity. Rather, finite things possess esse only in part, by participation. Now, if esse is

possessed only in a partial manner by things, by participation, it must be present in a being that

possesses it in all its fullness, in all its intensity. This being is none other than God.

Types of Efficient Causes

There are various types of efficient causes, namely: the primary cause and the secondary

cause; the principal cause and the instrumental cause; the total cause and the partial cause; the

coordinated cause and the subordinated cause; the universal cause and the partial cause; the

physical cause and the moral cause; the per se cause and the per accidens cause; the

proximate cause and the remote cause; the necessary cause and the free cause; the univocal

cause and analogical cause; the natural cause and the rational cause.

1. Primary Cause and secondary cause. God is the sole First or Primary Efficient Cause,

for the definition of primary efficient cause is this: a cause which is wholly independent of other

things; a cause which has, in no sense, a cause of its own. Creatures are secondary efficient

causes; they depend upon the First Cause for their existence and their equipment and their

function.

2. Principal cause and instrumental cause. The principal efficient cause exercises its

own activity with the aid of another cause which subserves that activity. The writer, for example,

exercises his activity with the aid of pen or pencil. The instrumental efficient cause operates

(exercises its causality) under the movement and direction of a principal cause. The pen or pencil

which serves the writer is an instrumental cause. Notice that the whole effect (in our example, the

finished piece of writing) is attributable to both the principal cause and the instrumental cause,

but in different respective ways. The writer wrote the whole letter; so did the pen. But the letter

is, first and foremost, the writers; as an expression of thought it must be attributed to the writer

alone; no one would praise the pen for high sentiments or graceful phrasing. But the letter is

attributable to the pen as used by the writer, and as having a fitness or suitability to serve the

writer in the activity of writing. The instrument thus has its efficient causality in its disposition or

fitness to serve a certain use, and this causality is actually exercised only under the transient

application of the instrument to its use by the activity of the principal cause.8

Regarding the principal cause and the instrumental cause, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo

state: We have so far stressed that the efficient cause is always superior to its effects.

Experience clearly shows, however, that there are certain effects which surpass the perfection of

the causes which produce them. A surgeons knife, for instance, restores health to a patient; a

combination of uttered sounds enables a man to convey his thoughts to another man. As we can

easily see, the enormous efficacy of these causes stems from the fact that they are employed as

instruments by some other higher cause.

An instrumental cause is a cause which produces an effect not by virtue of its own form,

but on account of the motion or movement conferred on it by a principal agent. A principal

cause, in contrast, is a cause which acts by its own power.

8 P. J. GLENN, Ontology, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1957, pp. 318-319.

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A distinction has to be made between two effects of an instrumental cause, namely, that

stemming from the instruments own form (proper effect) and that arising from the influence of

the principal cause (instrumental effect). The proper effect of a paint brush, for instance, is the

transfer of paint to the canvas; its instrumental effect, however, is the landscape scene impressed

on the canvas by virtue of the skill of the painter, who is the principal cause.

The action of the instrument as an instrument is not different from the action of the

principal agent, since the power which permanently resides in the principal agent is acquired in a

transient manner by the instrument insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. The skillful

painter always has the ability to do an excellent work, but the paint brush only has it while it is

being used by the artist.

Consequently, the effect of the instrumental action has to be attributed to the agent

rather than to the instrument. Strictly speaking, miracles are not attributed to saints but to God,

just as literary work is not attributed to the authors typewriter but to the author himself.

It is quite obvious, however, that in order to obtain certain effects the agent needs

suitable tools. To cut something, for instance, a sharp hard instrument is required. One should

keep in mind that the instrument achieves the instrumental effect through its proper effect. Once

a saw has lost its sharpness, it will not anymore be suitable for cutting and cannot be utilized for

furniture-making.

Instrumental causality has considerable importance not only in daily life, but also in the

supernatural dimension of human life in relation to God, who makes use of the natural actions of

creatures as instruments to obtain supernatural effects. This is why instrumental causality is dealt

with quite extensively in Theology.9

3. Total cause and partial cause. By reason of the scope of their influence, efficient

causes may be either total or partial. A total cause is the complete cause of the effect in any given

order, whereas a partial cause only produces a portion of it. For this reason, partial causes are

always coordinated. Each of the horses in a team, for instance, is a partial cause of the movement

of the carriage or of the plow. Men are partial causes of peace in society, since it is attained

through the good will of individuals.10

4. Coordinated cause and subordinated cause. A coordinated cause is the same as a

partial cause and thus accounts for only part of the effect. A subordinated cause is a cause which

depends upon another cause. If such a cause depends upon another cause in the very exercise of

its causality, it is called an essentially subordinated cause. Such a cause produces the whole

effect, but in dependence upon the other cause. For instance, the chisel of a scuptor is a cause

which exercises influence upon the whole statue, but is dependent upon the sculptor in the very

exercise of its causality. If a cause depends upon another cause, but not in the exercise of its

causality, it is said to be accidentally subordinated to this cause. For example, a man depends on

his father as upon upon a superior cause for his existence, but in the act of begetting a son he

9 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 205-207. 10

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 204.

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does not depend upon him; hence he is only accidentally subordinated to his father, insofar as the

act of begetting a son is concerned.11

5. Universal cause and particular cause. This classification refers to the coverage or

extension of the causal influence or the set of specifically distinct effects to which it extends. A

cause is universal if it extends to a series of specifically distinct results; it is particular if it is

restricted to a single type of effects. In the strict sense, God alone is a universal cause, since He

alone is an efficient cause who creates and sustains in existence every kind of creature. In a

wider sense, however, a cause is universal if its causal efficacy extends to all the specifically

distinct effects within a given sphere. In the construction of a building, for example, the architect

is a universal cause with respect to the many other agents (carpenters, bricklayers, plumbers,

etc.), who work together to build the structure.

In a different sense, a universal cause is a cause which produces a given effect from a

more universal point of view. God, for instance, produces all things from the supremely universal

point of view of being. A particular cause, in this sense, is a cause which achieves its effect from

a more limited point of view. A man, for example, produces a cabinet in so far as it is a cabinet,

but not insofar as it is a being.

