The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 2 | Number 2 | Jan 08, 2009

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East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: AfterAmerican Hegemony

Mark Beeson

East Asian Regionalism and the End of theAsia-Pacific: After American Hegemony

Mark Beeson

The economic crisis that currently grips theworld will have many consequences, not leastfor the US. A decade ago during the East Asiancrisis, the US lectured East Asian elites on theshortcomings of ‘crony capitalism’ and closebusiness relationships. Such claims lookbizarrely anachronistic as the US governmentfinds itself having to nationalise or bail-out large chunks of the domestic economy broughtlow by an inadequately regulated, predatory,but politically-influential financial sector. It isnot just that the material significance of the USeconomy will be diminished as a consequenceof this crisis, however, so will its ideationalinfluence and authority. The Washingtonconsensus centered on the dismantling of stateregulation and the unfettered working of themarket, had few admirers in East Asia evenbefore the current crisis; [1] the current turmoilwill further diminish its appeal and makealternatives more attractive. This diminution ofthe US’s overall ideological and economicimportance compounded by its failed wars inIraq and Afghanistan, is likely to undermine itsinfluence in East Asia and its standing as both aregional and a global power. One consequenceof this process may be to strengthen theattractiveness of exclusively East Asian regional

organisations—especially if China’s economicdevelopment continues to cement its place atthe centre of an increasingly integrated regionaleconomy. I suggest that the US’s hegemonicinfluence over East Asia is consequently likely todecline and so is the significance of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region of which it is notionally a centralpart.

The Washington Consensus

The paper is organised in the following way.First, I briefly outline the nature of hegemony,before linking it to some of the theoreticalimplications and insights that emerge from theAsia-Pacific/East Asian case in particular and thegrowing literature on comparative regionalismmore generally. The central claim here is that‘East Asia’ is – potentially, at least - morecapable of fulfilling some of the key qualities ofwhat Hettne and Soderbaum call ‘regionness’ ,

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which seem to be essential prerequisites for thedevelopment of effective regional organisationsand the necessary sense of identity andcommon purpose that underpins it. [2]Paradoxically, American hegemony—at least asexercised by the administration of George W.Bush— actually helped to redefine regionalidentities and concretise hitherto latent andunlikely regional relations. This possibility isexplored in detail in the second part of thisessay which examines the contrastingexperiences of regionalism in East Asian andAsia-Pacific contexts, making the point that themore expansive Asia-Pacific concept has alwaysbeen characterised by potentially irreconcilablecontradictions and tensions. Significantly,however, ‘East Asia’ may prove a more effectivemechanism for confronting contemporarychallenges and, when seen in a longer historicalperspective, a more authentic expression of atraditional regional order that American powermay have inadvertently helped to reconstitute.

Amer ican Hegemony and East As ian

Regionalism

There are a number of different ways ofconceptualising hegemony. While all agreehegemony is about dominance in theinternational system, there are very differentviews about what this means and how it isachieved.[3] For realists, hegemony is aboutmaterial resources, principally military. In theendless quest for power that realists believecharacterises the international system,hegemonic competition is cyclical andinevitable, as rising powers supplant enfeebledones in a Darwinian struggle for survival. [4] Ifthis was all there was to hegemony, the USought to be in an unassailable position for theforeseeable future given its military and

technological superiority. And yet, not only canthe US not impose i ts wi l l in I raq andAfghanistan, but there is plainly more tocontemporary dominance than sheer bruteforce. This is an especial ly importantconsideration given the bloody recent history ofthe East Asian region and the US’s directmilitary involvement in it: if any region ought tobe acutely attuned to a predominantly strategiccalculus it is East Asia. While much of East Asiadoes remain preoccupied with ‘traditional’notions of security, even here America’sstrategic presence is, as we shall see, no longeras decisive as it once was.

Hegemony has an important ideational orideological component that is realiseddiscursively, and which can be a crucialdeterminant of a hegemony’s power to achieveits goals peacefully.[5] Despite their verydifferent views about the impact of hegemony,there is a surprising amount of agreementbetween liberal theorists and those ‘neo-Gramscians’ who draw their inspiration from aradical, Marxist tradition about the importanceof ideas and institutions in entrenchinghegemonic rule. Both stress the normative andideational component of hegemonic rule,although they differ markedly on it overallimpact. For liberals like John Ikenberry,American dominance has been effective and –until recently, at least – largely unchallenged,because it offered real advantages tosubordinate powers which benefited from keycollective goods like a relatively stable, liberaleconomic system and access to lucrative USmarkets.[6] Critical scholars like Robert Cox,have also emphasised the importance of pay-offs for subordinates, although these have beenlargely confined to members of the local rulingclasses, rather than nations as a whole.[7]

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Both the liberal and critical perspectiveshighl ight the potential strengths andweaknesses o f Amer ican power : theestablishment of the Bretton Woods institutionsunder US auspices in the aftermath of WorldWar II plainly did entrench American power andoffer potential advantages to allies as Ikenberrysuggests. However, it is precisely this aspect ofAmerican power that is being undermined by itsrecent shift to more unilateral and/or bilateralpolicies, and encouraging a greater interest inregional mechanisms and strategies that couldexclude the US as a consequence. This leads toan important insight developed by criticaltheorists: the operation and impact ofhegemony is something that transcendsnational boundaries, and is not solely aconsequence of state behaviour. Althoughnation-states generally and the US in particularremain the most important actors in theinternational system, particular sets of ideas,practices and power relations have taken on adistinctly trans-national form.[8]

This is where East Asia’s nascent pursuit ofregional cooperation that excludes the USbecomes especially significant and interesting:while critical theorists are right to stress theimportance of trans-national forces and thedeclining significance of strictly national politicaland economic structures, they have generallyneglected the potential importance of regionalstrategies for maintaining different, non-hegemonic approaches to questions of political,economic and even strategic management andcooperation. Paradoxically, the attemptedapplication of the most traditional forms ofAmerican military power in the ‘war on terror’,or through direct bilateral leverage in theeconomic sphere, is actually undermining itsmore institutionally embedded, normativelybased authority and influence, and encouraging

the development of alternative, regionally-based modes of organisation. [9] Beforeconsidering how such impulses have beenrealised in East Asia, it is worth briefly spellingout the regional dynamics have beenunderstood, and why an East Asian, rather thanan Asia-Pacific from of regionalism is emerging.

