dred scott v sanford
DESCRIPTION
Famous Supreme Court CaseTRANSCRIPT
Casenotes: Constitutional Law Sullivan
Casenotes: Constitutional Law Sullivan Chapter 7 The PostCivil War Amendments and the "Incorporation" of Fundamental Rights
Copyright © 2013 CCH Incorporated or its affiliates
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Former slave (P) v. Administrator (D)
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
NATURE OF CASE: Action in trespass.
FACT SUMMARY: Dred Scott (P) claimed to have been freed
from his slave status by his travels to freestates with his
master, but Sanford (D) insisted Scott (P) could not bring a
federal court action pressing the point because former slaves
and their descendants are not "citizens."
RULE OF LAW Since they are not "citizens" in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution, blacks who
were slaves in this country, or who are the descendants of
such slaves, cannot bring suit in federal court.
FACTS: Dred Scott (P), a slave, was taken along on his
master's sojourns to the free state of Illinois and the free
part of the Missouri Territory (according to the Missouri
Compromise). It was after they returned to the slave state of
Missouri that the master died, and Sanford (D) became the
administrator of his estate. Scott (P) attempted to bring a
diversity action in federal court based on his claim that his
"residence" in the aforementioned free jurisdictions had
liberated him from his status as a slave. He was, he
insisted, thus properly considered a "citizen" of Missouri
and was therefore entitled to bring suit in federal court
against Sanford (D), who was a citizen of another state
(New York). Sanford (D) argued that a former slave could not be
considered a citizen of the United States or of Missouri. The
lower court agreed with him. Scott (P) appealed.
ISSUE: Can a former slave be a "citizen" so as to
qualify to bring an action in federal court?
HOLDING AND DECISION: (Taney, C.J.) No. Blacks who were
slaves in this country, or who are the descendants of such
slaves are, not "citizens" in the sense in which that word is
used in the Constitution and are thus not entitled to
maintain an action in federal court. A review of history
reveals quite readily that neither class of persons who had
been imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they
had become free or not, were acknowledged as part of the
"people" but were rather considered as mere property. They
simply were not among those who were "citizens" of the
several states when the Constitution was adopted, and that is
the time frame that must be utilized in determining who was
included as a "citizen" in the Constitution. Because he is
not a "citizen," Scott (P) cannot maintain this action.
DISSENT: (Curtis, J.) To determine whether individuals
who were free when the Constitution was adopted were
citizens, even though those individuals were the descendants
of slaves, the only necessary inquiry is whether those free
individuals were citizens of any of the States under the
Confederation at the time of the Constitution's adoption. It
is a fact that at the time the Articles of Confederation were
ratified, all free nativeborn inhabitants of five States
were citizens of those States, notwithstanding that they were
descended from African slaves. There is nothing in the
Constitution that deprived those who were citizens of the
United States at the time of its adoption of their
citizenship, especially given that those citizens established
the Constitution. The Constitution also contains nothing that
deprives nativeborn citizens of any State of their
citizenship. Finally, there is nothing in the Constitution
that empowers Congress to disenfranchise any State citizen of
that citizenship. Therefore, every free person born on the
soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force of
its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the
United States. This is also true of States that came into being
after the Constitution was adopted. When the Constitution was
framed, it was expected that some of the States would cede
their claims to what were then their territories, and that
those territories, and new States formed therefrom, would be
subject to the Constitution. Slavery itself is regulated by
municipal law, and the Framers, who recognized this, and who
knew that a slave was property only in those States where
laws so provided, intended that Congress in its discretion
would determine what regulations, if any, should be made
concerning slavery. This intent can be gleaned from the fact
the Constitution is silent as to the regulation of slavery,
and expresses no intent to interfere with or to displace
these principles. Finally, there is nothing in the
Constitution that supports the proposition that prohibiting
slave owners from bringing their slaves into a Territory
deprives the owners of their property without due process of
law.
ANALYSIS
The justices all knew this was a historically important case;
each one took the time to write an opinion. Besides the
primary opinion by Chief Justice Taney, there were six
concurring and two dissenting opinions. No longer doctrinally
important because of subsequent amendments to the
Constitution resolving of the slavery issues, this case still
serves as a prime example of the view that the Constitution,
as Chief Justice Taney put it, forever speaks "not only in
the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with
which it spoke when it came from the hands of the Framers."
It is a view that has been roundly criticized as too rigid
and formalistic an approach to take toward a document that
must be flexible enough to provide effective and operable
guidelines and governing principles for an everevolving
society.
Quicknotes
ACTION OF TRESPASS An action to recover damages
resulting from the wrongful interference with a party's
person, property or rights.
DIVERSITY ACTION An action commenced by a citizen of
one state against a citizen of another state or against an
alien, involving an amount in controversy set by statute,
over which the federal court has jurisdiction.
