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Why did Oslo fail?

Ever since the 1967 war, nearly every single US President has had a plan to resolve the conflict between the

Palestinians and the Israelis. But the sequels to a war which only lasted 6 days, had yet to finish. The

Palestinian-Israeli conflict originated in 1948, when the Israeli state was founded, and as such, the peace plans

are still in full throttle. The consequences of the 6 day war, when Israel occupied Gaza, the Sinai, east

Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, have resulted in an on-going peace process in which the Oslo accords onlyform one part. (Jones, D (1999). p 52.) However this is not to say that some facets of the conflict in all of its

senses (whether the Arab-Israeli conflict or notably the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) have not been resolved, for

example the Jordanian-Israeli Peace agreement at a diplomatic levels has fostered warm relations. (Golan, G

(2007) p1.)

This paper will, after describing the elements to the lengthy Oslo accords, pin down the different facets

which exacerbated mistrust and ultimately brought the peace process to a standstill. It will also explain what

brought Oslo to its supposed dead end. Many people have adhered to one of two different frameworks to

analyse the failure of the Oslo process, Jonathan Rynhold states that there is a Liberalist framework and a

Realist framework. The Accords in themselves according to the liberalist point of view promoted a great

opportunity for mature political relations. The liberals believe that what really failed was the negotiatorsbehaviour and their failure to implement the accords properly. The realist approach however, believes that there

were intrinsic constraints in the process and that the two parties ideologies were not compatible. (Rynhold, J.

(2008 March). The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?. Mideast Security

and Policy Studies. I (No. 76), p5-26.) However both these views fail to consider the fact that the wording, actors

and length of these accords each exacerbated difficulties in the negotiations. Even if each political party had

their own agendas, Jews and Palestinians had been living alongside each other not long before and peace was

the ultimate solution for the everyday citizen.

The interim periods of the accords 5 years; during this 5 year period the Oslo accords were drawn up

which in its-self defines the long drawn out framework of these accords1. Even though this period was meant for

gradual integration of the communities, it allowed for deadlines that might not be met, constant amendments tothe accords and in some cases, failure to implement them.The 1992 elections which brought Yitzhak Rabin and

the Labour party back to power in the 1992 election, paving the way to Oslo - he used the term window of

opportunity for peace . (Golan, G (2007). p1.) The idea behind the interim period was the concept that the two

conflicting sides were not yet ready for a full peace agreement, and that there was a need for an interim report. If

these two mediating sides had agreed to come to a peaceful solution- in actual fact there would have been no

need for an interim period because the economic integration and land settlements could have been done in a

shorter amount of time.

Rabins Labour party government was advocating a land for peace and - the first Intifada arose at the

same time aided by the support of the public and global sympathy, which led the Israelis to view the crisis as

ever dynamic and in search for a conclusion. This shows that the Israeli government at the time was keen tobring the process to a conclusion just as much as the Palestinians were. The occupation by the Israelis in Gaza

could not be expected to continue without a cry for freedom on the Palestinian side. It seems that the ideology

was flawed and that some Jews view of Zionism was of an Israeli (Jewish State) without Palestinians having the

right to return. This Jewish ideology is flawed because it contemplates no change despite an understanding of

the deep rooted view of the Palestinians. However this did not mean that the Israeli Labour party did not want to

see peace but this does show that there were inherent conflicting ideologies on both sides (Golan, G (2007) .

p11.)

11. The letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO 9, 10 and September 1993. 2.

Declaration of Principles on interim Self-Government Arrangement (Oslo I) -13 September 1993. 3.{Paris} Protocol on Economic Relations -29 April 1994. 4. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powersand Responsibilities- 29 August 1994 (additional agreement 28 august 1995). 5. Israeli-PalestinianInterim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II)-28

thSeptember 1995. 6. Protocol

concerning the Redeployment in Hebron- 15 January 1996. 7. Wye River Memorandum- 23 October 1998.Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum-4

thSeptember 1999.

