effects of framing, perspective taking, and perspective -affective focus- on choice

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Fagley, Coleman, Simon_2010_Effects of Framing, Perspective Taking, And Perspective -Affective Focus- On Choice

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  • dnState880, US

    Framing effect

    idudy 1entt; ated

    suggest that larger framing effects seen for women in previous research may be due to differences inwhether one spontaneously considers how one would feel, that is, to individual differences in affectiveperspective taking.

    2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

    ects

    demoning) oetweenexpec

    Tversky and Kahneman (1981) argued that different framescaused people to view the options from different vantage points,leading them to adopt different reference points or perspectives.They argued that from one vantage point, possible outcomes wereperceived as gains; whereas, from a different vantage point out-

    (1981) argued that changes in frame prompt changes in a decisionmakers perspective and reference point, affecting preference. Theyrelated changes in frame to changes in perspective:

    Alternative frames for a decision problem may be compared toalternative perspectives on a visual scene. Veridical perceptionrequires that the perceived relative height of two neighboringmountains, say should not reverse with changes of the vantagepoint. Similarly, rational choice requires that the preferencebetween options should not reverse with changes in frame.Because of imperfections of human perception and decision,

    q Results of study 1 were presented at the Annual Meeting of the AmericanPsychological Society, Chicago, 2004. Results of study 2 were presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, New York City, 2006.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 732 445 2000x123.

    Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269

    Contents lists availab

    Personality and Indi

    .eE-mail address: [email protected] (N.S. Fagley).(p. 453). Participants received two options framed either positively(in terms of the number of people saved) or negatively (in terms ofthe number of people expected to die). The positive and negativeversions were objectively equivalent; the positive frame of the surething option was 200 [of the 600 expected fatalities] will be savedand the negative frame was 400 [of the 600] will die. Nevertheless,most participants chose the sure thing when outcomes wereframed positively and the risky option (which stated there was a1/3 probability none will die and a 2/3 probability 600 will die)when outcomes were framed negatively.

    Although Prospect Theory predicts choices will be risk aversefor gains and risk seeking for losses, not all decision makers exhibitframing effects (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002). Subse-quent research has identied numerous moderators such as a deci-sion makers self-esteem (e.g. McElroy, Seta, & Waring, 2007),neuroticism (e.g. Levin et al., 2002), mode of processing (e.g. McEl-roy & Seta, 2003), and gender (e.g. Fagley & Miller, 1990, 1997;Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001).

    Although Prospect Theory does not identify potential modera-tors of framing effects, one can be inferred. Tversky and KahnemanPerspective takingAffectDecision makingGain frameLoss frameRisky choiceGender differences

    1. Prospect Theory and framing eff

    Tversky and Kahneman (1981)inuenced by the framing (i.e. wordThey asked participants to choose ban unusual Asian disease, which is0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2009 Elsevier Ltd. Adoi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.10.008strated choices can bef decision alternatives.programs for ghting

    ted to kill 600 people

    comes were perceived as losses. Only the wording the framing of the outcomes differed, which apparently affected perceptionof the outcomes as gains or as losses. According to Prospect Theory(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), gains and losses are evaluated differ-ently due to the shape of the value function, which is concave forgains and convex for losses.Keywords:appear less likely to spontaneously consider how they would feel. This was supported in follow-up anal-yses of the ve-way interaction of frame, gender, feel, cognitive and affective perspective taking. FindingsEffects of framing, perspective taking, an

    N.S. Fagley a,*, Jennifer G. Coleman b, Andrew F. SimoaGSAPP, Rutgers University, 152 Frelinghuysen Rd., Piscataway, NJ 08854-8085, UnitedbWestern New Mexico University, P.O. Box 680, 1000 West College Ave, Silver City, NMc Seton Hall University, 355 Jubilee Hall, 400 South Orange Ave, South Orange, NJ 07079

    a r t i c l e i n f o

    Article history:Received 11 February 2009Received in revised form 14 July 2009Accepted 4 October 2009Available online 17 November 2009

    a b s t r a c t

    Two studies explored indivchoice framing effects. StuStudy 2 (N = 256) experimincrease the framing effectional reactivity, we expec

    journal homepage: wwwll rights reserved.perspective (affective focus) on choiceq

    c

    s62, USAA

    al differences in perspective taking and perspective as moderators of risky(N = 230) showed perspective taking moderates framing among women.