Regionalism

A number of factors have underpinned the ‘new’regionalism that has become an increasinglyprominent part of the international system sincethe 1980s: regional cooperation is more feasiblein a less ideologically divided post-Cold Warworld; regional institutionalisation is part of amore generalised pattern of decentralisation inthe international system; and it is one way ofresponding to the competitive economicpressures associated with ‘globalisation’. Thedevelopment of regional processes has twoquite distinctive components that meritemphasis as they help to differentiate theextent and style of regional cooperation andintegration in different parts of the world. Abasic distinction needs to be made ‘betweeneconomic regionalism as a conscious policy ofstates or sub-state regions to coordinateactivities and arrangements in a greater region,and economic regionalization as the outcome ofsuch policies or of ‘natural’ economic forces’.[10]

Andrew Hurrell has suggested a number ofdimensions of regional processes that are usefulin trying to assess East Asia’s prospects and thecontradictory impact of American power. Inaddition to the basic distinction betweenregionalism and regionalisation, Hurrellsuggests that ‘regional awareness’, or the‘shared perception of belonging to a particularcommunity,’ is an important measure of

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regional development. Significantly, he arguesthat regional awareness can rest on common‘internal’ cultural foundations and history, or ‘itcan be defined against some external “other”’.[11] Although Hurrell suggests that thisexternal other is likely to be a security threat,this does not exclude the possibility that asense of regional identity may be consolidatedby the actions of powerful external actors likethe U.S. or the international financial institutions(IFIs) over which it exerts a significantinfluence. At the very least, it serves to remindus that the definitions of security are sociallyconstructed and East Asian perspectives aredistinctive and encompass a wider array of‘threats’ than simply military ones. [12]

The other major measures of regionaldevelopment Hurrell identifies – interstatecooperation and regional cohesion – are thus farnot well developed in East Asia. The reasons forthis are not hard to discern: in Southeast Asia inparticular, the relatively recent decolonisationprocess, the challenges of nation-building andeconomic development, and concerns about themaintenance of internal security, have allconspired to make regional political elitesespecially sensitive about threats to theirjealously guarded independence andsovereignty. In this regard, it is revealing thatthe most important and successful example ofregional institution-building in the developingworld – the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) – has been characterised by adistinctive ‘ASEAN way’ of managing regionalaffairs. [13] Consensus, voluntarism, and non-interference in the affairs of other members ofASEAN have been the hallmarks of theorganisation as a consequence. Critics haveemphasised the potentially self-serving andineffective nature of ASEAN’s modus operandi:not only has it insulated authoritarian rulers

from outside criticisms and ‘interference’, butASEAN itself has little capacity to develop orenforce policy on a regional basis.[14] Nevertheless, when seen in a longer historicalperspective the ultimate significance of ASEANmay have been its capacity to ‘indigenise’ andgive political expression to what had hithertobeen a fairly arbitrary geographical space.

For all its frequently invoked shortcomingsASEAN has provided a sense of identity andcommon purpose for Southeast As ia.Significantly, this sense of regional identity isbeing expanded to include Northeast Asia, asthe wider East Asian region becomes a moreimportant and institutionalised part of regionalrelations. [15] The precise form and extent ofregional definition will be intimately associatedwith the specific extant forms of regionalgovernance and intra-regional relations,patterns of relationships that are themselvesexpression of histor ical ly contingentcircumstances. East Asia’s historically closebusiness-government relations, and thedistinctive attitude to security that distinguishesmuch of the region, may simply be impossibleto accommodate in a wider trans-Pacificgrouping. Seen in this context, an organisationlike APEC was arguably fatally flawed at theoutset, and faced the potentially impossibletask of reconciling very different perceptionsabout the purpose and style of intra-regionalinstitutions. In such circumstances, a morenarrowly conceived East Asian alternative with aless intrusive and legalistic format may be moreattractive.

It is important to emphasise that US foreignpolicy is actually encouraging the developmentof regionally-based regimes as one part of acomplex array of uni-, bi- and multilateralinitiatives. [16] The crucial change here has

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been in the nature of American policy. Duringthe Cold War the U.S. was prepared to toleratea variety of social, political and economicpractices of which it did not necessarily approve- i f th is was the pr ice of ensur ing theconsolidation of successful capitalist alliesacross the region. It was in this environmentthat many of the countries of East Asia wereable to begin the state-led, export-orienteddevelopment processes that culminated in theextensive penetration of North Americanmarkets. The ending of the Cold War has freedthe US from any overarching geopoliticalconstraints and made it less tolerant ofalternative modes of political and economicorganisation and more willing to directlyintervene in order to change them. [17]

Nevertheless, for most of the post-World War IIperiod, much of East Asia benefitedeconomically from the overarching multilateral,open economic order that emerged under U.S.hegemony. In the strategic sphere, however,the picture has always been more complex andfor many less benign, despite the fact that anumber of countries in the capitalist campactually benefited economically from Americaninvolvement in the wars in Korea andVietnam.[18] The most significant consequenceof the Cold War period generally, and the U.S.’sstrategic orientation to East Asia in particular,was that American policy effectively divided theregion along ideological lines and established a‘hub and spokes’ series of bilateral alliancesthat made closer ties and cooperation within theregion more problematic. [19] In other words, asfar as East Asia was concerned, there was an in-built bias toward bilateralism, major constraintson multilateral processes, and formidablepotential obstacles to any sort of regionalintegration. Consequently, America’s strategicengagement with East Asia generally and the

continuing importance of its bilateral alliancesacross the region has led to widespreadscepticism about the prospects for greater EastAsian security cooperation. And yet the endingof the Cold War has, at the very least, raisedimportant questions about the basic rationalefor a continuing major American militarypresence in the region. Older patterns of intra-regional relations that pre-date Americaninvolvement are beginning to reassertthemselves in ways that further undermine theidea of a more inclusive Asia-Pacific region.