The more actuality a cause has (that is, the more perfect it is), the greater its operative

power is, and the wider the field of influence it has. As we ascend in the hierarchy or degrees of

being in the universe, we find a greater causal influence. The causal influence of plants goes

further than that of inanimate things. In the case of man, through his intelligence, he achieves a

wide span of effects inconceivable in the world of lower living things and of inanimate things,

which are rigidly directed towards a determinate kind of effect. God, who is supremely Perfect

Act and is, therefore, at the peak of efficient causality, infinitely transcends all causal influence

of creatures as regards both intensity and extension.12

6. Physical cause and moral cause. A physical efficient cause is one that produces an

effect by its own physical activity. A moral efficient cause (which is not an efficient cause

properly so called, but as such by an extension of meaning) is one that exercises an influence on

a free agent (that is, a free actor, doer, performer) by means of command, persuasion, invitation,

force of example. The free agent who is moved to action by such influences is the physical

efficient cause of the action; the one who exercises such influences over the physical cause is the

moral efficient cause of the action.13

7. Per se cause and per accidens cause. A per se efficient cause is one that tends by

nature or intention to produce the effect that actually is produced. Fire is the per se efficient

cause of light and heat; it tends by its nature to produce light and heat. A hunter who shoots a

rabbit is the per se efficient cause of the killing, because he intends it. A per accidens efficient

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H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 247-248. 12

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 204-205. 13 P. J. GLENN, op. cit., p. 319. Koren observes that a physical cause produces its effect by direct action towards

this effect; e.g., the carpenter is the physical efficient cause of the table he produces. A moral cause produces an

effect by proposing a purpose to the physical cause; e.g., a customer, by offering money, induces the carpenter to

make a table(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 248).

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cause is one that produces an effect by accident, since it is either not such a cause as naturally

produces this effect, or the effect is not intended. A man drilling a well for water strikes oil; the

drilling is not by nature calculated to bring up oil in each case, but, in this case, it does so per

accidens. A man digging a grave uncovers buried treasure per accidens. A hunter shoots a dog,

mistaking it for a rabbit; he is the per accidens cause of the killing of the dog, because he did not

intend it. The term per se means of itself; and the term per accidens means by accident. A

cause which of itself (that is, by its nature, or by the intention of a free agent) produces an effect

is the per se cause of that effect; a cause which happens to produce an effect, although the cause

is not naturally ordinated to the producing of this effect, or in case of a free agent acting as

physical or moral efficient cause is not intentionally directed to the producing of this effect, is

the per accidens, or the accidental cause of the effect.14

8. Proximate cause and remote cause. A proximate (or next door) efficient cause

admits no medium between itself and its effect. A remote (or farther off) efficient cause has

one or more mediate causes between itself and the effect. A thief is the proximate cause of the

theft; the man who ordered the thief to steal, or showed him how to do it, is the remote cause. A

disease may be the proximate cause of death; the contagion or infection which induced the

disease is the remote cause. There is here an axiom of value for philosopher and moralist: causa

causae est causa causati which is translated literally as, The cause of a cause is the cause of

what the latter produces. We may translate the axiom freely thus, The remote cause is a true

contributor to the effect of the proximate cause. Of course, the degree or measure of the

contribution will depend upon the actual influence which comes through to the ultimate effect

from the remote cause. A moral efficient cause is always a remote cause of the ultimate effect.

Our little Catechism lists the nine ways of being accessory to anothers sin, and therein presents

for our consideration a series of moral and remote efficient causes, and indicates that

responsibility for the ultimate effect rests upon the remote cause as well as upon the proximate

cause: causa causae est causa causati. Another way of expressing the truth of this axiom (as

touching free agents) is this: qui facit per alium, facit per se, He who does a thing through an

agent or proxy or representative, does it himself.15

9. Necessary cause and free cause. A necessary cause is one that is compelled by nature

to produce its effect when all conditions for it are fulfilled. Fire under dry chips is the necessary

cause for flame. The sun is the necessary cause of daylight. A free cause is one that can refrain

from producing its effect when all conditions for it are fulfilled. A hungry man with appetizing

food before him may still refuse to eat.16

Concerning determined cause and free cause, Alvira,

Clavell and Melendo state the following: A determined cause is a cause which produces its

14 P. J. GLENN, op. cit., pp. 319-320. Koren states: A cause is called direct (per se) if it tends to produce a certain

effect either naturally or freely. For example, the act of digging naturally tends to produce a hole, and the digger

freely intends to produce a hole. By an accidental cause is usually meant a cause which produces some effect other

than that which was freely or naturally intended. For instance, the act of digging a hole may be the accidental cause

of a treasure trove(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 248). 15

P. J. GLENN, op. cit., pp. 320-321. Koren writes: The proximate cause is the cause from which the effect

proceeds immediately. The remote cause acts upon another cause and thus produces the effect mediately. For

instance, if I boil water, the proximate cause of the boiling is the heat of the kettle, and the fire applied to the kettle

is a remote cause(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 248). 16 P. J. GLENN, op. cit., p. 321. Koren: A necessary cause is determined by its very nature to act in a definitive

way, whereas a free cause has control over its actions(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 248).

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proper effect as the result of the mere vitality of its nature. These causes are sometimes called

necessary causes, in another divergent sense. A plant, for instance, spontaneously produces its

flowers and fruit. Consequently, in the absence of any impediment, these causes necessarily

produce their effects and can never act in a different way.

In contrast, a free cause is a cause which produces its effect with mastery over its own

operation, thus being able to produce it or not, by virtue of its own decision. A man, for instance,

can decide to go for a walk or refrain from doing so. Free causes have mastery over the goal

which they seek, because they know it and tend towards it by their own will.

The effects of determined causes somehow pre-exist in their respective causes in such a

way that the movement of the cause of itself allows one to foresee its effects. The study of the

nature of a living organism enables a person to know how it will act subsequently, taking into

account its contingency. Free causes, in contrast, are not determined towards a single end. They

may or may not act, and they may act in a particular way or another. Knowledge of their nature

does not enable one to foresee their effects. This is true in the case of the activity of men and of

angels, and of Gods activity with regard to the created world.17

10. Univocal cause and equivocal cause. A univocal cause produces an effect of the

identical species to which itself belongs. Human parents are the univocal causes of their children.

An equivocal cause produces an effect which belongs to a different species than that to which the

cause belongs. Thus, April showers bring May flowers; the human sculptor produces a non-

human statue.18

Regarding univocal cause and analogical cause, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo

state the following: This classification of causes refers to the degree of likeness of the effect to

its cause. A univocal cause produces an effect of the same species as itself. Fire produces fire;

one tree produces another tree. An analogical cause produces an effect of a different and lower

species than itself, although there is always some likeness to itself. God is an analogical cause of

creatures: the act of being which He gives them does result in a likeness to God, since it is a

participation of that act which He has by essence. However, since the creatures act of being is

restricted by an essence, the created esse is infinitely distinct from that of God. Man is an

analogical cause of the artifacts he produces (a bed, a poem, a car), since these are of a species

different from man. Artificial things are subdued likenesses of the human spirit, since their forms

(received in matter) are similar to the spiritual forms which the artisan conceives in order to do

his work.

