e-voting status quo germany

08.02.2006 e-Voting: Status Quo Germany ulrichwiesner.de

e-Voting Status Quo Germany

Open Rights Group: Taking the lid off e-Voting

London, 08/02/2007

Ulrich Wiesner

08.02.2006 e-Voting: Status Quo Germany ulrichwiesner.de 2

Germany: Voting Computers

Permitted since 1999 Only certified vendor is Nedap

Sold 600 computers to City of Cologne in 1998

Other cities joined since then: Dortmund, Neuss, Cottbus, Koblenz

Covering 2’000 of 80’000 ballot offices

Hamburg decided to introduce Digital Pen in 10/2005 Based on Anoto Technology Prototype tested in 2005 Vendor selected in 01/2007

(Windows based system) IBM Germany announced to

develop a roll-in/roll-out offering (embedded Linux and Java)

Adds 1600 ballot offices at once

Circle size represents number of ballot offices using computers


Digital Pen

2D dot pattern, 90 dpi Dots are offset in 4 directions (up,

down, left, right) Pattern of 6x6 dots provide

coordinates for pen, Addresses* 436 squares of 2x2mm2

e.g. 20’000x20’000 km2

*)Anoto refers to 60M km2


Digital Pen

Pen with embedded scanner Paper contains dot pattern acting as a 2D bar code Pen recognises coordinates where it writes Electronic representation of marked areas is uploaded to computer and joined

with electronic voting form Paper ballot is put in ballot box

At end of election: Computer classifies electronic votes Ambiguously marked scans are presented to officials Classified votes are counted by computer

Inherent paper trail Kick-starts the re-count discussion

Is it acceptable to only count a random sample? Which sample size is required? How does a recount needs to be organised?

Hamburg plans to count paper ballots in 1.5% of the ballot offices. No recounts after first election.


Germany: e-Counting

Manual capture of paper ballots Barcode scanner (code next to chosen option on ballot paper) PC based entering via keyboard 4 eye principle

Used in local elections only Lacking appropriate legal basis No certification process

Southern Germany Baden-Würtemberg, Bayern, Hessen


Germany: Opposition

Little media coverage other than modernisation euphoria But detailled and frequent reports by Richard Sietmann in major

computer magazine (c’t) Other media picking up since Q4/2006

Election scrutiny 2005 Bundestag election challenged because of use of Nedaps

Violating election principles transparency and audit-ability Turned down in December 2006 Next step is constitutional court

2006 Cottbus major election challenged Turned down immediately

2006 On-line petition against voting computers Filed by Tobias Hahn, Berlin, Signed by 45’000+ people Pending with petition committee of the Bundestag

Chaos Computer Club, Berlin Involved in Nedap-Hack Active campaign supporting petition and scrutiny


Issues / To does

No national campaign Do we need one? Should it be European or national? Can existing organisations pick up? How can we maintain non-partisan character of the issue?

Digital pen adds new quality Technology requires research Security needs to be analysed Paper trail verification issues need to be understood Available knowledge on recounts need to be applied to German electoral system

Lack of awareness Many Politicians and Journalists still unaware of e-Voting and related issues Vendors still gets away with aim to provide the modern approach to elections Discussion needs to leave the IT corner

Efficiency of electoral systems? Does participation require more complex electoral systems and more frequent polls? Might/will drive purchase of e-Voting technology

08.02.2006 e-Voting: Status Quo Germany ulrichwiesner.de

Questions and Answershttp://ulrichwiesner.de


Germany: Election Organisation

Election Organisation National Electoral Act and Electoral Code provide framework National elections are supervised by Ministry of Interior Execution is with municipalities Costs are refunded to municipalities by a lump sum per voter

Use of technology Ministry of Interior is regulator (authorisation) Municipalities are free in decision if and what to use within regulatory

framework Voter registration

Law enforces that citizens register their residence with the municipality Voter register is prepared by municipality from residence register No requirement for voters to enrol in register No central registers for residence or voters on federal or state level Process is relatively incident free


Germany: Electoral System

National Parliament 2 votes: One for regional candidate, one for party in federal state

Parliaments of Federal States Typically 2 votes (candidate and party) or just one vote (party)

Regional Elections County, Municipality, (Major) System varies from state to state Often similar systems to national level Some states have complex electoral systems

E.g. Frankfurt: One vote for each seat (85) in the Council

Absentee voting Via mail on request


Germany: Remote e-voting

Late 1990‘s Significant effort in research, projects W.I.E.N, VoteRemote

05/2002: Minister of the Interior announces remote e-Voting for 2006 or 2010

10/2002 Parliament discusses remote e-Voting: supported by all 5 parties Perception that Germany is “behind” New channel in addition to ballot office and mail Hope that higher turnout can be achieved using internet voting Debate is focussed on if internet voting should be used to vote more

often (supported by Labour and Greens, opposed by Conservatives) Since 2004

Ministry of Interior considers internet voting to be appropriate for non-political elections only

Main concern is that secrecy of the vote can not be enforced


Black box voting

Hypothesis: Every electronic voting system

violates at least one of the three procedural election principles: Secrecy, Transparency, Verifiability

Every electronic voting system requires trust into vendor and operators

Trust is inappropriate measure to ensure election integrity

Secret? Transparent? Verifiable?

Black Box Voting Computer

Vote

Vote

Vote

Votes


Election Principles

Verifiability, transparency and secrecy ensure that elections are free, fair and general

free

equal

general

secret

in public auditable


2005 Election Scrutiny

Bundestag election, September 19th, 2005 Four e-Voting related complaints filed with scrutiny committee of the

parliament Federal Ministry of the Interior replied in May 2006:

No evidence of tampering, threads are hypothetical” Elections are still transparent and verifiable using Nedaps Nedaps can not be hacked because source code is private Manipulation is pointless because Nedaps are configured just before

election and hackers can’t know which party is on which button Election integrity is ensured by procedural framework

Bundestag rejected complaints on December 14th, 2006 Mainly follows arguments of Ministry of the Interior

Next step is Constitutional Court To be filed by 14/02/2007


Legal framework

Transparency and verifiability is substantial part of legal framework, but not repeated in context of e-Voting

Constitution (Grundgesetz )

Art . 20Democatric (transparent , in public )

Art . 38General, free, equal, secret

Art . 41Auditable , verifiable

Electoral Act (Bundeswahlgesetz )

§10Election committees act in public

§31Ballot is conducted in public

§35Use of voting machines is permitted

Electoral Code (Bundeswahlordnung )

§54Ballot is conducted and result

determined in public

§56Secrecy of ballot is mandatory

§67Result is determined immediately

after close of ballot

Parliament , 2/3

Parliament

Administration

Voting Machine Code (Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung )

Administration§1Use of voting machines requires

licence by Ministry of Interior

§2Licence requires

technical certification

§4Permission is required for use in

elections


Upcoming Elections

Germany No major computer based elections in 2007 Spring 2008 – Hessen and Nordrhein-Westfalen (Nedap) Spring 2008 – Hamburg (Digital Pen) Spring 2009 – European Parliament (Digital Pen?, Nedap) Autum 2009 – Bundestag (Digital Pen?, Nedap)

e-voting status quo germany

Documents

ballot paperpc

ballot officeshamburg

number of ballot offices

ballot boxat end of

voting computersfiled

bundestagchaos computer

online petition

petition committee