To assess the prospects for an alternative formof East Asian regionalism and the potentialimpact Amer ican power may have inencouraging or inhibiting it, we need todistinguish between the regional initiatives inthe economic and strategic spheres. While thisdefinition is to some extent artificial, it has themerit of simplifying a complex set of issues andhighlighting the key dynamics influencingregional development in East Asia.

Economic and StrategicRegionalism in East Asia

The story of East Asian economic regionalizationis complex and frequently contradictory.However, it is important to recognise that thecourse of regional economic integration in thepost-war period has been profoundly influencedby American policy: support for Japan as thelynchpin of a successful capitalist regional ordernot only assured Japan’s spectacular economicrenaissance,[20] but the subsequent expansionof Japanese multinational corporations acrossSoutheast Asia in particular has also had theeffect of knitting the region together throughcomplex production networks.[21] It isimportant to re-emphasise that the unique

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dynamics of the post-war geopolitical contextmeant the highly distinctive and, of late, muchreviled patterns of economic organisation andpolitical practise that are so characteristic ofmuch East Asian capitalism were toleratedbecause of Cold War rivalries. Whatevercriticisms are currently levelled at the‘developmental states’ of the region thatemulated Japan, there is no doubt that theyunderpinned substantial long-term economicdevelopment throughout the pro-Americanparts of the region.[22] Moreover, the EastAsian economies and the associated social andpolitical formations that emerged in this contextwere not just different from the idealised‘Western’ model so enthusiastically championedby organisations like the ill-fated APEC, but theyalso had a good deal in common with eachother. In other words, there were some potentialcommonalities and sources of identification thatmight provide the basis for a nascent sense ofregional identity.

The defining event in the recent history of EastAsian regionalism, of course, has been theeconomic crisis that began in 1997. For thepurposes of this discussion what is significantabout the crisis is not the dynamics of the crisisitself, about which much has been written, [23]but the political response of the region. In thisregard, it is evident that a number of thingsbecame apparent to East Asian leaders and anumber of perceptions were commonly sharedon a regional basis. First, it was widelyrecognised that the region as a whole waspotentially vulnerable to externally generatedsystemic shocks over which East Asians hadlittle control. Whether ‘crony capitalists’ orforeign speculators were more to blame for thecrisis was in many ways less important than theimplications of their intersection: East Asianpolitical practices and economic structures were

exposed to the potentially devastatingjudgements of money market managers andratings agencies from outside the region, raisingfundamental doubts about the sustainability ofEast Asian capital ism in an integratedinternational economy.

The second consequence of the crisis was awidespread feeling of resentment about thehighly intrusive policy interventions of the IFIs.[24] This is especially significant given the highprofile role played by the U.S. in crisismanagement, either directly or through theauspices of the IFIs. The crisis presented theU.S. - operating through the auspices of the IMF- with a unique opportunity to forcibly imposethe sort of neo-liberal reforms it had advocatedfor so long, but which had generally beenstudiously ignored throughout most of theregion. [25] Even more significantly as far asAPEC was concerned was its own relativeinvisibility and impotence throughout the crisis,and the fact that the U.S. chose to utilise theIMF rather than APEC to push its reform agenda.[26]

Thus , the most important long- termconsequence of both the financial crisis and ofthe U.S.’s perceived role in its subsequentmanagement may have been to encourage amore narrowly conceived form of East Asianregionalism that intentionally excludes‘outsiders’ and which is effectively a repudiationof the ‘Asia-Pacific’ idea. As Paul Bowlesobserves, ‘the contours of post-financial crisisregionalism are, by state design, aimed atrestoring to Asia a greater degree of politicalpower and autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of theworld, and the US and the international financialinstitutions it controls, in particular’. [27] Thissort of exclusively East Asian grouping had beenproposed by Malaysia’s Mahathir less than a

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decade before, but it had been effectivelyvetoed by American opposition and Japanesepusillanimity. Recently, however, it has re-emerged in the form of ASEAN+3 and becomethe centrepiece of regional cooperative effortsand the embodiment of a regional consensus onthe need for such an exclusive ‘Asians only’entity.[28] Not only do a number of observersclaim that there are sufficient historical,strategic, political and economic practices incommon to generate a common sense ofregional identity,[29] but some of thesupposedly insurmountable internal obstacles toregional cooperation appear less formidablethan once thought. True, Japan and Chinaremain regional leadership rivals, but they areincreasingly interdependent economically as aconsequence of China’s growing economicimportance in the region. Moreover, the rivalryis actually encouraging a proliferation of tradeagreements and negotiations with otherregional players that is helping to consolidate anew East Asian regional order, one thatincreasingly excludes outsiders and leaves APECand its ‘Asia-Pacific’ identity lookingincreasingly redundant. In this regard, it washighly significant and symbolic of the emergingnew order that the US was not invited to theEast Asian Summit that will help to determinethe region’s future institutional architecture andthe possible development of an East AsianCommunity. [30]

China, Japan, Korea Summit in Kyushu, Dec 13, 2008.

Prime Minister Aso Taro and Wen Jiabao of Japan and

China.

Two aspects of these developments are worthhighlighting. First, American foreign policy -both its promotion of trade groupings in Northand South America, and its growing enthusiasmfor bilateralism – have encouraged similarresponses in East Asia. When combined with thefailure of APEC and the WTO to promotemultilateral trade agreements, the attraction ofboth bilateral preferential trade deals, and thedevelopment of a specifically East Asianorganisation to facilitate intra-regionaleconomic and political cooperation becomesmore apparent. The other point to make is that,despite al l the attent ion given to theproliferation of trade deals in the region, and toEast Asia’s growing intra-regional trade, it hasbeen monetary, rather than trade cooperationwhere most progress has been made indeveloping regional cooperation.[31] This isunsurprising, however, given the impact of theeconomic crisis of 1997 on the region, the roleplayed by mobile financial capital, and theadverse impact of American policy in creatingthe precipitating conditions for the crisis itself.[32]

It is significant that ‘monetary regionalism’, aprocess that might provide the backbone of any