The entire natural activity of creatures is univocal, since it is limited to a definite kind of

effect: the effect is of the same species as the agent, by virtue of the substantial or accidental

form. Activity which arises from the spirit, however, is analogical. A man naturally engenders

another man, but under the guidance of his will and his intellect he produces very diverse

effects.19

11. Natural cause and rational cause. A natural efficient cause (called agens per

naturam, that is, Acting by its nature) is any necessary cause in the physical order. A rational

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T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 208-209. 18 P. J. GLENN, op. cit., p. 321-322. 19

T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 205.

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efficient cause (called agens per intellectum, that is, Acting with understanding) is a free cause,

a cause which acts with knowledge and free choice.20

Per Se Essentially Subordinated Series of Efficient Causes and Per Accidens

Accidentally Subordinated Series of Efficient Causes

Contrasting an essential efficient causal series from an accidental efficient causal series,

Aquinas states in the second article of the forty sixth question of the Prima Pars: In efficient

causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se thus, there cannot be an infinite number of

causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick,

the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity

accidentally as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied

should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental; as an artificer acts

by means of many hammer accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is

accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it

is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates

as a man, and not as the son of another man.21

Commenting on the difference between a per se essentially subordinated series of

efficient causes and a per accidens accidentally subordinated series of efficient causes,

Dougherty observes the following: An effect can be related to a series of efficient causes in

either an essential or accidental way. Let us consider first the meaning of an essential, efficient

causal series. An effect can be produced by a series of primary and secondary causes in what is

called an essentially (per se) subordinate series of proper causes. There are certain definite

attributes of this series: 1. The secondary causes cannot act except as members of the series

notwithstanding their own natures which are the principles of their own movement ; 2. Each

member of the series influences the total effect ; 3. Each member of the series has a true

causality proper to its nature; 4. There must be a first in the series which is independent and the

others are dependent upon it.

If there were no first cause in the essential series there would be no effect. The

secondary or intermediary causes cannot by themselves produce the effect, since intermediary

causes produce not only by their own nature but as influenced or moved by the first cause. If all

causes were only intermediate there would be in the series no sufficient reason for the effect. The

primary cause is the universal source of the causal series terminating in the effect of the series.

An accidental, efficient, causal series is a series in which the causal influence of the

primary and every secondary member does not reach to the last effect but only the proximate

effect. For example: a chicken lays an egg which is hatched into another chicken, which lays an

egg hatched into another chicken, and so on. Any one member of the series can be dropped

without effecting the last result so long as the members are cojoined. The following attributes

describe such a series: 1. Its causality is necessarily univocal. In other words all the members

cause in the same way. Every hen produces an egg. There is no hierarchy of causes, namely, a

superior primary cause and inferior secondary causes as in the case of the essential series ; 2. The

20 P. GLENN, op. cit., p. 322. 21

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7.

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members need only be cojoined in the series ; 3. There need not be a first in number in the

accidental series. The series as accidental need not be terminated from a primary cause since

multiplication of its members is accidental. It is theoretically infinite the potential infinite or

indefinite. There is no limit to the possible number of eggs and chickens as antecedents to this

last effected egg. It is called an accidental series because the multiplication of its members is

accidental.22

Per Se Essentially Subordinated Series of Efficient Causes Utilized for the Second Way

(Secunda Via) A Posteriori Quia Demonstration of the Existence of God. The second way23

quia

demonstration departs from the experience of efficient causality in activity found in the world

and ascends to an affirmation of the existence of God as the First Efficient Cause: The second

way is from the nature of efficient cause. In the world of sensible things we find there is an order

of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is

found to be the efficient cause of itself, for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes

following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the

cause of the ultimate cause whether the intermediate cause be several or one only. Now to take

away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore if there be no first cause among efficient

causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate, cause. But if in efficient causes it is

possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate

effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is

necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.24

The starting point is our experience of the basic phenomena of efficient causality in the

things of this world, in particular, of subordinated per se efficient causes, causes being ordered

per se whenever the virtue of the first cause influences the ultimate effect produced through the

intermediary causes. Here the causal influx of the first cause reaches to the ultimate effect by

means of other causes. Let us give an example of a subordinated per se order of efficient causes:

Harry is playing tennis. In this case, Harrys expertise moves his right hand, and his right hand

moves the tennis racket, and the tennis racket moves the ball, which is the ultimate effect. In this

series of causes the causal influx of Harrys expertise influences the ultimate effect, the moving

of the ball, by means of other causes like his hands and his tennis racket. The Angelic Doctor

explains: two things may be considered in every agent, namely, the thing itself that acts, and

the power whereby it acts. Thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower

agent depends upon the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower

agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action. Thus the

craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the

instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion.

Consequently, the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from the lower agent through

22

K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit., pp. 152-154. 23

Studies on the Second Way: P. CAROSI, La serie infinita di cause efficienti subordinate, Divus Thomas, 46

(1943), pp. 29-77, 159-175 ; R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, La deuxime preuve de lexistence de Dieu propose

par Saint Thomas, Doctor Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 28-40 ; R. LAUER, The Notion of Efficient Cause in the

Secunda Via, The Thomist, 38 (1974), pp. 754-767 ; J. R. T. LAMONT, An Argument for an Uncaused Cause,

The Thomist, 59 (1995), pp. 261-277 ; R. L. CARTWRIGHT, The Second Way, Mediaeval Philosophy and

Theology, 5 (1996), pp. 189-204. 24

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3.

11

the agents own power, but also through the power of all the higher agents, for it acts by the

power of them all. Now just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power

of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of the effect; because the power of

the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher

agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is

found to produce its effect of itself, as though it were the immediate cause.25

The secunda via deals with essential or per se subordinated efficient causes, not per

accidens ordered causes where the causal influx does not reach down to the ultimate effect, but

only to the proximate effect. That the proximate effect manages in turn to cause some other

effect is not due to the causal influx of the first cause in such a series. The latter effect is

obviously outside the influence of the first efficient cause. Here is an example of a per accidens

series of ordered causes: A camper lights a primed torch in the woods with his flaming torch.

The fact that the torch that was lit is then used to light another primed torch and yet another can

only be outside the influx of the first efficient cause (the flaming torch that lit the first primed

torch). In this series of one torch lighting another, the influence of the first cause extends only to

the proximate effect (the first primed torch lit) but not to the last or ultimate effect (the last

primed torch lit). Since the last primed torch lit is outside the influence of the first cause this

series of causes is ordered only accidentally, for what is beyond the virtue of a cause is by

accident (per accidens).