    ally manipulated two perspectives: a focus on feelings was expected tofocus on thoughts was expected to decrease it. Given mens lower emo-the affective focus would magnify framing effects among men, as they

    le at ScienceDirect

    vidual Differences

    lsevier .com/locate /paid

  • (APT) is feeling things from another perspective, which includesunderstanding what someone in a particular situation (includingoneself) would be feeling. Some scholars (e.g. Hogan, 1969) have

    dividused the term empathy to refer to the latter. However, others re-serve the term empathy for vicariously experiencing the emo-tional reactions of others (Underwood & Moore, 1982). In sum,researchers have conceptualized perspective taking as having bothcognitive and affective components (Duan & Hill, 1996; Redmond,1995) and while denitions often focus on taking the perspectiveof another person, a broader denition is used here.

    Perspective taking has been examined in many areas. Develop-ing the ability to take others perspectives, or decentering, is a mile-stone in cognitive development (Piaget, 1928). Galinsky, Maddux,Gilin, and White (2008) demonstrated that CPT facilitates effectivebargaining whereas empathy does not. Finally, Hynes, Baird, andGrafton (2006) demonstrated different regions of the brain areassociated with APT vs. CPT.

    We argue that individual differences in the propensity to viewproblems from multiple perspectives, which includes looking atdecision situations from multiple perspectives and reframingalternative options, moderates framing effects. Those high in CPT,should be less inuenced by framing because they are more likelyhowever, changes of perspective often reverse the relativeapparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options[italics added] (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453).

    That is, frame affects ones perspective and reference point,affecting the relative desirability of options, affecting ones choices.This implies that a tendency to spontaneously switch referencepoints should be associated with reduced framing effects. That is,their description of the process suggests perspective taking shouldmoderate framing effects. So although they did not suggest explic-itly that individual differences in perspective taking moderateframing effects, the fact that they argued that framing promptsadopting different perspectives can be viewed as logically implyingthat people higher in perspective taking would be more likely tospontaneously switch perspectives or frames, reducing the impactof initial frame. Additionally, research demonstrates seeing bothframes prior to choice reduces/eliminates framing effects (e.g.Bernstein, Chapman, & Elstein, 1999). This is consistent with theidea that using multiple perspectives would reduce framing effects.

    2. Perspective taking

    Perspective taking has been dened as the ability to under-stand how a situation appears to another person and how that per-son is reacting cognitively and emotionally to the situation(Johnson, 1975, p. 241). Goreno and Crano (1998), however, de-ned perspective taking as the capacity to take on multiple per-spectives when processing information or forming decisions (p.164), which is the broader conceptualization we adopt, that goesbeyond imagining what another person is thinking or feeling to in-clude considering various perspectives, including other conceiv-able ways of looking at a situation. Underwood and Moore(1982) described three types of perspective taking: perceptual/vi-sual, social-cognitive, and affective. As framing research does notinvolve visual/perceptual problems, we focused only on cognitiveand affective perspective taking. Cognitive perspective taking(CPT) is intellectually knowing another perspective, which includesunderstanding what someone in a particular situation (includingoneself) would be thinking; whereas, affective perspective taking

    N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Into examine alternative viewpoints, spontaneously reframing thedecision alternatives. Therefore they are more likely to spontane-ously generate the alternative frame, exposing themselves to bothframes, which should reduce the effect of the original frameaccording to previous research (e.g. Bernstein et al., 1999).

    However, high APT may be either a liability (as demonstratedby Galinsky et al., 2008) interfering with effective use of CPT tocounteract initial frame or an advantage in which feelings are usedto inform decisions (as demonstrated by Seo and Barrett (2007)).Although framing has been discussed as a way to prompt changeof vantage points and attendant reference points, to our knowledgeno published research has examined whether perspective takingmoderates framing effects.