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closer economic ties and cooperation betweenNortheast and Southeast Asia, has been drivenby Japan – a country with the capacity tounderwrite such an initiative if a number ofpolitical and ‘technical’ obstacles to greatercoordination of monetary policies can beovercome.[33] Perhaps the most significantaspect of this putative process is that Japan,normally the deferential client of its Americanprotector, has asserted itself on its own behalfand as a champion of ‘Asia’. As Katada pointsout, both Japan’s proposal for an AsianMonetary Fund (which was initially squashed bythe U.S.), and its attempts to boost the use ofthe yen in the region are designed to improveJapan’s position at the expense of the U.S. andinsulate the region from external predations:

..Japanese policymakers…became moreinterested in taking aleadership role to define andstrengthen regional monetarycooperation in reaction to theway the United States and theIMF handled the Asian financialcrisis …The idea behind thesemonetary initiatives is toreduce or balance Asiancountries' current heavyreliance on the US dollar. Bothof these initiatives appear as alarge step towards theinstitutionalization of Asianeconomic regionalization in apure "Asian" form rather thanan "Asia-Pacific" one (whichwould include the majorpresence of the United States).[34]

The most significant attempt to consolidate thisprocess thus far has been the ‘Chiang MaiInitiative’ (CMI) of May 2005, which agreed toestablish a set of currency swap arrangementsbetween participating countries in the region, asan insurance mechanism for distressedeconomies in future crises. [35] The long-termsignificance of this development is unclear atthis stage but a couple of points are worthmaking. First, the CMI occurred as an off-shootof the ASEAN+3 grouping and potentiallyconsolidates and gives practical expression toan East Asian identity. Sceptics have been quickto point out that there has been ‘considerabletalk but little action’ in developing thesemechanisms.[36] But, as T J Pempel points out,given the depth of historical animosity thatexists between Japan, Korea, and China, the factthat they have participated in ‘relativelyintimate and institutionalised regionalorganisations may portend enhanced potentialfor cooperation among the powers of NortheastAsia’.[37] The second point to make is that, asJennifer Amyx observes:

Despite the seeminglyinsurmountable problemspresently impeding thetransformation of the CMI intosomething that might beregarded as an Asian monetaryfund, the simple process ofnegotiating and concluding thebilateral swap agreements hashad a major impact on theability of countries in theregion to fend off futurespeculative attacks by givingrise to dense networks ofcommunication betweencentral bankers and finance

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ministers in the region –networks that did not exist atthe time of the Asian financialcrisis. [emphasis in original][38]

The picture that emerges in the economicdomain is, therefore, complex and evolving, butone with a clear integrative dynamic at both apolitical and economic level. While the tangibleconsequences of ASEAN+3 and the CMI may belimited as yet, the very fact that they areoccurring at all should not be underestimated.After all, who would have imagined fifty yearsago that Germany and France would becomethe central pillars of the European Union, or thatsomething as unpropitious-sounding as theEuropean Coal and Steel Community might beits springboard? Crucially, of course, the USplayed a decisive, geopolitically-motivated rolein actively encouraging such an outcome -unlike American foreign policy in post-war Asia.[39] What we appear to be witnessing atpresent is a return to something akin to thelogic of Cold War era in which the US is self-consciously linking economic and strategicoutcomes. In this case, the U.S. has made theprospect of bilateral trade deals and continuingaccess to critically important American marketscontingent on support for its wider strategicobjectives in the ‘war on terror’. [40] Anexamination of the patterns of Americanengagement with the region suggests that sucha move, while far from unprecedented, is likelyto have unpredictable but generally negativeimplications for the idea of an Asia-Pacificregion.

ASEAN+3

Regionalism and security

No region was more affected by the Cold Warthan East Asia. True, Europe may have been theepicentre of the super-power stand-off for muchof the Cold War period, but this did not eruptinto major conflict as it did in Asia. Like Europe,though, the super-power rivalry in East Asiacreated ideological divisions that effectivelysplit the region into pro-and anti-Americancamps. This potential for intra-regional cleavagewas reinforced by American strategic policy.The ‘hub and spoke’ security architecture thatthe U.S. constructed in much of East Asia waspredicated on a series of bilateral relationshipsthat made the establishment of intra-regionalre lat ions with in East Asia inherent lyproblematic. Indeed, it is important to recognisethat the U.S.’s preference for bilateral securityrelat ions was not s imply a funct ionalconsequence of the divided and unstable natureof the East Asian region, as some have argued,[41] but a key element of its overall grandstrategy. In other words, as Michael Mastandunopoints out,

since the United States doesnot want to encourage a

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balancing coalition against itsdominant position, it is notclear that it has a strategicinterest in the full resolution ofdifferences between, say,Japan and China or Russia andChina. Some level of tensionamong these states reinforcestheir individual need for aspecial relationship with theUnited States. [42]

Against an established backdrop of Americanstrategic involvement in the region that isexpressly designed to keep East Asia dividedand its security orientation firmly orientedtoward Washington, the prospects for a moreexclusive, East Asian mechanism with which tomanage regional security concerns might seembleak. And yet an examination of the historicalrecord and the impact of the U.S. ‘war on terror’suggests that the prospects for a moreexclusive regional order are not as remote orunprecedented as some observers believe. Evenin Northeast Asia, which has the mostentrenched divisions and historical animosities,the increasing interest in and push towardregional cooperation is in the view of oneseasoned observer, ‘a realistic response to therise of US unipolarity’.[43]

And yet, the conventional wisdom has it that aregion that contains two great powers like Chinaand Japan which are competing for regionalleadership, which have fought a major war inliving memory, and which have enduringmisgivings about each other as a consequence,is hardly a recipe for regional cooperation andharmony. When combined with a modest recordof achievement in, and capacity for, managingregional security issues independently of extra-

regional powers, East Asia, it is suggested, looks‘ripe for rivalry’. [44] However, an increasingnumber of observers are questioning whetherAsia’s future will inevitably replicate nineteenthcentury Europe’s past, and whether the regionis necessarily as unstable and prone to conflictas such realist analyses imply. [45]