In the per se ordered series of efficient causes, on the other hand, the influx of the first

cause extends to the production of the ultimate effect through the instrumentality of the

intermediate causes. The general characteristics of a per se ordered series of efficient causes

include: 1. Whenever the effect is produced in the our material cosmos, all the four causes

(material, formal, efficient and final) are simultaneously and actually exercising their proper

causality; and 2. Not only is the causality of the material, formal, efficient and final causes

properly and simultaneously exercised in the production of the effect, but it is also exercised in

the conservation of the effect, that is, in keeping the effect in being. Let us take the example of

the Piet sculpted by Michelangelo more than five hundred years ago. Now, the Piet cannot

remain in existence, in being, unless its matter (the marble) and form (the form of the statue) be

continually actualized, that is, unless the very act of being of that sculpted work of art composed

of prime matter and substantial form remains. And that act of being, in turn, had to be produced

or caused by an efficient cause. As the act of being of the effect (the Piet) is but a produced or

caused esse, it continually is in need of the presence and influx of its proper efficient cause.

The per se ordered series of efficient causes also has a number of special characteristics.

From the very nature of the series itself all the efficient or agent causes must be required here

and now, and in act, for the production of the effect. Remove any one of the causes and the

activity of the whole per se series immediately ceases. This is so for the causal influx of the first

efficient cause reaches down to the ultimate effect through the instrumentality of all of the

intermediate causes, not merely through some of them. Another special characteristic issues from

the first, namely, while all the causes involved in our per se series are agent or efficient causes,

each one of them is of a different nature of species. A third special characteristic is that all the

efficient causes must not only be in act, but must be in simultaneous act. We are not speaking of

25

Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 70.

12

a succession in time but only of a subordination in causality. Lastly, in our per se ordered series

there is but one causal influx, one single operation, in which all efficient or agent causes share

according to their respective natures, thus forming a single causal principle from which this

activity proceeds and which ends in the same ultimate effect.

Applying metaphysical causality to the point of departure of our secunda via, there is

indicated the contingency of subordinated efficient causes and a need for a foundation in a

primary and principal efficient cause. It is impossible for a thing to be its own efficient cause, for

then it would have to exist before it existed, which is absurd. It should be noted that when we are

dealing with efficient causality we are dealing with activity. We observe that things act, and by

acting they produce effects. They cause, they are efficient or agent causes. To produce means to

cause efficiently, to cause an effect efficiently. Now, for a cause to act, it has to be in act, in

being, for activity follows being. Nothing causes unless it first of all exists. We must ultimately

ask the question: what is the efficient cause of the very existence, of the very being, of the

subordinated per se ordered efficient causes?

There is then a reference to the impossibility of an infinite regress in per se ordered

efficient causes. An infinite regress would mean no first efficient cause. But if there would be no

first efficient cause then there could be no ultimate effect because there would be no causal

influx which produced the effect. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the

intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause. But, when you

suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first cause, the

intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among efficient

causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate, will be

suppressed. But this is manifestly false.26

The conclusion, that a First Efficient Cause (God)

necessarily exists, must therefore be admitted.

Objections to the Second Way and Their Replies. Holloway replies to four common

objections to the second way, posed by immanentists like the transcendental idealist Kant and the

rationalist Descartes, as follows: First objection. It seems impossible to conclude to the

existence of God as the first uncaused cause. This conclusion is based upon the principle of

causality, and the principle of causality flows from a particular contingent sensible fact for

example, the sun is heating my hand. Now it is quite impossible, as well as quite illogical, to use

a principle based upon a particular, contingent, sensible fact, to conclude to a universal,

necessary, suprasensible term. Contingency cannot give rise to necessity. A principle that flows

from sensible phenomena is valid only when applied to sensible phenomena. Hence this second

way of St. Thomas is quite impossible as well as completely illogical.

We answer: The principle of causality does not have its origin in sensible beings insofar

as they are sensible, but insofar as they are or exist. Thus this principle is founded in being as

such and its application is valid beyond mere sensible being. Moreover, although this principle

originates from contingent beings, there is in these beings some necessity; namely, these

contingent beings have a necessary relation to a cause. Therefore, by applying this principle of

causality, we are able to posit God as a first cause.

26

Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13, no. 33.

13

Second objection. If the world is eternal, there is no reason why a series of efficient

causes could not be infinite. But philosophy cannot prove with certitude that the world is not

eternal. Therefore, neither can it prove with certitude that there exists a first efficient cause.

We answer that even if the world were eternal, an infinite series of essentially ordered

efficient causes would still be a contradiction. Because in causes so ordered, the power of the

first cause extends itself to the ultimate effect. And therefore without this power neither the

ultimate effect can be produced, nor are the intermediary causes able to act. The question of the

eternity or non-eternity of the world does not touch our argument, since it is not founded in any

position concerning the duration the world, but rather in the very nature of per se ordered

efficient causes. However, as is clear, if the world were eternal, an infinite series of accidentally

ordered causes (ex parte ante) would not be contradictory.

Third objection. Even in per se ordered causes, although a first cause might be required,

it does not follow that this cause must be itself uncaused. For example, cause A could produce

the power of causing in cause B, and cause B could produce the power of causing in cause C,

and cause C could produce the power of causing in cause A. In this way, the first cause, cause A,

would not be itself uncaused, and our proof would not conclude to the existence of God.

We answer that the mutual causality which this objection presupposes is not possible

except among different kinds of causes; for example, between material and formal causes, or

between efficient and final causes. But in our proof there is a question of explaining the actuality

of only one kind of series, namely of efficient causes. And, as is obvious, the same efficient

cause could at the same time both give and receive the power of causing.

Fourth objection. Finally, as Descartes has pointed out, all that this argument can

conclude to is the imperfection of my intellect. I am not able to comprehend how an infinity of

such causes could so proceed one from another from eternity without one of them being first: I

have not taken my argument (for the existence of God) from the fact that I see in sensible things

a certain order or succession of efficient causesbecause from such a succession of causes I do

not see how I can conclude to any thing else except the imperfection of my intellect to

understand; to understand, that is, how such a series of infinite causes could succeed one another

from eternity without there being a first.27

And a little later on Descartes gives an example of

what he understands by such a series of ordered causes: When I understand that I was generated

by my father, I also understand that my father was generated by my grandfather; and since I

cannot go on ad infinitum asking about the parents of parents, I simply and arbitrarily make an

end of the enquiry by saying that there was a first. In other words, Descartes argues this way:

from the fact that I cannot comprehend an infinite series of causes, it does not necessarily follow

that therefore there must be a first cause. And then he gives us this example to prove his point:

from the fact that I cannot comprehend the infinite divisions in a finite quantity, it does not

follow that there is an ultimate division beyond which I cannot divide.