Casenotes: Constitutional Law Sullivan
Casenotes: Constitutional Law Sullivan Chapter 7 The PostCivil War Amendments and the "Incorporation" of Fundamental Rights
Copyright © 2013 CCH Incorporated or its affiliates
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Former slave (P) v. Administrator (D)
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
NATURE OF CASE: Action in trespass.
FACT SUMMARY: Dred Scott (P) claimed to have been freed
from his slave status by his travels to freestates with his
master, but Sanford (D) insisted Scott (P) could not bring a
federal court action pressing the point because former slaves
and their descendants are not "citizens."
RULE OF LAW Since they are not "citizens" in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution, blacks who
were slaves in this country, or who are the descendants of
such slaves, cannot bring suit in federal court.
FACTS: Dred Scott (P), a slave, was taken along on his
master's sojourns to the free state of Illinois and the free
part of the Missouri Territory (according to the Missouri
Compromise). It was after they returned to the slave state of
Missouri that the master died, and Sanford (D) became the
administrator of his estate. Scott (P) attempted to bring a
diversity action in federal court based on his claim that his
"residence" in the aforementioned free jurisdictions had
liberated him from his status as a slave. He was, he
insisted, thus properly considered a "citizen" of Missouri
and was therefore entitled to bring suit in federal court
against Sanford (D), who was a citizen of another state
(New York). Sanford (D) argued that a former slave could not be
considered a citizen of the United States or of Missouri. The
lower court agreed with him. Scott (P) appealed.
ISSUE: Can a former slave be a "citizen" so as to
qualify to bring an action in federal court?
HOLDING AND DECISION: (Taney, C.J.) No. Blacks who were
slaves in this country, or who are the descendants of such
slaves are, not "citizens" in the sense in which that word is
used in the Constitution and are thus not entitled to
maintain an action in federal court. A review of history
reveals quite readily that neither class of persons who had
been imported as slaves nor their descendants, whether they
had become free or not, were acknowledged as part of the
"people" but were rather considered as mere property. They
simply were not among those who were "citizens" of the
several states when the Constitution was adopted, and that is
the time frame that must be utilized in determining who was
included as a "citizen" in the Constitution. Because he is
not a "citizen," Scott (P) cannot maintain this action.
DISSENT: (Curtis, J.) To determine whether individuals
who were free when the Constitution was adopted were
citizens, even though those individuals were the descendants
of slaves, the only necessary inquiry is whether those free
individuals were citizens of any of the States under the
Confederation at the time of the Constitution's adoption. It
is a fact that at the time the Articles of Confederation were
ratified, all free nativeborn inhabitants of five States
were citizens of those States, notwithstanding that they were
descended from African slaves. There is nothing in the
Constitution that deprived those who were citizens of the
United States at the time of its adoption of their
citizenship, especially given that those citizens established
the Constitution. The Constitution also contains nothing that
deprives nativeborn citizens of any State of their
citizenship. Finally, there is nothing in the Constitution
that empowers Congress to disenfranchise any State citizen of
that citizenship. Therefore, every free person born on the
soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force of
its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the
United States. This is also true of States that came into being
after the Constitution was adopted. When the Constitution was
framed, it was expected that some of the States would cede
their claims to what were then their territories, and that
those territories, and new States formed therefrom, would be
subject to the Constitution. Slavery itself is regulated by
municipal law, and the Framers, who recognized this, and who
knew that a slave was property only in those States where
laws so provided, intended that Congress in its discretion
would determine what regulations, if any, should be made
concerning slavery. This intent can be gleaned from the fact
the Constitution is silent as to the regulation of slavery,
and expresses no intent to interfere with or to displace
these principles. Finally, there is nothing in the
Constitution that supports the proposition that prohibiting
slave owners from bringing their slaves into a Territory
deprives the owners of their property without due process of
law.
ANALYSIS
The justices all knew this was a historically important case;
each one took the time to write an opinion. Besides the
primary opinion by Chief Justice Taney, there were six
concurring and two dissenting opinions. No longer doctrinally
important because of subsequent amendments to the
Constitution resolving of the slavery issues, this case still
serves as a prime example of the view that the Constitution,
as Chief Justice Taney put it, forever speaks "not only in
the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with
which it spoke when it came from the hands of the Framers."
It is a view that has been roundly criticized as too rigid
and formalistic an approach to take toward a document that
must be flexible enough to provide effective and operable
guidelines and governing principles for an everevolving
society.
Quicknotes
ACTION OF TRESPASS An action to recover damages
resulting from the wrongful interference with a party's
person, property or rights.
DIVERSITY ACTION An action commenced by a citizen of
one state against a citizen of another state or against an
alien, involving an amount in controversy set by statute,
over which the federal court has jurisdiction.