While there is great scepticism about thecapacity of both the ASEAN, and the securityorganisation it spawned – the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF) – to manage effectively a numberof pressing issues,[46] a focus on substantive‘outcomes’ may miss more subtle processes ofsocialisation and identification that are steadilytransforming perceptions within, and of, theregion. Although ASEAN may have originallyemerged as a defensive response to the actionsof extra-regional powers during the Cold War,its very endurance has given pol it icalexpression and an increasing sense of identityto what was hitherto a rather arbitrarygeographical space. It is also worth noting thatthere has been no direct conflict betweenASEAN members since its inception – anachievement for which ASEAN can take somecredit. [47]

ASEAN Regional Forum leaders meet in 2008

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The ARF is to security what APEC was intendedto be for economics: a multilateral vehicle tomanage ‘Asia-Pacific’ concerns. [48] Like APEC,the ARF has a membership that includes theoriginal ASEAN nations, their Northeast Asianneighbours, China, Japan, and South Korea, aswell as the U.S., Russia, and Australia. LikeAPEC, it should be well placed to manageregional security issues, as it includes the keyregional players involved in potentialflashpoints. But like APEC, the ARF is dividedbetween those countries such as China andmost of the ASEAN nations which preferconsultation and non-binding discussion, andthe ‘Anglo-Americans’ who favour problemsolving and practical confidence buildingmeasures. Given that the original subtext ofthe ARF was to develop a mechanism that mightsocialise China into ‘good’ behaviour and makeit an institutionally constrained, stable andpredictable member of the regional community,there is a certain irony in the fact that Chinamay ultimately become a source of regionalstability and security that is exclusively EastAsian. At a time when both APEC and ARF normsare considered by some to be ‘dysfunctional’and in need of replacement,[49] it is notimpossible that East Asians will look to developthe i r own norms and p rac t i ces tha taccommodate regional realities like the rise ofChina.

This prospect is not as unlikely as it once was.Despite some initial misgivings, China has beenrapidly incorporated into an array of multilateralinstitutions at both the regional and globallevels, and its political elites do, indeed, appearto be undergoing an extensive socialisationprocess of precisely the sort many in bothSoutheast Asia and the U.S. desired. [50] Yetdespite – perhaps, because of – the increasingsophistication of Chinese foreign policy, this is

likely to consolidate an East Asian, rather thanan Asia-Pacific identity. China’s assiduouswooing of its ASEAN neighbours, combined withits growing strategic and economic importancein East Asia, are giving China a centrality inregional affairs that may ultimately restore anorder that prevailed for hundreds if notthousands of years. As David Kang haspersuasively argued, ‘When China has beenstrong and stable, order has been preserved.East Asian regional relations have historicallybeen hierarchic, more peaceful, and morestable than those in the West’. [51] It is highlysignificant that, as David Shambaugh pointsout, ‘most nations in the region now see Chinaas a good neighbour, a constructive partner, acareful listener, and a non-threatening regionalpower’; consequently, ‘the structure of powerand the nature of the regional system are beingfundamentally altered’.[52] In other words, notonly is there no inevitability about the form thatinternational relations may take in East Asia,contrary to what much realist scholarship mighthave us believe, but it is entirely possible adifferent, regional order centred on Chineserather than American power may re-emerge.This is especially the case as China’s growingeconomic importance to the region, and its ownincreasing interdependence with and relianceon the rest of the region, makes it potentially acentre of regional stability and growth, ratherthan destabilising insecurity. [53]

The key regional obstacle to China assumingthis role is Japan. Japan’s own regionalleadership ambitions, combined with anincreasingly close security relationship with theUS under the Koizumi government, [54] seem topreclude regional cooperation. Indeed, whencombined with Koizumi’s apparent indifferenceto regional sensitivities about Japan’s war-timerecord, the prospects for greater East Asian

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cohesion and autonomy look rather dim.However, there are long-term underlyingnational and regional dynamics that mayundermine the US’s position and force anaccommodation with China. On the one hand, itis clear that there is significant popular concernin Japan itself about America’s role – somethinghighlighted by continuing tensions over thetroop deployments in Okinawa, deep divisionsover US pressures to deploy SDF in the MiddleEast war zone, and the popularity of nationalistpolitical figures. On the other, the sheermagnitude of the economic links and theexpanding personal interactions theynecessitate between China and Japan may becompelling a rapprochement between twopowers that simply cannot live without eachother [55] – despite the nationalistic bluster onboth sides. In this context it is significant thatbilateral relations have improved significantlysince Koizumi’s departure from office, withChina and Japan agreeing in principle to jointlydevelop disputed potential oil and gas depositsin the East China Sea. [56]

Elsewhere in the region American policygenerally and the ‘war on terror’ in particularhave eroded popular support for the U.S. evenmore dramatically.[57] That enthusiasm for theU.S. in Islamic Indonesia might plummet as aconsequence of the U.S.’s increasinglyunilateral, for-us-or-against-us policy stance inthe ‘war on terror’ is perhaps predictableenough. What is more surprising is that theU . S . ’ s f r e q u e n t l y h e a v y - h a n d e d ,uncompromising approach, when combined witha frequently unsophisticated understanding of,or apparent disregard for, Southeast Asia’sparticular difficulties, may actually haveencouraged further opposition to its policies.Moreover, there is a good deal of scepticismabout American policy in the region, even

amongst supporters of the war on terror, as USpolicy appears to be equally preoccupied withcountering Chinese influence in Southeast Asia– a concern that is not widely shared in theregion.[58]