We answer this objection of Descartes as follows: The reason our intellect cannot go

into infinity in such a series of per se ordered causes is that this series in its existence is finite.

And our intellect positively sees that it must be finite, and thus it also sees, from the very nature

27

R. DESCARTES, Primae Responsiones, t. VII, pp. 106-107.

14

of the series, the necessity of positing a first cause; for our intellect positively sees that an actual

infinite series of essentially ordered efficient causes would be a contradiction.28

Furthermore, the example that Descartes uses of an ordered series of efficient causes

shows that he essentially misunderstands the second way of St. Thomas, which argues from a

series of per se ordered causes. Descartes gives an example of only accidentally (per accidens)

ordered causes, not essentially (per se) ordered causes. As we have already noted, there is no

repugnance in an infinite regress of accidentally ordered causes, for they are not all essentially

ordered (are not here and now needed) for the ultimate effect. A man generates a son precisely as

father, and not as son of his own father, let alone as grandson of his grandfather.

Finally, when Descartes talks about the infinite divisibility of quantity, he again misses

the point. The divisibility of quantity is potentially infinite; whereas in the second way, we argue

from the impossibility of an actually infinite series of per se ordered efficient causes.29

Axioms Regarding Efficient Causes

The axioms regarding efficient causes are the following: 1. Cause and effect are

proportionate; 2. No effect can be more perfect than its adequate cause; 3. The cause must

contain within itself the perfection of the effect; 4. Nothing can come from nothing (ex nihilo

nihil fit); 5. Every agent acts in a manner similar to itself; and 6. Action follows being (agere

sequitur esse).

1. Cause and effect are proportionate. The effect cannot be greater than the cause

producing it. Otherwise a part of the effect would be without a cause, and that is contrary to the

principle of causality. Again, the cause cannot have an actually exerted causality which is greater

than is required to produce the effect. Otherwise the cause would (partly) not be a cause, since

that part of its action aould not produce any effect.30

2. No effect can be more perfect than its adequate cause. This is obvious. Otherwise

there would be an effect, or part of an effect, without a cause to produce it and give it existence.

This would be in violation of the principle of causality.

3. The cause must contain within itself the perfection of the effect. No being can give

what it does not possess. Hence, the cause must contain the perfection of its effects either

formally, virtually, or eminently.31

28 See: Summa Theologiae, I, q. 105, a. 5; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, chapter 67; De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 7. 29

M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., pp. 99-101. 30 C. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 353. Koren: Cause and effect are proportionate. The effect cannot be greater than the

cause; for otherwise part of the effect would be without a cause, which is against the principle of causality. By cause

we mean that which really is the cause, and not that which perhaps erroneously is considered to be the cause.

Likewise, the cause cannot be greater than the effect, i.e., exercise more causality than required by the effect. For

otherwise part of the cause would be causing without causing something, which is a contradiction in terms(H. J.

KOREN, op. cit., p. 244). 31

C. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 353. J. F. McCormick writes: The cause must contain whatever perfection it confers on

the effect. This axiom rests on the general principle that a thing cannot give what it does not possess. But the cause

need not contain the perfection of the effect formally; it is sufficient that it should contain it virtually and

15

4. Nothing can come from nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit). The meaning is: whatever

happens must have an efficient cause to account for its happening. Nothing has nothing to give;

therefore, it cannot produce anything. This follows from the principle of causality, as just

explained.32

5. Every agent acts in a manner similar to itself. Action flows from the nature of the

agent. Since the action depends on the nature of the agent, the nature cannot give rise to an action

which would be at variance with itself: the agent, therefore, can act only in a manner similar to

its nature, i.e., to itself. For this reason the effect must also, in some way, resemble its cause,

otherwise the cause would not have contained the perfection of the effect.33

6. Action follows being (agere sequitur esse). All actions are the exercise of the

operative powers of a thing. These operative powers proceed from the nature or being of the

thing. Hence, the action of a thing must be proportionate to the being and follow the manner of

this being.34

Critique of Scotus on Efficient Causality

Holding the position that efficiency is the production of the effect viewed actively as

coming from a being and designating it as a cause, Charles Hart critiques Scotuss view of

efficiency as follows: In Duns Scotus, efficiency is considered formally to be precisely the

reference or intrinsic relation of the agent to its term or effect.35

It is a predicamental relation

subjected in the agent which results from the positing of the term of the relation (namely, the

effect). This is a confusion of the essence of efficiency with what results from it and takes its rise

from it. Efficient causality in act may cease when the action ceases, but the formal relation of

causality (that is, cause to effect, and effect to cause) continues; for example, the father-son

relation continues after the action (actio) of efficiency, whereby the relation was established, has

ceased. The reason for this continuation of the relation is that the action of efficiency has set up

in the cause and in the effect a fixed determination (an esse in) which continues to be the

equivalently. An explosive charge imparts velocity to a projectile. Of course, the charge does not contain velocity as

such, or formally; but equivalently it does because its power is equal to the effect produced in the projectile. It has

the perfection virtually. If God creates a rational soul, He must, as cause, contain the perfection of that effect, i.e.,

spirituality and rationality. Now God contains spirituality formally, for God is a spirit. Rationality He does not

contain formally, for it is a form of intellectuality that presupposes imperfection in its subject. But He does contain

rationality virtually, and not only equivalently, but even in a higher degree. For since He is an intelligent being, His

intelligence embraces whatever perfection is included in rationality without the imperfection which rationality also

contains(J. F. McCORMICK, Scholastic Metaphysics, vol. 1: Being. Its Division and Causes, Loyola University

Press, Chicago, 1940, pp. 154-155). 32 Koren: Nothing can come from nothing. The meaning of this axiom is clear whoever appeals to nothing as an

explanation of something does not give any explanation. Non-being cannot account for being(H. J. KOREN, op.

cit., p. 244). 33

Koren: Every agent acts as it is. The meaning is that every action of an agent depends upon the nature of the

agent, in the sense that no agent can exercise any action which is contrary to its nature. For no being can give what it

does not have. This principle makes it possible to determine the nature of an agent from the nature of the activities

exercised by this agent(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., p. 244). 34 C. BITTLE, The Domain of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 353-354. Koren: This axiom, which is

frequently used, may mean either that no agent can act unless it exists, or that the action of an agent is proportionate

to its nature(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 244-245). 35

In IV Sent., 13, 1; Quodlibet, 13.