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The ambiguity of expressions used in the this 5 year interim period did not aid with the negation of these

accords either, words like just and mutual legitimate and political rights instead of national rights were used

all aiding in perverting the peace process. This meant that more often than not the interpretation of these

agreements was more of an issue than implementation. And although these DOPs (declaration of principles)

were set to last 5 years because the Israelis in the past had been known to drag out peace negotiations, there

was no absolute guarantee that there would be a final agreement reached by both parties, and the already

established Israeli state was certainly in more of a regionally secure position. The process of Palestinian self-

Government was to be set in stages - first the delegations of governing powers would be transferred to the

Palestinians; secondly the transfer of some sort of civil authority e.g. taxes etc. Thirdly the gradual

implementation of election procedures. And finally fourthly the most important factor which should have been

resolved more promptly was the issue of refugees, settlements, security and borders.

Examples of how the wording of each accord meant different things to different parties can be seen in

(Article IV) which stipulated that all the territories of Gaza and the West Bank were to be governed by the same

governing body. It was aimed to prevent annexations by the Israelis through road buildings and settlements. But

the Israeli foreign minister at the time interpreted the West Bank as disputed territory and this did not

necessarily mean withdrawal from all the West Bank. (Golan, G (2007) p18.)

Out of all the parts of these accords the most important one was quite appropriately the first, theestablishment of mutual recognition between the Israelis and Palestinians. These are of historical significance

because it was the first time the modern Israeli State had even accepted the existence of such a state. Arafat

had accepted that Israel had the right to exist and have its own security. Territory lost in 1967, in signing these

agreements only secured the right to have the lands lost in 1967 returned and not the whole of Israel. Israel only

recognised the PLO as representing a people and not merely a refugee population and no longer denied that

they didnt have a right to their own state.

Dan Rabinowitz who follows the views of Edward Said, believes that despite the accords the West had a

different view on the Middle East, that democratization was not going to sweep across the east, and that the

Accords were inherently flawed as these conflicting narratives and premium of peace were set first, (Dan

Rabinowitz you feel However if it was only because of the communicators inabilities to reach a conclusion tothese accords, it does not mean that the accords were inherently flawed, because by nature the accords had

good intentions and if they had been implemented either more quickly or with greater willingness on both sides,

perhaps these accords would not have reached such a bleak deadlock. (Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated

Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process Revisited. Chicago Journals.

31 (No 2), p. 505-511.)

Five years ago, Yitzhak Rabin brought peace to Israel." This statement was issued by the organisers of

the Pace Now campaign which took place September 12th

1997 in the Israeli capital. Peace had existed to a

greater extent before the Oslo accords, which lies in the simple fact that since 1993, more Israelis had suffered

at the hands of terror than a decade prior. (2007). Oslo, The Oslo Accords. Available:

http://www.peacefaq.com/oslo.html. Last accessed 12/11/2012.)

The Paris Protocol was a good initiative of economic integration; whose theory was to foster over time

more healthy relations between the two groups. It established connections of taxes. However the following

agreements, Gaza Strip-Jericho Area Agreement 4 May 1994. The Preparatory Transfer of Powers and

Responsibilities 29 August 1994 did not constitute as a part of the DOP and were primarily the result of delays,

disagreements and haggling over the implementation process. The Gaza Jericho agreement for example was

probably in retaliation against the Hamas Jihad attacks after the signing of the DOP.( Shomali Qustandi. L'accord

et le dsaccord dans les textes d'Oslo. In: Mots, mars 1997, N50. pp. 8-22)

Oslo I and Oslo II in them-selves were good ideas, because they saw popular support to these

provisions and fostered hundreds of joint projects at a grassroots level, such as the sharing of pre-schools andjoint business ventures. Unfortunately groups mentioned before such as Hamas were viewed by the Jewish

state as part of the Palestinian nostalgia for a people search of identity and therefore constituting them not being

ready for peace. However it is true that Oslo II did not mean Israel had lost any control over some of these

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territories. In addition to this this short period of time actually saw the expansion of Israeli settlements to that

which had been agreed upon, and an increase of military check points, settler violence on the Israeli side had

also occurred - 29 Muslims died at the mosque of Hebron by the hands of Baruch Goldstein and Israeli

extremist. This decade also saw the advanced militarization of Israel Dan Rabinowitz states the following While

the IDF had been careful not to become embroiled in party politics or in direct power brokerage, it nevertheless

became involved in geopolitics through its interpretation of the Oslo process in ways hitherto unknown. This was

complicated further by the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in July 2000. (Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated

Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process Revisited. Chicago Journals.

31 (No 2), p. 505-511.)