The other issue that may be effectively creatinga divide, or at least a growing sense ofdifference, between the East Asian and NorthAmerica sides of the Asia-Pacific is the growingrealisation that, while the hub and spokesarchitecture that the U.S. continues to dominatemay further American grand strategy, it is notnecessarily helpful in resolving specific EastAsian problems or promoting greater regionalcooperation. As Muthiah Alagappa points out, itis striking that ‘the development of internationalsociety has made the greatest progress in asubregion - Southeast Asia - after Americandisengagement and has made much lessprogress in a subregion - Northeast Asia – wherethe United States has continued to be engagedmost heavily’.[59] Not only has Southeast Asiabeen able to foster a sense of regional identityin the absence of direct American engagement -with no obvious loss of security or stability - butAmerican policy has made little progress inresolving the East Asian region’s mostintractable and dangerous confrontation on theKorean peninsula. Indeed, Alagappa argues thatAmerican troop deployments across NortheastAsia may actually be making the resolution ofstand-offs in North Korea, and between Taiwanand China, more difficult to resolve. Like Kang,Alagappa concludes that ‘the consequences ofAmerican disengagement- may not be asdisastrous as posited’. [60]

Such a possibility is still quite unimaginable formany policymakers and commentators aroundthe region. Yet it is becoming increasingly lesscontroversial to suggest that China’s rise will

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inevitably draw Southeast and Northeast Asiainto ‘a single East Asia regional securitydynamic’. [61] If the ‘Korean problem’ can beresolved satisfactorily, if the status quo prevailsin relation to Taiwan, if Japan and the rest of theregion remain comfortable with the inevitabilityof a more powerful China and do not seek to‘balance’ its ascendancy in the manner muchWestern scholarship predicts – all clearly big‘ifs’ – then it is not obvious what justification orsupport there would be for continued Americantroop deployments across the region, or even asecurity architecture that continues to revolvearound Washington rather than Beijing. In suchcircumstances the Asia-Pacific would becomethe emptiest of signifiers, and the US would bedepr ived o f a potent ia l ly impor tantinstitutionalised link to the countries of EastAsia.

Confirmation that the idea of an Asia-Pacificregion as either a source of identity or as thebasis for regional, institutionalised cooperationmay be past its use by date can be found in therapid move toward greater regional cooperationalong East Asia lines. The emergence ofASEAN+3 is clearly the most potentiallyimportant initiative in this context, and it issignificant that its development has actuallybeen accelerated by American foreign policy.[62] Moreover, there are potentially enoughhistorical, political and economic commonalitiesacross the region to provide the basis for asense of common purpose and identity, [63] in away that APEC p la in ly has not . Morefundamentally, perhaps, in the all too likelyevent that ASEAN+3 fails replicate theEuropean experience and develop close, highlyinstitutionalised relationships, this does notimprove the prospects for ‘Asia-Pacific’ basedinstitutions or the inclusion of the US as aninstitutionalised part of East Asia. While sceptics

may be right to draw attention to the leadershipproblems faced by both Japan and China, thecomparatively modest levels of economicintegration in East Asia, and the continuingimportance of the United States strategicallyand economically, when seen in a longer timeframe it is the degree of change that hasalready occurred that is striking. Given theformidable obstacles East Asian cooperationfaces, the fact that any progress has been madeis remarkable, noteworthy, and of potentiallygreatest long-term significance.

Concluding remarks

The intrusive, heavy-handed and unilateral styleof the Bush administration made life difficult foreven the staunchest of allies, and made thecreation of regional mechanisms to off-setAmerican power more attractive; this was‘balancing’ of a sort, but its greatest long-termsignificance may prove to be that it ishappening through regionally based institutions,rather than individual states. Paradoxically,therefore, the legacy of the Bush administrationmay be that U.S foreign policy effectivelyundermined the multilateral, trans-nationalbasis of American power by encouraging thecreation of regionally based groupings withwhich to represent and protect local interests.Significantly, some of the most important recentinitiatives deliberately excluded the US as partof the emerging East Asian institutionalarchitecture. But this does not mean thatmultilateralism is necessarily in overall decline.On the contrary, the international system willcontinue to be distinguished by high-profile,multilateral regimes and institutions – like theWTO - that operate at the most encompassingof international levels, but they look likely to beincreasingly supplemented, if not opposed by,regionally based institutions and organisations.

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Two recent developments are l ikely todetermine the future of both the US’srelationship with East Asia and the course ofinstitutional development within the region;indeed, they are likely to determine how theregion is actually defined. These developmentsare, of course, the recent election of BarackObama and the economic crisis that had itsorigins in the US. At first blush we might expectthat the election of Obama might repair some ofthe damage inflicted by the Bush regime[64]—indeed, it is hard to imagine how theObama administration could be less effectivethan its predecessor. It is even possible that thenew administration could inject new life intomoribund organisations like APEC. After all,APEC ought to be well placed to provide abridge between the key actors on the unfoldingcrisis and economic management is supposedto be its raison d’être. To judge by APEC’shistorical record, however, it is unlikely to riseto the challenge without an unprecedentedinjection of enthusiasm on the US’s part.

But there is an even more fundamental reasonfor wondering whether even the Obamaadministration can—in the short term, atleast—restore the US’s standing in East Asia.One of the great ironies of the present situationis that the US—after many years of lecturingEast Asian el i tes about the supposedshortcomings of ‘crony capitalism’ and stateintervention—now finds itself at the epicentre ofa global economic crisis. At the very least, thelegit imacy and moral authority of the‘Washington consensus’ looks to be fatallydamaged. Not only is the US’s ideologicalinfluence likely to be diminished, but so, too, isits material importance to the region. East Asiawas already becoming less economicallydependent on the US; [65] the current crisis islikely to accelerate this process. It is not

unreasonable to assume that the US’s influenceover, and importance to, East Asia will continueto decline as a consequence of recent events.[66]

It is, however, far from clear whether China willbe able to play the sort of economic role thatthe US has done, much less act as a unifyingpolitical or ideological force in the region. Chinahas already been badly affected by the crisisand the portents are not good. [67] Whether itcan even maintain domestic stability isuncertain at this stage. If China’s developmentalproject is derailed by the current crisis then thismay well have negative consequences for anysort of regional initiatives, so there is little thatcan be usefully said about such a potentiallycataclysmic event. If China’s developmentcontinues, though, it is difficult to imagine aregional economic or political configurationwithout China at its centre. China’s enhancedeconomic importance will consequently makeEast Asian forms of political cooperation morecompelling—even for the likes of Japan. All otherthings being equal, therefore, if East Asiacontinues to collectively develop with China atits centre, it is difficult to see how this won’tencourage a consolidation of East Asianinstitutions. Whether they will be capable ofdealing with the intimidating range of problemsthe region faces is quite another question.