16

foundation of a relation whereby each has reference to the other (esse ad). Thus a relation

follows the exercise of efficiency but does not constitute it. Limitation of space does not permit

us to go into the definite misinterpretation of a few texts of St. Thomas (Summa Theologiae, I, a.

41, a. 1, 2m; also q. 45, a. 3, c. and a. 2, 2m) in which he appears to contradict himself on this

point. The distinguished Thomistic commentator, John of St. Thomas, deals at length with this

misinterpretation in his Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus.36

In a word, we must not identify the

distinct predicaments of action and relation as they concern finite efficiency.

The difficulty of making relation the essence of efficiency may also be seen when we

consider efficiency properly as a transcendental predicated analogously of both Infinite and finite

beings. Certainly God cannot have any real relations with His created universe, since that would

imply a dependence or limitation in God. We can think of God as related to creatures, but this of

course would be only a relation of reason or logical relation. If relation were of the essence of

efficiency as such, we should then have to say that creative efficiency is a mere relation of reason

of God to creatures. Rather as St. Thomas puts it: If creation is considered actively it signifies

action of God, which is His essence with relation (of reason) to creature.37

The relation of

reason is consequent upon the creative act which is God Himself. Because God is, we are.

Passively from the standpoint of the creature, creation may be defined as a real relation (of

dependence) with a newness of being. Here very obviously the relation is not the being nor the

action of creation but is itself definitely the effect of the action of creation. Here again the

transcendental character of efficiency, concerned as it is with the act of to be, keeps the mind

from confusing the essence of efficiency as such with what issimultaneously consequent upon

it.38

Critique of Suarez on Efficient Causality

Again, holding the Thomistic position that efficiency is the production of the effect

viewed actively as coming from a being and designating it as a cause, Hart critiques the view of

Suarez on efficiency as follows: Suarezs position on the action of efficiency is as follows:

Action is that by which the efficient cause actually attains its effect and by which the effect

depends on its cause; it is this dependence of the effect made on the cause making.39

And again:

Action of efficiency is an emanation or dependence of effect on cause acting.40

The immediate

objection is that such a definition of efficient cause in no way distinguishes its particular

influence or positive contribution to the to be of the effect from the influence of cause generally.

In all four causes there is the common element of dependence of effect on cause. As St. Thomas

says: This name cause (generally) is seen to imply dependence of some one thing on another.41

Further, this association of efficiency as such with a becoming would preclude divine or creative

action as efficient because there is here no subject of change and therefore no becoming. The

whole being is produced from the nothingness of the thing itself and the nothingness of any

subject. Lastly, even where there is becoming involved, the association of the becoming with

36

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, vol. II, Vives, Paris, 1893, p. 237b. 37

De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 3, c. 38 C. A. HART, Thomistic Metaphysics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1959, pp. 254-255. 39

F. SUAREZ, Disputationes in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, vol. 18, Vives, Paris, 1866, sec. 10, n. 6. 40 F. SUAREZ, op. cit., vol. 18, sec. 10, n. 8. 41

Summa Theologiae, I, a. 33, a. 1.

17

dependence of the effect means that it is considered passively from the standpoint of the

termination. This therefore presupposes a becoming considered actively from the standpoint of

the agent as proceeding from the being which the active becoming denominates as efficient cause

in act. Thus the difficulty of the Suarezian position brings out the soundness of the Thomistic

position in making the essence of efficiency, wherever it may be found, the production of the

effect viewed actively as coming from a being (radiating) and designating it as a cause.42

The Denial of the Objective Validity of Efficient Causality

Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. One of the first deniers of the objective validity of

efficient causality in the history of ancient thought were the Skeptics. We see the denial of

efficient causality, for example, in the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. In the Middle Ages we

see Al-Ghazali (Algazel 1058-1111) doubting the possibility of knowing with certitude the

relation of effect to cause as well as the actual influx of a cause. Towards the end of Medieval

philosophy William of Ockham doubted the universality of the principle of causality, a sad

consequence of his nominalism.

Modern Philosophy. With modern philosophy we see the immanentist phenomenalism of

the empiricists attacking the objective validity of the principle of efficient causality because of

their reduction of knowledge to sense experience as well as their agnosticism concerning extra-

mental reality. The phenomenalists taught that we can only know phenomena as they appear to

the human mind (immanentism) and not the real natures of things existing in extra-mental

reality. The mind, they maintained, only experiences a temporal succession of phenomena,

phenomena perceived as following each other. There are antecedents and consequents, no cause

and effects. But, because of habit, mans imagination changes the local and temporal sequence of

phenomena appearing before him into an imagined causal connection wherein it is thought that

a latter phenomenon has been produced by an earlier phenomenon.

Locke. Locke taught that we could never come to an understanding of the notion of cause,

for, in keeping with the tenets of phenomenalism, since intellection is reduced to the level of

sense experience our senses are only able to reach a succession of phenomena. The objective

existence of efficient causality, he says, is unknowable.

Hume. In keeping with his immanentist phenomenalism, Hume denied the objective

validity of the principle of efficient causality, reducing objective causality to a mere succession

of phenomena put together by the associative force of habit, a mere product of our imagination.

When we observe, for example, a lighted torch and then feel heat we are accustomed to conclude

a causal bond. But in fact, Hume points out, it is the imagination, working by habit, that conjures

up this causal bond from what is in fact a mere succession of phenomena: We have no other

notion of cause and effect but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoined

togetherWe cannot penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing and

always find that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire a union in the imagination.43

Attacking the objective validity of the principle of efficient causality in An Enquiry Concerning

Human Understanding, he states: When we look towards external objects, and consider the

42 C. A. HART, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 43

D. HUME, A Treatise on Human Nature, I, 3, 6.

18

operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary

connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible

consequent of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The

impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears

to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of

objects: consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any

thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.44

Kreyche explains that it is primarily by Hume that the major attack is launched upon

efficient causality. According to Hume, man knows only his ideas and images directly, and not

the world of reality. Mind is, for him, simply a state of successive phenomenal impressions, and

judgment is replaced by association. In asking whether causality can be justified, Hume requests

that one show how its most important characteristic, necessary nexus, is grounded in experience.