    3. Gender

    We predict women will exhibit greater framing effects thanmen, consistent with previous research (e.g. Fagley & Miller,1990, 1997; Wang et al., 2001). Additionally, as women score high-er in aspects of APT tapped by measures of empathy, emotionalreactivity, and emotional intelligence (e.g. Andrew, Cooke, & Mun-cer, 2008; Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006), wepredicted gender would interact with perspective taking and fram-ing, though there is insufcient basis for a rm directional predic-tion. One could argue that women would use their greater APT tofacilitate changes in viewpoint and assign value to potential out-comes. This view focuses on the value of emotion in formulatingpreferences. Alternatively, womens greater APT may signal greaterpropensity to be overwhelmed with emotion. So high CPT may beespecially critical for women, in order to balance/neutralizeheightened emotion and reduce framing effects. An implicationof womens greater APT is that gender must be controlled to avoidmisleading correlations resulting from combining groups havingdifferent means on predictor variables (Shavelson, 1996).

    In sum, Tversky and Kahneman compared changes in framewithchanges in perspective. New frames, like new physical vantagepoints, can change the relative prominence of features whetherthe relative apparent height of mountains or the desirability of op-tions. We built on this to hypothesize that individual differences inperspective taking moderate framing effects, such that greater CPTwouldbeassociatedwith reduced framingeffects.GreaterAPTcouldeither reduce or magnify framing effects, as theory and prior re-search could justify either prediction. We also predicted womenwould exhibit greater framing effects thanmen. Additionally, aswo-men have exhibited greater APT in prior research, we hypothesizedthat CPTmay bemore important in neutralizing framing for womenthan men, especially if APT is not associated with reduced framingeffects. Finally, as women are expected to exhibit greater APT, it isessential to control for gender when examining moderator effectsof APT, to avoid the combined groups problem (Shavelson, 1996).

    4. Study 1

    4.1. Method

    4.1.1. ParticipantsParticipants were two-hundred-thirty undergraduates (145 wo-

    men; 85 men).

    4.1.2. ProceduresParticipants were randomly assigned to framing condition,

    completing three decision problems (framed either positively ornegatively), perspective taking measures, and demographicquestions.

    ual Differences 48 (2010) 264269 2654.1.3. Instruments4.1.3.1. Cognitive perspective taking. TheMultiple Perspectives Inven-tory measures peoples capacity to adopt multiple perspectives

  • when making judgments (Goreno & Crano, 1998, p. 163). This20-Likert-item measure assessed CPT. Typical items include Dur-ing conversation, I nd it easy to take the other persons point ofview and I reserve judgment until Ive considered all angles. Inthis sample, coefcient alpha was .81 (M = 70.66, sd = 8.97). Goren-

    affect. It has been associated with larger framing effects (McElroy& Seta, 2003). Additionally, Chang (2007) found that, for those ina negative mood, framing effects regarding risky products werelarge. One may evaluate options differently due to the emotiongenerated by considering the dilemma. Or, the focus on affectmay direct attention away from problem features and toward one-self and ones emotional reactions.

    The complex relation between perspective taking and framingeffects seen in study 1 for women may be the result of conictingeffects of the two kinds of perspective taking. It may be that greaterCPT does reduce framing effects, while greater APT may increasethem. Mens signicantly lower APT could explain why their re-sults are simpler they may primarily reect differences in CPT.Or, equivalently, it may be that the greater APT of women could ex-plain why their results are more complex they reect the com-

    266 N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Individo and Crano (1998) demonstrated the items load on a single fac-tor and the scale shows good discriminant validity.

    4.1.3.2. Affective perspective taking. The 18-Likert-item affectivesubscale of the Social Decentering Scale (Redmond, 1995) provideda measure of APT. Typical items include I feel the pain my closestfriends feel when they are in trouble and Sometimes when I day-dream about situations Ive never experienced before, my day-dreams evoke strong emotional reactions in me. In this sample,coefcient alpha was .84 (M = 59.57, sd = 9.49).