Mark Beeson is Professor and Head of theDepartment of Political Science &International Studies, The Universityof Birmingham.

His books include Regionalism andGlobalization in East Asia: Politics,Security and Economic Development(http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_

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b ? u r l = s e a r c h -a l i a s % 3 D s t r i p b o o k s & f i e l d -keywords=beeson%2C+regionalism%2C+globalization+and+east+asia&x=0&y=0 )

and Institutions of the Asia-Pacific:ASEAN, APEC, and Beyond (in press).

This is a revised, expanded andupdated version of an article thatappeared in Geopolitics. Posted atJapan Focus on January 10, 2009.

Recommended Citation: Mark Beeson,“East Asian Regionalism and the End of theAsia-Pacific: After American Hegemony” TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 10,2009.

Notes

[1] M. Beeson and I. Islam (2005) Neoliberalismand East Asia: Resisting the WashingtonConsensus’, Journal of Development Studies, 41(2): 197-219.

[2] B. Hettne and F. Soderbaum,‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’, NewPolitical Economy, 5: 3 (2000), pp.457-73.

[3] For a more detailed explanation ofthese positions, see M. Beeson (2006)‘American ascendancy: Conceptualisingcontemporary hegemony’, in Beeson, M(ed.), Bush and Asia: America’s EvolvingRelations with East Asia, (London:RoutledgeCurzon): 3-23.

[4] R. Gilpin, Robert (1981) War andChange in World Politics, (Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge).

[5] E. Adler and S. Bernstein (2005)‘Knowledge in Power: The EpistemicConstruction of Global Governance’, inBarnett, M and Duvall, R. (eds.), Power inGlobal Governance , (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press): 294-318.

[6] J.G. Ikenberry (1998), “Institutions,Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence oft h e A m e r i c a n P o s t w a r O r d e r ” ,International Security, Volume 23,Number 3, pp 43-78.

[7] R.W. Cox (1987), Production, Power,and World Order: Social Forces in theMaking of History, Columbia UniversityPress, New York

[8] J. Agnew and S. Corbridge (1995)Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territoryand International Political Economy,(London:Routledge).

[9] M. Beeson and R. Higgott (2005) Hegemony,institutionalism and US foreign policy: Theoryand practice in comparative historicalperspective’, Third World Quarterly, 26 (7):1173-88.

[10] A. Wyatt-Walter, ‘Regionalism,Globalization and World Economic Order’,in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds.)Regionalism in World Politics: RegionalOrganization and International Order(New York: Oxford University Press,1995), p. 77, emphasis in original.

[11] A. Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in TheoreticalPerspective’, in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell(eds.) Regionalism in World Politics:Regional Organization and International

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Order (New York: Oxford University Press,1995), p 4.

[12] See, M. Alagappa, ‘Asian practice ofSecurity: Key Features and Explanations',in M. Alagappa (ed.) Asian SecurityPractice: Material and IdeationalInfluences (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1998), pp. 611-76

[13] A. Acharya, Constructing a SecurityCommunity in Southeast Asia: ASEAN andthe Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001).

[14] S. Narine, ‘ASEAN into the Twenty-first Century: Problems and Prospects’,The Pacific Review, 12: 3 (1999), pp.357-80.

[15] P. Korhonen, ‘Monopolising Asia: ThePolitics of Metaphor’, The Pacific Review,10: 3 (1997), pp. 347-365.

[16] C. Dent, ‘Networking the Region? The Emergence and Impact of Asia-PacificBilateral Free Trade Agreement Projects’,The Pacific Review, 16: 1 (2003), pp. 1-28.

[17] See, M. Beeson (2007) Regionalism,Globalization and East Asia: Politics, Securityand Economic Development, (Basingstoke:Palgrave)

[18] R. Stubbs (2005) Rethinking Asia'sEconomic Miracle, (Basingstoke:Palgrave).

[19] C. Hemmer and P. J Katzenstein,‘Why is there no NATO in Asia? CollectiveIdentity, Regionalism and the Origins ofMul t i la tera l i sm’ , In ternat iona lOrganization, 56: 3 (2002), pp. 575-607; J.Joffe, ‘"Bismarck” or “Britain”? Toward an

American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity’,Foreign Affairs, 14: 4 (1995), pp. 94-117.

[20] M. Schaller, ‘Securing the GreatCrescent: Occupied Japan and the Originsof Containment in Southeast Asia’, Journalof American History, 69: 2 (1982), pp.392-414.

[21] W. Hatch and K. Yamamura, Asia inJapan’s Embrace: Building a RegionalProduction Al l iance (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[22] M. Beeson (2005) ‘Politics and markets inEast Asia: Is the developmental statecompatible with globalisation?’, in R. Stubbs andG. R.D. Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and

the Changing Global Order, 3rd Edition, (Ontario:Oxford University Press): 443-53.

[23] See, for example, Haggard, S. (2000) ThePolitical Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis,(Washington: Institute for InternationalEconomics).

[24] R. A. Higgott, ‘The Asian EconomicCr is is : A Study in the Pol i t ics ofResentment’, New Political Economy, 3:3(1998), pp. 333-56.

[25] W. Bello (1998) 'East Asia: On theEve of the Great Transformation?' Reviewof International Political Economy 5(3):424-444.

[26] M. Beeson (1999) ‘ReshapingRegional Institutions: APEC and the IMF inEast Asia’, The Pacific Review, 12 (1):1-24.

[27] P. Bowles, ‘Asia’s Post-CrisisRegionalism: Bringing the State Back in,Keeping the (United) States Out’, Review

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of International Political Economy, 9:2(2002), p. 245.

[28] T. Terada, ‘Constructing an “EastAsia” Concept and Growing RegionalIdentity: From EAEC to ASEAN+3’, ThePacific Review, 16:2 (2003), pp. 251-77.

[29] R. Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three:Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’, AsianSurvey, 42: 3 (2002), pp. 440-55.

[30] M. Beeson (2009) Institutions of theAsia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond,(London: Routledge).