Not finding it rooted there, he concludes that the necessary connection between cause and effect

is psychological, having its ground in custom and the association of ideas. Cause thereupon

becomes a relationship among ideas, and no longer an influence of one thing upon the other in

the real worldThe principal shortcoming of Humes view stems from his empiricism and

nominalism. He attemped to have the senses detect, in a formal way, causality and necessity per

se something that those powers are incapable of doing. Aquinas had himself observed that not

even substance is sensible per se, but only per accidens. Since he did not admit abstraction of an

intellectual nature, Hume was consistent within his own system in rejecting causality and

substance. And, unable to justify causality ontologically, he did the next best thing in justifying it

psychologically.45

44 D. HUME, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VII, 1, 50. 45

G. F. KREYCHE, Causality, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 3, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, p. 346.

Benignus Critique of Humes Rejection of Efficient Causality: 1. Sensism. Humes original error, which led to his

rejection of substance and causality as valid philosophical concepts, was sensism. He considered experience as the

sole ultimate source of valid human knowledge, which it is, but by experience he meant pure sensation, or at very

best perception, and nothing more. Impressions of sense and their less vivid relics in the mind, namely, ideas, are the

only data of knowledge for which experience vouches, according to Hume. We have no impression of causality or

substance; therefore, he argues, these are not given in experience.

Hume mistakes an analysis of the factors in perception for an account of the perceptive act. The data of pure

sensation are, as he says, fragmentary and intermittent sense impressions. But the act which he is analyzing is not an

act of pure sensation. What I perceive is not these fragmentary impressions, but the things of which they are

accidents. It is doubtful that even animals perceive merely sensory qualities. Substances (i.e., particular, concrete)

are the data of perception. They are incidental sensibles immediately perceived by means of internal sense co-

operating within external sense. In his analysis Hume takes as the immediate datum of perception something which

is actually known only as a result of a difficult abstraction, namely, the pure sensation. Then his problem is to

discover how, starting from pure sensations, we come to believe in objective substances which exist unperceived

and permanently. It is a false problem.

2. Human Experience Includes Understanding. Hume is right in saying that we never have a sensory impression

of causality or substance. But he is wrong in saying that we never experience causes or substances. Efficient causes

are immediately experienced every time we observe anything physically influencing anything else, every time, for

example, we see a hammer driving a nail. But the cause qua cause is never sensed directly; cause, like substance, is

only sensed per accidens. The cause as a sensible object, its movement, and the subsequent movement of the object

acted upon are the immediate data of sense. But to limit experience to the sensible data perceived is to imply that

man perceives without ever at the same time understanding what he perceives. When I perceive a hammer

descending upon a nail and the nail moving further into the wood, I also understand that the hammer is something

and is driving the nail into the wood. Both perception and understanding are equally parts of the experience. To

exclude the understanding is to reduce all human experience to uncomprehending sense awareness. Not only is this

19

not the only kind of human experience, but, at least in the case of adults, it never normally occurs at all. We simply

do not perceive without some understanding of what we are perceiving; we do not perceive phenomena without

perceiving them as the phenomena of something; nor do we perceive one thing acting upon another without at the

same time understanding the former as a cause of the effect produced in the latter.

3. Understanding in Perception. There is surely a crystal-clear distinction between mere perceiving and

understanding. The domestic animals of the battlelands of Europe are no more spared the bombing and the fire, the

hunger and the cold, the noise and the stench, than are their human owners. But they have no understanding of what

is going on; no reason for what is happening is known to them, and none is sought. Their minds do not grope for

reasons the way their parched tongues crave for water. The darkness that their eyes suffer when they are driven in

the midst of the night through strange lands is matched by no darkness of intellect seeking a reason which it cannot

find that awful darkness which is so often the lot of man. Failure to understand could no more be a privation and a

suffering in man if his intellect were not made for grasping the reasons and causes of things, than blindness would

be a suffering if sight never grasped the visible. A man who does not understand feels frustrated, because his mind is

made for understanding; he suffers when he cannot grasp the reason, because he knows that there is a reason.

Perception is not understanding; but normally some understanding occurs together with perception: we could not

possibly have the experience of failing to understand what we perceive, if we did not have the prior experience of

understanding what we perceive.

4. Cause is Given to the Intellect. Cause is something that we grasp intellectually in the very act of

experiencing action whether our own action or anothers. We understand the cause as producing the effect: the

hammer as driving the nail, the saw as cutting the wood, the flood as devastating the land, the drill as piercing the

rock, the hand as molding the putty, ourselves as producing our own thoughts, words, and movements, our shoes as

pinching our feet, a pin as piercing our finger, our fellow subway travelers as pressing our ribs together. We do not

think that the nail will ever plunge into the wood without the hammer, the marble shape up as a statue without a

sculptor, the baby begin to exist without a father, the acorn grow with no sunlight; if something ever seems to occur

in this way, we do not believe it, or we call it a miracle (i.e., we attribute it to a higher, unseen cause). In a similar

manner, substance is given directly to the intellect in the very act of perception; the substance is grasped as the

reason for the sensible phenomena.

5. The Subjectivistic Postulate. The arguments of Hume are based on the subjectivistic postulate, namely, that

we know nothing directly except our own ideas. From this starting point, certitude about real causality can never be

reached. The only causality that could ever possibly be discovered if the primary objects of our knowledge were our

own ideas would be the causal relations among the ideas themselves. No such relations are as a matter of fact found,

since none exist and since the subjectivistic postulate is false to begin with. Causal relations exist between objects

and the mind, and between the mind and its ideas, but not between ideas and ideas. Hume places causality in our

mind, as a bond between ideas, when he accounts for our idea of causality by attributing it to mental custom.

Whatever his intention, he actually presents similar successions of ideas as the cause of our ideas of causality and

the principle of causality. As a matter of fact, such causality would not account for our belief in causality, because it

would never be an idea, but only an unknown bond connecting ideas. It is only because Hume is already in

possession of the concept of causality gained through external experience that he is able to formulate the theory that

invariable succession of ideas produces mental custom, which in turn gives rise to the idea of cause.

6. Imagination and Causality. It is, perhaps, this locating of causality among our ideas that leads Hume to a very

peculiar argument against the principle of causality: We can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every

new existence, or new modification of existence, without showing at the same time the impossibility there is that

anything can ever begin to exist without some productive principleNow that the latter is utterly incapable of a

demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by considering, that as all distinct ideas are separable from each

other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be

non-existent at this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive

principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible

fot the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no

contradiction nor absurdity; and it is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without

which it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause(D. HUME, Treatise of Human Nature, I, 3, 3).