    4.1.3.3. Decision problems. The three decision problems involvedhuman life outcomes and presented a choice between a sure thingand a probabilistic (risky) alternative of equal expected value.The risky options were all all-or-none, and the probability of sav-ing all/losing none was 1/3. They included slightly modied ver-sions of Fagley and Millers (1987) cancer problem, Tversky andKahnemans (1981) disease problem, and Fischhoffs (1983) civildefense problem. The lives at risk ranged between 120 and 600,as Wang (1996) and Bloomeld (2006) demonstrated framingmay not occur when fewer than 60 are at risk. Positively framedproblems gave the number of people saved. Negatively framedproblems gave the number who would die. The dependent variablewas the number of risky choices, which could range from zero tothree. The mean was 1.66 (sd = 1.23); coefcient alpha was .76.

    4.2. Results and discussion

    A GLM analysis of the centered independent variables (frame,gender, CPT, and APT) was computed on the number of riskychoices using SPSS. The analysis yielded two signicant effects:frame, F(1, 214) = 25.10, p < .001, and the interaction of frame, gen-der, CPT, and APT, F(1, 214) = 4.97, p = .027.

    Follow-up analyses examined frame, CPT, and APT for men andwomen separately. A GLM analysis of men yielded only an effect offrame; F(1, 77) = 5.64, p = .020, g2 = .064. A GLM analysis of womenyielded a main effect of frame, F(1, 137) = 30.21, p < .001, and athree-way interaction of frame, CPT, and APT, F(1, 137) = 8.90,p = .003.

    To interpret this interaction, APT scores were dichotomized atthe womens median of 62. Women scored signicantly higher inAPT (M = 61.79, sd = 9.04) than men (M = 55.78, sd = 9.09) (see Ta-ble 1), so the womens median score was used, rather than theoverall median. An analysis of frame, CPT, and their interactionconducted on women scoring below the womens median on APTyielded only an effect of frame; F(1, 63) = 9.93, p = .002, g2 = .134.The analysis of women scoring at-or-above the median on APTyielded an effect of frame, F(1, 74) = 13.78, p < .001, and a signi-cant interaction of frame and CPT, F(1, 74) = 4.66, p = .034 (seeTable 2).

    Further examination of women scoring at-or-above the medianon APT was needed to interpret this interaction. When CPT scores

    Table 1Mean affective perspective taking scores by study and sex.

    Men Women t df p

    Study 1 55.78 61.79 4.85 228

  • signicant three-way interactions, a signicant two-way interac-tion, and signicant main effects for CPT and frame.

    Follow-up analysis of the signicant ve-way interaction exam-ined the effects of frame, feel, CPT and APT separately for men andwomen. A GLM analysis of women yielded a signicant effect offrame; F(1, 133) = 15.52, p < .001, g2 = .094. As shown in Fig. 1, wo-men made more risky choices in the negative than in the positiveframe, regardless of whether they were asked to say what theywould feel. Analysis of men yielded a signicant effect of framing,F(1, 91) = 4.93, p = .029 and a signicant interaction of frame andfeel, F(1, 91) = 4.63, p = .034. As seen in Fig. 1, men showed a fram-ing effect only when they were asked to say what they would feel.

    To more fully interpret this interaction among men, frame wasexamined for each feel condition separately. In the no feel condi-tion, there was no evidence frame affected choice; F(1, 56) = 0.08,p = .783. In contrast, men in the feel condition showed a signi-cant framing effect; F(1, 47) = 10.06, p = .003, g2 = .176 (see Table 3and Fig. 1). Table 4 shows the correlations between frame and thenumber of risky options chosen for each feel condition by gender.

    Say What They'd FeelControl

    Feel Condition

    2.20

    2.00

    1.80

    1.60

    1.40

    1.20

    1.00

    0.80

    Num

    ber o

    f Ris

    ky C

    hoic

    esPositiveNegative

    FRAME

    Men

    Women

    dividual Differences 48 (2010) 264269 267to spontaneously consider how they would feel. Consequently, asmen exhibit signicantly lower APT, they are expected to showthe greatest increase in the magnitude of framing effects in re-sponse to a focus on affect. Furthermore, it may be that the greaterAPT of women provides the basis for the complex responses theyhave to framing.