[31] D. Webber (2001) ‘Two Funerals anda Wedding? The Ups and Downs ofRegionalism in East Asia and Asia-PacificAfter the Asian Crisis’, The Pacific Review,14 (3): 339-372

[32] It is widely acknowledged that it isunwise for small, developing economiesto open the i r cap i t a l accoun t sprematurely, before they have theregulatory capacity and capital markets tocope with such massive inflows andoutflows off capital. It is also recognisedthat this was precisely the policy that wasbeing encouraged by the US and the IFIsdespite the dangers. See, R. Wade (2001)‘The US Role in the Long Asian Crisis of1990-2000’, The Political Economy of theEast Asian Crisis and Its Aftermath: Tigersin Distress, Lukanskas, A. and Rivera-Batiz, F. (eds.), (Cheltenham: EdwardElgar): 195-226.

[33] H. Dieter and R. Higgott, ‘ExploringAlternative Theories of EconomicRegionalism: From Trade to Finance inAs ian Co-operat ion ’ , Rev iew o f

International Political Economy, 10:3(2003), pp. 430-454.

[34] S. N. Katada, ‘Japan and AsianMonetary Regionalisation: Cultivating aNew Regional Leadership after the AsiaFinancial Crisis’, Geopolitics, 7:1 (2002),p. 86.

[35] C.R Henning (2002) East AsianFinancial Cooperation, (Washington:Institute for International Economics).

[36] E.J. Lincoln (2004) East AsianEconomic Regionalism, (Washington:Brookings Institution): 194.

[37] T.J. Pempel, (2005) ‘Firebreak: EastAsia Institutionalizes Its Finances.’ Paperpresented to Regionalisation and theTaming of Globalization?, University ofWarwick, October: 2.

[38] J.A. Amyx (2004) ‘A regional bondmarket for East Asia? The evolvingpolitical dynamics of regional financialcooperation’, Pacific Economic Paper No342, (Canberra: Australia-Japan ResearchCentre): 8. In the same paper Amyx alsodetail the rapid development of a bondmarket in East Asia, something that couldhave a similarly long-term integrativeimpact.

[39] M.Beeson (2005) ‘Re-thinkingregionalism: Europe and East Asia incomparative historical perspective’,Journal of European Public Policy, 12 (6):969-85.

[40] Higgott, R. (2004) 'US foreign policy andthe "Securitization" of economic globalization',International Politics 41 (2): 147-175.

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[41] Joffe, ‘"Bismarck” or “Britain”?’, ‘(seen. 38 above)’.

[42] M. Mastanduno, ‘ IncompleteHegemony: The United States andSecurity Order in Asia’, in M. Alagappa(ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumentaland Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 200.

[43] G. Rozman (2004) Northeast Asia'sStunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust inthe Shadow of Globalisation, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).

[44] A. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’,International Security, 18:3 (1993/94), pp.5-33.

[45] T. Berger (2000) 'Set for stability?Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation inEast Asia', Review of International Studies26:405-428.

[46 ] S . Na r ine , 'ASEAN and theManagement of Regional Security', PacificAffairs, 71:2 (1998), pp. 195-214.

[47] T. Kivimaki, ‘The Long Peace ofASEAN’, Journal of Peace Research, 38: 1(2001), pp. 5-25.

[48] See, M. Beeson (2009) Institutions ofthe Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC andBeyond, (London: Routledge).

[49] S.W. Simon (2004) 'Southeast Asia:Back to the Future?' in Strategic Asia2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in thePursuit of Power, eds A.J. Tellis and M.Wills. Washington: National Bureau ofAsian Research:261-299.

[50] A. I. Johnston, ‘Socialization inInternational Institutions: The ASEAN Wayand International Relations Theory’, in G.J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds.)International Relations and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2003), pp. 107-62.

[51] David C. Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks’,International Security, 27:4 (2003), p. 66.

[52] D. Shambaugh (2004/05) ‘Chinaengages Asia’, International Security, 29(3): 64-99.

[53] I.J. Alastair (2003) ‘Is China a statusquo power?’, International Security, 27(4): 5-56

[54] G. McCormack (2004) 'RemilitarizingJapan', New Left Review 29:29-45

[55] H.W. French and N. Onishi (2005)‘Economic ties binding Japan to rivalChina’, The New York Times, October 31.

[56] The Economist (2008) ‘Profit overpatriotism’, June 21, p 83.

[57] PRC, Views of a Changing World 2003(Washington: Pew Research Centre,2003).

[58] J. Glassman, J. (2006) 'US foreign policy andthe war on terror in Southeast Asia', in G.Rodan, K. Hewison and R. Robison The PoliticalEconomy of South-East Asia: An Introduction,ed. 3rd edn. (Melbourne: Oxford UniversityPress), pp 219-237.

[59] M. Alagappa, ‘Managing AsianSecurity: Competition, Cooperation andEvolutionary Change’, in M. Alagappa

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(ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumentaland Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 594.

[60] Alagappa, ‘Managing Asian Security’,p. 599.

[61] Buzan and Waever, Regions andPowers, p. 129, ‘(see n. 10 above)’.

[62] M. Beeson (2003) ‘ASEAN Plus Threeand the rise of reactionary regionalism’,Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 (2): 251-68.

[63] Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three’, ‘(see n.57 above)’.

[64] T.J. Pempel, (2008) ‘How Bushbungled Asia: militarism, economicindifference and unilateralism have

weakened the United States across Asia’,The Pacific Review 21(5): 547-581.

[65] See J. Ravenhill (2008) ‘Trading outof crisis’, in A. MacIntyre, T.J. Pempel andJ. Ravenhill (eds.), Crisis As Catalyst:Asia's Dynamic Political Economy. (Ithaca:Cornell University Press): 140-63.

[66] See, M. Beeson (2008) ‘The United Statesand East Asia: The decline of long-distanceleadership?’, in Christopher M. Dent (ed.),China, Japan and Regional Leadership in EastAsia, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar): 229-46.

[67] Rachman, G. (2008) ‘China’s economy hitsthe wall’, Financial Times December 15.

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