This argument, even if we overlook the flagrant petitio principii in the statement that all distinct ideas are

separable from each other, is no argument at all. What Hume says is nothing more than that he can imagine a thing

beginning to exist without a cause, and that consequently no argument from mere ideas can ever prove the necessity

of a cause. We can agree with him that no argument from mere ideas can ever prove real causality; but we will add

that that is why Hume could never prove it he started with mere ideas, or rather images. Aside from this, the

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Kant. Kant rejected the objective validity of efficient causality (since he was an agnostic

concerning noumenal reality) in favor of a subjective view of causality as an a priori form, a

category of the mind. The mind, says Kant, expresses the a priori form by means of a judgment

and unifies it with a conglomeration of phenomena. Consequently, causality has a subjective

validity, not an objective, noumenal one. Causality, therefore, is not valid in the noumenal sphere

in order to prove, say, the existence of God. The causal connection which we place between

things and events is actually manufactured by the mind, says Kant, and therefore, has value only

for the mind and its operations. Causality, he says, is not derived from our experience of things

and events as they actually exist in the extra-subjective noumenal world as the realists naively

maintain.

Kantian transcendental idealism dictates that man knows but the order of appearance or

phenomena, not the order of things-in-themselves or noumena. Now, to know means to change

the datum by locating it within a spatio-temporal relationship, which structure is supplied by the

knower through the a priori forms of sensibility. Next man must impose upon this spatio-

temporal datum certain other categories that are also rooted in the knower a priori. These are the

categories of the understanding (Verstand): quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Causality is

contained as a subdivision of relation. Together with the forms of space and time, these

categories are constitutive of experience, as opposed to the ideas of reason (Vernunft), which can

only be regulative of experience. Previous philosophy erred in confusing the regulative function

of ideas with the constitutive functions of the categories. The categories (including causality) are

valid when applied to the phenomenal order, but not valid when applied beyond this to the

noumenal order. To attempt the latter is to court transcendental illusion (or metaphysics, as Kant

understood it). Nevertheless, such a tendency is natural to man, and he must always be wary lest

he give in to it.

argument is utterly unrelated to the subject of causality. Imagination has nothing to do with causes or with

beginnings of existence. I never imagine anything as beginning to exist, or even as existing; I simply imagine the

thing, and in my image there is no reference to existence. The thing which I imagine may as easily be a fire-

breathing dragon as my own brother. The reference to existence lies in thought, not in imagination. The words of

Hume, The separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for

the imagination, have no real meaning, because the imagination never possesses the idea of a beginning of

existence. Thought judges whether a thing conceived exists or not, and thought (even Humes natural belief)

judges that nothing begins to exist without a cause. Surely, I can imagine a situation in which a certain thing is not

an element and then a situation in which it is. To do this is not to conceive the thing as beginning to exist; it is

merely to imagine it after not imagining it. Such imaginative play has no connection with causality, except in the

obvious sense that I could not imagine anything, to say nothing of making imagination experiments, if I had not the

power of producing, that is, causing images in my mind; and presumably that is not the sense in which Hume

intended his illustration to the interpreted.

7. Loaded Dice. The subjectivistic postulate prejudices the whole issue as to the reality of causes before

examination of the question even begins. If knowledge cannot attain to anything real and extramental, it cannot

attain to real, extramental causes. The only causality it could possibly discover would be causal relation among

images in the mind. If the object is read out of court by the postulate that we know only our ideas, objective

causality is read out with it. It is not surprising that sensism and subjectivism should lead to the explicit denial of the

principles of causality, sufficient reason, and substance, since they begin with their implicit denial. Sensations,

impressions, images, separated from any being arousing them must be viewed by any intelligent mind as so many

phenomena without any sufficient reason for existing. Normal men cannot abide sensory experiences without

objective reasons. They regard a person who has such experiences as a psychopathic case; they say, He imagines

things, and suggests a psychiarist(BENIGNUS, Nature, Knowledge, and God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1947, pp. 337-

341).

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Since Kant allowed a valid but restricted use of causality and other categories within the

phenomenal order, he felt that he had preserved the legitimate character of the positive sciences.

But maintaining the inapplicability of such categories to the noumenal order led Kant to

conclude that metaphysics was impossible as a science. For Kant, then, man does not discover

causality in the order of things; rather, he prescribes it and imposes it upon the phenomena in

order to render them intelligible.46

Interestingly enough, Kant himself refers causality to the

noumenal order, an error he specifically warns against.47

48

46

Cf. I. KANT, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, a. 36. 47 Cf. I. KANT, op.cit., a. 13, remark 2, and Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction, 1. 48

G. F. KREYCHE, op. cit., p. 346. Proof of the Existence of Efficient Causality: Contrary to the deniers of efficient

causality (i.e., Hume, Kant), we maintain the objective validity of efficient causality based upon the data furnished

by experience and demanded by reason as the only true explanation of the facts. A mere invariable sequence of

antecedents and consequents is not sufficient to account for the concepts of cause and effect and that there really

exists an actual production of one thing or event by another thing or event.

Bittle explains: In proving the existence of efficient causality among things, it will be necessary first to show

that the assumptions which underlie the position of the opponents are unwarranted; then it will be necessary to

adduce the positive evidence which supports the view that efficient causality actually is present in nature.

The opposition against the existence of efficient cause is based primarily on an adverse theory of knowledge,

and not on the facts themselves. As such, the denial is made primarily on epistemological grounds. Kant, since he

maintained that we can have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, naturally had to deny any knowledge of

efficient causality as existing among these things-in-themselves. It is the purpose of epistemology to vindicate the

sources of our knowledge, among them being sense-perception, consciousness, and reason. In this connection we

will restrict ourselves to one consideration. If Kants fundamental assumption were correct, we could know nothing

of the existence and activity of other minds beside our own, because these other minds are evidently things-in-

themselves. But we have a knowledge of other minds. This is proved conclusively by the fact of language, whether

spoken or written or printed. We do not use language to converse with ourselves; conversation is essentially a

dialogue between our mind and other minds. Hence, we can and do acquire knowledge of things-in-themselves, as

they exist in themselves, through the medium of language. Kants fundamental assumption is, therefore, incorrect.

Consequently Kant is wrong, when he asserts that we could know nothing of efficient causality, if it existed among

things. If we can show that efficient causality exists in ourselves, we prove that efficient causes exist in nature,

because we ourselves are a part of nature.

Hume, Mill, and others, denied efficient causality because of their phenomenalism. According to their

assumption, all we can perceive are the phenomena, and phenomena are revealed to us in our senses merely as

events in invariable sequence. Whenever, then, we perceive phenomena as invariably succeeding each other in

place and time, we are prompted by habit and the association of ideas to imagine a causal connection to exist

between them, so that the earlier event is the cause and the later even the effect. This is, in their view, the origin

within our mind of th