This middle period of the Oslo accords saw a considerable breakdown of trust between the two parties,

which were consequently worsened when after the assassination of Rabin and the Israeli withdrawals from

occupied territories with Jihad attacks which killed an estimated 64 people in 1996, the peace plans were

essentially brought to a standstill and from then on commitment to the plan on the Israeli had severely worsened.

The The Hebron Protocol was intended by Benyamin Netanyahu (the newly elected Israeli Prime minister), to

resume commitment to the on-going peace process, with the support of the USA, and the Oslo accords. The

intervention of King Hussein of Jordan brought about the signing of this document on 17 January. The principles

of the (Hebron Protocol?) accord were to increase international presence in the region through the

implementation of Temporary International Presence (TIPH). This finally led to the presence of International

troops; this is of significant historical value seeing as it was the first right wing government had given away land

of what it considered to be Eretz-Isreal to the Palestinians. However even though the Israelis did withdraw from

about 80% of Hebron - again there was a unwillingness to comply with other stipulated accords such as the safe

passage of return for Palestinians and the settlements in West bank, which continued to increase, as they are

still doing today. (Golan, G (2007) P24.)

For Netanyahus sake, he did continue discussions on settlements, although contradicting himself with

regard to some of the occupied territories return, and continuing with the building of more settlements, he did

agree with the peace process. Interestingly enough, he did state at times that the Oslo accords were based on a

flawed plan. The Netanyahu period, without taking into account the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River

Accords, showed the diminished work at peacekeeping which therefore intensified the gap of relations between

the two parties. For example Nabil Shaath, blamed Netanyahu for the failure of Camp David II in July 2000,

because he broke negotiation practices, which although were very fragile at the time, had not yet ceased to

exist. (Mara Mercedes Guzmn Almansa. (2011). Anlisis del fracaso del proceso de paz de oslo entre Israel y

el pueblo Palestino desde el punto de vista religioso: casos Gush Emunim y Hammas. 1993 2000. Relaciones

Internacionales Bogot d.c., 2011. I, p 9-50.)

In Conclusion, the failure of the Oslo accords does adhere to the liberalist point of view in the sense that

the constant change of Israeli leadership daw different parties personal interests, putting constraints on how the

accords were to be implemented. The realist point of view also has its legitimacy in that the Ideology of Zionism

was in direct opposition to the will of the Palestinians, namely being a Palestinian state. However this negate the

fact that during the interim period there was great integration at a grass-roots level which could have continued

had the accords been implemented and finalized more rapidly. The Oslo accords were the most practical

approach to the peace-making at the time, but the extremist groups such as Hammas, the political parties

leaders blessed with the roles of negotiating peace also precipitated these negotiations to become ever more

wild and lead to failure. Arafat did not do himself any favours by supporting the Iraq invasion of Kuwait during the

Gulf crisis which angered many of the Arab States. The lengthy drawn out period of these accords made the

process last until 2000 and not 1998, and even then peace had not been achieved. Since then we have an

increase in Israeli settlements and the death toll increase on both sides. Hopefully the recent return of suicide

bombers in 2012 by the Israeli government, with see further cooperation between the two sides, and this conflict

will be able to reach a positive conclusion.

Wordcount excluding references and quotes: 2191

References

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Mara Mercedes Guzmn Almansa. (2011). Anlisis del fracaso del proceso de paz de oslo entre Israel y el pueblo

Palestino desde el punto de vista religioso: casos Gush Emunim y Hammas. 1993 2000. Relaciones Internacionales

Bogot d.c., 2011. I, p 9-50.

Jones, D (1999). Cosmopolitan mediation? Conflict resolution and the Oslo Accords. Manchester: Manchester

University Press. 52.

Golan, G (2007). Israel and Palestine Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement. Princeton: Markus

Wiener Publishers. p1.

Dan Rabinowitz. (2005). Belated Occupation, Advanced Militarization: Edward Said's Critique of the Oslo Process

Revisited. Chicago Journals. 31 (No 2), p. 505-511.

Rynhold, J. (2008 March). The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?. Mideast

Security and Policy Studies. I (No. 76), p5-26.

Shomali Qustandi. L'accord et le dsaccord dans les textes d'Oslo. In: Mots, mars 1997, N50. pp. 8-22.:

10.3406/mots.1997.2302 Availible:http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/mots_0243-

6450_1997_num_50_1_2302

(2007). Oslo, The Oslo Accords. Available: http://www.peacefaq.com/oslo.html. Last accessed 12/11/2012.