    In contrast to the effects of a focus on what one would feel, a fo-cus on what one would think may invoke analytical processing,which previous research has demonstrated reduces framing effects(e.g. McElroy & Seta, 2003). The analytical/rational mode of pro-cessing may promote scrutinizing problem features, especiallyquantitative aspects such as the number of people or dollars at risk,saved, or lost. Peters et al. (2006) demonstrated numeracy moder-ates framing effects. Analytical processing may also promote con-sidering complementary numerical information omitted from theframe and encourage quantitative reasoning.

    In sum, the current study examined the moderating effects of anaffective and/or a cognitive focus on framing effects. A focus onones feelings was expected to increase the impact of framing,especially among those lower in APT, such as men. A focus on onesthoughts was expected to reduce framing effects.

    5.1. Method

    5.1.1. Participants and instrumentsTwo hundred fty-six undergraduates (149 women; 107 men)

    responded to the same three decision problems and perspectivetaking instruments used in study 1. They also reported theirgender.

    5.1.2. ProceduresPerspective was experimentally manipulated. Participants were

    randomly assigned to one of the eight cells of the design: 2 frame(positive vs. negative) 2 affective perspective (feel: either saywhat they would feel or not) 2 cognitive perspective (think:either say what they would think or not). That is, within each fram-ing condition, one fourth of the participants just responded to thedecision problems (control condition) and the perspective takingmeasures. Those in this cell of the design were not asked to saywhat they would feel or what they would think. In the other threeconditions, prior to making their choices, participants were askedto take a moment and imagine the feelings [thoughts] [feelingsand thoughts] you would have if the situation described in thedecision problem involved your local community, so that it may af-fect people you know. What would you be feeling [thinking] [feel-ing and thinking]? Then they were asked to Please write yourfeelings [thoughts] [feelings and thoughts] below. This wasviewed as a way of inducing them to consider their personal per-spective, focusing on their feelings, thoughts, or both feelings andthoughts regarding the dilemma. The feel condition promoted a fo-cus on affect; whereas the think condition promoted a focus onthoughts.

    5.2. Results and discussion

    Means and reliabilities were similar to study 1. A GLM analysiswas conducted on centered variables using SPSS. The independentvariables were frame, gender, feel (whether or not they were askedto imagine what they would feel), think (whether or not they wereasked to imagine what they would think), CPT, and APT. Thedependent variable was the number of risky choices, which couldrange from 0 to 3. The overall mean was 1.73 (sd = 1.24); coef-cient alpha was .78.

    N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and InThe GLM analysis yielded eight signicant effects including theinteraction of frame, gender, feel, CPT and APT; F(1, 193) = 8.13,p = .005. In addition to the ve-way interaction, there were threeSay What They'd FeelControl

    Feel Condition

    2.25

    2.00

    1.75

    1.50

    1.25

    Num

    ber o

    f Ris

    ky C

    hoic

    es

    PositiveNegative

    FRAMEFig. 1. Estimated marginal means of the number of risky choices as a function ofsex, feel condition, and frame.

  • fects the magnitude of framing effects. Specically, when men

    dividfocus on affect by imagining what they would feel if the scenariowere happening in their local community, they are much moreinuenced by framing than when they do not, as indicated bythe g2 of .176 for those in the feel condition. In contrast whenmen are not explicitly asked to imagine how they would feel, theyshow no framing effect. The choices of women, on the other hand,are inuenced by framing regardless of whether or not they areAdopting a personal perspective, focusing on what they would feel,resulted in a moderately large framing effect among men(r = .42). Otherwise, men did not appear susceptible to framing.Women showed a framing effect, somewhat smaller in size,regardless of whether they were asked to focus on what theywould feel.

    6. General discussion

    These ndings indicate that perspective taking the tendencyto adopt multiple perspectives moderates framing effects. Addi-tionally, the particular perspective adopted by a decision maker af-

    Table 3Study 2: mean number of risky choices by sex, frame, and feel condition.

