econ 381 compensating differentials. we have talked about how workers care about non-wage job...

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ECON 381 Compensating differentials

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Page 1: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

ECON 381

Compensating differentials

Page 2: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics

We also talked about the “fixed wage” model, in which the straight-time wage adjusts to offset the overtime premium. The idea is that workers care about the overall value of their compensation package

What is the relationship between non-wage job characteristics and wages? Do lousy jobs pay more to compensate workers for bad conditions? How are non-wage job characteristics priced in the labour market?

Page 3: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Workers’ preferences

Consider a job that has two characteristics, a wage and something else (e.g. safety, hours of work, prestige),. Let’s take the example of risk, R.

Both of the characteristics affect workers’ utility:

Page 4: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Indifference curves

Negative slope Convex Don’t cross U0>U1>U2

S

W

U2

U1

U0

Page 5: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Indifference curves

Who is more risk-averse?

A is willing to give up more wages than B in exchange for a given increase in safety. A values safety more, i.e. she is more risk-averse.

S

W

Page 6: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Firms’ iso-profit functions

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W

Page 7: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Firms’ iso-profit functions

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Which firm can provide

safety least expensively?

Firm B requires a larger reduction in the wage rate to offset the costs of providing one more unit of safety.

B can provide safety least expensively.

Page 8: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Equilibrium – one firm, one worker

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Competitive equilibrium – firms make zero profits

Equilibrium at tangency point

S*

W*

Page 9: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Equilibrium – two firms, two workers

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Which worker is matched with which firm?

Why?

Person A likes safety more. She is matched to Firm A, which can provide safety at lower cost.

Page 10: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Equilibrium – many firms, many workers

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Locus of tangencies traces out hedonic relationship between wages and safety.

Slope of hedonic relationship is the market price of safety.

Page 11: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Minimum safety standards

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Minimum safety standard = Smin.

Smin

Page 12: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Minimum safety standards

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W

Minimum safety standard = Smin.

Smin

Page 13: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Minimum safety standards

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Minimum safety standard = Smin.

Firm C goes out of business.

Smin

Page 14: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Minimum safety standards

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W

Minimum safety standard = Smin.

Worker C gets lower utility.

Smin

Page 15: ECON 381 Compensating differentials.  We have talked about how workers care about non-wage job characteristics  We also talked about the “fixed wage”

Minimum safety standards

Does this mean that occupational health and safety regulations are a bad idea?

Prof. Simon D. Woodcock