    Men Women

    Frame

    Negative Positive Negative Positive

    No feel 1.59 1.50 2.15 1.56Feel 2.22 1.09 2.23 1.29

    Note: Scores could range from 0 to 3.

    Table 4Study 2: correlations between frame and number of risky choices by feel conditionand sex.

    Men Women

    No feel r = .037 r = .252aFeel r = .420b r = .389b

    * p < .05.** p < .01.

    268 N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Inasked to imagine how they would feel (see Fig. 1).These ndings suggest one factor leading to gender differences

    in framing effects (e.g. Fagley & Miller, 1990, 1997; Wang et al.,2001) may be that women may spontaneously consider how theywould feel when confronting such decisions; whereas, men may doso only if specically instructed to. When men are asked explicitlyto consider how they would feel, then they exhibit framing effectssimilar in size to women. This instruction does not signicantlyinuence womens responses, consistent with the idea that theymay do this spontaneously. Additional evidence supporting thisidea is that women exhibit signicantly higher APT in bothsamples.

    The think condition was intended to increase rationality, as itasked participants explicitly what they would be thinking. Conse-quently it was expected to decrease framing effects, especiallyamong women. But it may have failed to do so because most par-ticipants may spontaneously consider what they would think if thescenario were happening in their community, even without beingexplicitly instructed to do so. This would explain why the resultsof the think condition are similar to the control condition thosemerely asked to make a choice. Additionally, imagining the sce-nario was occurring in their community may have heightenedspontaneous emotional reactions among women even when askedonly what they would be thinking (rather than feeling).Or, the think manipulation may not have been strong enough toprompt greater use of the analytical mode of processing. The ques-tion What would you be thinking? may not have focused theirattention sufciently on rational, critical evaluation of the scenario.The wording is so ordinary, so like typical speech, that it may nothave been construed as asking for their rational, analytical viewof the situation, but just as asking for their view in general.

    6.1. Connection to research on affect and decision making

    Isen and Labroo (2003) suggested that positive affect facilitatesperspective taking and switches of perspective. Consequently, onecould speculate that positive affect should reduce framing effectsby promoting switches in perspective. We did not explicitlymanipulate affective valence, but in study 2, focusing on whatone would feel would be expected to produce negative affect (spe-cically, anxiety or fear, because the situation they were imagininginvolved deaths in their community). Following the reasoning ofIsen and Labroo, the negative affect would be expected to reduceor inhibit switches in perspective, which should increase the mag-nitude of framing effects. This is consistent with the increasedmagnitude of framing effects we observed for men.

    6.2. Limitations

    These studies have limitations that should be considered wheninterpreting the results. Participants were university students,which may limit the generalizability of the results, as studentsare younger and more educated than typical adults. Second, thedecisions were hypothetical rather than actual decisions faced bythe participants and whose consequences they would experience.However, research has demonstrated that responses to hypotheti-cal decision problems often are a reasonable proxy for responses toreal-life decisions (e.g. Khberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner,2002). A third aspect of the research should also be noted. We usedonly three decision problems, with two options (one certain andone all-or-none), with one probability level (1/3), in one arena (hu-man life outcomes). These actually represent both limitations andstrengths. Although some may view three decision problems as asmall sample from the universe of possible problems, it is large en-ough that the ndings are not likely to be due to idiosyncrasies of aparticular decision problem, yet it is small enough that the partic-ipants should not have gotten fatigued, bored, or developed a par-ticular response set. Future studies may examine perspectivetaking and affective focus with more options, other probability lev-els, and in other arenas of outcome, such as nancial.

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    N.S. Fagley et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 48 (2010) 264269 269

    Effects of framing, perspective taking, and perspective (affective focus) on choiceProspect Theory and framing effectsPerspective takingGenderStudy 1MethodParticipantsProceduresInstrumentsCognitive perspective takingAffective perspective takingDecision problems

    Results and discussion

    Study 2MethodParticipants and instrumentsProcedures

    Results and discussion

    General discussionConnection to research on affect and decision makingLimitations

    References